Popular Mobilization and Political Culture in Revolutionary Virginia: the Failure of the Minutemen and the Revolution from Below Author(S): Michael A

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Popular Mobilization and Political Culture in Revolutionary Virginia: The Failure of the Minutemen and the Revolution from Below Author(s): Michael A. McDonnell Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Dec., 1998), pp. 946-981 Published by: Organization of American Historians Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2567217 . Accessed: 23/11/2011 20:09

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http://www.jstor.org PopularMobilization and Political Culturein RevolutionaryVirginia: The Failureof the Minutemenand the Revolutionfrom Below

MichaelA. McDonnell

In the fallof 1775, GeorgeGilmer, friend and physicianto ThomasJefferson and himselfa memberof thegentry of Albemarle County, Virginia, wrote an addressto his neighborslamenting the lack of supportfor the new militaryestablishment cre- atedthat August by the colony's extralegal revolutionary government, the Third Vir- ginia Convention.The problem,Gilmer believed,was the decline in popular enthusiasmfor the cause manifested in thepoor rate of enlistment for the new "minuteman"service: "I knownot fromwhat cause, but everydenomination of thepeople seem backward;the Conventionhave alteredthe name Volunteersto thatof MinuteMen, and behold!what a wondrouseffect it has had. Out ofnear three hun- dredVolunteers there are how manyMinute Men? So fewthat I am afraidto name them."He notedthe striking contrast between the ardor of a fewmonths before and thepresent: "We wereonce all fire,now mostof us arebecome inanimate and indif- ferent."He pleadedwith his neighborsto "rouzewhat spirit resides in our constitu- tions"and "become. . . Minutemen, or we shallnot knowwho to call on in the momentof danger.""This is a matter,Gentlemen," Gilmer gravely concluded, "that requiresyour most serious attention, on yourown, as wellas yourCountrie's account." 1

MichaelA. McDonnell is a lecturerin Americanhistory at theDepartment of American Studies at theUniversity of Wales,Swansea. I would liketo thankPeter Thompson, Daniel W Howe, JackPole, Thad W Tate,Al Tillson,Ron Hoffman, BrentTarter, Peter Wood, Julian Gwyn, P. E. Kell,and colleaguesin Swanseafor their encouragement, comments, and adviceon earlierdrafts of thispaper, and particularlyWoody Holton forhis invaluableand generouscollabo- rationthroughout. More recently,Sylvia Frey, Steve Sarson, Edward Countryman, Michael Bellesiles,Don Hig- ginbotham,Robert Gross, Charles Royster, and especiallyDavid Nord have helpedsharpen my argumentand emboldenany insights gained. For financialassistance in researchingand writingthis piece, I would liketo thank BalliolCollege, Oxford, the Virginia Historical Society, the David Libraryof theAmerican Revolution, the Social Sciencesand HumanitiesResearch Council of Canada, and theDepartment of American Studies, Swansea.

I GeorgeGilmer, "Address of GeorgeGilmer to theInhabitants of Albemarle," [fall 1775], in "Papers,Military and Political,1775-1778, of GeorgeGilmer, M.D., of 'Pen Park,'Albemarle County, Virginia," ed. R. A. Brock, VirginiaHistorical Society, Collections, new series,6 (1887), 122, 125. Gilmerwas activein politicsand servedas a stand-infor Thomas Jefferson in theVirginia conventions of 1774-1775 whilethe latter served in theConti- nentalCongress. We can safelydate theaddress cited here as laterthan September 11, probablya fewweeks later. On Gilmer'slife, see RobertL. Scribner,ed., RevolutionaryVirginia: The Road toIndependence, vol. III: TheBreak- ingStorm and theThird Convention (Charlottesville, 1977), 50.

946 TheJournal of American History December1998 Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 947

Indeed,the minuteman service was designed to playa pivotalrole in Virginia's defenseamid escalating hostilities through the summer and fall of 1775. Established whenpopular enthusiasm for the war was high, it was supposed to be thetruly revo- lutionarybackbone of Virginians' defense of theirliberties. Replacing the royally controlledmilitia as theideological alternative toa standingarmy, the minute service wasdesigned to ready8,000 "citizen-soldiers" forservice at shortnotice-men "in whoseHands the Sword may be safelytrusted," as a creatorof theservice put it. Eventhe appellation "minuteman" was designed to evoke an imageof the mass pop- ularresistance toperceived British tyranny already immortalized inNew England in thefirst skirmishes ofthe war-an imagestill strong in thepantheon of American historicalmyths.2 Virginia,too, was supposed to have its minuteman heroes. But the minute service in Virginiafailed miserably and was quicklyforgotten. Gilmer's complaints about poorrecruiting for the minutemen inhis county were paralleled throughout the colony,and theminute service never came close to attractinga full complement of men.Consequently, it entirely failed in providingfor the colony's defense, pushing thegentry into relying wholeheartedly on the kind of paid, professional regular army vilifiedby revolutionary rhetoric. But the minuteservice was not simply the victim ofan earlydeath in Virginia of the continental rage militaire that gripped the rest of thecolonies until at leastthe end of the following year; indeed, as Gilmer'scom- mentsimply, the minute service was responsible forthe demise of popular enthusiasm forthe cause in Virginia.Before the minutemen were established, "Volunteers pre- sentedthemselves from every direction" and "Every rank and denomination ofpeople [were]full of marshal notions." After the minuteman plan was introduced, itwas reportedthat "Virginia is in thegreatest confusion," and thatthe "Continental Spirit"had been "retarded by internal Divisions" caused by the new military establishment.The failureof the minute service, then, played a keyrole in Virginia's war- timemobilization and its revolutionary movement.3 Moreimportant, the reasons why the minuteman plan failed illustrate a more enduringconflict than the one againstBritain: the one betweenthe governors and thegoverned, between the gentry and the "lower" and "middling sorts." That con- flicthas been masked in itsscale and detail by an elitebias in theavailable sources. Smallfarmers in Virginiain theeighteenth century left very few written records of

2George Mason to GeorgeWashington, Oct. 14, 1775, in ThePapers of George Mason, 1725-1792, ed. Rob- ertA. Rutland(3 vols.,Chapel Hill, 1970), I, 255-56. See RobertA. Gross,The Minutemen and TheirWorld (New York,1976), 59. 3Nov. 19-20, 1775, entriesin PhilipVickers Fithian: Journal, 1775-1776...., ed. RobertGreenhalgh Albion and LeonidasDodson (Princeton,1934), 133-34; W W Abbotet al., eds.,The Papers of George Washington: Revolu- tionaryWar Series (7 vols.,Charlottesville, 1985 - ), I, 24; GeorgeGilmer to Thomas Jefferson, [July 26 or 27, 1775], in ThePapers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. JulianP. Boyd et al. (27 vols.,Princeton, 1950- ), I, 238; FieldingLewis to GeorgeWashington, Nov. 14, 1775, in PennsylvaniaMagazine of History and Biography,53 (Jan.1929), 93; June6, 1775, entryin PhilipVickers Fithian: Journal, 1775-1776, ed. Albionand Dodson, 24. For thecontinental experience,see CharlesRoyster, A RevolutionaryPeople at War:The ContinentalArmy andAmerican Character, 1775-1783 (New York,1979), 25. The prevailingopinion in thehistoriography is that the minuteman establishment was a suc- cessand thatit was replacedbecause of theneed for more regular troops. See JohnSelby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783 (Williamsburg,1988), 77-78, 129; and E. M. Sanchez-Saavedra,"'All Fine Fellows and Well-Armed': The CulpeperMinute Battalion, 1775-1776," VirginiaCavalcade, 24 (no. 1, 1974), 4-12. 948 TheJournal of American History December1998 theirthoughts and experiences.Most Virginians, particularly nongentry Virginians, livedin an oral-auralworld-perhaps as manyas 75 percentof adults in thecolony couldnot even sign their names. So we areleft with the writings of the very few, pre- dominantlygentry, Virginians who left"traditional" accounts and sourcesand who werereluctant to "washtheir dirty linen in public,"as one scholarhas noted.4 Yetthe reasons for the failure of the minute service, particularly from the point of viewof ordinary Virginians, though elusive, are not impossible to reconstruct.There is at leastone paththat will bring us closerto themind-set of smallfarmers in Vir- ginia,and to a fullerpicture of the Revolution in Virginia.By applying the method- ologyused by Rhys Isaac beyondthe gentry world that was hismain concern, we can findthe alternativeand oftenconflicting meanings of the Revolutionfor ordinary Virginiansby placing their actions within the context of events. In thiscase, though it is difficultto reconstructwhat ordinary Virginians thought about the war, we can determinewhen theydid or did not fight.By comparingwhen men would fight withthe moments when they refused, we can assesswhy men actedas theydid. By examiningthe experience of militaryservice, then, we can beginto piecetogether the meaningof servicefor the different participants. Thus, thestory of theminute ser- viceis importantin thefirst place because it allowsus insightinto the normally inac- cessibleworld of the small farmer in Virginia.5 Resistanceto theminute service among the middling sort in Virginia,it becomes clear,was not overwhether or not to fightthe British,but overhow and on whose "terms"to do so. The conditionsof servicewere often decisive in the choice of a farmerto fightor not.Throughout the Revolutionary War, small farmers in Virginia groundedtheir patriotism in theeconomic realities of small-scalefarming (with few or no slavesand littleother help). They desired a moreegalitarian distribution of the burdenof war, a moredemocratic and consensualmilitary organization, and equal-

4 In defininggroups in easternVirginia, I havefollowed John Selby, who concludedthat the "typical white Vir- giniamale was a smallfarmer.... [who]had accessto no morethan a coupleof hundredacres, at mosta slaveor two,and some cattle."Just under 50% ofwhite males were small landowners, 10-20% tenants(concentrated in theNorthern Neck), and 20-30% agriculturallaborers or indenturedservants. "Small farmers," or the"middling sort,"were those in thefirst two groups;"poor whites," or the "lowersort," refers to the thirdgroup. The final 10% of whitemales were the gentry, who ownedhalf the land in Virginiaand almosthalf the personal property and occupiedmost important posts of leadership and authorityat provincialand local levels.See Selby,Revolution in Virginia,24. On thepredominantly nonliterate world of Virginia, see RhysIsaac, "Dramatizingthe Ideology of Revolution:Popular Mobilization in Virginia,1774 to 1776," Williamand Mary Quarterly,33 (July1976), esp. 357-64. EmoryG. Evans,"Trouble in theBackcountry: Disaffection in SouthwestVirginia during the American Revolution,"in An UncivilWar: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Thad Tate,and PeterJ. Albert (Charlottesville, 1985), 180. 5 My methodologyhas been influencedby RhysIsaac, The Transformationof Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill, 1982), esp. 323-59; Isaac, "Dramatizingthe Ideology of Revolution,"357-64; and worksof thenew mili- taryhistorians, beginning with John Shy, A PeopleNumerous and Armed:Reflections on theMilitary Struggle for AmericanIndependence (Ann Arbor, 1990). More recentworks drawn on hereinclude Royster, Revolutionary Peo- ple at War;Fred Anderson, A People'sArmy: Massachusetts Soldiers and Societyin theSeven Years' War (Chapel Hill, 1984); StevenRosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class:The Philadelphia Militia and the"Lower Sort" during theAmer- icanRevolution (New Brunswick,1987); and JamesTitus, The Old Dominionat War:Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late ColonialVirginia (Columbia, S.C., 1991). On thisschool, see E. WayneCarp, "EarlyAmerican Military History:A Reviewof RecentWork," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,94 (July1986), 259-84; and Don Higginbotham,"The EarlyAmerican Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal,"William and MaryQuar- terly,44 (April1987), 230-73. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 949 itywithin the service.When policymakers did not takethese considerations into account,ordinary Virginians refused to serve.They thereby demonstrated their com- mitmentto an "alternativepopular political culture," very similar to theone prevail- ingin thebackcountry and verydifferent from the expectations of the gentry.6 Containedwithin the small farmers' demands were the seeds of an idealof political and socialrelations outside of military service very different from that held by the leadinggentry, an idealthat would help shape the contours of political life in thenew independentrepublic. Indeed, through their participation, or refusalto serve,in the military,ordinary Virginians not only articulated alternative ideas about the political societyin whichthey lived but, more important,exercised power to make those demandsheard. Ultimately, small farmers' wartime resistance to unfavorablemilitary policy,beginning with the minutemen, helped develop their ideas aboutthe nature of politicaland socialrelations, demonstrated the limits of theauthority of thegentry,and irrevocablychanged postwar politics in theOld Dominion. Such an interpretationleads us closerto overturningtwo powerfuland interre- latedhistoriographical trends. First, the story of thefailure of theminutemen chal- lengesthe traditional and enduringpicture of an organicallyunified white Virginia societybefore and duringthe Revolution. Such a vieworiginated with earlier historians of prerevolutionaryVirginia who emphasizedthe homogeneity and harmonyof thecolony and ofthe ruling class. Common interests, such as landownership,tobacco, slavery,and racism,wedded small farmers and wealthyruling planters and created fertileground for not just a "stable,hierarchical, consensual-or deferential- community"but also an emergingand consensualrepublicanism.7 In this story, ordinaryVirginians, whose voices are rarelyheard, mobilized easily and quietly behindthe gentrywhose inferred motives for rebellion included desires to defend theirconstitutional rights, to repudiatedebts, to freewestern lands fromimperial restrictions,to achieveeconomic independence, or to "renew"or save themselves froman internal"cultural crisis."8 Whatever the reasons for rebellion, recent scholar-

6On a popularpolitical culture that was an alternativeto the gentry's,see AlbertH. TillsonJr., Gentry and CommonFolk: Political Culture on a VirginiaFrontier, 1740-1789 (Lexington,Ky., 1991); and AlbertH. Tillson Jr.,"The Militiaand PopularPolitical Culture in theUpper Valley of Virginia, 1740- 1775," VirginiaMagazine of Historyand Biography,94 (July1986), 285-306. Tillson'swork also pointsto the need to recognizesubtler dis- tinctionsand gradationsof disaffectionthan the traditional Tory-Patriot dichotomy. 7Herbert Sloan and PeterOnuf, "Politics,Culture, and the Revolutionin Virginia:A Reviewof Recent Work,"Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,91 (July1983), 267. For the interpretationthat created the imageof a unifiedVirginia, see CharlesSydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders: Political Practices in Washington'sVirginia (Chapel Hill, 1952); numerousworks by Jack P. Greene,but especially Jack P. Greene,"Society, Ideology, and Pol- itics:An Analysisof the PoliticalCulture of Mid-Eighteenth-CenturyVirginia," in Society,Freedom, and Con- science:The Coming of the Revolution in Virginia,Massachusetts, and New York,ed. RichardM. Jellison(New York, 1976), 14-76; Edmund S. Morgan,American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordealof ColonialVirginia (New York,1976), book 4; Allan Kulikoff,Tobacco and Slaves:The Development of Southern Cultures in theChesapeake, 1680-1800 (Chapel Hill, 1986); T. H. Breen,Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Tidewater Planters on theEve ofRevolution(New Brunswick,1985); and Isaac, Transformationof Virginia. 8 Sloan and Onuf,"Politics, Culture, and theRevolution in Virginia,"260-74; Marc Egnal,"The Originsof the Revolutionin Virginia:A Reinterpretation,"William and Mary Quarterly,37 (July1980), 401-28; Marc Egnal and JosephA. Ernst,"An Economic Interpretation of theAmerican Revolution," ibid., 29 (Jan.1972), 3- 32; Breen,Tobacco Culture, 160-203; Isaac, Transformationof Virginia, part II; RhysIsaac, "Preachersand Patri- ots: PopularCulture and the Revolutionin Virginia,"in TheAmerican Revolution: Explorations in theHistory of AmericanRadicalism, ed. AlfredF. Young(De Kalb, 1976), 125-56. 950 TheJournal of American History December1998 shiphas revivedthat traditional notion of revolutionaryVirginia by emphasizing consensus-whatRhys Isaac has called "the remarkable phenomenon of Virginia's dissent-freemobilization for rebellion and revolution"-and downplaying internal wartimedivision, upheaval, and change.9 Recently,however, scholars have begun to questionthe homogeneity and harmonyof prewar Virginia as theyhave looked at the diverse and diverging interests of growinggroups of merchants, wheat growers, backcountry farmers, dissenting sec- tarians,laborers and the "lower sort," and even those who challenged that stability fromwithin, enslaved Virginians. We now have a muchfuller understanding ofwhy, as GordonS. Woodnoted over thirty years ago, the gentry voiced "a growingsense of impendingruin" on the eve of the Revolution. For there are now clear indications that evenamong the white agricultural communities the "consensus" on whichthe gentry premisedtheir authority tocommand was coming undone.10 Formany of the ruling class, the Revolution may be seenas an attemptto reassert control,authority, and legitimacy. As thisessay will show, the gentry's approach to mobilizingfor war shows a conservativeand fearfulgroup clinging to traditional notionsof hierarchy,deference, and publicvirtue in an attemptto maintainan increasinglychallenged social and politicalculture. But the struggle with a politi- cizedmiddling and lowerclass over mobilization during the Revolutionary War wouldfurther and finallyerode that authority and demonstrateto the gentry the finalityof their failure to governby old standardsand thepressing need to recast

9Isaac, "Dramatizingthe Ideology of Revolution,"367. ThoughIsaac picturesprewar Virginia society as con- frontational,he maintainsthat dissenters and Patriotscame togetherduring the conflictwith Britain. See Isaac, "Preachersand Patriots."Even such a neo-Progressiveas EdwardCountryman concludes that whites in the Old Dominionentered the Revolution "as somethingclose to a unitedpeople." See EdwardCountryman, The Ameri- can Revolution(London, 1985), 120. Cf. Selby,Revolution in Virginia,xi. See also EmoryG. Evans,"Executive Leadershipin Virginia,1776-1781: Henry,Jefferson, and Nelson,"in SovereignStates in an Age of Uncertainty, ed. Ronald Hoffmanand PeterJ. Albert (Charlottesville, 1981), 185-225. On this"revised consensus," see Sloan and Onuf, "Politics,Culture, and the Revolutionin Virginia,"260-67. More local studieshave uncoveredwar- timedisaffection, though usually on themargins of Virginia.See Adele Hast, Loyalismin RevolutionaryVirginia: TheNorfolk Area and theEastern Shore (Ann Arbor, 1982); Tillson,Gentry and CommonFolk; and Evans,"Trouble in the Backcountry."Two othernotable challenges to thepicture of a unitedVirginia are Dale Benson,"Wealth and Powerin Virginia,1774-1776: A Studyof the Organizationof Revolt"(Ph.D. diss.,University of Maine, 1970); and JohnD. McBride,"The VirginiaWar Effort,1775-1783: ManpowerPolicies and Practices"(Ph.D. diss.,University of Virginia, 1977). And see MichaelA. McDonnell,"The Politicsof Mobilizationin Revolution- aryVirginia: Military Culture and Politicaland Social Relations,1774-1783" (D. Phil. thesis,University of Oxford,1995). For an earlyrecognition that Virginia was plaguedwith internal problems during the war,see HamiltonJ. Eckenrode,The Revolution in Virginia(1917; Hamden,Conn., 1964), esp. 232-60. 10Gordon S. Wood, "Rhetoricand Realityin theAmerican Revolution," William and MaryQuarterly, 23 (Jan. 1966), 28. The mostoriginal of thenew Virginiastudies describes dramatic challenges to thegentry from other groups.See WoodyHolton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and theMaking of the American Revolution in Virginia(Williamsburg, Institute of EarlyAmerican History and Culture,forthcoming). See also Titus, Old Dominionat War;Isaac, Transformationof Virginia, part II; Isaac, "Preachersand Patriots";Rhys Isaac, "Evangeli- cal Revolt:The Natureof the Baptists'Challenge to theTraditional Order in Virginia,1765 to 1775," William and Mary Quarterly,31 (July1974), 345-68; and RichardR. Beemanand RhysIsaac, "CulturalConflict and Social Change in the RevolutionarySouth: LunenburgCounty, Virginia," Journal of Southern History, 46 (Nov. 1980), 525-50. On the riseof the merchantclass, see JacobPrice, France and theChesapeake: A Historyof the FrenchTobacco Monopoly, 1674-1791, and ofIts Relationshipto theBritish and AmericanTobacco Trades (2 vols., Ann Arbor,1973); JacobPrice, "The Rise of Glasgowin the ChesapeakeTobacco Trade,1707-1775," William and MaryQuarterly, 11 (April1954), 179-99; BruceRagsdale, A Planter'sRepublic: The Search for Economic Inde- pendencein RevolutionaryVirginia (Madison, 1996); and Benson,"Wealth and Powerin Virginia."On therise of wheatgrowing, see Breen,Tobacco Culture, 180-82 and notes. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 951 theirleadership. The transitionfrom a deferentialtoa morerepublican political cul- turewas forged and fueled by conflict, not consensus.11 That transition-theconflict and its consequencesin Virginia-bringsinto focusa second,more general historical interpretation, Carl Lotus Becker's claim that theAmerican Revolution was as mucha conflictover who would rule at homeas oneover home rule. Though Becker's conclusions have been challenged and refined, it is nowgenerally recognized that all acrossthe colonies and newstates, popular upheavaland socialprotest before, during, and afterthe war was endemicand involvedhundreds of thousands of ordinary people, male and female, black, white, andNative American.12 However, the apparent absence of internal conflict in Vir- ginia,arguably the most important rebel colony of all,has underminedefforts to portraythe war for independence as trulyrevolutionary. Even conceding internal strifein most colonies, historians could point to its absence in Virginia and conclude thatinternal upheaval was not necessary or evenrelevant in explainingthe revolu- tionaryoutcome. A demonstrationof social conflict in Virginiais thefinal-and cornerstone-pieceofthe neo-Progressive interpretation, more broadly defined. Moreimportant, the story of Virginia in theRevolution also helpsshow how internalconflict and social protest were crucial to- that revolutionary settlement. For allwe know and are learning about the nuances and diversity ofinternal conflict, we stillneed to understand and appreciate fully the consequences ofthat internal popular upheavalon stateand national political and social developments. Anexamination of theminuteman establishment and thewar in theOld Dominionin generalwill showthat, as in thePhiladelphia militia and elsewhere, the experiences and actions ofordinary people at war were as importantas political and imperial issues in shap- ingthe revolutionary transformations thattook place.13

Boththe origins of the minute service and the roots of its failure lay in theestablish- mentthat it wasdesigned to replace,the "Independent Companies of Volunteers" thathad begun forming between fall 1774 and summer 1775. This initial effort at

I Howeverstrong or weakdeferential behavior was in prerevolutionaryVirginia, many members of thegentry soughtto reassertit as an idealduring the Revolution. On theweakness of deference in Virginiaand elsewhere,see JackP. Greene,Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities:Essays in EarlyAmerican Cultural History (Charlottesville, 1992), 181-207. '2CarlLotus Becker, The History ofPoliticalParties in the Province ofNew York, 1760-1776 (Madison,1909). The literaturesubstantiating and addingnuance to Becker'sdual-revolution thesis is large,but good startingpoints are Young,ed., American Revolution; Alfred F. Young, ed., Beyond the American Revolution (De Kalb,1990); and thesemi- nalwork, Gary Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and theOrigins of the American Revo- lution(Cambridge, Mass., 1979). Good statestudies in theneo-Progressive tradition include Edward Countryman, A Peoplein Revolution:The American Revolution and PoliticalSociety in New York,1760-1790 (Baltimore,198 1); RichardAlan Ryerson,The Revolution Is Now Begun:The Radical Committees ofPhiladelphia, 1765-1776 (Phila- delphia,1978); Rosswurm,Arms, Country, and Class;Ronald Hoffman, A SpiritofDissension: Economics, Politics, and theRevolution in Maryland(Baltimore, 1973); MarjoleineKars, "'Breaking Loose Together':Religion and Rebel- lionin theNorth Carolina Piedmont, 1730-1790" (Ph.D. diss.,Duke University,1994); and RachelN. Klein,Unifi- cationofa SlaveState: The Rise ofa PlanterClass in theSouth Carolina Backcountry, 1760-1808 (ChapelHill, 1990). 13 On theradicalism and lastinginfluence of thePhiladelphia militia, see especiallyRosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class.See also GregoryT. Knouff,"'An ArduousService': The PennsylvaniaBackcountry Soldiers' Revolu- tion,"Pennsylvania History, 61 (Jan.1994), 45-74. 952 TheJournal of American History December1998 organizinga military force was crucial in shapingsubsequent military policy, for it seta precedent-frighteningforthe gentry, exemplary for small farmers. To under- standthe failure of the minute service, we need to understandwhy the independent companieswere successful, what was really "altered," as Gilmernoted, between the "Volunteer"and minuteman companies, and why Virginia leaders sought to replace thevolunteers with minutemen. In theaftermath ofthe Boston Port Act, as relationsbegan to worsen between the coloniesand Britain during the summer and fall of 1774,Virginia's elite leadership confrontedthe problem of rallying popular support for further and more disruptive resistanceefforts. The last economicboycott, of 1768-1770, had ended ignominiously-"soon forgotten, so baselydeserted, and boththe letter and the spiritof it kickedout of doors." In summer1774, there was every indication that strongermeasures would be necessary, but the gentry could not take popular support forgranted. In thedramatic days immediately following the news of the Boston Port Act,a reportwas circulated in theNorthern Neck that "The lower Class of People hereare in a tumulton theaccount of Reports from Boston, many of them expect to bepress'd & compell'dto go andfight the Britains!" Such reports must have worried thegentry, who couldremember that the "lower Class of People"had singularly rejectedtheir general calls to join the provincial army during the French and Indian Warand had resisted efforts toconscript them to fight. Moreover, Virginia had little in theway of a universalmilitary tradition, especially on theeastern side of the Blue RidgeMountains: in mostplaces the militia, if functioning, had long since taken on a largelysymbolic social role. The generalpopulation had rarely been called upon to fight.Consequently, drawing on lessonslearned in theFrench and Indian War, the gentrymoved cautiously and refused to call for mandatory service.14 Instead,they tried to mobilizepopular opinion by beginning an informalmove- ment,in September1774, to formextralegal "Independent" or "Volunteer"companies of "Gentlemen."Rather than try to mobilizeall men and riskupheaval, the gentryestablished military companies that were voluntary, exclusive, and amenable to theirown sense of propriety. Paralleling efforts during the French and IndianWar to organize"an Associationof Gent[leme]n,"in partto inspire"lesser" men to take up arms,the volunteer companies were thus generally organized on verydifferent termsthan the colonialmilitia or previousvolunteer or conscriptarmies. These companieswere not designed for the "common" sort; they were established to "rouse theattention of thepublic," to "exciteothers by [their]Example," and to "infusea martialspirit of emulation."These werepreliminary preparations: one memberof thegentry believed these companies to be useful,not becausethey would provide a firstline of defense,but becausethey would "providea fundof officers;that in case of absolutenecessity, the people mightbe betterenabled to act in defenceof their invadedliberty." The gentrywould thus ready themselves, train, and ifwar came, go

14 On thequestion, of theextent of popularbacking for the gentry in summer1774, see McDonnell,"Politics of Mobilizationin RevolutionaryVirginia," chap. 1. VirginiaGazette (Rind), March 8, 1770, quoted in Breen, TobaccoCulture, 195; May 31, 1774, entryin Journal and Lettersof Philip Vickers Fithian, 1773-1774: A Planta- tionTutor of the Old Dominion,ed. HunterDickinson Farish (1943; Williamsburg,1957), 111. On theproblems of raisingmen in theFrench and IndianWar, see Titus,Old Dominionat War. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 953 forthamong the people to assume leadership roles on thefield of battle and in more traditionalmilitary organizations.15 Limitedmembership and theterms on whichthese companies came together reinforcedthe exclusivity ofthe independent companies. Though some of the com- paniesstipulated a maximum of 100 in each unit, the numbers enrolled were usually muchsmaller. In DunmoreCounty, which embodied one of the largest companies, only87 menenrolled out of an eligiblefighting population of approximately 800 males.Similarly, the 23 menwho enlisted in thecompany from Albemarle repre- sentedless than 1.8 percentof the county's 1,314 eligible males. The morematerial termsof enrollmentseemed tailored to excludeless wealthy farmers and in effect playedthe role that property qualifications for office played in civillife: Among otheraccoutrements, each member of the unit had to providehis own uniform, in "Blue,turn'd up withBuff," complete with "Coat & Breeches& whiteStockings," alongwith "a goodFire-lock and Bayonet"and sixpounds of gunpowder, twenty poundsof lead,and fiftygun flints, "at the least." It was generallyreported that membershipin the new independent companies was to be confinedto "gentlemen ofthe first fortune and character."George Mason later boasted that his own company,from Fairfax County, when first formed "consisted entirely of Gentlemen."'16 Consequently,between September 1774 and April 1775, when actual fighting broke out,no more than a handfulof volunteer companies were raised throughout Virginia.17

15Titus, Old Dominionat War,144; GeorgeMason, "FairfaxCounty Militia Association," [Sept. 21, 1774], in Papersof George Mason, ed. Rutland,I, 210; GeorgeMason, "Remarkson AnnualElections for the Fairfax Inde- pendentCompany," [April 17-26, 1775], ibid, 229. 16 For theestimates of thoseeligible for military service in Dunmoreand Albemarlecounties, see themanuscript listpublished as "The Numberof Men ofMilitary Age in Virginiain 1776," VirginiaMagazine ofHistory and Biogra- phy,18 (Jan.1910), 34-35. "Declarationof Subscribersto theFirst Independent Company of DunmoreCounty," [afterJan. 1775?], Dunmore County Committee of SafetyPapers (Virginia Historical Society, Richmond); Mason, "FairfaxCounty Militia Association," 211; Mason to [Mr.Brent?], Oct. 2, 1778, in Papersof George Mason, ed. Rut- land,I, 434. See also "Reportof the Committee to inquireinto the causes of the late disturbances.... June1, 1775, "The Proceedingsof the House ofBurgesses of Virginia," in Recordsof the States of the United States, ed. WilliamS. Jen- kins(Washington, 1949) (microfilm:Virginia, lb, reel3, 1773-1781), I wouldlike to thankWoody Holton for this reference.A quantitativeanalysis of a volunteercompany from Albemarle corroborates Mason's observation. George Gilmerlisted 23 menunder his copy of the company's "Terms of Inlisting," April 18, 1775. See AutographDiary and RevolutionaryMemoranda of Dr. GeorgeGilmer (Virginia Historical Society). (The printededition of thesepapers lists24 additionalmen, but takenfrom rolls drawn up later.See Brock,ed., "Papers,Military and Political,. . . of GeorgeGilmer," 69-140.) Of theoriginal 23 men,15 werefound on the1782 AlbemarleCounty personal property taxlists, and 15 on the 1782 land taxlists (4 appearedon onlyone list).Between them, they owned 232 slaves(an averageof 15 each),403 cattle(27 each),and 114 horses(8 each).They owned a totalof 14,594acres of land (an average of 973 each).Albemarle County Personal Property Tax Records,1782 (VirginiaState Library, Richmond); Albe- marleCounty Land Tax Records,1782, ibid In 1787 theaverage Piedmont farmer might own just over 300 acres,and amongthe 70% who ownedslaves, the average holding was 7.6 each.See JacksonTurner Main, "The Distributionof Propertyin Post-RevolutionaryVirginia," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 41 (Sept.1954), 241-58. 17WilliamC. White,"The IndependentCompanies of Virginia, 1774-1775," VirginiaMagazine of History and Biography,86 (April1978), 151; McDonnell,"Politics of Mobilizationin RevolutionaryVirginia," 35-36. Accord- ingto White's list, most counties in whichcompanies formed were in thelower Piedmont, along either side of the fall line.No companiesappear to havebeen formedin southwesternVirginia, outside of AmherstCounty, and onlya fewin theTidewater. On thevolunteer movement before April 1775, see Feb. 25, 1775, entryin TheJournal of NicholasCresswell, 1774-1777 (London,1925), 57; CharlesLee to RobertMorris, Jan. 27, 1775, in TheLee Papers (4 vols.),New YorkHistorical Society, Collections (1871-1874), I, 168; Lord Dunmoreto Dartmouth,Dec. 24, 1774,in TheWritings ofGeorge Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, ed. JohnC. Fitzpatrick (39 vols.,Washington, 1931-1944), III, 248n; and JamesMadison to WilliamBradford, Nov. 26, 1774, in The PapersofJames Madison, ed. WilliamT. Hutchinsonand WilliamM. E. Rachal(Chicago, 1962- ), I, 129. 954 TheJournal of American History December1998

Becausethe new independent companies were established by the gentry, and for gentlemenalone, they were organized on a muchmore consensual and egalitarian basisthan militia or regular army units. Service in an independent company was voluntary,as "Subscribers"entered into a "bond."Unlike soldiers in the militia or other regularmilitary units, the members of the company were not bound to serve by law but"by the sacred ties of virtue, Honor, and love to our Country," and "the words of Gentlemen."More significantly different were the provisions for the appointment of officersand the nature of their command. Officers were to be "oftheir own Choice," selected"from among our Friends and acquaintaince, upon whose Justice, Human- ity& Braverywe canrelie." Moreover, members promised only to "obeythe com- mandsof the officers"that theythemselves had "electedfrom the Inlisted Volunteers."Finally, some associators pledged to "adherestrictly" only "to such resolveswhich shall be enteredinto by a Majorityof the Company." 18 The radicalnature of the independent companies was highlighted by one of the gentry.Just prior to theoutbreak of hostilitiesin Virginia,George Mason wrote "Remarkson Annual Elections" of officers for his volunteer company, justifying the practiceby appealing to broad principles of natural rights philosophy. Declaring that "Allmen are by nature born equally free and independent"and that all powerwas originally"lodged in, and consequently is derived from, the people," Mason argued thatfrequent appeals to the"body of the people" for their "approbation ordissent" werenecessary toprevent the "abuse of authority, and the insolence of office." More- over,yearly elections of officerswould open "a doorto thereturn of officersof approvedmerit, and will always be a meansof excluding unworthy men."19 Yetit was because the companies were generally small and composed of the "bet- tersort" that the election of officers and a moreconsensual style of leadership were initiallypermitted. Mason implied that elections of officerswould be acceptable onlyif a companywas composed of gentlemen of equal merit: "In a companythus constituted,no youngman will think himself degraded by doing duty in theranks, whichhe mayin histurn command, or has commanded." Among "equals," Mason couldtalk of popular elections; the company's exclusivity would allow a "safe"elec- tionas competitionwould be limitedto equalsof the "better sort," mirroring the safe,almost symbolic, political competitions at the polls in prerevolutionaryVir- ginia.And if the companies consisted only of gentlemen, they could afford to leave regulations,rules, and even actions up tothe decision of a majority,democratic vote: indeed,they had to,so gentlemenwould not feel "degraded by doing duty in the ranks."With membership generally confined to "gentlemenofthe first fortune and character"the companies posed no threatto theestablished order or to thetradi-

18White, "IndependentCompanies of Virginia,"152; "Termsof Inlisting,"[April 1775], in "Papers,Mili- taryand Political,.... of GeorgeGilmer," ed. Brock,82; Mason, "Remarkson AnnualElections for the Fairfax IndependentCompany," 229; George Mason, "FairfaxCounty Militia Plan 'For Embodyingthe People,"' [Feb. 6, 1775], in Papersof GeorgeMason, ed. Rutland,I, 215-16; Mason, "FairfaxCounty MilitiaAssocia- tion," 210-11; "Declarationof Subscribersto the FirstIndependent Company of Dunmore County";"The FirstIndependent Company of Dunmore,"Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography,44 (April1936), 102- 4 (emphasisadded). 19Mason, "Remarkson AnnualElections for the Fairfax Independent Company," 229-31. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 955 tionalmethod of raising and structuring themilitary through a rigid hierarchy, discipline,and clearregulations. Rather, these companies were designed to strengthen andreinforce young gentlemen's own sense of public virtue, responsibility, andbelief in theirability and authority to commandin theburgeoning crisis. While hostilities hadyet to breakout, the units resembled elite gentlemen's clubs, rather than formal militaryunits.20 Butthe start of hostilities inApril 1775 caught the gentry off balance, and a win- dowof opportunity thus opened for small farmers. In VirginiaBritish troops under thedirection of the royal governor, John Murray, earl of Dunmore, executed a suc- cessfulmidnight raid on theWilliamsburg public magazine, removing fifteen half barrelsof stockpiled gunpowder only two days after Gen. Thomas Gage botched his similarforay into the Massachusetts countryside. Though the troops went unop- posedin theirclandestine efforts, news of Dunmore's actions, quickly joined with reportsof bloodshed from the north and, importantly, rumors that the governor had threatenedto armthe slaves and use themagainst white Virginians, inflamed the colonyand inciteda newburst of enthusiastic militarism. "Mars the great god of Battle,is now honoured in every Part of this spacious Colony ... hereevery Presence is warlike,every sound is martial!"wrote one observer. "Volunteers presented them- selvesfrom every direction," a soldier later recalled, and Gilmer wrote from Williams- burgthat "Every rank and denomination ofpeople [are] full of marshal notions."'21 The vehiclesfor those martial expressions were the democraticallyorganized "IndependentCompanies of Volunteers," which now seemed to hold out a tantaliz- ingand most immediate example of revolutionary ideology in practice. Men from all overthe colony rushed to jointhe independent companies. The numberof volunteercompanies also leaped dramatically: ByJune 1775 at leastthirty-two counties acrossVirginia had raisedcompanies, and previouslyquiet regions, such as the Southside,began to stir.22 Thosewho now began to rally to arms, however, seemed to look and act different fromthe "gentlemen" who had previouslypredominated in the volunteer companies.In GeorgeGilmer and ThomasJefferson's Albemarle County, for example, membershipin the volunteer company blossomed from the 23 whohad originally signedon inApril, to 74 presentat a musterin June (and there was one report that nearly300 volunteerseventually signed up). ByJune, however, only 12 ofthe origi- nalcompany were present, and in theothers' place stood an entirelydifferent body ofmen. Property tax records from 1782 are available for 30 ofthe 62 newmen, and

20Ibid.,231-32. 21 On Dunmore'sraid, see Selby,Revolution in Virginia,1-6. On rumorsof Dunmore'sthreats to arm the slavesand the rumors'effect on whiteVirginians, see Holton,Forced Founders; Peter Wood, "'LibertyIs Sweet': African-AmericanFreedom Struggles in theYears before White Independence," in Beyondthe American Revolu- tion,ed. Young,163-64; EdwardStabler to IsraelPemberton, May 16, 1775, PhotostatCollection (Foundation Library,Colonial Williamsburg,Williamsburg, Va.); and Scribner,ed., RevolutionaryVirginia, III, 6. June6, 1775, entryin PhilipVickers Fithian Journal 1775-1776, ed. Albionand Dodson, 24; Abbotet al., eds.,Papers of GeorgeWashington, I, 24n; Gilmerto Jefferson,July 26-27, 1775, in Papersof ThomasJefferson, ed. Boyd, I, 238. 22 White,"Independent Companies of Virginia," 151. On theraising of theindependent companies and their number,see McDonnell,"Politics of Mobilizationin RevolutionaryVirginia," chap. 1. 956 TheJournal of American History December1998

land recordsfor 21. Whereason the average,each memberof the earliercompany ownedalmost 1,000 acresof land, the June soldiers owned only 322 acreseach. The newmen also ownedan averageof 5 slaves,10 cattle,and 3 horses,compared with the 15 slaves,27 cattle,and 8 horsesowned by the averagemember of the earlier company.Moreover, whereas all the men fromthe earliermuster for whom tax recordsare available owned slaves, one-third of the new group owned none.23 Gone werethe white-stockinged gentlemen volunteers. Some countieshad low- eredthe "property"qualifications for joining the independent companies in antici- pationof the outbreak of hostilities. In FairfaxCounty, for example, a newplan "for Embodyingthe People" in earlyspring 1775 stipulatedthat those "who had or could obtainrifles" would form a separatecompany who would "distinguish" themselves by wearing"painted Hunting-Shirts and IndianBoots, or Caps." The stipulationthat the recruitswear blue uniforms"turn'd up withBuff; with . . . BuffWaist Coat & Breeches,& whiteStockings" was quietlydropped. In thegrowing crisis of April and May,most men seemed to ignoreany such remaining regulations-if they were not votedout of existenceby the swellingnumbers of ordinaryfarmers who beganto composethe independent companies. After April descriptions of "thedamned shirt- men"showed the majorityof themto be wearing"an Oznab[urg]Shirt over their Cloaths,a belt aroundthem with a Tommyhawkor Scalpingknife." Clearly, the membersof the independentcompanies were no longerpredominantly gentry but moreof a crosssection of lower to middlingfarmers.24 Such men now exercisedtheir newfound right to chooseofficers and to voteto act as theyfelt appropriate. Following Dunmore's raid on the magazine,volunteer companiesgathered to sendoffers of assistanceto Williamsburgand to "debate"the proprietyof marchingon thecapital to exactvengeance. A largegathering of men fromnorthern Virginia at Fredericksburgwas dispersedby the argumentsof Vir- ginia'sdelegation to Congress,who urgedthat that body be givena chanceto delib- eratebefore action was taken,but a secondgathering in HanoverCounty was notso easilydissuaded. Under the leadership of thepopular radical Patrick Henry, volunteers fromAlbemarle, Orange, and other neighboringcounties, now further inflamedby reports of the bloodshed at Lexingtonand Concord,decided to presson and demandretribution from Dunmore. Acting offensively and independently,this groupsent out a smallparty to seize the receivergeneral, Richard Corbin, and to forcepayment for the powder from Dunmore's royal officials. After that plan failed, thetroops were satisfied with a promissarynote from Thomas Nelson Jr., a promi- nentYorktown merchant and planter,and wenthome, but not beforeHenry's offer of furtherprotection to Williamsburgwas refusedby a worriedRobert Carter

23 Gilmer,"Address of GeorgeGilmer to the Inhabitantsof Albemarle,"122; GeorgeGilmer, "List of Volun- teersPresent at Muster,June 17, 1775," in "Papers,Political and Military,... of GeorgeGilmer," ed. Brock,85; "Termsof Inlisting,"82; AlbemarleCounty Personal Property Tax Records,1782; AlbemarleCounty Land Tax Records,1782. 24Mason, "Fairfax County Militia Plan 'For Embodyingthe People,"' 215-16; Isaac, "Dramatizingthe Ideol- ogyof Revolution," 381. On thepopularization of military mobilization as seenthrough the medium of uniforms and outwardassertions of martialardor, see ibid.,379-80. Mobilizationand PoliticalCulture in Virginia 957

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25 "VirginiaLegislative Papers, 1774-1775," VirginiaMagazine of History and Biography,13 (July1905), 49- 50; JamesParker to CharlesSteuart, May 6, 1775, in "Lettersfrom Virginia," Magazine ofHistory, 3 (March 1906), 158-59; JamesMadison to Bradford,May 9, 1775, in Papersof James Madison, ed. Hutchinsonand Rachal,I, 144-45; Selby,Revolution in Virginia,5. The precedingparagraph owes muchto ibid., 1-6. See also MichaelWallace to GustavusWallace, May 14, 1775, Wallace FamilyPapers (Alderman Library, University of Virginia,Charlottesville); and CharlesYates to SamuelMartin, May 11, 1775, CharlesYates Letterbook, ibid. 958 The Jour1al of American History December1998

6 s

Builtbetween 1706 and 1720 in Williamsburg,the Governor's Palace, as it quicklycame to be known,represented not just the coming-of-age of the colony but also a model foraspiring Virginia gentlemen to emulate.After Governor Dunmore took the gunpowderfrom the Williamsburg magazine, moderate gentlemen tried to interveneto stopvolunteers from attacking and looting thepalace. Eventually, Dunmore fled to greatersafety on boarda shipof war. CourtesyColonial Williamsburg Foundation, Visual Resources Library. createdto correspondwith other counties and coloniesand to enforcethe 1774 boy- cott)to disbandand notto marchout ofthe county. But the company, meeting after receivingthese instructions, noted the members were still "at a losswhat to do." The companytherefore voted, and themajority were in favorof marchingto Williams- burg,which they proceeded to do. Two men,John Coles and David Rodes,both prominentcounty committee members, voted against the measure, on whichit was theopinion of theComp'y that they ought to be druad out of thecompany, as an exampleof thatkind, from people of such conspicuouscharacters in the County, mightbe of dangerousconsequence." Significantly, the two menwere later exoner- ated by the more conservativecounty committee. It was reportedin Junethat, thoughthe independentcompany from Spotsylvania County had actedunder the directionof theirelite-led county committee, "the Carolinecompany refused to enlist,unless they were to be solelyunder the directionof officersof theirown choosing."There is some evidence,too, suggestingthat some companieselected officerson eachoccasion of marching, further exacerbating the problem of control.26

26 Scribner,ed., RevolutionaryVirginia, III, 177. See also ibid.,71 -72n. Proceedingsof theIndependent Com- pany of Volunteers,[April 29, 1775], Diary and Memorandaof Gilmer;"Report of the Committeeto inquire intothe causes of thelate disturbances." John Coles and David Rodes werewealthy; in 1782 Coles owned 5,000 acresand 64 slaves,Rodes 568 acresand 22 slaves.Albemarle County Personal Property Tax Records,1782; Albe- marleCounty Land Tax Records,1782. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 959

As imperialtensions mounted throughout June, volunteer companies marched to Williamsburgfrom nearby counties and set up camp on the edge of town.Their presencethere, particularly their lack of discipline and ofdeference to civilauthority, would forcethe gentryto reevaluateVirginia's military establishment. Arriving underthe authorityof theirrespective county committees or merelytheir elected commandingofficers, the soldiersat Williamsburgquickly made a nuisanceof themselves.Thomas Jefferson was told thatthe electedcommanding officer of the volunteers,a Captain Scott,though his "goodnessand meritis great,fear[s] to offend,and by thatmany members are rather disorderly."27 What thegentry feared was thelack of a clearchain of commandwith centralized control. If a commander could be replacedby thevote of his men and militaryactions decided by majority vote,there could be no disciplineand no controlover what these troops might do. A dramaticdemonstration of this problem was notlong in coming.Lacking clear directionand otherduties, the volunteersat Williamsburgwent on the offense. Believingany delay"would be dangerous,and tend to defeatour purposes,"the officersdecided to "waiton" thereceiver general, other collectors of taxes, and naval officersto procureand protectpublic monies from leaving the colony. Should these royalofficials refuse to comply,the volunteers were to bringthem to campto explain themselves.When the officersof the independentcompanies finally wrote to the then-convenedThird Virginia Convention on July26, 1775, forapproval, they were rebuked.The proceedingsof the officers, the gentry-dominated convention resolved, "thoughthey arose from the best Motives, cannot be approved,"and theywere thus "requiredto desistfrom carrying their Resolutions into Execution."28 In the eyesof the gentry,particularly the moderatePatriots, the independent actionsof thevolunteer companies threatened political and socialstability because theywere increasingly responsible for pushing Britain and Virginia further down the roadto openconflict. Governor Dunmore had initiallyreacted to newsof the marches of theindependent companies by appealingfor reinforcements from General Gage andAdm. Samuel Graves in Boston.He also madeclearer and morepublic his threat to armthe slaves to spread"Devastation wherever I can reach,"further inflaming Vir- ginians,especially propertied moderate Virginians. Finally, after repeated incidents involvingindependent companies in Williamsburg,Dunmore fled from the town to an awaitingvessel, abandoning conciliatory efforts, he said,because his "housewas keptin continualAlarm and threatenedevery Night with an Assault."29With Dun- more'sflight, the possibility of reconciliation became even more remote. But equallyimportant, as theindependent companies helped radicalize resistance

27 Selby,Revolution in Virginia,47-48; Scribner,ed., RevolutionaryVirginia, III, 218-19; Gilmerto Jefferson, [July26-27, 1775], in Papersof ThomasJefferson, ed. Boyd,I, 237; "Meetingof Officersat Williamsburg,"July 18, 1775, in "Papers,Political and Military,... of GeorgeGilmer," ed. Brock,92-93. 28 Officersof theVolunteer Independent Companies at Williamsburgto the Convention,July 26, 1775, in "Papers,Political and Military,.. . of GeorgeGilmer," ed. Brock,98-99; PeytonRandolph to theOfficers at Wil- liamsburg,July 28, 1775, ibid.,107-8. On thecompanies' actions, see ibid.,90-107; Officersat Williamsburgto the Convention,Aug. 1, 1775, ibid., 109; and Scribner,ed., RevolutionaryVirginia, III, 401. For a similarinci- dent,see ibid.,417-18. 29 See Selby,Revolution in Virginia,4-5, 42-43. 960 TheJournal of American History December1998

externally,against Britain, they also beganpushing for a stricteraccounting of alle- giancesinternally, polarizing the conflict within Virginia. Most often,they called for everyoneto showpatriotism by joining the independent companies and byostraciz- ing thosewho wereslow in displayingtheir allegiance or approval.Not onlywere thosewho were"backward" in their"Attendance" with the independent companies oftencompelled to do servicewith the threat of "Tar & Feathers"and other"popular Terrors"including "Scoff and Shame"but others who triedto avoidservice altogether werealso threatened.Many merchantsaround the colonywho wishedto remain neutralhad apparentlybeen "calledupon" by volunteer companies "to enlistas Sol- dierstherein, under pain of incurringthe Displeasure of theSaid Company,and of beingtreated as Enemiesto the Country."These werepolitical acts and directly anticipatedthe struggles of the lower sort in Philadelphialater that summer to make themilitia compulsory for all in thatQuaker-dominated colony. Those who joined theequivalent of theindependent companies in Philadelphiacomplained that they wereof the "poorerSorts of Peoplewhose public spirit far exceed their abilities in pointof Fortune";it particularlybothered them that a "vastnumber of Substantial Inhabitants"were "sitting at theirease & bearingno partin theExpence or Labour ofthe Association."30 Indeed,to the gentryin Virginia,perhaps the mosthorrifying manifestation of the volunteercompanies' newfound independence was the levelingentailed by increasedattacks on neutralor unsympatheticindividuals, particularly propertied ones.In suchinstances, volunteers recognized no socioeconomicbarriers, a situation furtherexacerbated by the sometimes fine line betweenconservative patriotism and loyalism.Thus men as prominentas WilliamByrd and RobertMunford could no longerfeel safe. Byrd, worried about the directionresistance to Britainwas taking, complainedthat he was "oftenthreatened with Visits from the valiant Volunteers of some of the neighbouringCounties." He believedhe had received"many insults" and given"great offence" because he would not offerhis servicesin the military. Munford'splay The Patriots, written a yearor twolater, in 1776 or 1777,bitterly sat- irizedthe zealous patriotism of his less wealthy neighbors.31 The movement,in theeyes of the gentlemen, was becomingunwieldy, dangerous, and potentiallysubversive. The gentryfelt that their control over the "ebullitionof patriotism"(as one of Henry'ssupporters put it) was slipping.Armed bands of men weretaking the law intotheir own hands and radicalizingthe resistance movement. Ultimately,the gentryfeared the social chaos that mightaccompany open and uncontrolledwarfare. As earlyas thesummer of 1774, one Virginianpointed out to thewealthy the danger of resistance:"even a slightcommotion may expose part of

30June8, 1775, entryin PhilipVickers Fithian: Journal, 1775-1776, ed. Albionand Dodson, 25, 34; petition ofCharles Duncan, [Aug.9, 1775], in RevolutionaryVirginia, III, ed. Scribner,410, 412; Rosswurm,Arms, Coun- try,and Class,54. See also Scribner,ed., RevolutionaryVirginia, III, 490-91. 31William Byrdto RalphWormeley, Oct. 4, 1775, WormeleyFamily Papers (Alderman Library); Byrd to Sir JefferyAmherst, July 30, 1775, in The Correspondenceof the ThreeWilliam Byrds of Westover,Virginia, 1684- 1776, ed. MarionTinling (2 vols.,Charlottesville, 1977), II, 812; RobertMunford to Byrd,April 20, 1775, ibid., 806. See CourtlandtCanby, ed., "RobertMunford's The Patriots,"William and Mary Quarterly,6 (July1949), 437-503. Mobilizationand PoliticalCulture in Virginia 961

Zl fi0 a- ~~~~~T w. f.BO..EEi|iUm.-.^..y''.+...B < ,:'..'-...... :>.

ternativeof Williamsburg by Philip Dawe London ( 775) This showsarmed patriots forcinggentlemen-merchants tosign the commercial Association" against imports The "alternative"was to sufferthe degradation of being tarred and feathered withthe materials hanging from the scaffold. Such scenes of social mixingand conflict,particularly ones in whicharmed men compelledtheir supposed "betters" with threats and violence,horrified not only Englishmen like Dawe, but also manyof the leading gentryin Virginia. CourtesyColonial Williamsburg Foundation, Visual Resources Library 962 TheJournal of American History December1998 yourwealth to theravages of the populace, or theplunder of a licentiousarmy." Pey- ton Randolphhad earlierwritten to the Fredericksburgvolunteers warning that "violentmeasures may produce effects, which God onlyknows the consequence of." Similarly,in theaftermath of PatrickHenry's march on Williamsburg,James Madi- son explainedthat "The Gentlemenbelow [on theYork and Jamesrivers] whose propertywill be exposedin case of a civil war in this Colony were extremely alarmed."Even the House of Burgessesconfessed the great"difficulty there is in restrainingan incensedmultitude."32 The situation,of course,was exacerbatedby thepresence of slavesand indenturedand convictservants, many of whom saw the coming"civil war" as an opportunityto gaintheir personal "independence."33 The gentrywere also fearful of the perceived and real erosion of deference inherent in the new volunteercompanies and the loss of theirauthority and controlover the dynamicand fluid situation. An armyof citizen-soldiers was to somea worrisomepros- pect,for it heldout thepossibility of wholesalesocial changes. Distinctions between armedmen were difficult to maintain,and deferencewould be thefirst casualty of war. One Mr. Gully,in theNorthern Neck ofVirginia, for example, refused to accepthis positionas a drillsergeant, much to LandonCarter's disgust: "the rascal calls himself Adjutantand insisted he would be so."As RhysIsaac has noted, in theheady summer of 1775, "socialdistance was inevitablyreduced, special advantages derived from cosmo- politaneducation were diminished, and distinctions of rankwere rendered less sharp."34 Thus,when the Third Virginia Convention-the extralegal substitute for the sus- pendedHouse of Burgesses-metin Julyand August 1775, many of the leading gen- tryhad alreadydecided to abolishor "meltdown" all theindependent companies into a newand orderlymilitary establishment. Many gentlemen believed that the independentcompanies "aim[ed] at too much"and thattheir "wild irregular sallies" needed to be checked.One gentry-dominatedlocal committeehad complainedthat "disorderly behaviour"had ensuedas a resultof theirindependent company's "assuming an authorityindependent of any Military Controul by Law established."As thehistorian JohnSelby has written,in theinterim between the dissolutionof thelast House of Burgessesand thegovernor's fleeing to safetyoffshore, "the worst fears of moderates seemedabout to cometo pass;the leadership could scarcely retain control."35

32 [ThomsonMason], "The BritishAmerican, VII," VirginiaGazette (Rind), July 14, 1774, in Revolutionary Virginia:The Road toIndependence, vol. I: FormingThunderclouds and theFirst Convention, 1763-1774, ed. Rob- ertL. Scribner(Charlottesville, 1973), 184. See also a revealingexchange of letters,first published in May and June1775, ibid.,III, 117, 180-82, 199-200. For PeytonRandolph's statement, see Selby,Revolution in Virginia, 3. JamesMadison to Bradford,May 9, 1775, in PapersofJames Madison, ed. Hutchinsonand Rachal,I, 145. The House of Burgesses,responding to Dunmore'scharge that it had given"countenance" to the "violentand disor- derlyproceedings of thepeople" when the magazine was rifled,told thegovernor the burgesses would neverhave given"countenance to suchunjustifiable proceedings as happenedthat day" and thatseveral gentlemen had tried to restrainthe mob. See "Reportof theCommittee to inquireinto the causes of thelate disturbances." 33See,for example, Peter H. Wood, "'The Dream Deferred':Black FreedomStruggles on the Eve of White Independence,"in In Resistance.Studies in African,Caribbean, and Afro-AmericanHistory, ed. Gary Okihiro (Amherst,1986), 161-87; and Holton,Forced Founders, chap. 5. 34July22, 1775, entryin TheDiary ofLandon Carter of Sabine Hall, 1752-1778, ed. JackP. Greene(2 vols., Charlottesville,1965), II, 925-26; Isaac, "Dramatizingthe Ideology of Revolution,"383. 35 GeorgeMason to MartinCockburn, July 24, 1775, in Papersof George Mason, ed. Rutland,I, 241; Louisa CountyCommittee Proceedings, Dec. 4, 1775, in VirginiaGazette (Dixon and Hunter),Dec. 23, 1775; Chester- Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 963

The answerto theproblems inherent in theindependent companies, the gentry believed,was the minutemen. Hoping to channelthe manifest enthusiasm for the causeamong the yeomanry, the gentry-dominated Third Virginia Convention called for8,000 men (almost one-fifth ofthe colony's eligible fighting males) who would trainfor twenty days immediately and frequently thereafter. This force would be the backboneof thenew military establishment, ready and trainedto fighton short notice.36It was also believedthat the ranks would be filledwith those who had alreadyshown a dispositionto fight,particularly the common farmer, or themid- dlingsort-men "in whose Hands the Sword may be safelytrusted"-rather than thelower sort, those deemed economically expendable, who usually fought the wars ofthe eighteenth century. George Gilmer also hoped the new military establishment would"be on suchfooting as inevitablytodraw in Gent'nof the first property inthe Colony.37 But,because the gentry established the minute service in reactionto the disorder engenderedby the independent companies, they imposed conditions that ignored thepopular will and clashedwith the more voluntaristic, egalitarian, and demo- craticprinciples that had underpinnedthe success of those companies. Thus, pre- scribedterms of service were introduced that compelled men to trainand serve for longerperiods of time than in theindependent companies. New rules and regulationsfor the governance of forcesin the fieldimposed strict discipline on the troops.Subordination would henceforth be enforced,and an elaboratehierarchy withinthe military was resurrected, all to comeunder the central direction of the Committeeof Safetyin Williamsburg.Most seriously, the new rules ended once andfor all thepopular election of officers ofany rank.38 The minuteservice was, in effect,a conservative reaction-perhaps a counterrevolution-to the disorder of theegalitarian and uncontrollable independent companies. The "enthusiasm"ofthe volunteercompanies was to be restrainedand moderated in thenew military estab- lishmentby the introduction ofproper principles of hierarchy, command, subordination,and discipline.

fieldCounty Committee Memorial, [before July 1775], in RevolutionaryVirginia, III, ed. Scribner,339; Selby, Revolutionin Virginia,47. On the "independence"of thecompanies and thefears of thegentry, see McDonnell, "Politicsof Mobilizationin RevolutionaryVirginia," chap. 1. 36A compulsorymilitia service was resurrected,and a few"regulars" ordered raised. The regularswere to be stationedin Virginiafor the time being, but theywere too fewto providefully for the colony's defense, and it was expectedthat they would be called north.Similarly, though measures were takento revivethe militia,it was expectedto be called on onlyin emergencies;otherwise it would be a reservepool of men forthe regularand minuteservices. Selby, Revolution in Virginia,51-52; WilliamWaller Hening, ed., TheStatutes at Large:Being a Collectionof all theLaws of Virginia,From the First Session of the Legislature, in theYear 1619 (1809-1823; 13 vols.,Charlottesville, 1969), IX, 9-48. On theContinental Army and itsimpact on theVirginia military establishment,see Don Higginbotham,The Warof American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York,1971), 81-95. 37Mason to GeorgeWashington, Oct. 14, 1775, in Papersof George Mason, ed. Rutland,I, 255-56; Mason to Cockburn,Aug. 22, 1775, ibid.,251; Gilmerto CharlesCarter, July 15, 1775, Diaryand Memorandaof Gilmer. On eighteenth-centurywarfare and expectationsof service,see ReginaldC. Stuart,War and AmericanThought: Fromthe Revolution to theMonroe Doctrine (Kent, 1982), xiii-xv;Shy, People Numerous andArmed, 277-80; and RobertMiddlekauff, The GloriousCause: TheAmerican Revolution (New York,1982), 297-98. 38Hening,ed., Statutes, IX, 9-53. 964 TheJournal of American History December1998

Thus,while the gentry wished the ranks of the minute service to be filledwith the samemen who expressedenthusiasm for the cause through the independent companies,they changed the terms upon which those companies were founded. Although thegentry saw no contradictionin thisnew organization, the common farmer firmly and soundlyrejected the new terms. By all accounts,the minute service failed miserably.Lund Washington,cousin of GeorgeWashington, declared that "our minute Scheme does not Equal the ConventionsExpectation. the people do not come readilyinto it." The NorthamptonCounty Committee of Safetycomplained of dif- ficultiesin completingthe minute companies, "people in generalbeing averse to the minuteservice." A contemporaryfrom Fredericksburg noted on October20, 1775, that"the Officers of The Minutemen are much behind and byall accotswill not be able to getthe full compliment of men,"adding that only "one district"out of fif- teenwas "compleated."Fielding Lewis augmented this report a monthlater: "Vir- giniais in thegreatest confusion, only one Battalionof MinuteMen compleat,and littleprospect of the others being so.... Spotsylvaniahas herMen compleat,Caro- line not one Company& the lowerCounty[ies?] scarce a Company."Archibald Caryreported from his home in Ampthillin ChesterfieldCounty on October31, 1775, thathis battalion of minutemen was "notYet Compleat," though he had been givencommand of them,and he concludedgloomily: "I fearbut fewBattalions of Minute Men will be rais'd."39A littlelater, Robert Honyman, a physicianfrom HanoverCounty, reflected in his diarythat the "peopledisliked the plan, & there neverwas morethan half of them raised."40 The reasonsfor the failureof the minuteservice were many, but Gilmeraptly summedthem up in theextraordinarily explicit speech he made in thefall of 1775 withwhich this essay began. In his address,Gilmer took note of all thecomplaints

39Lund Washingtonto GeorgeWashington, Dec. 3, 1775, in Papersof George Washington, ed. Abbotet al., II, 479; NorthamptonCounty Committee of Safetyto theContinental Congress, Nov. 17, 1775, in "VirginiaLegis- lativePapers," Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography,14 (Jan. 1907), 253; RobertL. Scribnerand Brent Tarter,eds., RevolutionaryVirginia: The Road toIndependence, vol. IV: The Committeeof Safety and theBalance of Forces,1775 (Charlottesville,1978), 246; Lewisto GeorgeWashington, Nov. 14, 1775, in PennsylvaniaMagazine ofHistory and Biography,53 (Jan.1929), 93; ArchibaldCary to Jefferson,Oct. 31, 1775, in Papersof Thomas Jef ferson,ed. Boyd,I, 249. See also JohnPage to thechairman of theLancaster District Committee, Nov. 4, 1775, Sabine Hall Papers(Alderman Library). When companieswere raised, it was oftenslowly and incompletely.See "Proceedingsof the Committeesof Safetyof Carolineand SouthamptonCounties, Virginia, 1774-1776," Vir- ginia StateLibrary Bulletin, 17 (Nov. 1929), 148-49, 153-55; "Proceedingsof the Committeesof Safetyof Cumberlandand Isle of Wight Counties,Virginia, 1775-1776," in VirginiaState LibraryBoard, Fifteenth AnnualReport (Richmond, 1919), 21, 24-27, 32, 33, 39. 40 RobertHonyman Diary, Jan. 2, 1776, microfilmf.1 (AldermanLibrary). See also ibid.,March 17, 1776, f.26. His commentsare borne out bystatistics. Of the 160 companiesof minutemenordered raised by theThird VirginiaConvention in July1775, no morethan three-fourths seem to havebeen raised. One listshows 129 companieson therecord books (throughrequests for provisions, pay, or ordersgiven out to them)between 1775 and theend of 1776, but it is not clearwhether those companies were raised at all or raisedin full.Culpeper district, forexample, touted as havingthe largest of theminute battalions with 14 companieson the books,was able to musteronly about 350 men to marchto Williamsburgin fall1775, halfthe numberthat 14 companiesshould havebeen able to supply.In the crucialinitial period before the end of October,at most49 companiesformed, accordingto thelist, and onlyanother 19 fromNovember to December.The restformed after the military crisis of fall1775 and afterthe Fourth Virginia Convention, when the delegates, responding to popularpressure, abol- ishedbattalion duty, stripping the minute service of any real distinction from the militia. Hening, ed., Statutes,IX, 86-88; E. M. Sanchez-Saavedra,A Guideto VirginiaMilitary Organizations in theAmerican Revolution (Rich- mond,1978); Sanchez-Saavedra,"'All Fine Fellowsand Well-Armed,"'4-6. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 965 hehad heard about the service among his neighbors and attempted to countereach in orderto raiseenthusiasm for the minute plan. In doingso, he allowedus a rare andrevealing glimpse of the views of the normally "inarticulate" common farmer in Virginia,which, with the evidence of white Virginians' earlier enthusiasm for the independentcompanies and similar complaints later in theconflict, provides a clear portraitof smallfarmers' grievances and demandsat thestart of thewar. What emergesquickly and clearlyfrom Gilmer's speech is a pictureof a Virginiadeeply divided-betweenthose dictating the terms upon which the colony would fight and thoseexpected to bear the brunt of those terms. In anyvoluntary call for manpower, inequality will prevail. Military service is a regressiveform of taxation as everyonemust make the same sacrifice, regardless of wealth.Though the minuteman plan called for "only" twenty days' initial training, smallfarmers generally found this difficult to manage.In additionto theinitial training,companies were supposed to get together for four days every month (except December,January, and February,to avoidbad weather)and twicea yearin their districtbattalions for twelve successive days. They would train for a totalof eighty daysthe first year and sixtydays in lateryears. In return,the minutemen were to receivea modestpay, but only for the time they were out for training or in service. Mostsmall farmers felt, in the words of Gilmer, that the service was "a heavy duty."41 Thosewere long periods to be awayfrom farms. But the burden was far less for thepolicy-making wealthy planter with many slaves and overseers who could labor inhis absence than it was for the small farmer. Despite popular images of Virginia as a "slavesociety," the bulk of the people were not generally slave owners, or owned oneor two slaves at most. One recentstudy concludes that a "majorityofthe whites stoodoutside of the slave system at thetime of the Revolution."42 For many slave- holdingplanters, time away from the estate meant at worstlost profits; for small farmerswith no help-whose"Corporeal Labours [were] necessary to sustaintheir families"-the basicsubsistence ofthe family was at risk. Hence many ordinary Vir- ginianswere particularly affected by calls for them to leavetheir farms for a duration.Petitioners from Chesterfield County in 1776were explicit about who would be mosthurt by military service: "the poorer sort who have not a slaveto labour for them."Later in thewar, one militia unit put the case succinctly: "We generally pro- curea sustenancefor our Selves and families by the labour of our own hands and one daysLabour is Necessaryfor the Next days support." Moreover, the initial call for enlistmentsinthe minute service began at the end of August and continued through Septemberand October-the second busiest time of the year for tobacco-growing farmers.Small farmers would have none of it.The "One greatObjection" of the inhabitantsofAccomack County to the minute service, itwas reported, "Arises from

41Hening, ed., Statutes,IX, 20-21; Gilmer,"Address of GeorgeGilmer to the Inhabitantsof Albemarle," 122-23, 125, 127. 42Richard S. Dunn, "BlackSociety in the Chesapeake,1776-1810," in Slaveryand Freedomin theAge of the AmericanRevolution, ed. Ira Berlinand Ronald Hoffman(Charlottesville, 1983), 67. For an attemptto make senseof the sketchy data about the number of slaveholding families at thetime of the Revolution, see Main, "Dis- tributionof Property in Post-RevolutionaryVirginia," 248-49. 966 TheJournal of American History December1998

the timeof Encampmentbeing such thatit mustunavoidably break in upon their wholeyears Business."43 Yet it was less themilitary service that small farmers objected to thanthe atten- danttraining. If enrolled in theminute service, farmers had to attendtraining or risk beingfined. Most smallfarmers believed that such trainingwas unnecessaryand more than "a littleburthensome," particularly once theyhad learnedthe "most essentialparts" of soldiering.Gilmer believed that his neighborsthought that the "militaryanticks & ceremonies[were] altogether useless."44 Small farmers wanted, in thewords of northernVirginians protesting the new militaryestablishment, to "go and Fightthe Battle at once,and not be ShillyShally, in thisway, until all thePoor, people are ruined."Indeed, small farmers were willing to fight,just as theyhad in the independentcompanies. Membership in a volunteercompany called forlittle trainingor extraduty, at leastnone that was notvoluntary. The independentcompa- nieswere so popularbecause they required service only when it was absolutelyand evidentlynecessary. The feelingsof the FluvannaCounty militia, expressed later in thewar, were typical. Called out formere guard duty in themiddle of a harvest,they complainedof the "extremeinconvenience" they suffered under and promisedif theywere discharged at thistime, "they will more chearfully attend when there may be morenecessity for them." Subsequent events would provethem true to their word,as throughoutthe war, ordinary Virginians did turnout to defendthe shores ofthe Old Dominion,but usually as "volunteers."45 Economicallygrounded complaints, though serious, are not enoughto explain therefusal of smallfarmers to participateas minutemen.There was somethingodi- ous about servicein the new militaryestablishment, whether in the minutemen, militia,or regulararmy, which stood in markedcontrast to conditionsin theinde- pendentcompanies. What the farmers especially objected to was havingto makesac- rificeson thegentry's terms, embodied in the rulesand regulationsfor the minute service.Small farmers particularly resented training that consisted of "learning"discipline,subordination, and "respect"for now-appointed officers. Moreover, they werebeing asked to do thisand to pay theprice of thisunfair taxation even as gen-

43 For thestatement about "Corporeal Labours," see JamesInnes to Jefferson,Feb. 21, 1781, in Papersof Tho- masJefferson, ed. Boyd,IV, 675. For similarcomplaints that the minuteservice took men fromtheir farms, see "VirginiaLegislative Papers," Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography,17 (Oct. 1909), 381; and "VirginiaLeg- islativePapers," ibid., 18 (Jan.1910), 26-27. Petitionfrom Chesterfield County, in Proceedingsof theFifth Vir- giniaConvention, May 7, 1776, in RevolutionaryVirginia: The Road to Independence,vol. VII: Independenceand theFifth Convention, 1776, ed. BrentTarter (Charlottesville, 1983), 47; RockbridgeCounty Petition, [June 14, 1781] (VirginiaState Library); Hening, ed., Statutes,IX, 20-21; AccomackCounty Committee of Safetyto the FourthVirginia Convention, Nov. 30, 1775, in "VirginiaLegislative Papers," Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography}14 (Jan.1907), 258. On thelabor needed for tobacco growing, see Lois GreenCarr, Russell R. Menard, and LorenaS. Walsh,Robert Co/es' World: Agriculture and Societyin EarlyMaryland (Chapel Hill, 1991), 59. 44Petition fromChesterfield County, 47; George Gilmer,"Address to the AlbemarleCounty Independent Company,"[April 18, 1775], in RevolutionaryVirginia, III, ed. Scribner,50-51. 45Lund Washingtonto GeorgeWashington, Feb. 29, 1776, in Papersof GeorgeWashington, ed. Abbot et al., III, 396. On the northernVirginians' protest, see Woody Holton and Michael McDonnell, "The Loudoun CountyUprising and theRevolution in Virginia,"typescript, 1997 (in MichaelMcDonnell's possession). William Henryto TheodorickBland, June 17, 1779, Bland FamilyPapers (Virginia Historical Society). For a sampleof thetimes when many small farmers turned out to fight,see McDonnell,"Politics of Mobilizationin Revolution- aryVirginia," chap. 7, esp. 246-49. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 967 tlemendid notenlist and exemptionsfrom service benefited the wealthy. Gilmer addressedmany of the complaints raised against the minute service, but he usually dismissedthem as frivolous.Those complaints, however, are key to understanding thementality ofthe small farmer during the revolutionary crisis. Dissatisfaction with theconditions and terms of military service was and continued to be a paramount factorin limiting small farmers' desire and willingness to fight. In thefirst place, small farmers wanted the burden of service equally distributed throughall ranksof society, with no exceptions.It was one thing to taketime away tofight, but it was another to do so whilewealthier neighbors stayed at home. Small farmers'commitment toa moreequal distribution ofmilitary service, first evidenced in theindependent companies' demand that reluctant gentlemen and othersjoin themin the common defense, can be seenin a relatedprotest. At the time when they refusedto join the minutemen, small farmers also remonstrated against the exemp- tionfrom military service, particularly in the now-compulsory militia, granted to overseers:a move designed to restoreorder and control on largerplantations where slaveswere agitating for their own independence, but one thatdirectly benefited wealthyplantation owners to thedisadvantage of theless wealthy. Small farmers fromLunenburg County felt that many wealthy slaveholders "are become Overseers thatotherways wou'd not, on purposeto Secure themselves from Fighting in defence oftheir Country as well as theirown property." Militia from Amelia County felt that thosewho had been exempted were not only "Strong healthy able bodied Men" but "Manyof them[were] possessed of ConsiderableProperty in Landsand Slaves." Classdifferences were prevalent in thecomplaints of militia units from Lunenburg andMecklenburg counties: Manyof your Petitioners are poor men with families that are Incapable of Sup- porti[ng][th]emselves without Our labour & Assistanceand we look up[on] it to be extremlyhard & noways [equatable or Just] that we Should be Obligedto leave ourFarms [in such a Situation]that if ever we Shou'd return again Wou'd find our Wives& Childrendispers'd up & downthe Country abeging, or at homeaSlav- ing,and at the same time quite unable to help them to the Necessaries oflife while theOverseers are aliving in ease & Affluence. Thepetitioners' words indicate, not a reluctancetofight, but a sensitivitytothe fair- nessof the terms on which they would fight.46

46Hening,ed., Statutes,IX, 28, 31, 89; "Petitionof Amelia County Militiamen," [May 23, 1776], in Revolu- tionaryVirginia, VI, ed. Tarter,236. For evidenceof a similarpetition from Chesterfield County, see ibid.,87. Proceedingsof the FifthVirginia Convention, June 4, 1776, ibid., 349; "Petitionof Inhabitantsof Lunenburg County,"[April 26, 1776], RevolutionaryVirginia: The Road toIndependence, vol. VI: TheTime for Decision, 1776, ed. RobertL. Scribner(Charlottesville, 1981), 474-77. The missingwords were supplied by a similarlyworded petitionfrom Mecklenburg County, May 13, 1776, RevolutionaryVirginia, VII, ed. Tarter,114-15. On thestruggle overexemptions of overseers,see Allan Kulikoff,"The AmericanRevolution, Capitalism, and the Formation of the Yeoman Classes,"in Beyondthe American Revolution, ed. Young, 80-119. Some plantersabused that exemption.Robert Carter asked the colonelof the militiaof WestmorelandCounty to takeRobert Mitchell off the listof militiamenrequired to musteras Carterwas designatinghim as an overseer(although Mitchell had enteredCarter's estate as a clerkand steward).Robert Carter to JohnA. Washington,Nov. 23, 1775, Robert CarterLetterbooks, vol. 3, RobertCarter Papers (Foundation Library, Colonial Williamsburg). 968 TheJournal of American History December1998

Small farmerswere further chagrined at the exemptionsgranted to foreigners, especiallymerchants. The ThirdVirginia Convention, reacting to thespirited activi- tiesof theindependent companies and anxiousnot to alienatea vocal,wealthy, and influentialsegment of society, recommended that all nativesof Great Britain residing in thecolony be treatedwith "lenity and friendship"and be exemptedfrom military service.Small farmers reacted vehemently. By marking out a moderateline, the con- ventionhoped to smoothover prevailing dissension, but the recommendationhad theopposite effect. Dale Benson,in his studyof committeeactions in 1775-1776, notesthat after the convention's resolution urging leniency and militaryexemptions forforeigners, "reports of renewedpersecutions of Scottishmerchants surfaced." RobertHonyman reported that the move was "generallydisapproved of bythe people, & servedto aggravatetheir ill will towardsforeigners." The inhabitantsof LunenburgCounty contended that the measure had "greatlyincreased" any "jealou- sies and distinctions"that had existedbefore and askedthat a testbe institutedto distinguishthe friendsof Americafrom her foes. Such grievancescontinued to be voicedand actedupon throughoutthe war. Surges of violent anti-Tory actions coin- cidedwith greater manpower demands, and theyusually came from below.47 Discontentwith the minuteservice was capped by theperception that many of eventhe Patriotgentry were not serving.Fielding Lewis reportedthat the minute servicewas failingbecause of "theyoung Gentlemen not settinga good exampleof inlisting."This impressionexacerbated complaints by smallerfarmers and led to proteststhat the minute service was "calculatedto exemptthe gentlemen and throw the whole burthenon the poor." Otherssaid thatinstead the "men of Fortune should bear the wholeweight of the war."Such concernsseemed to be endemic throughoutthe war. Indeed, even by the end of 1776, it had becomea common- place "objectionwhich many with us have of enteringthe service. . . thatas the Dangerof War approaches, men of Fortunerefuse to affordthat assistance, which is expectedfrom them." Such a perceptioncontinued to plague the war effortand helpedprecipitate an incipientrebellion in theNorthern Neck as aggrievedmilitia complained"that the Rich wanted the Poor to fightfor them, to defendthere property,whilst they refused to fightfor themselves."48 Withinthe minute service, small farmers were equally irritated by the belief that when the gentrydid take part in the new militaryservice, it was invariablyas appointedofficers. Gilmer took note that many "declare the Gentlemen have more at stakeand oughtto fightto protectit, but thatnone enterthe service but as offi-

47Scribner,ed., RevolutionaryVirginia, III, 490-92, 497; Benson, "Wealthand Powerin Virginia,"246; HonymanDiary, Jan. 2, 1776, f. 2-3; RobertL. Scribnerand BrentTarter, eds., Revolutionary Virginia: The Road to Independence,vol. V: The Clashof Arms and theFourth Convention, 1775-1776 (Charlottesville,1979), 157. See also ibid.,IV, 72-73, 142. On the timingof anti-Toryactions, see, forexample, a petitionfrom Caroline County,submitted during the militiacall-outs to counterthe 1781 Britishinvasion, in TheLetters and Papersof EdmundPendleton, 1734-1803, ed. David JohnMays (2 vols.,Charlottesville, 1967), I, 363-65. 48 Lewis to GeorgeWashington, Nov. 14, 1775, PennsylvaniaMagazine ofHistory and Biography,53 (Jan. 1929), 93; Gilmer,"Address of GeorgeGilmer to the Inhabitantsof Albemarle,"122-23; "VirginiaLegislative Papers,"Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography,18 (Jan. 1910), 29-3 1; "Proceedingsof a GeneralCourt Martialheld in LeedsTown," June 18, 1781, ExecutivePapers (Virginia State Library). Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 969 cers,"they being, it was said, "fond of officer's places." The gentry,frightened bythe potentialand real leveling in the independent companies, had reverted back to the tra- ditionalhierarchical military establishment with its attendant social role, which was, as RhysIsaac has demonstrated, "suffused with the sense that society is a rankedsys- temof dignity, honor, and obligation." In thatestablishment persons of high stand- ingserved as commissionedofficers, ornot at all. Now that rules and regulations had beenimposed and rigid discipline was expected, many of the gentry refused to "sub- mit"to "standingin theranks as commonsoldiers" as theyhad in theindependent companies.The viewof FrancisWillis of FrederickCounty seems typical. In July 1775 he wroteto RobertCarter that he had "no objectionto mySons Henrys entringinto the Service in thelowest as an Officer,from his own Behaviour then woulddepend his being advanced." However, he asserted,"I am absolutelyin the strongestTerms against his enlisting as a commonSoldier."49 To reestablishand reinforce that social role, the Virginia convention scrapped the electionof officers by the rank and file, replacing it byappointments based on rec- ommendationsmade by the county committees (which were generally dominated by thecounties' old rulingoligarchies). Convention members did so as partof their counterrevolutionagainst the anarchy of theindependent companies officered by electedmen. Not only did Virginia repudiate a factor that had clearly contributed to thesuccess of the earlier mobilization but it was almost alone among the colonies in eliminatingpopular elections of officers, at least at thecompany-grade level. Even in neighboringMaryland, the convention in December1774 had calledfor the reorganizationofthe old militiaand the election of new officers. The Virginiagen- try,however, frightened bythe example set by the independent companies, returned to thecarefully delineated and controlled world of the prerevolutionary militia.50 Whenthe gentry began to resurrectthe old-style militia along with the minutemen,there had been enough opposition that at least one county committee pleaded withits citizens to "suppressevery animosity among yourselves; pay obedience to Officersproperly appointed; let no Discontentson Accountof their Advancement interruptthe necessary Preparation; letHarmony dwell amongst you." The situation onlyworsened when the gentry finally and thoroughlyrepudiated the election of officersin plansfor the minutemen. One reportin fall1775, amid the poor recruit- ingfor the minute service, noted that the "Continental Spirit" was still present, but was"retarded by internal Divisions concerning the Mode of appointing Officers."51 Complaintsabout the appointment of officersin theminuteman service had reachedsuch a pitchthat Gilmer, who had beenappointed captain of a company fromAlbemarle, told his neighbors that he was"ready and willing to submitto the

49Gilmer,"Address of George Gilmerto the Inhabitantsof Albemarle,"122, 124; Isaac, Transformationof Virginia,105; FrancisWillis to RobertCarter, July 19, 1775, CarterFamily Papers (Virginia Historical Society). 50 RobertL. Scribner,ed., RevolutionaryVirginia: The Road toIndependence, vol. II: TheBreaking Storm and the ThirdConvention (Charlottesville, 1975), 374-75. On electionsof officersin othercolonies, see David J.Toscano, "A Shiftin Strategy:The Organizationof MilitaryStruggle," in Resistance,Politics, and theAmerican Struggle for Independence,1765-1775, ed. WalterH. ConserJr. et al. (Boulder,1986), 426, 430. 51 "Proceedingsof the Committeesof Safetyof Cumberlandand Isle of WightCounties," 15-16; Nov. 19- 20, 1775, entriesin PhilipVickers Fithian: Journal, 1775-1776, ed. Albionand Dodson, 133-34. 970 TheJournal of American History December1998 determinationofsuch as areor intend to becomeminute men, whether I shall con- tinueCaptain or become a commonsoldier." Intended to rousepopular enthusiasm and to countercriticism, Gilmer's willingness to makethis concession to thedis- gruntledissignificant. Gilmer may not have been unique in responding tohis neighbors'complaints and resistance.After internal struggles over the appointment of minutemanofficers, the Cumberland County Committee, when asked by the Fifth VirginiaConvention to send minutemen reinforcements andto "appoint... proper Officers"to leadthem, allowed their minutemen to "havethe Liberty of chusing" whichcaptain they would serve under of the three appointed, and "theirChoice" wasto becomethe "Sense" of the committee. Official policy, however, remained the sameand contributed greatly to the"backwardness" ofmilitary service after summer 1775.When a newcounty was created in summer1777, the state government made itsposition clear: "The Idea of the people having a Rightto elect the Militia Officers istotally inadmissable." In the fall of 1775, however, ordinary Virginians expressed their angerover the end of formal elections of officers bystaying out of the minutemen.52 Finally,the fact that the gentry would serve only if they served as officerswas par- ticularlygalling in lightof the reintroduction of"distinctions" in the service by way ofincreased pay for officers. Nobody had been paid in theindependent companies, butin thenew military establishment, everyone was paid on a graded,hierarchical scale.In theminute service, for example, privates were to get a shillingand a quarter perday when in service,whereas their captains were to receivesix shillings and their colonelsfifteen shillings per day. Many complained of thisdifference. When the minutemenwere first established, small farmers in LoudounCounty had com- plainedabout the officers' wages "being too high." When a full-scaleriot broke out in February1776, protesters inthat county then argued that "the pay of officers and Soldiersshould be thesame, or what would be stillbetter they should not be paidat all,there is no inducementfor a poorMan to Fight,for he hasnothing to defend." Gilmer'sneighbors similarly desired "no pay at all or officers,"and even the chair- manof the Sussex County Committee had to defend himself publicly before his own committeefor expressing "his disapprobation ofsome . . . ofthe proceedings ofthe lateconvention held at Richmond,particularly in regard to thewages of the officers ofthe intended forces to be raised."Those complaints reflected a social vision that wasfar more egalitarian than the gentry's.53 The issueof pay was inextricably tied to thedesire of ordinary Virginians to fight unrestrainedbyhierarchical distinctions and control.Immediately after noting the complaintsabout the pay structure, Gilmer asserted that his neighbors were desirous of"all marching promiscuously andon equalfooting as volunteers."Ultimately, small

52Gilmer, "Address of GeorgeGilmer to theInhabitants of Albemarle," 123-24, 125; Tarter,ed., Revolutionary Virginia,VII, 88; "Proceedingsof the Committeesof Safetyof Cumberlandand Isle of WightCounties," 37; H. R. McIlwaine,ed.,Journals ofthe Council ofthe State of Virginia, 1776-1788 (4 vols.,Richmond, 1931-1967), I, 491. 53Hening,Statutes, IX, 9-10, 21-23; LevenPowell to SallyPowell, Dec. 5, 1775, photocopy(Virginia Histori- cal Society).I would like to thankWoody Holton forthis reference. Lund Washingtonto GeorgeWashington, Feb. 29, 1776, in Papersof George Washington, ed. Abbotet al., III, 395-96; Gilmer,"Address of George Gilmer to theInhabitants of Albemarle," 126; Scribnerand Tarter,eds., Revolutionary Virginia, IV, 142. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 971 farmerswanted to fighton thesame terms as theyhad in theindependent companiesof onlya fewmonths before, when equality was at leastan ideal,and men marchedalongside their supposed superiors for no pay,but for patriotism. Gilmer couldnot understand the nature of his neighbors' complaints. When they protested thatthe new service was calculated to exemptthe "gentlemen" at the expense of the poor,Gilmer also looked to thepast to counterthem: "Did we notall indiscrimi- natelymix togetheras Volunteers;was thereever any partialityor distinction shewn?"54Yet if the freeholders and inhabitantsof Albemarleagreed with him on thispoint, there was an obviousquestion: Why must there be partialityand distinctionsin thenew service? Gentlementook a differentview. They considered a wide pay disparity vital to the maintenanceofhierarchy and thus of discipline. "Such as havebeen already in the service,"Gilmer explained, "must know that without some distinction there can be no subordination."Near the end of his address he beseechedhis neighbours to "pray [that]all would determine to be subordinateto thosein command.Without it, no disciplinecan be observed;'tis the life of an army."George Washington later argued thatdecent pay for officers was needed to preserve a distance between an officerand hismen. If the officer was in no way distinguished, hismen would "consider and treat himas an equal;and . . . regardhim no morethan a broomstick,being mixed togetheras one commonherd; [thus] no order,nor no disciplinecan prevail." CharlesLee, a formerBritish army officer, made the connectionbetween pay and "distinctions"more explicit. Petitioning Congress for an increasein officers'pay, he explained:"men who chuseto preservethe decent distance of officers,must have a decent subsistance,and withoutthis distanceno authorityor respectcan be expected."He thenordered his officersto "be particularin not associatingwith the Soldiersso faras to letthem Make use ofFamiliarity." The contrastbetween the ideal of equalitycelebrated in the independentcompanies a fewshort months before the "indiscriminatemixing"-and the inequalitynow demandedin the new militaryestablishment could not have been clearer to smallfarmers.55 The payissue was clearlyinterwoven with the gentry's attempts to reassertcontrol and authorityover the revolutionary movement when they could no longertake that commandfor granted. Indeed, Gilmer and others'emphasis on the need fordisci- pline,subordination, and hierarchyis yetanother sign of the dual purposeof the minuteservice.56 The gentrydesired an armycomposed of men differentfrom the membersof the mercenarybody thatthey opposed, yet a desireto maintain socialorder and a relianceon traditionalmeans of fighting meant that discipline and distinctionsin rankwere absolutely vital to thewar effort and ultimately,they felt, to the integrityof Virginiasociety. Ostensibly arguing that discipline was necessary

54Gilmer, "Address of George Gilmer to theInhabitants of Albemarle," 122, 126 (emphasisadded). 55Ibid.,126, 128; GeorgeWashington to the presidentof Congress,Sept. 24, 1776, in Writingsof George Washington,ed. Fitzpatrick,VI, 108-9, 110; CharlesLee to BenjaminRush, Oct. 10, [1775], Lee Papers,I, 212; "The OrderlyBook of theCompany of CaptainGeorge Stubblefield, Fifth Virginia Regiment," Virginia Histori- cal Society,Collections, new series, 6 (1887), 159. 56 Posturingand claimsto superioritywere given a new lease on lifein the militaryforces, but the middling sorthad becomesensitized to suchbehavior. See Greene,Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities,200-201. 972 TheJournal of American History December1998

to militarysuccess, the gentryand, in thisinstance, Gilmer also saw the need for social controlover the armedforces. Gilmer's choice of the word"promiscuously" suggeststhe lurking fear behind gentlemen's attempt to reestablisha clear hierarchy of commandand discipline. The contestover military service and the complaintsabout the minuteservice, then,reflected wider social issues. Though explicitly military concerns seem to be at the forefrontof mostof the gentry'sefforts to reformthe armedservices, implicit concernsfor the social order clearly influenced the way they reorganized the military establishment.And the reactionof smallfarmers, particularly in stayingout of the newforces, reinforced an internaland implicitchallenge. Efforts to mobilizethe popu- lationand thepeople's subsequent response indicate what both sides expected, or at leasthoped, from the process. Though the gentrywent into the conflicthoping that deference would secure theirauthority, they quickly turned to a greaterreliance on law and coercionto maintaincontrol. When the conflict began, the gentry fell back on a wishthat deferencewould be sufficientto rousepopular enthusiasm and to keepit undercontrol. Thus theyhad hoped in the independentcompanies to "infusea martialspirit of emulation"and to "exciteothers by our Example,"and in othermilitary matters, theyhoped forordinary Virginians' "implicit acquiescence and Concurrence,"as Cumberlandofficials put it, in whateverwas recommended.And, as Gilmernoted withregard to theminutemen, the gentry wanted and expectedordinary Virginians to "sacrificetheir own ease and intereststo theircountry's wellfare."57 The gentry, however,wanted them to makesacrifices on imposedterms, especially after they saw the consequencesof uncontrolledand uncheckedmilitarism in the independent companies.When appealsto publicvirtue and deferencefailed to keepsmall farmers in check,the gentry tried to reimposetheir authority through a traditionalmilitary establishmentthat reasserted the primacy of raw power. GeorgeGilmer first invoked a deferentialargument to justifythe need for distinc- tionsfor officers in theform of higherpay, asking whether "a thinking,considerate soldiersuffer a manwho he admires,whose commands animate him to action,to be no waysdistinguished?" Yet when officers were no longerelected by the men, "admi- ration"was hardlythe glue that bonded or "wedded""thinking men" to their"superiors."Rather, Gilmer betrayed the mentalitythat prevailed among the gentryin a curiousmetaphor that must have infuriatednumbers of his neighbors:"since time immemorialevery head or chiefhas had marksof distinction and certainemoluments abovethose under him. The Customis so prevalentwith ourselves that every planter allowshis Gang leadercertain indulgences and emolumentsabove the restof his slaves."58Gilmer could not have introduceda moreinappropriate analogy, particu- larlyin a colonyin whichapproximately 40 percentof the population were enslaved, providingsmall farmers with a constantreminder of what they were not supposed to be.

57Mason,"Fairfax County Militia Association," 210; Mason, "Remarkson AnnualElections for the Fairfax IndependentCompany," 229; "Proceedingsof the Committees of Safetyof Cumberland and Isle ofWight Coun- ties,"16-17; Gilmer,"Address of GeorgeGilmer to theInhabitants of Albemarle," 122-23, 125, 127. 58Gilmer, "Address of GeorgeGilmer to theInhabitants of Albemarle," 126. Mobilizationand PoliticalCulture in Virginia 973

GeorgeWashing-ton in the Uniform of a BritishColonial Colonel by Charles Wilison Peale, oil (1772). Paintedafter Washington's service as an officerin theprovincial army duringthe French and IndianWar but beforehe tookcommand of the Continentalarmy, this portrait is indicativeof Washington's earlypretensions to gentilityand supportfor a traditional hierarchicalmilitary establishment. Washington's views mayhave been shaped by his experienceswith insubordinateand independentbackcountry volunteersduring that war. CourtesyWashing-ton-Custis-Lee Collection, Washing-ton and Lee University,Lexington, Virginia. 974 TheJournal of American History December1998

It wasprecisely the inequality, subordination, dependence, and involuntaryser- viceinherent in slaverythat farmers were rallying against in themilitary. Small farm- ersrefused to comply,refused to actdeferentially, particularly when asked to make unequalsacrifices. They would serve, but not out of deference to whatthe gentry wanted,and only if they could do iton theirown terms. George Washington himself perhapsbest summed up theproblems in theclash of cultures between the gentry andyeomanry. Remonstrating against the idea of raising "volunteers" in Virginia a littlelater in thewar, Washington claimed that "Those who engage in Armsunder thatdenomination . . . areuneasy, impatient of Command,ungovernable; and, claimingto themselvesa sort of superior merit, generally assume, not only the Priv- iledgeof thinking, but to do as theyplease." In theirdemands for no differencesin pay,or no payat all,the inhabitants of Albemarle,Loudoun, and othercounties demandedjust that. They demanded, not just the "Priviledge" but theright "of thinking"and, while making sacrifices, ofdoing "as they please."59 Thus,the response to effortsto recruitfor the minute service demonstrated that resistanceto gentrymilitary policy was notover the objectives of mobilization resistancetoBritain-but over the means to thatend. Implicit in theresistance was a firmchallenge to the gentry's "revolutionary" vision, which was informed by a def- erentialand hierarchical political culture. Albert H. TillsonJr. has written about an "alternativepopular political culture" in theupper valley of Virginia, or thebackcountry.As mademanifest in themilitary organization of thecommunity, such a cultureemphasized a "preference forless hierarchical, more consensual styles of leadership."We can nowbegin to see a similar"alternative culture" among the small farmersofTidewater and Piedmont Virginia. Military preparations in 1775 and the subsequenthistory of wartime mobilization reveal a coherentpattern in smallfarmers'expectations and demands. They too wished for less hierarchy and subordination andmore democratic, orat least consensual, modes of organization. Moreover, small farmersconsistently demonstrated their commitment to "fare play," as oneirate Pied- montcarpenter-farmer laterput it-not onlyequality within the service but also a fair distributionofthe burden of service through all ranksof society. If these demands werenot met, ordinary Virginians could simply refuse to serve,as theydid in the minutemen,forcing the gentry to recognizethat they could not take unquestioning anddeferential popular support for granted.60

The failureof the minutemen inVirginia had important consequences, both in the militaryshort run and the political long run. Militarily, the refusal of small farmers to enterinto the minute service in theexpected numbers left the colony defenseless,

59 GeorgeWashington to PatrickHenry, April 13, 1777, in Writingsof George Washington, ed. Fitzpatrick,VII, 407-9. 60Tillson, "Militia and PopularPolitical Culture in theUpper Valley of Virginia," 306. See alsoTillson, Gentry and CommonFolk, chaps. 3-5. The commentabout "fareplay" was made in the heat of an incidentover the apprehensionof a deserter."Information," Oct. 6, 1777, box 1, 1770s-, SuitPapers, Cumberland County Court Records(Virginia State Library). Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 975 threatened,and in the"greatest confusion" at thevery moment when Governor Dunmorelaunched his counteroffensive in the Hampton Roads and Norfolk region and officiallyproclaimed all slaveswho would join with him against their masters free.In a panic,the gentry effectively scrapped the minuteman plan in theDecem- ber1775 convention and instead asked Congress to accept and pay for six more bat- talionsof regularfull-time troops. Indeed, contrary to theidea thatthe minute servicewas scrapped because of the need for more regular troops to meetWashing- ton'sdemands farther north, the gentry pleaded with Congress to authorizeand to payfor more regular troops because the minutemen had failedto attractsufficient citizen-soldiersto defend the colony. The newprofessional troops raised were not sentnorth; they were stationed around the frontiers ofVirginia, in a defensivepos- turewith full-time pay. Thus they were literally to takethe place of the minutemen butwere paid by Congress and composed of the "lower sort" who would serve full timeand for regular pay.6' The gentrythus abandoned the ideological ideal of the citizen-soldier and turned toa moretraditional force of paid professional troops, and to a moretraditional pool of people-the "poor,the unemployed, and theunlucky," the young, men "who couldbest be spared,and will be mostserviceable," or, in thewords of one ofthe gentry,"those Lazy fellows who lurk about and are pests to Society"-offeringeco- nomicincentives inreturn for disciplined and obeisant service. The gentry turned to thesame kind of men they had relied on to do thefighting in theunpopular French andIndian War in an effortto keepthe politically active middling sort out of the conflict.Thus small farmers' refusal to actas thegentry asked at a criticalmoment in the warshaped the contours of Virginia's military policy for the duration of the war.62 Subsequently,even the lower sort were able to resist and manipulate gentry efforts toprosecute the war with their labor. Persistent and violent resistance to attemptsto raisea full-timeregular army also forcedleaders to adoptdestructive inflationary measuresand seriously frustrated mobilization. Indeed, until the war moved south in 1780-1781, the gentry had to rely mainly on largebounties and material induce- mentsto getmen to servein thearmy. Such policies contributed immeasurably to thehorrendous inflation that plagued Virginia's wartime economy. At the height of theirinflationary problems, in 1779,Edmund Pendleton reported that the men enlistedin thearmy had cost"on an Averageof ?5000, each,besides the public

61Lewisto GeorgeWashington, Nov. 14, 1775, PennsylvaniaMagazine of Historyand Biography,53 (Jan. 1929), 93; Hening,ed., Statutes,IX, 86, 89,139; Scribnerand Tarter,eds., Revolutionary Virginia, V, 190-91. On thestruggle over the addition of Virginia's new troopsto theContinental establishment, the situation in Virginia in fall 1775, and Dunmore'sproclamation, see Selby,Revolution in Virginia,58-79; and JohnRobert Sellers, "The VirginiaContinental Line, 1775-1780" (Ph.D. diss.,Tulane University, 1968), 54-63. 62Titus,Old Dominionat War,45; Hening,Statutes, IX, 275-80; EdmundPendleton to WilliamWoodford, June28, 1777, in Lettersand Papersof Edmund Pendleton, ed. Mays,I, 215; JohnChilton to his brother[Charles Chilton?],Aug. 11, 1777, in KeithFamily of Woodburn, Fauquier County, Papers (Virginia Historical Society); HonymanDiary, Aug. 29, 1777, if. 154-56. Studiesof recruitsfrom 1776 and laterin thewar confirm this pat- tern.See RichardC. Bush,"'Awake, Rouse Your Courage, Americans Brave': Companies Raised in Northumber- land Countyfor the Virginia Continental Line, 1776 and 1777," Bulletinof the Northumberland County Historical Society29 (1992), 7- 10; JohnVanAtta, "Conscription in RevolutionaryVirginia: The Case of CulpeperCounty, 1780-1781," VirginiaMagazine offHistory and Biography,92 (July1984), 279; and JosephA. Goldenberget al., "RevolutionaryRanks: An Analysisof theChesterfield Supplement," ibid., 87 (April1979), 182-89. 976 TheJournal of American History December1998 bountyof a hogsheadof tobacco." This was, he concluded, "a sumwhich at anyrate ofdepreciation must exceed the ability of any Countrey frequently to repeat."63 The gentrythus paid a highprice to keep the middling sort out of the war. In themilitary crises of 1780and 1781,when the Virginia Assembly was forced to implementa more universal draft policy that targeted the middling as wellas the lowersort, resistance to military service on thegentry's terms-once again became widespread.Pressure from below thoroughly disabled enforced mobilization in 1780 and 1781.Draft laws collapsed under the weight of "violent and riotous" behavior andthe threat thereof, although ordinary Virginians again turned out as volunteers inmore local skirmishes when necessary. Against mandatory laws Virginians reacted withevasive and resistance tactics; Friedrich, baron von Steuben, summed the situa- tionup in disgust:"The oppositionmade to thelaw in somecounties, the entire neglectof it in others, and an unhappydisposition to evadethe fair execution of it in all afforda verymelancholy prospect."64 As Steuben'scomments indicate, such opposition also contributed to a growing localism.The extentand violence of protests was often mitigated by local officials' refusalfully to executestate laws. Recognizing that they would provoke confronta- tionif they carried out the laws, many local officials chose to ignore, evade, or adapt statelaws when they felt it was in theinterest of the community at the county level. Thuslocal county institutions and officials gained in authorityat the expense of the stategovernment, and an incipientsense of localism was strengthened. Problemsover mobilization, however, also politicized small farmers. The farmers' frustrationspilled over into other, more political realms. Called upon to make sacrifices forthe Patriot cause, ordinary Virginians demanded a say in how that cause should be run.At the very least, the new military establishment caused bad feelings between the gentryand middling farmers. In hisefforts to recruitfor the minute service, Gilmer hadlabored under "censure and illiberal abuse" and was subject to "ungenteelreflec- tions"and "infamousaspersions." More seriously, Gilmer thought that efforts were beingmade among his neighbors to"delude the populace, to raise factions, orestablish parties."A worried Gilmer told his neighbors that if they did not like the minuteman plan,they should not resist it but get the laws changed. The convention, he reminded them,was the only method they had "of getting the voice of the people," and thus "if yourdelegates should proceed in a mannerthat you think unjustifiable, take care to electbetter men." There is evidence that small farmers did exactly that.65 Evenbefore the next elections for convention members, small farmers got an opportunityto demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the revolutionary government and itsmanpower policy. Elections for the county committees of safety,previously unregulated,were set for November 1775.66 During the elections, other issues con-

63Pendleton to JamesMadison, Sept. 25, 1779, in Lettersand PapersofEdmundPendleton, ed. Mays,I, 308-9. 64 "Representationof the Stateof theVirginia Line," enclosure in Friedrich,baron von Steuben,to Jefferson, May 28, 1781, in Papersof ThomasJefferson, ed. Boyd,VI, 31. 65 Gilmer,"Address of GeorgeGilmer to theInhabitants of Albemarle," 115, 121-22. 66 The ThirdVirginia Convention had providedthat "freeholders" who wereentitled to votefor burgesses were eligibleto elect"annually twenty-one of the most discreet, fit, and able men"to serveas a committee.Hening, ed., Statutes,IX, 53-60; Scribnerand Tarter,eds., Revolutionary Virginia, IV, 206. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 977 tributedto discontent,such as saltshortages, British depredations, and pressure on tenants,but military policy was foremost in theminds of small farmers. The result wasupheaval. One leadingscholar of the committees, Dale Benson,concludes that in countiesfor which data are available, "the local elite suffered a deflation of its authorityeven though it retainedabsolute power." In mostcounty committee elec- tionsin November1775, Benson asserts, "planters who were dropped [from their previouspositions on thecommittees] were of prominentfamilies and possessed largeestates while those who were added were middling planters whose social pedi- greewas mediocreor non-existent."67 OrdinaryVirginians' politicization in the independent companies and the protest againstthe minutemen also help explain the popularity ofThomas Paine's Common Sense,which appeared shortly after the minuteman fiasco. Events in Virginia in 1775 mayhave created fertile soil for a pamphletthat urged not just independence from Britainbut also the creation of a newand far more democratic government. Although Paine'spamphlet was original, its fundamentals expressed what people were already thinking.The popularsovereignty and egalitarianism that small farmers in Virginia had calledfor in theirmilitary organization and in theirprotests over bearing the burdenof the war were endorsed in Paine's Common Sense, which did more than any otherdocument to equateindependence and republicanismin the minds of the Americanpeople. At the very least, most ordinary Virginians believed that indepen- dencewould give them a greaterrole in affairsof state. Virginians reported Common Sensemade a "greatnoise" and helped "subvert all Kingly Governments and erect an IndependentRepublic." Even Landon Carter, who detested Paine's pamphlet and was hesitantabout independence, was forcedto admitthat "there is abundance talkedabout independency ... itis allfrom Mr Common Sense."68 Suchfeelings found an outletin April 1776, when an electionwas held for dele- gatesto a newgeneral convention, the first since the previous spring. Years later, EdmundRandolph recalled that the election of delegates for that convention, which ultimatelydecided on secession,"depended in very many, if not in a majority,ofthe countiesupon the candidates pledging themselves . . . tosever . .. thecolonies from GreatBritain." Many incumbents who refused to endorse independence were turned out.As thefirst results came in, Josiah Parker, a young convention member, recently appointedmajor in theContinental Army, wrote: "Our freeholders all Mad, deter- minedto have a Newhouse altogether." Robert Brent, a Northern Neck planter, too notedthe general turmoil in theelection: "For many counties there has been warm contestsfor seats in ourApproaching convention. Many new ones are got in." Alto- gether,forty-eight seats, or 38.1 percentof the convention, changed from the fourth tothe fifth meeting, the largest turnover ina Virginialegislature since 1758 (another wartimeelection). In a colonyunused to contested elections and legislative turnover,

67Kulikoff, Tobacco and Slaves,307-8; Benson,"Wealth and Powerin Virginia,"303-9. 68Jan.22, 26, 1776, entriesin Journalof Nicholas Cresswell, 136; March 12, 28, 1776, entriesin Diary of LandonCarter, ed. Greene,II, 999, 1006. On theimpact of CommonSense in Virginia,see Holton and McDon- nell,"Loudoun County Uprising." 978 TheJournal of American History December1998 particularlyinthe run-up to rebellion, these results were significant, and they caused anxietyamongst the gentry.69 Certainly,military issues were at the forefrontof manyof the contests.Landon Carterwas disgustedto hearthat one man was electedafter he had exclaimed"agst the Patrollinglaw, because a poor man was made to pay forkeeping a richmans Slavesin order."Another delegate "actually in a mostseditious manner, resisted the draughtingthe Militia by lot, to be readyfor any immediate local emergency;and he gotfirst returned that way." Echoing the concerns of such members of thegentry as Gilmerand Washingtonover the "independence"of thevolunteers, Carter feared thatthe popular feeling was foran independencedefined as "a formof Government, thatby being independt of the rich men eve[r]y man would then be able to do as he pleasd"-an "independence,"he confidedin his diary,"in whichno Gentleman shouldhave the least share." It was withthis "expectation," he lamented,that "they sentthe men they did, in hopesthey would plan such a form."It was thisconvention thatinstructed Virginia's delegates in Congressto proposethat the thirteen colonies declareindependence and thatbegan to framea new,republican, government.70 Yet the politicsof mobilizationdid not end withindependence. Persistent and widespreadresistance to gentrypolicy not onlyshaped the contoursof legislation introducedduring the war years but also promptedordinary Virginians to taketheir grievancesto thepolls. During the war years a highrate of legislative turnover, most oftencoinciding with unpopular mobilization policies, especially draft laws, continued to markVirgihia politics, as "thepeople interest themselves in Electionsat this timemore than ever." By 1780, manygentry were complaining that the assembly was fullof "menof mean abilities& no rank"or too many"ignorant or obscure" men and "factiousbawling" fellows.71 Such changesin the assemblymay explain why new mobilizationlaws weighedheavily on the wealthy,culminating in an attemptin late 1780, narrowlydefeated, to take everytwentieth slave from those owningtwenty or moreslaves, to offeras bountyfor new recruits instead of institut- ing a draft.One legislatorcommented that the principle upon whichthe plan was proposedwas that"Negroes were a desireableProperty, and it wouldbe obligingto theWealthy, who performlittle personal duty, to contributelargely." Joseph Jones, an assemblydelegate from King George County and James Monroe's uncle, thought

69 EdmundRandolph, History of Virginia, ed. ArthurH. Shaffer(Charlottesville, 1970), 234; JosiahParker to Landon Carter,April 14, 1776, Sabine Hall Papers;Robert Brent to R. H. Lee, April28, 1776, in Lee Family Papers,ed. Paul P. Hoffman(microfilm, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, 1966); Scribner,ed., Revo- lutionaryVirginia, VI, 287-91. On the relativelyquiet prerevolutionaryelections, see John G. Kolp, "The Dynamicsof Electoral Competition in Pre-RevolutionaryVirginia," William and MaryQuarterly, 49 (Oct. 1992), 652-74. 70LandonCarter to GeorgeWashington, May 9, 1776, in Papersof GeorgeWashington, ed. Abbot et al., IV, 236-37, 240-41; May 1, 1776, entryin Diary ofLandon Carter,ed. Greene,II, .1031. For the suggestionthat smallfarmers' demand for independence, combined with the gentry's fear of "disorders"-including thosecreated bythe independent companies and by resistanceto theminutemen-pushed the gentry into this unforeseen decision,see Holton,Forced Founders, esp. partIII. 71 HonymanDiary, April 15, July4, 1780, ff.395, 414; GeorgeMason, "Remarkson the ProposedBill for Regulatingthe Elections of theMembers of the General Assembly," [June 1, 1780], in Papersof George Mason, ed. Rutland,II, 629-31, 631 -32n. On legislativeturnover in thelate war years and mobilizationpolicy, see McDon- nell,"Politics of Mobilizationin RevolutionaryVirginia," chap. 4. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 979

that,though the scheme "bears hard upon thosewealthy in Negroes,"it had a fight- ingchance in theassembly because "a greatpart of our House arenot of that Class or ownso fewof them as notto comewithin the Law shod.it pass."Though that plan was defeated,it was agreedthat any new recruitwould be givena land bountyand either?60 in specieor a slaveupon thetermination of his service-but not before theassembly debated an inflammatoryproposal to makethe wealthy alone pay for all monetarybounties given to newrecruits.72 Such legislativechanges and theireffect on wartimepolicy have often been over- looked becauseby the end of thewar the compositionof the assemblyresembled thatof the prewarlegislature. But the turmoilof the war yearsmight also help explainan anomalyin postwarstate politics. It is generallyrecognized that, with few exceptions,the same men who governedcolonial Virginia and dominatedthe legisla- turewere also in chargein thepostwar period.73 If thewar was so damagingto the politicalculture of the new state,why were the effectsnot immediatelyevident in thelegislature? If ordinaryVirginians were so throughlydissatisfied with the prose- cutionof thewar and thegentry's conception of thesocial order, why were so few leadersturned out ofthe legislature and keptout? Partof the answerlies in anotheracknowledged but littleunderstood change in Virginiapolitics in thepostwar period. The prewarpolitical consensus that had prevailed among elitesvanished after the war. One recentstudy concludes that the "moststriking thing about Virginia politics in the postwarperiod is thatthe har- monyso characteristicofthe prewar years is completelyabsent," a contrastmade all the "morearresting" because of the continuityof membership.74Postwar Virginia was a changedplace, and gentlemenas wellas thelower and middlingsorts thought differentlyabout the politicalculture in whichthey lived, at the local, state,and nationallevels. The upheavalof thewar years goes far in explainingthis transformation. Because scholarshave generally failed to recognizeboth the tremendous outburst of popular discontentin Virginiaduring the war and the natureof thatdiscontent, they have overlookedthe results of suchdiscontent. Protest, defiance, and theturnover in the legislaturein themidyears of the war, though temporary, not only opened up a tradi- tionallyclosed sphere of politicsto a widerrange of menbut also musthave shaken the leadinggentry's confidence in the powerof deferenceto securevotes. Postwar politicsshowed a moveaway from deferential politics and marked"the beginnings

72Undated bill, LegislativeDepartment, Rough Bills (VirginiaState Library). I would like to thankBrent Tarterfor this reference. Thomas Madison to WilliamPreston, Nov. 30, 1780, PrestonPapers (Virginia Historical Society);Joseph Jones to James Madison, Nov. 10, 18, 24, Dec. 2, 8, 1780, in Papersofjames Madison, ed. Hutch- insonand Rachal,II, 168, 182-83, 185, 198, 218-19, 232; Hening,ed., Statutes,X, 326-37; Journalof the House ofDelegates, Nov. 10, 1780,Jan. 1781 (VirginiaState Library). 73See, forexample, Selby, Revolution in Virginia,318; and Sloan and Onuf,"Politics, Culture, and theRevolu- tion in Virginia,"280. For contemporarycomments on the returnof elitedominance, see Pendletonto James Madison,April 16, 1781, in Lettersand Papersof Edmund Pendleton, ed. Mays, I, 350, 350n2; and St. George Tuckerto Bland,May 2, 1782, in TheBland Papers: Being a Selectionfrom the Manuscripts of Colonel Theodorick Bland,Jr., ed. CharlesCampbell (2 vols.,Petersburg, Va., 1840- 1843), II, 79. 74Sloan and Onuf,"Politics, Culture, and theRevolution in Virginia,"280. 980 TheJournal of American History December1998 of sustainedconflict between legislative factions over public policy, and of issue- orientedappeals to constituents."75 Thoughthe long-term consequences ofresistance are difficult tomeasure, a more responsivelegislature may have been a resultof theyears of challengeduring the RevolutionaryWar. The gentrylearned valuable lessons about the expectations and demandsof theirless wealthy neighbors, and afterthe war they were far more responsive.They were less likely to put their self-defined interests above the concerns oftheir constituents. The gentrybecame far less reluctant to jeopardizeprovincial, evennational, harmony and consensus for the sake of more local issues in thepost- warperiod. If they had ignored the concerns of their neighbors before the war, they didso at theirown peril afterward. Alfred F. Young has argued that the "ghosts" of DanielShays, Abraham Yates, and Thomas Paine were a radicalpresence in Philadel- phiaduring the framing ofthe Constitution; so too the memory of small-farmer war- timeresistance haunted Virginia's leaders during the early national period, reminding themwhere the limits of their authority truly rested.76 Thusthe apparently placidity of the revolutionary years in Virginianeeds to be reassessed.Small farmers left an indeliblemark on thecourse and direction of the rev- olutionarymovement inVirginia that is notalways apparent in the letters and diaries ofthe state's leading gentry. In Virginia,both the middling and lowersorts used thewar in differentways, at differenttimes, in differentplaces, to maketheir voices heard,to manipulate gentry attitudes and policies and to change the patterns of social interactionand political culture in thenew state subtly but profoundly. Though here thefocus has been on theminuteman service and the middling sort, closer attention to theexperiences ofall Virginians during the war promises rich rewards, as similar effortdoes on thenational front. Ultimately, the voices of those people whom elites livedwith, listened to, and often struggled against must be recoveredand thoroughly reexaminedifwe are to advance further our understanding ofpolitical and social rela- tionsin eighteenth-centuryVirginia and throughout the new republic. Indeed,as historianshave shown, all acrossthe colonies and new states, internal conflictand socialupheaval made resistance and rebelliona dual revolution,and

75Ibid.,279. See also NormanK. Risjord,Chesapeake Politics, 1781-1800 (New York,1978); NormanK. Ris- jord,"How the 'Common Man' Votedin Jefferson'sVirginia," in America:The Middle Period; Essays in Honorof BernardMayo, ed. JohnB. Boles (Charlottesville,1973), 36-64; and JacksonT. Main, "Sectionsand Politicsin Virginia,1781-1787," Williamand Mary Quarterly,12 (Jan. 1955), 96-112. See also StevenJames Sarson, "Wealth,Poverty, and Labor in theTobacco PlantationSouth: PrinceGeorge's County, Maryland, in the Early NationalEra" (Ph.D. diss.,Johns Hopkins University,1998). Though it arrivedtoo late forfull consideration here,Sarson's thorough and thoughtfulstudy promises to challengehistoriographical paradigms concerning the yeomanfarmer in theearly republic and suggeststhat any gains made by ordinaryVirginians during the Revolu- tionmay have been temporary or moreideological/cultural than social/economic. 76See AlfredF. Young,"The Framersof the Constitutionand the 'Genius' of the People,"Radical History Review(no. 42, 1988), 8-18. Popularupheaval may have had effectson Virginia'snational leaders. For specula- tionon the consequencesof anti-Federalistpopulism for political society in theearly republic, see Saul Cornell, "AristocracyAssailed: The Ideologyof BackcountryAnti-Federalism," Journal of American History, 76 (March 1990), 1171-72. See also Ronald P. Formisano,"Teaching Shays / the Regulation: Historiographical Problems as Tools forLearning," Common Sense (no. 106, Winter1998), 24-35; and Shy,People Numerous andArmed, 213- 63. Shyoffered suggestive thoughts on thepostwar national legacy of thearmed conflict, but his call forresearch on theimpact and consequencesof thewar has stillnot been answeredcomprehensively. Mobilizationand Political Culture in Virginia 981 neverwas this more apparent and dramatic than during the armed conflict itself. In all thecolonies, the varied experiences ofthe middling and lower sorts in themili- taryand theirvaried outcomes-not always positive-brought revolutionary change.The Minutemen of Massachusetts went to war to retain their traditional way oflife and endedup transformedbyparticipation in the war. In Pennsylvaniathe mostradical gains were made, as thelower sort in Philadelphiawere mobilized and politicizedand used their new bargaining power to affectpolitics and constitution making.Militia in backcountryPennsylvania, however, used the Revolution to pro- tectand expandtheir family farms and to intensifya racially motivated war with neighboringNative Americans. Throughout the coloniesand new states,many pooreror younger whites and blacks joined local forces or the Continental Army in thehope of securing a steady income or a propertiedstake in the new republic, while broadeningtheir social and political horizons.77 Yet despite the labors of an expand- inggroup of social-military historians, we still have much work to do in linkingthe wartimeexperience of ordinaryAmericans, men and women,black, white, and NativeAmerican, both in and out of the military, with the social and political devel- opmentsof the period. Wherever the net has been cast so far,it is clearthat while resistanceand rebellion may have resulted in a warfor independence, social conflict andinternal upheaval made for a revolutionarywar that profoundly changed Ameri- cansociety.

77See Gross,Minutemen and TheirWorld; Rosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class;Knouff, "'Arduous Service"'; and EdwardC. Papenfuseand GregoryA. Stiverson,"General Smallwood's Recruits: The PeacetimeCareer of the RevolutionaryWar Private," William andMary Quarterly,30 (Jan.1973), 117-32.