Armor, November-December 1983 Edition

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Armor, November-December 1983 Edition Commandant MG FREDERIC J. BROWN Assistant Commandant BG GORDON R. SULLIVAN Chief of Staff COL ROY C. PRICE Deputy Assistant Commandant COL MICHAEL H. CRUMLEY Command Sergeant Major CSM JOHN M. STEPHENS INSTRUCTIONAL DEPARTMENTS Maintenance COL DONALD S. ZUlTER Command and Staff LTC JOE G. DRlSKlLL Weapons COL DAVID V. HARBACH Committee Group COL BOBBY J. CARTER NCO Academy/ Drill Sergeant School SGM JOHNNIE J. PRESTON DIRECTORATES Evaluation and Standardization COL JOHN E. SWINDELLS Training and Doctrine COL DUDLEY M. ANDRES Combat Developments COL ROBERT W. DeMONT UNITS The Lightning Brigade COL NEAL T. JACO 1ST AIT/OSUT Brigade (Armor) COL ROBERT L. PHILLIPS "To disseminate knowledge of the military arts and sciences, with special attention to mobility in ground warfare, to promote 4th Training Brigade professional improvement of the Armor Community, and to COL WILLIAM M. MATZ, JR. preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of 194th Armored Brigade Armor in the Army of the United States." COL FRED W. GREENE, 111 The integrated battlefield encompasses the employment and coordina- ARMOR may be forwarded to military tion of combat assets that include infantry, armor, cavalry, artillery, and personnel whose change of address is caused by official orders (except at APO irregular forces, as well as close air support, air defense artillery, and addresses) without payment of additional engineers. Beginning on page 26, Captain Alan W. Watts tells Armor pla- postage. The subscriber must notify the postmaster. toon leaders how to use this combat power to accomplish their missions. USPS 467-970 (The cover art is based on a photo made by Sergeant First Class Robert W. Griffin.) November-December 1983 Vol XCII. No. 6 Sene Your Soldiers, Not Yourself The big question is: Why did not the wehr and the Italian Army. Argentines use a vehicle they had in abun- The Argentines did not really prepare for Dear Sir: dance to gain that mobility-the horse? their war with Britain, even though they During my 6 years of active duty I saw As of 1980, Argentina had some spent lavishly on weapons. Had they, as and served under too many career soldiers 4,000,000 horses, a large part being the suggested here. tried an old approach- who were anxious to command and to Criollo breed, a hardy type that can with- used horses-they might have come off make a name for themselves and who left stand long periods with little food or water. much better than they did. This might be nothing tangible behind. The big loser in The three brigades of mountain troops in one of the more important lessons of that this practice is the Army, and the one who the Argentine Army, using horses, could war for us. suffers the most is the individual soldier. have introduced a substantial element of Colonel Rilhac, a French armor officer, mobility in their garrison’s defense efforts. GORDON J. DOUGLAS, JR. had this to say about serving his men: Some gauchos, Argentine cowboys, could Fullerton, CA “The day before relinquishing command have given the British a hard time in the of my regiment, I had a conversation with Falklands. The British margin of victory the commanding general who asked me was small and a mobile unit on horseback Another Bit of a Byte what I thought about my time in com- could have substantially increased British mand. My main feeling, I answered, was casualties. Dear Sir: that I had spent about two-thirds of my Compared to motor vehicles and heli- Major Hanselmann’s article “A Compu- time helping, advising and protecting my copters, the horse is obsolete. But in ter For Every Orderly Room” in the May- subordinates in order that they could per- remote areas, over rough country, and in June 1983 issue of ARMOR Magazine is form their duties as well as possible. The poor weather, the horse can perform well right on the mark. general replied, Yes, that is the price of in competition with his mechanical sup The army has concentrated on the big leadership.”’ planters. Indeed, the Falklanders use “megabuck” computer at division and In another article, Colonel OMeara at Fort horses for local transport on their roadless higher levels: a computer that will proba- Knox had this to say: islands. bly not survive the combat environment in “A commander who serves his soldiers Most cavalrymen today do not have which it will have to operate and that has mrns respect and admiration, and creates experience with a horse’s capabilities. done very little to make life easier for the an environment of friendship and pride.” Let’s review some of these: A typical pack commander at the bottom. The desktop Unlike these examples, a commander or cavalry horse in the American expe- computer or, better yet, the newer portable concerned about making a name for him- rience is the Morgan. This horse stands computer, will provide a benefit across the self leaves nothing behind but bitterness, between 57 and 61 inches at the shoulder full army organization. instability, questionable integrity and and weighs about 1.000 pounds. It is an As a member of the 24th Infantry Divi- unhappy soldiers. intelligent breed, strong and resistant to sion (Mechanized), we are taking part in A commander should help, advise and fatigue. And it often forms a bond with its various initiatives as part of the Army’s protect his subordinates, allowing them to rider that can heighten the military effec- SMART program. One of these has pro- use their own initiatives, establish policies tiveness of the unit. vided an APPLE I1 Plus computer to the at the unit level and have input into the A horse walks at 3 mph, trots at 7 mph, squadron. Since its arrival, the computer system. He should set high standards but and gallops at 14 mph. In an &hour day, a has been used almost 16 hours a day. It he must be willing to allow junior leaders horse carrying a soldier and equipment produces the squadron deadline and, from to establish priorities and plans to attain totaling 225 pounds can cover 25 miles. A the deadline, keeps a historical file on those standards, and he should support pack horse, laden with 250300 pounds, each vehicle. It does a daily and monthly those priorities once established. can cover 20 miles in the same day. A draft percentage operational readiness report. Assume command and, above all else, horse, pulling 1,600 pounds by road or 700 Our medical platoon leader has put all the serve your soldiers. Soldiers deserve pro- pounds cross-country. can cover 23 miles squadron’s immunization records and fessional leaders-not careerists inter- a day. These are routine marches, forced other key medical data on file. We also use ested only in making a name for marches would cover more distance. And, the APPLE for deployment rosters. It themselves. the horse can travel over terrain totally allows us to keep track of the large unsuitable for foot or vehicles. volumes of information on each soldier JOHN A. FLORIO It is little known, but there is a well- and this can be rapidly sorted into Milton, Mass. developed chemical warfare technology deployment data; main body, rear de- for horses. The Wehrmacht and the Red tachment, etc. Army both made extensive use of horses One of our troop commanders has a in WW I1 and had extensive horse portable computer, an OSBORNE 1. which Horses in The Falklands chemical-resistant gear including canister he uses in his troop. Its value has aptly gas masks, capes and leggings to protect demonstrated the wisdom of Major Han- Dear Sir: the animals. selmann’s article. For key control and I would like to discuss the lack of mobility Several South American countries still maintenance operations, he has entered in the Argentine forces in the Falklands- have horse units with Bolivia having four all vehicles, their principal drivers and Malvinas in 1982. cavalry regiments and 13 infantry regi- authorized additional drivers, the non- The Argentines in the islands were well ments using horses. These are composed commissioned officer in charge of each equipped but once in place had little mobil- of paired motorized and mounted battal- vehicle, serial numbers of all keys ity. Without the special, all-terrain vehicles ions. Perhaps the largest country still assigned to the vehicle and other impor- and helicopters that the British had, they using horses in appreciable numbers is the tant vehicle data. This list is used by the were limited to “shank‘s mare” for getting Peoples Republic of China. They use troop dispatcher to check drivers and around. Some of their troops were starving division-size cavalry units for .reconnais- release authority upon completion of their within a few kilometers of supply depots. sance and border patrol work over gener- missions, key control during deployment IndividualArgentine units could not support ally rough terrain. Some NATO countries and upon return from field training, and to one another because of their lack of use horses and/or mules as pack animals, assist in the maintenance of motor pool mobility. notably mountain units of the Bundes- records. he has also placed all section 2 ARMOR november-december 1983 hand recei, allowing a ( record of a abuck” con to pick up, 1 that a chan As part 01 sion is test1 cribed load desktop co into every 1 This compi tions, updti lines, hand1 greatly red1 Class IX rec Hopefull) pave the WE way to go ir is now avai needed for staff sectior sion level orders and ’ vide the Arr and is an id - Prc Dear Sir, As marti journal of 1 neers, the 1 “ancient” d attached 1 (Heavy), th infantry tan to be very ii very serioc not too unl Mark Vlll’! emphasize support in e The artic ARMOR b) titled: “The ing” seeme important.
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