DOCSLIB.ORG

Preserving Location Proximity

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Preserving Location Proximity Scalable Decentralized Privacy- Preserving Location Proximity Alexander. M. Bergersen Department of Computer Science CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG Gothenburg, Sweden 2017 Scalable Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Location Proximity Alexander M. Bergersen Department of Computer Science Chalmers University of Technology University of Gothenburg Gothenburg, Sweden 2017 1 Scalable Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Location Proximity. ALEXANDER M. BERGERSEN © ALEXANDER M. BERGERSEN, 2017 Department of Computer Science Chalmers University of Technology University of Gothenburg SE-412 96 Gothenburg Sweden Telephone + 46 (0)31-772 1000 Department of Computer Science Gothenburg, Sweden 2017 2 Abstract This report is the report of a Master Thesis carried out at Chalmers University of Technology by me, Alexander Bergersen. The aim of the Master Thesis was to introduce authentication into decentralized privacy-preserving location proximity without adversely hampering the scalability of such protocols further. This was done by creating two solutions that slightly modified the behavior of a location proximity protocol called “InnerCircle”. The first solution, called the Gossiping solution, tries to introduce authentication by having the base network be an unstructured distributed network where each client substitutes as an authentication authority for each of the clients connected to it, viewed as its neighbors. This solution assumes a majority honest network where each vote of authenticity from each neighbor carries equal weight. The second solution develops the first one by going in a different direction and uses an Identity Based Encryption system with distributed key generation as the basis. Instead of proving authentication it hides information from those not authorized to see it. However, even though the second solution is based on the first one, they are different enough that instead of the testing each solution and showing the progress, the solutions are compared as to which one is better and most fulfill the aim of not adversely affecting the performance of the underlying protocol, InnerCircle, the best. The test results are presented to the reader for each of three cases, baseline, first solution, second solution, in tables and the data is analyzed. This analysis showed that the Gossiping solution without the Identity Based Encryption will eventually always outperform the second solution, even if the Identity Based solution was developed with the goal of performing better than the Gossiping solution. Keywords: Location Proximity, InnerCircle, Decentralized Cryptography, Distributed Systems 3 Table of Contents Abstract ..............................................................................................................................................0 1.Introduction .....................................................................................................................................6 1.1 Structure ...................................................................................................................................6 2. Theory ............................................................................................................................................8 2.1 Distributed Systems ..................................................................................................................9 2.1.1 Content Addressable Network(CAN) ................................................................................. 11 2.2 Cryptography .......................................................................................................................... 13 2.2.1 Public-key Cryptography ................................................................................................... 13 2.2.2 Location Proximity ............................................................................................................ 16 2.2.3 Secure Multiparty Computation ........................................................................................ 16 2.2.4 InnerCircle ........................................................................................................................ 17 2.3 Elliptic Curves .......................................................................................................................... 19 2.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC) ............................................................................................. 22 2.4.1 Elliptic Curve ElGamal ....................................................................................................... 23 2.5 Identity based encryption(IBE) ................................................................................................ 24 2.5.1 Boneh and Franklin IBE ..................................................................................................... 24 2.5.2 Distributed Identity based encryption ............................................................................... 26 3. Problems and Approach ................................................................................................................ 28 3.1 Challenges ............................................................................................................................... 29 3.1.1 Confidentiality Challenge .................................................................................................. 29 3.1.2 Scaling Challenge .............................................................................................................. 30 3.1.3 The Research Question ..................................................................................................... 31 3.2 Approach ................................................................................................................................ 31 3.2.1 Distributed Systems .......................................................................................................... 31 3.2.2 Cryptography .................................................................................................................... 32 3.2.3 Research method ............................................................................................................. 32 4. Solutions ....................................................................................................................................... 33 4.1 Gossiping ................................................................................................................................ 34 4.1.1 The Idea ........................................................................................................................... 34 4.1.2 How it works .................................................................................................................... 34 4.1.3 What problems does it solve? ........................................................................................... 38 4.1.4 The changes to InnerCircle for the solution ....................................................................... 39 4.1.5 Suggested Implementation ............................................................................................... 39 4.1.6 Security Considerations .................................................................................................... 42 4.2 Cryptography .......................................................................................................................... 45 4 4.2.1 The Idea ........................................................................................................................... 45 4.2.2 How it works .................................................................................................................... 46 4.2.3 What problems does it solve? ........................................................................................... 48 4.2.4 The changes to InnerCircle for the solution ....................................................................... 48 4.2.5 Possible Implementation .................................................................................................. 48 4.2.6 Security Considerations .................................................................................................... 48 5. Testing and Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 51 5.1 Testing .................................................................................................................................... 52 5.1.1 Testing Method ................................................................................................................ 52 5.1.2 Results.............................................................................................................................. 52 5.2 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 60 6. Future ........................................................................................................................................... 61 6.1 Future Work ............................................................................................................................ 62 7. Ethical and Social considerations ................................................................................................... 63 7.1 Possible social impact of location proximity ............................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • CEH: Certified Ethical Hacker Course Content
    CEH: Certified Ethical Hacker Course ID #: 1275-100-ZZ-W Hours: 35 Course Content Course Description: The Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) program is the core of the most desired information security training system any information security professional will ever want to be in. The CEH, is the first part of a 3 part EC-Council Information Security Track which helps you master hacking technologies. You will become a hacker, but an ethical one! As the security mindset in any organization must not be limited to the silos of a certain vendor, technologies or pieces of equipment. This course was designed to provide you with the tools and techniques used by hackers and information security professionals alike to break into an organization. As we put it, “To beat a hacker, you need to think like a hacker”. This course will immerse you into the Hacker Mindset so that you will be able to defend against future attacks. It puts you in the driver’s seat of a hands-on environment with a systematic ethical hacking process. Here, you will be exposed to an entirely different way of achieving optimal information security posture in their organization; by hacking it! You will scan, test, hack and secure your own systems. You will be thought the Five Phases of Ethical Hacking and thought how you can approach your target and succeed at breaking in every time! The ve phases include Reconnaissance, Gaining Access, Enumeration, Maintaining Access, and covering your tracks. The tools and techniques in each of these five phases are provided in detail in an encyclopedic approach to help you identify when an attack has been used against your own targets.
    [Show full text]
  • Fbi Fbi Flash
    TLP: GREEN FBI FLASH FBI FBI Liaison Alert System #M-000045-TT The following information was obtained through FBI investigation and is provided in conjunction with the FBI’s statutory requirement to conduct victim notification as outlined in 42 USC § 10607. In furtherance of public-private partnerships, the FBI routinely advises private industry of various cyber threat indicators observed during the course of our investigations. This data is provided in order to help cyber security professionals and systems administrators to guard against the persistent malicious actions of cyber criminals. This product is released at TLP: GREEN. The information in this product is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector. Recipients may share this information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels. SUMMARY The FBI is providing the following information with HIGH confidence: A group of cyber actors utilizing infrastructure located in Iran have been conducting computer network exploitation activity against public and private U.S. organizations, including Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs), academic institutions, and energy sector companies. The actors typically utilize common computer intrusion techniques such as the use of TOR, open source reconnaissance, exploitation via SQL injection and web shells, and open source tools for further network penetration and persistence. Internet-facing infrastructures, such as web servers, are typical targets for this group. Once the actors penetrate a victim network, the actors exfiltrate network design information and legitimate user credentials for the victim network. Often times, the actors are able to harvest administrative user credentials and use the credentials to move laterally through a network.
    [Show full text]
  • Analysis and Processing of Cryptographic Protocols
    Analysis and Processing of Cryptographic Protocols Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Bachelor of Science (Honours) of Rhodes University Bradley Cowie Grahamstown, South Africa November 2009 Abstract The field of Information Security and the sub-field of Cryptographic Protocols are both vast and continually evolving fields. The use of cryptographic protocols as a means to provide security to web servers and services at the transport layer, by providing both en- cryption and authentication to data transfer, has become increasingly popular. However, it is noted that it is rather difficult to perform legitimate analysis, intrusion detection and debugging on data that has passed through a cryptographic protocol as it is encrypted. The aim of this thesis is to design a framework, named Project Bellerophon, that is capa- ble of decrypting traffic that has been encrypted by an arbitrary cryptographic protocol. Once the plain-text has been retrieved further analysis may take place. To aid in this an in depth investigation of the TLS protocol was undertaken. This pro- duced a detailed document considering the message structures and the related fields con- tained within these messages which are involved in the TLS handshake process. Detailed examples explaining the processes that are involved in obtaining and generating the var- ious cryptographic components were explored. A systems design was proposed, considering the role of each of the components required in order to produce an accurate decryption of traffic encrypted by a cryptographic protocol. Investigations into the accuracy and the efficiency of Project Bellerophon to decrypt specific test data were conducted.
    [Show full text]
  • Download CVS 1.11.1P1-3 From: Ftp://Ftp.Software.Ibm.Com/Aix/Freesoftware/Aixtoolbox/RPMS/Ppc/Cvs/ Cvs-1.11.1P1-3.Aix4.3.Ppc.Rpm
    2003 CERT Advisories CERT Division [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited distribution. http://www.sei.cmu.edu REV-03.18.2016.0 Copyright 2017 Carnegie Mellon University. All Rights Reserved. This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0002 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. The view, opinions, and/or findings contained in this material are those of the author(s) and should not be con- strued as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other documentation. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trade mark, manu- facturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by Carnegie Mellon University or its Software Engineering Institute. This report was prepared for the SEI Administrative Agent AFLCMC/AZS 5 Eglin Street Hanscom AFB, MA 01731-2100 NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribu- tion. Please see Copyright notice for non-US Government use and distribution.
    [Show full text]
  • Data Acquisition Systems), Section 1
    INST 260 (Data Acquisition systems), section 1 Lab Data acquisition and transport over Ethernet: Question 91, completed objectives due by the end of day 6, section 3 Exam Day 6 of section 3 – only a simple calculator may be used! Complete mastery of these objectives due by the next exam date Specific objectives for the “mastery” exam: Electricity Review: Calculate and annotate voltages and currents in a DC series-parallel resistor circuit • given source and resistor values Sketch proper wire connections for a data acquisition unit to measure an analog sensor signal • Convert between different numeration systems (decimal, binary, hexadecimal, octal) • Calculate ADC (analog-digital converter) input and output values given calibrated ranges • Solve for a specified variable in an algebraic formula • Determine the possibility of suggested faults in a simple circuit given measured values (voltage, current), • a schematic diagram, and reported symptoms Motor/relay/3phase/PLC Review: Determine status of a relay logic circuit given a schematic diagram • and switch stimulus conditions INST241 Review: Identify (American) wire colors for different thermocouple types • INST250 Review: Convert between different pressure units (PSI, ”W.C., bar, etc.) showing proper • mathematical cancellation of units (i.e. the “unity fraction” technique) Recommended daily schedule Day 1 Theory session topic: Signal coupling, shielding, and wiring practices Questions 1 through 20; answer questions 1-9 in preparation for discussion (remainder for practice) Day 2 Theory session
    [Show full text]
  • Sicheres Coworking in Zeiten Von Corona
    Sicheres Coworking in Zeiten von Corona Ein Leitfaden von PwC Cyber Security & Privacy 20. März 2020 Herausforderungen Pandemie Sicherheit Viele Unternehmen stehen auf Grund der aktuellen Ad-hoc aufgebaute Strukturen sind anders als die etablierten Strukturen Bedrohungslage von Covid-19 vor der Herausforderung, nicht auf Sicherheitslücken getestet und bergen damit nicht zu ihre Mitarbeiter remote anzubinden. unterschätzende Risiken in Bezug auf Datenschutz und Datensicherheit. Infrastruktur Lösung Üblicherweise sind die Infrastrukturen von Firmen nicht auf die Dieser Leitfaden soll Sie Anbindung aller Mitarbeiter an das Firmennetz ausgelegt. unterstützen, die richtige Eine Möglichkeit zur Fortführung der Tätigkeiten der Mitarbeiter Coworking Lösung für Ihr muss schnellstmöglich zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Unternehmen zu finden. Sicheres Coworking in Zeiten von Corona 20. März 2020 PwC Cyber Security & Privacy 2 Risiken, Prioritäten und Compliance Risiken bei der Bereitstellung von Ad-hoc Lösungen Auslastung Monitoring Nachvollziehbarkeit Evtl. sehr hohe Auslastung Verlagerung der Prioritäten Fehlende Koordination und von IT-Services, IT-Infrastruktur, innerhalb der IT-Organisation mangelhafte Kommunikationswege. Bandbreiten durch vermehrte und dadurch fehlendes oder Fehlender Fokus auf die Remote-Zugriffe auf das unzureichendes Monitoring von Dokumentation der Implementierung Unternehmensnetzwerk. Sicherheitsvorfällen. von Ad-hoc Lösungen. Fokus auf der Bereitstellung von Services, nicht auf Funktions- und Sicherheitstests vor Inbetriebnahme.
    [Show full text]
  • ZERO TRACE DARKNET CARDER's GUIDE Table of Contents Introduction 2 Security 2 Spoofing
    ZERO TRACE DARKNET CARDER'S GUIDE Table of Contents Introduction 2 Security 2 Spoofing Spoofing Software 11 Other Factors 23 A brief overview about carding 35 How to organize your Illegal data 36 Checking Cards like a Pro AVS and BINs 38 39 Sourcing Fullz@ JayFountains 41 Personal Bank Drops Business Bank account 42 52 3Dsecure Phone carding 52 Mobile carding 63 Physical items carding 64 66 Digital items carding Self-carding: Stripe 66 PayPal 68 How to process carded PayPal transfers 70 Venmo 77 86 Final words 98 100 1 Introduction Thanks for putting you trust on me I’m 100% confident this guide will be a HUGE time saver, especially for a newbie rand above all,, if you actually put the effort, will make you a ton of money THIS GUIDE IS FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. Security ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE@ JayFountains TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ ★ PURCHASE TO UNLOCK ★ 2 Hardware: you will require a burner laptop, avoid at cost desktop pcs, as you can` t bring them with you, plus if there is a raid going on from LE, you will find it harder to get rid of it/hide it. Here are the general specs that you will need to work proficiently: a minimum of a 6GB laptop will be enough to handle all the apps and processes running into the VM. I personally have a refunded Alienware 17, that`s kind of expensive though in general, you can find the same specs for a much lower price.
    [Show full text]
  • Secure Communication: Is It Possible with SSL and Or SSH?
    Secure Communication: Is it possible with SSL and or SSH? Edvard Wikström Supervisor, [email protected] Tina Lindkvist, [email protected] TDDC03 Information Security Project Linköping University May 8, 2004 Abstract 2. Formatting your paper The purpose of this project is to gather information This document will analyze the SSH and SSL about SSL and SSH as tools for security protocols for secure communication. To achieve this, communication and present them in relation to their white papers and information from reliable sources features, usability and vulnerabilities. Short related to this domain have been studied. Descriptions instructions of installation and configuration will be of how the protocols work and their vulnerabilities are presented for both technologies, this will only provide presented in sufficiently detail to understand their the necessary information to get a quick start. The weaknesses. focus is directed towards vulnerabilities and attacks against these utilities. SSL and SSH are both among 3. SSL the most used methods for transporting information securely through networks. The conclusion is that they 3.2 Background offer good security in open networks if proper configuration and updates are applied The SSL protocol is intended to provide a practical, application-layer, widely connection oriented 1. Introduction mechanism for Internet client/server communication security developed by Netscape. To use the SSL Secure communication is essential for exchange of protocol, the host computer, the client, must be sensitive information. For a long time weak protocols equipped with an SSL Certificate. A digital certificate like Telnet, FTP, the old UNIX utilities, rlogin, rsh is an electronic message that verifies that a user and rcp have been used but they do not provide a sending a message is who he or she claims to be, and secure way for the interchange of data.
    [Show full text]
  • Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Bider Request For
    Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Bider Request for Comments: 8308 Bitvise Limited Updates: 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 March 2018 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721 Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Abstract This memo updates RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, and 4254 by defining a mechanism for Secure Shell (SSH) clients and servers to exchange information about supported protocol extensions confidentially after SSH key exchange. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8308. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
    [Show full text]
  • Yksityisyyden Suojan Parantaminen Tietoverkoissa
    KARELIA-AMMATTIKORKEAKOULU Tietojenkäsittelyn koulutusohjelma Vesa Viljanen YKSITYISYYDEN SUOJAN PARANTAMINEN TIETOVERKOISSA Opinnäytetyö Huhtikuu 2013 OPINNÄYTETYÖ Huhtikuu 2013 Tietojenkäsittelyn koulutusohjelma Karjalankatu 3 80200 JOENSUU p. (013) 260 600 Tekijä Vesa Viljanen Nimeke Yksityisyyden suojan parantaminen tietoverkoissa Toimeksiantaja Pohjois-Karjalan ammattikorkeakoulu Tiivistelmä Opinnäytetyön aiheena oli tutkia, kuinka tietoverkkojen yksityisyyden suojaa voitaisiin kehittää kotikäyttäjän kannalta. Tarkoituksena oli löytää keinoja, joiden avulla yksityisyyden suojaa voitaisiin helposti edistää ja siten taata turvallinen viestintä. Työssä tutustuttiin alan tietokirjallisuuteen sekä verkkolähteisiin ja löydettyjä ohjelmistopohjaisia ratkaisuja yksityisyyden suojan edistämiseksi testattiin empiirisesti itse. Tutkimuksessa ilmeni, että lainsäädännön tarjoama turva ei ole riittävä ja että käyttäjältä vaaditaan omaa panostusta, mikäli viestintä halutaan suojata. Jotta verkkorikoksia ja laajalti levinneitä haittaohjelmia voidaan estää, on tietoturvataso rakennettava kunnolliseksi ja sitä on ylläpidettävä jatkuvasti. Verkkomainonta ja tiedonlouhinta ovat yleistyneet räjähdysmäisesti, mikä asettaa uudet normit oman yksityisyyden varjelemiselle. Sosiaalinen media tuo oman näkökulmansa yksityisyyden suojan kysymykseen pakottamalla käyttäjät kyseenalaisiin tietosuojaehtoihin. Tulokset osoittivat, että kotikäyttäjän on syytä hyödyntää erilaisten verkkoprotokollien ja niitä hyödyntävien ohjelmien, palveluiden ja tekniikoiden tarjoamaa
    [Show full text]
  • Model Learning and Model Checking of SSH Implementations
    Model Learning and Model Checking of SSH Implementations Paul Fiterau-Bros¸tean˘ ∗ Toon Lenaerts Erik Poll Radboud University Nijmegen Radboud University Nijmegen Radboud University Nijmegen [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Joeri de Ruiter Frits Vaandrager Patrick Verleg Radboud University Nijmegen Radboud University Nijmegen Radboud University Nijmegen [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT model learning (a.k.a. active automata learning) [6, 21, 28] to infer We apply model learning on three SSH implementations to infer state machines of three SSH implementations, which we then an- state machine models, and then use model checking to verify that alyze by model checking for conformance to both functional and these models satisfy basic security properties and conform to the security properties. RFCs. Our analysis showed that all tested SSH server models satisfy e properties we verify for the inferred state machines are the stated security properties, but uncovered several violations of based on the RFCs that specify SSH [32–35]. ese properties the standard. are formalized in LTL and veried using NuSMV [13]. We use a model checker since the models are too complex for manual CCS CONCEPTS inspection (they are trivial for NuSMV). Moreover, by formalizing the properties we can beer assess and overcome vagueness or •Networks →Protocol correctness; •eory of computation under-specication in the RFC standards. →Active learning; •So ware and its engineering →Model is paper is born out of two recent theses [19, 29], and is to checking; •Security and privacy →Logic and verication; Net- our knowledge the rst combined application of model learning work security; and model checking in verifying SSH implementations, or more KEYWORDS generally, implementations of any network security protocol.
    [Show full text]
  • List of Applications Updated in ARL #2547
    List of Applications Updated in ARL #2547 Application Name Publisher .NET Core Runtime 3.1 Microsoft .NET Core SDK 1.0 Microsoft .NET Core SDK 1.0 Preview Microsoft .NET Core Windows Server Hosting 2.1 Microsoft .NET Core Windows Server Hosting 3.1 Microsoft .NET Framework 1.0 Microsoft .NET Framework 4.0 Microsoft .NET Reflector 10.2 Red Gate Software 3D DriveGuard 1 HP 3D Engrave Roland DG 3DxWinCore 17.2 3Dconnexion 3DxWinCore 17.4 3Dconnexion 3DxWinCore 17.5 3Dconnexion Access IBM IBM Access Management Console 4.5 Citrix Systems Acrobat Reader 3 Adobe Acrobat Reader DC Adobe Acrobat XI Pro Adobe AcSELerator QuickSet Designer 4.5 Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories ActivClient 7.1 HID Global Adaptive Server Anywhere SAP Adaptive Server Anywhere 6.0 SAP Adaptive Server Anywhere 8.0 SAP Adaptive Server Anywhere 9.0 SAP Administrator 1.0 Oracle AdminStudio Components 2016 Flexera ADtoolkit 3.0 Javelina Software Advantage Database Server for Windows 11.1 SAP Agent Ransack 1.7 Mythicsoft Agent Ransack 5 Mythicsoft Agentless Management Service 1.44 Hewlett Packard Enterprise AGI32 15.3 Lighting Analysts AGi32 16.8 Lighting Analysts AGi32 17.5 Lighting Analysts AGi32 2.0 Lighting Analysts Alchemy OpenText Alchemy 6.0 OpenText Alteryx Designer 10.0 Alteryx Alteryx Designer 10.5 Alteryx Analytic Services Client 9.3 Microsoft Analytics Desktop 12.2 Oracle Animation Shop 2 Corel Anti-Virus 2011 Kaspersky Lab Anti-Virus 5.2 Conpal Anti-Virus 6.5 Conpal Anti-Virus 7.0 Conpal Anti-Virus 7.5 Conpal AppFabric for Windows Server 1 Microsoft Arcade
    [Show full text]