Liberal Democracy As the End of History

Liberal Democracy as the End of History

Francis Fukuyama claims that liberal democracy is the end of history. This book provides a theoretical re-examination of this claim through postmodernist ideas. The book argues that postmodern ideas provide a valuable critique to Fuku- yama’s thesis, and poses the questions: can we talk about a universal and teleological history; a universal human nature; or an autonomous individual? It addresses whether postmodern theories – concerning the movement of time, what it means to be human, and what it means to be an individual/subject – can be accommo- dated within a theory of a history that ends in liberal democracy. The author argues that incorporating elements of postmodern thought into Fukuyama’s theory makes it possible to produce a stronger and more compelling account of the theory that liberal democracy is the end of history. The result of this is to underpin Fukuyama’s theory with a more complex understanding of the movement of time, the human and the individual, and to show that postmodern concepts can, paradoxically, be used to strengthen Fukuyama’s theory that the end of history is liberal democracy. The book will be of interest to students and schol- ars of political theory, postmodernism and the work of Francis Fukuyama.

Chris Hughes currently teaches at the University of Liverpool and the University of Manchester, UK. Routledge Innovations in Political Theory

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40 Liberal Democracy as the End of History Fukuyama and postmodern challenges Chris Hughes Liberal Democracy as the End of History Fukuyama and postmodern challenges

Chris Hughes This edition published 2012 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2012 Chris Hughes The right of Chris Hughes to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested Hughes, Chris (Christopher) Liberal democracy as the end of history: Fukuyama and postmodern challenges / Chris Hughes. p. cm. — (Routledge innovations in political theory; 39) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Democracy—Philosophy. 2. Liberalism. 3. Postmodernism. 4. Fukuyama, Francis. End of history. 5. History—Philosophy. I. Title. JC423.H835 2011 321.8—dc22 2011014160

ISBN: 978–0–415–66905–4 (hbk) ISBN: 978–0–203–80217–5 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman by Swales & Willis, Ltd, Exeter, Devon For my Mum and Dad Contents

Acknowledgements xii

Introduction 1

1 Methodology: an approach to philosophical analysis 18

2 Fukuyama I: the concept of a history with universal direction and end point 35

3 Fukuyama II: why does history end in liberal democracy? 49

4 Postmodern perspectives on the ﬂ ow of time 68

5 Questioning the universality of human nature: a politics without a concept of the ‘human’ 98

6 The myth of the individual: how ‘I’ is constructed and gives an account of itself 118

7 A theory of a history which ends in liberal democracy through a reading of Fukuyama and postmodernism 140

Postscript: limitations and outcomes of the study 169

Notes 175 Bibliography 209 Index 218 Acknowledgements

I have received comments, feedback and suggestions on this book, and material related to it, from far too many people (including anonymous reviewers) to name everyone. However, I would particularly like to thank Steve de Wijze, Angie Wil- son, Joe Femia and Kim Brownlee for the useful comments and valued support which they provided. I offer a special thanks to Alan Hamlin for the sage support he provided during my PhD, and his comments which were very valuable for the development of this work. But, possibly more importantly, I wish to thank him for his support during the development of my academic career and for facilitating a great deal of learning in political philosophy. But, most importantly, I wish to thank my Mum and Dad for their continued and unwavering love and support, even when times have been difficult; without their love and support none of my achievements would have been possible. I gratefully acknowledge permission to reprint material, previously published as: Chris Hughes ‘A Politics in the Absence of a Universal Human Nature’, Review Journal of Political Philosophy, 8.1 (2010) pp. 75–102; and Chris Hughes, ‘The Recycling of Time and The End of History’, Interna- tional Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 8.1 (2011). Introduction

The scope of the book In this book, I provide a theoretical examination of Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democracy is the end of history. The concepts of history and history are central to this thesis; they require careful explanation and elaboration. By means of a preliminary explanation, history refers to a particular and philosophical concept of history; whereas, history is used to cover the multitude of ideas which are part of the common usage of the word ‘history’. I will leave aside detailed explanation of the difference I make between history and history for the next section of the Introduction.1 The book assesses the theoretical and philosophical content of Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democracy is the end of history. I seek to pose the question, is the idea that liberal democracy is the end of history a compelling theory? I do this by posing various challenges to the idea that history has culminated in liberal democracy. I use a range of critiques, ideas and authors to level challenges to core arguments in Fukuyama’s thesis. Specifically, my book provides an answer to the question: does Fukuyama’s end of history thesis provide a compelling account of the movement of time and history/history, where an individualistic understanding of the human acts as the geist propelling history to its end point, and where the end point of history’s movement is liberal democracy? This is a long and unwieldy question, and this specific task is approached by examining three ideas which are intrinsic to Fukuyama’s thesis. The first idea is the claim that it is possible to construct time and history as something which has a universal, forward-moving direction; the second idea is the claim that there is a universal geist behind the movement of history and history; and finally, the third idea is the notion that this geist is an individualistic account of what it means to be human. The concept of a geist is central to the idea of a teleological history, and the idea that there is a geist driving and underpinning the movement of history is an idea I will explore in much more depth when I discuss the concepts of history and history.2 I limit the scope of the book to a consideration of these three areas, since I cannot explore all possible challenges to Fukuyama’s account of liberal democracy or the concept of a history. I have further limited the range and scope of the critiques I deploy against the ideas of history and liberal democracy, because although 2 Introduction numerous critiques can be posed, e.g. from Marxists, Fascists, Communitarians and even other Liberals, the critiques which I focus on are critiques which spring from ideas in postmodern philosophy.3 Due to the importance of postmodernism as a theory and a method of critique for the purposes of this book, postmodernism is something that requires substantial exploration to elucidate its points of divergence and its common features. However, I will leave aside any further discussion of ‘postmodernism’ until the next section of the Introduction. This book is, essentially, a reading of Fukuyama’s theory in opposition to a range of concepts derived from postmodern theory. It is not an attempt to construct a homogenous postmodern critique; it is, instead, an attempt to pose a critique through postmodern concepts. I use concepts from postmodern theory as my method of critique, since postmodern ideas have been less frequently and less overtly used to challenge Fukuyama than traditional ideologies, e.g. Marxism and Fascism. Fukuyama has addressed these more traditional challenges in depth;4 but he has not formulated a detailed and in-depth response to arguments and ideas found in postmodern theories. Thus, this book aims to both open up this critique, and then provide a response to it. I hope to make an original contribution to political thought in this book by attempting to a problematicise Fukuyama’s theory. In doing so, I make a significant contribution to two debates. First, I enter the debate about the meaning of the concept of a history and show how a history is constructed. I question the feasibil- ity of constructing a history and provide a fresh analysis about the legitimacy of a history. Second, I question the validity of the metaphysical assumptions which underpin liberal democracy and examine whether liberal democracy and liberal democratic values can feasibly be put forward as the final social/political system. I use Fukuyama’s theory as the basis of this examination, since Fukuyama presents himself as a spokesperson, defender and advocate for both the concepts history and liberal democracy. Fukuyama’s originality stems from his claim that not only is there an end point to history but that we have also reached that end point. Fukuyama follows a long-standing tradition in attempting to write a history which can reach an end point. This tradition stems, primarily, from modernity’s Enlightenment project.5 The Enlightenment approach to understanding the world requires detailed exploration and explanation in order to elucidate the nuances of this theory, because despite some uniting ideas, it is/was not a uniform movement, since Liberalism, Utilitarianism and Marxism have all been aligned, in some sense, to this general school of thought.6 I provide a more detailed discussion of the nuances and common features of Enlightenment thinking in the next section of this Introduction. Although the Enlightenment tradition gave us the concept of an end of history, the claim that history actually has ended is a more specific and unique claim, and the relationship between the general Enlightenment position with its theory of a theoretical end to history, and Fukuyama’s specific theory with its claim that history has ended is something I also explore in the next section of this Introduction. The primary focus of the book is to examine whether Fukuyama’s theory that history has reached its end point in liberal democracy is compelling. I subject Introduction 3 this theory to analysis by drawing on a range of concepts and critiques derived from ideas in postmodern thinking. I do not seek to either wholly defend Fuku- yama’s position in the face of postmodern critiques or support the postmodern critique; instead, I seek to locate points of convergence between key postmodern concepts and Fukuyama’s thought in order to transcend or bridge the apparent dualistic binary between Fukuyama and postmodernism. I aim to take seriously both the claim that we can conceive of a history which ends in liberal democracy and a range of postmodern ideas which challenge this concept of a history and their arguments for thinking about history as something which must be kept open, something which cannot end. In this book, I examine the differences in the theoretical methodologies and ways to think about core social and political ideas in Fukuyama’s Enlightenment approach and postmodern thought. My primary hope in this book is to explore the possibility of producing a space where a conversation between the two can take place. I assess the possibility of points of convergence, resonance and commonality between these positions. A second goal, and one which stems from this, is to show that a conversation produced between Fukuyama’s thinking and postmodern ideas could be constructive for contemporary political theory. I seek to illustrate limitations and problems in Fukuyama’s theory through a discussion of postmodern concepts; however, I also want to show that by instilling postmodern concepts into Fukuyama’s theory that it is possible to reconstruct his theory. Thus, this book will, ultimately, argue that it is possible to produce an enhanced and more compelling account of Fukuyama’s theory of liberal democracy as the end of history, by incorporating postmodern concepts into it.

Theoretical underpinnings of the project This book relies on: a vast array of philosophical terms; a range of key ideological positions; and numerous central ideas and concepts. Before embarking on the project of reconstructing liberal democracy as the end of history through a blend- ing of Fukuyama’s theory and postmodern ideas, it is important to clarify the most central concepts. For now, I will leave aside discussion of technical terminology and specific concepts and, instead, focus on four ideas and ideological perspectives which underpin this project, and upon which this project is constructed.7 Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democracy is the end of history invokes three core ideas which need to be explained and defined. The first of these is the methodological and epistemological background from which Fukuyama is working, i.e. the Enlightenment approach. Thus, I shall start by discussing the common features and points of divergence within Enlightenment theory, and Fukuyama’s relationship to the Enlightenment tradition. However, I do not intend to spend too long discussing Enlightenment theory, since it is the concept of history, as constructed within Enlightenment theory, which is the primary concern for my work. Thus, the second concept which I attempt to define is history; and, specifically, I discuss how I differentiate history and history. The third concept invoked by Fukuyama’s theory, which requires elaboration, is liberal democracy. Liberal 4 Introduction democracy is a rich and divergent ideology, with a vast literature; therefore, my discussion on this is limited to Fukuyama’s defence of it. Finally, in this section, I produce a discussion on the methodology and epistemology which I am using to critique Fukuyama, i.e. postmodernism. It is necessary to spend some time explor- ing what is meant by postmodernism and elucidate the divergences within the broad theory of postmodernism. There are numerous topics on which there seems to be no shared position between the various postmodern thinkers, and thus any reference to a postmodern position must be a recognition of the diversity within the ‘ideology’ of postmodernism.

Enlightenment theory The Enlightenment is both a period in history and a philosophy about the world, knowledge, humans, politics, etc. The Enlightenment is a period in history because the ideas, values and ways of thinking about the world in Enlightenment thought became the dominant way of thinking. The Enlightenment way of thinking is, arguably, still the dominant form of discourse, and it is an epistemological and methodological approach for theorising about the world and society which I need to explore, and to some extent define, since it is from within this tradition that Fukuyama operates. Enlightenment thought is best understood as an approach for theorising about the world and politics, rather than as an ideology. As a school of thought, it can be seen to possess a number of core unifying traits, but its epistemology can be used to ground a variety of conflicting ideologies. Although Enlightenment theory may be used to justify and ground numerous ideological positions, it is based on the underlying notion of the development of rationality. Enlightenment thought takes the view that humans are progressing towards the greater usage and fulfilment of their rationality. For Kant, the Enlightenment is the development of reason; it is the development of each man’s understanding.8 The Enlightenment is a system of thought based around the belief in man’s ability to reason, and the search for a social/political order which facilitates this. Thus, in a historical context, Enlight- enment thought was a radical and dangerous philosophy, since it was an attack on authority and ‘guardians’.9 The Enlightenment both as a philosophy and a period of history sought to ‘liberate mankind from immaturity . . . [leaving] all men free to use their own reason in all matters of conscience’.10 Enlightenment theory and its epistemological approach to human understanding implies a great many things. First is the idea of ‘man’s emergence from . . . immaturity’11 – the idea that man is progressing towards the use of his own reason and that the aim for mankind is for each individual to ‘have [the] courage to use your own understanding!’12 Thus, the epistemological framework of Enlighten- ment theory can be seen to have some uniting traits concerning: the passage and movement of time and history, human nature and the individual.13 Most crucially for the project I am undertaking in this book, Enlightenment theory produces the formula for the notion of a history, based on the idea that through the cultivation of reason, time and history move in a progressive manner. Kant’s definition of the Introduction 5 Enlightenment as man’s emergence from immaturity defines historical movement by its progression from one phase – a lesser phase – to a new, higher phase; and, implied in this is the concept of teleology, and an end point where the end point is when mankind leaves behind its immaturity and emerges into adulthood. The Enlightenment, thus, postulates a theory about the perfectibility of man; it takes a positive account of mankind, because even if mankind is seen to be an immature state, Enlightenment theorists argue mankind can rise from barbarism through the freedom to reason and ‘men will of their own accord gradually work their way out of barbarism’.14 Thus Enlightenment theory provides the basis for theorising about a progressive/teleological history, since it is premised on the improvement and progress of mankind. Fukuyama’s conception of man does not always sit comfortably with the Enlightenment concept of a man who is moving towards self-reasoning. For Fuku- yama, there is a side of man that may act contrary to rationality; there is a side of man that is willing to risk his very existence for prestige. If we take rationality to be a desire to preserve the body, and attain/secure basic natural needs/desires, e.g. food, water, shelter, rest etc., then to argue that man is willing to risk his life for immaterial goods, e.g. recognition, produces the implicit argument that there is also an irrational side to man. Fukuyama does recognise man’s desire for natural goods,15 but he argues that humans want to be recognised as human, and that each human wants to be seen to possess a certain quality, dignity and value. For Fukuyama, a man’s ‘encounter with other men leads to a violent struggle in which each contestant seeks to make the other “recognize” him by risking his own life. Man is . . . [led] into a violent struggle to the death for pure prestige’.16 Although a willingness to jeopardise one’s own existence for something that is not materially essential to life seems irrational, there is a process of reasoning behind the action, as the reason to act in this manner originates from a desire for recognition and dignity; and thus Fukuyama’s man may not be rational, per se, if rationality is con- strued with material preservation. However, Fukuyama’s concept of man is still a concept of man as a reasoning being, but his claim that man has a violent impulse for non-material desires does put Fukuyama at odds with many Enlightenment thinkers. Thus, Fukuyama is not wholly representative of the Enlightenment tradition and poses some critiques to Enlightenment thought, himself; however, he can still be seen to be working from within an Enlightenment framework, because his theory is based on the notion of progress and the movement of history/history towards a ‘mature’ social/political order. For Fukuyama, even though the individual may not always be ‘rational’, humanity is progressing towards a rational social/political order, a social/political order which does not possess contradic- tions and satisfies the desires and objectives of mankind.

The concepts of history and history In some ways, Fukuyama is the first thinker to argue that history has ended. Hegel had declared that history ended with the Battle of Jena in 1806,17 but he also questioned whether the realised European state embodied freedom and justice (the end 6 Introduction point for history in Hegelian thought), and argued that the ‘world spirit is always ready to move on . . . [and] not even the most advanced human state can realize the human species’ potential for freedom’.18 Philosophers who endorse the concept of history do not tend to argue that history has ended, or even that it necessarily will end. Instead, they tend to argue that history can end, i.e. they argue there is a deep universal force driving history; and that history is driven towards the realisation of this geist. This position is perfectly exemplified by Kant, for whom history was an evolutionary process whereby the intelligent and instinctive sides of man become reconciled and conflict between body and mind becomes civilised. Thus, for Kant, the end point of history is when man is sufficiently prudent and rational to over- come the shortcomings of his instinctual nature.19 Kant does not argue man has, or ever will, achieve this, but he argues history has direction and is programmed by a geist, and that history is a process which is seeking to realise the geist; thus, Kant argues, we can write history, because there is an end point. It is important to underline the difference I make between history and history. It is possible to argue that history has ended; but also argue that history has not ended, or will necessarily end. Fukuyama acknowledges events (i.e. history) will continue, but he claims history has ended because philosophical conversations about the ideal social/political system have reached their cumulative point. Whilst it is important to distinguish history from the past, it is even more important to distinguish history from history. History is not the same as the past – the past is events which are emplotted, and as part of their narration, they become history: ‘history is a discourse about, but cat- egorically different from, the past’.20 History is a discourse about things that happen in time; it is ‘the creation . . . of a particular narrative form on the past’.21 History is not the same as the actuality of the past, since it is a discourse about empirical events. History is ‘the need to interpret the past, not simply present it [and] finding a larger context for the story in an attempt to say not just “what happened” but what it meant’,22 but what it is important to take from the notion of history is the idea that history is about events – actual, specific events which happened. History, on the other hand, as Kant explains, is the attempt to discover a metaphysical, universal ‘purpose in nature behind this senseless course of human events’.23 Thus, for Fukuyama, history and events do continue even at the end of history, because history ‘is not the end of worldly events but the end of the evolution of human thought’.24 History ends when we locate a social/political order which satisfies the universal and metaphysical force driving it. For Kant, for instance, the end of history is the idea that

the history25 of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about . . . [a] perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely.26

Fukuyama’s argument concerning the end of history and continuation of history can be more clearly elucidated by examining his metaphor of mankind as wagons Introduction 7 on a road. He depicts each wagon as occupying a different point on the road, and whilst some may be pulling into town, others may be stranded in the desert or have lost their sense of direction, etc.; but, each wagon is making the slow journey into town and most will eventually arrive there. Importantly, Fukuyama does not argue that all wagons have reached the town, or even that all necessarily will do so, i.e. history has not reached its end. Fukuyama’s point is that we are all heading along the same journey: ‘the apparent differences in the situations of the wagons will not be seen as reflecting permanent and necessary differences between the people riding in the wagons, but simply a product of their different positions along the road’.27 Fukuyama’s end of history is an argument that despite different positions, there is a road, a journey and an end point; and this end point, Fukuyama argues, is liberal democracy. For Fukuyama, history is the progressive development of human societies; history is the

coherent development of human societies from simple tribal ones based on slavery and subsistence agriculture, through various theocracies, monarchies and feudal aristocracies, up through modern liberal democracy, and techno- logically driven capitalism. This evolutionary process was neither random nor unintelligible, even if it did not proceed in a straight line.28

The idea of a history relies on the idea of a coherent process of development and an ahistoric geist which moves history towards an end point. The end point is the realisation/emancipation of the geist. Writing a history is a philosophical endeavour; it does not concern itself with events, per se, but with the activity of the geist. Fukuyama’s idea of history is taken from Hegel’s notion that ‘the task of the historian . . . is to bring out the order that is already present in history through the activity of the spirit’29; and, thus, history is presented as ‘a single, coherent, evolutionary process’.30 Producing a history is about identifying the underlying idea that motivates the geist; thus, history is universal and teleological since it is seeking to satisfy the geist.

Liberal democracy Fukuyama’s theory rests on the argument that liberal democracy is the social/ political system which satisfies the universal forces behind the movement of history. However, this presents significant conceptual difficulties, since there are divergences within liberal democratic theory. Although there are common charac- teristics and features in liberal democracy, it is a contested concept and there are many interpretations of what is meant by liberal democracy. The first aspect of the conceptual difficulty in understanding liberal democracy arises from the fact that liberalism and democracy are two different concepts wed- ded together. They do not have to exist simultaneously and can exist separately. It is possible for a state to be liberal but not democratic, e.g. eighteenth/early nineteenth-century Britain, modern-day Singapore; equally, it is possible for a 8 Introduction state to be democratic but not liberal, e.g. Ancient Athens, various republics in Renaissance Italy. Thus, to talk of common liberal democratic values is problem- atic, since liberal democracy, itself, rests on two different ideologies and value systems. Liberalism and democracy do not necessarily share the same objectives or emphasise the same things. For instance, the intrinsic individualism of liberalism is almost in dualistic competition with the democratic values of public par- ticipation, public engagement and public-mindedness. However, even within the separate ideologies of liberalism and democracy, there is much that is contested. Liberals such as Rawls and Nozick produce contrasting notions about the just distribution of primary goods, whilst democrats have very different notions about how to interpret the idea of ‘rule by the people’.31 A detailed analysis of the divergences and common traits within liberal democracy, liberalism and democracy is beyond the scope of this book. The book is not intended to be a defence of liberal democracy, per se; instead, I am concerned with the specific defence of liberal democracy that is articulated by Fukuyama. Fukuyama puts forward an unusual basis to defend liberal democracy as the end of history, arguing that the state which emerges at the end of history rests ‘on the twin pillars of economics and recognition’.32 He does, also, put forward a more conventional notion of the fundamental principles of liberal democracy, arguing that it is ‘the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern [liberal] democracy is founded’.33 Fukuyama’s idea that liberal democracy rests on economics and recognition is a quirky one, since it utilises a quasi-Marxist understanding of a history moved by economic progress and a notion of a non-rational man who is seeking recognition and does ‘not feel himself a full human being until he [has] . . . achieved recognition’,34 and this contrasts sharply to the conventional liberal conception of man as a rational being, seeking bodily preservation and security for property. However, for Fukuyama, these twin pillars are the geists moving history. They are the human desires which direct history and they find realisation in the twin principles of liberty and equality. In this sense, Fukuyama offers a fairly typical and mainstream reading and defence of liberal democracy, since he returns to ideas of liberty and equality as the basis of liberal democracy. Liberty and equality are probably seen as the core principles upon which liberal democracy rests. The prioritising of these values originates in the central role played by the individual in liberal democratic thought. Liberal democratic theory is based around a respect for the individual, the individual’s dignity and providing freedom and security for the individual. For Fukuyama, the driving force behind history is each individual human’s desire to prove that he/she is a free and worth- while individual. The individual is central to Fukuyama’s thought; he argues that ‘the good political order needs to . . . satisfy man’s just desire for recognition of his dignity and worth’.35 The centrality of the individual in Fukuyama’s thought is typical of liberal democratic thinking, and the objective of liberal democracy can be interpreted ‘as the preservation of the individual and the attainment of individual happiness’.36 The attainment of this objective relies on a commitment to the principles of liberty and equality and also a recognition of differences between Introduction 9 individuals, a notion of plurality and different conceptions of the good. Thus, central to liberal democratic theory, and particularly Fukuyama’s defence of liberal democracy, is the notion of the pursuit of individual freedom and recognition, and a notion of difference and plurality between individuals.

Postmodernism In this book, I use postmodern concepts to challenge Fukuyama’s thesis that the end of history is liberal democracy. However, it is important to clearly state that postmodernism is not a single ideology, and there is no coherent position agreed upon by ‘postmodern’ authors. There is much divergence within postmodern thought; and thus, when I use the term ‘postmodernism’, I use it as a placeholder to represent a system of thinking which refuses to produce a totalising ideology. ‘Postmodernism’ exists as an ‘ideology’ only in the sense that there are core ideas and points of family resemblance amongst the differences. The term ‘postmodernism’ is a stand-in for a universal ideology, since ‘postmodernism’ is primarily based around the ideas of being anti-universalising and anti-totalising; thus the entire philosophy of postmodernism seems to resist the possibility of becoming a coherent ideology. Postmodernism should always be understood as ‘postmodernism’, a term that is always contested and always open to question and where debate about its meaning is never settled.37 The postmodern refusal to put forward a totalising ideology is particularly evi- dent if we read mid–later era Lyotard (i.e. after his break with Marxism),38 e.g. in ‘Nanterre, Here, Now’, Lyotard rejects trying to seize power (which he claims was the objective of Bolshevism), and instead, he advocates a politics of the ‘here and now’ which destructs/breaks power.39 Lyotard’s vision, then, is one which deliberately lacks an anti-totalising stance or an ideology, per se. Postmodernism’s desire to break power means that it is essentially an oppositional philosophy; and, therefore, as Sim concludes, it is easier to say what postmodernism is against, than what it is for.40 As well as being an anti-universalising/anti-totalising ‘ideology’, a further point of commonality and point of family resemblance amongst postmodern theorists is the rejection of truth. This rejection of truth is another reason why postmodernism cannot be constructed as an ideological position. By rejecting truth claims, postmodernism retains a certain openness that means it can never put forward a universal ideological position based on strong epistemological foundations. The postmodern questioning of truth can be traced back to Nietzsche’s argument that ‘there is no . . . real knowing apart from metaphor’.41 For Nietzsche, truth is an invention: ‘there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of “world history”’.42 This questioning of truth (or rather, ‘truth’) has continued in Rorty’s theories about the contingency of values and the lack of ultimate grounds for a consensus, and in Derrida’s rejection of metaphysics and his philosophy of deconstruction. Possibly the most widely quoted proclamation that the questioning of truth is fundamental to postmodernism is Lyotard’s declaration: ‘I define postmodern as incredulity toward 10 Introduction metanarrative.’43 Baudrillard also takes up this position and defines theory by its refutation of truth: ‘the secret of theory is that truth doesn’t exist’.44 Postmodernism is also an approach to analysing power. Despite the many divergences within postmodern theories of power, there is a uniting belief that politics, society and even truth and science rest on power. Lyotard, for instance, argues that truth in science is legitimised only through power since experts are required to agree upon something as truth: ‘a statement must fulfil a given set of conditions in order to be accepted as scientific . . . Legitimation is the process by which a “legis- lator” dealing with scientific discourse is authorized to prescribe the stated conditions’.45 Derrida questions the legitimising foundations of political order, arguing that political authority rests on power and is neither legitimate nor illegitimate, just nor unjust. He vividly elucidates a question right at the heart of politics and ethics: ‘How are we to distinguish between the force of law of a legitimate power and the supposedly originary violence that must have established this authority and that could not itself have been authorized by any anterior legitimacy[?]’46 Derrida concludes that the Law ‘is neither legal nor illegal . . . just nor unjust’,47 because the law and politics rests only on itself, and, thus, if an ‘act simply consists of applying a rule . . . we would be wrong to say that the decision was just’.48 In this book, I am concerned with three ideas for which it is possible to develop a shared postmodern position; these are: an anti-teleological account of time; an anti-totalising argument that seeks to keep categories (e.g. the ‘human’) open; and an idea of power as something that is productive – something which produces discourses, structures, society and the individual. First, since postmodern theory rejects the notion of truth and metaphysics, the present is seen as a contingent arrangement and time cannot be articulated into a progressive, Enlightenment concept of history. For Rorty and Lyotard, for instance, there is no history, because the present cannot be a permanent consensus; instead any present consensus is contingent, temporary and rests on petit narratives; thus, the future is left open. Derrida is the postmodern thinker who has, possibly, most explicitly challenged the idea of a teleological history, arguing that he has ‘attempted to systematize a deconstructive critique . . . against the authority of meaning . . . [against] telos, in other [against] history determined . . . as the history of meaning’.49 Second, the postmodern critique of universalism and totalising concepts/categories is a claim that any category (e.g. the ‘human’) cannot achieve closure. The category (e.g. ‘human’) cannot produce a final account of itself; it must remain open and be available for re-articulation. This problematises Fukuyama’s work, since Fukuyama’s thesis rests on the idea of an ahistoric, universal and metaphysical geist. Postmodernism critiques the idea of universal categories; however, postmodern theory is vague about what to put forward in their place. Whilst postmodernism does not offer an ideological alternative to liberal democracy, it does pose a radical and important critique of Fukuyama and his theory, since the possibility of constructing fixed, ahistoric categories which act as a geist are necessary to formulate a history. Third, postmodernism seeks to reveal power and demonstrate how the values, structures and discourses which have become dominant in a society are merely Introduction 11 contingent constructions. Postmodernism shows that what one is, i.e. the self, the ‘individual’,50 is not what one truly is, not what one wills but something one becomes. Postmodernism shows that power is something that produces the self and limits how one can understand one’s self and articulate one’s self as an ‘individual’. The one is always ‘outside oneself, beyond oneself in a society that has no single author’,51 therefore:

Individual agency is bound up with [the] social . . . One only determines ‘one’s own’ sense of gender [or sense of self] to the extent that social norms exist that support and enable that act of claiming gender for oneself. One is dependent on this ‘outside’ to lay claim to what is one’s own. The self must, in this way, be dispossessed in sociality in order to take possession of itself.52

This perspective on the ‘individual’ and what it means to be a self poses a radical critique of Fukuyama’s theory, since Fukuyama and wider liberal ideas construct philosophy and politics around the idea of the individual. Therefore, by drawing into question what it means to be an ‘individual’, the theory that history ends in liberal democracy is problematised.

Methodological approach Before I outline the structure of this book, and the arguments and conclusions I try to reach, I intend to briefly lay out my methodological approach. The book represents an attempt to set up a hypothetical debate between Fukuyama and postmodernism.53 The discussion I set up between Fukuyama and postmodern ideas is hypothetical since postmodernists have not, generally, related their arguments directly to Fukuyama; and, simultaneously, Fukuyama has not made a significant attempt to argue against postmodern ideas. I use postmodern concepts to pose a critique of Fukuyama, and then, construct a response to this, one which will constitute a hypothetical response from Fukuyama. To suggest that the conversation between postmodernism and Fukuyama is entirely hypothetical would be to misrepresent the situation, since there has been occasional dialogue between the two. For instance, Derrida’s Specters of Marx could be read as, primarily, a response to Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man.54 And it would also be a mistake to suggest that Fukuyama has made no attempts to discuss postmodern ideas; however, he has never seriously constructed a response to postmodern ideas, or produced a detailed rebuttal or critique of postmodern concepts in the way he has attempted to refute Communism and Fascism.55 Producing this dialogue between Fukuyama and postmodern concepts is the purpose of this book, and its original contribution to scholarship lies in its attempt to construct a constructive dialogue between the two which allows for the end of history thesis to stand, but with some refinement, nuancing and modifica- tion through a recognition of the value of postmodern ideas. The postmodern authors which this book utilises to form a critique of Fuku- yama are not necessarily in agreement with each other. I bring in an author at a 12 Introduction particular stage in this book in order to pose a particular critique to Fukuyama’s thesis; thus, an author will appear in one chapter and disappear in another. My methodological approach in this book is an attempt to use various postmodern authors to critique various elements of Fukuyama’s thesis; and, therefore, I use an author at the point where I feel that he/she most pertinently articulates a critique to Fukuyama’s theory. When a particular argument/idea/author is brought in to pose a critique of Fukuyama, I do not claim that this view is necessarily the most representative of postmodern philosophy; I only claim that this author/idea/argument poses a particularly relevant critique to a segment of Fukuyama’s argument. This usage of an author for my own purposes, i.e. to form part of a critique of Fukuyama’s argument but not, necessarily, to engage with the entirety of that author’s theory, is a key component of my methodological approach. When I approach a philosophical text, I am doing so in order to locate a useful idea in that work; thus, I am approaching the text from an ideological and purposeful perspective. My method is to ‘sample’ ideas from a text/author, rather than to analyse the ‘true’ text/author. I do not intend to spend more time elaborating on this method for philosophical research and analysis in the Introduction, since the next chapter is entirely devoted to the exploration of my methodological approach to conduct- ing research and analysis in philosophy. In the next chapter, I seek to put forward an interesting and novel approach to reading texts and doing philosophy which I hope will influence discussions about the methodology of philosophy.

The structure of the book The objective which underpins this book is to provide an assessment of whether the idea of a history which ends in liberal democracy is a compelling one, by subjecting it to a critique using postmodern concepts. I argue that we must take postmodern/poststructural critiques of the ideas which Fukuyama uses to underpin his argument seriously, since there is something valuable in postmodern ideas. However, I also question whether postmodern ideas represent a radical break with an Enlightenment notion of history or liberal democracy. I suggest that, despite the apparent binary between Fukuyama’s Enlightenment theory of history coupled with his defence of liberal democracy and postmodern concepts which emphasise an anti-universalising stance, there are moments of convergence and resonance between the two. I seek to assess whether postmodern ideas constitute a theoretical rival to the idea of a history which ends in liberal democracy, or whether the useful insights which postmodern concepts offer for theorising about time, history and the social and political can be used to produce a more compelling theory of a history which ends in liberal democracy, by subjecting the theory to revision. The book questions and probes three key areas which I have identified as the basis for constructing the theory that history ends in liberal democracy. Fuku- yama’s thesis relies on: first, the existence of a universal history with a forward moving direction; second, the notion of a geist which leads history to its end point; third, the idea that liberal democracy is the end of history. These three core elements of the end of history thesis are questioned in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 Introduction 13 respectively. However, before I examine these questions, I discuss: my methodological approach; how I read philosophical texts/authors; and how I conduct philosophical research and analysis. I also produce an account of liberal democracy as the end of history through an exposition of Fukuyama, and provide a reading of his theory which I find plausible and intuitively appealing. Chapter 1 provides a discussion of how we can go about researching, reading, discussing, analysing and writing philosophy. This chapter serves two purposes. First, it operates as an explanation, clarification and justification of the methodology I adopt in this book. Second, it serves a wider function, as it attempts to put forward a way of going about the doing – the reading and writing, researching and analysing – of philosophy. In Chapters 2 and 3, I examine the two concepts which are inherent and necessary in the concept of history: the first being direction; the second being an end point. I examine the concept of a directional, universal, teleological history by discussing these two points in isolation; thus, my discussion of Fukuyama and the concept of history is spread out across two chapters. Chapter 2 elucidates Fukuyama’s idea of history as a universal, directional process. This chapter introduces the idea of the geist, and the idea that the desire for economic development gives history56 directional movement. However, I show that Fukuyama argues that this desire does not provide history with an end point, and for Fukuyama whilst the desire for economic development provides history with direction and the possibility of an end (in theory, at least), it is not the end goal of humankind. Having outlined the theory of direction and progress in the movement of history in Chapter 2, I move on and, in Chapter 3, turn to the question: what is the end of history?57 This chapter examines the specific geist which Fukuyama argues is driving history, and is realised in liberal democracy. For Fukuyama, the end of history is the realisation of a social/ political system which satisfies ‘man as man’. Thus, Chapter 3 examines how we satisfy the geist, ‘man as man’, and why this results in liberal democracy. Before I assess critiques of Fukuyama, I put forward a defence of the concept of a history which ends in liberal democracy. In setting up the concept of liberal democracy as the end of history, I am not endorsing it, per se, but outlining what I believe to be an intuitively appealing and attractive theory. My objective is to construct a plausible concept of history and explore why there may be a geist lead- ing humanity towards liberal democracy. However, in order to assess whether this theory is compelling, I subject it to postmodern critiques. In Chapter 4, I return to the ideas introduced in Chapter 2 and provide a critique of the notion that we can conceive of time as something which is universal and directional. Chapter 4 examines how time and history flows and moves. The chapter looks at different ways of theorising about the movement of time and history, ideas of a history without a forward-moving geist. The chapter explores how we can construct and understand the process of time and history, and the narratives that can be produced about temporal sequencing and history. Although the chapter calls into question the notion of a universal direction to history’s movement, ultimately, it seeks to show that Fukuyama’s theory of a history can co-exist with postmodern ideas about the flow and movement of time and history. 14 Introduction In Chapter 5, I question the legitimacy of constructing a metaphysical, universal and ahistoric concept of the human which acts as the geist behind history. The notion of a history relies on an ahistoric presence which must be emancipated/ realised, and as I argue in Chapter 3, for Fukuyama, this ahistoric geist is based on the notion of a fixed and universal conception of what it means to be human; therefore, history ends when we satisfy ‘man as man’. Chapter 5 questions the legitimacy of discussing a universal human nature underpinned by ahistoric drives, and asks, can we construct an account of a history without the concept of an ahistoric human? Thus the chapter explores what is meant by ‘human’ and asks: what kind of politics is possible without a notion of a totalised, fixed, universal human? In Chapter 6, I interrogate the idea of an individual, since Fukuyama’s thesis relies on the idea of an individual who is seeking emancipation and seeking to realise him/herself as a unique and individual self. Chapter 6 deconstructs the concept of an individual in order to see if this undermines Fukuyama’s account of an end of history. I show that Fukuyama’s account of the individual is flawed, since power is involved in the production and regulation of the ‘individual’, or more accurately, the self; and, therefore, the self is not an autonomous self-constructing individual. The chapter poses the questions: what does it mean to be a person in the singular?58 Can we construct a history after we have deconstructed the ‘individual’? Can we justify locating the ‘individual’ at the centre of political thought? Chapter 7, the final chapter, acts as a summation of what has gone before and as a conclusion. In Chapter 7, I show how we can utilise postmodern thought to critique both the concepts of a teleological history and liberal democracy. How- ever, I also seek to establish a position which avoids a binary opposition between postmodern thought and Fukuyama’s liberal-Enlightenment position. I show that it is necessary to re-think some assumptions and component elements in Fuku- yama’s theory due to the critique posed by postmodern concepts. However, I argue that by using more complex conceptions of the movement of time, the human and the individual, it remains possible to construct a compelling account of a history which ends in liberal democracy. Thus, I intend to show that postmodern concepts are a valuable tool for theorising about history, politics and liberal democracy; but, paradoxically, postmodern concepts can be used to strengthen Fukuyama’s account of a history which ends in liberal democracy. I conclude by arguing that the dualism between Fukuyama and postmodernism is false and undermines potentially constructive philosophical exchange. I provide a theory of a history which ends in liberal democracy which utilises ideas from postmodern thinking to instil Fukuyama’s theory with greater fluidity and flexibility. I argue that this establishes a stronger and more compelling argument for the idea that history cul- minates in liberal democracy.

The objectives of the book The book uses postmodern concepts to challenge Enlightenment and liberal theory; and, specifically, the claim that liberal democracy is the end of history. My Introduction 15 aim is to use postmodern ideas to enrich the concepts of history and liberal democracy, and provide a compelling, nuanced theory of a history that ends in liberal democracy. I use postmodern concepts as they represent possibly the most pertinent and most recent critique to have emerged against liberal and Enlightenment ideas. The book does not look at all the individual instances where Fukuyama’s thesis does not appear to depict the reality of the global situation, since my aim is to examine the more fundamental claim that there is nothing beyond liberal democracy. My objective can be elucidated through the metaphor of wagons on a road, the metaphor which Fukuyama uses to close The End of History and the Last Man.59 This is the idea that different peoples, nations and cultures are represented by wagons on a road, and they are all making a journey towards a specified destination.60 I am not testing the accuracy of Fukuyama’s wagon metaphor by examining each of the wagons on the journey, but by examining those wagons furthest down the road. Thus, the purpose of this book is to see if the wagons which have reached their supposed destination (i.e. liberal democracy) are likely to stay there or if they will change course and set out on a new journey. The book examines and questions whether the ideas and values articulated in postmodern theory represent a challenge to the idea that liberal democracy is the end of history, since as Ermarth argues, ‘in moving beyond modernity we necessarily encounter challenges to cultural assumptions that have been current in one form or another across humanist Europe’.61 Therefore, we must ask: ‘can democracy survive . . . changes to the value systems it inherited from the Renaissance?’.62 Thus, I tease out a critique to Fukuyama’s theory of liberal democracy as the end of history by using postmodern concepts in order to assess whether postmodern ideas come after modernity and liberalism, or whether the values and ideas in postmodern concepts can be embraced within a broader conception of modernity and liberalism. I examine those wagons furthest along the road, since postmodern ideas have been articulated in the developed world, and assess whether postmodern ideas represent an alternative to the idea that history ends in liberal democracy, or whether postmodern concepts can be used to nuance and enhance this theory. It is beyond the scope of this project to explore the entirety of the range of postmodern critiques which could be posed to the theory that liberal democracy is the end of history. The book only aims to point out certain key areas where particular postmodern ideas pose a challenge to the notion of a history which ends in liberal democracy. Although I cannot discuss all the postmodern authors who have critiqued history or liberal democracy, or all of the variations within postmodern thought, I do hope to be able to offer insights into where postmodern concepts provide alternative perspectives on history/history and politics. Unfortunately, it is also beyond the scope of this project to fully explore the notion of a postmodern future, and an extension of the project would be to try to construct a political vision using postmodern ideas in order to analyse if this vision constituted a coherent alternative to the idea that liberal democracy is the end of history. Before I begin this project, it is important to explore my own personal position; how my own bias has affected the production of my thesis, and the ideological 16 Introduction endeavour which I am pursuing. This, for me, is not a simple matter, since I do not seek to defend one position against another; instead, my bias and my ideological endeavour is to seek consensus. The desire to strive towards consensus is a bias, and, for me, it is a personal one, developed in response to my own personality traits and personal upbringing. Although I do not wish to produce a deep psycho- analytical exposition of myself, I feel that it is necessary to state that this book presents a particular application of the theories and ideas it discusses, since the author is someone who is conflict-adverse and someone seeking to find consensus, commonality and resonance between factions which are typically polarised into antagonistic dichotomies. I acknowledge the differences in the epistemologies and methodologies between liberal-Enlightenment and postmodern thinking. However, ultimately, I seek to locate points of convergence around the concepts discussed. I argue that, stem- ming from the location of points of commonality, a constructive philosophical conversation can take place between Fukuyama’s theory of a history which ends in liberal democracy and concepts in postmodern thought. I seek to show that it may not be helpful to construct postmodern ideas as a rival to the idea that history ends in liberal democracy; and, instead, I argue that postmodern concepts are something which can enhance our understanding and thinking about: the movement of time and history, the human, the individual, the social and the political. I intend to show that postmodern concepts offer valuable theoretical insights into political theory and call into question the idea that history ends in liberal democracy and, therefore, it is necessary to re-think some of the component elements in this theory. However, I seek to show that by instilling Fukuyama’s theory with postmodern ideas, greater fluidity and greater flexibility and underpinning his theory with a more complex notion of time/history, the human and the individual, it is possible to construct a more compelling and nuanced account of a history which ends in liberal democracy. My intention is to highlight that the political objectives of liberal modernists and postmodernists are not as opposed as they may appear and that it may be possible to reconcile elements of traditional Enlightenment thought and its belief in a progressive, teleological history brought about through the realisation of the geist, with aspects of postmodern thought which is premised on a rejection of universals, claims to progress and the uncovering of truth. I seek to show that, despite apparent fundamental differences, it is possible to see a similar political vision articulated in Fukuyama’s liberal-Enlightenment theory and ideas articulated in postmodern thinking. I use these points of resonance and commonality to deepen, strengthen and nuance the idea that history ends in liberal democracy. My conclusion represents a radical break with traditional Enlightenment thought, since I reject the notion of universals, autonomous individuals and the progression of a society towards the realisation of a system based on truth and rationality. However, my conclusion also represents a radical break with typical postmodern thinking, since I claim that it is possible to construct a geist and a history. I recognise that the desire to seek consensus is, itself, a controversial aim. I recognise that, due to the limited scope of this thesis, I cannot hope to construct a Introduction 17 consensus between all areas of the liberal-Enlightenment theory of liberal democracy as the end of history, and postmodern ideas which emphasise the rejection of universals; however, even striving towards a limited consensus between these two positions is controversial, and the desire to reconcile antagonism towards a consensus is far from a universal aim. For instance, the works of Mouffe highlight that, for her, the aim of politics should not be to seek consensus but to keep a permanent antagonism open.63 The controversial nature of seeking consensus is why I describe this objective as a ‘personal bias’ based on my own personality traits. In many ways, this desire to find consensus is in direct contrast to both of the theories which I seek to defend and reconcile, i.e. liberalism and postmodernism. At the core of liberal values is a pluralism that advocates dissension, and therefore a plurality of voices rather than consensus. For instance, Mill advocates freedom of speech and argues that no man should be silenced from expressing his views, thus legitimising dissent and a move away from consensus;64 and Montesquieu’s defence of ‘checks and balances’ and ‘a separation of powers’ illustrates that the aim of liberalism is not consensus, but the recognition of pluralism and the institutional management of dissent.65 Postmodern ideas tend to be even more attuned to difference and many postmodernists are directly hostile to consensus. For instance, Lyotard directly attacks Habermasian notions of consensus,66 and Butler argues that there should never be closure over the definition of a term, e.g. woman.67 I accept that my objective of locating a consensus may be too ambitious, since I recognise that it may not be possible to find an ideological consensus between the political theories discussed. However, what it may be possible to find are points of resonance and commonality, which allow for the possibility of moving antagonism and dualistic dichotomies towards a position of closer agreement. Bibliography

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