Sri Lanka's Authoritarian Turn: the Need for International Action
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Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action Asia Report N°243 | 20 February 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. HRC and LLRC Implementation: A Failure to Deliver .................................................... 3 A. The Rule of Law ......................................................................................................... 4 1. LLRC and government action plan ...................................................................... 4 2. Impeachment of the chief justice ......................................................................... 5 B. Investigations into Serious Crimes ............................................................................ 7 C. Accountability ............................................................................................................ 9 D. The Detention System ................................................................................................ 12 1. Long-term detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) ........... 12 2. “Rehabilitation” .................................................................................................... 13 3. Database of detainees ........................................................................................... 14 4. Prison violence ..................................................................................................... 14 E. Freedom of Expression .............................................................................................. 15 F. Demilitarisation of the North .................................................................................... 18 G. Land Dispute Resolution ........................................................................................... 19 H. Devolution of Power .................................................................................................. 21 III. A Real Action Plan ............................................................................................................ 25 IV. What the International Community Should Do ............................................................... 28 A. Responding to Sri Lanka’s Twin National Crises ...................................................... 28 B. Reorienting International Engagement – Beyond the UNHRC ................................ 29 1. The Commonwealth ............................................................................................. 29 2. UN Human Rights Council’s 22nd session .......................................................... 30 3. The role of the UN Secretary-General .................................................................. 31 4. Other avenues for justice ...................................................................................... 32 5. Vetting .................................................................................................................. 32 6. Military-to-military relations ............................................................................... 33 7. Targeted pressure on and non-cooperation with the regime .............................. 33 8. Review of UN policies in Sri Lanka ...................................................................... 34 9. Review of development assistance ....................................................................... 35 V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 37 APPENDICES A. Map of Sri Lanka .............................................................................................................. 38 B. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 39 C. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2010 .................................................. 40 D. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 43 International Crisis Group Asia Report N°243 20 February 2013 Executive Summary Government attacks on the judiciary and political dissent have accelerated Sri Lanka’s authoritarian turn and threaten long-term stability and peace. The government’s politically motivated impeachment of the chief justice reveals both its intolerance of dissent and the weakness of the political opposition. By incapacitating the last institutional check on the executive, the government has crossed a threshold into new and dangerous terrain, threatening prospects for the eventual peaceful transfer of power through free and fair elections. Strong international action should begin with Sri Lanka’s immediate referral to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) and a new resolution from the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) calling for concrete, time-bound actions to restore the rule of law, investigate rights abuses and alleged war crimes by government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and devolve power to Tamil and Muslim areas of the north and east. Sri Lanka is faced with two worsening and inter-connected governance crises. The dismantling of the independent judiciary and other democratic checks on the execu- tive and military will inevitably feed the growing ethnic tension resulting from the absence of power sharing and the denial of minority rights. Both crises have deep- ened with the Rajapaksa government’s refusal to comply with the HRC’s March 2012 resolution on reconciliation and accountability. While the government claims to have implemented many of the recommendations of its Lessons Learnt and Recon- ciliation Commission (LLRC) – a key demand of the HRC’s resolution – there has in fact been no meaningful progress on the most critical issues: the government has conducted no credible investigations into allegations of war crimes, disappearances or other serious human rights violations; rather than establish independent institutions for oversight and investigation, the government has in effect removed the last remnants of judicial independence through the impeachment of the chief justice; there has been no progress toward a lasting and fair constitutional settlement of the ethnic conflict through devolution of power; the military still controls virtually all aspects of life in the north, intimidating and sidelining the civilian administration; more than 90,000 people remain displaced in the north and east, amid contin- ued land seizures by the military, with no effective right of appeal and no fair process for handling land disputes; government security forces have broken up peaceful Tamil protests in the north, detained students on questionable charges of working with the LTTE and actively harassed Tamil politicians; the government has responded with force to protest and dissent in the south, too, deploying troops to prevent the newly impeached chief justice and supporters from visiting the Supreme Court while pro-government groups attacked lawyers protesting the impeachment. Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action Crisis Group Asia Report N°243, 20 February 2013 Page ii Analysts and government critics have warned of Sri Lanka’s growing authoritarian- ism since the final years of the civil war, but developments over the last year have worsened the situation. The president’s willingness and ability to push through the impeachment – in the face of contrary court rulings, unprecedented opposition from civil society and serious international concern – confirms his commanding political position. The move completes the “constitutional coup” initiated in September 2010 by the eighteenth amendment, which removed presidential term limits and the in- dependence of government oversight bodies. It has sent a clear message to domestic critics that their dissent is unwelcome. The consolidation of power paves the way for moves that could further set back chances of sustainable peace. The president and his two most powerful brothers – Defence Secretary Gotabaya and Economic Development Minister Basil – have sig- nalled their intention to weaken or repeal the provinces’ already minimal powers. As the government makes explicit its hostility to meaningful power sharing between the centre and the Tamil-speaking north and east, Tamil identity and political power are being systematically undermined by the military-led political and economic trans- formation of the northern province. Recent months have also seen an upsurge in attacks by militant Buddhists on Muslim religious sites and businesses. The government has done little to discourage these. Should such provocations continue, the remarkable moderation of Sri Lanka’s Muslims could face serious tests. Given the country’s history of violent resistance to state power perceived as unjust, the authoritarian drift can only increase the risk of an eventual outbreak of political violence. Sri Lankans of all ethnicities who have struggled to preserve their democracy de- serve stronger