Armor, November-December 1983 Edition

Commandant MG FREDERIC J. BROWN Assistant Commandant BG GORDON R. SULLIVAN Chief of Staff COL ROY C. PRICE

Deputy Assistant Commandant COL MICHAEL H. CRUMLEY Command Sergeant Major CSM JOHN M. STEPHENS

INSTRUCTIONAL DEPARTMENTS Maintenance COL DONALD S. ZUlTER Command and Staff LTC JOE G. DRlSKlLL Weapons COL DAVID V. HARBACH Committee Group COL BOBBY J. CARTER NCO Academy/ Drill Sergeant School SGM JOHNNIE J. PRESTON

DIRECTORATES Evaluation and Standardization COL JOHN E. SWINDELLS Training and Doctrine COL DUDLEY M. ANDRES Combat Developments COL ROBERT W. DeMONT

UNITS The Lightning Brigade COL NEAL T. JACO 1ST AIT/OSUT Brigade (Armor) COL ROBERT L. PHILLIPS "To disseminate knowledge of the military arts and sciences, with special attention to mobility in ground warfare, to promote 4th Training Brigade professional improvement of the Armor Community, and to COL WILLIAM M. MATZ, JR. preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of 194th Armored Brigade Armor in the Army of the United States." COL FRED W. GREENE, 111 The integrated battlefield encompasses the employment and coordina- ARMOR may be forwarded to military tion of combat assets that include infantry, armor, cavalry, artillery, and personnel whose change of address is caused by official orders (except at APO irregular forces, as well as close air support, air defense artillery, and addresses) without payment of additional engineers. Beginning on page 26, Captain Alan W. Watts tells Armor pla- postage. The subscriber must notify the postmaster. toon leaders how to use this combat power to accomplish their missions. USPS 467-970 (The cover art is based on a photo made by Sergeant First Class Robert W. Griffin.) November-December 1983 Vol XCII. No. 6 Sene Your Soldiers, Not Yourself The big question is: Why did not the wehr and the Italian Army. Argentines use a vehicle they had in abun- The Argentines did not really prepare for Dear Sir: dance to gain that mobility-the horse? their war with Britain, even though they During my 6 years of active duty I saw As of 1980, Argentina had some spent lavishly on weapons. Had they, as and served under too many career soldiers 4,000,000 horses, a large part being the suggested here. tried an old approach- who were anxious to command and to Criollo breed, a hardy type that can with- used horses-they might have come off make a name for themselves and who left stand long periods with little food or water. much better than they did. This might be nothing tangible behind. The big loser in The three brigades of mountain troops in one of the more important lessons of that this practice is the Army, and the one who the Argentine Army, using horses, could war for us. suffers the most is the individual soldier. have introduced a substantial element of Colonel Rilhac, a French armor officer, mobility in their garrison’s defense efforts. . GORDON J. DOUGLAS, JR. had this to say about serving his men: Some gauchos, Argentine cowboys, could Fullerton, CA “The day before relinquishing command have given the British a hard time in the of my regiment, I had a conversation with Falklands. The British margin of victory the commanding general who asked me was small and a mobile unit on horseback Another Bit of a Byte what I thought about my time in com- could have substantially increased British mand. My main feeling, I answered, was casualties. Dear Sir: that I had spent about two-thirds of my Compared to motor vehicles and heli- Major Hanselmann’s article “A Compu- time helping, advising and protecting my copters, the horse is obsolete. But in ter For Every Orderly Room” in the May- subordinates in order that they could per- remote areas, over rough country, and in June 1983 issue of ARMOR Magazine is form their duties as well as possible. The poor weather, the horse can perform well right on the mark. general replied, Yes, that is the price of in competition with his mechanical sup The army has concentrated on the big leadership.”’ planters. Indeed, the Falklanders use “megabuck” computer at division and In another article, Colonel OMeara at Fort horses for local transport on their roadless higher levels: a computer that will proba- Knox had this to say: islands. bly not survive the combat environment in “A commander who serves his soldiers Most cavalrymen today do not have which it will have to operate and that has mrns respect and admiration, and creates experience with a horse’s capabilities. done very little to make life easier for the an environment of friendship and pride.” Let’s review some of these: A typical pack commander at the bottom. The desktop Unlike these examples, a commander or cavalry horse in the American expe- computer or, better yet, the newer portable concerned about making a name for him- rience is the Morgan. This horse stands computer, will provide a benefit across the self leaves nothing behind but bitterness, between 57 and 61 inches at the shoulder full army organization. instability, questionable integrity and and weighs about 1.000 pounds. It is an As a member of the 24th Infantry Divi- unhappy soldiers. intelligent breed, strong and resistant to sion (Mechanized), we are taking part in A commander should help, advise and fatigue. And it often forms a bond with its various initiatives as part of the Army’s protect his subordinates, allowing them to rider that can heighten the military effec- SMART program. One of these has pro- use their own initiatives, establish policies tiveness of the unit. vided an APPLE I1 Plus computer to the at the unit level and have input into the A horse walks at 3 mph, trots at 7 mph, squadron. Since its arrival, the computer system. He should set high standards but and gallops at 14 mph. In an &hour day, a has been used almost 16 hours a day. It he must be willing to allow junior leaders horse carrying a soldier and equipment produces the squadron deadline and, from to establish priorities and plans to attain totaling 225 pounds can cover 25 miles. A the deadline, keeps a historical file on those standards, and he should support pack horse, laden with 250300 pounds, each vehicle. It does a daily and monthly those priorities once established. can cover 20 miles in the same day. A draft percentage operational readiness report. Assume command and, above all else, horse, pulling 1,600 pounds by road or 700 Our medical platoon leader has put all the serve your soldiers. Soldiers deserve pro- pounds cross-country. can cover 23 miles squadron’s immunization records and fessional leaders-not careerists inter- a day. These are routine marches, forced other key medical data on file. We also use ested only in making a name for marches would cover more distance. And, the APPLE for deployment rosters. It themselves. the horse can travel over terrain totally allows us to keep track of the large unsuitable for foot or vehicles. volumes of information on each soldier JOHN A. FLORIO It is little known, but there is a well- and this can be rapidly sorted into Milton, Mass. developed chemical warfare technology deployment data; main body, rear de- for horses. The Wehrmacht and the Red tachment, etc. Army both made extensive use of horses One of our troop commanders has a in WW I1 and had extensive horse portable computer, an OSBORNE 1. which Horses in The Falklands chemical-resistant gear including canister he uses in his troop. Its value has aptly gas masks, capes and leggings to protect demonstrated the wisdom of Major Han- Dear Sir: the animals. selmann’s article. For key control and I would like to discuss the lack of mobility Several South American countries still maintenance operations, he has entered in the Argentine forces in the Falklands- have horse units with Bolivia having four all vehicles, their principal drivers and Malvinas in 1982. cavalry regiments and 13 infantry regi- authorized additional drivers, the non- The Argentines in the islands were well ments using horses. These are composed commissioned officer in charge of each equipped but once in place had little mobil- of paired motorized and mounted battal- vehicle, serial numbers of all keys ity. Without the special, all-terrain vehicles ions. Perhaps the largest country still assigned to the vehicle and other impor- and helicopters that the British had, they using horses in appreciable numbers is the tant vehicle data. This list is used by the were limited to “shank‘s mare” for getting Peoples Republic of China. They use troop dispatcher to check drivers and around. Some of their troops were starving division-size cavalry units for .reconnais- release authority upon completion of their within a few kilometers of supply depots. sance and border patrol work over gener- missions, key control during deployment IndividualArgentine units could not support ally rough terrain. Some NATO countries and upon return from field training, and to one another because of their lack of use horses and/or mules as pack animals, assist in the maintenance of motor pool mobility. notably mountain units of the Bundes- records. he has also placed all section

2 ARMOR november-december 1983 hand recei, allowing a ( record of a abuck” con to pick up, 1 that a chan As part 01 sion is test1 cribed load desktop co into every 1 This compi tions, updti lines, hand1 greatly red1 Class IX rec Hopefull) pave the WE way to go ir is now avai needed for staff sectior sion level orders and ’ vide the Arr and is an id

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Dear Sir, As marti journal of 1 neers, the 1 “ancient” d attached 1 (Heavy), th infantry tan to be very ii very serioc not too unl Mark Vlll’! emphasize support in e The artic ARMOR b) titled: “The ing” seeme important. ground ba! hensionanc ing of basil profession: sizing the relationshi1 logistics, e: and commi weapons cI critical natu I was a bit : material on ing lists. Van Creveld’s “Supplying War; on previous orders, an action drill on the actively wrest the initiative from the Threat Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton,” was part of the Threat column may well result regiment. then one would perhaps be bet- the only included reference that I noted. in return fire and a general move to deploy ter advised to place three-quarters (leaving To facilitate an understanding of the basic for combat. one-quarter in reserve) of the forces in an concepts essential for a true professional, This leads to the consideration of just offensive posture, seeking to establish the I would suggest adding the following: how fast an M7 would need to travel not kind of freewheeling action best epitom- Logistics in the National Defense, by only to creep up unseen, but to rapidly ized by the German panzer troops in the Henry E. Eccles (Greenwood Press, West- overrun and demolish the Threat com- early years of W II, or the way the then port, CT); The Sinews of War, Army Logis- mand vehicle group under the shallow Lieutenant Colonel Abrams maneuvered tics 7775-7953, by James A. Huston, Chief attack format of high-speed fire and his command around Arracourt, France, in Military History, US. Army; Logistic Sup- maneuver. Though the MI may provesub- September 1944. Not only will the princi-

ARMOR november-december 1983 3 hered to better, but the It is the first article I’ve seen about the dealing with neutrals and allies, and the 1 feature that best differ- “behind the armor” effects of HEAT or preservation of the will to break free at m US. command struc- kinetic energy munitions. This is a ques- whatever the cost. tures - American initiative and competition that I am asked many times by the On The Art of War, by Frederick the tive pursuit of tactical victory, will be younger soldiers in my platoon and a point Great. This volume was relatively unknown substantially enhanced to our benefit that some of the old timers and I often talk until the late 1960s. Frederick’s ideas have while severely straining the structured about: “What happens exactly when a had influence on Russian military thinking response system of the Soviets. It can be round penetrates the hull of a tank?” Our and this alone makes reading this book done if a plan using terrain, in the form of conclusions have always been a matter of profitable. His viewson limited war, aswell, territory. is reduced in importance to seek- conjecture. are worth considering because he es- ing terrain in the form of coverlconceal- One point I would like to question is the pouses the absolute necessity of respon- ment leading to surprise is adopted. use of gas masks in WW I tanks “to protect sive logistics. In any event, the lieutenant‘s endorse- against war gases and the gasoline and Attack and Die, by Grady McWhitney ment of the concept of striking an enemy engine-gas contaminated interiors of the and Perry D. Jamieson. This is a new and force in the flank from an unexpected WW I tanks.” unique analysis of the reasons for limited quarter using surprise and maneuver are My M25A7 gas mask certainly affords Southern battle success during the Civil concepts that one would hope would be protection against war gases but is no pro- War. The crux of the problem was a dis- heartily endorsed not only by the armor tection “against ammonia or carbon mon- connect between technology and doctrine branch, but the Army as a whole. oxide fumes.” In fact, the operator’s man- - with frequently disastrous results for ual for the M25/M25Al states this and also Southern arms. JOSEPH R. BURNIECE mentions, “Your mask isn’t effective in Military Elites, by Roger A. Beaumont. Project on Military Procurement confined spaces where there is not enough The whole subject of military “elitism” Washington, D.C. oxygen (less than 18 percent) in the air within military organizations has many you breathe.” more facets than rivalries would indicate. If a WW I gas mask would protect This book explores elitism/esprit in a dis- against the gasoline and engine-gas con- passionate manner and forms some unex- Supports Cavalry Master Scout taminated interiors of WW I tanks, then my pected angles. M25A1 is a step backward because of its’ How to Make War, by James F. Dunni- Dear Sir, limitations with ammonia and carbon gan. This was originally published asan aid I would like to add my support to Lieut- monoxide fumes. Clarification of the to war garners, but the revised edition is enant Colonel Olmsteads and SFC Col- degree of protection afforded by WW I gas actually a branch-by-branch, service-by- lins’ stand that the time to implement a masks might be in order as I find it difficult service, function-by-function summary of Cavalry Master Scout Program is long to believe that my M25A7 is not superior to major organizations, hardware and opera- overdue. (See “Professional Thoughts” the WW I mask. tional environment considerations of mod- May-June 1983 ARMOR.) Keep the superlative articles coming. ern armed forces. It is a primer on The modernization of the Army makes ARMOR Magazine has been and is a valu- warmaking. the scout‘s role even more critical, if that is able tool in training my platoon. . possible. He must not only master many BRUCE P. SCHOCH complex weapons systems, but the battle- DOUGLAS H. BOX Supervisory Training Specialist field reconnaissanceskills he must master Platoon Sergeant, TXARNG Fort Eustis, VA are also growing in complexity with that of Tyler, TX our new equipment. To train our cavalry 19Ds in the myriad of firing and nonfiring tasks so critical to the realization of the Cavalry Connection Upheld combat multiplier that our new equipment More Professional Reading Dear Sir, offers, requires a “master.” I agree wholeheartedly with Major Dials’ The scout must develop information on: assertion that divisional cavalry requires a enemy locations and strengths, routes, Dear Sir, combination of tanks and fighting vehicles attack positions, and other vital informa- I read with great interest your July- to create a “credible economy force.” (See tion so that we can exploit the mobility of August 1983 issue and was really struck by Economy of Force-the Cavalry Connec- the Abrams tank to strike the enemy in the Lieutenant Colonel Garland’s article, “The tion,” July-August 1983 ARMOR). flank or rear. Case for Professional Reading.” It is an Superior mobility over the enemy and Just as each troop and company is outstanding advisory for all officers, regard- combat power that is sufficient to defeat authorized a “master“ gunner, so should less of branch, by why stop there? NCOs reconnaissance and security elements are each cavalry troop be authorized a “mas- should also be required to read profes- absolutely necessary for effectiveeconomy ter” scout. sionally. The exposure to other points of of force operations. Hopefully, ARMOR and the Armor Cen- view will benefit them, too. Additionally, I would like to point out that ter will take the lead in gaining authoriza- I have a pet peeve. Why limit prdfesional cavalry, given a covering force mission, is tion for and training of this critically journals to those of the combat arms and expected to not only meet and defeat enemy needed individual for all cavalry organiza- combat support branches. Army Logisti- forces, but to deceive them as to the locations. cian, published bimonthly by the U.S. tion of the main friendly defensive effort. A Army Logistics Center, is an invaluable suitable mix of MBTs and fighting vehicles BRUCE B. G. CLARKE supplement to a professional’s reading in the cavalry is essential to a viable decep- Lieutenant Colonel, Armor fare. A common complaint from “our” side tion. 2d Squadron, 1lth Armored Cavalry of the house is that combat arms officers Cavalry operating as a covering force will know too little about the capabilities and also be called upon to delay enemy forces. I problems of their support systems. do not feel that helicopters and fighting ve- Presumably everyone has personal hicles alone can generate enough “combat Gas Mask Protection Queried choices in this area, as do I. The following staying power” to achieve a successful delay works should be considered by all military against armor-heavy Threat formations. Addi- Dear Sir, professionals for the timeless lessons they tion of the firepower, mobility, and survivabil- Mr. Donald R. Kennedy’s article, “lm- give: ity of the tank will be the major deciding proving Combat Crew Survivability,” in the The Persian Expedition, by Xenophon. factor. July-August ARMOR Magazine is of par- This timeless classic illustrates the mas- ticular interest to me as I am a platoon ser- sive problems of the fighting retreat; GUY C. SWAN 111 geant in a tank company in the Texas abandonment by the host forces, cut off Captain, Armor National Guard. from all friendly aid, discipline, morale, Fort Lewis, WA 4 AIlMoll november-december 1983 Murphy’s Valentine Report also credited with destroying the flame pros and cons of tanks . . .“that is exa thrower mentioned in the article. what his article is all about. The platoon leader, Lieutenant Edgar I am not sure why the then Chief of St-.., Dear Sir, Winger, did not trap his vehicle between two General Meyer, removed the tanks from the While researching WW I issues of the trees, Rather, after running blind off the trail, cavalry squadron. I seriously doubt that he Stars & Stripes I found an item in the he became disoriented. When he opened his did it because he considered its primary “Around the Sibley Stove” column in the hatch to gain his bearings, a nervous function ”. . . as detailed ground and air 14 February 1919 issue: member of the Philippine Army fatally reconnaissance within and to the front, “This is the story of Murphy’s report. wounded him with a burst from a BAR flanks and rear of the division . . .”, or that he Murphy was in Company A, 301st Tank (Browning Automatic Rifle, Ed). thought that tanks must be removed to Battalion. His tank blew up in a minefield A painting of the (aircraft) downing has accomplish this mission. and, although he himself was wounded, he been donated to the Patton Museum. My doubt is based upon the fact that helped to get the men in his crew to the General Meyer approved the operational rear first. Before they shipped him back, STEPHEN ZENON BARDOWSKI organizational concept almost a year after he wrote an accurate message to his sec- D/1-124th Cav. TXARNG he directed removal of tanks from the tion commander, giving his casualties and Randolph AFB, TX squadron. At the time of his decision, the the map location of his burned out tank. organizational concept called for 24 tanks in The message was written on the back of the squadron and for the squadron to per- the only scrap of paper he had saved from New Role for Sheridan Proposed form traditional cavalry roles. the wreck of the tank. That scrap was a I am also rather appalled that, as a matter photograph of his wife.” of policy, DA is withholding resources from A rather poignant letter for the Valen- Dear Sir, field commanders because they (DA staff tine’s Day issue of Stripes. I thought. As an armor enthusiast and a former officers?) do not believe the field command- For anyone with access to a bound ordnance officer, I hate to see what has ers competent to correctly employ those volume of WW I Stripes, I highly recom- happened to the Sheridan. Intended as a resources. I consider the elimination of mend a leisurely look-through. The pages reconnaissance vehicle, it was armed with tanks so as “. . . to remove the temptation at are filled with pathos and humor of our the Shillelagh missile, a weapon much all levels of command to readily allow part or armor forebearers. more potent than the Sheridan’s role all of the divisional cavalry to become deci- required. sively engaged,” a highly suspect proce JOHN A. REICHLEY Today, Sheridans are used as targets for dure. I am not sure what our division and Major AUS (Ret.) antitank missiles, some have been remod- corps commanders think of that comment Fayette, AL eled to resemble Threat vehicles, a few on their competency. It is also questionable have been used as carriers for experimen- that the new organization will not be deci- tal gun systems and many are in storage. sively engaged when it is the only force the T-62, T-64 Mixup In my letter on this same subject in the division or corps commander has left. July-August 1981 issue of ARMOR, I men- I have always considered our most critical tioned the original variations that had been resource to be manpower, with our current Dear Sir, considered for the Sheridan chassis, end-strength ceilings making it even more Reference my letter in the July-August including variations in the main armament. critical. It, therefore, appears hard to justify a issue of ARMOR Magazine. The sentence It has been encouraging to read that at 630-man force of trained cwnbat soldiers ’ reading: “Severa’l sources including lnter- least one chassis armed with the Ares used to provide messenger service with their national Defense Review, have reported automatic 75-mm gun has undergone CFVs. to control routes and choke points to that the predecessor of the T-64 was iden- tests at Yuma, AZ, and that the Navy, with ensure navigation is accurate and that prior- tified before the first public appearance of Army collaboration, has mounted a 105- ities are properly observed, and to help con- the T-64 in 1965”; should have ended refer- mm tank gun on an M551 Sheridan, using trol battlefield clutter by monitoring and ring to the T-62’s first public appearance, the existing turret and recoil system. controlling the movement of CS and CSS not the T-643. Our armor doctrine calls for tank-vs- elements. tank combat but, in Europe at least, we are I don’t know where Major Bush learned JAMES M. WARFORD likely to be so out-numbered in armor that cavalry, but if he thinks that is good use of Captain, Armor our antiarmor needs are being given much cavalry soldiers-and he is teaching new Fort Hood, TX study. lieutenants-then we have a problem. Rearmed, the Sheridan could be a Major Bush’s closing comment is most highly potent antiarmor vehicle. It is hardly profound: ”. . . there is no other unit@)spe Bardowski Correction likely that the WW II tank destroyer con- cifically designed for the cavalry squadron’s cept will ever be revived, but as a way to roles . . .” Unfortunately, what he fails to say Dear Sir, even the likely future odds, one can hope is that there is no unit in Division 86 It was with great joy that I read Colonel that the concept of vehicles such as the designed to fulfill the role of cavalry. Thomas Dooley’s article on the exploits of German Jagdpanzer and the American the Provisional Tank Group in the defense tank destroyer will not be overlooked. DOUGLAS B. CAMPBELL of the Philippines. (See ‘The First US. Tank Using surplus M551s would seem to be a Lieutenant Colonel, Armor Action in World War 11,” July-August 1983 sensible step at a reasonable cost. Fort Stewart, GA ARMOR. Ed.) and I feel compelled to add a few words. ROBERT J. ICKS The man credited with shooting down the Colonel, AUS (Ret.) first enemy aircraft was not Technical Ser- Elmhurst. IL Questions DMsion 86 geant Temon “Bud Bardowski, rather he was Technical Sergeant Zenon “Bud” Bar- Mechanized Infantry Setup dowski. I know this because he is my father, and for the last 30 or so years, people have Rebuts Eyes 81 Ears Philosophy asked me what my middle initial “Z’(not Dear Sir, “T) stood for. I strongly question the ability of the pro- During the attack, he,drove his M3 half- Dear Sir, posed Division 86 mechanized infantry track out into the open to gain a better field I found Major Bush’s apologia a rather company to carry out its functions in the of fire and put a 75-round belt of .SO caliber interesting example of the indirect ap- urban sprawl of the potential European bat- into a Zero. The Air Corps commander, proach. (See “The Division Commander’s tlefield. Colonel Maitland, submitted his actions for Eyes and Ears” September-October 1982 The company will have 116 men (in 13 a Medal of Honor, but evacuated the Islands ARMOR Magazine.) Although the author Bradley IFVs) of whom only 63 can fight before the paperwork was returned. He was states his purpose I‘. . . is not to argue the dismounted. The Bradley’s armor can stop ARMOR novem ber-decem ber 1983 5 14.5-mm projectiles, and while this is margi- of otherwise competent and aggressive command-we must never fail to give con- nally better than the armor on the M113 troops who had suffered a double upset, sideration to the overall situation as well. APC, it is not designed to fight alongside their first defeat by an army declared "rot- Every commander, no matter what his posi- tanks. Yet the company that it carries is ten" by their supreme commander. One tion, must give thought not only to written designed mainly for offensive maneuvers. result of this entire episode, which was to and oral orders of his superiors, he must However, since the length of time that an play a major role a year later, was the also give thought and some interpretation to infantry unit engages in offensive operations defense of the Demyansk pocket north of those orders. can generally be counted in days while the Moscow. Another point that seems relatively simple time spent in defensive positions (generally As the Siberian-led Red Army streamed to state in peacetime is the timely and in built-up areas) can be counted in weeks west in January-February 1942. the 12% forcefully-argued appreciation of the cir- and months, I submit that this proposed month battle for the pockethlient of Dem- cumstances, and the suggested course of company is overly mechanized, under- yansk began. In the course of the battle, action. Troops on the "quiet" front north of manned, and not designed to prepare and 100,OOO troops were supplied solely by a Stalingrad had sent back word of impending hold a fortified defensive position. 5CSplane airlift in the course of the bitter Soviet moves, all of which Paulus had been The history of war clearly shows how a winter. That it took a vast amount of Luft- privy to, but no one argued the case suffi- relatively small, well dug-in infantry unit can waffe resources and tremendous effort was ciently forcefully-sspecially in the weeks delay an attacker and often alter the course perhaps appreciated best (if not singularly) preceding the Soviet counterstroke-to in- of a battle. on the line, but the result-the successful form Hitler of the folly of his decision. In order to increase the number of men defense of the Demyansk highlands-was In short, defying orders may be a means who can fight dismounted, Ipropose that its duly noted by Goering and Hitler. to an end, but it is certainly no long-term nine rifle squads have 12 men each, all of As the Soviets struck out to encircle the solution. Each individual must make his whom would fight dismounted. This would German 6th Army at Stalingrad, Hitler per- knowledge and opinion known to his seniors add 18 men to the company and would haps had every reason to justify his decision in order for them to make a proper decision. increase the numbers who fight dismounted to keep troops on the Volga River in spite of This will undoubtedly at times be very diffi- by 45. for a company total of 108. the alarming reports filtering back in the first cult as the "neck is put on the block." On the The company, in order to accomplish this, few hours and days after November 19, other hand, "foreknowledge is forewarned." would have to exchange 9 of its Sradleys for 1942. Throughout the summer months and JOSEPH R. BURNIECE 9 M113s. which would be attached when up to September 1942 the German Army Project on Military Procurement rapid movement was anticipated. When not General Staff (General Zeitzler) declared the Washington. D.C. needed, these vehicles, with drivers, would Soviets had no reserves remaining. Further, revert to battalion control. The platoon lead- the reports from Stalingrad were such that ers' Bradleys can furnish fire support. invariably "one more effort" would yield I also propose that each company be success and that effort was just as invariably BatHefidd Clutter Unraveled equipped with 3 new tank destroyer vehi- only a few days from being prepared. Given Dear Sir, cles. These should have the Same gun as the as well that not only had the German forces Figure 3 in "The Division Commander's MBTs, but they need not have turrets or gun (by hitler's view) survived the winter of 1941 Eyes and Ears" (September-October, 1983 stabilizersas they would only be used in hull by standing fast, but Demyansk had been a ARMOR Magazine), is another example of defilade and would not have to fire on the relatively bright star in that period as well, how perspective and Scale can detract from move. They could engage enemy tanks and one can readily understand Hitler's intention the credence of an otherwise excellent arti- INSat ranges that would prevent the enemy to once again prove the generals were just cle. overrunning the company position. Adding on the wrong side of correct in strategic The "obvious" battlefield clutter is not so these vehicles would increase company appraisals. obvious when one considers 5.3 vehicles per strength by 9 men. The appearance of two Soviet tank armies kilometer (square kilo.). This assumes about Thus, by adding only 27 men, the com- and five infantry (combined arms) armies, 188 thousand square meters per vehicle. pany can be transformed into a substantial however, proved Hitler to be quite wrong in Even when taken exactly to scale, the small defensive blocking force while still maintain- the decision. But the intelligence prepared squares that represent vehicles end up ing its ability to move rapidly when required. for him apparently gave no such warnings being about owtenth of a square kilometer. until far too late. Then, of course, in the face or 10,oOO square meters. WALLACE J. KETZ of the Soviet counter-offensive came the A small point maybe, but when a picture is Jackson Heights, NY decision, based on Goering's promise to a worth a thousand words, it shouldn't be man looking for the answer he wanted to misleading. hear, to hold Stalingrad by means of airlift WILLIAM SOUTHWORTH To Obey Or Not To Obey until a relief could be mounted. At this point-November 25 (2 days after Major, USA Dear Sir: the encirclement of the 6th Army)-pre- Fort Lee, VA Lieutenant Colonel William L Howard's cisely the kind of decision and action in the (The graphics used to portray battlefield article "To the Last Man. To the Last face of direct orders suggested by Colonel clutter were, in fact, not drawn to scale. The Round-Why?" was certainly a provocative Howard was effected by General von Seyd- precision and degree of resolution of the article. One might, on the basis of the infor- litz, commander of the German L1 Corps in printing process, as well as page space mation presented, be willing to go further the northeast of the Stalingrad pocket. availability, would not permit a more accu- than simply agreeing-perhaps so far as to Forcefully arguing that the 6th Army should rately scaled representation of a brigade make the "proper" decision to disobey direct abandon their encircled positions and fight sector in which individual vehicles are both orders so as to make best use of information their way out to the west, he gave orders for accurately and meaningfully portrayed. immediately at hand. But basing this deci- his troops to destroy their heavy equipment, Additionally, it must be remembered that sion on immediate information (intelli- demolish their fortified positions, and com- in most geographical areas where combat gence) can be just as damaging if not care- mence the proposed withdrawal. The 94th may occur only a very small fraction of any fully weighed in balance with the presumed Infantry Division responded as instructed, given area will likely be suitable for combat information being evaluated by higher com- but the order made no impressions on the occupation by a vehicle, and trafficable road mand. other troops in the pocket who awaited nets (as well as cross-country avenues of In the fateful Russian winter of 1941-42. orders from both Army Commander Paulus approach) will be densely occupied. Hitler had taken the decision to enforce a and Hitler. The result was the destruction of Figure 3 was intended to portray the "no retreat" policy on an army rapidly updat- the 94th Division by an immediate, massive expecteddifficulties of movement across an ing itself on Caulaincourt's history of the Soviet attack. occupied piece of the battlefield without disastrous retreat of Napoleon's Army 130 Though we can certainly agree with the showing specific terrain features, obstacles, years earlier. conceptual argument of Colonel Howard's roads or civilian refugee traffic. The numbers On the omer hand, it went a great dis- discussion-that decisions must be made of various types of vehicles shown in figure tance in putting an iron ramrod to the backs on the scene promptly by the immediate 2 and figure 3 are accurate. Ed.) 6 ARMOR november-december 1983 Fielding Viable Units

As Chief of Armor, I am charged by AR 10-41with sary defeat mechanisms based on factors of MEW-T. providing those items that our operating units must Development of doctrinal manuals such as FM 17-15, possess in order to perform assigned combat missions. I standardized vehicle load plans, the CCH Development must monitor the entire personnel, materiel, and train- Plan, and a coordinated maintenance doctrinal frame- ing life cycles to ensure that compatible components work are examples of current USAARMC efforts stem- can be fielded and sustained within the unit. Unit via- ming from our work during the Armor Conference. bility, therefore, is always viewed in the collective sense Organization. Knowing how to fight is only the first as the overall health of the unit. Only those units that step. We must also ensure that the correct organiza- develop readiness by using the personnel and materiel tional design is available to support the execution of our furnished, within the given organizational framework, doctrine. As branch proponent for the tank battalion, inaccordancewithdoctrinalpreceptstoaccomplishpeace divisional cavalry squadron, scout platoon, and armored time and combat tasks, can be considered as fully cavalry regiment, the Armor Center must ensure that viable. organizational structures work within the context of AirLand Battle doctrine. Where inadequacies exist, Components Contributing to Unit Viability prompt action will be taken by the USAARMC to Doctrine, organization, materiel, personnel, training, change or refine our TOE to ensure an effective organi and leadership are the essentials of unit viability. Just zational structure is provided to MACOMs for MTOE as each is vitally important, no single component development and application. At the same time, we are stands alone, but blends with the others to achieve vigorously pursuing actions in support of the conver- overall viability. sion to the new Regimental System as well as initiatives Doctrine. Proper employment of Mission Area An- to modernize our forces through the use of unit rotation. alysis (MU)provides an understanding of the true The USAARMC is now developing a proposed organi- nature of the Threat. If we are to break, exploit, and zation for the 1st OSUT Brigade which will reflect and destroy the enemy, we must, as a matter of second support the training of soldiers affiliated with the Reg- nature, know how they and how we will fight. Close imental System. Combat Heavy (CCH) and Armor How-&Fight doc- Materiel. Mastery of our equipment in tactical oper- trine is central to the execution of AirLand Battle and ations and maintenance is essential. As Armor, all are AirLand Battle 2000. In concert with the Combined required to execute proper employment of our weapons Arms Center, we are developing, testing, and applying systems (new as well as old) in the mounted battle. This doctrine which will serve as our primary basis for mov- demands quality performance under stress to an exact- ing, shooting, communicating, securing, and sustaining standard of excellence. The Armor Center will con- ing on the battlefield. Within the doctrinal framework, tinue to improve current weapon systems capabilities we are rapidly moving toward development of stand- by exploiting friendly technological opportunities. ardized building blocks to be used across the force This effort is being pursued on two fronts; first, which, when properly employed, will create the neces- through well-thought-out product improvement pro- ARMOR november-december 1983 7 grams to enhance and upgrade our present materiel the superb capabilities provided by the multipurpose capabilities and, secondly, by an aggressive research ranges and improved training devices such as the Unit and development effort which will result in an ad- Conduct of Fire Trainer. In addition to revising FM vanced family of CCH vehicles. Development of the 17-12-1/2/3 to incorporate tank tactical tables and the MlEl,with its increased capabilities and lethality, is a developing of state of the art training devices and simu- clear illustration of what we can do collectively in the lators, we have published ARTEP Mission Training improvement of existing products. We have now taken Plans (AMTP)for platoon, company/team, battalion/ actions which will lead to the establishment of a tank task force, and scout platoon which outlines “a way” to test bed program under Armor Center management train in units. that assimilates all existing and known future pro- Consistent with the guidance of the Chief of Staff, we grams under one umbrella system that feeds the total are continuing our efforts to develop and refine stand- CCH developmental plan. In addition, efforts are already ardized ways to train both here at Fort Knox and in the well underway to ensure that our MUM3 and M60 series units. Standardized vehicle load plans, main gun cali- vehicles are product improved to ensure adequate material bration policy, crew drills, and standing operating capabilities through this century. procedures (SOP) are the first step. Standardized recom- Personnel. As we move to transition our organiza- mended training strategies, as expressed through the tion in support of emerging doctrine, new Challenges are Standards inTraining Commission (STRAC),is another. posed for the manning system. Diligent planning is now These strategies are now being tested and refined so as being exercised to ensure that manning the Armor force to accurately reflect the ability of the unit to implement results in recruiting, training, and sustaining individu- and will include prescriptions for the use of substitution, als who contribute positively to cohesive, viable units. simulation, and miniaturization in order to conserve Stated briefly, I continue to see our overall goal in force precious ammunition assets. manning as one of increasing the tactical and technical Leadership. I have previously devoted a full Com- proficiency of our officers and NCOs. To accomplish this mander’s Hatch to the issue of Armor Force leadership. goal, we will continue to pursue: The fundamental obligation to know, practice, and 0 Recruitment, accession, and retention of the best apply basics of our branch is the very foundation on possible personnel. Proud, disciplined, and properly which we develop and sustain our units. The develop trained soldiers are without question our most precious ment of leadership depth in training yourself and your asset. subordinates while reinforcing the chain of command is 0 Initial entry training programs which train soldiers the very essence of what I am talking about. to an acceptable level of combat ready proficiency. 0 Assignment and distribution of personnel within Putting It All Together the Armor force in such a way as to reinforce our overall In my view, the overall goal of the Armor Center is to combat readiness by giving priority to the needs of the assist all of the Armor community in ensuring that TOE force. Serving repeatedly under competent leader- viable units capable of meeting and defeating the ship contributes immeasurably to our overall health as Threat are fielded and sustained. It simply isn’t enough a branch. to develop pieces of unit viability without looking 0 Development and sustainment of professional edu- toward total systems fielding and sustainment. I see our cation programs and alternative assignments that serve role as one which assists the chain of command and unit to develop leadership and Armor specific skills required leadership by exercising three primary responsibilities: by the force. The branch chief supports the chain of command to We are now developing institutionalized programs provide insights and advice which derive from the spe- which will, in effect, provide certification to those offi- cialized knowledge of the branch center. I remain per- cers and NCOs able to demonatrate required competencies. sonally committed that the Home of Armor exists to Fkgrams of Instruction are now being developed for serve the interests of the total Armor force as a leader officer and NCO requalification to rete proficiency in within the combat arms. tactical and technical skills. In addition, action is under- 0 The branch chief interacts at MACOM and DA lev- way to develop career patterns for officers and NCOs els to pursue resolution of systemic problems identified which will reinforce the need for tactical and technical within the force. In this effort, it is essential that we all standards of excellence. When fully implemented, these work together in pursuit of this common goal. programs will be used to provide units with trained, certi- 0 The branch chief corrects deficiencies uncovered in fied (warranted) individuals on a timely basis. his own operations and coordinates with other propo- Training. Training bonds all the components of unit nents to ensure that the total needs of the force are met. I viability. As evidence of the importance of training, the can assure you that this is of primary interest to all Commander, TRADOC, has set training as the highest elements of the Armor Center. We will continue to work priority to guide the efforts of the integrating centers toward the goal of setting an example for the force. and service schools. We, at the Home of Armor, intend to be second to none in meeting this obligation. The increase in battlefield capability, due to receipt of new technology and doctrine, creates new and difficult training challenges. It is only through effectivetraining that units actualize the enhanced fighting capabilities 0 of our new materiel. To meet this challenge, we are making evolutionary changes in the way that we train Armor and, in turn, CCH. To accomplish this, we have developed (and are now validating) improved tank system proficiency tables for gunnery based on the requirement to make full use of our new tank and cavalry capabilities. These tables allow us to take advantage of a ARMOR november-decernber 1983 __ __ . ... --_~..._.._ ~ Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

First Impress We have co118t8ntly emphasized to soldim that their Iftheunitknowsthattheanswertothesequestionsare appearance plays a very important role in the gaining special interest to the seniorcommander and the comma: unit’s perception of what caliber of soldier they are receiv- sergeant major, deficiencies,if any, will quickly disappe; ing. The soldier who wears his uniform properly, with The appearanceof the organizationis as important to t emphasis on attention to detail, demonstrates his deeire to new soldier as the soldier’s appearance is to the organi exceL An exemplary appearancealso relates to the soldier’s tion. The soldier expects attention to detail in the everyd desire to sustain basic proficiency. When such a soldier housekeeping because that is what he has been taught. 1 reports to a unit, that unit can be sure that it has received a expects clean rooms and clean common areas that requ highly-motivated, competent soldier who is ready to exceL the assistance of the entire unit. Just because we do not li However, there is another “&st impression” that must in the common areas does not mean we do not use the exist before the soldier and the unit can obtain full confi- especially hallways, latrines, and dayrooms, etc. Any fa( dence in each other’s ability. That first impression is the ity that is not monitored for missing screws, leaki one the soldier gets of the unit. We provide good sponsor- faucets, broken windows, faulty door locks, etc., will quick ship programs for our soldiem-transportation, orienta- deteriorate. Soldiers who know they have to maintain thl tions, Army Community Services, and other community billets to a high standard take better care of the bille and organizational services. But, does the unit possess Billets that are maintained properly add greatly to t those basic attention-todetail standards that readily iden- morale and espin’t de corps of the organization. t& it as a competent professional organization? The outside area is as important as the inside. The pox Remember, the majority of soldiem reporting to a unit and maintenance also require the same attention to det will have 1to 3 years’ service and have been required to live to achieve the desired high standards. Maximum do1 in military billets on military installations. They have must be made to ensure that the soldier’sfist impression been taught, through a succession of training cycles, how his organization is one that he can be proud of-an orga to conform to standing operating procedures and squad, zation that demonstrates its desire to want every soldier . platoon, and company inspections, which were once very belong to it. difficult tasks for them, but are now routine. The fjrst formation the soldier stands in the new unit also The first 1or 2 weeks that the soldier spends in the unit gives him a vivid pidure of whether or not he is in a pm tells him many things. The Grst is “Do I belong to a unit fessional organization. The newcomer wants to we highly that cares? shined shoes, polished brass, and pro~erlyfitted uni- There are many ways to identify whether or not an forms-that is what he has been taught to expect The organization carea for its soldiers. The introdudion of the absence of attention to detail by his peers and supervisors immediate supervisor and the speedy establishment of a in wearing the uniform can bevery disheartening. Further- “you belong” relationshipwith the crew or squad are musts. more, a formation that is not conducted in accordance with The immediate assignment of a bunk and wall locker to FM 22-5 has a strong negative effect because the new sol- establish the soldier’spresence must be made. If you require dier has spent much time and effort to learn the right way. a soldier to live out of a duffle bag for a week, or even a Finally, a soldier expects to be marched to the motor pool couple of days when it’s not necessary, you not only have or wherever the work assignment is located, and he expects one disgruntled soldier, but the unit’s other soldiers also his “chain of support” to march with him. become disgruntled. New soldiers also expect to receive We must understand that htimpressions carry beyond standardized procedures on how the area must be main- the first meeting. First impressons establish attitudes that tained, and that standard must be readily available to are the basic foundation of the discipline, proficiency, and them. At the start of inprocessing,have incoming soldiers combat readiness of an organization. answer the following questions: How long were you in the unit before you were assigned a sponsor? (CSM John M. Stephens assumed his new duties a8 Com- How long did you wait for a wall locker? nand Sergeant Major of the US.Army Annor Center in Were you immediately assigned to a crew or squad? August. CSM Stephens was previously commandant of Did you immediately receive the SOP for standardized the NCO Academy/DriU Sergeant School at Fort Kmx, wall locker and area display requirements? Ky. Ed.)

ARMOR novernber-decernber 1983 9 Captain Mark W. Kennedy Weapons Dept. USAARMS, Fort Knox, KY

Reserve Component Tank Commander‘s Course A pilot Reserve Component (RC) Tank Commander’s The sixth day was devoted to range estimation and Course that was developed solely by andfor the RC was conduct-of-fireexercises. This was folkwed by a 2-hour conducted for the first time at Gowen Field, Boise, ID in practical exercise in range estimation and completion of September 1983. a &hour Tank Crew Proficiency Course (TCPC) on the The come is designed to accommodate eight three seventh day. man groups, with an assistant instructor (AI) and a The schedule for the eighth day was modified to pro- driver assigned for each group when they man a tank. vide more time for more TCPC training, with half the he3 to 1 ratio of students to AI is important because 75 crews completing the TCPC in the morning while the percent of the course consists of hands-on instruction. other half worked with gunnery training devices. The The POI also emphasizes the need for TCs to trdntheir sequence was reversed for the afternoon hours. crews with “hip pocket” instruction by requiring each Commander’s time on the ninth day was used to student to conduct a 30-minute class during the course. review material presented up to that time. The first class began on 10 September when Lieuten- ant General David E. Grange, Jr., Commander, Sixth Army, spoke to the cadre and the students about the importance of the course and the fact that it wus to be taught by RC members. Aday-byday accountof thepilotcourseactivitieafollows. During the first day, a 50question diagnostic test covering primarily skill levels 1 and 2 was administered. This identified student weaknesses and enabled the cadre to mix weaker students with stronger ones when making up the tank crews. The first day also included the firat class on maintenance forms and records. Crew assignments were an- nounced, and the crews linked up with their AI’S. As a point of inkeat, the primary instructors were up until 2200 hours the night before, working in the Learn- ing Center to clear up any problems or misunderstand- ings that might arise the following day. The students were at the Learning Center as well, going over field manuals, technical manuals, and Training Extension course tap. The second day’s training consisted of preventive maintenance checks and services on.theM60 tanks,and a class on the armament controls and equipment (AC & E). Moretimethan wasinitiallyscheduledforAC&Ewas needed, so all of the third day and most of the fourth day was devoted to this phase of training, and a briefing on the M229 coaxial machinegun, with a crew drill, round- ing out the fourth day. During the fifth day, the crews were required to load, unload, clear, disassemble, assemble, conduct a fun0 tion check, and perform immediate action on the M85 Figure 1. .50 caliber and M229 machineguns.

10 AR- november-december 1983 During the loth day, the crews conducted prepare-to- fire checks and weapons calibration, and made at least two dry runs to prepare for the livefire exercise. The day concluded with instruction in auxiliary fire controls. The live-fire accuracy screening tests of the fire control system calibration were completed so quickly on the NO GO. lii.a eleventh day that more time was made available for hit bt@ mer additional dry runs and for setting up range card posi- mask with M105D tions on the range. During the night hours of the 11th day, the crew reoc- cupied their range card positions and used their range card data to engage targets without illumination. Also, each man rotated through the positions of TC, gunner and loader for both day and night firing exercises. Due to range restrictions, the daylight live-fire battle run scheduled for the 12th day had to be modified to a tactical tank table (table 1) developed by Sergeant First Class Richard Wagner. The table was based on Ser- geant Wagner's experience at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA and used the wingman concept to assist the firing tank in adjusting fire. This modified is find. table combined gunnery with tactics by having each crew defend a piece of terrain (figure 1). The E was lwwithin 15 %- scored on ability move well firehis his to as as tank. 650850 m NO GO. 3/W a When the firing tank came on the range, the "C krtcawrafin requested permission from the tower to negotiate the course and never contacted the tower again unless he I i. Ems0 one &usenmm ara (M. 11 HEAT GO. Hit bpt with- encountered mechanical problems or to report complet- in 10 samnds. ing the course. The TC gave the only fire commands, NO GO. Miss. or u- while the AI ensured that safety regulations were fol- d10uconds t GO.Hitbt@rith-" lowed and also scored the crew's performance. in 10 mends. As the tank approached firing position 1, the gunner 1.200 m NO GO. Miss. or ex- was required to clear a lava rock mask to enable the TC d 10 wands. I to engage the target by using his override. The first stings: Distiiwishad-6 Got. IbUltr-5 w)r. Unaurlii--3 or hst Go1 round gave a good visual indication as to whether the gunner had properly used his M105D telescope to clear professionalism and enthusiasm of the instructors and the mask because, if he had not, a cloud of dust arose the eager, willing-to-learn, attitudes of the students, as and the round was obviously LOST. well as the hard work by the support troops and the At position 2, the TC moved his tank into a hulldown leadership of the headquarters element. Additionally, position and used his override to engage the right-hand Master Gunners were considered to be ideal instructors. tank. He then moved forward somewhat to engage the They were able to pass on vital information to the TCs left-hand tank. This technique enabled him to fire at his on how to fight their tanks, which equates to combat first target without being threatened by the second. survival. ARer moving to firing position 3, the same procedure This TC training course is an exportable POI that was used except that the gunner lid at the lefbhand includes everything a school commandant needs-a let- tank first, then at the rightrhand tank. While the tank on ter of instruction, lesson plans, schedule,resource require- the right was being taken under fire, the TC engaged the ments, firing table, score card, and appropriate tests. It BRDMs with the caliber .50 machinegun. is a training package that can be used by the Continen- The firing table was completed at position 4 where the tal U.S. Armies to train, develop, and maintain the TC engaged a troop target with the coaxial machine- skills of RC armor units. gun, using his override. Ideally, one or more locations could be established in As soon as the firing tank's crew cleared and elevated each CONUSA where all RC tankers would have an all weapons and moved the tank off the range, the opportunity to attend the course-armor training div- wingman tank on the ready line began its run as ision trainers, Maneuver Training Command armor another tank took up the wingman position. crewmen, and crews from TO&E tank units and cavalry Even though the firing engagements were scored, a squadrons. GO was not a requirement for graduation. The primary This course could take the place of, or be in addition to, purpose of the course was to give the students the oppor- annual active duty for training and could provide the tunity to apply the skills and knowledge they had best tank specific training now available to the RC of gained in the classroom and to negotiate a rather diffi- the Armor Force. cult livefire run down range that emphasized survival by using fire and movement. For additional information contact On the 13th day, a 100-question final examination The Directorate of Training and Doctrine and the tank crew gunnery skills test were administered U.S. Army Armor Center to the students. AWN: ATZK-TD-CD (CPTCrevar) Equipment maintenance and turn-in was completed Fort Knox, KY 40121 on the 14th day and the course ended the following day Autovon 464-6430 with a graduation ceremony. Commercial 624-5430 The success of this pilot TC course is attributed to the

ARMOR november-decem ber 1983 11

Task Configuration for Fighting Vehicles by Richard E. Simpkin Two years ago I proposed a modu- UDES 40, and my own ideas (so ticular, to exploit the “double articula- lar construction for armored vehicles excellently intmpreted by one of tion” development of the Swedish and closed by flying a kite about ARMOR’S artists, Mark Irwin).l It UDES XX20,three levels of modular- “task configuration” - a term pitched then becomes thinkable to base an ization are needed: factory modulari- into the discussion by your editor. As armored vehicle family on the modu- zation for the production of short, I see it, ‘‘task configuration” means lar construction indicated in iigure 1. standard, articulated hull units, base the ability to optimize the structure In further thoughts on the technical modularization to obtain maximum and equipment of a task force,formu- aspectz, I reasoned that this full mod- flexibility hma limited inventory, tion, or combat team for a particular ularization might be overly extrava- and field modularization to allow the campaign, operation, or mission. gant in weight. Given certain design exchange of interface and functional precautions to ensure ease of replace- modules (elements 4-5 of figure 1) on The First Leap ment of the automotive subsystems, each of these types of hull unit. For On the technological side, the first elements 1-3of figure 1 could be com- far-flung friends of the wheel, I would leap you have to take leads to a tank bined to produce a hull unit analo- point out that both modular conhe successor with an external gun, crew- gous to the standard cabchassis unit tion and the family concept below are in-hull layout, like some of Cliff of a family of trucks. As we will see, to valid for either wheels or tracks, but Bradley’s concepts, the Swedish give the concept its full scope, in par- not for a mix or for interchangeability

ARMOR november-december 1983 13 between tracks and wheels. Advanced technological studies of SHORT STANDARD EXTENDED armored vehicles for the nineties have 7 combined with geopolitical and military trends to spark radical thinking both on strategic mobility, in the context of a mechanized rapid interven- reconnaissance light mobile - tion force, and operational mobility3, tank destroyer, or protected gun (LMPG) 4, gun this by way of airmechanization. As fire support (TDG) we will see, it is at the end of long air (cannon) or sea lines that the notion of task armored vehicle configuration comes into its own. So tank destroyer JFANTRY SQUAD VEHICL launched bridge as the basis for my comprehensive (missile (TDM)) (military load class 40) modular family, I am going to assume armored self-propelled a maximum individual load of 15tons (includes armored defense artillery and rocket artillery and a maximum width of 2.8 meters. variant) hulls or carriages This is compatible with nineties transport aircraft, with the derricks of mortar vehicle many heavy lift ships and, by a rea- surveillance neavy air aerense systems sonable extrapolation from Chinook sensor command. control, (launchers and radars) and communication; and Soviet Hook helicopters, with the platform - slung or clipon load capability of artillery command post; future heavy-lift helicopters (HLHs). ambulance shell heavy support weapons i Possible Tank Successors armored maintenance and recovery vehicle If my argument is not to founder on L controversy before it sets sail, I must forward ammunition (?) heavy armored digress at this point with a brief dis support vehicle (FASV) reconnaissance vehicles cussion of the tank successor. As I - I have discussed elsewhere5, 6, a crew- 1st: in-hull, light mobile protected gun (LMPG), - mounting, say, the Fthein- metall 10511 gun (a lightweight rubfamiles, with standard mounb modules should not also be compati- development of the NATO 105mm ngs to accommodate theroleoriented ble with the standard hull (though Id51 tank gun) - is definitely to be electronics, also in modular form. The not, of course, vice versa). had at 15 tons. Likewise, an external rear module, corresponding roughly By contrast, the standard hull unit to the idler and rear roadwheel station gun tank,mounting the German 120- must accept both platform and box- mm or Soviet 125mm smoothbore, or and having a strengthened rear sec- body type functional modules. It is even the Soviet 1Xh-m rifled gun, tion to support the magazines of essential both to restorability and to could be fielded at as little as 20 tons. weapon platforms, long payloads in the idea of task configuration that all But a growing body of evidence and cantilever, and the front articulation standard hull units will accept either opinion suggests that Sven Berge and assembly of the extended vehicle, is category of functional module and its his colleagues have got their home likewise common to all standard and associated interface panel. This work right again, and that a tank of short variants. The center module means, as hinted at in figure 1, that this kind with a maximum indivisible corresponds to two roadwheel sta- the internal physical configuration of load of 35 to 40 tons (UDES 40) tions in length in the standard sub the interface panels may differ widely. represents an excellent payoff point in family, and to one in the short. The As just mentioned, it is desirable, and terms of a tank with a really worth- longitudinal rigidity of this modular probably feasible, for the standard while level of direct protection against hull is an evident problem that should hull to accept short functional the future antiarmor threat. This prove amenable to expert structural modules and interface panels. Look- makes the tank unique, putting it out- design ing at the box-body variants (table 1, side the comprehensivemodular fam- Looking next at the field modulari- center column below double line), we zation of the standard and short sub ily and the effective scope of airmobil- see that field modularization can be ity. I leave the reader to weigh this families, we see that these two hull carried one stage further (as it already against the alternate solution below units cannot be broken down and are is in some armored personnel carrier and to decide for himself whether a thus not interchangeable, although (APC) families)by a functionalmodule unique military load cldcation 40 they will have virtually 100 percent made up of a standard armored shell (MLC40) justif;ed. logistic commonality. Table 1 shows that accepts plastic liners pmquipped tank is that the short version is required to with dedicated installations for the accept only functional modules of various coyunication, command, The Comprehensive platform con&uration for weapons and control (C ), combat support, and Armored Vehicle Family or sensors (figure 1, (5) upper). Even if service support roles. This technique Table l7 and figure 3 speak for the mechanical interface is identical, greatly reduces the financial and themselves. In terms of factory modu- each of these functional unib is likely logistical cost of the numerous var- larization, we can envision the stan- to require its matching interface panel iants of this kind, and is itself a major dard hull as designed in four modules. to link up the roleoriented electronics step toward task configuration. The hnt two sections, forming the to the dedicated packs in the crew With the exception of the tank de crew/automotive pod (figure 3a-b),are compartment (figure 1 (4)). I see no stroyer gun (TDG), the extended sub common to the standard and short reason why these short roleoriented family does not require thickened

14 ARMOR november-december 1983 Vgure 1. The modular concept. The constant elements consist of a "chassis" frame l),running gear (2). and a heavily protected crew/automotive pod (3). To this are

riFigure 2. (left) The automotive crew pod1. The power train at the front forms part a1 an integrated compound armor system1. The hatched sections are armor steel plates or castings, the heavy outline in a com pound array that includes the area wit1h zigzag shading. The stippled rear eiemenIt is a lining of boronated polyethylene (0r such). The crew of 3 is seated in line - 0'I driver; C, commander; and DC, deputY commander (see text). The optical arrange- ments indicated for stations C and DC art e secondary vision systems, the main inpuIt for the optronic sighting vision systenn coming from muitisensor heads at thie highest point of the vehicle via an imagie processor to a monitor (M). The ope!n areas are: F, fuel, 0, oil; C, coolant; 1 transmission; and PP, powerpiant. Thi shaded areasin thecrew compartment art housings of eiectronic/eiectricai packs controls, etc.

frontal armor. Until the driver can be provided with true binocular telev1- sion - a somewhat intractable pro1 F lema - he must be at the fmne anid there are very strong psychologiall arguments against isolating the me\ Y from one another.8 Sure, a number aIf analysts, such as Joe Backofen, foir- merly with Battelle Columbus Lab01r- atones, and a school of thought i~n Sweden, favor a rear crew compmt- ment - despite vigorous user opposL- tion. But the bulk of my discussion8 with the Swedes, and some pape!r studies of crosscountry situations I have carried out, support a forwand crew compartment. At least as long a8

ARMOR november-december 1983 15 hydromechanical (as opposed to elec- it stands or with the aid of a subsi- capacity. As I see it, the front unit trical) transmissions are employed, diary functional module, is used for (figure 3d) would need to be of the space saving dictates that the final all detachable stores associated with same length as the short subfamily. drive of the forward unit should be at the payload (including reserve am- The crew and short center modules its back end, adjacent to the rear munition), for the amount of fuel car- would be standard (CS and W2). automotive unit. ried in the sponsons of the short and Special strengtheningwould be needed Thus, the crew compartment standard hulls, and for the bulk of the for the rear module (RA),which must module, with a vertical external plate general vehicle and crew stowage. On now support both magazines and the carrying brackets for the idlers faced ballpark figuring one might achieve a driven end of the articulation. The up to its front bulkhead, forms the main payload of 7 to 8 tons, with a shell of the front module (F)could be front of the forward unit (CA, figure further 4 to 5 tons available in the standard apart from an idler mount- 3c), backed by a standard center rear unit, around 12.5 tons in all. ing fitted into the final drive hole. module (M). The unit is completed by I looked at the option of a crew/ Inside, this module would be stripped a rear module of standard structure automotive forward unit and a load- out down to the subframe and used to but with the rear section (RA), which carrying rear unit, but this entails accommodate the electronic packs must in any case be strong enough to sacrificing a third of total payload normally carried in the (full-length) support magazines and the like and weight and around a fifth of total center module. The upper front armor carrying an assembly that comprises volume/platform area for no gain in would be standard, but I guesstimate the driven end of the articulation. undivided weight and a gain of less there would be enough weight avail- The rear unit of the train again than one quarter in undivided volume/ able to provide a useful amount of sup consists of three modules. At the back platform area. In this discussion of plementary direct protection, in pas- is a standard rear module (Rs, figure the extended subfamily, I have, of sive or dynamic form, to the roof and 3c), with a short center module (M/2) course, been considering fadory mod- sides of the crew compartment. forward of it. At the front is an auto- ularization; field modularization Finally, under this head, the logis- motive module (AA) in which the would be confined to interface panels tic advantages of using a common upper front armor array is replaced and to main (front) and subsidiary power train (for instance that of M2 by an assembly, squared off up to hull (rear) functional modules. Bradley) and common running gear roof level, containing the power take The need for a TDG only arises if assemblies needs no stressing. Each off and the driving end of the articula- the combined antiarmor firepower of subfamily requires a different final tion. As in the Swedish project and the LMPG and the tank destroyer, drive ratio. Given this, the power-to- heavy semitrailer practice, the “dead” missile (TDM) is inferior in a tacti- weight ratios, nominal ground pres- unit would be provided with minimal cally critical degree to that of the sures, and steering characteristics of automotive power to facilitate han- MBT/TDM combination; or if a u- the three subfamilies are excellently dling. (I don’t want to probe the technique MLC40 MI3T is regarded as too matched to their respective groups of nical aspect deeper at this time, but expensive despite its combat worth. roles. one might mention in passing the Although a relatively short-term pro- great advantage offered by electric ject, the Swedish UDES XX 20 pn User and Logistical Advantages transmission for the entire modular vides a general guide. As far as I can Given careful design, two-thirds or family.) see, the TDG would be something of a thequarten3 of the hardware’s unit This configuration (figure 3c) tradeoff with field modularization cost and at least 60 percent of the divides the payload into two parts. confined to replacement of battle maximum indivisible load of short Most of the weight and armored damaged functional modules. Briefly, and standard variants will be con- volume is in the same unit as the the rear unit would be identical with tained in the hull elements discussed crew. This is essential to keep data the rest of the extended subfamily, the above. Thus the carriage of reserve transmission systems and control payload space in it being used to functional modules, interface panels, linkages, which may be very complex, relieve the front unit of all possible with roleoriented electronic packs in within the bounds of realism. The weight and to carry a recharge for the logistic train, becomes in itself spare space in the rear unit, either as magazines of deliberately restricted attractive, in terms both of inventory

16 ARMOR november-december 1983 ~~

cost and of sea, air, and road lift. grated combat arm.9 Although Fort fields, modern military hardware is Functional modules would weigh Knox’s recommendation on this sub too complex and too heavily engi- between 4 and 8 tons; together with jed was rejeded for the US. Army’s neered to offer a sound basis for the ancillaries, they could be carried Division 86 structure, I and many improvisation. On the other hand, an on normal logistic vehicles and others are convinced that all ad- attempt to hold a comprehensive exchanged by crane or by horizontal vanced armies will take this step in range of dedicated complete equip body-swapping techniques. the end. And a single comprehensive menta for unlikely contingencies On arguments already developed in armored vehicle family would destroy would mult in prohibitive capital and your columns’, the functional most of the rational arguments running inventory costs. Holding modules of diredrfire weapon plat- against integration. I stress this be- enough functional modules to ensure forms are at much higher risk than cause an integrated combat arm is a flexibility is a very different story their hulls. Thus, the first payoff in prequisite to full exploitation of task under both capital and maintenance terms of combat worth, which I configuration. My discussion of this heads. Thus, given commensurate believe should remain the cornerstone aspect will be based on a composite rationalization in other fields, a mod- of the comprehensive family concept, battalion of the kind indicated in fig- ular combat vehicle family of the kind is “restorability”’ of battledamaged ure 4.1° But let us next take a first and I proposed above would allow an vehicles by replacement of the func- less conventional bite at this rather intervention force to be equipped from tional module - the complete mount- bitter cherry. stock in a way that precisely matched ing of an external gun LMPG, for Force composition. The British, its needs. By the same token, the need instance. The second advantage, par- F‘rench and U.S. armies are very for equipment-oriented retraining ticularly important in long line inter- familiar with the problems of mount- would be minimized. I guess mwt vention, is the ability to keep key ing a force for a specific intervention readers would agree that the avail- functional modules, such as guns, or operation or for a sustained campaign ability of a purposedesigned mix of C3 installations, in service when their in a theater with some kind of major equipments, and the direct hulls suffer battle damage or severe extreme conditions. (The Soviet Army, logistic savings arising from com- mechanical failure. A less important incidentally, is paying a very high monality and modular construction, functional module on a serviceable price in Afghanistan for its lack of combine to put a new look on inter- hull can just be dumped until another familiarity with this problem.) If a and intra-theater airmobility-indeed hull or a logistic vehicle is available to cadre of officers and noncoms with on strategic mobility and long-line pick it up. For that matter, some C3 relevant experience exists, and is intervention in general. and service support modules could given proper scope, the orientation, Regrouping in the field What your operate on a logistic vehicle chassis in acclimatization and training of offic editor and I earlier had in mind, an emergency. ers and men, as well as structuring of though, was tactical regrouping in the the force, can be achieved within field, specifically changing the “tank- Task Configuration Implications weeks or at worst months. The stum- infantry” balance. A balanced com- All my studies over the past 6 years bling block is equipment. posite unit of the kind depicted in fig- have indicated the need for an inte Even in the medium technology ure 4 roughly equates, in combat worth, to a tank battalion plus a mechanized infantry battalion. It was in fact designed to split into two balanced combat teams, or one tank- heavy and one infantry-heavy team, if required. The reader will see that it COMD Et RECON can do this from ita own remurcea. Likewise, combat teams of the required balance can be formed by company- level regrouping hm a balanced force of conventional tank and infantry battalions. But even supposing a company headquarters to be capable of handling a company of the other kind, a change in the first line balance of the force as a whole can only be achieved by backloading tanks 15x4=20) co with their crews, or IFVs with their squads, and bringing forward manned e Vehicles to replace them. I cannot help feeling that a tank company made up of a mechanized company headquarters and reinforcement crews would be likely to astonish the enemy rather than surprise him. And the same and more goes for an ad hoc mechanized company. Given the progressive training system within composite platoons which 1 IFV I envision for an integrated combat arm8, 10, it would be feasible for a Fkure 4. composite battalion (figure 4) to go at

ARMOR november-decem ber 1983 17 fue team) could be switched to stiffen modularization would turn on produc- the new IFV load, the new intake tion techniques, notably methods of being divided between the two IFVs production control, and on the sue of of the section. I guess most readers the total production run. Certainly would consider this an acceptable automated control and robotized lines wartime expedient; many will have favor modular design. In a long war, experienced or witnessed more ex- modular design would greatly ease treme disruption brought about both innovation and the tuning of simply by losses. production programs to changing In realism, though, all this runs needs. counter to man-management based Within a theater, task configura- on “tribal” relationships and the reg- tion can evidently make a contribu- imental tradition. In particular, it tion to operational-level airmobility, brings us right back to the brutally but it does not look to offer any familiar problem of how to hold relief advantages over conventional re- and reinforcement of armored vehicle grouping; in fact, it is less economical crews well forward yet in reasonable and less effective. At this level, flexi- RICHARD SIMPKIN joined safety. One would almost certainly be bility has to be built into the force the Royal Tank Regiment forced to adopt the principle of vehi- structure down to unit level. However, (British) in 1940. and saw cles and personnel staying and mov- this limitation does not affect the service in the Middle East. He graduated from Staff College ing together. Reinforcements could argument, because the requirements in 1951. and the Royal Mil- only be used for restructuring as a of field modularization to give “res- ita.ry College of Science in very short-term expedient; in any torability” and for base modulariza- 1953, specializing in vehicles. event, they may not be available for tion to permit task configuration are He was responsible for user this purpose. By the same token, almost identical. trials of the Chieftain, and manned reserve functional modules A comprehensive armored vehicle worked with the Scorpion could not be exchanged with dam- family of the kind depicted in table 1 and Swingfire development. aged modules on fit hulls and crews. should and, I believe, could be modu- He was promoted Brigadier This slice of manpower and equip larized to the point where any hull of in 1968 and placed in charge of equipment policy for the ment would be far better placed in a subfamily will accept any role direct-fire battle and all coherent, balanced, integrated com- oriented kit (functional module, inter- aspects of mobility. He bat arm units to start with. face panel and electronic packs) headed the British team on designed for that subfamily. Addi- the project definition and Conclusion tionally, hulls of the standard sub operational requirements of Adoption of a modular concept for family should accept kits designed for the Anglo-German MBT pro- AFV design would be likely to entail a the short subfamily. It goes without gram, where he was closely weight penalty, from known anale saying that the whole family should concerned with the exploita- gies of probably around 5 percent. have the highest possible logistic tion of Chobham armor. After (The 10 percent weight penalty of retiring he set up a language commonality. But the advantages of consultancy in 1971, and articulation would be superimposed modularization of hulls are confined divides his time between that on this.) Against this, one must set to the production level and may well and writing books. substantial savings in inventory costa, be offset by design penalties and logistics costs and logistic lift, To my incred unit cost.

18 ARMUR novern ber-decem ber 1983 The Soviet Mechanized Corps in 1941 by Michael Parrish

Reprinted from MILITARY unduly involved with questions of study the role of morin the Red AJFALRS, April 1983, with permis- military doctrine. In regard to the lat- Army. The chairman of the commission. Copyright 1983 by the American ter, it seems that despite their pre sion was Marshal G. I. Kulik, who Military Institute. No additional vious inconsistencies by mid-1941 the has since been blamed by Soviet wri- copies made without the express per- Sovieta had finally come to accept the ters as one of those responsible for the mission of the author and the editor of independent role of armor in modern Red Army’s lack of preparedness in MILITARY AFFAIRS. Warfare. 1941. Other members include S. M. The mechanized corps were firet Budennyi, B. M. Shaposhnikov, S. K. formed in the Red Army in 1932, and Timoshenko, K. A. Meretskov, L 2. Animportantchapterinthehietory the first two of these, the 11th and Mekhlis, D. G. Pavlov, M. P. Kovalev, of Soviet mor- the reintroduction 45th were assigned to the Leningrad and B. A. Shchadenko. This commis- and deployment of mechanized corps and Kiev Military Districts. In 1933 sion considered the armor question in 19401941 - remains incomplete1 and 1934, two more mechanized corps from 8 July to 22 August. Pavlov and This article is an attempt to tell the were formed. Each consisted of three possibly Kulik, arguing hmtheir confused hietory of the development brigades with a total strength of 500 experiences during the Spanish Civil of the mechanized corps in the Red tanks, 250 armored m, 250 trucks, War, suggested that the tank corps be Army and to point out some of the and 60 artillery pieces. In 1938, the disbanded, an idea rejected by the reasons for ita dismal performance Soviets reorganized their four mech- commission. In fact, in September during the Summer of 1941. The anized corps into tank corps,but the 1939, two tank corps (the 15th and Soviet Union’s current heroic image change was largely semantic. The 25th) took part in the invasion of of the Great Patriotic War makes it new tank corps fielded a rifle and two Poland. This was, however, the only dSdt to examine all the fadors tank brigades with a combined occasion in which tank or mechan- involved in the catastrophic defeata of strength of 12,710 troops, 500 tanks ized corps as such were used in com- 1941. The thrust of this article is a his- (mostly T-26s and BTs), and 118 bat by the Soviets before 1941. None torical survey of the development and artillery pieces. The four unita were were deployed either at Lake Khasan deployment of larger armored forma- stationed in the following military (1938), or Khalkhin Go1 (1939) against tions in the Red Army and an districts No. 10 in Leningrad, No. 15 the Japanese, or during the Winter assessment of the technological and in Belorussia, No. 25 in Kiev, and No. War against the Finns. leadership factors that played so large 20 in Transbaikal. In November 1939, under circum- a role in its performance in the early In July 1939, the Main Military stances that remain unclear, the months of the war without being Council established a commission to Main Military Council (or poseibly ARMOR november-decem ber 1983 19 Stalin alone) ordered the tank corps disbanded. About this same time new instructions were given to form four motorized divisions (a new designation), and plans were made to form 15 more of these in 1940 and an additional seven in 1941. In the Summer of 1940, having observed the resulta of the German blitzkrieg in Poland and in the West, the Soviets seem to have panicked, with the result that there was another dramatic change in policy. On 9 July 1940, the Minister of Defense, S. K. Timoshenko, ordered the reforming of mechanized corps on a truly gigantic scale.* The inconsistent policy reflected in the deployment of armor was influenced by political as well as military factors. The earlier purge of M. N. Wachevskii and others who had been ident5ed closely with armor development made advocacy of inde pendent armor potentially dangerous. It is quite possible that Pavlov and Kulik, the alleged culprita in breaking up the large armored units, inter- preted their experiences of the Span- ish Civil War in accord with the contemporary political climate - a very commonplace practice during the Stalin era By mid-1940, however, some of the lessons of the blitzkrieg must have bmeclear to Stalin and his chief military assistants. Therein- troduction of the mechanized corps as an independent force would seem to cars, 85 pieces of artillery, and nearly The main question which remains support this contention. 11,OOO men. Each motorized division is why the Soviet forces, enjoying The Soviet mechanized corpe of had 11,600 men, 275 light tanks, 51 such clear numerical superiority, 1W1941 was the largest armor for armored cars, and 158 artillery pieces. fared 80 poorly in the field. In their mation created anywhere, larger even (Another source gives respective fig- writings, some Soviet writers, includ- than any of the six tank armies urea of 11,650,275,48,and 98.) The ing Chief Marshal of Tank Troops, formed during 19421945, which USU- retically, on the eve of the war the Red P.A. Rotmistrov, have tended to ally had fewer than 700 tanks. The Army had a strength of over 30,000 ignore the early tank battles of the 1940 mechanized corps consisted of tanks. At the time of the outbreak of war.6 Others offer unsatisfactory 37,200 men, 1,108tanks, 208 armored hostilities, German intelligence esti- explanations for failure: that the cars, and more than 300 artillery mated Soviet armored sbrength at mechanized corps were not up to pieces. In 1941 the number of tanks 15,000 tanks, while other sources cite strength, that some of the unita were was reduced to 1,031and personnel to 24,000 as a more accurate figure.4 in the Far East, and that there was an 36,000. Each corps had one motorized Most motorized and tank divisions insufficient number of new 2‘-34 and infantry and two tank divisions. It were assigned to corps organizations, KV tanks,even though the older Rus- was several times the size of ita suo although there were also a few inde sian tanks were not much inferior to ce8sor in name which was to appear pendent divisions. German tank the German Mark III tank, which in 1942 when armored farces were strength numbered fewer than 3,000. was the mainstay of the German once again reorganized. Incidentally, The Soviets, who have shown a reluo armor at this time. Even in the face of although in 1942 the name mechan- tance to reveal their total armor Russian excuses, it would not be an ized corps was reintroduced, the titles strength on the eve of Barbaa, exaggeration to claim that the Rus- of ‘Yank” and “motorized” divisions admit to the following fads: from sians enjoyed a threebone superior- were only revived during the postwar January 1939 to June 1941, 7,000 ity against the enemy, and that they period. tanks were bdt, including at least had at the very least 1,500 combat In 1940, nine mechanized corps 1,860 T34s and KVs. The motorized ready T-34 and KVS - weapons were formed, and in February and divisions were also only about half- clearly superior to anything that the March of 1941, another 20 were added strength, while the tank divisions had Germans had at this time. In view of to the Red Army. These corps a strength of 68 percent. Many of the these qualifications to various argu- included in their total complement at mechanized corps were considerably menta, it is difficult to question the least 61 tank and 31 motorized divi- understrength, some having no tanks dissident General Petr Grigomnko’s sion~.~Each tank division in 1941 and others as few as 98. In some unita claim that in 1941 the Red Army was consisted of 375 tanks (63 KV, 310 only 27 percent were combabready, superior to the enemy both in quan- T34, 102 T-26 and BT), 95 and spare parts were always scarce.5 tity and quality.7 20 ARMOR november-december 1983 Then why did the Soviet armor fail Order of Bank. soviet Mechanized Corps, Summer 1941 so miserably in the Summer of 1941? uln The element of surprise and early # 8.r confusion must have played a part, 1 Baltic Special Military District MG of -Tank Troops. 'Elesswnyi podvig as well as the defeat of the Russian (Northwest Front) M. L. Chemiavskii -- 2 Odessa Military District MG Iu. V. Novose(skii "Bessmertnyi podvig" air force by the Luftwaffe, but other (South Front) considerations obviously extended to 3 BaMc Special Military District MG of Tank Trwps. "Elessmertnyi podvig" the inexperience and incompetence of (Northwest Front) A. V. Kurkin Soviet commanders who were simply 4 Kiev Special Military District MG A. A. vlasov 'Kiev. godgeroi." no match for their German counter- (Southwest Front) (executed 82-1946) E. Dwingrer. "Vlasov" 5 Western Special (Belorussian) MG of Tank Troops. "Bessmertnyi podvig." parts. The typical Soviet mechanized Military District (West Front) I. P. Alekseenko (executed?)" "Voenno istoricheskii zhumal." corps commander owed his position to 7-1971 the rapid promotions of the purge 6 Western Special (Betmian) MG M. 0. Khatsilevich 'Bessmertnyi yg." years and under other circumstances Military District (West Front) (KIA, 624-41) I. V. Boldin. "Stranitsy zhizni" 7 Western Special (Belorussian) MG V. I. Vinogradov 'Bessmertnyi podvig." would scarcely have been qualified to Military District (West and Central V. I. Kazakw. "Na perelome" command a regiment. Leading a force Fronts) of 1,OOO tanks, however, was simply 8 Kiev Special Milltary Distnct LTG D. I. RiabVshev "Bessmertnyi podvig." (Southwest Front) N. K. Popel'. beyond him. The average age of six 'Natiazhkuiu pwu" mechanized corps commmanders for 9 Klev Special Military Distnct MG K. K. Rokossovskii. "8essmertnyi podvig." whom birthdates are available (Southwest Front) 7/19/418/9/41. MG of Technical K K. Rok-kii. (Korovnikov,Leliushenko, LE. Petrov, Services A. G. Maslov "Soldaskie dolg" 10 Leningrad Military Distnct Riabyshev, Rokossovsln, and Vlasov) (North Front) was about 41. Facing them were 11 Western Special (Belorussian) MG M G Mostovenko "Beswnertnyi podvig." German panzer division command- Military Distnct (West Front) I. V. Boldin. "Stranitsy zhuni" ers, each of whom commanded about 12 BaHic Special Milnary Distnct MG N M Shestoplw. "Bessmertnyi podvig." (Northwest Front) (dted as a POW 8/6/41) A. A. Sharipw. 300 tanks. A random check of eight MG I T Korovnikov. "Chemiakhoskii" contemporary commanders - Kirch- 13 Western Special (Belonrmsn) MG P N Akhliusten 'Elessmertnyi podvig" ner (l), Von Veiel(2), Model (3),Land- Military Distnct (West Front) graf (6), Hubicki (91, Hube (16), Von 14 Western Special (Belorussian) MGS I Obonn 'Elessmertnyi podvig." Arnim (17), and Nehring (18) - Military Distnct (West Front) (executed 19419) L M. Sandalov. "Perezhitoe" 15 Kiev Speclal Military Distnct MGI I Karpezo "Elessmerhyi podvig." shows the average age to be about 53. (Southwest Front) (wounded 7/26/41) N. K. Popel'." "Na Soviet commanders included such COLG I Ennolaw tiazhkuiu poru" men as N. V. Feklenko, a failure with 16 Kiev Special Military Distnct KomdwA D Sokolar "Bessmerhyi podvig" the 57th FWle Corps in Khalkhin Gol, (Southwest Front) 17 Western Special (Belorussian) MGM P Perm "8essmertnyi podvig- and I.N. Khabarov, whose leadership Military District (West Front) (to 7/25/41) MG I N Khabarw of the Soviet 8th Army during the 18 Odessa Military Distnct "ROMI Blikkriga" Winter War merited a court martial. A (South Front) few of the Soviet commanders had 19 Kiev Special Military Dtstrtct MG of Tank Troops -Bessmermyi podvig" fought in Spain, in the Far and (Southwest Front) N V Feklenko East 20 Western Special Military Distnct MG A G Nikitin from mKeJuly A. E. Eremenko. 'V against Finland, but their limited (Belorussian) (West Front) 1941. MG of Tank Troops N D nachale voiny." L. M. Sandalov, experience, usually at very junior lev- Vedeneev "Na moskovsko napravienni" els, could not match their German 21 Baltic Special Milltary Dish113 MG D D Leliushenko "Elessmerhyi podvig." D. D. opponents. (Northwest Front) Leliushenko. "Laria pobedy" 22 Kiev Special Milltary District MG S M Kondrusev. (KIA?) 'Bessmerhy podvig" To reach the heart of this issue, one (Southwest Front) MG V S Tamrushi (6/25/41) must go beyond the general histories MG V N Simvolokov '23 Western Speclal (Belotusstan) MG M A Miasnikov Voenrm istoricheskii of the war which are laden with pm Military Distnct (West Front) zhurnal. 574 paganda, inaccuracies, and omis- 24 Kiev Special Milltary District MG V I Chistiakov (KIA 1941) sions. Our best sources, although far 25 Western Special (Belotussian) MG S M Knvcshein S M Krmhn. from adequate, are the memoirs of the Military Distnct (West Front) 'Ratnam byl'." A I Eremenko. men who commanded or who were 'V nachale voiny" 27 North Caucasus Milltary District? MG I. E. Petrov Voenno storicheskir associated with the mechanized corps zhurnal. 9-66 in the early days of the war. Partim- 28 Transcaucasus Milltary Distnct MG V. V. Novikov"

larly useful are the pre1965 memoirs 30 Far East Front A I Getman. Tanka tdut M written during a brief period when - frankness was not a cardinal sin in :orps, only to end up mired in and 27, never saw combat as complete Soviet historiography.8 It is obvious swamps. He eventually committed unita and were probably broken up from these memoirs that the atmos- suicide.10 Not all mechanized corps and sent piecemeal to threatened phere of command in the early days were involved in combat of uniform areas. For instance, the 18th Mechan- of the war left much to be desired. In intensity. Some, such as Numbers 8, ized Corps was attached to the South the midst of combat, watchdog com- 9, and 15, took part in several pitched Front, and yet it was not deployed as missars questioned the proletarian battles. Others, such as Numbers 6, a complete unit. On rare occasions geneology of the commanders, while 16, and 23, were apparently wiped out when the Soviets used their superior at the same time offering medals for in their first engagements --in the tanks with imagination the results success and fjring squads for failure.9 case of the 6th Mechanized Corps,on were quite impressive. Such an One fanatical commissar, N. N. the second day of the war. On 25 instance occurred in Mtsensk on 5 Vashugin, lacked any armor com- June, the 22nd, 19th, and 9th October 1941, when the German mand experience; nevertheless, he Mechanized Corps were respectively armor was smashed and Guderian took it upon himselfto lead into battle reduced to 33,35,and 66 tanks. Still was ahnost captured.11 But such sue elements of the 8th Mechanized others, such as Numbers 10, 18, 24, cessea were indeed quite rare, and by

ARMOR november-december 1983 21 destroyed. Now the largeat tank unit German advance toward Stalingrad. commanded by a former mechanized operating in any army that had pia- The excuses of 1941 could no longer be corps commander, D. D. Leliushenko. neered large armored formations was applied to the failures of armor in the The most distinguished career, of the tank brigade. These were used Summer of 1942, and Soviet infantry course, belonged to the former com- . almost exclusively in defensive posi- paid with blood for continued short. mander of the 9th Mechanized Corps, tions in support of the infantry. Dur- comings in the use of armor. During the future Marshal K. K. Fbkossovski, ing the Summer of 1942 the Soviets the Stalingrad counteroffensive, the who later commanded regular armies slowly began to reform mechanized new 5th Tank Army of the Southwest and fronts, but never purely armored and tank corps, and eventually a new F’ront was hampered by the slowness units. Among the other commanders, designation -tank army - appeared- of its accompanying rifle divisions, A. A Vlasov, N. V. Feklenko, and These usually consisted of three corps and in the Spring of 1943, Field Mar- I. N. Khabarov commanded regular (in the beginning with additional rifle shal Erich von Manstein easily routed armies, the first a defector and the divisions) and were about twa-thirds the Soviet 3rd Tank Army and the last two leaders without any particu- the size of the 1940 mechanized corps. “Popov Armored Group,” which lar distinction. The commander of the These h3t tank armies profited the formed the main Soviet armor units 15 Mechanized Corps, I. I. Karp~o, Soviets little because the lessons of in the South. Only at Prokhorovka, was so badly wounded that he never previous defeats had not yet been during the battle of Kursk in July returned to combat. A. A. Vlamv was learned. In July 1942, the newly 1943, did the Russians finally begin to of come executed in 1946, a fate formed and splendidly equipped 5th demonstrate mastery of the art of which may also have befallen Tank bywas in perfect position to modern armored warfare, at least dur- General S. I. Oborin, commander of stop the German advance towards ing those occasions in which they the 14th Mechanized Corps in 1941.14 Voronezh and thus frustrate Hitler’s enjoyed numerical superiority. At The strangest career belonged to D. L entire Summer campaign, but it was Prokhorovka the Soviet 5th Guard Riabyshev, the commander of the 8th deployed haphazardly and without Tank Army, ably led by the Russians’ Mechanized Corps, who started and adequate air and artillery support.12 best armor commander, P. A. Fbtrnb finished the war as a corps com- Consequently, the 5th Tank Army trov (Chief of Staff of the 3rd Mechan- mander, but who also managed to was annihilated at the gates of VOID- ized Corps in the beginning of the command several armies and for a nezh, with its commander, Major war) managed to hold ita own against time the entire South hntwithout General A I. Liziukov (one of the the crack II SS Punzer Corps. ever receiving a promotion. At a time early writers on armor), seeking death In reviewing the military career of when a great deal is being written on the battlefield, although Stalin the surviving mechanized corps about advances in Soviet weaponry, preferred to believe that he had commanders, we discover that most perhaps it is advisable to remember defected to the enemy.13 of them did not again command the lessons of the Summer of 1941 as Farther south, two other tank purely armored forces. Further, of the well as American experiences in Viet armies, the 1st and the 4th (named six tank armies that formed the back- Nam, to say nothing of the recent Russian clif6dties in Afghaniatam powerful weapons in superior numbers Refwenma do not necessarily guarantee victory. 1 For a survey of So*. histqical literature this disaeter 88e (by Marehal A. M. Vaailmlrii see A. Davidenko, ‘‘Istonograiim tankovykh and General M. L Kazakov) “Na vomnezhskom voisk,” Voenno istorichkii zhurmcrl, 10 (1980), napravlenii letom 1942 goda,” Voenno istori- 81-03. cheskii zhunurl, 10 (I%), 34. Ale0 the respective 2 A. F. Ftyhakov? “K vopo Sp4itel”Btve memoirs of the m&olllsts Del0 user rhizni and bronetankovykh vmk Krasnoi Arrrm v 303 Nu kratai bythh sreknii. gody,” Voennoistorichakii zhd, 8 (1968). l3 Iu. Zhu ov, lrudr 4G.x goabv, 225, D. 107-108. Rodinskii and N. Tsar’kov. Powst’ o bmt’iakh. 50 let Voonuhennykh Si1 SSSR, 236. 50. 4 “The Development of Soviet Mobneed I4 Roy Medvedew, Let Hietory J~uige,466. Infantry,” Born in Battle Magazine, 12 (1980), 15 Besides the aforementioned memoirs the 43. E.ary source for additional readings are the 5 For .estimates of the atrength of v&m. nes of the border Mhtary Districts. These Be v. A. Mov,Bessmertnyz are Krasnoznamennyi Belorusskii voennyi mTk“$Emenko, ArdcroLls Begilming, okrug (1973),Krasnoznnmmnyi Odesski (1970), $$:%I E”nckmn, Road to Stalmgmd, 63,143 Istariia pribaltiiskogo wennogo okruga (I*), 163, L M. Sandalov,. “O~mnitel’naiaoperataii and Kievskii Krasnoznammennyi (1969). There 4i armii v nachal’nyl penod voiny,” Venn0 isb are, however, some gape; for example, the history richeskii rhurnd (7-71). 22; V. Butkov, “Kon- of the Odessa Military District says nothin trudar 5gO me vanno o korpusa na about the deployment of the 18 Mechd le l’skom naprWGl1ii&a 1941 gwCorps even though this umt wa~attached to this d%no istoricheskrr zhd(91971), 60.61; and district. The history of the North Caucasus Mil- V. I. Kazakov, Nu perebme, 5. itary District also says nothing about mechan- 6 P. A. Rotmistrov, Vremiu i tanki. ized corps deployed there. MICHAEL PARRISH is direc- 7 P. Grigorenko,Staline et la deuieme gwrm 16 The histpry of the Kiev Military District mondiale. blatantly omta Vlasov’s name and lists the 4 tor of the Indiana University E V. I. Kazakov (cinc Artille 7 MC), Na pew+ Mechanized Corps under ita chief of staff Colonel School of Public Affairs lome (1962), S. M. Kri’uoshein YCinC 25 Mu, Rat A A. Mar’ianov. See Kievskii Krasnoznamme- Library (1973) and professor Mia byl’ (1962).N. K Popel’ (commissar 8 MC)! nyi, 192. Nu tiuzhkuu poru (lp59), K. K. Rokossovslo A. I. Erp~dOin ‘Y nachale voinf’ (497) in the same school. A gradu- (cine 9 MC), Soldutskz dolg (1968), D. D. Lelju- gives a detded biography of Alekseenko but ate of Indiana University, he shenko (cinc 21 MC), Moskua-Std&-&rllingmd-BerIm- omita any mention of his fate after June 1941 is author of numerous publi- Prago (1971). Zana pobedy (1961). which hints that Alekseenko must have falld N.K. Po jel, In schwere zit, 161. victim to Stalin’s firing squads. cations on Soviet military his- Io I. Kh. €!am, Tak nnchinalae’ voina. In Jul 1941 the 28 Mechanized Corps wan tory and historiography. His 144. dissolved. &lita’ base on the borders of Iran, the two-volume study USSR in I’ M. E. Katukov, Naostnkglavnogoudara,ldarcS28 47th Army was formed. This unit took part in the World War II was published 32. Heinz Guderum, Ennnerungen eks Sol- invasion of Iran before being deployed in the daten, 21@211. north Caucasus. See “Sovetskaa voennaia en& in 1981 by the Garland Press. ’2 For two diametrically opposing vim of syklOpedii&“ VOl. 7, 449.

22 ARMOYP novernber-december 1983 Counterattack Planning by Lieutenant Colonel Shewood E. Ash The new FM 1W5, Operations, is stronger, this battle could have been sive activity is regained. soon to be published. This manual another Cannae, with the attendant Indeed, some of the great military emphasizes audacity and offensive ac- massive destruction of the loser. thinkers of our time have stressed the tion in defensive operations. Two up During November 1941, the British importance of the reserve in their and one back-counterattack. Those Eighth Army attacked Rommel in writing. Major General J. F. C. F’uller old concepts are now (again) in vogue. North Africa. In 40 days Rommel was in his book Machine Warfare says: But just how does a commander go pushed back 400 miles, but then the “There is yet one other point about planning and conducting a British attack lost its momentum. which battles between mechan- counterattack? To find the answer Rommel counterattacked and in turn ized forceswill aaxntuate-name you have to look in the obsolete FMs. pushed the British back 350 miles in ly, the increasing value of a pow- But to save you the time fmm research- 20 days. By now, Rome1 had stretch- erful reserve, because increased ing the old “bibles,” and to ease the ed his supply lines so thin he had to mobility carries with it power to transition to the “new” defensive doc stop. surprise. As one of the great difli- trine, this article discusses counteratr Besides illustrating the successful culties in such operations will be tack rationale and planning tech- application of the counterattack, these to gauge the enemy’s intentions, niques. First, let us look at some examples also demonstrate the differ- unless strong reserves are kept in background on the counterattack fol- ent situations where counterattacks hand, it will be impossible to meet lowed by the planning considerations have been used. Cannae and Cow- unexpected situations.” and, Gnally, let us look at a sample pens were planned counterattacks, Additionally, Field Marshal Gen- counterattack operations plan the attacker was deceived and fell into eral Rim von Leeb has the same (OPLAN). a trap. In the battles of Gettysburg opinion. This paragraph hm his Throughout history, counterattack and Warsaw the counterattacks were book Defense published in 1943, prcb operations have had a significant actually desperation typea where the vides the modern reader with some effect on battle outcomes. And, while alternative (attrition warfare) would practical concepts for using reserve it is not the intent of this paper to ana- have been disastrous to the defender. forces: lyze specific battles, it is instructive to In Rommel’s case, he was an oppor- “The determination of the deci- give some examples. For instance, the tunist. He recognized the loss of Brib sive ones does not depend only on battles of Cannae and Cowpens re ish momentum and calculated this to the defender but also on the sulted in victories for the counterat- be the time for a counterattack. Thus, attacker, at least to the extent tack form. In these two battles, the he let the situation dictate the right that the defender must take his attacking mystruck and pushed moment. opponent’s actions into account. back the defensive army. Then at the Each attacker knows that against decisive moment, the defense coun- an organized defensive front, be terattacked from the flanks, and ““Acounterattaek is the most it in a war of movement or a war muted the attacker. The tam defensive decisive element of the de- of position, only an attack led offensive (not used in current U. S. fensive battle. It is the only with force and articulated in literature) describes the above battles. naneuverthatcantakeadvan- depth has any prospect of break- Ekom our own Civil War, the battle tage of enemy vulnerabili- ing through with its entire grav- of Gettysburg also demonstrated the ity. Strong and mobile reserves power of the counterattack. During ties of the moment.” spare many womes to the com- the defense of the Union left flank at mander of an operative defense. Little Round Top, the 20th Maine On the modern battlefield, a defen- But he needs also increased, con- found itself low on ammunition and sive battle can only be influenced by stant, and far-reaching recon- probably unable to beat back another the commander’s uncommitted re naissance and observation.” charge. The commander decided on a serves. Lest this point be misunder- Now that we have seen some counterattack as his only choice to stood, it is necessary to digress and examples of counterattacks andestab prevent the flank from being turned. briefly review the purposes of the lished the importance of a reserve, let Only about 250 men participated in defense. Generally an army defends us turn to the purposes of the counter- the counterattack, but it caught the during one of the following con- attack. Confederate Army completely by sur- ditions: Generally, munMttacks fall into prise; it was succe88fuL 0 The attacker has superior strength two categories-C-ain+riented and The 1920 war between Russia and and has taken the initiative. enemy-oriented. Terrain-oriented Poland demonstrated yet another ex- 0 Key terrain must be held counterattacks could be undertaken to ample of the counterattack. In this An economy of force is needed in reat~rea position or reinforce a threa- case, the Polish Army, which was one area to allow sufficient offensive tened defensive area as in “restore numerically inferior to the Russians, power to be massed in another area. the F’EBA”; securing an objective conducted a strategic retrograde move In short, the purpose of defense is to could also be a purpose. Enemy- ment west toward Warsaw. When the buy time until sufficient forces or oriented counterattacks are employed Poles had enough maneuver space, other conditions (loss of attacker’s to destroy the enemy in an area (such they consolidated their army and momentum) exist to conduct offensive as a raid or tank sweep, or to create a counterattacked around the Russian operations. It follows, therefore, that trap for the enemy that can then be left flank into the rear. This attack so only units with powerful reserves attacked either by fire (artillery, tac disrupted the Russians that they have the capability to influence a de air, direct fire), or by fire and maneu- retreated. If the Poles had been fensive battle to the extent that offen- ver.

november-december 1983 23 this would be the type of counterati tack employed by fixing forces. Higher- level reserves, division or corps, are me.1 a-ve3.- CounwrawcKL 11- 1 rorcesF m the overall conduct of defense. There fore, the most powerful and mobile elements in a defensive area are these higher level reserves. l'bning-htion.Obviously, the timing and location of the counterattack are important considerations of the plan. The counterattack may be against a flank, a seam, or a gap, or against the nose of a penetration. It may develop that the counterattack will have to be launched at night or under cover of other poor visibility. This will affect timing, amount of traffic control, and the effectivenessof combat support units such as air sup port and attack helicopters. Unity of effort. A counterattack plan must also provide for unity of effort. All forces must be oriented on the execution of the plan for it to be successful. Unity of effort can be established in one of the following A counterattack is the most decisive assumed penetration on each princi- ways: element of the defensive battle. It is pal enemy avenue of approach. As the Designate a single higher com- the only maneuver that can take intelligence of the enemy develops, mander. advantage of enemy vulnerabilities of other plans should be developed. 0 Attach units in the area to the the moment. One of the purposes of Initial plans will probably conform counterattack force. the defense is to seize the initiative only generally to the situation that 0 Have the counterattackforce con- from the attacker by conducting offen- actually develops. Therefore, the sue duct a passage of lines. sive operations. Counterattackssatisfy cess of the plan must not be based Adjust boundaries. this purpose. upon preselected areas into which the 0 Organize a special task force. If counterattacks are so critical to enemy must be canalized before being Plan for failure.Finally, what ifthe the defense, when then is the oppor- attacked, We must remember that the plan, when executed, fails to achieve tune moment for this operation? Un- only certainty in battle is uncertainty its objective? One of the dangers of fortunately, there are no pat solutions; itself. this situation is a loss of depth, there it is entirely dependent upon the Forces. Defensive combat forces are by reducing the ability of the defend- situation. Intelligence becomes a very organized into security or covering ing force to react to enemy initiatives. vital key to the commander's timely forces, fixing forces, and reserves. The Commanders will have to decide decision. Successful counterattacks de covering force is a minimum force whether to hold current positions and pend upon surprise and speed. The used to gain information, delay, die wait for reinforcements, to try again commander must consider his own organize, divert, and weaken the in another sector, or to conduct some power, the rate of the enemy advance, attack in preparation for the counter- sort of retrograde to regain time and and the weight and location of enemy attack. Some of these forces may space for reorganization, reserves. Then the commander must remain as stay-behind-forces to fur- To communicate a counterattack decide if he can cope with the penetra- ther refine the intelligence already plan to his subordinate units, the tion (or other vulnerability,such as an collected. The ikhg force uses a com- commander uses the operation over- exposed gap or enemy loss of momen- bination of holding ground, delay, lay and OPLAN formats. The overlay tum) with his own reserves, or if he and limited-objdve attacks to fur- requirements for the counterattack must hold and call for help. This deci- ther weaken and canalize the enemy are the same as for a coordinated sion is the most difficult Thus, it attack. Then, when an enemy vulner- attack and should have, as a min- becomes the most critical of the de ability is apparent, or when the attack imum, a line of departure, an objee fensive battle. has been slowed, stopped, or has tive, an attack position, a direction of Now that we have established a become disorganized,, the reserve is attack and boundaries. Additionally, firm base for counterattack opera- committed as a unit to destroy the the overlay may have assembly areas, tions, just what are the considerations enemy. fire support coordination lines, phase for planning this event? The plan- Types. Counterattack types include lines, coordination points, and con- ning factors that follow include the the use of &-e, local reserves, or the tact points. number of plans, organization of for- reserves of higher headquarters. A Figure 1 assumes an enemy pene ces,counterattack type, time and loca- counterattack by &-e can be employed tration on the avenue of approach in tion, unity of effort, and a contin- in a killing zone or in an ambush. the 1st Brigade sector. ("hi3 may be gency plan for failure (table 1). Local reserve counterattacks might be one of several, because a plan should Plans. As a minimum, counterati those employed by a brigade com- be made for each enemy avenue of tack plans are prepared to attack an mander in a division area. Normally, approach). 24 ARMOR novernber-december 1983 Copy 1 of 30 copies HQ. 23d Armd Div Battleground, somewhere 010001 A Nov 19- OPLAN 84-1OA Reference: Map, series .... To precluae any misundcdand- Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA ings about this Counterattack plan, let Task Organization: us review its salient features. First, 1st Bde 3d Bde the 1 tack force is very strong 1-91 Mech 1-95 Mech and three armored and one 1-10 Armor 1-13 Armor mec )attalion,one attack heli- 1-11 Armor 1-14 Armor copL ~wlllIIany,two companies of 1-15 Armor divisional engineers, three artillery C/23d CAB (AHC) (OPCON) battalions and a Vulcan battery. 2d Bde Div Trps (Table 2) Addbonay, wty or effort 1-92 Mech 1-22 Cav is provided by an initial passage of 1-93 Mech lines, then a boundary change. And 1-94 Msh finally, a plan is in plat & the 1-12 Armor force should the COI :k be D/23d CAB (AHC) (OPCON) + + + + + + unsuccessm (ngure 1). udds are this 3. EXECUTION OPLAN won’t be executed as envisi- a. Concept of Operation. oned. But, as the actual location of the (1) Maneuver. On order, 3d Bde passes through 1st Bde; conducts counter- enemy attack becomes known,we can attack to secure OBJ ACE and prep to cont exploitation. 1st Bde assists pass of 3d make the adjustments with confi- Bde. reorganizesdef posand preptofol3d Bde. 2d Bdefixesenemyfwd of FEBAto dent prev enemy forces from shifting toward OW ACE; Prep to spt exploitation of 3d SUmmaLJ Bde success. 1-22 Cav fol3d Bde and perform rear guard as 3d Bde cont exploita- Many readers will recognize that I tion; if counterattack fails, block and cover retrograde of 3d Bde through FEBA. have borrowed heavily from the old (2) Fires: Pri of fires to 3d Bde. 2d Bde. 1st Bde; 1-22Cav; upon retrograde of 3d Bde, pri is to 3d Bde; 1-22 Cav. 2d Bde. on order PL SKINNER becomes “Mobile Defense” in my example. It is FSCL. a vahd tool actician and it deserves to be Indeed, the b. 1st Bde. murrrx.ted. (1) Assist pass of 3d Bde; 1-22 Cav. new FM 1W5 says “the commander (2) Hold left shoulder of penetration. may defend . . . by drawing the en- (3) After pass of 3d Bde; assume msn as Div Res and prep to fol 3d Bde emy deep into the area of operations exploitation. and then striking him along his (4) Reorg def after pass of 3d Bde and, if necessary. assist retrograde of 3d flanks and in his rear.” But the field Bde; 1-22 Cav. manual shie c. 2d Bde. type of defe (1) Fix enemy fwd of FEBA. t€?lTll. (2) Prevent enemy from shifting toward OW ACE. Gounman ningisaninte (3) Prep to atk and spt exploitation of 3d Bde. gral part of 3ive operations. d. 3d Bde. Even though mOaern warfare has (1) Atk through 1st Bde and seize OW ACE. shown the defense to be “the stronger (2) Prep to cont exploitation to defeat enemy in zone. form” (Clausewitz),an army can only e. Firesupport. win battles with the defense; to win a + + + c 0 + + war that Samc LulLIJ lnust attack and (3) Field Artillery. acheve “thepositive aim.” + + I c c + c b. Organization for Combat. 1-50 FA (1 55) DS 1st Bde. 1-51 FA (155) DS 2d Bd 1-52 FA (155) DS 3d Bd 1-53 FA (8“) GSR 1-50 + + c + + f. Air Defense. (1) 1-440ADA(-) GS; A/1-440 (Vulc) atch to 3d Bde when comm (2) Upon exec of this OPLAN, prot 3d Bde mov through LD. g. Aviation: 23d CAB (-) GS pri for airlift to 3d Bde. I c c t + + t i. Engineer Support. (1) General: 23d Engrand 3d Bdecoord mobilityreqfroma88emblyareasto PL SKINNER. (2) Organization for Combat. LIEUTENANT COLONEL 23d Engr. SHERWOOD E. ASH was A/23d Engr DS 1st Bde. cornmis rrmor Trom W23d Engr DS 2d Bde. the Uni California. C/23d Engr atch 3d Bde. ne IS a yrauuate of the D/23d Engr atch 3d Bde. AOAC. and C8GI i E/23d Engr GS: pri to 3d Bde; 2d Bde. served in Vietnam I 510th Engr Bn GS: pri to mobility opns during exploitation. and CONUS in air cavalry troops, armorea cavalry reg- j. Div Troops: 1-22 Cav. iments, and tank battalions. (1) Fol 3d Bde and conducts rear guard opns to OW ACE and for :urreritiy II I exploitation. on Division mier UI- (2) Should counterattack fail to regain the initiative, cover retrograde of 3d e of Evaluation and Bde and delay enemy to FEBA. aranoatdization. USAARMS. I k. Reserve: 1st Bde fol l -22 Cav to support exploitation. II 1. Coordinating Instructions. + + + + + + + r (4) Consider exec during night or limited visibility. The term integrated battlefield was not new to the men of Alfa ?koop. The actions for chemical and nuclear attacks had long been drilled into them by extensive train- Leading a Platoon on t ing. When they received the operations order (OPORD)for by Captain I the troop’s participation in an Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP)exercise, they felt coddent that it was struggle through their platoon missions alone and without complete and gave them everything they needed to know. support and, after great effort, reached the troop objective. Nuclear and chemical attack, artillery, and close air sup The attack on the objective was a ragged, piecemeal port (CAS) were all covered in the order and in the unit &air that was surprisingly successful because the left and standing operating procedures (SOP). There were few right platoons maneuvered to the flanks and rear of the questions. enemy before attacking. Once on the objective, the pla- The operation seemed to be progressing in an orderly toons consolidated their assigned sections and reestab- manner the next morning except that inclement weather lished the courier system. had slowed the tactical road march. The time to cross the This story is true. . . . I know, because I was one of line of departure (LD)would have to be moved back. Then, those unfortunate platoon leaders who had to struggle just as the troop entered the forward assembly area (AA), through that difficult and exasperating first day of that the platoons were blown right off the air by very intensive ARTEP. This experience taught me some necessary les- jamming. Every frequency and alternate assigned to the sons about the integrated battlefield. troop was so fiercely jammed that any radio communica- The integrated battlefield encompasses all the difiklt tion was impossible. factors that influence the modern battlefield using the broadest possible interpretation of “combined arms.” It oral communications includes the integration of infantry, armor, reconnais- The platoon leaders did not panic, but moved smoothly sance (cavalry),artillery, irregular forces, CAS, air defense into the AA using arm and flag signals. They dismounted artillery (ADA), and engineers; and always presents the to check with the adjacent platoons to ensure 36Odegrees threat of chemical, nuclear and, electronic warfare (E- of security and to coordinate fields of fire. Having so far all of which are affected by terrain and natural or man- done everything correctly, they proceeded to spend a h- made obstacles that impede traf€icability and obscure vis- trating and hitless hour trying to reestablish radio com- ibility. munication with the commander and within the platoons. It was about this time that everyone began to get the feel- Basic Integration ing that the fun and games were over, and that the rest of Let us begin with basics, the integration of infantry, the ARTEP would be long and difficult. They were not armor, reconnaissance, and artillery into a single fighting diS€lppoint€!d. force. The point was brought out by my former platoon The troop commander maneuvered his platoons by sergeant who said to me, “Sir, I have been in armored going from one to another and giving them oral com- battalions most of my Army career. Being in this unit (an mands. The radio jamming continued all day. The courier armored cavalry squadron) has shown me for the fist system, as laid down in the unit SOP, never survived the time what scouts are supposed to do and how tankers are departure from the AA. With all the elements on the move supposed to use them.” and no radio communication to tell each other their new Generally, the M60 tank crewmen in career manage positions, couriers sent out did not return until the jam- ment field 19E whom we receive in the squadron have had ming stopped and new locations were transmitted. Recog- little experience with scouts or with infantry, except as nizing that to wait for instructions was to sit and do members of an opposing force during field exercises. They nothing, the platoon leaders used their own initiative to feel that their tank is the world’s deadliest weapon and 26 ARMOR november-december 1983 Most of the time, indirect fire is only a radio call away. But ; Integrated someone has to make that call. The platoon will be in W. Watts contact with the enemy and able to see the battlefield. The platoon Wiu, therefore, be best able to see where and how that ‘‘groundpounders” are only good for cannon fodder. (I artillery needs to be employed. Since there is no artillery suspect the infantry has a similar, though opposite, opin- forward observer with an armor platoon, more ofin than ion.) but after they see how the scouts can be used to not it is the platoon leader who must call for tire. The exploit the tank‘s strengths and protect its weaknesses, ANIVRC-12 radio enables him to preset the frequency their opinions become more favorable. Once they see the necessary to call for tire and rapidly switch back to the value of scouts and/or infantry they want them for all platoon net when he is finished. No one else in the platoon, future operations. except the platoon sergeant, has this capability. This It is possible for a platoon of infantry and a platoon of situation puts the platoon leader in a @ar, but all too armor to work together as a well-drilled team. I have seen familiar, dilemma. His platoon is in contact with the it. My troopers and I have done it. enemy and he must stay on the platoon net to maneuver it. The experiences of armies in recent conflicts (especially At the same time, he must leave the net to get the iire the 1973 ArabIsraeli War) have rather graphically shown support he needs. that any pure force will most likely be destroyed in a mod- The solution to this problem requires that the platoon ern battlefield, while a combined arms force will be sue have an effective SOP and that all members of the platoon cessful. I had the opportunity to participate in two know how to use it. This was how we did it in my platoon: ARTEPs where the opposing force was a pure armored If the scouts were detected by the enemy and fired battalion. In both ARTEPs the squadron felt that not only upon when they made contact, the tanks would sup did we beat the armored battalion, we embarrassed them. press with direct fire while the scouts determined the We also felt that they were at a terrible disadvantage size, composition and location of the enemy. As we because they had no infantry assets attached, while we had several battle drills to cover various situations, I had our scouts. Even the most ardent cavalry trooper told the platoon what action I wanted taken. I then among us knew it would have been a completely different told the platoon sergeant (PSG) that I was leaving ball game if they had had an infantry company attached. the net. He immediately took over to carry out my Combined arms operations are necessary for victory. orders while I called in the spot report and the call An armor platoon leader must be able to caU an infantry for fire. As soon as possible, I would return to the platoon leader (and vice versa), or i5-e support team, and platoon net and ask the PSG for a situation report on some occasions, even reconnaissance elements for help (SITREP).This informed the platoon that I was if we are to use combined arms effectively. The Threat’s back on the net and in controL The PSG’s SITREP doctrine also includes combined arms operations. There- informed me what had happened while I was off net fore, platoon leaders and company or troop commanders so I could issue additional orders if necessary. must consider what infantry, armor, artillery, and recon- The key parts of this procedure were handing off the naissance forces are available to both the friendly and platoon to the PSG while I left the net so that command enemy forces when they are planning and executing any and control would not be lost; alerting the platoon that I operation. They must also know how these forces are was back on the net by asking for a SITREP so that they employed by both sides. would know who was in charge and that I would know what was going on; and having SOPS, battle drills, and SOP for Fire Support well-trained NCOs who could run the show while I was off Field artillery is an important part of combined anm. the net.

ARMOR november-december 1983 27 A platoon leader must often leave the platoon net for a Listening in on the troop net, I learned that the other two multitude of reasons. Handingaff the platoon to the PSG platoons were stopped by a large enemy force they could and vice versa is identical no matter for what reason the not dislodge. After about onehalf hour, the commander platoon leader must leave the net. called his platoon leaders to say that there were “fast mov- ers” on the way. One of the newer platoon leaders who had The Battlefield Is Three-dun’ ensional not lost his enthusiasm had prepared some control meas- The platoon integrated battlefield is threedunensional ures for aircraft The commander called for the aircraft and includes the skies above. In preparation for our exer- and directed them to the target area, using the lieutenant’s cises, our S3 was told there would be attack helicoptem control measures, and 45 minutes later I heard that the training in our maneuver area and they would be moving objective was secured after we had received a proper lesson generally west to east. The S3 checked his overlay and on CAS from four F4s and four A-10s. We cannot afford to made a note in the OPORD that the helicopters were ignore or forget the air space above the integrated battle friendly to the attackers. We took it for granted that the field, and must always use it to our advantage. helicopters were conducting a completely separate operation that would only affect the defenders, who would have Air Defense to hide hmthem. Well, nobody told the pilots that. While But this third dimension holds menace as well as oppor- I was conducting a zone reconnaissance in bounding tunities. Most of the soldiers I have observed realize that overwatch, a Cobra came up behind us. He set up on line on the integrated battlefield, cover and concealment with my tanks and started watching the valley. When my includes concealment from aerial observation and attack. scouts reported everything clear, the tanks bounded up. Unfortunately, the .Xkaliber machineguns and small When the tanks were set, the Cobra moved up, passed us, arms have been neglected as air defense weapons. The and disappeared into the trees. A few moments later he prevailing opinion is, “I don’t care what the book says. popped up, spun around to look at us, spun back around, They move too fast for me to hit with my ‘Bty.”’ Some- and dropped back into the trees. My scout section leader times, this may be true for high performance aircrafl, but it radioed me that the Cobra was telling us all was clear is certainly not true for helicopters. Appearanca can be ahead and to move up. We played bounding overwatch deceiving. An aircraft may just look too fast when, in real- with that pilot all day. ity, you are able to track, lead and hit it. I also learned a lesson in humility and attention to detail Our kaserne was a favorite practice target for many from our fiends in the Air Force. Incorporating air boxes NATO air forcee, so we were buzzed quite often by high and other control meas- for air support had become performance aircraft. The first and sometimes second air- meaningless map exercises for the platoon leaders, craft usually surprised us, but they established the direc- because they neither got aircraft nor their radio frequen- tion the aircraft were using for their approach. So,when cies; nor were they able to mrdinate with the Air Force to the third aircraft made its run,we were ready for it and our show them where the air boxes were located. As a platoon gum were already aimed at the air space where we knew it ARTEP evaluator, I found that things had not changed. was going to fly.

28 ARMOR novernber-decernber 1983 If you scare off enemy aircraft so that you can continue leader nearest to the air defense unit may have to do some your mission, that is just as good as shooting them down. of that integration. Modem air defense weapons have forced helicopters down close to the ground and low altitude flying has Using Engineer Support slowed their operations. This presents many opportunities Engineers also have a habit of coming out of nowhere. for organic weapons to be used in air defense in such inci- One track commander told me that while he was on an dents as this one recounted by a tank platoon leader. observation post, expecting to see the enemy at any An OPFOR scout helicopter was trying to find his moment, a track appeared, going like a bat out of hell, and platoon hidden under the trees. The pilot had been towing a l’/zton trailer. When it got close enough he given the platoon’s position by the umpires, so he stopped it and challenged its commander. It was an engi- knew they were there. He kept getting closer and neer squad attached to the troop that had been forward closer, and lower and lower. When the pilot finally emplacing obstacles when they spotted an advancing found the platoon he was hovering 10 feet off the enemy force. ground only 200 meters from the platoon, which sur- Engineers will be up front with the platoons, either rounded him on three sides. The umpires ruled he had clearing obstacles for the attack or putting them in for the been shot down without having time to radio the pla- defense. For this reason company, troop, and team com- toon’s position. On a battlefield where both aircraft manders will often attach them to the nearest platoon 80 and ground forces are using terrain for maximum the engineers will have a tiein with the platoon’s parent cover and concealment, closerange engagements will unit. These attachments are also made so that the com- be common and the ground forces may well have the mander can be sure, through his platoon leader, that the advantage. engineers accomplish the right things at the right places. Another experience was related to me concerning air From the other point of view, there are few things more defense: depressing than to see a well-trained enemy engineer unit A platoon leader was setting his platoon into a bati go through an obstacle in 15 minutes that took your pla- tle position when a self-propelled Vulcan came up to toon,l hour to set up. The enemy knows how to use his him. The track commander/gunner hopped off his engineers. Do you? Vdcun, trotted over to the platoon leader and said, “Hello sir! I’m attached to your platoon. Where do you Operating During Poor Visibility want me?” Suddenly,air defense had become another Two factors that will influence the integrated battlefield factor for the platoon leader to consider on the ink are 80 obvious that most of us forget to consider them. grated battlefield. They are poor visibility and weather. Vulcun and Chapad platoon leadem will ohhave Our night vision devices, no matter how good, will never their platoons spread out over a large area, possibly even turn night into day. These devices don’t provide the depth split into sections for greater coverage. A tactical plan that perception, peripheral vision, detail, and confidence that does not integrate air defense is no good. The platoon daylight vision gives you. These shortcomings produce an

ARMOR novernber-decernber 1983 29 adverse psychological effect. At night, we relax security, slow down, or cancel activity, and sleep. Unfortunately, troops will continue this behavior in the field-in training or in war-unless steps are taken to remedy this weakness in our operations. At night I have found I have to wow about the entire crews of two or three vehicles going to sleep rather than two or three individuals in the platoon as in the day. Our confidence decreases as darkness closes in and our lmowledge of our surroundings is limited to a device’s narrow beam. Once, while conducting a night attack, my scouta (who were leading) could not determine where they were or how to get to the objective. I thought I knew where we were and the way to the objective, but due to the uncertainty and confusion we were all feeling, I put the platoon into a defensive position and left to reconnoiter the area and the route. It turned out that I was right, but we lost about 2 hours because I had lacked the confidence to take the platoon with me. Operations at night take on a wholly Merent character. Like a blind man who relies much more on his hearing, I rely much more on my radio at night to tell me where my people are and what they are doing since I cannot see them. In daylight, I usually look at the map only when I need a coordinate, or once every kilometer to check my location. Mostly I keep my eyes on the terrain and on my troops. At night, I stay inside the track with a flashlight, huddled over my map, popping up only every 15 minutes to examine the terrain to find out which grid square I am in. Generally, I act like a person playing chess by tele phone. Other platoon leaders have related similar expe riences to me. Remember that these problems affect the enemy as well. If our doctrine, training, and equipment gives us the edge in fighting at night or during periods of poor visibility, we must exploit this advantage with night operations.

ueing Inclement weather Weather has many similar effects. It tends to degrade the leader’s vision and mobility, and has an adverse effect on the spirit of his soldiers-they will want to stay where it is dry and warm. One of my former commanders liked bad weather because it had these effeds on the opposing Using the procedures and codes we already have will go forces. He warned us that if the weather turned bad, he a long way to protecting us from offensive EW. OPORDs, was going to attack. True to his word, when a damp, cold whether written or oral are going to be rare gems on the fog rolled in and cut visibility to less than 100 meters, we fluid, integrated battlefield. Therefore, ensure that if you attacked. During the previous day’s reconnaissance I had issue or receive one, that it has all the instructions neces- found a rough but passable way into an isolated valley sary so that all the units involved can completely accom- that let out just behind the enemy’s rear. The squadron plish their missions in a awrdinated fashion without once commander told me to take this route and then continue to using the radio. For example, control measures could be penetrate into their rear. I would then face about and set timed; do not rely on the radio if a unit gets ahead or up in a defensive position near the suspeded location of a behind. “All elementa will hold at PHASE LINE BLUE bridge that the enemy must cross while withdrawing. The until 1030. No one will cross before that.” Coordinate an other platoons (and troops) would be pushing them toward assault, using time. “All units will assault OEiJECllVE us. We were able to do all this without being deteded LUCIFER at 1230.” Use pyrotechnics. “Assault OBJEC- because of the reduced visibility. All the enemy units were TIVE LUCIFER when you see purple smoke.” Couriers caught completely by surprise. The platoon destroyed a and wire communications can be made SOP and very tank company before the umpires stopped the play so the effective if the situation is right. enemy battalion could get across the bridge and set up a Hand and arms signals are also effective and cannot be new defense. emphasized enough in platoons. When I first joined my platoon they wondered if there was something wrong with EWCountermeasurea me because I was always waving my arms around. Nine Let us not forget the lesson of EW. We have already seen months later I watched with great pride as the platoon some of the havoc it can cause through radio jamming. moved for an hour and a half in bounding overwatch Offensive EW remains largely with the Signal Corps and without once using the radio. They used hand and arm Military Intelligence and will seldom be seen at the pla- signals. toon or company level. There are, however, a variety of One more point: nothing beats facebhx contact for defensive measures you can take. long conversations. It is a lot of work to move over to

30 ARMUR novernber-decernber 1983 ne’s position, unhook, climb out up on his (and reverse the process DUL ulere is no substitute for it. This bec method for my scout section leader, my and I when the need arose for direct co1 Finally, there are the chemical, nucle warfare factors of the integrated battlei tions, precautions, and countermeasure these types of attacks have been well d publications. My purpose here is not to n in these aspects of the integrated battle you aware of them so you can prepare i lishing battle drills and SOPs.

Good SOPs Are Invalu Innovative thinking founded on the I especially the principle of the objective, c ing to the standards of unit SOPs will every crisis. SOPs or battle drills are SUcces8. Deciding how to react to eventa on tht they occur has several advantages. In hesitantly, or reacting before you have give the situation careful thought, you a to react, and you react with a carefully This also gives you the opportunity to k of others who have been in similar situ who know a mccmsful drill and how to e drills in my platoon were those that incorporated the “encouragement” I needed to get off my duff, square my ideas of the platoon’s NCOs. The drills were seldom shoulders, and press forward. exactly what they suggested, but did include their ideas What I did not realize at the time was that he was also and experiences and produced extremely effective results. reinforcing the principle of objective-that all my efforts Another advantage is that during peacetime training we should be aimed at a specific goal, and secondary objec can determine whether our SOPs and battle drills work or tives should get only secondary efforts. whether they need to be improved. When jamming makes your radios useless, you will con- After the platoon has an opportunity to use the refined tinue with your orders and reach the objective. If you get SOPs and drills, the engagements must be reviewed to see attached to an infantry company, you will execute your if drills and procedures are adequate and if individuals mission with aggressiveness. If an ADA team asks you properly implemented the drills. The review will indicate where to go, you may not get them in the best spot, but you the need for additional instruction and training to bring will get them in a place that contributes to the 8u-M the platoon up to standard. completion of the mission. If hostile aircraft threaten, you A final advantage to SOPs and battle drills is that in an will evade them, destroy them, or drive them off. If obsta- emergency everyone knows what to do and does it because cles interfere, you will get engineers to clear the way. If it has become routine. Success and survival of the platoon irregular forces harass you, you will inflict as much dam- no longer depend on one person giving the correct com- age as you can and then drive on. And if, heaven forbid, mands or instructions. The instructions have already been you are hit with a simultanmus chemical and artillery given. If the situation is not quite what the OPORD pre attack at the moment you are making contact with enemy dided, everyone will still know what to do and what the attack helicopters and ground reconnaissance elements, other members of the platoon are going to do. This enables you will not sit there in dumbfounded confusion or throw a individuals to act with much greater confidence,initiative, fit of frustration Rather, you will remember your mission, and aggressiveness. determine what you must and can do to reach your objee tive, and lead the way! Command and Control It is entirely appropriate that the U.S. Army hor School’s Command, Staff, and Doctrine Department is CAPTAIN ALAN WAlTS was housed in Boudinot Hall at Fort Knox, KY, because Brig- commissioned in armor from adier General Truman Everett Boudinot was one of the West Point in 1979. He is a early shapers of American armor tactics and doctrine. He graduate of the AOBC, JOMC, discovered early that mechanization extends the battle AOAC and the Joint Firepower field to much greater distances and that for mechanized Control Course. He served as unita to function effectively over these distances, com- a cavalry platoon leader, squad- mand and control must also be extended. ron adjutant and executive officer in Germany and is cur- For the platoon leader, this means that not only must he rently assigned as a systems respond to mission-type orders and then use his initiative, coordinator in force moderni- he must also allow his sections and tanks to use their zation with the 1st Cavalry Di- initiative as well. It always dismayed me when the scouts vision, Fort Hood, TX. on the far right saw and reacted to a situation that I could not see. I was forced to follow their lead in maneuvering

ARMOR novernber-decern ber 1983 31 Improved Company Command and Control by Major David W. Marlin and Captain Robert N. Sweeney

The tank company single radio net elements dedicate one radio to the ments, as do his platoon leaders. "he system offers the company command- tank company radio net (figure 1). XO compiles those spot reports in er improved command and control The company commander, XO, NBC detail and transmits them to the bat- capabilities. With this system, the operations sergeant, platoon leaders, talion command post The company commander is able to report and use and platoon sergeants monitor the commander concentrates his commu- accurate intelligence, make quick, battalion command net on their see nications on maneuvering his pla- timely decisions, and rapidly deploy ond radio, or auxiliary receiver. toons during the fight, while monitor- his forces. The single radio net system Similarly, the first sergeant, supply ing the battalion command net. By decreases redundant transmissions sergeant, and motor sergeant monitor monitoring the single radio net, the and breaks in communication, while the battalion administrative and log- company commander receives imme enhancing the company's communi- istic net. This gives every vehicle diate updates on the platoon's actions cation security, reaction time, unity of commander in the company the abil- and status. The XO remains on the effort, and the ability to operate with ity to keep abreast of the situation company net when the commander is no radio communications. Without and to transmit and receive on the transmitting on the battalion net. As these capabilities, rapid tactical ma- company net Furthermore,this allows second in command, the XO leads the neuver on the electronic battlefield every key leader in the company the unit, Guing the void created by the will remain an unpracticed theory. ability to monitor the battalion net. commander's communication absence The Division 86 tank company, a The company commander and the With the company single radio net smaller organization with its im- XO work as a team. The company system, the XO is constantly in a key proved leader-to-led ratio, will con- commander receives all radio trans- position to take charge during the tinue to rely on the radio as its pri- missions immediately, as does the commander's absence, or death. When mary means of ~mmunication.When rest of the company. As enemy spot deployed forward, the XO can also using a single radio net system, each reports are received, the company assist in controlling the company company vehicle and all supporting commander makes brief acknowledge through visual signals.

32 ARMOR november-december 1983 During the *ht, the NBC opera- geants also monitor the battalion platoon leader applies a “do as I dc tions sergeant operates hmthe com- command net. This, in effect, provides style of leadership. This better en mander’s wheeled vehicle. Able to them a warning order in virtually bles the platoon to fight during rad communicate on both the company every situation. ARer hearing the silence, jamming, or electronic ma and battalion command net, he moni- company commander receive instruc netic pulse (EMP) damage. Platoc tors, coordinates, and reports nuclear, tions from battalion, they can antici- leaders are also able to communica biological, and chemical activities pate the more specific instrudion~ with other platoon leaders during tl from lower to higher and higher to that will be forthcoming. In the fight. Potential opportunities creak lower. On this single radio net system, absence of the company commander by one platoon leader can initia this critical data is speeded through and XO, the succession of command actions by another in situations thi the chain of command from individ- remains unbroken as platoon leaders the commander is unable to overset ual vehicles to battalion headquarters are completely informed of the battal- Each tank commander monito and vice versa. Chemical alerts are ion’s status and higher headquarters’ the company commander’s instru expedited throughout the company. last instructions. Platoon leaders and tiom. In the same manner that tl In addition to providing more timely platoon sergeants no longer serve ap platoon leader and platoon sergm advice and information to the com- relay stations for spot reports and receive warning orders hmthe ba mander, the NBC operatiom sergeant calls for fie. They simultaneously talion command net, tank comman is in a better position to assist in coor- fight their tank, communicate with ers receive like warning orders. Tl dinating and supervising the com- the company commander, and main- tank commander can send a sp pany’s survey, detection, and decon- tain continuity with their platoon. report or a call for &-e with the fu tamination efforts. However, visual signals, battle drills, realization that he is notifying eac Platoon leaders and platoon ser and platoon SOPS are stressed as the member of the command. While mol itoring the company net, tank cor manders, along with all crew mer bers. also are kept abreast of the othc platoons’ and the company’s situi tion. Unit integrity, an intangible fea------. FIST CHIEF ture of the company single radio net AN /VRC-12- system, is achieved both during train- xo ing and battle. * The support (FIST)is “-I- fire team also linked to the company single radio net system. The FIST is prepared to move to any vantage point to support the company fight. By receiving spot reports and calls for fire spontane ously, the FIST team is able to reduce P their decision-malangand steel-on-target SHOULD THE MORTARS 2X AN/VRC-46 OPERATE WITH TWO SEPARATE time. In addition to maintaining one FDC 5, THE SECOND COMPANY SUPPLY SGT/ARMOREI AN/GRC-160 COULD OPERATE radio on the company net, the FIST ON THAT NET THIS RADIO COULD ALSO BE USED AS A has a radio configuration to support DEDICATED FIRE CONTROL NET *L WHEN NECESSARY 2x PRC-77 either split battalion mortar sections on separate nets, or provide a dedicated fire control net to the company. MOTOR SERGEANT During complete radio blackouts, the I LEGEND I, FIST serves as the company’s contin- - COMPANY NET : gency messenger or liaison to battal- BATTALION COMMAND ; - ‘ - NET -@ r : ion until radio communications are AN/VRC-‘6 - ADMIN AND LOGlSlIC reestablished. NET RECOVERY ! I The first sergeant is the primary - FA NETS I administrative and logistical leader. ---*--- SUPPORTING UNITS < I_ Like the supply sergeant and motor L__-._._ AN!Y!C-4P- ______i sergeant,the first sergeant maintains a radio on both the company net and the battalion administrative and logistics net. By keeping abreast of the company’s fight, the first sergeant can push forward logistical and main- rt- tenance support available at the com- IST pany trains and coordinate additional PLT support from the battalion. The sup ply sergeant and motor sergeant are 2ND PLT thus totally aware of the battalion’s administrative and logistics situation

3RD and are prepared to succeed him PLT when necessary. -AN/VRC-64 --- UN/VRC-64 A_N/VRC-I2 AN/VRC-I2 The key to the tank company, single radio net systems is radw disci- Figure 1. pline. In order to achieve all these

ARMOR november-december 1983 33 advantages, all personnel must com- the practice of radio Mpline. ication system and that of our allies. ply with correct and proper use of ‘ With the reduction of 75 percent of WestGetman,Ca~dian,Britjsh,Austra- radio telephone procedures (RTP). In the company’s radio nets and correct lian, and Israeli tank companies addition to the ground rules laid down RTP and the potential for redundancy operate on a tank company, single by RTP, personnel must become inti- of transmissions, overall securi? vie radio net system with approximately mately familiar with the company’s lations are decreased. The battahon’s the same number of vehicles as U.S. tactical SOP and be aware of the radio net requirements can be de companies operate. situational priorities. creased by 12 nets and the division The tank company, single radio net Companies using the tank com- can decrease its requirements by 72 system is not a new system or con- pany single radio net system for the radio nets. cept. However, the realization that httime will notice a significant The single radio net system can be modern armored warfare executed on change in their radio disciplinewithin adapted to other tank company TOE’S an accelerated, lethal, battlefield em- a very short period of time. This will as well as that of the Division 86 tank phasizes the need to simplify the be driven home by the fact that the company (figure2). primary means by which a tank com- company commander and key leaders Even the novice observer would pany commander and platoon leaders will be in a position to remind per- discover quite a disparity between the will command and control their units sonnel of the need for and to reinforce US.Army’s tank company commun- during the fight.

MAJOR DAVID W. MARLIN was commissioned in armor from Old Dominion University, Virginia in 1971. He hasserved in various command capacities in Europe, Australia. and the CONUS. He received his mas- I 4 ters degree in systems management from USC in 1982 and presently is assigned as Chief, Offense Branch, Corn- mand and Staff Department, I USAARMS, Fort Knox, KY.

I- I- mi si I

CAPTAIN ROBERT N. SWEE- NEY was commissioned from Lehigh University in 1976. He has served as platoon leader, 2-5 Cavalry and at headquarters, 2-5 Cavalry and as company commander in the same unit. He is presently assigned to the Command and Staff Department, Advanced Tac- tics, at USAARMC, Fort Knox, KY.

34 ARMUR november-december 1983 Elements of Tank Design by Gerald A. Halbert To a tank crewman, a tank is a tected firepower in the aggressive figuration and characteristics. large complex track-laying vehicle assault role so vital to offensiveland To a force structure analyst or that requires a great deal of mainte- combat. military economist, a tank is a nance, mounts a monstrous cannon, To a commander of combined unit of firepower, whose cost and armored to resist battlefield threats, arms, the tank is the centerpiece of performance can be quantified and and capable of negotiating rough land combat-the optimum combi- assessed in realistic combat scena- terrain and running over most ob- nation of firepower, shock action, rios in comparison with other exist- stacles. mobility and protection when em- ingsystems orpossible new systems To an enemy foot soldier, an ployed with other close combat units. in a force structure. attacking tank is a large, awesome, To a tank developer, a tank is, A tank may be viewed by various noisy, frightening, invincible main essence, a response to certain people, but no one can question that chine capable of instilling terror in demands created by a tactical role. this combination offirepower, mobil- spite of what his leaders have told These demands are functional and ity,protection, and shock action cal- him about the capabilities of his can generally be described by a set led a tank is the most effectiveinstru- weapons against the “weaknesses” of requirements or system capabili- ment of aggressive assault in land of the tank. ties derived from the interaction of warfare today, and will continue to To a tactical commander of the threat, technology, and the in- be in the foreseeable future. armor units, a tank is the ideal tended operational concept, and can instrument foremployingmobilepro- be related to design in terms of con- CliffBradley

Much study has gone into tank armament. There are, however, other start with a clean sheet of paper. In design since the first tank entered perspectives that must be considered practice, however, there are several combat in the WW I Somme offensive. such as length-to-width ratios, ground- design constraints that will affect the At least two books, R M. Ogorkiewicz’s pressures, length limits, and width tank design. Briefly stated, tankers Design and Development of Fighting and height. The tank designer must desire a tank that can, with a single Vehicles, and Richard E. Simpkin’s be aware of these limitations when he shot, kill any possible opponent at all Tank Warfare, have discussed tank reads the Staff Requirement (UK), possible combat ranges; that can sur- design in great detail. Obviously, Required Operations Characteristics vive a hit from any opponent at any while a magazine article cannot dis- (US) or Tactical Technical Require angle of attack, at any range that can cuss all those tank design factors ment (USSR), that establishes the move rapidly across any type of ter- covered in the above books, it is pos- basic design of the tank,l plus those rain at the fastest possible speed, and sible to cover some of the basic fadors. speciSc requirements peculiar to the have the greatest possible road range. Most writings on tank design stress desired tank. They generally do not Logisticians desire tanks that cost lit- those fadors that distinguish tanks specify how the fmished product will tle, can be transported on a pickup from one another and focus primarily look nor how it will be built.2 truck, require little or no maintenance, on engine power, armor, and main Theoretically, a tank designer can and consume little fuel and ammuni-

ARMUR novem ber-decem ber 1983 35 the loader to stand. One method of determining the minimum height of the tank is to add the thickness of the turret roof armor, thickness of the flooring, thickness of the torsion bars (if used), thickness of the belly armor, and the ground clearance. An altema- tive method is to add the ground clearance, 40 inches (1,005 mm) for the seated driver, and 26 inches (660 mm) for the turret (additional space is always required for gun depression)to set a minimum height for a conven- tionally designed tank of about (2,122 This compares to a height of 94 inches (2,400 mm) for the Soviet T-62. Length. A tank's length is generally not as critical as its height or width. However, tank length is governed to tion. Unfortupately, it is not possible af€ectedin part by the diameter of the some extent by tank width. The ability to accomplish all this in any single turret ring.5 The turret ring must allow of a tank to turn is greatly influenced vehicle, and features must be traded the gun breech to swing down to aim by the ratio of the length of the track off to produce a balanced tank design. at an elevated target and must allow on the ground to the width of the track enough room for the gun to be loaded If the ratio becomes too large, turning Dimensions with a long main gun round. Turret is impossible because forward thrust rings for U.S. tanks have varied in is offset by the power lost in the skid Width is perhaps the most critical size from 60 inches (1,524.6 mm) for of the tracks. For tanks with simple dimension on a tank because it gov- the M4 Sherman medium tank,mounb transmissions having only one steer- erns the tank's capability to move ing either a 75 or 76mm gun, to 85 ing radius, the length to width (L/W) along highways, cross bridges, be inches (2,159mm)for the M-48Patton ratio should not exceed 1.5. Tanks with transported, and maneuver. For and M-60 tanks mounting 9@ or 105 more sophisticated transmissions example, special timbers had to be laid mm guns.6 Table 1gives the turret ring (with a variable turning radius) have on WW 11 Bailey bridges to protect the diameters for several tanks. L/W ratio limits ranghg from 1.7 to bridge curbs from damage by M-26 Height. Three factors influence a 1.8. The location of the tank's center of Pershing tanks, which were 20.3 tank's total height turret height, hull gravity (CG) has a major effect on the inches (516 mm) wider than the M-4 height, and ground clearance. If the ability of a tank to cross obstacles. Shermans that acould traverse the overall height is controlled and kept Ideally, the longitudinal CG should be spans with ease. low, the tank becomes harder to see located above the geometric center of The width of tank transporters, air- and therefore harder to hit. A critical the supporting tracks to create a uni- craft, and railroad cars also affect the element in Soviet tank design has form distribution of weight on the road design width of tanks. The USSR been controlling the height of the tank wheels.ll limits width of cargo transported by to reduce weight while maintaining rail to 3,414 mm (134.4 in). This in turn the maximum level of protection with Ground Pressure and Weight establishes the maximum width of frontal armor. Reducing the height to soviet tanks.3 the minimum has the most payoff in Perhaps one of the most critical fac- The U.S. hyoriginally set a reducing weight because the frontal tors affecting the mobility of tanks is maximum width of 144 inches (3,658 armor is thickest and requires more the ground pressure of the tracks. The mm) for the MI tank, which is now weight to maintain a given level of USSR sets a limit of 0.85 kg/cmz for being produced with a width of 141 protedion.7 Therefore, if the height of dead (non-rubberbushed)tracklZ How- inches (3,588 mm). Factors influene a tank is lowered and if the weight is ever, the Soviets have not fielded ing the width specified by U.S. tank kept at a constant, the frontal armor main battle tanks with a ground pres- designers include the Berne Intema- can be thicker because it need not sure greater than 0.81 kg/Cm2, includ- tional Railway Gage, which prescribes cover ~EI great an area ing the T-64 and T-72, that have live a maximum width of 3,150 mm (124 Ground clearance is normally speci- track (table 2). U.S. tanks normally inches) or the maximum width of fied by the user, and for the US M60 have higher ground pressure than do highway load limits, which generally tank is 18 inches (457 nunha soviet tanks. range from 2,438 mm (96 in) to 2,591 The height of the hull is normally Generally speaking, the lower the mm. Both limits can be waived. The limited by the space required by the ground pressure, the easier-it is for a standard U.S. Army Heavy Equip engine height and by the average tank to travel over poor terrain. For ment Transporter is 99.5 inches (2,438 height of 1meter for the seated driver. example, the very low ground pres- mm) wide, but a transported tank The height of the turret is controlled sure of the British Scorpion armored overhangs each side. The limit of 144 by the size of the main gun and the fighting vehicles (0.35 kg/cmZ) allowed inches specified in the original Mate main gun depression angle.s The them to traverse very soft ground in rial Need Document for the M1 was turret roof height is also governed by the Falklands that was impassable to established as an arbitary, but reason- the need for the loader to stand, and almost any other ground combat veh- able, limit based on the most efficient load main gun rounds. There must be icle.13 The less the tank track pene use of space aboard cargo ve~sels.~ at least 66 inches (1,676 mm) from the trates into the ground, the less power The width of a tank hull is also hull floor to the inside turret roof for is required to drive the tank. In addi-

36 ARMOR november-decem ber 1983 tion, softer s( as well as ha Allied to pressure is tl ern battle ta~ 39.6 to 60.6 tc It used to be 1 to less mobilil technology, ally have be tanks of low powerful eng does make it by rail or b also limit the use.

The heavie its armor en\ As mentio design conk to reduce wei that requires armor protec areal densit) ideal properti are that it be hard, ductile, and stable16 Thus, the heaviest armor is on the tion comes from fallout or induced Although titanium armor might be frontal arc,’* and the area that is (secondary)radiation. Table 4 shows attractive from a weight point of view, normally most heavily proteded is the how different materials shield it is much more expensive than steel 6Ckdegree frontal arc.lg Figure 1 illus- against radiation. It can be seen Although aluminum is onethird ligh- trates some of the 6Odegree arca that that steel is the most effective radi- ter than steel, for an equal amount of are possible on tanks. Due to weight ation shield. Using the formula protection it must be three times as considerations, most tanks would K=V/2 X VP where K=the degree thick as steel. This means that a steel place the centerline of the 6Odegree of gamma activity, V=the thickness armor hull and an aluminum armor arc at the rear of, or tangential to, the of the material and VP=the half hull giving equal protection would turret. value layer, it can be seen that 1.5 weigh the same. The thicker alumi- The protection provided by a inches (38 mm) of steel drops the num is also more rigid. However, given thickness of armor is en- level of radiation to one half, 3 aluminum armor can significantly hanced by sloping the armor to inches (76-mm) to onequarter and reduce overall structure weight because increase its effective thickness (fig- 114-mm of steel to oneeighth.22 an aluminum hull requires less rein- ure 2).20,21 Additionally, greater Thus, if one must be exposed to a forcement than does a steel hull. angles of obliquity will heighten the nuclear attack, it is best to turn the Aluminum is therefore very suitable chances for attacking projectiles front of the hull and turret toward for lighter vehicles. to ricochet. the blast. Chobham armor recently developed Armor also offers radiation pro- Although recent advancea in armor in the United Kingdom givea mgnifi- tection. Unclassified literature offers have significantly improved protec- cantly better protedion, weighbfor- little data on neutron degradation tion, it is impossible to defeat every

\ i \/ \I \ i V CENTERLINE CENTERLINE CENTERLINE TANGENTI At CENTERLINE CENTERLINE OFF VEHICLE REAR OF VEHICLE TO TURRET REAR OF TURRET CENTER OF ROTATION Figure 1. Frontal Arc Definitions.

ARMOR novernber-december 1983 37 EQUIVALENT

actual thickness Equivalent thickness = cosineof angle of obliquity 100 rnrn l00rnrn 100 rnrn I. ET= 2. ET= 3. ET= cosine 0 degrees cosine 60 degrees cosine 70 degrees 100 rnrn 100rnrn 100 rnrn ET = ET = ET = 1 .5 32 ET = 100 rnrn ET = 200 rnrn ET= 292 rnrn Source: Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 94. Figure 2. Effect of sloping armor. possible threat. Armor alone is not enhance survivability include smoke The vehicle height must be increased the only factor to consider when grenade launchers or other smoke to allow the driveshaft to transfer evaluating a tank’s survivability. generating devices for screening pur- power to the transmission and, poses; self-entrenching devices that since a transmission requires main- Survivability permit the tank to dig itself iq25 and tenance, the front of a tank with a A tank should have protection design features to lower visual, front-mounted transmission must against being destroyed even if the infrared, or audio signatures to protect have access hatches or removable armor is penetrated. After a tank is against detection. Thus, the need for armor to gain access to the trans- penetrated, fire is the biggest survivability helps determine how the mission.28 Furthermore, front- hazard. Recognizing this, the Ml’s tank is laid out. mounted transmissions are vulner- designers equipped it with seven able to mines because most mines sensors to detect a fire and extin- Tank Layout detonate under the front of the veh- guish the flame growth before it can Tank layout (or how the engine, icle. If this happens to a tank with a cause an explosion. transmission, gun and crew are rear engine and transmission, an In older tanks with gasoline placed in the tank) is an example of idler may be destroyed, but the tank engines, the probability of fire was form following function. A tank’s can be short-tracked and moved very high if there was a hit in the layout is driven by the tank’s opera- away under its own power. On the engine compartment or near a fuel tion on the battlefield. The tank other hand, if a front-mounted drive tank. In such cases, the fire spread must move across country at com- sprocket is hit, the tank cannot be faster than would a diesel fuel fire. paratively high speed, carry power- moved and must be recovered by Additionally, vapors from a leaky ful armament, and protect the crew some other means. Yet another dis- gas tank were much more likely to and the entire system. Tank configu- advantage of front-mounted trans- cause a secondary explosion than rations vary from year to year, but missions is the necessity for mount- were diesel fumes. Besides lowering most countries have settled on a ing final drives close to the hull, the likelihood of fuel fires, and there- design that can be trad back to the thereby making it difficult to give by improving survivability, the shift T-34 tank the glacis plate a slope with a large to diesels increased the tank’s mile- The tank hull is normally divided angle from the vertical to provide age between refuelings. The gasoline- into three compartments: the driv- the greatest possible effective thick- engined M-46 Patton tank had a er’s compartment, turret area, and ness for the frontal amor.29 range of 70 miles (113 km), while the the engine compartment. The engine The only tanks in service today that M60Al (with increased fuel aboard) of a tank is normally comparb have front-mounted engines has a range of 300 miles (483 km).23 mented to reduce the chance of a fuel and transmissions are the Israeli Ammunition propellent charges fire spreading into the crew areas. Merkava and the Swedish STank. are the biggest fire hazard in the The engine is normally found in the The Merkava was designed with a tank because they ignite instan- front or rear of the tank, but the first front-mounted engine and trans- taneously when struck by a pene real tank, the British Mark I, had mission as additional frontal trator. However, the risk of a propel- the engine in the middle.26 Although The STank’s front engine lant fire can be significantly reduced most tanks produced since WW 11 compartment also provides addi- by using stowage racks filled with have the engine and transmission tional mew protection. However, ita liquid, such as was done in the M-4 in the rear, many tanks were built front engine/transmission layout Sherman and the Chieftain. An before and during WW I1 with the was really a byproduct of the alternate method is to use blow-off engine in the rear and the trans- requirement for an autoloader that panels as in the M1.24 mission in the front.2’ There are filled the space where the engine In addition to armor and fire pro- several disadvantages to the rear would have been plad.31 As for tection, other measures that can engine/front transmission layout. maintenance of the S-Tank, if the

38 ARMOR november-december 1983 b optical or electro-optical systems to 1 ensure that vision would be at least (in) (mm) (mm) as good as it is in a conventional 13 54.5 1.384 37 turret. 'anther 65 1,650 75 14 69 1,753 75/76 1126 69 1,753 90 Armament lger I 73 1,850 88 The choice of a tank's main knturlon 74 1,880 83.4/105 armament is governed by many 148fM60 85 2,159 9011 05 factors. Among these are the tacti- Meftaln 85 2.159 120 cal doctrine of the country develop- niir~n~.narinn R na.,slnnrnan+nf C;-h+in- Irahirlar. n 74. UiinniPittt Dnmhinn. n SL","W". Yw",y,, " "w.w,"p,,,w,,, "I , ,y,r L,,, y 1-11, "IW", y. -7, I l" 11.11 "Y.., I "." 1..11 J, *. ing the tank, the potential enemy's 201; Tank Warfare, p. 67. armor protection, and the require ment to destroy a variety of targets. diesel engine must be replaced, not pr~jediles.~~ In the 19608, it appeared that future only must the glacis plate be removed Most tanks mount the engine and tanks would be equipped with anti- but the gun barrel must also be transmission in the rear, avoiding tank guided missiles (ATGM) be dismounM.32 the disadvantages of the hnt loca- cause of their long-range and high With development of thermal tion, but this complicates the instal- kill probability. In the U.S., the imagers, front-mounted engines lation of controls because they must Sheridan and M60A2 were designed may increase the likelihood of the pass from the driver's compartment, primarily to fire ATGMs from their tank being detected in defilade, through the turret area, and into main gun. The French Army started while the location of cooling radia- the engineltransmission compart- to develop the ACRA, a 142-mm tors up front may also contribute to mer~t.~~ missile fired from a gun, but termi- uneven main gun barrel heating With the major exception of the nated the program after several fir- and gun barrel droop. S-Tank, most tanks have a single ing~.~3Although missiles may have In addition to the disadvantages turret. The S-Tank has a fixed 105 some advantages for long-range just mentioned, the problem of keep- mm gun mounted in the vehicle hull

ing the driver cool when he is with an autoloader behind it that ~ located next to a hot engine or gives the system a 15round-per- transmission is aggravated. How- minute rate of fire.36 Gun elevation Roiled Homogeneous Armor 40.4 7.713 ever, keeping exhaust gases or of -10 to +12 degrees is obtained by itanium 23.2 4.429 noises out of the crew compartment using the hydropneumatic suspen- 039 Aluminum 14.4 2.749 lotes: 1. Areal density is the weight per is greatly simplified. sion to change the hull's pitch.37 unit of surface area for a given A sigdicant advantage of locating The gun is traversed using a very thickness of material. the fighting compartment in the rear sophisticated transmission to ad- 2. psf = Pounds per square foot of the tank is the reduction of the vance or reverse the tracks to of a one inch thick plate. overall length of the tank/hull/gun change the gun's deflection. The combination, which lowers the system allows the gun to be tra- engagements, their disadvantages chances that the gun will strike the versed as rapidly as most tank include a low firing rate, inability to ground when moving across country turrets.38 fire on the move, a long minimum with gun The rear fighting Drawbacks to the S-Tank concept range, and reduction of the basic compartment configuration can also are rarely mentioned but obvious. load because of their large size.44In accommodate a longer gun, which The first is the total inability to fire addition, because of their high cost, increases muzzle velocity, and im- the main gun on the move or from the crews of AGTM weapons sys- proves the penetration of armor- some positions. Since the entire hull tems fire very few training missiles. piercing, discarding-sabot (APDS) must move to traverse the gun, an While the ATGMs were being S- Tank commander cannot orient developed, significant advances the gun while in turret defilade, were made in tank gun fire control, order the driver to move forward, permitting the gun to shoot more engage the target as soon as the accurately at the ranges likely to be gun is exposed, and then return to encountered in combat. Thus, all defilade.39 recently-fielded tanks mount guns Although virtually all modern as their main armament. tanks have a single turret it is not impossible that in the future the Ammunition crew will be positioned within the Tanks carry large volumes of hull and the main gun mounted ammunition for the main gun, externally. coaxial machinegun, roof-mounted The turret may be outmoded, but it machinegun(s), the crew's weapons, offers advantages that no other system can match. If the commander is u uum .h nuuuuuuuu mawurauug mounted above the hull, he has a 1 better view of the terrain,is better able to spot targets and give spdc instructions to the driver. Currently, the viewing systems necessary to do this are relatively simple, but mounting the commander and gunner in the hull would require complicated and Tank Troops, p. 96.

ARMOR november-decem ber 1983 39 with a port in the side of the turret Year for loading ammunition and dispos- IOC ing of spent cartridges, while Mark I (male) 332 57-mm 1916 ammunition for other tanks must be Mark IV 204 57-mm 1916 loaded through the loader’s hatch 1917 and empty cases thrown out through 1918 the same opening. The cartridge case disposal problem has been par- 1940 1941 tially solved in tanks such as the 1942 T-64, T-72, and Leopard 2 by using 1944 combustible cartridge cases that 1945 leave only a relatively small obtura- 1945 tor that resembles a very short 1949 cartridge case. The Chieftain is the 1-54 34 100-mm 1949 only production tank using ammu- 1950 nition that does not have an obturator 1953 but has a completely combustible pro- 1953 1958 pellant bag instead. M6OA1 60 105-mm 5950 900 1960 T-62 40 115-mm 2000-3000 250 1967 Crew Chieftain 64 120-mm 6Ooo 1963 The cubic volume of the tank Lempard 1 60 105-mm 5500 1965 devoted to the crew is a very impor- 1-64 40 125-mm 3Ooo 500 1970 tant consideration in tank design. A MWA2 33 152-mm 13 rnsl. 5560 1080 1974 seated man needs .52 cubic yards T-72 40 125-mm 3000 50 1975 (0.4 cubic meters) of space when Leopard 2 42 120-mm 2000 1979 wearing nuclear-biological-chemical M1 55 105-mm_-...... - 11,400 . 1000- . 1980 Sources: uuncan- wow,- APVS or woria war I: (uuncan Grow),- American AtVS (NBC) gear. A loader needs 1.04 wori fdWar 11, Ray Bonds, Modern Tanks and Fighting Vehicles, (Salamanc cubic yards (0.8 cubic meters), while Boalk, Arc0 Publishing Inc), NY 1980, “OrdnanceTank Automotive Co the driver needs about .78 cubic malid Characteristics Data, Tank, Combat, Full Tracked, 90-mm GI yards (0.6 cubic meters). Allowing M48A2, ’* 22 Dec. 58. 10 percent extra for room and essential movement, a four-man crew requires about 3.3 cubic yards (2.5 smoke grenades, and sometimes its basic load weighs 2,460 pounds cubic meters) of space.47 hand grenades. The most critical (1,116 kilos) (table 6). Many people wonder why tanks ammunition is that for the main Empty cartridge cases add another must have four-man crews. Modem gun. Historically, the number of problem for both the tank and electronics and engineering allow main gun rounds aboard tanks has ammunition designer. After firing driving controls to be operated by fluctuated greatly. For instance, the as few as five rounds, the empty either the commander or gunner. WW I Mark Itank, carried 332 57-mm cases hinder the loader’s operations An automatic loader can replace a rounds, and the WW 11, T-34/76 and the residual propellant gases crewman, Indeed, the commander carried 77 main gun rounds (table 5). held in the cases begin to pose a can, in most tanks, lay and fire the Since WW 11, the number of main gun breathing problem for the crew.46 main gun. So why have more than rounds carried by main battle tanks Some tanks have been designed one or two crewmen? (MBTs) has decreased in most countries. In the West, the consensus appears to be that 5@60 rounds are required, while the Soviets appear to accept about 40 rounds as the basic load. us The weight and bulk of ammuni- UK USSR tion directly affects tank design and UK configuration. If more, or larger us rounds, are to be carried, a penalty USSR must be paid in equipment, crew us space, or armor protection. Some UK examples: USSR Increasing the basic load of an us M-47 from 71 to 105rounds required us USSR the removal of the bow machinegun us and elimination of the bow gunner’s USSR station.45 FRG The 75mm round for the M-4 us HEAT M409 Sherman’s main gun weighs 20 Sources: R. P. Hunnicutt, Sherman, A History of the American Medium Tank, (Tarus pounds (9.04 kilos) and the tanks Enterprises),Belmont, CA. 1978, pp. 554567: Ezio Bonsignore, Anti-Tank basic load weighs 1,931 pounds Warfare, Technology, Trends, Weaponry (I), Military Technology 23, p. 31, (875.88 kilos). By contrast, the M- R. P. Hunnicutt, Pershing, (Feist Publications), Berkeley, CA 1971, pp. 23@ 6OAl’s 105mm main gun round 231, Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s World Armored Fighting Vehicles, (Mac weighs 41 pounds (18.6 kilos) and Donalds and Jane’s), London, 1976, pp. 94-95.

40 ARMOR novernber-decernber 1983 Table 7. Road Wheel Travel 1-55 85 Chieftaln 120 AMX-30 186 T-64 203 Vlckera MBT 203 Leopard 1 (lat wheel) 260 MWA1 300 T-72 310 M1 381 TYP 74 '400 Leopard 2 530 S-Tank (last wheal) 543 MBT-70/KPZ-70 550 - - , ....-...-..-..-. fense Review (IDR) Special Series: Main Battle Tanks (MBT),pp. 42-43; International Defense Review Special Ser- L ies 11, Armored Vehicles, p. 22

"here is a E Centurlon 12.5 for a separat Chleftain 13.92 during an at M-4A3 13.96 mander finds T-54 14.4 shoots, and t MOA1 15.3 the tank with T-34/85 15.6 by the comm M48A5 15.9 cases, the dric 1-55 16.1 1-44 16.2 and hand the! M47 17.54 there is the indisputable fact that the but the volume of the Leopard 2's S-lank 18.7 fourth crew member reduces the diesel is only 5.19 cubic meters T-72 19.0 strain on the crew by spreading out compared to the MI turbine's 5.48 1-62 19.2 the workload of operating and main- cubic meters. However, most of the Leopard 1A3 19.6 taining the tank during 24-hour-a- difference between the M1 and the T-64 20.0 day operations. However, the case Leopard 2 weight and space require Leopard 2 27.5 for a separate loader is weaker. The menta for the propulsion systems of M1 28.1 Soviets have fielded two MBTs the M1 and thk Leonard 2 lies in the , - equipped with automatic loaders volume of fuel that must be carried cia, Modern Armor, A Compre. that offer higher sustained rate of aboard the -a problem that was hensive Guide, (Squadron/ Sig a MI nal Publications), Warren, MI fire, but have the disadvantage of solved by placing it in specially- 1978, pp. 21-22, 25, 97, 106, 126 occupying much space as a man. shaped to best use the available as tanks 130.137.143.149., .-.- Furthermore, the automatic loader is ~pace.~~ I subject to failure and requires main- Complicating the problem of com- Sumension tenance to ensure reliability. paring different engine power rat- One of the a'ms of any euspen- The question of crew size will ings is the difference between gross sion system design is to produce a undoubtedly be raised again when horsepower (the power produced by smooth ride by absorbing the shocks new tanks are designed for the an engine with no accessories) and and jolts that occur when the tank 1990s and the year 2000 since the the net horsepower (the power avail- maneuvers over varying terrain.53 watchwords will be smaller crews able to the transmission, after Such forces are initially taken up by and greater mobility.48 deducting cooling, electrical gener- a springing medium consisting of ating, and other losses). A case in either torsion bar, coil springs, Belle Power Plant point is the M48. Its AV-1790-5gas- ville washers (disc springs), or hydro- The power-to-weight ratio deve oline engine developed 825 gross pneumatic springs.54In the hydro- loped by the tank is widely regarded horsepower, while the diesel version pneumatic system, nitrogen gas in as the most critical measure of the developed 750 horsepower, but the a sealed container is compressed tank's ability to move with some diesel version produced 630 net when road wheel movement actu- agility. Power-to-weight is normally horsepower compare to the gasoline ates a piston that forces oil against expressed as the ratio of horse engine's 625 net horsepower.51 Some the gas. Then, as the road wheel power-per-unitof vehicle weight and observers are now beginning to clears the obstacle, the gas expands is found by dividing the gross power believe that it is more important to to move the wheel back to its nor- developed by the engine by the quote the power-to-weight ratio at mal position. Tanks without hydro- gross vehicle weight in tons. Power- the sprocket rather than the gross pneumatic suspension use shock to-weight ratios were in the 14-161 power to weight ratio to account for absorbers to absorb the force that is area during WW I1 and have risen these differences. not taken up by the springing to 27-28:l with the Leopard 2 and The Soviets believe that the fao medium. M1 tanks (table 8). These ratios tors to be considered when picking a Regardless of what suspension is provide rapid acceleration and sus- tank engine are the compactness used, the designer's primary objec- tained higher speeds that translate and reliability of the engine, its tive is to provide the smoothest ride to improved agility and mobility, accessability for maintenance, and possible. The smoother the ride, the

ARMOR novernber-decernber 1983 41 the BMP and T-62 have marker lights to maintain formation while maneuvering at night. The lights

- facing forward are green, side lights When considering the human fac- fires). are yellow or orange, and those in tor in suspension design, it should 0 Good ventilation. the rear are red. In addition, T-62 be noted that motion sickness sets 0 Bore evacuators for quick re tanks have a removable hood with a in when the hull’s pitching motion moval of propellant gases from the vision block, windshield wiper, and reaches 4 to 5 cycles per second.55 gun tube.56 electrical defroster that is placed The desired goal is about .7 to .8 Also, the Soviets have included over the driver’s hatch in bad cycles per second, which can be several design features not found in weather.5’ achieved by increasing road wheel U.S. tanks that affect tank opera- Summary travel (table 7).56 tion. On both the BMP and T-62 Tankers worldwide will probably Human Engineering there are lights that warn the driver always insist that the guy who Although the Soviets are frequent when the main gun is traversed designed his tank “blew” the design ly believed to ignore human engi- over a line extended from the tracks of one particular feature. While this neering when designing tanks they forward. The vision blocks are elec- may possibly by true, the tankers do, in fact, consider the following trically heated to demist them, and should be grateful if only one minor factors closely: a spraying device is used to clear feature is faulty. Then, instead of 0 Provision of comfortable head- the vision blocks of mud or dust. On griping among themselves, they rests. the T-62,the main gun cannot be should share their firsthand expe 0 Attention to layout of gunner’s power-traversed when the driver’s rience with equipment shortcom- and commander’s station for ease of hatch is open. The BMP has a light ings through articles or letters to operation. to warn that the rear doors are the editor of their professional jour- 0 Good depth of field for sights, open, and a light that tells the nals. After all, who knows better thereby making them easier to use dnver that the gunner has applied about the quality of a tank than because placement of head is not as power to the turret controls. Both “the man who owns one?’

Footnotes

I Arthur J. Alexander, “Decision Making in z2 Tanks and Tank Troops, pp. 103-104. 52 Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 133. Soviet Weapons Procurement,” Adelphia 23 Design of Fighting Vehicles, p. 91. s3 Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 135. Papers, 147-148, (IISS), London, 1978, p. 31. 24 Fred Schreier. “A Tank Designed to Cost 54 F. Schreier, “The Modern,,Battle Tank, P. Aileen O’Brien “Generation of Weapons -The US Army XM-1,” ZDR Special Series-11, Part 3 Mobility-3. Suspension, ZDR Special Requirements in the Soviet Ground Forces,” pp. 21-24. Series, Battle Tanks, 1976, (hereafter cited as Army Research, Development and Acquisi- 96 “Details of the Soviet T-72 Battle Tanks,” Suspensions), p. 41. tion Magazine, January-February 1980, p. 21. ZDR Special Series-11, p. 31. 55 Suspensions, pp. 41-42. A. Kh Babdzhanyan, ed., Tanks and Tank z6 Chris Ellis and Peter Chamberlain, ‘Tanks ,5e Tanks and Tank Troops, pp. 8749. Troops (Red Banner of Labor Military Press of Mark I to V,” Duncan Crow, ed., AFV’s of 57 “Tank Driver Hood,” Military Review the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Mos- World War One,(Profile Publications Limited, 1972, p. 100 and “Modificantions to the T-62,” cow), 1970, translated by the US Army Tank Windsor, Berkshire, England), 1970, p. 24. Armies & Weapons #35, June, 1977. Automotive Command, Warren, MI, NTIS (hereafter cited as AFVs). Number AD762 557, 1970 (hereafter cited as 27 Tanks and Tank Troops. D. 51. Tanks and Tank Troops), p. 50. z8 Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 56. F. Clifton Berry, Jr., “Solving the 144inch 29 Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 51-52 Mystery,” Armed Forces Journal Znterna- 30 “An Israeli Tank Ready for Series Produc tional, July 1970, p. 1820. tion: The Merkava. Mk I,” International Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 5859. Defenee Review Special Series-11, Armored Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, “M-3 Vehicles. 1980, (Hereafter cited as ZDR Series- Medium (Lee Grant),”ArmoredFighting Veh- 11). pp. 3538. icles ofthe World. Volume 4. American AFV’s Main Battle Tanka, pp, 8890. of World War ZZ(Profi1e Publications, Limited, 31 Main Battle Tanks, p. 90. Windsor, Berkshire, England), 1972, p. 48. R. 33 Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 57. M. Ogorkiewin, Design and Development of a Main Battle Tanks. p. 87. Fighting Vehicles (Doubleday & Company, Tanks and Tank Troops, pp. 5255. Inc., Garden City, NY), 1968 (hereafter cited $0 Duncan Crow, Modern Battle Tanks, (Arc0 as Design of Fighting Vehicles), p. 74. Publishing Company, NY), 1978, (hereafter Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 96. cited as Modern Battle Tanks, p. 87. Design of Fighting Vehicles. pp. 196-197. 37 Modern Battle Tanks, p. 83. e Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 58. 38 Modern Battle Tanks. p. 83-84. lo Design of Fighting Vehicles, pp. 7374. $9 Tank Warfare,pp. 145146. l1 Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 50. Footnotes 40, 41. and 42 are not shown Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 4550. because material that referred to them in the GERALD A. HALBERT grad- William Fowler, “Battle for the Falklands text was deleted. uated from California State 0,Land Forces,” (Osprey Publishing, Lon- 43 Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 90. University-Fullerton in 1974. don), 1982, p. 19 I4 Tanks and Tank Troops, p. 62. He served with the 1Olst Air- 46 AFVs of WWZZ, p. 229. Design of Fighting Vehicles, p. 96. borne, 9th Infantry, 82d Air- Is Tanks and Tank Tmops, p. 96. 48 Tanks and Tank Troops. p. 87. borne divisions, I Corps (ROW Tanks and Tank Troops, pp. 94-96. 47 Tank Warfare, p. 135. “Zmproved Chieftain for Iran,” ZDR Spe- (8 The discussion of crew size was based in US) Group and XVlll Airborne cial Series, Battle Tanks, 1976, pp. 96-97. large part on Simpkin’s Tank Warfare, p. 122- Corps, 66th MI Group, and la Design of Fighting Vehicles, p. 82. 125 and 127-133. The opinion on reasons for Hq. USAREUR. Prior to his l9 Tank Warfare, pp. 111-113. retention of the driver and loader are the retirement, he was assigned to MG I. Krupchenka “Characteristic Fea- author’s. Studies Division, Directorate ture of the Development and Employment of ‘9 R.M. Ogorkiewin, “Gas Turbine or Diesels of Combat Developments,

Troops,’’ Military History Journal, ~ Tank for Tanks,” ZDR Special Series 11, p. 85. USAARMS, Fort Knox. KY. (Moscow), No. 9, 1979, pp. 2627. 5O IDR Special Series - I I, p. 83. 21 Design of Fighting Vehicles, pp. 8283. 51 Design of Fighting Vehicles, p. 89.

42 ARMOR novernber-decernber 1983 The Training Revol ition by Colonel Andrew P. O’Meara, Jr. Over a desade ago the army initiated dangerous world, it was apparent developers to clearly define thresholds comprehensive plans to revamp train- that the army would need to mod- of proficiency and critical skills needed ing. Under the leadership of General ernize rapidly through the acquisition by small unit leaders and first line William E. DePuy, Training and Doc- of a vast array of new equipment, as supervisors at each skill level. The trine Command (TRADOC) set in well as to scientis.caUy engineer our systems engineering of courses such motion changes that were to revolu- methods of training in order to ensure as basic and advanced NCO courses tionize training throughout the army. maximum return on the nation’s through the Instructional Systems Although the origins of the revolution investment in modernization. Development (ISD) process is gradu- predate General DePuy’s arrival at New words entered the vocabulary ally transforming our noncommis- TRADOC, his leadership brought the of army trainem A hierarchy of indi- sioned officer corps into the most prof- revolution to each company, battery, vidual training tasks composed of five icient body of small-unit troop leaders and troop in the Army. skill levels was developed for each in the world. General DePuy played an impor- MOS. The skill qualification test In the years that have followed the tant role in marketing and imple (SQT) was inaugurated in order to introduction of the new training sys- menting the ideas associated with the provide a yardstick to assess soldier tem, comprehensive change has been new training methods that were ini- proficiency at each skill level. Detailed at work within the TRADOC institu- tially known as systems engineering analysis based upon a comprehensive tional training base and within army of instruction and were made manda- field assessment identified the indi- units in the field. Assessment of the tory in 1968 by CONARC Regulation vidual tasks performed within each effectiveness of the new training tools 350-10(11. The revolution employed MOS at each skill level. Designated is important so that we can under- the analytical tools of the systems the “frontend analysis,” these field stand the profound change that has engineer as well as the lateat educa- assessments were designed to ensure taken place throughout the Army, as tional techniques from the civilian the training was focused upon the well as the great potential of a train- educational community in order to actual tasks and skills required by the ing system that is raising soldier improve institutional and unit train- soldier in order for him to perform skills to performance levels unheard ing. Earlier methods of army training effectively at each successive skill of in the past. These changes have were simpler, built upon years of level. been complemented by the enhanced experience, and consisted of tech- Unit mission training was redesig- attractiveness of the military profes- niques of the trade passed from nated collective training in order to sion, vis-a-visthe civilian job market. generation to generation through ex- iden@ group tasks which were ori- Consequently, the Army has been ample in a manner best described as ented on performance of combat mis- able to recruit and retain highly quali- militaryart. sions. Assessment tools to evaluate fied individuals to complement the The yardsticks formerly used to unit performance-the Army Train- enhanced effectiveness of army train- measure unit performance as well as ing and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) ing. The combination of tougher train- the equipment our soldiers carried -were designed that recognized both ing and volunteers with the abilities into battle were relatively simple. the individual tasks and the collective to master more difficult training stan- Army training consisted of tech- tasks necessary to achieve full unit dards have enabled trainers to achieve niques practiced for generations in proficiency. Training developers em- a si@cant increase in soldier per- basic training (BT), advanced indi- ployed the tools of the systems ana- formance. vidual training (AIT),the Army Train- lyst to design instructional materials The Hierarchy of ing Program (ATP), and unit tests through a logical sequence of perfor- Army Training Functions known as Operational Readiness manceoriented training to ensure The complexity of the new training Tests. mastery of skills and knowledge. system and its comprehensive scope As more complex weapons systems Criterion-referenced instruction com- have necessitated new approaches to began to enter the Army’s inventom posed of tasks, conditions, and stand- updating trainers throughout the it became apparent that the army was ards became the norm to enable Army. The Battalion Training Man- on the threshold of a period of prcl trainers to ensure that training amm- agement System (BTMS) and the found change. The advanced tools of plished its intended purpose and to Commander’sTraining Management the system analyst and of civilian clearly establish the efficacy of train- System (CTMS)have been introduced educators offered better ways to mas- ing performance. to assist trainers throughout the Army ter tasks, skills, and missions. Mastery of the new training sys- in understanding the new system and The DePuy initiatives came at a tems posed an awesome challenge for to effectively employ the training time when the need for modernization the Army. It entailed the training of management tools developed by was long overdue. The Army had personnel involved in design and TRADOC. Figure 1 shows the hi- brought to a close a decade of in- development of training materials, as erarchy of training management func volvement in revolutionary (insur- well as the retraining of trainers tions within the new training system. gency) warfare. Preoccupation with throughout the Army. Moreover, mod- Each of the training tools is relatively revolutionary warfare had oversha- ernization necessitated the simul- simply to employ. &ginning at the dowed preparation for conventional taneous integration of new equipment lowest level at which initial entry warfare and deferred procurement of and weapon systems into the army individual training is executed through new weapons systems needed in order training system. the performance of collective tasks at to dominate modern battlefields. Faced The need for a system of profes- the unit level, the system is composed with a massive challenge to achieve sional schools for our noncommis- of a logical progression of task build- combat readiness and to preserve sioned officers was also recognized. ing blocks to ensure complete mastery peace through deterrence in a more F’ront-end analysis enabled training of the unit mission. Each higher level

ARMOR november-december 1983 43 _.. -. -mining Function -rxampia . A~~VI~V Responsibility Skill DevelOpmOnt Refomncos hanagement of 1'reparation of Army TRADOC and Proponent S8SC. CLGSC, ARMY FM 25-1; Threat Assess- lraining and Doctrine 1rraining 1990 Study Schools StTAFF, TRADOC ments. Combat Develop- - ments, and AR 350-1 Write Doctrine F'reparation of How Directorateof Doctrine TRADOC Senior Military History. MAA, and -t o Fight Manuals and Proponent Schools Managers Course Combat Developments ----^^ - . . _-_ - Design Training HAUUL; senior I~AUOL;neguiation 360-7. llSD Pmceu) ind Collective Training/ ommandant for Educa- lanagera Course How to Fight Literature, rest Materials mal Technology, and ISD Handbook imctory of Training avelopments, and - -PI'oponent School -- _:-_A_ __ __--...----. .." '...'I .".....V'.."... 1 Btigaos or Donmiion born- CTMS. BTMS, and FM 25-2, FM 26-1, FM 25-3, I mander, 53, and Opere- Proponent School FM 25-4 Lviiy-r-iig- I rmining rians tic3ns Sergeant -- Program Training for Produce Training Schedule CIompany Commander E the Unit bwl --01 id First Sergeant --P Collective Training 1hnnual or Semi-annual BI,igade and Battalion B Auossment (IARTEP) External Eval- CIDmmonders and Subordi- ARTEP 17-65, and FM 17-95 I uation na ites -- Conduct Collective IJnit Training: Finel As- Cc ~mpanyCommander, A ,OC. OBC. and *ARTEP 71-2. FM 25-3, Task Training Imult PIatoon Leader, Platoon ALNCOC FM 26-4. FM 7-7 - --SI irgeant -- Assessment of mt Sergeant, Platoon A NOC and BNCOC SQT. FM 7-7, FM 25-3. Individual Task 1'mining: Combat SIargeant. Squad lander, ARTEP 71-2, ARTEP 17-56 Proficiency Ilowment .I id Vehicle Commander I -I -- Conduct Training for C:ombat Movement Tmin- Drill Sergeant, Platoon D rill Instructors School. *FM 26-3. FM 7-7. FM 21-2 Individual Task iiig of Individual Soldmr SIargeant. Squad Leader, BINCOC. and PLC IFM 21-3, and FM 17-19E 1/2 a1id Vehicle Commander I Figure 1. The Hierarchy of Army 1'raining Functions 'These references pertain to training in Armor or Cavalry Units and CMF 19 Initial Entry Training aggregates more advanced individual tem, who were bold enough to borrow the course manager, and members of and collective tasks. Through BTMS advanced training techniques from the task force attended the Staff and workshops, trainers gain practical the civilian sector and apply them to Faculty Development Course to pre experience in the organization of unit army training. Suffice it to say that pare for their new responsibilities in training programs and assessment of our soldiers today are achieving levels the development of course materials. unit training effectiveness. In view of of proficiency on the MI tank that we The objectives of the training devel- the fact that the logical progression of had not dreamed possible on older opment effort were to transform the functions becomes more abstract at and simpler weapons systems. Let us courses of instruction using criterion- the higher levels within the hierarchy, examine some of these changes as referenced instruction that was per- it has been necessary to focus upon they apply to Career Management formance oriented as well as interac the specific functions of the trainer in Field (CMF) 19 in the training base. tive, a technique that forces the BTMS workshops. student to demonstrate mastery of BTMS workshops allow trainem at Systems Engineered Armor IET skills and knowledge during the block every level of the organization to In the summer of 1980, General of instruction. These educational tech- understand their role in the develop Donn A. Starry directed that the niques demand that the soldier pre ment of their individual skills, as well Armor Center revise its program of vide undivided attention throughout as their responsibilities as trainers to instruction in order to eliminate sea+ each block of instruction and they develop the full range of individual specisc training that produced a sepa- require him to perform the task at the and collective tasks within the organ- rate MOS for the tank driver. More- completion of the training. This serves ization. Appreciation of the full range over, General Starry directed the to assess the effectiveness of the of management responsibilities and Armor Center to system engineer all trainer as well as soldier performance training tasks is essential so that courses of instruction, including CMF during training. units design their training programs 19K (Ml) as well as existing IET Inswtence upon performanceorient- in harmony with concomitant train- courses. The Deputy Commanding ed training meant elimination of the ing programs being conducted at General of the Armor Center charged former lecture techniques and required Basic and Advanced Noncommissi- the commander of the 1st Training that each student be allowed the oned Officers Courses (BNCOC) Brigade with the responsibility to act opportunity to demonstrate his per- (ANCOC),and Initial Entry Training as course manager for IET in CMF 19 formance of the task being taught. (IET), as well as at higher echelons and to initiate ISD of the new courses Consequently, the task force recog- within the tactical organization. The in cooperation with the Directmate of nized that the new programs of beauty of the system rests upon the Training Developments. A task force instruction would entail higher start hard logic made possible through the composed of officers and noncommis- up costs in terms of instruction sup systems engineering approach as well sioned officers with firsthand ex- port equipment. as the significant increase in soldier perience in conducting of IET was In order to compensate for the proficiency currently being achieved formed within the 1st Brigade. The anticipated higher costs, the develop in the institutional training base. task force operated directly under bri- ers simultaneously worked to identify Credit for the great changes in lev- gade S3 and augmented the efforts of cost-saving approaches whenever els of soldier performance, which we the training developers of the new possible in the developmental effort. have observed since the DePuy initia- courses of instruction. The Deputy Specific approaches employed to tives were implemented, must go to Assistant Commandant for Educa- reduce costs included selection of local the far-sighted architects of the sys- tional Technology provided advice to training areas and closein training 44 ARMOR november-december 1983 facilities whenever possible to hold vidual to master each of the crew is vitally important’ that soldiers down fuel costa as well as the wear duties associated with each position faithfully perform their sequential and tear on equipment in the move in the tank. Television tapes have checks for putting the equipment into ment to distant training locations. been produced that allow an increase operation in order to preclude damage Numerous subjects that were for- in standardization of instruction and to the equipment. In the past we have merly taught were identified as being ensure that interactive techniques are experienced great difficulty with the unnecessary because they did not con- effectively presented to the soldier. operation of systems such as the tribute to a speafic task identified in Further incrmes in soldier perfor- M60A2 tank, the M551 reconnais- the hntend analysis. Convoy driv- mance and cost savings are antici- sance vehicle, and even simpler equip ing, training with the M16, and firing pated as simulation devices now in ment such as the M151 %-ton truck, Table VIIC were expensive to conduct production become available to rein- because soldiers were not sufficiently and contributed no skill required by force the training programs, Finally, disciplined to operate the equipment individual tankers at Skill Level 1. the production of a systematically in accordance with directed startup Consequently, major savings were designed program of instruction allows and shutdown procedures. The indis- achieved by the elimination of train- us to anticipate resource requirements cipline of the operators resulted in ing activities that did not contributeto and harness our instructional efforts burned-out radios and destroyed elec- the skills required to prepare the sold- to the resources allocation programs trical components. The disciplined ier to achieve MOS mastery. This of the Army that are not geared to approach to training, which the ISD decision caused some misgivings support programs that have not been approach provides, has resulted in a because trainers had achieved consid- developed by ISD. The Army Moder- much higher level of soldier confi- erable skill in conducting the excluded nization Information Memorandum dence and discipline that has drasti- classes. (AMIM), Modernization Resource cally reduced equipment failures. Additional approaches to achieve Information Submission (MRIS) and Trainers and testers at the Armor cost savings through the employment TRADOC Review of Manpower (TRM) Center also recognize the magnitude of simulation devices were identified processes constitute little burden in of the change that has taken place in during the developmental process. additional staff work once the ISD JET. They are enthusiastic about the Inasmuch as the new systems were tools have been employed. On the con- changes because they mgnize the coming on line during a period in trary, these Army resource allocation consistency and discipline which has which simulation technology was tools are designed to program recog- been achieved. Moreover, these instrue available through simultaneous de nized requirements that have been tors are acquiring a far more sophisti- velopment efforts at the Army Train- approved in the rmurce annexes of cated mastery of items of equipment ing Support Center (ATSC)and Mate the TRfiDOC course of instruction. upon which they work as a result of riel Development and Readiness The greatest return for our investment the detailed instructional materials Command, @ARCOM), the training in training development, however, provided for their use in training. developers at the Armor Center ink cannot be measured in dollars and Comments from the field concerning grated plans for acquisition of driving cents. Soldiers who are subjected to the quality of our recent graduates and conduchf-tiresimulation devices, “hurry up and wait” as well as attests to the validity of the new train- and improved driving courses to instruction that cannot be clearly jus- ing methodology. achieve increased opportunities for tified in terms of eventual jobsite per- operator performance and the capac- formance become cynical and ques- ity to expand training si@cantly tion the direction of the “green during mobilization. machine.” The sequence of individual instrue Conversely, soldiers who are worked tion was designed to ensure that basic hard to master meaningful require skills were mastered before progress- ments that challenge them mentally ing to more complex individual skills and physically at each block of and crew duties. Test plans and test instruction gain a profound respect instruments were produced before for the order and disciplined environ- individual lesson plans were prepared ment in which they are trained. to ensure the methodology of instruc- Upon my arrival in June 1980 in tion was consistent with expectations the 1st Training Brigade, 28 percent of soldier performance during testing. of our soldiers in training posseased a Classes were piloted with small groups high school diploma. Today 90 per- commencing trial instructional before cent of our active component soldiers COLONEL ANDREW P. cycles to identify weaknesses and to are high school graduates. We hear no QMEARA, JR, was commis- perfect each block of instruction. complaints today from soldiers regard- sioned in Armor in 1959 from The new courses of instruction for less of their level of civilian education. USMA. He has served in var- 19K, 19E, and 19D are now being Each man works hard and is required ious capacities in Vietnam, taught. Advantages identified by the to master tough training that is rele Germany and CONUS and trainers include harmony between vant to effective MOS performance. A commanded the 147th Ar- SQT requirements and ET. Trainers by-product of the rationalization of mor, Fort Hood, TX. He is a now teach each block of instruction in CMF 19 instruction is a marked graduate of the U.S. Army War College and from 1980 to 1983 accordance with evaluation test increase in the level of soldier disci- was commander, 1st AIT/ requirements for end-ofcourse com- pline. The individual soldier accepts OSUT Brigade at Fort Knox, prehensive tests, which reduces the his instruction and is prepared to per- KY. He is currently assigned demands upon the drill sergeants to form in accordance with the stand- as president of the U.S. Army conduct reinforcement training. Sold- ards demanded. Training Board, Fort Eustis. iers receive comprehensive instruction In the operation of complex wea- VA. that is designed to prepare the indi- pons systems such as the MI tank, it

ARMOR novernber-decernber 1983 45 ~~ Dunn-Kempf Is Still a Valuable Tmining Aid

One of the most versatile, and overlooked training aids toring a platoon net as well as a unit command net, position available to the armor unit leadertoday is the Dunn-Kempf an AN/GRA39 remote unit centrally located for use as the wargame. It was invented by two army officers interested unit command net. muire your troop or company com- in using military miniatures to improvetraining skills. The mand post (CP) to set up in the motor pool complete with Dunn-Kempf wargame employs realistic U.S. and Threat maps, and monitor the battle by radio. The XO can either miniature vehicles on representative terrain to simulate play as the acting unit commander in the CP (using the armored combat between a Threat reinforced tank battal- “fall+ut one” concept),or can serve as your battle deputy in ion and a U.S. tanvmechanized team (or armored cavalry a location near the terrain board. If you require players to troop). render spot reports to the unit CP, and connect the CP by There are many advan- to this type of simulation. radio to a participating battalion or sqaudron S2 cell located TheonlyresourcesrequiredtouseDunn-Kempfarethetime nearby, you can verify the accuracy of the tactical picture of the personnel involved and the spaceto lay out the game, painted by your unit’s spot reports and passed on by your approximately 10 feet by 15 feet. The game itself can be set CP to the next higher headquarters. This simple procedure up anywhere from a unit day room to a general purpose will graphically illustrate whether or not your unit provides medium tent. Leaders are given the opportunity to make the battalion or squadron commander with information he tactical decisions while confronted with realistically por- needs to fight his unit. trayed and sized Threat units. Good decisions are rein- Before conducting the game, gather your subordinates forced by success (attrition of the enemy). Incorrect ones are around the playing board and check their terrain associa- underscored by the destruction of fiendly forces. Combined tion skills. Can arms training is emphasized and leaders can enhance their 0 They associate map graphics to the playing board and map association skills. The only limiting factors are the locate phase lines, target reference pointa, lines of depar- imagination and innovative skills of the armor leader. ture, etc.? As with all forms of training, proper prior planning, 0 They determine the maximum effective ranges of their vigorous execution, and reflective critique are essential weapons systems and relate them to the board? elements for success. The following ideas are designed to 0 Leaders correctly draw section or platoon fire plans? supplement the instructional manual provided as well as Once players have examined the rules, demonstrate on the initiative of the players themselves. the terrain board how to move and engage targets. Ensure In determining what scenario to play, examine the war- they can recognize terrain advantage5and are familiar with time mission of your unit (if you are stationed ovm) any special rules you want to employ, such as how to con- and/or a recent Army Training Evaluation Program duct armored ambushes or simulate vehicle hide positions. (ARTEP) to determine what missions require additional And to make life particularly interesting, consider playing emphasis. Armored cavalry units would probably choose all or part of a game in chemical protective clothing. The some variation of the covering force battle, while armor loss of efficiency displayed by all players will be revealing. units might decide to emphasize defensive actions at the Before you begin, don’t miss the chance to practice troop company team level. If this is the first time your unit has leading procedures. Issue a warning order to your subordi- used Dunn-Kempf, it is best to keep the mission nates before you give the detailed operations order uncomplicated. (OPORD),then give them time to conduct a leader’s recon- Once the scenario is determined, decide who will partici- naissance of the battlefield as well as issue their OPORD to pate. Physical space around the playing board will pmba- their soldiers. This will allow you to evaluate their profi- bly limit participation to the unit commander, executive ciency as leaders as well as the thoroughness of your own officer (XO),platoon leader, platoon sergeants and section OPORD. sergeants, and the mortar section leader. If your unit habitr If your local Training Aids Support Center is the ener- ually crowattaches with the same infantry unit, invite getic and cooperative type, you can enlist their help in thosemechanized platoon leaders and platoon sergeants to producing terrain boards that represent your local maneu- take part. Other worthwhile participants might include a ver areas or general defense plan positions. Conductingthe fire support team and an engineer squad leader if you are simulation on representative terrain boards before you assigned one. The fht few sessions with Dunn-Kempf expend fuel and blank ammunition is a tremendous way to should “train the trainer.” maximize training value from field maneuvers. Now that you know who will play the U.S. side, it’s time The best role for the troop or company commander to to visit your battalion or squadron S2 and get him involved assume is that of umpire and trainer. As the senior leader as the Threat player. Realism will be enhanced by using present, he is best suited to arbitrate conflicts and keep a radio comunications. Establish a communication net by handle on the natural competitive spirit that might scuttle using any PRC-77 radios borrowed from cavalry scouts or the training value if not controlled. If play gets out of hand, the combat support company commander, and equip every- he can stop the action, redirect the scenario and continue one with combat vehicle crewman helmets, or the H-l61/ U the war. (A slight digression:Many people are frightened by headsets used for tank gunnery training. One communica- the size of the Dunn-Kempf rule book. The CO, as umpire, tion net should be established for each platoon, one for fire can simplify or modify the rules, as required. Remember, support, and one for the troop or company command net. To simulation rules are a guide, not an absolute law.) Finally, give participants a feel for the problems inherent in moni- he can keep play moving swiftly, halting only to reinforce a

46 ARMOR november-december 1983 lint re 01 mwwutxu 4th ers. The possib resourcefulness situations are e by turning off SI warfare can IXX chemical clothh talions from unt to the test. (Insie not U.S. tactics. onstrated, will 1 lessly advances tothosetactics- Play should commander an( the spot report: compare what 1 reports, with wl As stated earl events or subtli value. Did iiier prematurely en1 battalion, or dic kill zone? Was were too many cles? can sub smoke to isolate 1UuUW-OIl IILI~ZLX~~UWJU~ HW~ UIC: umb IVI "LLIU UU-L ..zL w-11116. *LA= "USJ au-wuI.- Y'6Lc-c"" hbattle? The teaching points are endless. Successfultae needed for some outstanding and interesting training is tics and good initiative are reinforced by the destruction of some old-fashioned armor leader ingenuity. enemy vehicles; the opposite can be illustrated by iiiendly The overall benefit will be to better prepare the unit to casualties. Once the din of battle has subsided it is time for execute its mission during ARTEP exercises in the intense constructive criticism. and realisticenvironment of the National Training Center, A tremendous benefit can be obtained from a thorough or in the ultimate test of combat. critique.The final question to be asked is whether or not the unit accomplished its mission. In examining that question, HENRYS.SCHARPENBERG each platoon leader should explain his concept of the oper- Captain, Armor ation gleaned from the unit OPORD and relate it to what Headquartem, USAREUR

Five-Point Platoon Training Program

The new lieutenant graduating from his branch basic shortages, and the result is a severe restriction on time, course and arriving in his new company finds all too often equipment and men. Thus,it becomes evident the platoon the platoon he has been assigned is not proficient in the leader must carefully plan his training to take advantage basic fundamentals necessary to perform its combat mis- of the resources he has available and to make maximum sion. And while many fadors go into preparing a platoon use of every opportunity for training. A platoon leader for combat, the basic resour-, especially equipment and should use a fivepoint training plan to maximize his effi- men, necessary for developing an efficient, well-trained, ciency as follows: unit are present. It is the lieutenant's responsibility, as the leader and a8 a trainer, to ensure his platoon is prepared to Standardize perform its mission in a capable manner. To begin, the platoon leader should attempt to sed- To properly train his men is a difficult task for the pla- ize as many procedures and actions as possible. Standing toon leader for, in many cas-, little scheduled training operating procedures (SOPS)reduce confusion and hesita- time is allotted to him solely for his use to train specific tion thereby allowing the platoon to react quickly and tasks. Add to this the distractions of maintenance, post effectively to changing requirements. By reducing the pla- support activities, taskings from higher headquarters, toon's response time and assisting in coordinating ita details for the first sergeant, and equipment and personnel actions, SOPs enhance the combat power of the unit.

ARMOR novemberdecember 1983 47 When formulating platoon SOPS, it is imperative that In line with having an established chain of command, they be clear and concise to ensure understanding by all the platoon leader must train subordinates to beproficient members of the platoon. Wherever possible, emphasis in kadership tasks. Among these should be spot reports, should be placed on making the majority of the unit’s map reading, basic tactics, radio procedures and use of actions repetitive for each SOP rather than having a spe communications-electronics operation instructions cialized plan for every scenario. Platoon SOPs should be (CEOI), and the use of artillery. The platoon leader must developed as a group in order to draw on the experience of add any further skills depending on the unit’s mission and the noncommissioned officers. They possess much broader the level of experience. These sldus may be taught during backgrounds and sources of knowledge than the young NCO development classes and then built upon during field lieutenant. This expertise needs to be incorporated into training. Additionally, encourage junior noncommissi- every platoon plan. During this, and all other training, oned officers to enroll in army correspondence coursea that consult the platoon sergeant and listen to his advice. have been prepared to help them teach themselves leader- Additionally, ensure that platoon plans and procedures ship tasks. This will enhance their knowledge and profi- conform to higher level SOPs and required reporta to ease ciency while also earning them promotion points. Thus, reporting procedures. This will allow section leaders to subordinate leaders will possess the basic skills necessary know when reports are due to the platoon leader/sergeant to continue the platoon mission in the event the platoon and what information is required. Since reports will aub leader becomes a casualty. matically be compiled and forwarded up the chain of command, valuable time will be saved which might oth- Ex- the Platoon erwise be wasted in collecting needed information. The next step in the training process is mastering Once the draft SOPS are hished, conduct a terrain selected platoon-level ARmP tasks. These actions require board exercise with the platoon, or use sand tables to teat the platoon to function in a coordinated effort. Prime these plans. During this phase, modify SOPs as necessary examples would be tactical movement, night refueVreload and develop any new ones as needed. Finally, compile all operations, distribution of fires, and breaching a minefield. SOPs into a booklet to be carried by all members of the SOPs, crew drills, and well-trained noncommissioned platoon. Periodically review and update these plans and officers are merged together to provide the basis for effec- ensure all new members of the platoon bmefamiliar tive platoon operations. with them. An illustration would be a tank platoon’s occupation of an assembly area. The platoon should cross the release Crew Teamwork point in a traveling formation and pick up the platoon Practice ground guide of the advance party without stopping. Cer- Next, the platoon needs to practice crew drills by using SOPs that are deaigned for specific actions that crews may tain actions should automatically occur while moving into be forced to undertake during combat situations. Aban- individual vehicle positions. SOPs must provide vehicle doning a tank,engaging targets, and decontaminating a order and identification signals thus allowing the ground vehicle are examples of actions requiring the crew to act in guide to easily pick out his platoon. Also, tank command- a coordinated effort. Many are everyday eventa or are ers must know the general area their vehicle should be practiced during speciiic training. Others may be practiced located in relation to the platoon leader’s tank. Vehicle in the motor pool or any time the crew is on the vehicle. sectors of responsibility should be provided to allow 360 These drills need to be done on a recurring basis to main- degreea of observation and fire. tain crew proficiency as individuals change positions and Again, SOPs and crew drills must dictate actions once new members join the platoon. Use skill qualification test the vehicle is in position. Which crew member collecta (SBT) results and job books on individuals along with camouflage, which member does basic vehicle main& leadership observations of the mew to idenhfy crew weak- nance, who monitors the radio and provides local security nesses and plan your trainingto strengthen them. Getting from the tank cupola and who runs communication wire to personnel to work together as a crew is the key building adjacent positions are basic items that must be decided. block in the process of developing the platoon. Further considerations are what reports need to be sent to the platoon leader/sergean%where the platoon leader will be locaw how the platoon will shut down all the engines Develop Subordinates at one time; how soon range cards must be made; and Concurrent with practicing individual and crew tasb, which vehicle crewmen will be used for dismounted the platoon leader must develop his subordinate leaders. securiw. The platoon leader cannot run the entire platoon himself The list goes on, but the idea is clear. Actions must and must use his noncommissioned officers to achieve automatically occur in a consistent pattern under the maximum efficiency. The designated chain of command supervision of the platoon’s noncommissioned officers. needs to be exercised and made to work within the platoon. The platoon occupiea the assembly area in a rapid, smooth Many leaders are hesitant to let their Subordinatesrun the fashion. The platoon leader is fke to look after his own platoon field exercises due to pressure hmabove to per- vehicle, and coordinate with adjacent platoons and the form well. The platoon, however, must be able to function company commander. He is able to react quickly to any in the absence of the platoon leader or platoon sergeant. mission changes. With the introduction of Multiple Integrated her Platoon-level training is generally conducted durjng Engagement System (MILES), the possibility of the pla- field training exercisea (nxs) or during combined arms toon leader being removed from the play of a problem livefire exercises (CALFEXs). FlXs provide the platoon bmesmuch more likely. Therefore, subordinate leaders leader the opportunity to identify platoon weaknesses. The have to be allowed to practice running the unit in a field platoon trains as a complete unit in a tactical environment situation where they can gain experience and be critiqued and mistakes can be pointed out as they occur. This allows

48 ARMUR novern ber-decernber 1983 the junior leaders to make immediate codom.When a garrison aRer being in the field and do not conduct an major teaching point needs to be made, such as maintain- after-action review of the lessons learned during the exer- ing vehicle dispersion, stop the platoon momentarily and cise. The platoon needs to regroup as soon as possible in a use the radio to point out the problem. This tends to high- classroom environment and discuss the field training con- light a deficiency and reinforces the corredive action ducted. This is the time to refine SOPS, develop plans for taken. Also, battle drills need to be practiced. Battle drills improving crew and platoon weaknesses, and analyze the are specilic platoon actions that occur when enemy con- platoon tasks practiced. This prevents mistakes E-m tact is made and the platoon must react immediately with recurring and contributes to the development of all a minimum of communication. An example of this type of members of the platoon. Ultimately, the platoon should drill would be platoon actions during an ambush. evolve into an eflicient, smooth running organization CALFEXs take platoon-level tasks a step further from The new lieutenant has a hard job preparing his Unit to the simulation provided by an FIX by incorporating perform properly. Many obstacles will hinder his efforts. actual firepower. Along with expanding the tasks a pla- However, he can draw upon the experience of his non- toon may practice, CALFEXs are an excellent morale commissioned officers and other officers assigned to hie builder. Calls for fie, distribution of platoon fires, and unit. Also, he has his own abilities and determination to coordinated activity with air support can be realistically complete the job. So,even while faced with a difficult task, practiced. Crews gain a better understanding of the total training the platoon up to realistic standards is possible. capabilities of their vehicle and the entire platoon. Along And that is a major step in the ultimate mission of prepar- with this, weapon system limitations and the problems of ing the platoon to fight and survive in combat. operating in a livefire environment are made evident. PERRY R CLAWSON Review the Results F’irst Lieutenant, hor Unfortunately, many platoons immediately return to . FortStewart,GA

Is AirLand Battle a Paper Tiger ? The U.S. AirLand Battle doctrine depends on the ability cannot bypass. The “deep strike’’ force must have reliable to strike Warsaw Pact (WP) forces throughout the depth of communications, must cover long distances and arrive at the battlefield-E-m the line of contact rearward to their the WP secondechelon area in a strong enough condition second echelon. This doctrine emphasizes a nonlinear to perform its mission of destruction. It must never be for- defense because penetration is now possible through gotten that WP follow-on forces will be moving continu- sophisticated weaponry and mobility, including nuclear ously, like a relentless tide, which will complicate the US. and chemical weapons. The new doctrine expeds not only “deep strike” force’s targeting and intelligence collecting to blunt the initial momentum of WP spearheads, but at efforts. The second echelon will not be stationary and can the same time to strike their follow-on forces with air and hinder the “deep strike” forces progress with conventional ground weapons. weapons, and with nuclear and chemical weapons if There is merit in the Airhd Battle doctrine-if it can required. Additionally, the WP second echelon forces can be curried out. WP soldiers are trained to stick to a battle create physical obstacles in the path of the US. “deep plan and, admittedly, they have not yet proven to be very strike” force and with ita excellent electronic counter mea- good at improvisation if that plan is disrupted. They sure capabilities can disrupt the “deep trike” force’s depend largely upon their mass and momentum to over- command, control, and communications (C3 ). Also, inter- come an opponent. Therefore, the probability exists that if vening WP formations can make the “deep strike” force US. forces can disrupt and fragment the first echelon of expend large amounts of fuel and ammunition by forcing WP forces and if they can strike the follow-on forces with it to fight every meter of the way to the secondechelon telling effect, they could win the battle. environment. These same forces can block the resupply of There are, however, holes in the Airhd Battle plan. the “deep strike” force so that it quickly bmesa tooth- These holes and possible WP counters raise the following less tiger. questions and considerations: WP leaders are admittedly sometimes slow to learn, 0 Can US. forces disrupt and fragment the WP kt but what they do learn they learn well-and they never echelon attack in order to provide the time and space for a forget. They know all about intelligence gathering and “deep strike” into their follow-on forces? To do so will they will know exactly where the US. “deep strike”force is require reserves, a particular resource of which the US. at any given time and what it is doing. WP agents, ground forces in Europe are in short supply. In fact, if the WP and an reconnaissance, and space surveillance satellites forces intensify their firstechelon effort, thereby lessening will tell them. Moreover, they may well adopt the US. the time and space between echelons, US. forces may policy of “aggressive delay” in countering “deep strike” for- have to use their “deep strike” force just to prevent the ces. Among these delay tactics will undoubtedly be special destruction of their main force in the main battle area armored soyedineniye (light., mobile and essentially (MBA). antiarmor task forces) to nibble away at the flanks of the 0 Can the U.S.commander in Europe position a “deep “deep strike” force, much as the Cossacks of old harassed strike” force to hit the WP second echelon? To do 80, the the flanks of Napoleon’s armies. Masses of WP artillery “deep strike” force must be extremely fast and capable of will hit at the “deep strike” force and WP commanders violent, destructive combat to counter elements that it may well designate special rear area combat soyedine-

ARMOR november-december 1983 49 myes (armored forces) to slug it out, t,oet~-h,with the conveniently sited for such attacks. If the WP version of unsupported “deep strike” force. These measures will the “deep strike”is successful,the US. support of the MBA ensure that the “deep strike” force will not be able to divert will be tenuous, for not only will the OMGs attack US. the WP’s second echelon from its task of moving through support forces and facilities, they will sow confusion, dis- its firstechelon forces and rolling over the MBA. order and panic in our rear areas. Can the US.deliver a successful deep attack by other WP political leaders believe that in view of world opin- than ground forces? WP forces hold no monopoly on air ion and its propaganda value, the US.forces should be the tactics, and some air and missile attacks will get through. first to use NBC weapons if they are employed. With No one can maintain continuous or 100 percent air super- nuclear parity, there is no clear theater strategic advan- iority and knock down every plane and missile, but WP tage to WP “first use” given their numerical superiority in planners continue to emphasize the destruction of US. air conventional forces. That would put the onus for “first fields and nuclear delivery means to degrade that capabil- use” squarely on the shoulders of the US. commanders. ity. Even so, US. air and missile strikes can destroy large However, WP forces are better trained and otherwise pre concentrated forces and fixed combat service support pared to use NBC weapons. WF’attacks then, will be vie (CSS) facilities. Therefore, WP planners will not present lent, launched with surprise, and pushed forward rapidly such large targets. Combat forces above battalion level with the first echelons closing so fast that the use of tacti- will be dispersed, and CSS facilities will be dispersed and cal nuclear weapons would endanger U.S. forces as much kept in motion as much as possible. as WP forces. Since US. planners visualize a nonlinear Can such a “deep strike” force be resupplied? Aa battlefield in which opposing forces will be intermingled, stated, it will be incumbent upon the WP forces to make the use of NBC weapons can only be to the advantage of that “deep strike” force expend its combat supplies on its the numerically superior force. way to the WP second echelon. Conventional and uncon- An American officer laid out the tasks of the American ventional resources will be used to destroy or disrupt US. corps commanders in the AirLand Battle. He says that the support activities in its own rear areas or in transit to the commander must: forward elements. The US.commander may well find it Provide subordinate force commanders the forces to extremely difficult to resupply his “deep strike’’ force, let accomplish their missions in the covering force and MBA. alone his MBA forces, because of the tonnage involved 0 Prevent or delay the employment of enemy follow-on and the ubiquity of the in-depth WP air defense systems. forces sufficiently to allow fiendly forces in contact to The toal U.S. force CSS structure may be considered a maintain the forward defense. shaky leg upon which to stand because much of it will 0 Unhinge or disrupt the integrity of the enemy’s opera- consist of reserve components who must be fuuy operational scheme sufficiently to seize the initative, go on the tional in Europe within days or even hours after the open- offensive, and force the enemy to ground, or destroy him. ing shots have been fired. WP planners have undoubtedly The officer’s ideas are basically sound. In question, taken all this into consideration and, even if the Reserve however, is the ability of the US.forces to execute those Component CSS forces arrive in Europe unscathed, they ideas. There should have been a fourth task listed in the must still face formidable challenges. Even though some officer’s article-that of fighting the rear area battle. US. of their units periodically deploy and train at their war- military and paramilitary publications estimate that there time operational sites, most are not sufficiently familiar are some 20,000 pnSoviet agents and provocateurs in with their operational areas in Europe, not with the per- Western Europe. Add to that the WPs OMGs and it is easy sonnel with whom they must work under wartime condi- to see the US. rear areas will be subject to constant enemy tions to be fully effective for some time after arrival. attack. Support echelon troops will be so busy protecting Can the US. even sustain its already deployed force in themselves they will be barely able to perform their prim- Europe in the face of ground attacks direded against our ary missions. Indeed the main focus of enemy efforts may CSS facilities? Western military forces will face a formid- well be located deep in the U.S. rear area. able threat in the form of Soviet Operational Maneuver Therefore, can the US. realistically conduct the Air- Groups (OMG) that operate much as do the U.S. “deep Land Battle? Can we make good our “shield of blows?” strike” force. WP planners have used these OM& from Can a hive of bees keep the bear out of the honey? The fast, battalion to corps level in their maneuvers. Such forces mobile bee, even in swarms, rarely does so. The bear usu- will advance on multiple routes and will seek to destroy or ally wins. render ineffective the US. nuclear weapons and facilities, command and control points, communications centers, ROBERT T. SAUNDERS, JR. and CSS assets, some of which in Western Europe are Fort Lee, VA.

RecognRlon Quiz Answers 1. Bn-60 (USSR). This 8x8-wheeled APC is armed with a 4. UAZ-4696 (USSR) This 4x4-wheeled half-ton truck is 14.5-mm heavy machinegun and a 7.62-mrn Coaxial ma- the replacement for the GAZ-69. It was introduced in 1973 and chinegun. It has a 2-man crew and carries 8 passengers. Its has a maximum road speed of 100 km/hr and a maximum road maximum road speed is 80 kdhrand its maximum road range is range of 700 km. 500 km. 5. YP-408 (Neth). This APC was introduced in 1964 and is 2. BRDM-2 (USSR). This 4xCwheeled amphibious recon- armed only with a 12.7-mm machinegun. It has a Cman crew naissance vehicle is manned by a crew of 4. It is armed with a and carries 10 passengers. Its maximum road speed is 45 km/hr 14.5-mm heavy machinegun and a 7.62-mm coaxial ma- and its maximum road range is 230 km. chinegun. Variants include the SA-9, the AT-5, the AT-3 and 2 6. OT~C(CZECH). nis14.3 ton 8x&wheeld has and the Rkh models. a 2-man crew and carries 15 passengers. It is armed with a 3. Gm-69 (USSR). This4xCwheeled half-ton truck is 14.5-mm heavy machinegun and a 7.62-mm coaxial machi- as a prime mover for small antitank guns, rocket launchers and nWJn. It has a maximum road speed Qf 94.4 km/hr and a for personnel. Its maximum road speed is 90 km/hr and it has a road range Of 710 km. road range of 530 km. Prepared by Threat Branch, DCD, USAARMC, ft. Knox, KY.

50 MMUR novem ber-december 1983 The followii Varch-April 1s 3ut almost 98 ?a1and A RMC ’mental activil Fradition. As u ‘mental Manni !heir activities

9th ( LIEUTENA

Lieutenant 1 regiment and relieving Lieui assumed comr P. Stearns, wi ision as Chief Lieutenant the regiment 2 sium on St. Pa The Regime the Post Tour .. fifty points. P a. 8“. ,.a IIVVVI Y”yuY” \...’..”., fighting in the light heavyweight class has won three Fort Knox. KY bouts out of three by the knockout route. The season for Baseball is at hand and the familiar sounds of cracking bats and popping gloves are all around. We look forward to a splendid team and a successful season. 2-70th Armor Faces Soviet Amrat Fort Stewart Men of Company A, 2-70th Armor Battalion, were First Segeant Charles E. Pearson, Headquarters and impressed with their first sight of genuine Soviet armor vehi- Service Troop, having completed the course of instruc- cles during recent exercises at Ft. Stewart. tion prescribed for the Noncommissioned Officers’ “At first they didn’t know what it was. Then, when they Course, The Cavalry School, for the year 1937-38, was recognized the Soviet armor, they’d go wild,” said First graduated February 24th. Due to Sergeant Pearson’s Lieutenant Cliff D. Stiles, battalion S-3 (Air) and chief con- ability as a horseman he was selected to remain in the troller of the exercise. Noncommissioned Officers’ Advanced Equitation Class. “One thing the men pointed out to us after the exercise,” From the progress being made in the remodeling of he said, ”was that we need to work more on vehicle identifi- 3ur barracks, all indications point to a set of modern cation. It‘s one thing to see a vehicle on the cards, and it’s barracks by summer. another to actually see it, especially when it’s coming right at you.”

632d Armor First To Be Realigned in 4th ID “Thunderbolt” troops from the 6th Battalion, 32nd Armor will be the first 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) unit to be Postal Registration realigned under the Division ’86 plan with the creation of a fourth line company, said a recent article in THE MOUN- TAINEER, the Fort Carson, CO newspaper. 1. Date of Filing: 13 October 1983. Under the realignment, the combat support company lost 2. Title of Publication: ARMOR Magazine. its scout and mortar platoons to headquarters and headquar- 3. Frequency of Publication: Bimonthly, ters company. The number of M60 tanks in the three com- 4. Location of Known Office of Publication: U. S. Army panies will be reduced to 13, and the spare tanks will go to Armor School, Bldg 2369, ATTN: ATSB-DOTD-MAG, the new D company. Fort Knox, KY 40121. 5. Location of the Headquarters of the Publication: U. S. Army Armor School, Bldg 2369, Fort Knox, KY 401 21 Town North Lions Club Honors Armor 6. Publisher and Editor: Major Charles R. Steiner, Jr., The Town North Lions Club, Dallas, TX, under the direc- U. S. Army Armor School, Bldg 4401, Fort Knox, KY tion of its President, Ralph W. Widener, Jr., featured a salute 401 21. to Armor on 17 October 1983 as part of its ongoing program of recognition of the contributions made by the many

ARMOR november-december 1983 51 and death in the Indian Wars can be While these chassis, with their limited MILITARY BALLISTICS - A gleaned from his performance in the Civil traverse, often called for frequent vehicle BASIC MANUAL by C. L. Farrar and War. The idea is great. The book is a total displacement to change fire direction, they D. W. Leeming. Pergamon Press, Inc., fai Iure. provided the required mobility and only SP Elmsford. NY. $17.50. Documentation is impressive at first guns could maintain the momentum of glance but is terribly flawed. Over 62 per- armored warfare and the frequent changes This is volume 10 in Brassey’s Battlefield cent of all citations are from eulogies and of firing positions. Weapons Systems and Technology series other biased items collected by ME. Cus- Studying the operations of such armored and provides an overview of ballistics ter from 1876 to 1906. These items were artillery units is valuable in understanding including interior, intermediate, exterior, originally and solely intended to glorify the the principles of the combined arms team terminal and wound ballistics. It provides deeds of her Beau Sabreur. The remaining that is today’s armor forces. the professional soldier with a background citations are similarly flawed, or manipula- sufficient for good comprehension of the tively selected. A. HARDING GANZ processes and problems involved in ballis- This documentation problem leads to Associate Professor of History tics of all types. Mr. Urwin’s claims that Custer “beat“ Ohio State University It is written in textbook fashion with self- General Robert E. Lee; that Custer did test questions and answers. It is an excel- more than anyone else to win the Civil lent introduction to military ballistics. It is War; and that Custer “won” the battles of not a designer’s handbook but is highly Gettysburg, The Wilderness, Cedar Creek, recommended for soldiers and weapons Five Forks and Appornattox. Of course, the designers. Custer letters and Times told Mr. Urwin BULLETS AND BUREAUCRATS: that this was so. THE MACHINEGUN AND THE DONALD J. BUTZ Custer Victorious has no sense of Battelle Columbus Laboratories scope. A supposed biography, most of it UNITED STATES ARMY, 1861- Columbus, OH rehashes the campaigns where Custer was 1916 by David A. Armstrong. Greenwood present. The author presents no analysis Press, Westport, CT. 1983. 239 pages, of Custer’s actions and Custer appears illustrated $27.50. FAINT PRAISE: AMERICAN almost a passenger in a book out of con- TANKS AND TANK DESTROY- trol. Other flaws and errors abound. The This small, well-written and researched message is simple. . . ignore this book. volume examines the role of the machine by ERS DURING WORLD WAR II gun in the U.S. Army from 1861 to 1916. Charles M. Baily. Arachon Books, the ARTHUR B. ALPIN Like so many revolutionary weapons, Shoestring Press, Hamden CT. 196 pages. Major. Armor the machinegun was a victim of bureau- $24.00. USMA, West Point, NY cracy during its infancy and only the insistence of President Lincoln led to its The story of the ill-fated tank destroyer use in the Union Armies during the Civil force provides fascinating juxtapositions War. Neither artillery nor infantry nor of personalities, doctrine, technology, and cavalry officers could, or would, see a use combat experience and Charles Baily for the new weapon in their ranks. Lincoln brings them all together in this volume in a COCKNEY, by Robert W. McCormick. said it was “worth the attention of the manner to please the historian, the armor Cottonwood Publishing Co., Worthington. government.” buff, or the general reader. OH. 219 pages, $22 ($15 paperback). The book details use of the Gatling and Tank destroying guns were first looked ____ other early versions of the machinegun on as towed weapons, but combat proved Cockney was the code name for the during the Spanish-American War and the the need for self-propelled guns that could 696th Armored Field Artillery Battalion Philippine Insurrection and the attempts of maneuver to get flank shots at the heavy (105-mm SP howitzers on M-7 chassis), Lieutenant John Henry Parker to gain mil- German tanks (Panthers and Tigers) met and this book is that unit’s history in W itary acceptance for the sophisticated during the war‘s closing months. It. Dr. McCormick was a medic with the weapon. Parker claimed that the machine The book covers the bureaucratic bat- 696th and is now a professor emeritus at gun represented “A massed fire in reserve,” tles that culminated in the demise of the Ohio State University. and promulgated that theory to the Infan- tank destroyer concept in favor of the The 696th was an independent battalion try and Cavalry School at Fort Leaven- proponents of the main battle tank. attached to a number of divisions, includ- worth as early as 1897. Recommended for both professional ing the 4th Armored Division in the Saar Armstrong’s book also provides an infor- and lay readers. offensive and later in the Ardennes. It was mative discussion on the landmark reform also attached to the 2d Armored Division program for the modernization of the ARMOR Staff in the advance to the Rhine River and American military system as initiated by Fort Knox. KY finally to the Elbe River. Elihu Root, Secretary of War following the The 696th derived from the New Jersey Spanish-American War. National Guard and was inducted into This volume, then, represents a thor- CUSTER VICTORIOUS: THE Federal service in 1941 as the 2d Battalion. oughly comprehensive study of the rela- CIVIL WAR BATTLES OF GEN- 112th Field Artillery Regiment and became tionship of early military technology to the the 696th Field Artillery Battalion in 1943. bureaucratic process and is an important ERAL GEORGE ARMSTRONG Currently it is listed as the 4th Battalion, work in understanding the development of CUSTER by George J. W. Urwin. Fair- 112th Field Artillery, 50th Armored Div- one of the Army’s major infantry weapons leigh Dickinson Press. 1983. 308 pages. ision, NJARNG. systems. $27.50. The unit was originally horsedrawn and later truck-towed and in 1943 was reorgan- MICHAEL E. LONG Mr. Urwin’s book is based on the pre- ized as armored field artillery and was Captain, Infantry mise that a clue to Custer’s performance eventually mounted on the M-7 chassis. Fort Shafter, HI

52 ARMOR november-decem ber 1983 warrare. Today, ihey may include 'iurreted tanks or fast attack dune buggies. Sometime in the future they may include Star Wars Land- walkers for surface mobility, hovercraft for near surface operations and high speed boring machines for subsurface maneuver. As Armor goes, so goes the Army. Good Shooting.