Tracking and Refuting Disinformation in Georgia

Social Media Monitoring and Analysis FINAL REPORT

Tracking and Refuting Disinformation in Georgia Social Media Monitoring and Analysis inal Report Table of Content

INTRODUCTION �� 4

BACKGROUND �� 7

SOURCES �� 9

MAINSTREAM MEDIA �� 9 speech, and calls for violence. SOCIAL MEDIA �� 10

STAGES OF ANALYSIS �� 11 power NARRATIVES �� 14

Date: The project focused on historical data from January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018, with special research done on breakout events which occurred over the course of the project in HATE SPEECH AND ANTI-WESTERN POSITIONS �� 19 2019. REFUTING DISINFORMATION �� 22 4 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

Tracking and Refuting Disinformation in Georgia: Final Social Media Analysis Report

Introduction

Exploitation of social media by anti-Western countries and extremists has fueled polarization and strengthened tribalism in both developed and developing states. From a bird’s eye view, it appears as though the global fight between open and closed socie- ties is being fought online, which many believe Russia and various extremists groups are winning with their targeted disinformation and fake news campaigns. The attached final report provides a glimpse into Russian and domestic extremist groups’ campaign to incite extremism and turn Georgia against the West. The one-year project, funded by the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center, was implemented in three phases: (1) monitor and identify disinformation, propaganda and the foreign entities promulgating them; (2) flag, report, and analyze purported falsehoods and sources of disinformation; and, (3) debunk falsehoods through television and social media platforms in Tbilisi and in Washington, D.C. As we went down the social media rabbit hole of data, we quickly realized that we did not have the financial resources, technology, or the manpower to accurately identify the culprits hiding behind the many bot and troll accounts or to counter their disinformation efforts in real time. The best we could do was to identify the disinformation and propaganda patterns and their messages, and the respective sources, such as the originating Facebook page, website, or other source. We also discovered that Russian and domestic extremists’ disinformation and propaganda campaigns (which spouted the same extremist messaging), for the most part, promoted historical Russian ties to Georgia, portrayed NATO as a weak organization that could not protect Georgia from Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 5

Russia, the idea that LGBTQ rights will destroy Georgia’s values, and that greater West- ern integration will destroy Georgia’s national identity. Interestingly enough, we found that campaigns that specifically targeted the U.S. did not resonate with the public. There are ongoing debates on how best to counter Russia, and extremist groups’ social media campaigns. Some believe the best approach is to counter by increasing funding to social media projects that will promote Western values, and fund campaigns to allow us to identify and counter the anti-West bots and trolls. If we choose this route, we must provide the Western contractors and NGOs with ample funding that will allow them to invest in both human capital and in technology to counter Russia’s state- sponsored efforts. There are a number of social media companies in the U.S. and in Europe that have the technology and the expertise to develop social media campaigns that can promote Western values while countering Russia’s disinformation efforts. Our partner, Artis Looking Glass, is one such company. Unfortunately, due to lack of funding, the technology was not able to be fully deployed. On the other hand, many believe the best way to counter disinformation or fake news campaigns is not to engage, but to instead use the disinformation campaigns as an opportunity for Western aid providers and host countries to better tailor their democratic development efforts, as disinformation campaigns often expose and exploit the vulnerabilities in a given society. The solution to disinformation and fake news campaigns on social media may be a combination of both the use of technology combined with grassroots educational, training, and public outreach efforts. We hope this report helps us better understand both the threats and opportunities to counter anti-Western efforts. I want to thank Shota Gvineria for his endless effort to make sense of the data and for writing the report. Thank you to Hasan Davulcu and his social media Looking Glass technology that helped us monitor and identify Russian and domestic disinformation campaigns. And a special thanks to Kaleigh Schwalbe for managing the project and ensuring the deliverables were of the highest quality. The project could have not been made possible without the generous support of the Global Engagement Center.

Sincerely,

Fron Nahzi Project Director, Tracking and Refuting Disinformation in Georgia Senior Director of Global Development, McCain Institute for International Leadership Arizona State University 6 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

FINAL REPORT THE REPORT INCLUDES ANALYSIS OF GEORGIA’S SOCIAL MEDIA INFORMATION TRENDS

FROM JANUARY 1, 2017 TO AUGUST 31, 2019 The report was authored by Shota Gvineria, Head, Security Programs, Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC).

Opinions expressed belong solely to the authors, and not necessarily to the author’s employer, organization, or donor. Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 7 Background

Arizona State University’s (ASU) McCain Institute for International Leadership, along with ASU’s Looking Glass (LG) (an advanced digital monitoring program), and in partnership with the Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC), have implemented a comprehensive project in Georgia to analyze and counter anti-Western disinformation.

Arizona State University’s (ASU) McCain The overarching objective was to expose Institute for International Leadership, and counter pro-Russian and anti-Western along with ASU’s Looking Glass (LG) (an disinformation campaigns by helping the advanced digital monitoring program), Georgian public become more informed and in partnership with the Economic about fake news and more engaged in Policy Research Center (EPRC), have seeking out truthful sources of information. implemented a comprehensive project in The project increased the Georgian public’s Georgia to analyze and counter anti-West- awareness of fake news by identifying and ern disinformation. tracking disinformation on social media, and by sharing and refuting disinformation with relevant stakeholders. 8 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

The program was implemented in three EPRC staff were trained by ASU at the phases: start of the project on the use of Looking i) monitor and identify disinformation and Glass. Based on the knowledge and skills propaganda; gained during the training, EPRC staff ii) flag, report, and analyze purported assisted with developing a matrix of over falsehoods and sources of disinformation; 160 individuals, groups and organizations iii) debunk falsehoods through television spanning the full spectrum of Georgia’s and social media platforms. diverse information landscape – from ultra-nationalistic to ultra-liberal ideo- EPRC used a custom social media moni- logical platforms. Twenty-one variables toring tool built by Looking Glass to track were carefully designed to identify hidden messaging, sources, and trends within trends in mainstream and marginal nar- Georgia’s complex digital landscape. ratives in pro-Russian or Anti-Western Looking Glass Georgia is a comprehensive propaganda. The matrix was constantly social-media monitoring tool developed updated throughout the life of the project at ASU to identify propaganda outlets, to reflect changes in the political environ- trending issues, narratives, and senti- ment. As a result, the LG database has ments of various political groups, sources been extended to include more than 300 and drivers of pro-Russian, anti-America/ variables. West, anti-democracy, and anti-liberal sentiments and fake news. Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 9 Sources

Mainstream Media

At the start of the project, the team threat to anyone3. There is not enough analyzed some general trends in Georgia’s evidence to conclude that there is a shift mainstream media landscape. One of the in Imedi’s broadcasting policy. However, main findings was that the liberal and it seems Imedi is testing the sentiments pro-Western media sources were under and reaction of the population to Russian- constant attack by extreme nationalist friendly news. forces, starting with the lead-up to the Georgian presidential elections in the Openly pro-Russian Obieqtivi TV, together third quarter of 2018. Far-right groups, with representatives of the Georgian cyberbullies, and trolls, and government Orthodox Church, were heavily involved in officials1 frequently attacked the editors disseminating the Russian narrative that and journalists of the leading pro-Western granting autocephaly to the Ukrainian broadcaster, Rustavi 2 TV. Orthodox Church is unacceptable. Anchors of the channel and representatives of the As an example of this trend, Imedi TV, the church issued synchronized arguments to second largest private media channel with support the Russian position. The objec- an openly pro-government broadcasting tive of this campaign was to emphasize policy, recently began publishing content Russia’s threat that unless the Georgian on its webpage and social media aimed patriarchate acknowledges the autoceph- at discrediting Western lifestyles and indi- aly of the Ukrainian church, Russia will rectly promoting Russia. Some examples retaliate by recognizing the independence include an article on how an old Russian of the Abkhazian Orthodox Church4. Volga was towing away a brand new, but damaged American Tesla2 and how Putin declared that Russia does not pose a

1 https://1tv.ge/en/news/irakli-kobakhidze-rustavi- 2-carrying-policy-russian-style-brainwashing/ 2 https://imedinews.ge/ge/tabloidi/95729/ 3 https://imedinews.ge/ge/msoflio/97255/ rusulma-volgam-amerikuli-tesla-buqsirit- vladimer-putini-ruseti-aravis-emuqreba tsaikvana 4 https://tinyurl.com/yxabmhdc 10 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

Social Media course through social media and expand- ing on them based on their broadcasting Social media, especially Facebook, the policies. most popular social media platform in Georgia, has been echoing the discourse The initial data pulled by LG across all in the mainstream media. LG data indi- media sources was overwhelming, so the cated that there are two different patterns project team decided to prioritize the of correlation between the content of monitoring and analysis of disinformation mainstream and social media in Georgia’s pages on social media. Twitter did not information space. In some cases, social provide a sufficient amount of data nec- media is picking up and amplifying mes- essary for analysis, so the project team sages from the broadcast media, while pulled most of the data from Facebook in other cases, television journalists are and identified 55 anti-Western sources identifying relevant topics in public dis- (see Figure 1).

Welcome to Georgia Information Page Erekle Meoris Sazogadoeba Obieqtivi Sputnik inews.ge wcf10 Dedakalaki Erovneba Qartveli GeoAltRight Cardhu Geworld.ge AntiParadox MorgoshiaOcial Erovnuli Idea Qartuli Marshi Zneoba.ge Bavshvta Uﬂebebisatvis Iveron Corp Georgian Power Don’t be a Liberal GeoAntiliberal GeorgianNationalConservatives JondiBagaturia7 Siaxleebi1 GeorgianNationalAwakening AltInfoCom Palavandishviltan GiaKorkotashvili FondGorchakova GeorgiGigauri1968 GrishaOniani GeorgianMarseLadoSadgobelashvili Damocles123 Ambebi.ge ValeriKvaratskhelia Medianews.ge Qliberali Georgians for Georgia Figure 1: KartveliMeamboxe Anti-Western sources SaqartvelosSulieriMisia Stop Turkish Occupation and their social media activity. Aborti Mkvlelobaa Gorchakov Fund Some of the top sources Religion, Language, Religion MelorVachnadze5 include Welcome to Georgia, Europe Falling Bakhtrioni1659 Erekle Meoris Sazogadoeba, Sputnik Georgia Erovnul Religiuri Instituti obieqti, Sputnik, wcf10, wwwmedianews For Georgia For Georgians dedakalaki, Georgian Power, Patriots from Georgia Piapirweli Cardhu, and others. 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 11

Stages of Analysis 13% 26% In the first phase, the project analyzed Russia historical data from January 1, 2017 to 18% EU December 31, 2018 from Facebook disin- NATO formation pages and websites associated US with them. This includes source, message, 22% Other and statistics measuring their resonance 21% (likes and shares). Out of 61,905 posts from the 55 propaganda outlets shown in Figure 1 (which have a total of 892,470 Figure 2: Quantitative distribution of Facebook posts originating from 43 followers), 21,048 posts (34%) belong to 15 disinformation pages in the period of reoccurring propaganda themes identified January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2018 into four positions. by the project team. Although these propaganda-themed posts account for only 34% of all posts made by those pages, they In the final stage of analysis, the research carry 55% of all likes and 83% of all shares, team reorganized the variables into three which shows that these posts significantly categories: resonate among social media users. 1. Propaganda positions: The overarch- The data generated by Looking Glass ing narratives under which specific presented seemingly limitless possibilities propaganda themes were shared by for analysis from different angles and per- disinformation pages. spectives. Consequently, the project team Upon EPRC’s request, Looking Glass selected and fine-tuned the themes and provided additional data on four prop- sharpened variables based on the content aganda positions that were used to of the themed posts, relevance and reso- enable enduring propaganda themes nance. As a result, 12 outlets, which were in the first three quarters of 2019: not generating any content or were lack- pro-Russian, anti-EU, anti-NATO, and ing engagement, were removed from the anti-US. These propaganda positions database, leaving 43 focused channels of accounted for 87% of all posts from propaganda. Fifteen propaganda themes the 43 anti-West Facebook groups where handpicked, and were regrouped that Looking Glass has been tracking and merged into 6 themes. throughout the project. 12 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

2. Enduring propaganda themes: Reoc- Topic 1: On May 1, 2019, the president curring propaganda themes. of Georgia Salome Zurabishvili issued a The research team also identified controversial statement5 that it is “not a and tracked 11 enduring propaganda good idea” to build an American base in themes and compared them to the Georgia. The research team’s analysis re- four propaganda positions (Figure 3). vealed a correlation of this message with Pro-Russian positions had the highest the narratives from extreme nationalist total posts, while anti-US posts were and pro-Russian groups. Further analysis less frequent. Anti-EU and anti-NATO showed that this statement also corre- positions were shared with similar lated with all four propaganda positions frequency. and fueled discussions across all enduring propaganda themes in the second and 3. Breaking propaganda themes: third quarters of 2019 (Figure 4). Themes that emerged as a result of specific, one-time events. EPRC tracked events in Georgia to pin- point potential events or statements that could create a burst in propaganda messaging around that event. EPRC requested data from Looking Glass for these events, and they identified three breaking propaganda themes during 5 http://georgiatoday.ge/news/15452/ Zurabishvili%3A-It-is-Not-Recommended-to- the second and third quarters of 2019: Build-US-Base-in-Georgia

Figure 3: Quantitative distribution of the total number of Facebook posts originating from 43 disinformation pages in the period of January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2018 into four positions matched with the enduring propaganda themes. Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 13

Topic 2: On May 4, 2019, the Alliance of four propaganda positions, including with Patriots (a pro-Russian parliamentary the President’s controversial statement. opposition party) campaigned for the “non-alignment status” of Georgia6 which Topic 3: On June 20, 2019 protests sparked has been a mainstream anti-NATO narra- in Tbilisi as a result of the Georgian tive for years. The research team matched Parliament’s controversial invitation to the topic with enduring disinformation hold a session on the Interparliamentary themes and revealed that the message Assembly on Orthodoxy (Kremlin’s known resonated widely on the forty-three disin- soft-power tool) led by the communist formation pages in the second quarter of member of the Russian Duma, Sergei 2019 (Figures 4 and 5). Statistical analysis Gavrilov. Analysis showed that this state- also showed that the messages related to ment also correlated with all four propa- this topic were widely discussed across all ganda positions and fueled discussions across all enduring propaganda themes in

6 https://metronome.ge/story/200272 the third quarter of 2019 (Figure 5).

Figures 4 and 5: Correlation of the breaking propaganda topics with four propaganda positions matched with the enduring propaganda themes originating from 43 disinformation pages in the second and third quarters of 2019, respectively. 14 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report Narratives The project team focused on six major disinformation and propaganda themes, Analysis of the data revealed that the all of which have shown a dramatic Kremlin’s strategic narratives were skill- increase in the volume of posts and men- fully translated into the local context and tions since the fourth quarter of 2018: EU, followed developments in international NATO, US, Extreme Nationalists, LGBT, and and Georgian politics, for example: NGO. The figures below demonstrate the increase in activity around these topics on Strategic narrative: Russia is provoked social media in Georgia (Figures 6-11): by NATO encroaching on its borders Georgian context: Non-block status will The volume of data mentioning those solve Georgia’s security problems Strategic narrative: Russia is a global topics has been increasing in parallel power and is protecting its legitimate with Georgia’s 2018 presidential election interests timeline. Various pro-Russian and/or anti- Georgian context: Georgia shouldn’t have Western actors inserted topics with a high started military provocation in 2008 potential to inflict divides in Georgian public discourse. Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 15

Figures 6-11: Increased disinformation activity in Georgia around the topics of EU, NATO, US, Extreme Nationalists, LGBT, and NGO from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2018. 16 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

For example, discussions on who started demonstrated upward trends in the fourth the war between Georgia and Russia in quarter of 2018, as conservative and 2008 very steadily gained traction before traditional themes were used in political the presidential election near the end of debates leading up to the elections to win 2018, then plunged right after the election the hearts and minds of the large Ortho- in early 2019. This debate was sparked by dox and conservative voter groups (shown the government-backed presidential can- in Figures 6-11 above). didate, Salome Zurabishvili, who accused the third president of Georgia, Mikheil Analysis and fact-checking of specific Saakashvili, of starting military actions in stories have shown two types of anti-EU August 20087. Analysis showed that sev- narratives: eral ultra-nationalistic, anti-Western, and • Europe is not a credible partner: pro-Russian sources followed the govern- messages in this group of narratives ment’s line of messaging. Pro-Western argue that European integration is groups in Georgia heavily criticized this not feasible and Georgia’s so-called action as an attempt to justify Russian partners will never challenge Russian aggression. The government’s attempt to interests for Georgia; justify Zurabishvili’s statement by adjust- • Obscene Europe: these value-based ing the context only polarized public group messages argue9 that Georgian opinion further8. values are incompatible with the Eu- ropean way of life, and EU integration In the fourth quarter of 2018, EPRC is a threat to Georgian identity. observed that pro-Western NGOs came under orchestrated attacks by members Anti-NATO narratives include more im- of the ruling Georgian Dream party and portant messages: ultra-nationalistic, anti-Western and pro- • The West is not a reliable partner: Russian sources. Looking Glass showed The 2008 war has been used to argue the peak of criticism towards Georgia’s that NATO couldn’t protect Georgia as civil society, which was vocally opposing its partner; Zurabishvili’s and the government’s posi- • NATO threatens territorial integrity: tion on the Russia-Georgian war issue. Another false narrative attempts Anti-LGBT and homophobic rhetoric also to link NATO membership with the occupied territories and present it

7 https://civil.ge/archives/253861 8 https://civil.ge/archives/257321 9 https://tinyurl.com/yxpwbtlv Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 17

as a false dilemma choice – NATO or Extreme nationalist narratives are the territorial integrity; largest group of narratives in volume, num- • NATO is an aggressor: This article10 ber of themed posts, and resonance. These portrays NATO as an aggressive extreme nationalist narratives frequently organization, and compares NATO’s intersect with other groups of narratives, actions to the Russian occupation of such as anti-NATO, anti-liberal, anti- LGBT, Crimea. and anti-NGO messages. The project team spotted the tendency of renaming compro- Mentioning Turkey in a disinformation mised extreme nationalist Facebook groups narrative can be an enabler for both anti- and exponential growth of new accounts. Western/anti-NATO disinformation and Analysis of the messages shows that this extreme nationalist narratives. topic contains the most aggressive rhetoric, hate speech, and calls for violence. Figure Direct anti-American disinformation and/ 12 below demonstrates a good example of or propaganda is quite rare, and anti-US this aggressive messaging. messages are often nested into other topics of disinformation: EPRC noted a continuing trend of govern- • One of the flagged examples11 dem- ment officials, media, and NGOs con- onstrates conspiracy theories about trolled by the ruling party committing how America is a symbol of evil and orchestrated attacks against pro-democ- is fighting Christianity (while Russia is racy civil society organizations (CSOs) that presented as a vanguard); are critical of the government. Conspiracy • Another example12 represents a group theories against George Soros are still of covert messages that are meant a very prominent topic and have been to insinuate that America, as a world found in a high volume of themed posts. hegemon, has caused more trouble and destruction in the world than In accordance with this trend, disinforma- Russia. tion pages have been accusing pro-West- ern media, opposition parties, and NGOs 10 http://geworld.ge/ru/%D1%8D%D0%B9- %D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE- in conspiring against the government and %D1%82%D1%8B-%D0%B3%D0%B4%D0%B5/ using Russian propaganda as a shield to 11 https://www.facebook.com/erovnebaqartveli/ photos/a.1922546738033094/2155915521362880/?ty fight against the freedom of expression of pe=3&theater the anti-liberal groups, as shown in the 12 https://www.facebook.com/ GeorgianNationalConservatives/ Figure 13 below. posts/1947720121977968?__tn__=-R 18 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

Figure 12: Example of an aggressive anti-LGBTQ message.

Figure 13: Example of antidemocratic rhetoric.

During the final phase of the project, the project team reviewed historic data from January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018 to identify hate speech and match it against anti- Western and pro‑Russian propaganda positions. The research team identified that401 Facebook posts from all 43 disinformation pages monitored during the project contained clear hate speech content across multiple propaganda themes. Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 19

Hate Speech and The grouping of hate speech messages is Anti‑Western relative, and there was significant overlap between the categories, propaganda Positions positions, and enduring propaganda themes. These Facebook posts contain During the final phase of the project, the hate speech directed toward their politi- project team reviewed historic data from cal and/or ideological opponents. The January 1, 2017 through December 31, posts that did not fit the abovementioned 2018 to identify hate speech and match categories were grouped together under it against anti-Western and pro-Russian the label of Hate Speech Directed towards propaganda positions. The research team Opposing Political Parties (35). The least identified that 401 Facebook posts from all popular content was Sexism and Gender 43 disinformation pages monitored during Discrimination (10). the project contained clear hate speech content across multiple propaganda This report previously stated that the themes. The research team sorted the project found that the volume of propa- data into categories presented in Figure ganda was in direct correlation with the 14 below. breaking propaganda themes (catalyzing

Hate Speech and Anti-Western Attitudes

Sexism, 10 Gender Discrimination

Hate Speech Directed to Opposing 35 Political Parties

Xenophobia, Armenophobia, Islamophobia, 78 Anti Semitism

Anti-Western, 106 Pro-Russian Attitudes

Homophobia 175

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Figure 14: Among the selected posts, the most (175) contained homophobic references; they also carried anti-Western messages and, to some extent, negative attitudes towards NGOs. 20 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

Hate Speech and Anti-Western Attitudes (Shares and Likes) 60000 56171 50000

40000 32478 30000

20000 13600 12905 14271 302 8076 9237 10000 4796 105 0 175 106 78 35 25 Homophobia Anti-Western Xenophobia Hate Speech Sexism/Gender Propaganda Discrimination Shares Likes Posts

Figure 15: Homophobic (175) posts had 32,478 shares, and 56,171 likes; Anti-Western/Pro- Russian posts (106) 8,076 shares and 13,600 like and so on. Hence, one can claim that homophobia is most actively used means for communication with the targeted audience.

events). An example of such a catalyz- popularity, which can be seen in the ing event for hate speech content was figure below. May 17th, the International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia. The post with the most shares (6,200) was Every year during this holiday, there is a the homophobic post by Giorgi Gigauri visible rise in homophobic speeches and (journalist for the newspaper “Asaval attitudes. The Georgian Orthodox Church Dasavali”). The post calls for people to also proclaimed May 17th to be Family join the rally on Rustaveli Street and Purity Day. On May 17th, 2019 LGBTQ activ- “show the rest of the world that Georgians ists planned a pride march; however, they will never mix the freedom of the nation had to postpone it as the government into the freedom of a rare part.” The Face- refused to guarantee their security. book post starts with the following words: “I want to upset you chickens!” These 401 posts containing hateful messages were popular and had 11,000 The post with the most likes (10,000) shares and 98,000 likes. Interestingly, contains homophobic content from homophobic posts have the highest Gigauri’s Facebook profile too. The post Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 21 includes information on a journalist from Anti-Western and/or Pro-Russian Narra- a regional television station who had to tives (106 Posts): They traditionally also leave his position because he rejected extensively demonstrate homophobic LGBT people. The post refers to LGBT and attitudes. See comments below illustrat- human rights activists as “Judas” and ing the point. “Jesus’s betrayers.” Sample post from Nino Sharabidze (Ge- On average, homophobia has the highest world.ge): “That’s how brainwashed are number of shares per post with 185.6, Soros’ puppies! They, Soros’ soulless pig- and the posts directed towards Opposing lets, are so uneducated and ignorant that Political Parties have the highest likes per they can’t even realize that their requests post ratio. On average, posts spreading are mutually exclusive… They claim that hateful messages towards the opposing freedom of speech is most important for political parties have about 407.7 likes. them, but at the same time want to block Russia and Russian narrative… But what Homophobia (175 Posts): “Chicken”, “old the hell has Russia to do with all that, gay”, “brainwashed”, “sick soul”, “satanic when the whole nation is against LGBT gay-festival” are some of the keywords march?! Although, their main goal is to used as a common jargon by the people fight with Russia, while freedom of speech spreading homophobic narratives. is just their cover!”

Hate Speech and Anti-Western Attitudes (Shares and Likes) 450 407,7 400 350 320,9 300 250 185,6 200 165,4 128,3 137 150 118,4 105,8 100 43,9 50 76,2 0 Homophobia Anti-Wetsern Xenophobia Hate Speech Sexism/Gender Attitudes Discrimination

Shares per Post Likes per Post

Figure 16: Posts spreading hateful messages towards opposing political parties. 22 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

Sample post from MP Aleksandre Erq- preliminary findings in Tbilisi. The event vania from the ruling party (Georgian was attended by a group of policymakers, Dream): Erqvania had comparatively government officials, and representa- softer messages in his speech. However, tives of the CSOs involved in identifying, he also stresses the role of the West as analyzing, and countering information follows: “Scheduled LGBTQ march with warfare in Georgia. The meeting informed the name Pride Parade is the mockery the audience about the project and its and insult in the face of Georgian society. findings and discussed possible joint ac- It is a well-directed effort to damage the tions to refute disinformation in Georgia’s honor of Georgian people. I am asking the information environment. government not to take into account the domestic and international pressure, and On July 8, 2019, the project team presented to restrict the propaganda of immorality the findings to policymakers, domestic and gay parade in our country. The rest of and foreign government officials, and the world should realize that Georgians CSOs in Washington, DC. An intermediary would never betray their faith, nation, analysis of the findings was presented to honor, and beliefs. And that immorality policymakers, domestic and foreign gov- will never prevail in Georgia, no matter ernment officials, and civil society organi- who supports it.” zations working to identify, analyze, and counter information warfare in Georgia.

Refuting After the project ended on August 31, 2019, Disinformation the findings of the project were presented and discussed at the fifth annual Tbilisi The trends and developments in Geor- International Conference jointly organized gia’s information ecosystem highlight by the ASU McCain Institute and EPRC on the urgent need to refute disinformation September 10, 2019 in Tbilisi. Conference activities. The project team planned and participants included top senior officials, implemented a number of activities aimed subject matter experts and journalists at raising the awareness of the Georgian from the United States, Europe, Georgia, public on the devastating effects of disin- and NATO. formation campaigns. EPRC worked with independent broad- On May 27, 2019 the ASU McCain Institute caster Rustavi 2’s programs to refute dis- and EPRC held a joint presentation of the information, encourage a broader public Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report 23

#Disinformation=weapon #CheckTheFacts

In the last 2 years, 43 sources have published 44,043 What do the different sources and data tell us? anti-Western propaganda posts in Georgian social #Opinion ≠Fact media.

Does the information present facts or does it express #Half_Truth=lie opinions? Let’s ask critical questions #Analyze #CheckTheSource The resonance and effectiveness of disinformation are Should you trust the organization or the person alarmingly high: 127,506 likes and 345,323 shares. providing the information? #Dontbetricked

Figure 17: Sample hashtags produced for EPRC’s awareness campaigns. discourse of fake news, and encourage hygiene. Specific hashtags were produced Georgian citizens to scrutinize sources and promoted with the aim to educate the and sensational headlines before accept- public on the most common soft targets ing them as facts. By doing so, the project of disinformation campaigns (see Figure team introduced an element of caution 17). A series of public service announce- and skepticism to Georgians as news con- ments were circulating on the broadcast sumers, working towards neutralizing the programing of Rustavi 2 from June through power of Russian disinformation by em- September 201913. powering Georgians to discern real news from fake. The project team provided six EPRC’s analysis of the enduring disin- updates to Rustavi 2, which resulted in formation themes and breaking themes presenting the project findings on six talk reveals increased activity by extreme shows. nationalist groups using all four propaganda positions to discredit Georgia’s pro- In addition to the TV shows, Rustavi 2 col- Western course and allies. Those groups laborated with EPRC to produce two pub- have dangerously polarized the Georgian lic announcement video clips to increase population. Pro-government groups awareness of viewers about fraudulent blame the opposition for instigating un- informational interventions, as well as 13 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kAGxYeqy3RTrJRj to provide useful tips on informational wqgDoVa44ZpEQ5KRk/view?usp=sharing 24 Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Final Report

rest, while the pro-opposition blames the The analysis of the trends suggests that government for deliberately strengthen- there is a high probability of more ac- ing Russian influences in Georgia. EPRC’s tive waves of propaganda from Russian analysis also shows that the agenda of sources as well as their Georgian proxies, those anti-Western groups and the groups including the disinformation webpages directly or indirectly associated with the monitored under this project, in the government in many instances coincide, attempts to put pressure on Georgia’s especially when attacking pro-Western pro-Western public opinion. At this point, civil society, media, and opposition. Georgia’s vibrant civil society is taking the lead on fighting Russia’s influence This trend was clearly demonstrated dur- operations in Georgia. Growing pressure ing and in the aftermath of Gavrilov’s cri- from the Kremlin suggests that a compre- sis, when the call for violence from those hensive approach is urgently needed with groups was met with silent consent from more structured support from Georgia’s the government institutions, especially Western allies in order to counter the against the background of the overreac- trends mentioned in this report. tion of the police forces against the anti- occupation protests on June 20, 2019. The ambivalent response of the government institution to the ever-increasing influence and volume of disinformation have already resulted in alarming trends across the country, such as: • unprecedented polarization of Geor- gian society; • impunity for the aggression of extreme nationalist groups against pro- Western critical media, civil society and opposition; • encouragement of hate speech and call for violence; and, • pro-Russian positions gradually pushed from the fringes to the mainstream.