Fairness and Efficiency
Fairness and Efficiency: The Rotten Firm Theorem Daniel J. Benjamin∗ Institute for Social Research and Dartmouth College July 20, 2006 Abstract When contracting is not possible, a preference for fair exchange can generate efficient ex- change, fully exhausting the potential gains from trade — or no exchange at all, leaving all gains from trade unexploited. A profit-maximizing firm offers a wage to a fair-minded worker, who then chooses how much effort to exert. The Rotten Firm theorem says: if the worker cares suf- ficiently about fairness and the firm employs the worker, the equilibrium transaction is Pareto efficient. However, even when gains from trade were possible, the firm may not to hire the worker because every “fair” transaction (acceptable to the worker) could be less profitable than the firm’s outside option. The theory explains a puzzle: why firms offer profit-sharing plans to non-management employees. JEL classification: D63, J33, J41, M52, D64 Keywords: fairness, social preferences, gift-exchange, efficiency wages, profit-sharing ∗A previous version of this paper circulated under the title, “A Theory of Fairness in Labor Markets.” I am grate- ful to Philippe Aghion, Attila Ambrus, Antonia Atanassova, George Baker, Gary Becker, Lynn Benjamin, James Choi, Steve Coate, Noam Elkies, Florian Englmaier, Erik Eyster, Dan Friedman, John Friedman, Roland Fryer, Drew Fudenberg, Alexander Gelber, Jerry Green, Jonathan Hall, Oliver Hart, Daniel Hojman, Richard Holden, Caroline Hoxby, Erzo Luttmer, Lisa Kahn, Lauren Kaiser, Emir Kamenica, Lawrence Katz, Fuhito Kojima, Ilyana Kuziemko, Sendhil Mullainathan, Karthik Muralidharan, Emi Nakamura, Natalija Novta, Ted O’Donoghue, Emily Oster, Giacomo Ponzetto, Jesse Shapiro, Monica Singhal, Jón Steinsson, Jeremy Tobacman, Stephen Weinberg, Richard Zeckhauser, seminar participants at Cornell, Haas School of Business, Harvard University, LSE, MIT, Uni- versity of Maryland at College Park, University of California at Santa Cruz, and especially Edward Glaeser, David Laibson, Matthew Rabin, and Andrei Shleifer for valuable comments and advice.
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