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Download the Publication Political and Institutional Responses to TransboundaryWater Disputes in the Middle East by Miriam R. Lowi HERE ARE THREE MAJOR, OUTSTANDING DISPUTES OVER THE DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY waters in the Middle East. They concern: 1) the Euphrates River basin among Iraq, Syria, and Turkey; T 2) the Jordan River basin among Israel, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians; and 3) West Bank groundwater between Israel and the Palestinians. In the three cases, aridity or semi-aridity characterizes the climate and hydrology of the region, hence undisturbed access to water is essential for continued survival. In the three cases, as well, political tensions among the concerned riparians aggravate the water disputes. Let me begin by briefly outlining the nature of the problem in each of the cases and the stakes involved in failing to resolve the disputes. Next, I will highlight the minimum conditions that must be met before a water dispute can be resolved in a protracted conflict setting. Finally, I will describe some of the institutional mechanisms that could be effective in promoting a mutually satisfactory solution. In doing so, I note what seems to have worked in similar situations in the past, and what seems to be working currently under the auspices of the water resources working group of the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process. THE PROBLEM In the Euphrates basin, the central problem can be described thus: the river rises in Turkey and flows southward into Syria and then into Iraq. The two downstream riparians are highly dependent upon the river flow for agricultural development, while Turkey upstream has become increasingly dependent upon the river since the mid-1960s by virtue of the GAP (Southeast Anatolia Development) project, a massive water management scheme that includes dam-building and diversions.1 In the absence of a basin-wide agreement that stipulates who gets what from the river, when and how, Turkey, as the upstream riparian and the strongest state in the basin, is able to requisition what it wants from the river system; Syria and Iraq must suffer the consequences. On a number of occasions, in fact, the flow entering the two countries was reduced considerably, and although Syria and Iraq complained vociferously about this, Turkey was not contractually bound to behave otherwise. Moreover, relations in the basin are such that Syria and Iraq, who have the most to lose from the status quo, are engaged in a protracted conflict: there is virtually no official interaction between the two regimes, hence a bilateral alliance vis-à-vis Turkey is out of the question in the prevailing political environment. It is also fair to say that the international community has not shown much concern about this conflict and its resolution; there have not been significant efforts at third party mediation. In the case of the Jordan basin, the river system rises in four tributaries: the Yarmouk in Syria, the Banias in Israeli-occupied Syria, the Hasbani in Israeli-occupied Lebanon, and the Dan in Israel. The Banias, Hasbani and Dan meet in northern Israel to form the Upper Jordan River that flows into Lake Tiberias and then the Lower Jordan; the Yarmouk flows in a southwesterly direction, forming the border between Jordan and Syria, then Jordan and Israel, before flowing into the Lower Jordan that forms the boundary between Jordan and the West Miriam R. Lowi is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Trenton State College. Her book, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin, was published by Cambridge University Press in 1993 and 1995. Her articles have appeared in edited volumes and journals that include International Security and the Journal of International Affairs. Her latest research is on oil and the politics of development in Algeria, Iran and Indonesia. 5 Features - Miriam R. Lowi Bank, and then Jordan and Israel. By virtue of both the settlers in the territory, leaving only twenty percent for 1967 war and the establishment of the “security zone” the Palestinian population.4 No doubt, negotiations on in South Lebanon in the early 1980s, Israel has become the final status of the occupied territories will have to the upstream riparian on the Upper Jordan system; consider arrangements for the distribution and man- Syria is upstream on the Yarmouk. Jordan and the agement of this precious resource. Palestinians, as downstream riparians vis–à-vis both Israel and Syria, have remained in the worst possible RESOLVING WATER DISPUTES positions in the basin. Moreover, Jordan’s dependence on the river system is great; apart from a few wadis,2 The sine qua non of resolving a transboundary there are no other important sources of fresh water water dispute in a protracted conflict setting is the available to Jordan. prior resolution of the political conflict. The history of On three occa- the water disputes in the Jordan River basin and in the Approximately eighty sions, efforts were Indus basin (between India and Pakistan)—both of percent of West Bank wa- made to resolve the which have been deeply intertwined with a protracted water dispute in the political conflict—instructs us that states involved in ter is exploited in Israel Jordan River basin and “high politics” conflicts that provoke wars and engage establish an “interna- the visceral issues of territorial sovereignty and the and by Israeli settlers in tional regime” that recognition of identities, are not inclined to collaborate the territory, leaving only would oversee the dis- in seemingly technical matters that concern economic tribution and manage- development and human welfare.5 twenty percent for the Pal- ment of the water This being so, it would be fair to assume that among the riparians. In there will not be a truly basin-wide accord regarding estinian population. 1953-55, 1976-81, and the Jordan waters prior to the successful completion of 1987-90, the United final status negotiations between Israel and the Pales- States government was engaged in trying to secure an tinian Authority, and the signing of peace treaties agreement: among all four riparians on the first occa- between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria. sion, among all except for Lebanon on the second, and Similarly, it is unlikely that Turkey, Syria and Iraq will between Israel and Jordan on the third. In the three come to an agreement regarding the Euphrates waters attempts, outcomes fell short of the objectives; it was prior to a mutually satisfactory resolution of the differ- clear that in the absence of a political settlement of the ences between the two downstream belligerents. In- Arab-Israeli conflict, the parties were not going to deed, it has been very difficult up to now for the three come to an agreement.3 parties even to appear together at meetings. It is important to note that by virtue of the The other precondition for resolving Middle East peace process that was initiated in 1991, transboundary water disputes is that the active sup- the status quo in the Jordan basin is in flux. Indeed, a port and involvement of a Third Party be enlisted, or at water resources working group has been meeting un- least accepted, by the concerned parties. It is critically der the auspices of the multilateral track, and a peace important that the mediator be perceived as being both treaty has already been signed between Israel and impartial and firmly committed to a successful resolu- Jordan. While that treaty lays out an agreement on tion of the dispute. In the case of the Indus waters sharing and managing water resources, it is not a conflict, for example, the World Bank mediated basin-wide agreement: not only are Syria, Lebanon more-or-less continuous negotiations between India and the Palestinians not signatories of the document, and Pakistan from 1952 until September 1960, when there is absolutely no mention of them. Nonetheless, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed. It was thanks to the continued progress in the peace process holds out positive involvement of an impartial mediator that hope that a basin-wide agreement may eventually be both states perceived an equitable distribution of ben- reached. efits and sufficient inducements to bring them to the The situation with regard to the groundwater negotiating table. sources of the West Bank is equally complex. About In contrast, the perception of impartiality on one-half of Israel’s annual supply of groundwater and the part of the mediator has not characterized the one-quarter of its total renewable supply of fresh water negotiation process in the Jordan basin until very originate in two subterranean basins in the West Bank. recently. In the 1950s, when the Eisenhower Adminis- Those waters flow naturally across the “Green Line” tration of the United States government took charge of (the 1949 Armistice Demarcation Line) into Israel. the Jordan water dispute and appointed Eric Johnston Moreover, by virtue of its occupation of the West Bank, as “Personal Representative of the President” and Israel has been controlling water use in the territory. chief negotiator, the Arab riparians insisted outright The result has been that approximately eighty percent that the United States government was not an impar- of West Bank water is exploited in Israel and by Israeli tial Third Party; in fact, their perception of a pro-Israel 6 Political and Institutional Responses to Transboundary Water Disputes in the Middle East bias was reiterated throughout the two years of nego- ment to working closely, and in an advisory capacity, tiations and influenced the outcome of that process. It with local expertise. I should emphasize that local is only since the inception of the current Middle East expertise and ingenuity in the peace process—and the creation of a truly multilateral water resource domain is not track (composed of delegations from 29 countries ex- lacking among the Israelis, Jor- It is important to cluding the Middle East and North Africa) under the danians, and Palestinians; to wit, realize, however, leadership of the United States—that the importance the three parties have had no that the implemen- of impartiality has been properly addressed.
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