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Attacking from Inside
WIPER MALWARE: ATTACKING FROM INSIDE Why some attackers are choosing to get in, delete files, and get out, rather than try to reap financial benefit from their malware. AUTHORED BY VITOR VENTURA WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MARTIN LEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY from system impact. Some wipers will destroy systems, but not necessarily the data. On the In a digital era when everything and everyone other hand, there are wipers that will destroy is connected, malicious actors have the perfect data, but will not affect the systems. One cannot space to perform their activities. During the past determine which kind has the biggest impact, few years, organizations have suffered several because those impacts are specific to each kinds of attacks that arrived in many shapes organization and the specific context in which and forms. But none have been more impactful the attack occurs. However, an attacker with the than wiper attacks. Attackers who deploy wiper capability to perform one could perform the other. malware have a singular purpose of destroying or disrupting systems and/or data. The defense against these attacks often falls back to the basics. By having certain Unlike malware that holds data for ransom protections in place — a tested cyber security (ransomware), when a malicious actor decides incident response plan, a risk-based patch to use a wiper in their activities, there is no management program, a tested and cyber direct financial motivation. For businesses, this security-aware business continuity plan, often is the worst kind of attack, since there is and network and user segmentation on top no expectation of data recovery. -
APT and Cybercriminal Targeting of HCS June 9, 2020 Agenda
APT and Cybercriminal Targeting of HCS June 9, 2020 Agenda • Executive Summary Slides Key: • APT Group Objectives Non-Technical: managerial, strategic • APT Groups Targeting Health Sector and high-level (general audience) • Activity Timeline Technical: Tactical / IOCs; requiring • TTPs in-depth knowledge (sysadmins, IRT) • Malware • Vulnerabilities • Recommendations and Mitigations TLP: WHITE, ID#202006091030 2 Executive Summary • APT groups steal data, disrupt operations, and destroy infrastructure. Unlike most cybercriminals, APT attackers pursue their objectives over longer periods of time. They adapt to cyber defenses and frequently retarget the same victim. • Common HPH targets include: • Healthcare Biotechnology Medical devices • Pharmaceuticals Healthcare information technology • Scientific research • HPH organizations who have been victim of APT attacks have suffered: • Reputational harm Disruption to operations • Financial losses PII/PHI and proprietary data theft • HC3 recommends several mitigations and controls to counter APT threats. TLP: WHITE, ID#202006091030 3 APT Group Objectives • Motivations of APT Groups which target the health sector include: • Competitive advantage • Theft of proprietary data/intellectual capital such as technology, manufacturing processes, partnership agreements, business plans, pricing documents, test results, scientific research, communications, and contact lists to unfairly advance economically. • Intelligence gathering • Groups target individuals and connected associates to further social engineering -
Gothic Panda Possibly Used Doublepulsar a Year Before The
Memo 17/05/2019 - TLP:WHITE Gothic Panda possibly used DoublePulsar a year before the Shadow Brokers leak Reference: Memo [190517-1] Date: 17/05/2019 - Version: 1.0 Keywords: APT, DoublePulsar, China, US, Equation Group Sources: Publicly available sources Key Points Gothic Panda may have used an Equation Group tool at least one year before the Shadow Brokers leak. It is unknown how the threat group obtained the tool. This is a good example of a threat actor re-using cyber weapons that were originally fielded by another group. Summary According research conducted by Symantec, the Chinese threat actor known as Gothic Panda (APT3, UPS, SSL Beast, Clandestine Fox, Pirpi, TG-0110, Buckeye, G0022, APT3) had access to at least one NSA-associated Equation Group tool a year before they were leaked by the Shadow Brokers threat actor. On April 14, 2017, a threat actor called the Shadow Brokers released a bundle of cyber-attack tools purportedly coming from the US NSA, also referred to as the Equation Group. Among the released material there was the DoublePulsar backdoor implant tool, which was used alongside EternalBlue in the May 2017 destructive WannaCry attack. DoublePulsar is a memory-based kernel malware that allows perpetrators to run arbitrary shellcode payloads on the target system. It does not write anything on the hard drive and will thus disappear once the victim machine is rebooted. Its only purpose is to enable dropping other malware or executables in the system. According to Symantec, Gothic Panda used the DoublePulsar exploit as early as in 2016, a full year before the Shadow Brokers release. -
Bluekeep Update 12/05/2019
BlueKeep Update 12/05/2019 Report #: 201912051000 Agenda • What is BlueKeep • Timeline of BlueKeep • BlueKeep Today • Initial Attempts to Exploit BlueKeep • Why Initial Attempts Failed • BlueKeep Tomorrow • Mitigations • Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) • HC3 Contact Information • References Slides Key: Non-Technical: managerial, strategic and high-level (general audience) Technical: Tactical / IOCs; requiring in-depth knowledge (sysadmins, IRT) TLP: WHITE, ID# 201912051000 2 What is BlueKeep • BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) • Vulnerability in Microsoft’s (MS) Remote Desktop Protocol • Grants hackers full remote access and code execution on unpatched machines • No user interaction required • Essential owns the machine, malicious actor can do as they please • Affects: Windows XP, 7, Server 2003, Server 2008, and Server 2008 R2 • Deja Blue(Related BlueKeep Vulnerabilities) affects: Windows 8, 10, and all older windows versions • EternalBlue affects: Server Message Block version 1 (SMBv1) • “Wormable” meaning it has the ability to self propagate (think WannaCry level of damage) • MS, NSA, DHS, many other security vendors released advisories and warning on this exploit TLP: WHITE, ID# 201912051000 3 BlueKeep Timeline Metasploit Team Microsoft Released Patch: DHS Tested a Working BlueKeep Scanner Significant Uptick in Releases BlueKeep Coin Miner Exploit CVE-2019-0708 Exploit Against W2000 Discovered in Malicious RDP Activity Exploit Module BlueKeep Vulnerability Watchdog Malware 34 Days (Private Exploit) 70 Days (Semi-Public Exploit) 115 Days (Public -
Threat Landscape Report – 1St Quarter 2018
TLP-AMBER Threat Landscape Report – 1st Quarter 2018 (FINAL) V1.0 – 10/04/2018 This quarterly report summarises the most significant direct cyber threats to EU institutions, bodies, and agencies (EU-I or 'Constituents') in Part I, the development of cyber-threats on a broader scale in Part II, and recent technical trends in Part III. KEY FINDINGS Direct Threats • In Europe, APT28 / Sofacy threat actor (likely affiliated to Russia military intelligence GRU) targeted government institutions related to foreign affairs and attendees of a military conference. Another threat actor, Turla (likely affiliated to Russia’s security service FSB) executed a cyber-operation against foreign affairs entities in a European country. • A spear-phishing campaign that targeted European foreign ministries in the end of 2017 was attributed to a China-based threat actor (Ke3chang) which has a long track record of targeting EU institutions (since 2011). As regards cyber-criminality against EU institutions, attempts to deliver banking trojans are stable, ransomware activities are still in decline and cryptojacking on the rise. Phishing lures involve generic matters (’invoice’, ‘payment’, ‘purchase’, ‘wire transfer’, ‘personal banking’, ‘job application’) and more specific ones (foreign affairs issues, European think tanks matters, energy contracts, EU delegation, EU watch keeper). Almost all EU-I are affected by credential leaks (email address | password) on pastebin-like websites. Several credential- harvesting attempts have also been detected. Attackers keep attempting to lure EU-I staff by employing custom methods such as spoofed EU-I email addresses or weaponisation of EU-I documents. Broader Threats • Critical infrastructure. In the energy sector, the US authorities have accused Russian actors of targeting critical infrastructure (including nuclear) for several years and are expecting this to continue in 2018. -
31 July 2020
FINANCIAL REPORTING AUTHORITY (CAYFIN) Delivery Address: th Mailing Address: 133 Elgin Ave, 4 Floor P.O. Box 1054 Government Administrative Building Grand Cayman KY1-1102 Grand Cayman CAYMAN ISLANDS CAYMAN ISLANDS Direct Tel No. (345) 244-2394 Tel No. (345) 945-6267 Fax No. (345) 945-6268 Email: [email protected] Financial Sanctions Notice 31/07/2020 Cyber-Attacks Introduction 1. Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 (“the Regulation”) imposing financial sanctions against Cyber- Attacks has been amended so that an asset freeze now applies to the persons listed in the Annex to this Notice. Notice summary (Full details are provided in the Annex to this Notice) 2. The 9 entries listed in the Annex to this notice have been added to the consolidated list and are now subject to an asset freeze. What you must do 3. You must: i. check whether you maintain any accounts or hold any funds or economic resources for the persons set out in the Annex to this Notice; ii. freeze such accounts, and other funds or economic resources; iii. refrain from dealing with the funds or assets or making them available (directly or indirectly) to such persons unless licensed by the Governor; iv. report any findings to the FRA at [email protected] , together with any additional information that would facilitate compliance with the Regulation; v. provide any information concerning the frozen assets of designated persons to the FRA at [email protected] by completing and submitting a Compliance Reporting Form (CRF). Information reported to FRA may be passed on to other regulatory authorities or law enforcement. -
Press Release
31 July 2020 NOTICE RE: Financial Sanctions 1. The Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (“CIMA”) hereby notifies you that it has received a new Notice from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, HM Treasury (“OFSI”), which is attached as an Annex to this Notice. 2. What you must do: A. In the case of an addition or amendment of a person to the Consolidated List and asset freeze: i. Check whether you maintain any accounts or hold any funds or economic resources for the persons set out in the OFSI Notice; ii. Freeze any such accounts and other funds or economic resources. iii. Refrain from dealing with the funds or assets or making them available (directly or indirectly) to such persons unless licensed by the Governor. iv. Report any findings to the Financial Reporting Authority (“FRA”) at [email protected] together with any additional information that would facilitate compliance with the relevant legislative requirements. v. Provide any information concerning the frozen assets of designated persons to the FRA at [email protected] and submitting a compliance reporting form. Information reported to FRA may be passed to other regulatory authorities or law enforcement. B. In the case of the removal of a person from the Consolidated List and unfreezing of assets i. Check whether you have frozen assets of any person or entity removed from the Consolidated List and verify that the person is no longer subject to an asset freeze. ii. Remove the person from your institution’s list of persons or entities subject to financial sanction. iii. Un-freeze the assets of the person and where necessary re-activate all relevant accounts. -
Digital Warfare Or Organized Crime
Breakfast Seminars in Information Security Digital warfare or organized crime (Professional Master in Information Security) Dr. Anders Carlsson, ([email protected]) Anders Carlsson 25y Royal Swedish Navy ÖrlKn (Lt Cmd) Submarines < 20year in BTH teacher & researcher Phd in Cyber Security from National University of Radio Electronics Kharkiv Ukraine last years www.engensec.eu to develop a Msc in Cyber Security EU + Ukraine + Russia agenda - The last year’s changed threat against the countries, companies and organizations. - PROMIS general information - Courses - How to apply Actors then threat opponent…… Coalition Coalition Nation Nation Organization Organization Group Group Individual Individual From Hacktivism organized crime that make BIG money using Hybrid War to overtake a country I managed to take over Georgia 2008, Crimea 2014 and manipulate US-election 2016, nobody stop me Threat Report, Survey, from shows a dramatically increase in ransomware attack against: • CrowdStrike • companies • municipal • ESET • governments and • agencies • KasperskyLab • healthcare providers • EMISOFT A town in Florida has paid $500,000 (£394,000) to hackers after a ransomware attack Lake City voted to pay hackers in $??? In Bitcoin after two weeks downed computer Coastal suburb Riviera Beach recently paid hackers $600,000 following a similar incident that locked municipal staff out of important files. The cyber-attack that sent an Alaskan community back in time US-Security reports shows that during 2019 966 government agencies, educational establishments and healthcare providers at a potential cost in excess of $7.5 billion. 113 state and municipal governments and agencies. 764 healthcare providers. 89 universities, colleges A town in Florida has paid $500,000 (£394,000) to hackers after a ransomware attack Lake City voted to pay hackers in $??? In Bitcoin after two weeks downed computer Coastal suburb Riviera Beach recently paid hackers $600,000 following a similar incident that locked municipal staff out of important files. -
EY Technical Intelligence Analysis
“Petya ” Ransomware Attack Technical intelligence analysis June 2017 Executive summary On 27 June 2017, a global ransomware attack campaign called Petya (also being called “NotPetya”, and “Petna”) impacted companies across a wide range of sectors including financial services, power and utilities, media, telecom, life sciences, transportation as well as government agencies. While organizations in countries around the world were affected - including the United States, Netherlands, France, India, Spain and Russia - Ukraine seems to have been the first and hardest country hit by the attack due to the use of an auto-update feature of M.E.Doc software required for tax calculation by any company operating in the Ukraine. The ransomware successfully infected several of its banks as well as media outlets, energy companies, government agencies, airports and radiation monitoring equipment within the Chernobyl power plant. It is the second major ransomware event in as many months after the WannaCry outbreak in May 2017. Although initially characterized as very similar to that attack, Petya is notably different, particularly in the way it spreads and encrypts victims’ data. While WannaCry relied on its worm-like behavior to spread across the Internet, Petya was less virulent, and spread internally using a number of lateral movement techniques including the SMB vulnerability and credential harvesting. Once inside the network, Petya is more sophisticated and nefarious than WannaCry. It subsequently leverages several additional hacking tools to gather credentials from the infected computer’s memory, before spreading to other machines using legitimate and well-known Windows system administration tools such as PsExec and WMIC. It does this for about an hour before rebooting and encrypting the system and/or the files. -
Demystifying Ransomware Attacks: Reverse Engineering and Dynamic Malware Analysis of Wannacry for Network and Information Security
ZAMBIA INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) JOURNAL Volume 1 (Issue 1) (2017) Pages 35-40 Demystifying Ransomware Attacks: Reverse Engineering and Dynamic Malware Analysis of WannaCry for Network and Information Security Aaron Zimba1,2 Luckson Simukonda2, Mumbi Chishimba2 Department of Computer Science and Technology Department of Computer Science and Information University of Science and Technology Beijing1 Technology Beijing, China Mulungushi University2 [email protected] Kabwe, Zambia {thezo1992, chishimba.mumbi}@gmail.com Abstract— Encryption has protected the Internet for some time attacks is that of extortion, making the victim’s data now and it has come to raise user trust on the otherwise inaccessible via encryption until a ransom demand is met. The unsecure Internet. However, recent years have seen the use of tragedy of ransomware is that it employs the most robust and robust encryption as stepping stone for cyber-criminal resilient forms of encryption making it computationally activities. Ransomware has not escaped the headlines even as it infeasible [4] to decrypt a victim’s data without consented has attacked almost every sector of the society using a myriad of efforts of distributed computing. WannaCry, one of the infection vectors. Mission critical data has been held to ransom devastating ransomware attacks which plagued over 150 and victims have had to part away with millions of dollars. The countries and traversed all continents [5] in May of 2017, advent of the anonymous Bitcoin network has made matters spared no industry niche owing to the indiscriminate nature of worse where it’s been virtually infeasible to trace the the attack. It attacked universities, transport sector, health perpetrators. -
Analyzing Wannacry Ransomware Considering the Weapons and Exploits
ICACT Transactions on Advanced Communications Technology (TACT) Vol. 7, Issue 2, March 2018 1098 Analyzing WannaCry Ransomware Considering the Weapons and Exploits Da-Yu KAO*, Shou-Ching HSIAO**, Raylin TSO*** *Department of Information Management, Central Police University, Taoyuan City 333, Taiwan **Haishan Precinct, New Taipei City Police Department, New Taipei City 220, Taiwan ***Department of Computer Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei 116, Taiwan [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] attacks continue to target out-of-date systems as the recent Abstract— As ransomware has increased in popularity, its WannaCry ransomware (also known as WCry, WannaCrypt, creators are using our fears to their advantage. The rapid WannaCrpyt0r, or WannaCrpytor) has spread in a tragic proliferation of ransomware attacks indicates the growing scenario containing thousands of computers [5, 10]. The tendency of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) and the integration emergence of malware creation tools has facilitated the of hacking weapons. This paper presents the analysis of the creation of new variations of the existing ransomware [1]. infamous WannaCry ransomware, which is one of the most Ransomware can easily to modify its ability to propagate propagated and damaging malware in 2017. The anatomy of ransomware attacks is discussed to understand the multi-phased quickly [10]. The dark web is a repository of the hacking execution of WannaCry, including the deployment, installation, weapons. By installing the TOR (The Onion Router) browser, destruction, and command-and-control. The chain of criminals can access the dark web to realize their intentions of WannaCry’s execution comprises several hacking weapon conducting ransomware attacks, which requires only a few components. -
Cb Defense Ransomware Efficacy Assessment
Efficacy Assessment of Cb Defense Against Ransomware September 2017 Table of Contents 1 Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 3 1.1 Test results ........................................................................................................................................ 3 2 Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 5 2.1 Structure of this report ..................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Ransomware as a business model .................................................................................................... 6 3 Ransomware families in scope .................................................................................................. 7 4 Detailed Results ........................................................................................................................ 9 5 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 11 5.1 Infection methods ........................................................................................................................... 11 5.2 Result interpretation ......................................................................................................................