Somalia's New Government and the Challenge of Al-Shabab
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MARCH 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 3 Somalia’s New 1992.2 The first al-Qa`ida operatives Somali-Kenyan border resulted in the arrived in Somalia in February 1993 death of one of the three, Abu Taha al- Government and the and, working closely with an extremist Sudani. Challenge of Al-Shabab Somali group known as al-Ittihad al- Islami (AIAI), established three training The Rise of Shabab By David H. Shinn camps. The evidence concerning al- Aden Hashi “Ayro,” a former military Qa`ida’s role in attacks against U.S. chief of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) after the september 11 attacks, the Bush and subsequent UN forces in Somalia who had previously received training administration’s foreign policy toward So- during 1993 is conflicting. It appears, with al-Qa`ida and the Taliban in malia focused primarily on counterter- however, that al-Qa`ida claimed more Afghanistan, established al-Shabab rorism.1 This focus was a result of So- involvement than it deserved. Al- as early as 2004.7 Ayro attracted malia’s proximity to the Middle East, Qa`ida underestimated the cost of its disaffected young Somalis by combining U.S. concern that al-Qa`ida might re- Somalia operation and overestimated Somali nationalism, reverence for Islam locate to the country, a history of ter- the degree to which Somalis would and after 2006 a clarion call to expel rorist bombings targeting Western in- become jihadists. It especially failed to Ethiopian military forces that had terests in nearby Kenya and Tanzania appreciate the strength of traditional moved deep into Somalia at the request and early contact between al-Qa`ida Sufi doctrine in Somali Islam.3 of the Somali Transitional Federal and individuals in Somalia. Although Nevertheless, al-Qa`ida did manage to Government (TFG). Al-Shabab became ties exist between al-Qa`ida and So- recruit a number of young Somalis who a highly disciplined force.8 Many of its malia’s al-Shabab militant group, the probably formed the core structure of followers were probably driven more overwhelming objective of U.S. policy subsequent radical Islamist groups that by Somali nationalism than religious in Somalia should not be confronting adopted terrorist tactics.4 fanaticism. A subset of the organization, international terrorist activity. Instead, however, committed itself to creating the United States should contribute to The United States believed that three an Islamic caliphate in Somalia. This creating a moderate government of na- al-Qa`ida operatives—Fazul Abdullah select group reportedly received tional unity in Somalia, which offers the Muhammad of the Comoro Islands, training in Eritrea for making roadside best hope of minimizing Somali links to Abu Taha al-Sudani of Sudan and bombs, car bombs and suicide vests.9 international terrorism. Long-term U.S. Salah Ali Salah Nabhan of Kenya—who From the beginning, al-Shabab has interests in the Horn of Africa will not took part in the 1998 U.S. Embassy been a decentralized organization and be served by a policy that is consumed bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar increasingly subject to clan and regional with military action to the detriment of es Salaam, Tanzania benefited from fissures. There are persistent reports supporting economic development and AIAI protection in Somalia.5 Although that Sudanese, Saudis, Egyptians, a broad based Somali government. AIAI eventually disappeared as an Pakistanis and Yemenis have joined identifiable organization in Somalia, a al-Shabab and that most of its funding This article outlines al-Qa`ida’s number of Somali groups professed to comes from the Somali diaspora and early activity in Somalia, provides carry on its radical agenda, the most foreign Islamist supporters.10 Together background and current information on important of which is now known as al- with other organized groups in Somalia, al-Shabab including its recruitment of Shabab (The Youth). In the meantime, al-Shabab likely obtains a residual cut Americans and Europeans, and finally al-Qa`ida continued to call on Somalis from some of the piracy ransom funds. offers some policy suggestions on how to wage a jihad against Ethiopian forces best to stabilize Somalia. in Somalia and their U.S. allies. The In May 2008, a U.S. cruise missile attack United States pursued a policy focused killed al-Shabab’s founder in the town of Early Al-Qa`ida Activity in Somalia primarily on capturing the three Dusa Mareb in the Galguduud region of Al-Qa`ida links to Somalia date back persons linked to the embassy bombings central Somalia. The primary al-Shabab to 1992. At that time, the United States and Somali support for international spokesperson since Ayro’s death has prepared to send troops to the country terrorism.6 In 2007, an Ethiopian air been Muktar Robow, his former deputy. to open humanitarian corridors to feed attack against fleeing Islamists near the Although factions continue to hamper starving Somalis in an operation known the organization, al-Shabab became as the Unified Task Force. Declassified 2 Al-Qa`ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (West documents made available through Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). the Harmony Project at West Point’s 3 Salafist movements arose in Africa and other regions 7 For an excellent analysis of al-Shabab as of early 2008, Combating Terrorism Center show that to counter the “innovative” customs and traditions of see Anonymous, “Somalia’s al-Shabab Reconstitutes the Africa regional al-Qa`ida leader, Muslims who adhered to Sufi Islam. Al-Qa`ida largely Fighting Force,” CTC Sentinel 1:3 (2008). In addition, Abu Hafs, made multiple trips to Somalia pursues a Salafist ideology. see Stig Jarle Hansen, “Misspent Youth – Somalia’s Sha- from the al-Qa`ida base in Khartoum in 4 David H. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the bab Insurgents,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, Horn,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 27:1 (2007): pp. 56- 2008. 58. 8 Al-Shabab does not take instruction from one hierar- 1 The United States provided modest amounts of hu- 5 “Target of U.S. Strike Wanted for Multiple Attacks,” chical structure. Each splinter group or fighting unit, manitarian assistance to Somalia each year since U.S. Associated Press, January 9, 2007; “Senior U.S. Official however, is disciplined and effective militarily. troops left the country in 1994. Moreover, in 2008 the Calls on Islamic Militia in Somalia to Turn Over al-Qaeda 9 Ibid. United States began to actively support the political rec- Suspects,” Associated Press, June 21, 2006. 10 This information is based on the author’s own confi- onciliation process. 6 Shinn, pp. 59-64. dential interviews. MARCH 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 3 even stronger after Ayro’s death.11 His in al-Qa`ida camps. We get our tactics significance. Indeed, if the merger killing underscored outside involvement and guidelines from them. Many have does occur, it will only further alienate in Somalia and bolstered the resolve of spent time with Usama bin Ladin.”19 al-Shabab from the vast majority of al-Shabab’s supporters to oppose all Radical Somali groups, including al- moderate Somalis. foreign elements.12 After his death, al- Shabab, have a history of exaggerating Shabab stepped up its attacks on the their terrorist credentials. Muktar Shabab Recruiting Americans and Europeans TFG and Ethiopians and demonstrated Robow’s statement that al-Shabab A particularly disturbing turn of events increasing military success. takes orders from Bin Ladin may well occurred when the FBI reported that demonstrate more anger at the United during the past 18 months as many as Shabab’s Leadership and Ties to Al-Qa`ida States for killing Ayro than a command 20 young Somali-Americans may have Al-Shabab’s leadership is decentralized, and control association with al-Qa`ida.20 left their homes in Minneapolis and St. and some sub-clan militia units may For al-Qa`ida’s part, leaders Ayman al- Paul in Minnesota, the largest Somali just be calling themselves al-Shabab Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi make diaspora in the United States, under as a matter of convenience.13 Ibrahim frequent references to Somalia in their suspicious circumstances.25 A few Haji Jama “al-Afghani” operates in internet pronouncements. In September young Somalis were also recruited in the area where Somaliland, Puntland 2008, al-Qa`ida operative Salah Ali Boston; San Diego; Seattle; Columbus, and Ethiopia converge.14 His group Salah Nabhan appeared in a propaganda Ohio; and Portland, Maine.26 It has been consists mainly of Isaaq and Harti clan video with Muktar Robow.21 Nabhan confirmed that several of them found members and reportedly carried out reportedly knows Bin Ladin personally their way to al-Shabab in Somalia. attacks against foreigners in Somaliland and declared an oath of loyalty on Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. during 2003 and 2004.15 Shaykh Fuad behalf of al-Shabab to Bin Ladin and al- citizen, blew himself up in Somalia in Mohamed “Shongole” heads a group of Qa`ida. He has encouraged training in October 2008, killing dozens of al- fighters in the ports of Marka and Brava al-Shabab camps and urged fighters to Shabab’s opponents.27 Hassan Burhan south of Mogadishu.16 Muktar Robow of oppose the TFG, Ethiopian forces and and two Somali-American colleagues the Rahanwayn clan runs the al-Shabab African Union peacekeepers.22 In a mid- left Minneapolis in November and made unit in Bay and Bakool regions of February 2009 video, Abu Yahya called their way to Kismayo, a fundamentalist central Somalia and is affiliated with the on Somalis to oppose the new Somali stronghold.28 FBI Associate Director mainly Hawiye/Habir Gidir/Ayr sub- government and attack African Union Philip Mudd recently stated that the sub-clan unit in southern Mogadishu.