Hedging, Critical Discourse Analysis and the Original Brexit Affair
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The Future of Europe the Eurozone and the Next Recession Content
April 2019 Chief Investment Office GWM Investment Research The future of Europe The Eurozone and the next recession Content 03 Editorial Publication details This report has been prepared by UBS AG and UBS Switzerland AG. Chapter 1: Business cycle Please see important disclaimer and 05 Cyclical position disclosures at the end of the document. 08 Imbalances This report was published on April 9 2019 10 Emerging markets Authors Ricardo Garcia (Editor in chief) Chapter 2: Policy space Jens Anderson Michael Bolliger 14 Institutional framework Kiran Ganesh Matteo Ramenghi 16 Fiscal space Roberto Scholtes Fabio Trussardi 19 Monetary space Dean Turner Thomas Veraguth Thomas Wacker Chapter 3: Impact Contributors Paul Donovan 23 Bond markets Elisabetta Ferrara Tom Flury 26 Banks Bert Jansen Claudia Panseri 29 Euro Achim Peijan Louis Pfau Giovanni Staunovo Themis Themistocleous Appendix Desktop Publishing 32 The evolution of the EU: A timeline Margrit Oppliger 33 Europe in numbers Cover photo 34 2020–2025 stress-test scenario assumptions Gettyimages Printer Neidhart + Schön, Zurich Languages English, German and Italian Contact [email protected] Order or subscribe UBS clients can subscribe to the print version of The future of Europe via their client advisor or the Printed & Branded Products Mailbox: [email protected] Electronic subscription is also available via the Investment Views on the UBS e-banking platform. 2 April 2019 – The future of Europe Editorial “Whatever it takes.” These words of Mario Draghi’s marked the inflection point in the last recession and paved the way to the present economic recovery. But as the euro celebrates its 20th birthday, the world and investors are beset again by recessionary fears, with risks mounting and likely to continue doing so in the coming years. -
Anatomy of a Crisis
Page 7 Chapter 2 Munich: Anatomy of A Crisis eptember 28, 1938, “Black Wednesday,” dawned on a frightened Europe. Since the spring Adolf Hitler had spoken often about the Sudetenland, the western part of Czechoslovakia. Many of the 3 Smillion German-speaking people who lived there had complained that they were being badly mistreated by the Czechs and Slovaks. Cooperating closely with Sudeten Nazis, Hitler at first simply demanded that the Czechs give the German-speakers within their borders self-government. Then, he upped the ante. If the Czechs did not hand the Sudetenland to him by October 1, 1938, he would order his well-armed and trained soldiers to attack Czechoslovakia, destroy its army, and seize the Sudetenland. The Strategic Location of the Sudetenland Germany’s demand quickly reverberated throughout the European continent. Many countries, tied down by various commitments and alliances, pondered whether—and how—to respond to Hitler’s latest threat. France had signed a treaty to defend the Czechs and Britain had a treaty with France; the USSR had promised to defend Czechoslovakia against a German attack. Britain, in particular, found itself in an awkward position. To back the French and their Czech allies would almost guarantee the outbreak of an unpredictable and potentially ruinous continental war; yet to refrain from confronting Hitler over the Sudetenland would mean victory for the Germans. In an effort to avert the frightening possibilities, a group of European leaders converged at Munich Background to the Crisis The clash between Germany and Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland had its origins in the Versailles Treaty of 1919. -
ASD-Covert-Foreign-Money.Pdf
overt C Foreign Covert Money Financial loopholes exploited by AUGUST 2020 authoritarians to fund political interference in democracies AUTHORS: Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley © 2020 The Alliance for Securing Democracy Please direct inquiries to The Alliance for Securing Democracy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1700 18th Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/covert-foreign-money/. The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the authors alone. Cover and map design: Kenny Nguyen Formatting design: Rachael Worthington Alliance for Securing Democracy The Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD), a bipartisan initiative housed at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, develops comprehensive strategies to deter, defend against, and raise the costs on authoritarian efforts to undermine and interfere in democratic institutions. ASD brings together experts on disinformation, malign finance, emerging technologies, elections integrity, economic coercion, and cybersecurity, as well as regional experts, to collaborate across traditional stovepipes and develop cross-cutting frame- works. Authors Josh Rudolph Fellow for Malign Finance Thomas Morley Research Assistant Contents Executive Summary �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1 Introduction and Methodology �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� -
An Analysis of Euroskepticism's Influence on Britain's Vote to Leave the European Union
An Analysis of Euroskepticism’s Influence on Britain’s Vote to Leave the European Union* Kayla McCrary Abstract In June 2016, the United Kingdom held an in/out referendum on membership in the European Union (EU) resulting in a narrow victory for Euroskeptics. Historically, Britain has notably been a Euroskeptic nation, and the following analysis of Britain’s relationship with the EU will explore the implications of Brexit in context with Euroskepticism. This analysis is a result of previous research on the British vote to the leave the EU and draws substantially on research in the fields of voting patterns, social identity, and Britain’s unique characteristics that culminated in the vote to leave the EU. As a result, this paper relies heavily on historical implications of Euroskepticism as well as recent literature on the theories of Euroskeptic voting, demographics, and the history of the relationship between the UK and the EU. The paper concludes that populist and anti-globalist sentiments driven by political parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) mobilized Euroskepticism, allowing for a philosophy to transform into effective policy change. The main driving factors behind Britain’s unique position of leaving the EU were economic and social. This conclusion is substantiated by a constituency-based analysis, which utilizes demographic data, voter turnout, and the referendum result data in order to quantify Euroskepticism and its impact on the top constituencies that voted to leave the EU. Keywords: European Union, Euroskepticism, Brexit, UKIP, Britain, referenda *Adapted from “An Analysis of British Euroscepticism and Britain’s Vote to Leave the European Union,” a University Honors Thesis for Middle Tennessee State University. -
Brexit: Initial Reflections
Brexit: initial reflections ANAND MENON AND JOHN-PAUL SALTER* At around four-thirty on the morning of 24 June 2016, the media began to announce that the British people had voted to leave the European Union. As the final results came in, it emerged that the pro-Brexit campaign had garnered 51.9 per cent of the votes cast and prevailed by a margin of 1,269,501 votes. For the first time in its history, a member state had voted to quit the EU. The outcome of the referendum reflected the confluence of several long- term and more contingent factors. In part, it represented the culmination of a longstanding tension in British politics between, on the one hand, London’s relative effectiveness in shaping European integration to match its own prefer- ences and, on the other, political diffidence when it came to trumpeting such success. This paradox, in turn, resulted from longstanding intraparty divisions over Britain’s relationship with the EU, which have hamstrung such attempts as there have been to make a positive case for British EU membership. The media found it more worthwhile to pour a stream of anti-EU invective into the resulting vacuum rather than critically engage with the issue, let alone highlight the benefits of membership. Consequently, public opinion remained lukewarm at best, treated to a diet of more or less combative and Eurosceptic political rhetoric, much of which disguised a far different reality. The result was also a consequence of the referendum campaign itself. The strategy pursued by Prime Minister David Cameron—of adopting a critical stance towards the EU, promising a referendum, and ultimately campaigning for continued membership—failed. -
'The Birth of the Euro' from <I>EUROPE</I> (December 2001
'The birth of the euro' from EUROPE (December 2001-January 2002) Caption: On the eve of the entry into circulation of euro notes and coins on January 1, 2002, the author of the article relates the history of the single currency's birth. Source: EUROPE. Magazine of the European Union. Dir. of publ. Hélin, Willy ; REditor Guttman, Robert J. December 2001/January 2002, No 412. Washington DC: Delegation of the European Commission to the United States. ISSN 0191- 4545. Copyright: (c) EUROPE Magazine, all rights reserved The magazine encourages reproduction of its contents, but any such reproduction without permission is prohibited. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_birth_of_the_euro_from_europe_december_2001_january_2002-en-fe85d070-dd8b- 4985-bb6f-d64a39f653ba.html Publication date: 01/10/2012 1 / 5 01/10/2012 The birth of the euro By Lionel Barber On January 1, 2002, more than 300 million European citizens will see the euro turn from a virtual currency into reality. The entry into circulation of euro notes and coins means that European Monetary Union (EMU), a project devised by Europe’s political elite over more than a generation, has finally come down to the street. The psychological and economic consequences of the launch of Europe’s single currency will be far- reaching. It will mark the final break from national currencies, promising a cultural revolution built on stable prices, enduring fiscal discipline, and lower interest rates. The origins of the euro go back to the late 1960s, when the Europeans were searching for a response to the upheaval in the Bretton Woods system, in which the US dollar was the dominant currency. -
Hedge Funds and Following Last Week’S Brexit Vote by Boosting Allocations to Hedge Funds
Tuesday June 28, 2016 www.bloombergbriefs.com Following Brexit, Clearbrook Plans to Add Funds INSIDE Alaska’s $53 billion wealth fund plans BY HEMA PARMAR Clearbrook Global Advisors is seeking to take advantage of market turmoil to exit all of its funds of hedge funds and following last week’s Brexit vote by boosting allocations to hedge funds. will instead make investment decisions in- The New York-based firm, which has $2 billion of its $28 billion invested in hedge house: From the Minutes funds, is looking to bring on at least two new managers in the next few weeks whose strategies could benefit from the fallout of Britain’s unexpected decision to quit the Computer-driven funds led the winners European Union, according to Tim Ng, its chief investment officer. Clearbrook currently following Britain's decision to leave the EU: Returns in Brief has 30 managers on its platform of direct hedge fund investments. Equity markets plunged and the pound fell to a three-decade low on Friday in the aftermath of the 52 percent to 48 percent vote to leave. Many hedge funds avoided Citadel hires Morgan Stanley's betting around the vote altogether, but several computer-driven funds that did profited Lieblich as chief technology officer. from the market turmoil. Mariner Investment's Co-CIO Williams Clearbrook is planning to add two distressed funds to its platform to take advantage of is leaving the firm: On the Move stocks hit in the market rout, Ng said in an interview on Friday. The firm will also raise its existing long-short equity fund allocation to 6 percent from 4 percent to benefit from New York Life Insurance's Private equity valuation spreads, which "have blown out quite dramatically," said Ng. -
Additional Submissions to Parliament in Support of Inquiries Regarding Brexit Damian Collins MP Dear Mr Collins, Over the Past M
Additional Submissions to Parliament in Support of Inquiries Regarding Brexit Damian Collins MP Dear Mr Collins, Over the past many months, I have been going through hundreds of thousands of emails and documents, and have come across a variety of communications that I believe are important in furthering your inquiry into what happened between Cambridge Analytica, UKIP and the Leave.EU campaign. As multiple enquiries found that no work was done, I would like to appeal those decisions with further evidence that should hopefully help you and your colleagues reach new conclusions. As you can see with the evidence outlined below and attached here, chargeable work was completed for UKIP and Leave.EU, and I have strong reasons to believe that those datasets and analysed data processed by Cambridge Analytica as part of a Phase 1 payable work engagement (see the proposal documents submitted last April), were later used by the Leave.EU campaign without Cambridge Analytica’s further assistance. The fact remains that chargeable work was done by Cambridge Analytica, at the direction of Leave.EU and UKIP executives, despite a contract never being signed. Despite having no signed contract, the invoice was still paid, not to Cambridge Analytica but instead paid by Arron Banks to UKIP directly. This payment was then not passed onto Cambridge Analytica for the work completed, as an internal decision in UKIP, as their party was not the beneficiary of the work, but Leave.EU was. I am submitting the following additional materials to supplement the testimony and documents I gave to the DCMS Committee last year as follows: 1) FW PRESS INVITATION HOW TO WIN THE EU REFERENDUM INVITE ONLY.pdf a. -
Report on an Investigation in Respect of the Leave.EU Group Limited
Report on an investigation in respect of the Leave.EU Group Limited Concerning pre-poll transaction reports and the campaign spending return for the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union 11 May 2018 1 Other formats For information on obtaining this publication in a large-print or Braille version, please contact the Electoral Commission: Tel: 020 7271 0500 Email: [email protected] The Electoral Commission is the independent body which oversees elections and regulates political finance in the UK. We work to promote public confidence in the democratic process and ensure its integrity. 2 Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 4 2 The decision to investigate .................................................................... 8 3 The investigation ................................................................................... 12 4 The investigation findings .................................................................... 14 5 Final determination on offences .......................................................... 28 Annex A: Legal framework .......................................................................... 29 3 1 Introduction The Electoral Commission 1.1 The Electoral Commission (“the Commission”) is the statutory regulator with the power, granted by an Act of Parliament, to set and enforce standards in relation to elections and referendums. Its functions include the regulation of political finances -
Arron Banks V HMRC
[2020] UKUT 0101 (TCC) Appeal number:UT/2019/0024 INHERITANCE TAX – exemption for gifts to political parties – s 24 Inheritance Tax Act 1984 – gift to UK Independence Party not within scope of exemption – whether breach of European Convention on Human Rights – whether breach of European Union law UPPER TRIBUNAL TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER ARRON BANKS Appellant - and - THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER Respondents MAJESTY’S REVENUE & CUSTOMS TRIBUNAL: Mrs Justice Falk Judge Timothy Herrington Sitting in public at The Rolls Building, The Royal Courts of Justice, Fetter Lane, London EC4 on 18, 19 and 20 February 2020 Imran Afzal, Counsel, for the Appellant Christopher Stone, Counsel, instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs, for the Respondents © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2020 DECISION Introduction 5 1. The appellant (“Mr Banks”) appeals against a decision by the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) (Judge Ashley Greenbank) released on 15 October 2018 (the “Decision”). The FTT refused the appeal of Mr Banks against a notice of determination dated 15 February 2017 issued by the respondents (“HMRC”) which assessed him to inheritance tax (“IHT”) in the amount of £162,945.34 on donations that he or a company that he 10 controlled made to the UK Independence Party (“UKIP”) in the period from 7 October 2014 to 31 March 2015. 2. It is common ground that the donations constituted “transfers of value” within s 3 Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (“IHTA”). The parties also agree that the transfers of value comprising the donations made by a company controlled by Mr Banks can be treated 15 as having been made by him under s 94 IHTA. -
Black Wednesday’
Salmond currency plan threatens a Scottish ‘Black Wednesday’ Alex Salmond has five plans for the currency of an independent Scotland according to his list in the STV debate on 25th August (and then there is the latent plan F). They were presented as a range of equally attractive options. This makes light of the issue. One of the options – using “a currency like the Danish krone” - means entering the ERM (the Exchange Rate Mechanism) that the UK was so disastrously a part of and which the UK wasted a meaningful portion of its foreign exchange reserves (£48 billion in today’s money) trying to stay within just on 16th September 1992. That was Black Wednesday, when the Bank of England base rate went up to 15%. Notably Alex Salmond omitted to mention the Norwegian krone: Scotland, with high public spending, too little oil&gas left in the North Sea, and an all-in national debt of £131 billion equivalent on a GDP of £146 billion, will need its oil&gas tax revenues to either defend its currency or manage its debt, and will not have enough left over for a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Scotland has the attributes of a lax fiscal policy now: a current deficit of taxes versus spending (called a primary fiscal deficit) of 5% of GDP, with extra spending promised by the SNP that could expand an already high debt as a proportion of GDP. The debt is likely to start out at above 70% in cash, plus another 20% in contingent liabilities like PFI, backing for Bank of Scotland and RBS, and Scotland’s share of the Euro bailout of Ireland and Portugal. -
Why the Euro Will Collapse
Why the Euro will collapse Whither Europe ?’ CIBAM Global Business Symposium 21 June 2013 Michael Kitson University of Cambridge www.michaelkitson.org https://twitter.com/MichaelKitson Europe is not working Source: Eurostat: 2013 Unemployment in Europe (April 2013) Source: Eurostat, 2013 Youth unemployment rates in Europe, Jan 2000 - April 2013 (%) Source: Eurostat, 2013 Source: Eurostat Explaining the crisis • A debt crisis austerity is the solution • A ‘structural’ or ‘competitiveness’ problem reducing the role of the state and more ‘competition’ • A Euro problem the single currency is structurally flawed The Euro problem • Combined countries together with different structures and different business cycles • Lack of policy flexibility • Lack of market flexibility • Why has the Euro problem not emerged before? • Masked by the twin deficits: – fiscal – balance of payments Source: Eurostat database Source: Eurostat database Balance of payments on current account, selected countries (% of GDP) Source: Simon Wren-Lewis: http://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/other-eurozone-crisis.html The lack of policy flexibility • Exchange rates • Monetary policy • Fiscal policy • Resource transfers Eurozone: long-term interest rates, 1993-2013 Author: Spitzl, available on a creative commons license, (GNU Free Documentation License) Data Source: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu European Fiscal Compact • A debt-to-GDP ratio below 60% • A general budget deficit less than 3.0% of the GDP • A structural deficit of less than 1.0% of GDP if the debt-to-GDP ratio