FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES
Israeli-Jordanian Foreign Relations: An Intricate Association in a Volatile
Neighbourhood
Bachelor's Thesis
VIKTÓRIA VARGOVÁ
Supervisor: Aaron Walter, MBA, Ph.D.
Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations
Brno 2019
2
Bibliographic Record
Author: Viktória Vargová Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and European Studies University Number: 450754 Title of Thesis: Israeli-Jordanian Foreign Relations: An Intricate Association in a Volatile Neighbourhood Degree Programme: International Relations Supervisor: Aaron Walter, MBA, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2019 Year of Enrolment: 2015 Number of Pages: 63 Keywords: Israel, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, The Wadi Araba Treaty, Israeli-Jordanian relations, Constructivism, Security Cooperation, the Palestinian question, Palestine, The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project, The Arab Spring, ISIS, Water management, the Middle East
3
Abstract
In this thesis, I will focus on the relationship between the two neighbours, Israel and Jordan. In the first part, I am going to assess their relations before the Wadi Araba Treaty otherwise known as the peace treaty between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan signed in 1994. The second part will be dealing with their post-1994 relationship and how such a document changed and shaped their relations and how it has evolved since then. In the analytical part, I will explore possible situations for future or potential future relations, taking into account external variables like ISIS and the Palestinian question which hinder the improvement of their current relationship. Through the prism of constructivism, I will assess their situation to explain the hostility and disputes dealt with through time between these two nations. Based on all information researched, I will try to find out whether their treaty is in jeopardy or whether it will continue providing a safe ground for their enhanced cooperation in the future, despite the problematic areas they have to bear with.
Anotácia
V tejto bakalárskej práci sa budem sústrediť na vzťah medzi dvoma susednými štátmi, Izraelom a Jordánskom. V prvej časti budem posudzovať ich vzťahy pred podpísaním Wadi Araba zmluvy, inak známej aj ako mierová zmluva medzi štátom Izrael a Jordánskym kráľovstvom podpísanej v roku 1994. Ďalšia časť sa bude zaoberať ich vzťahom po roku 1994 a ako tento dokument zmenil a sformoval ich vzájomný vzťah, ktorý sa vyvíja až dodnes. V analytickej časti sa budem snažiť nájsť možné situácie pre ich budúce vzťahy, berúc do úvahy externé premenné ako ISIS alebo palestínsku otázku, ktorá veľmi intenzívne zabraňuje akémukoľvek zlepšovaniu ich vzájomných vzťahov. Pomocou prizmy sociálneho konštruktivizmu sa budem snažiť posúdiť ich situáciu a vďaka tomuto teoretickému rámcu zhodnotiť, ako možno vysvetliť ich nevraživosť a spory, s ktorými sa museli vysporiadať. Na základe informácií získaných štúdiom tejto problematiky sa budem snažiť zistiť, či je ich zmluva v ohrození, alebo aj napriek všetkým problematickým oblastiam, ktorým čelia, bude aj naďalej predstavovať bezpečný základ pre ich posilnenú spoluprácu.
4
5
Statutory Declaration
I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Bachelor's Thesis concerning the topic of Israeli-Jordanian Foreign Relations: An Intricate Association in a Volatile Neighbourhood independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.
In Brno on May 06, 2019
……......
Viktória Vargová
6
7
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Aaron T. Walter for his valuable and useful suggestions during the planning and writing of this thesis. His patient and precise guidance, encouragement and constructive critiques have been greatly appreciated. I would also like to thank my friends for their willingness to discuss the topic of this thesis and therefore provide intriguing points of view and constructive feedback. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their endless support throughout my whole study.
8
Table of Contents
Introduction ...... 11 1 The overview of Israeli-Jordanian Relations ...... 13 1.1 Israeli-Jordanian Relations prior to 1994 ...... 13 1.2 Israeli-Jordanian Relations after 1994 ...... 18 1.3 Social constructivism as the main theoretical framework ...... 22 2 The Palestinian question and security cooperation ...... 25 2.1 Palestine: A thorn in Israeli-Jordanian relations ...... 25 2.2 Arab Spring and the Islamic State: a changed narrative for Israel and Jordan .... 32 2.3 Security cooperation between the two neighbours ...... 36 3 Future cooperation: asset or liability? ...... 41 3.1 Sectors of collaboration & water management ...... 41 3.2 The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project ...... 45 3.3 Possible shortcomings of the Red-Dead Project ...... 48 Conclusion...... 53 Bibliography ...... 58
9
10
Introduction
The main objective of this thesis is to assess the relations between the two neighbouring countries, Israel and Jordan. According to their joint decision to sign the so- called Wadi Araba Treaty, officially they should be enjoying peaceful cohabitation without any further problems. Nevertheless, even with the treaty signed, they could not get rid of certain obstacles affecting their relationship. The Palestinian question, post Arab Spring tendencies related to terrorism and security cooperation are the main issues this thesis aims to focus on in order to assess the development of their relationship, both prior to 1994 and after signing the treaty. Within this context there is the main question; is the Wadi Araba Treaty in jeopardy? Considering this possible hypothesis, there are two follow up questions this thesis aims to tackle: Are the current and formerly older disputes going to change the perception of the treaty? Or is it still going to keep its importance, positively shaping the relationship Israel and Jordan have towards each other?
In order to either affirm or rule out the hypothesis, and to address this issue properly, the main methodological framework for this thesis is qualitative research. For this type of research, the focus is to understand, explore, explain, discover or clarify situations, perceptions, values, beliefs and experiences of a group of people. The flexibility of this approach is often based on deductive rather than inductive logic and thus many times is non-sequential in its operationalism. But because of the mentioned flexibility, it is more difficult to check for researcher bias, which to some extent can be perceived as a limitation.1 Within this qualitative approach, the method chosen for this research is going to be document analysis, as this thesis aims to analyse mainly secondary sources like articles, books, policy papers and academic works. The primary source that is to be analysed is the treaty itself, as it provides the best comprehension of the intended shift in their relationship and areas they claimed to resolve and cooperate at.
This work also seeks to understand the complexity of their relationship through the prism of social constructivism, which has been chosen as the theoretical background
1 Kumar, R. 2014. Research Methodology. A Step by step guide for beginners, 131-132.
11 underpinning the main hypothesis, which claims the treaty might be jeopardized. The implementation and appropriateness of this theory would be further explained in Chapter 1. Just to present an outline, this theory presumes that reality is rather constituted than merely described as actors talk it, write it and argue it.2 Thereby it creates new possibilities for understanding and evaluating the Israeli-Jordanian relationship, as it implies it has not been strictly given as a whole and just a simple consequence of the Arab relationship towards Israel, but more likely created through perceptions, values and beliefs of its actors, which are all variables that are about to be reviewed through qualitative research.
As has already been discussed, in every research they are limitations that are going to influence the whole working process and the possible outcomes of it. Therefore, it is very important to be aware of such flaws, as their targeting could provide a better interpretation of the research finding. Looking at the limitations in broader terms of methodology, working mainly with secondary data could end up in a somehow constrained perspective, as there might be, even a slight but significant bias, disregard or exaggeration present. Such phenomena could influence the overall reading and comprehension of the analysed data; hence it is important to evaluate the sources within a rather holistic perspective. The other essential limitation that is going to be present in this study is a confined time frame. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is put on 1967 onwards, as this year marked the end of the “small Israel” era and led to the Jordanian loss of the East Jerusalem and West Bank to Israel, which also laid the foundation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that still presents a significant issue for both neighbours.3 Although the time period from 1948 to 1967 will still be assessed, for the purpose of this study it is important to target the events that profoundly affected their relations. Nevertheless, this thesis attempts to take all those external influences into account and through three main chapters provide the reader with all the information necessary for finding the appropriate answer for its hypothesis.
2 Potter, J. 1996. Representing Reality. Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction, 97-98. 3 Čejka, M. 2015. Izrael a Palestina. Minulost, současnost a směřovaní blízkovýchodního konfliktu, 113-115.
12
1 The overview of Israeli-Jordanian Relations
1.1 Israeli-Jordanian Relations prior to 1994
In order to understand how the situation got to the point where it is nowadays, one must examine the underlying causes in the past. If there is such a thing like Israeli- Jordanian relations regarded, many would see only the axiomatic part behind – that it deals with relations between Jews and Arabs. Certainly, things are not that simple whatsoever, but it is indeed a part that plays an important role in the whole picture. It is misleading to suppose that their relations have always been tense though, as in fact, they were able to live in relative harmony. The Jews living in the Middle East (pre-state) learnt how to form a rather symbiotic relationship with Arabs and Bedouins, whom they bargained with. Surprisingly, and despite still prevailing unequal position of the Jewish community, they were able to find their place more easily in the Arab world rather than anywhere else. That is why when the Zionist tendencies started appearing from the second half of the 19th century, the epicentre was not placed in the Jewish communities of the Arab world, but in Europe, harshly facing bitter waves of antisemitism.4
However, as time went on, the situation started to get more complicated. After all the atrocities that Jewish people had to face especially during WWII, it was decided; they needed their own state. They would establish it at what was the British Mandate for Palestine at that time. Needless to say, that although Arabs were able to accept the Jewish population that was already in that area, they were strictly against any further immigration of Jews. Moreover, they were fiercely against the idea of a two-nation state under the British patronage. Demographic facts and further statistics were still in favour of Arabs who would be a majority, thus this solution was immediately turned down by both parties. Britain was not able to find any suitable solution and that is why in February 1947 the UN took over the initiative. A special committee called UNSCOP5, consisting of 11 member states, decided about the future of Palestine. It was divided into 8 parts, 3 meant for the Jewish state and
4 Čejka, M. 2015. Izrael a Palestina. Minulost, současnost a směřovaní blízkovýchodního konfliktu, 19-21. 5 An abbreviation for The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.
13
3 for the Arab one. Jerusalem was supposed to get a special corpus separatum6 status due to its special ethnic and religious nature. The last part was the city of Jaffa, that was supposed to be an Arab enclave within a Jewish state. Voting in the UN proved that agreement was reached and on the 14th of May 1948 the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel was solemnly read by David Ben Gurion.7
As Arab countries were vocal about their unwillingness to respect the so-called Partition Plan since the very beginning, it was no surprise when they launched attacks on Israel. It is necessary to say that although British trained forces from Transjordan intervened in the conflict after all, they intervened only in the areas that had been designated as part of the Arab state under the UN Plan, as well as Jerusalem. Together with Egypt, Jordan retained control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively.8 In 1949 an armistice was signed with Israel and the other Arab states followed suit and signed a separate bilateral agreement with Israel – Transjordan did so on April 3. It could enjoy the power it gained over the West Bank, as it was gifted to Jordan as a token for its loyalty to Britain and the Zionists.9 It is not really known that King Abdullah I, the kingdom´s founder, had secret contacts with the Zionist movement beginning in the 1930s, including his two meetings with Golda Meir.10 His cooperation with Zionist leadership was driven by his desire for an expanded Arab state in the region and hoped that in return for granting Jewish autonomy within his proposed kingdom, he would be able to incorporate Palestine.11 Although Zionist leaders rejected his previous proposals, after the war he got what he wanted – the West Bank was finally his.
6 In case of Jerusalem the term refers to a separate body, that was to have been administred under UN sovereignity as an international city. For more detailed information visit: http://www.mideastweb.org/ga303.htm 7 Čejka, M. 2015. Izrael a Palestina. Minulost, současnost a směřovaní blízkovýchodního konfliktu, 63-70. 8 Office of the Historian. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948. Accessible via: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war 9 TRT World. May 14, 2018. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and Nakba explained [Video File]. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTMRMX7Pw5U 10 Karsh, E. 2004. Review of The Jordanian-Israeli War 1948-1951: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 11 Center for Israel Education. May 10, 2018. Golda Meir Has Secret Meeting with King Abdullah in Amman. Accessible via: https://israeled.org/golda-meir-secret-meeting-king-abdullah-amman/
14
Later on, the 1950s were challenging for both countries. While Israel was still trying to figure itself out as a new country, and deal with the Suez Crisis, Jordan´s new king Hussein12 tried to govern his country according to the ideals of democratic liberalism. Due to several coups and riots in the Arab world he was almost forced, even though reluctantly, to accept British military help and American oil airlift in order to keep his state safe from its external enemies. Ultimately, Jordan managed to overcome these difficulties they had to face and entered the 1960s with new hope and confidence, as their economy started to take off and develop quite well.13
The Hashemite Kingdom underwent huge progress, with rates of economic growth higher than most other developing countries. It gave rise to a new middle class of educated Jordanians, eager to continue building their country, thus making it more stable. Unfortunately, stability was soon challenged. In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established, alongside other independent Palestinian guerrilla groups (fedayeen). Their raids were conducted into Israel from Lebanon or Jordan. On November 13, 1966, Israel launched a major attack on the West Bank border village of Samu as a response to a fedayeen raid. The Jordanians wanted to repel the attack but were utterly defeated by the Israeli´s firepower. Egypt, Syria and Iraq called for riots in major Jordanian cities while the opponents of the Kingdom blamed their regime. Moreover, Egyptian president Nasser announced the Straits of Tiran would be closed to Israeli shipping vessels, while Jordan firmly aligned with Egypt, expecting that war was very likely to happen. Not far away from the truth, on June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise attack on the Egyptian air force. In response to that, Jordanian forces launched an offensive, but Israelis counterattacked soon enough, in direction of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel dominated the skies and the Jordanian army, undoubtedly outnumbered, was completely shattered along with the Egyptian and Syrian
12 The former Emirate of Transjordan was turned into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan after the ratification of The Treaty of London. What is more, King Hussein was coronated in May 1953, as King Abdullah I was assassinated in 1951 and his son, Talal bin Abdulah, was forced to abdicate. 13 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Fruits of Stability. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods2.html
15 ones. Israel seized the West Bank and East Jerusalem at the expense of Jordan.14 The Hashemite Kingdom paid the highest price in the conflict. Around 300,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees and were forced to flee to Jordan and the Jordanian economy was desolated as almost three-quarters of their agricultural land and much of their industrial production was located in the West Bank. Jerusalem and other religious sites had provided revenue through the tourism industry and that was now in the hands of Israel. Because of that, 38% of Jordan´s gross national product vanished.15 Without any doubt, the Six-Day War presented an unfathomable loss for their country.
One would assume that such disputes would leave Israel and Jordan on the warpath, but in fact it just strengthened the overall desire towards peaceful reconciliation. The problem was that both countries had different views on how that peace should look. It is undeniable though, that passing the UN Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967, set the basis for further negotiation. It called upon Israel to ensure the withdrawal of their forces from territories occupied in the conflict in exchange for the respect and acknowledgement of their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area. The aim was for each to live free from threats and within recognized boundaries. Both Israel and Jordan accepted the resolution, but Israel stated that in order to address those questions properly it needs to be done only through direct negotiations with Arab states as that could lead to a comprehensive peace treaty.16 It was quite a counterstatement though, as Israel’s occupation of Arab lands put a serious obstacle in the process of reconciliation and justice.
That is why during the next few years it was difficult to find any common ground for either of them. The situation was still turbulent, with Israel outlasting Yom Kippur war, followingly accepting Resolution 338, participating in Camp David accords and signing a peace treaty with Egypt. Just with its neighbour they were not able to find a compromise. Hussein was
14 As a matter of fact, Israel also seized the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria. 15 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Disaster of 1967. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods3.html 16 UN Security Council. Resolution 242. Accessible via: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch3.pdf
16 not keen on the treaty, as he thought it would be destabilizing to the region, and on the other hand, Israelis persistently refused to negotiate with the PLO17, even after Hussein´s offer to coordinate the negotiations under a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.18 Israel seemed to be not ready to compromise as there was a general fear that those compromises would be mainly at the country´s expense.
Especially in the 1990s, and with Middle Eastern states still not capable of any reasonable solution, the US and the USSR decided to give them a hand. At the end of October 1991, there was a peace conference held under American-Soviet patronage. It was supposed to create a basis for future multilateral negotiations between Israel, Palestine and Jordan (and other Arab states), along with help of the international community. When the turmoil in the Middle East escalated again, Norway offered its help as a mediator. The so-called Oslo Accord was then signed between Israel and Palestine, which was deemed as a successful and long desired move by Jordan. They also signed an agreement about further cooperation and a peace treaty in 1992, and because of the Oslo Accords Jordan was ready to continue pursuing peace.19 The atmosphere of peace and possible direct negotiations continued with a set of meetings between the main political actors. Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli prime minister, and King Hussein had a secret meeting in Aqaba, where he proposed the peace treaty. They did not agree completely, and that is why Hussein was left in confusion when he received a letter from Bill Clinton where he expressed his congratulations for agreeing to sign a peace treaty. At that time, it had not been agreed upon yet, as Israelis wanted the leasing by Israel of Jordanian lands, which was for Jordan completely out of the question. However, King Hussein expressed his decision to move ahead with negotiations for full peace with Israel and after a secret meeting with Efraim Halevy, Mossad´s deputy director, it seemed they finally found a compromise. On July 25, 1994, the Washington declaration, summing up the peace agreement between Israel and
17 In 1947 King Hussein agreed to recognize PLO as the „sole, legitimate represenatative of the Palestinian people“, which Israelis rejected. 18 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Building Bridges East and West. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods7.html 19 On the other hand, situation was not so bright as many Palestinians and Israelis condemned Oslo Accords, showing their unwillingness to support the peace process. For more information check Čejka, M. 2015. Izrael a Palestina. Minulost, současnost a směřovaní blízkovýchodního konfliktu. 183-193.
17
Jordan, was solemnly signed by Rabin and Hussein together with the US President Clinton on the White House lawn.20 Prime Ministers of both countries, Yitzhak Rabin and Abdul Salam Majali, witnessed by William J. Clinton, signed the peace treaty itself, the so-called Wadi Araba Treaty, on October 26, 1994, at the southern border crossing of Wadi 'Araba.21 It was certainly believed that this treaty would improve their relations and thus positively influence the overall situation in the Middle East, which was undoubtedly a desired goal for the future.
1.2 Israeli-Jordanian Relations after 1994
Israeli-Jordanian talks leading to a full-fledged peace treaty were finished relatively fast, in comparison to what it normally takes to sum up any peace initiatives in a wholesome treaty. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, it was considered as the friendliest and the least problematic negotiation within the whole Middle East peace process. There were no further disputes or hindrances when it came to territories; the borders were accepted and mutually agreed upon after a few modifications. After all, they have been through, they have realised that such a partnership and cooperation is inevitable, as they shared a powerful sense of common aims, interest and what is probably the most important, the realization that any future threats can change the fate of each other.22 The Treaty consisted of a Preamble, 30 Articles and 5 Annexes that further elaborated on the topics of the international boundary, water, crime and drugs, environment and interim measures. In the Preamble it was clearly stated, that both the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the State of Israel were committed to honour the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity.
20 Halevy, E. 2018. The Real Story Behind the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Deal. Accessible via: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-the-real-story-behind-the-israeli-jordanian-peace-deal- 1.5976491 21 The Library. Treaty of Peace Between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The State of Israel. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html 22 Bligh, A. 1998. Jordanian-Israeli Strategic Partnership in Historical Perspective. Policy Paper No. 2, Ariel Center For Policy Research, Israel.
18
What is more, they wanted to ensure lasting security for both of their states and to avoid threats and the use of force between them.23
Articles 1-5 then described general principles, security, diplomatic and other bilateral relations, while they agreed to respect and recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the region. Especially Article 3, which was dealing with international boundary, took into account the special circumstances of the Baquara/Naharayim area. This area was officially under Jordanian sovereignty, but with Israeli private ownership rights. Furthermore, this part of the treaty also regarded an agreement on taking necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism, subversion or violence from being carried out in their territory and combat such activities and all their perpetrators. Out of the following articles, and for the purpose of this thesis, it is adequate to put a focus on Article 6, that dealt with water problems and future regional cooperation in order to ensure sufficient water resources. Chapter 3 would further elaborate on whether they were really keeping this promise and what was the effectiveness of such commitment. Moreover, Article 10 and 12 had a goal to strengthen their future cooperation in the field of cultural and scientific exchanges, while on the other hand, this enhanced knowledge would help to combat crime and drugs issues.24 The treaty covered almost all of the areas, not leaving out important issues like environment, energy, Rift Valley development or agriculture; although they were not explicitly addressed, more likely just considered of great importance and as providing a legal base for future priorities for enhanced cooperation.
However, they did not hesitate and took even further steps toward the implementation of the versatile peace. Jordan and Israel signed thirteen follow-up agreements regarding areas which were covered by the treaty. They opened their borders so tourists on both sides could cross them without serious impediments. Ideas like building a joint airport in the Eilat/ Aqaba region or a joint science and technology college were also being considered.
23 UN Peacemaker. 1994. Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Volume 2042, 1-35325, pg. 1. Accessible via: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IL%20JO_941026_PeaceTreatyIsraelJordan.pdf 24 Ibid, 2-11.
19
In addition, in 1995 they signed a trade agreement governing every commercial transaction between the two countries and the same year they signed an agreement ensuring their future cooperation against crime and drugs. This document was very precise, covering areas of fighting against crime with means like operational cooperation, forensic and identification matters (e.g. DNA testing), information exchanges and investigations. Plus, their police headquarters were connected via a hotline.25
While their diplomatic relations were fundamentally changed with the treaty and have been assessed very optimistically since, there have been situations that tested what was promised on the paper. In 1997, a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls at a border site called the “Island of Peace” at Naharayim, which is exactly the area that has upset many Jordanians since the treaty was signed.26 Israelis are not fully innocent when it comes to plotting attacks either, as later that year Israeli intelligence attempted to assassinate the Palestinian political leader of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal, in Amman. Mossad´s move was planned after a series of suicide bombings Hamas carried out in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, which obviously left Israeli-Jordanian relations quite disrupted. The whole operation failed as two of Mossad´s agents were captured, and Jordan demanded the antidote for Meshaal. At that point was their peace treaty at the brink of a failure, as Jordan stated hadn't they saved Meshaal, the treaty would have been over.27 Those violent attacks carried out by both countries reflected their need for retaliation, showing that even the peace treaty could not fully erase a grudge they continued to hold towards each other.
Especially after such events, the popularity of the treaty was not on the same level for both countries´ citizens, as while Israelis celebrated it, Jordanians were perturbed about the whole situation. It could not be denied though that it helped to achieve some progress in
25 Lukacs, Y. 1999. Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process. Syracuse University Press. Accessed via Google Books 03-15-2019, 196. 26 Daqamseh, the mentioned soldier, expressed no regret over his attack, referring to Israelis as „human garbage“. For more information: Khoury, J. 2017. Murderer of Seven Israeli Schoolgirls Released by Jordan, Shows No Remorse for Killings. Accessed 03-16-2019. Accessible via: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/jordanian-soldier-who-killed-seven-israeli-girls-released-shows-no- remorse-1.5447559 27 Al Jazeera. 2013. Kill Him Silently: Mossad vs Khaled Meshaal. Accessible via: https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2013/01/201312210472621589.html
20 the area of economic cooperation. In 1996, with help from Washington, the Qualifying Industrial Zones were established. They allowed goods produced in Jordan to enter Israel duty-free, under the condition that they contained a clear-cut percentage of Israeli value or content. Thirteen Industrial Zones were established by 2010, which provided jobs for thousands of Jordanians, as those products were also exported to the United States.28
When it comes to bilateral trade in general, it has been quite small though. Imports and exports just between those two states totalled around 365 million dollars in 2013. Some possible ways for improvement are being opened, as Israel is also planning on to supply Jordan with natural gas from its two offshore fields. Another strategically important realm worth mentioning is that they are attempting to solve their respective water scarcity through joint water projects. Equally important is their cooperation in sharing intelligence sources.29 Both of those areas currently tackled upon are going to be further addressed in Chapters 2 and 3.
To assess the situation as it is nowadays, there are two conceptions; on one hand, it could not be denied that political elites of both countries are relying on the treaty heavily, perceiving it as a vital framework of their rather stable cooperation. But on the other hand, citizens of (especially) the Hashemite Kingdom are not so keen on it, barely showing any excitement since 1994. And while it is clear that decisions lay in the hands of the powerful, if Jordan and Israel want to keep a certain level of stability within their countries, they need to hear out those who have something to say against it. The agreement they decided to acknowledge in the 1990s is still solid and helped to advance their ties, but there is still a lot of work to be done in order to come to terms with what has been promised in the Wadi Araba Treaty.
28 Speaking of the US, they also provided Jordan around 35 million dollars in economic support, including joint training and intelligence sharing; over the years, Jordan has built a prosperous, significant partnership with the United States of America. 29 Schenker, D. 2014. Twenty Years of Israeli-Jordanian Peace: A Brief Assessment. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
21
1.3 Social constructivism as the main theoretical framework
As has been already stated in the introduction, this thesis seeks to explain relations between the two actors through the prism of social constructivism. It deems this theory is the most appropriate to do so, as it aims to provide an explanation that lies behind the typical premises of traditional theories like (neo)realism or (neo)liberalism. It does not assess anarchy and the whole international arena as it is known nowadays but rather seeks to disintegrate the system to micro-level, focusing on variables that have been actively creating it. This approach provides a plausible explanation when considering all presented variables, which have been playing such important roles within the Israeli-Jordanian relation.
In order to provide a clear conceptual framework, it is fundamental to understand the main premises of constructivism. Since the late 1980s constructivism has become one of the major schools of thought within IR. Social constructivism is a sociological theory of knowledge that is also applied for the purpose of understanding international relations. According to this theory, human development is socially situated, and knowledge and conception of reality are constructed through interactions with others. When looking from the perspective of IR in general, social constructivism presumes that those relations are historically and socially constructed, rather than inevitable consequences of human nature or other essential characteristics of politics. This perception of the core aspects of IR is in contrary to those assumptions of neorealism or neoliberalism.30 Rationalistic perspective would assume that decisions makers make their decision based on what are the costs and benefits, searching for the most profitable outcome. It would be senseless to completely rule out this perspective, as actors still seek for what is the most beneficial approach for them, but what social constructivism does, is that it goes way deeper into this common assumption. It argues that actors not only make those rational decisions but also act like this based on the social setting they come from, thus the choice cannot be reduced to pure
30 Only NTA NET Political Science. February 9, 2019. Social Constructivism in International Relations [Video File]. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_M0Rls8yERU
22 rationality. The way how actors think and perceive the world around them comes out of the social conditions they are in.
Moreover, another important premise that characterises social constructivism is that actors tend to use so-called “logic of appropriateness”, therefore making decisions due to expectations that are put on them in the social setting.31 This is a crucial point for understanding Israeli-Jordanian relations through the prism of constructivism, as it's been possible to see such phenomena since the very beginning. The international community led largely by the US has put immense pressure on both countries to stabilize their relations and demanded a ceasefire. On the other hand, the constant public pressure of their citizens might be implying otherwise, but behind the belligerence is just a pure wish to finally hush uncertainty and constant turmoil mangling the Middle East.
So how could social constructivism be used as an appropriate theory to explain the intricate association between Israel and Jordan? This school of thought entails a lot of different strands trying to explain social constructions from various points of view, but the one that considers both perceptions is the concept of structuration by Anthony Giddens. In his view, the actor-structure relationship is ambivalent, as just as an individual´s autonomy and decisions are influenced by the structure they live with, structures are also maintained and adapted through the exercise of agency. This structuration thus exists only within the context of rules produced by social structures, and by understanding that actions in a compliant manner reinforce those structures. So, the outcome is no inherent stability of social structures outside human action, because they are socially constructed.32 Society and all its structures are therefore created by an accumulation of all of the decisions their members take, which means the structure itself is not rigid but remains very dynamic due to the decision-making process.
31 Van der Ree, G. February 2014. 04 Social Constructivism [Video File]. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-4Pw_60EgM 32 Gibbs, J. 2013. Structuration theory. Accessible via: https://www.britannica.com/topic/structuration- theory
23
Thereby, how to perceive and assess Jordanian-Israeli relation with such comprehension of constructivism? The main argument would be that since the establishment of Israel, the Arab states saw different religion, different beliefs and basically a threat to their own world. The idea of Zionism, that came in hand with the State of Israel, possessed a profound obstacle for accepting the new country by others, as it diminished them and also detached them in its very own premises. By this approach, a new discourse was created, in which there was not a common ground of mutual acceptance for both countries, because the ideas and principles that lied behind them were mutually exclusive. At the very beginning, Israel saw its Arab neighbours as a threat for its prosperity as they refused to accept the Jewish heritage and the same applies vice versa, as Arab states did not want to accept such a country in the Middle East. But as stated, actors are able to change the structures and that is what happened when King Hussein was in power, actively searching for a reasonable agreement with its neighbour. It is thus possible to argue that politicians, public, allies and other actors (variables) in the system actively contribute to its development and direction. The next chapters will elaborate on how those decisions were taken, especially when it came to problematic areas like Palestinians or on the contrary, areas that were in their common interest, as enhanced security cooperation and how did they change their entangled relations.
24
2 The Palestinian question and security cooperation
2.1 Palestine: A thorn in Israeli-Jordanian relations
When WWI finally ended, the victorious superpowers got their mandate rights in the Middle East. They got to be responsible for governing, and social and cultural development until the mandates were ready for independence. British Mandate for Palestine was created as one of the five mandates, and in 1921 Transjordan was hived off it.
Under such circumstances, many people started developing a sense of not being just ethnic Arabs, but more precisely Palestinians. After WWI, Jewish immigration to Palestine was still allowed. There were around 700,000 citizens there, out of whose approximately 80% were Muslim, 10% Arab Christians and 10% Jews.33 But the more Jews came, the greater the tensions grew in the country. As had already been described in Chapter 1, the UN decided to adopt the Partition Plan in 1947, which was supposed to give Jews their state and to give Palestinians their independence. And while Jews accepted such an idea, Arabs saw the plan just as a pure validation to steal more land of theirs.34 Despite the fact that both Jews and Arabs had been living there for millennia, when the Arab countries formed the Arab League to attack Israel in 1948, they were not willing to give up on their land. When the war was over, the two nations had two completely different perceptions of what kind of era was about to take place. While Jewish celebrated the war as Milchemet Ha'atzma'ut – War of Independence, Arabs brought up a more accurate name – Al-Nakba, The Catastrophe.35 Indeed, as there was nothing to celebrate for the Arabs.
33 Čejka, M. 2015. Izrael a Palestina. Minulost, současnost a směřovaní blízkovýchodního konfliktu, 40- 41. 34 Vox. January 20, 2016. The Israel-Palestine conflict: a brief, simple history [Video File]. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iRYZjOuUnlU 35 History. June 1, 2018. How the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Began [Video File] Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bno1m1zhIWs
25
As a consequence of this war (and riots that took place earlier that year), a huge number of Arabs were expelled or fled from their homes, starting the so-called Palestinian exodus. During this period, until the end of the war, between 600,000 and 700,000 Palestinians fled from the areas that were allocated to Israel or were evicted by Jewish forces. Whether the main reason for their mass exodus was fear, panic, societal collapse or Israeli force, the one thing is undeniable – every effort was made to prevent their return to their land. It is important to bear in mind, though, that Palestinians were not the only victims. At the time when the war started, Jerusalem was on the verge of collapse. Situations including bread riots, robbery, extortion or the incitement of the masses were happening on a daily basis. Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary organization, carried out retaliatory strikes against Arab militia units and albeit there were supposed to secure roads and border areas, it came with a price. Villages or towns from which they operated were permanently occupied or destroyed. Such damage and dangerous situation drove many citizens out; not only Arabs but also Jews were forced to flee. As fights went on, both sides got to suffer profound consequences. The individual brigades and commanders were given instructions which villages and towns they were to conquer and either depopulate, destroy or evict the inhabitants. Attack on Jews were conducted by Arab militiamen and bloody fighting left many casualties.36
After everything they have been through, Israelis were afraid that if there had been too big Arab population in the new Jewish state, it would have compromised and even put in danger the main pillars of the fragile principles of their “new-born” country.37 Although there have been multiple debates on who was responsible, it is not an easy thing to find out as there are always two sides of the story. From the Israeli government, a series of laws had been passed, preventing Arabs who had left from returning to their homes or even claiming their properties; therefore, making even their descendants refugees. Moreover, Israel had its
36 Morris, Benny. 2008. 1948 : A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press. Accessible via: https://search-ebscohost- com.ezproxy.muni.cz/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,uid&db=nlebk&AN=278429&lang=cs& site=eds-live&scope=site. 115-126. 37 On the other hand, there is this opinion that the Zionist movement always stressed the fact that Jewish people who have experienced persecution and discrimination for many years, would provide a fair treatment of minorities within their own state.
26 strategies and policies regarding the borders of the Jewish state with all of the locations, numbers and placement of new Jewish settlements, which to great extent determined the future destiny of Arab population living within the area.38 In the spirit of “to the victor goes the spoils” Israel took over around 60% what was formerly allocated to the proposed Arab state, Transjordan took control of the West Bank and Egypt of the Gaza Strip.
With tendencies like these, it did not come as a huge surprise when in the 1960s the stateless Arabs formed the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It became the biggest Palestinian exile organisation and at the same time arched over most of the smaller Palestinian fractions. Jordan was not particularly keen on such organisation, as at that time there was already a big number of Palestinians living in Jordan and thus King Hussein was afraid that PLO could trigger their separation tendencies. It is possible to see direct connection with Jordan's initiative to create an alliance with Israel, as for King Hussein it was either this cooperation, or giving Palestinians influence over decision-making process within the Kingdom, which might have brought a transformation of the Hashemite Kingdom into a Palestinian state – therefore the king opted for the lesser of two evils.39
Speaking in terms of influence, it took some time until the Palestinian organisation raised public awareness. The main merit went to Yasser Arafat, who got in charge of PLO in 1969. How the organisation was distinguished by the international community was highly debatable, though. Israel, together with the Western countries, referred to it as a very radical; a terrorist organisation. But on the other hand, for many Arabs it represented something like a resistance group, liberation organisation for the Palestinian Arabs.40 Therefore, a new discourse was created, where Israel felt threatened and opted for a rather precautious approach towards PLO, while Arabs, now defining themselves as Palestinian, finally saw a movement for obtaining their fundamental rights and desires. The Charter of PLO basically established the organisation as a legitimate and political representative of
38 Flapan, S. 1987. The Palestinian exodus of 1948. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4., University of California. Accessible via: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2536718.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A552d94fecab3db0e99b4be421ebc24c4 39 Bligh, A. 1998. Jordanian-Israeli Strategic Partnership in Historical Perspective, 12-16. 40 Čejka, M. 2015. Izrael a Palestina. Minulost, současnost a směřovaní blízkovýchodního konfliktu, 102- 103.
27 the Palestinian people. Some articles of the charter have created disputes with Israel, as they had denied the existential right of Israel.41 Ex adverso, when the Oslo Accords were adopted, PLO thought that they had denied rights of Palestinian refugees to return home; it was thus obvious that both sides held a grudge and felt rather hostile towards each other.
So, when the Six-Day War broke out, things have changed. Israel took over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as the Gaza Strip. At that time, many Palestinians were living in that area, which all of a sudden became the responsibility of Israel. The Jewish state still wanted the assimilation of the Palestinian population into the Jordanian political infrastructure, as it was believed such a step would limit their burden with the resolution of the Palestinian problem. But King Hussein was also afraid that Israel would make a push against Palestinians and that would produce a massive influx into Jordan, destabilizing the kingdom and in the worst possible scenario, turning Jordan into Palestine.42 The PLO opted to associate itself with terror tactics and international terror organisations in an attempt to destroy Israel's legitimacy and to undermine the morale of its citizens. That is why starting negotiations with the PLO seemed like the least threatening option for Israel (and also approved by Jordan), as they were both afraid that the disintegration of PLO would lead to its replacement by smaller and more radical terror groups.43 Thereby, being in charge of the West Bank came as a big responsibility, as fully and officially taking over the area meant dealing with the problems present there on the whole.
A good example of how complex such responsibility could be was the division within the Israeli government. There were many different opinions about what to do with the occupied territories, varying from ideas like relinquishing them, integrating West Bank into the Israeli economy, to make the occupation more benign, which would eventually initiate “open bridges” policy with Jordan. In the middle of those stances, there was an approach calling for part of the land being retained and given to Jordan to enhance a peace settlement. Eventually, in the 1970s the Galili document was adopted by the Israeli Labour Party, calling
41 Ibid, 105-106. 42 Sasley, B. March 2002. Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1. 43 Bligh, A. 1998. Jordanian-Israeli Strategic Partnership in Historical Perspective.
28 for the economic and infrastructure development of the occupied Palestinian territories, the encouragement and development of Jewish rural settlements in the Jordan valley and the continuation of the open bridge policy. Such period did not last too long though, as with the political shift in Israel, the right-wing Likud party took the power leach in 1977.
It is important to realize that this political and ideological shift was underpinned by the active campaign of terror that affected Israeli attitudes. The 1970s were marked by a series of horrendous terrorist attacks, including planes hijackings, bombing attacks, hostage crises and multiple massacres. The most (in)famously known were the Avivim massacre, where a school bus leaving Moshav Avivim was attacked with bazooka fire, leaving 12 dead (half of that children)44, or the Munich massacre in 1972, where 11 Israeli Olympic athletes were killed by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September.45 The hijacking of the Air France 139 aeroplane by a pair of Germans who were working with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led to the famous Operation Entebbe (Thunderbolt), where the Israeli forces saved almost one hundred Israeli hostages who had been held captive in Uganda.46 There were no exceptions in how far could such terror lead, therefore it is understandable that the Israeli government was thinking of all possible solutions that might have stopped it. No wonder that some members of Likud would perceive “Jordan as Palestine” and seriously argued for the overthrow of the Hashemite regime and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan. They hoped that the demographic pressure of refugees47 would undermine the Hashemite regime and thus turn Jordan into an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, using all historical, cultural or language claims.48
44 Jacobson, V. A. May 2015. Israeli school bus bombing survivor reunites with nurse who saved him - 45 years later. Accessible via: https://legalinsurrection.com/2015/05/israeli-school-bus-bombing-survivor- reunites-with-nurse-who-saved-him-45-years-later/ 45 Von Hein, M. September 2017. 1972 Munich Olympics massacre: an avoidable catastrophe? Accessible via: https://www.dw.com/cda/en/1972-munich-olympics-massacre-an-avoidable-catastrophe/a-40405813 46 Ruiz, G. February 2018. The Heroic Tale of Operation Entebbe, Israel’s Most Daring Rescue Mission. Accessible via: https://allthatsinteresting.com/operation-entebbe 47 Those refugees would come from Lebanon as a consequence of the war in 1982. 48 They argued that Jordan was, from a historical point of view part of Palestine, then that Jordanians and Palestinians are very alike when it comes to religion, language, culture etc. and also that the original version of the Palestine Mandate included both Jordan and Palestine. In: Barari, H. 2014. Jordan and Israel. A Troubled Relationship in a Volatile Region. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Amman. Deposit NO.: 2014/9/4608, 54-72.
29
Such thing happening would mean the creation of an independent Palestinian state, which would have been a very convenient solution for Israel.
But whatever scenarios and solutions were Israel and Jordan plotting, Palestinian people still felt a strong sense of injustice. Israel ruled the occupied territories with an iron fist, constantly pushing the mental borders of people living there. 1987 marked as a cataclysmic year when the First Intifada broke out. Protests and clashes spread rapidly across refugee camps in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Palestinians took control of neighbourhoods, barricaded roads and defended themselves at any costs. The whole situation underwent a serious upheaval and showed no signs of dissipating, also changing Israel's position in the eyes of the international community. With all atrocities and punishments they caused Palestinians, Israel was abridged of their image as the Jewish nation surrounded by hostile Arab countries. PLO was trying to work together with the UN to stabilize the situation, which met with little success; on the contrary, at that time recently-formed Hamas encouraged resistance fighters and called on the liberation of Palestine. After that Jordan cut all administrative and economic ties with the West Bank and the Palestinian National Council accepted the two-state solution, formerly envisaged by a UN resolution. Despite all the effort, violence went on until the PLO was finally recognized as a sole representative of the Palestinians, which opened a dialogue with Israel.49 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Oslo Accords were finally adopted in 1993, giving an official future framework of cooperation for all parties.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the whole situation has not led to any satisfying end yet. Independence, that was promised to the Palestinian people is still not on the table and has not been close either. In 2000 the Second Intifada burst forth, as Ariel Sharon, at that time an Israeli opposition leader, walked the grounds of the Al-Aqsa mosque. It provoked an angry reaction from the Muslim population, and started an upheaval and riots within the country, leaving even more resentment, debris, wounds and casualties. It was an expression of a deep disappointment and frustration that promises stated in the Oslo
49 Hasan, H. December 2017. Remembering the First Intifada. MEMO: Middle East Monitor. Accessible via: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171209-remembering-the-first-intifada-2/
30 accords were not kept as the signatories did little to back them. As a dire move, Israel decided to reoccupy the Palestinian territories, violating the peace accord signed with PLO. People fiercely resisted the occupation and even Palestinians living in Israel took a stance against the Israeli government.50 Retaliation endlessly continued from both sides, seriously undermining the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Years of fights, full of violent crackdowns, left hundreds dead and thousands injured, many times just innocent bystanders who possessed no imminent danger to Israeli forces.
With a change in the Palestinian leadership, some silver linings occurred. After Arafat's death and Abbas takeover Israeli forces withdrew from some West Bank towns and released dozens of Palestinian prisoners. Israel and Palestine were finally willing to find some solutions. Although, in 2006, with the elections won by Hamas over Fatah, the situation was still at the brink of a crackdown. Hamas asserted control over the Gaza Strip and Fatah got to retreat to the West Bank.51 And especially the West Bank still possess a flaw in the Israeli-Jordanian relationship. As around 60% of the area is still under the Israeli control, with a huge number of settlements, and the rest is under the control of Fatah and there is no satisfying compromise plausible for both sides, it remains a thorn in the relationship of all parties.
In 2017, Hamas called for a transformation of a Palestinian state using the 1967 borders, which was obviously neglected by both parties. Anyway, it is more than obvious that the current condition cannot be carried out forever, and Jordan certainly does not want to engage under current circumstances. The Palestinian question is still a difficult issue to deal with, as whoever would be responsible for the area, needs to be responsible for all burdens of the past that it carries within. Jordan realized that Israel is not ready to “give” the West Bank to anyone, thus decided to step back. The Hashemite Kingdom does not
50 AlJazeera. December 2003. The Second Intifada. Accessible via: https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2003/12/20084101554875168.html 51 Hasan, H. September 2017. Remembering the Second Intifada. MEMO: Middle East Monitor. Accessible via: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170928-remembering-the-second-intifada/
31 want itself to become Palestine.52 The land comes with its people and it is not possible to separate those two aspects as if they had not been intertwined, but rather to search for another option, that would not only benefit Israel or Jordan but also real citizens living in the area, severely affected by many years of this ongoing crisis. Israel and Jordan should accept the responsibility they have over the area in between them and instead of throwing it back and forth like a hot potato find a solution that would benefit all three parties. But as the situation has been unsteadily escalating up and down, it seems like a very challenging task to do, especially within a short period of time. If they are about to keep their promises from the peace treaty and deepen their cooperation in other areas, it might lead to a natural spill-over helping also with the right assessment and solution-finding for Palestine.
2.2 Arab Spring and the Islamic State: a changed narrative for Israel and Jordan
In order to comprehend how has been a situation in the Middle East shaping, it is essential to know the main variables that affected the region. This thesis considers as one of the most important factors actors that emerged as the consequence of the Arab Spring. This term normally refers to a series of pro-democracy uprisings throughout the Middle East that began in December 2010 in Tunisia. Anyway, there is more to that, as describing it solely in terms of democracy fight omits the real character of it. Therefore, it is appropriate to characterize it rather as a reactionary movement led by mainly conservative, religious and Islamist elements against secular Arab regimes with eventually developed into corrupt governments ruling by brute force.53 Those riots quickly spread across the region to fully unleash their destructive power in spring 2011. And as it goes with such events, not every time they lead to a successful end. That was also the case here, as many of them led to even increased instability and oppression. They were accompanied by the desperate desire
52 Al-Masri, H. April 2016. The West Bank for Jordan and Gaza for Egypt. MEMO: Middle East Monitor. Accessible via: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160405-the-west-bank-for-jordan-and-gaza-for- egypt/ 53 Micallef, J.V. January 2018. The Arab Spring: Six Years Later. Huffpost. Accessible via: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-arab-spring-six-years_b_14461896
32 to change the system, as regimes in those countries had been established without accepting that the prevailing ideology of people living there is predominantly different and thus should not have been forced top down. The governments adopted only some aspects of the region's Islamic nature but still continued with their secular ideologies. Such an approach not only did not satisfy the citizens but also further helped to develop and encourage the growth of Islamist or Salafist inspired movements.
Atrocities filled with resentment and eagerness to take a stance against the rulers to change the face of those regimes brought a lot of consequences. Destabilized governments and civil wars have proven to be training grounds for a large number of jihadists and countries like Syria turned into a massive source of refugees. Jordan paid the price when the spread of jihadist groups has also impacted economic growth in the country and thus affected tourism, which had been one of the major industries in there; numbers of visitors dropped a lot in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. What is more, the political instability that these Jihadists groups brought, has proven to be a perfect ground for chaos and the rise of more extreme regimes. It affected the geopolitical situation in both Israel and Jordan, especially riots that had taken place in Egypt and Syria as those are the neighbouring countries. Israel found itself in a rather uncertain situation, as for a long time it had been relying on status quo in the Middle East, especially when it came to a relationship with Syria under the rule of Mubarak.54 Suddenly, regimes they had known for a long span of time were visibly shattered (some of them overthrown) and thereby the fragile status quo changed its face. Additionally, another concern emerged with unexpected power. In the wake of the Arab Spring an opportunity loophole was created, the one convenient for Islamist parties, which had had their functional political structures working quite effectively.55 That is why the situation became less clear and stable for Israel, as new forces, which aroused in the region, did not have specifically friendly approach toward the Jewish country.56
54 Ibid. 55 And some of them being very critical of Israel, e.g. the attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, that was way harsher than the previous regime. 56 Čejka, M. Izrael a Palestina. 2015. Minulost, současnost a směřovaní blízkovýchodního konfliktu, 283- 289.
33
One of those actors seized the opportunity of a turmoil and stepped into an international arena with a horrendously extreme ideology – fanatic Sunni Islam. The Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) was created in summer 2014. After a dispute with al-Qaida, they emerged out of their former ideology, but with an enhanced narrative. They proclaimed themselves as a worldwide caliphate, therefore trying to claim political and military authority over all Muslims in this world. Although the caliphate itself was very unstable and its structures not clear, it frightened the whole world with its horrifying methods – uncensored propaganda of slavery, beheadings, crucifixion, setting their victims on fire, sending suicide bombers et cetera.57 Daesh did not hesitate to show they will do everything that is in their power to impose their rules on other countries.
The Hashemite Kingdom was not left out and on the contrary, played a very specific role in brutalities carried out by the Islamic State. Not only it fell victim to killings and attacks planned by Daesh, but also contributed to the rise of such a regime, as even within the country were those who were in favour of the organisation's ideology. As ISIS had been gaining power, its extreme ideas paradoxically lured a lot of people from other countries to join and support its structures. And among them, Jordan ranked as the third largest source of foreign fighters to the Islamic State caliphate. It has been estimated that between 3,000 – 4,000 Jordanian militants have travelled to join the structures of the Islamic State.58 Obviously, when it comes to this phenomenon, it is necessary to assess the reasons that made Jordanian people join Daesh. A report by Speckhard (2017) focuses on the main factors determining the reasons for Jordanians to join the Islamic State. Among others, the main were unemployment and poor economic conditions, feelings of marginalization, concerns over injustice, corruption and nepotism along with loss of confidence in government structures or to some significant extent also religious alignment, the spread of militant jihadi ideologies or strong identification with Sunni victims in nearby sectarian conflicts. Such ideology still possesses a huge threat to Jordan, regardless of whether foreign fighters stay or return, as they might remain active through direct involvement,
57 Brahimi, A. 2019. The caliphate is over, but Isis will be back in another form. Accessible via: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/26/caliphate-isis-islamic-state-guerrilla 58 Przyborowski, E. October 2018. Why Jordan is next for ISIS. The National Interest. Accessible via: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/why-jordan-next-isis-34792
34 proxies or even family ties. These factors could present a very dangerous issue for Jordan because if the ISIS “alumni” decide to come back to Jordan, they do so with the Islamic State's annihilating ideology, experience in battlefield plus combat training.59 And if the population of the Hashemite Kingdom is vulnerable and prone to seek other solutions to solve their desperateness, there is always a higher possibility to successfully seed such ideas into a soil that has been amended with fear, doubts and instability. Plus, considering that there are more than 650,000 Syrian refugees living in Jordan, such a scenario might be imminently real, as living conditions in the refugee camps are rather debatable.
When talking about ISIS and its approach to Israel (and vice versa), Israelis adopted a very different attitude toward the problem. It was based on their specific position within the Middle East region, and unlike the Western world, Israelis did not proclaim an open war with ISIS but rather worked on premises of deterrence. They have been through very harsh times since they got their land and therefore know (especially when keeping in mind their proximity to the threat of the Islamic state) how to operate in these conditions. Israel has always been very clear about its red line and about its willingness to show off its capabilities, if necessary. Although the Jewish state has not been hesitant about the use of detection, defence or decisive defeat, it still placed deterrence at the core of its counterterrorism strategy. Certainly, it cannot be declared that this is the only technique working flawlessly, but it has been, to some extent, fruitful; ISIS largely refrained from attacking Israel.60 It does not mean that Israel has not been threatened by Daesh, but rather than suffering from first- hand actions, it fears that instability that had been unleashed mainly in the neighbouring countries like Jordan could have far-reaching consequences for its own security and stability.
59 Speckhard, A. March 2017. Drivers of Radicalization into Violent Extremism in Jordan. International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism. Accessible via: https://www.academia.edu/32337905/The_Jihad_in_Jordan_Drivers_of_Radicalization_into_Violent_Extre mism_in_Jordan
60 Allison, G. August 2016. Why ISIS Fears Israel. Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center. Accessible via: https://www.belfercenter.org/index.php/publication/why-isis-fears-israel
35
Jordan's response to ISIS it thereby built on different premises. Jordan tries to fight any possible threats by strongly proclaiming its counterterrorism policy. The government of the kingdom has criminalized the act of not only joining but also promoting terrorist organisations, ISIS included. The strong anti-terrorist campaign resulted in the 2014 National Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, plus the government also formed a counter-extremism committee with the strategy that has the basis laying on culture, democracy and human rights. These policies sparked a lot of ambivalent reactions throughout the country; many people criticized poor coordination among the participating authorities, when it came to its implementation. One of the drawbacks of the strategy is the lacking base explaining reasons behind terrorism and what might have sparked that ferocity. Therefore, without such issues properly addressed it is very difficult to comprehend how to fight against it. What is more, further critique is for ignoring the socioeconomic causes of extremism, insufficiency of social justice and poverty issues along with unemployment and corruption.61 That is one of the main reasons why Jordan should focus on cooperation regarding these issues with its neighbour, as it is obvious that Israel has a lot of knowledge to share. In order to successfully fight against corrosive powers, present within the region, they must cooperate on as many levels as possible. Only that way they would be able to ensure that their nations will not succumb under the rule of extreme Islamism but would be capable of combating domestic terrorism with greater efficiency.
2.3 Security cooperation between the two neighbours
Jordan and Israel are no strangers to enhanced security cooperation, though. Especially with sites of great importance, like Jerusalem or the West Bank, there were cases when they needed to step in to prevent any upheaval or dangerous turn of events. Those areas are very prone to be like a volcano for Israeli and Arab clashes, as each side deems those locations as the most important for them. Their cooperation is thus essential in order to prevent any hostile concurrences in the future.
61 Al-Sharafat, S. August 2018. Assessing Jordan's National Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism. The Washington Institute. Accessible via: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/assessing- jordans-national-strategy-to-combat-violent-extremism
36
From the Israeli perspective, such cooperation presents one of the pillars of the strategic- political stability, as Jordan helps Israel against threats that might come from either Iraq or Syria. On the other side, for Jordan, their collaboration presents mainly anchor of stability, as it not only helps with possible external threats but also with internal security against the subversion of local or regional terror elements. When the two governments realized the urgent need for such cooperation in terms of security, they invested a lot of effort, resources and deliberation to put such initiatives into practice.62 Even though with a not-so-warm response from the public it presents a difficult task, both sides have been steadily working towards further development of security cooperation.
On November 2014, weeks marked with tensions and riots regarding access to the Temple Mount and al-Aqsa Mosque led Netanyahu and King Abdullah II to secret meetings, dealing with security measures at the holy site. Both sides, interested in de-escalating the violence, agreed on stationing the Jordanian Waqf Authority63 at the al-Aqsa Mosque to help with providing security. There was a point when the situation escalated again and Jordan recalled their ambassador from Israel, also dealing with fierce protests in the streets. Fortunately, the situation did not last for too long and for the sake of a ceasefire, and after further negotiations, Jordanian officials announced they would be sending the ambassador back to Israel. Moreover, in the aftermath of a brutal murder of a Jordanian pilot by the Islamic State, Jordan forged closer ties with Israel, understanding the vigorous potential of a mutual bond.
In 2015, Israel gifted Jordan a fleet of US-supplied Cobra combat helicopters, mainly to provide border security. Later on, pilots from the Royal Jordanian Air Force participated in training with the Israeli Air force; nevertheless, this project was not publicized by either country, as they tried to keep it mainly professional for the purpose of improving security
62 Gal, Y. 2018. Fruit of Israeli-Jordanian peace still on the tree. Accessible via: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5209464,00.html 63 Waqf is entirely controlled and funded by the Jordanian government and basically it is the civil administration for the holy site, which includes al-Aqsa, Dome of the Rock, archeological sites, museums and schools. In: Lieber, D. July 2017. Amid Temple Mount Tumult, the who, what and why of its Wafq rulers.
37 cooperation projects. In order to make their collaboration on safety even stronger, Israel announced their plans to construct a fence along the joint border to normalize the flow of refugees, fleeing from Syria and other countries affected by the rise of jihadi and radical groups. The erection started in 2016 on a 30-kilometre section of the security fence on the Israeli-Jordanian border. The project was very complex, including roads, military observation bunkers and observation towers as well as a special security system for the (currently under construction) Ilan Ramon Airport.64 Along with all these projects, many secret visits to either Jordan or Israel had been conducted, for the leading figures to discuss future possibilities on security matters. Both countries realized the importance of such initiatives and despite many different opinions about issues they were dealing with, there was undeniable willingness to collaborate with their partner.
With the common threats they both faced, they opted for joint security solutions in order to ensure stability. Their security concerns often stem from the Jordan Valley, as it runs along their 300-kilometre border, making it strategically important for security defences. Due to land's varying elevation (it goes 400 meters below sea but also 900 meters above), the area is defensible for both countries against terrorist groups. Without their cooperation over the Jordan Valley, more terrorist groups would be able to enter and exit Israel and Jordan via the valley. Although Jordanian public is not quite keen on further ties with Israel, especially because of the issues it has with Palestine, they do not oppose peace and security cooperation with Israel in principle. This has been a difficult task for Jordan, though, as the Hashemite government is pragmatically cooperating and keeping in touch with Israel, but on the other hand, tries to hear out complaints of its people, who might not see the security partnership important enough.65
In July 2017, both countries took steps together to defuse an explosive crisis regarding Jerusalem's Temple Mount. It was the third time since 2014 that Israel and Jordan worked together to ensure a ceasefire in that important area. An Israeli security guard, who killed a
64 Jewish Virtual Library. 2018. Israel-Jordan Relations: Overview of Bilateral Cooperation. Accessible via: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/overview-of-israel-jordan-cooperation 65 Naghi, N. February 2017. The Value of Security Cooperation with Jordan. Israel Policy Exchange. Accessible via: https://israelpolicyexchange.com/2017/02/value-security-cooperation-jordan/
38
Jordanian attacker and unfortunately also a bystander, was released from the embassy in Amman, where he had been locked inside for more than 24 hours, alongside with some twenty Israeli diplomats. In exchange, as the price for the release, Israel agreed to remove controversial metal detectors set up at the edge of the Temple Mount compound. These detectors had been deployed in the area after supporters of radical forces caused death to two Israeli policemen with guns they had smuggled into the area. The deployment that Israelis decided about was carried out without the coordination of Arab authorities, which caused tense clashes between Israelis on one side and Palestinians and Jordanians on the other. Both sides always need to assess such situations carefully, as although they have deepened their security ties due to common threats like already mentioned Daesh, jihadists groups or terrorism occurrences, issues related to the Temple Mount are a sensitive topic for both. Jordan, as the custodian of the site, views its role as a pillar of their religious legitimacy and that is why they could not act any different in the metal detector issue. On the other hand, Israel saw the detectors as tools that could help restore security, but Jordanians and Palestinians clearly understood their role as an instrument to exert control over a holy site. Both sides were willing to cooperate and work their way towards a compromise, with Netanyahu proposing less-intrusive measures to keep security, such as biometric facial-recognition technology capable of identifying suspects.66 Balancing the need for safety, and need to take into account the opinions of their people, is a long term challenge for both Jordan and Israel. However, showing their willingness is a first step in successfully doing so.
For both countries, security is one of the top priorities. Nevertheless, despite their cooperation, there might be a very different perception of how to obtain such security, or how to comprehend it. They understand the importance of common threats they avail against, but there is also another narrative present. For Jordan, the desire for a righteous resolution of the Palestinian question might outweigh the benefits of cooperation with Israel. On the other hand, for Israel, concerns about their own security might trump the potential
66 Makovsky, D. July 2017. Israel and Jordan Act to Ease Jerusalem Crisis. Policy Analysis: Policywatch 2837. Accessible via: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israel-and-jordan-act-to- ease-jerusalem-crisis
39 pros of cooperating with Jordan.67 One way or another, if both actors are able to realize that through cooperation on security issues they might be much stronger together than on their own, it could bring fruitful outcomes and a more stable environment.
67 Mitha, F. The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of „Cooperation“. Middle East Policy Council. Volume XVII, Nr. 2. Accessible via: https://mepc.org/jordanian-israeli-relationship-reality-cooperation
40
3 Future cooperation: asset or liability?
3.1 Sectors of collaboration & water management
As was already stated in Chapter 1, the main aim of the last chapter is to focus on future regional cooperation between Jordan and Israel. After reading the two previous chapters, the reader should be able to comprehend the relationship between these two neighbours, how was their relationship changing over time, what were the problematic issues that hindered and slowed down possible compromises, the importance of the Palestinian question and on the other hand, the importance of their enhanced cooperation. It's crucial to understand that there were many areas where Israel and Jordan, according to the treaty, committed themselves to cooperate, to develop joint projects and to work toward stronger security in the future. Nevertheless, this thesis does not deem incorporating and analysing all of them as the chief objective, as it might end up in providing only partial information about many areas without a relevant backup, which could be a very confusing element for the reader. However, areas worth mentioning are about to be concisely outlined in this chapter in order to provide the reader with a broader image. Nonetheless, this chapter aims to focus on their cooperation in the field of water agriculture and management, as it has been widely discussed by both parties. Not only as an area with the biggest potential to harmonize and improve their cooperation but also the peace process in the Middle East as well.
Therefore, it is vital to mention there are indeed many areas of cooperation that present great potential. Already mentioned security cooperation has gone the furthest, allowing both countries to share their capacities and to rely on each other. Apart from it, they have been collaborating on the economic level, including hospitality service and tourism. Back in 2013, according to the data of the Export Institute, the import and export of Israel with Jordan amounted to approximately 366 million dollars, covering the vehicle, agricultural, chemicals, mechanical devices or refined petroleum industry.68 For the tourism industry, there has
68 IMRA: Independent Media Review Analysis. February 2016. Export Institute publishes export data to Jordan over the years. Accessible via: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=70053
41 been a sharp rise in tourists arriving Jordan to visit the Jewish state. Around 81,000 Jordanians travelled to Israel, which is a number twice as big as it was back in 2009.69 Furthermore, there has been almost 200 Jordanians who started working in Eilat hotels, which helped to strengthen economic and tourism ties between them. In 2014, after three years of negotiations, a cooperation agreement was reached and it provided hiring of up to 1,500 Jordanians in the Israeli tourism industry. They were allowed to cross the border on a daily basis, and with higher pay and benefits in Israel, it made this opportunity worthwhile.70 Such areas of cooperation are still of great importance, as they give opportunities not only to political elites to enjoy the fruit of joint projects, but also give tangible outcomes and experiences to ordinary people. Because of these benefits, they can see that cooperation is plausible, despite disputes faced by their countries.
Another important area worth mentioning is gas and natural resources industry. After a conference on natural resource preservation in 2016, the Jordan Electric Power company announced that Israel would become Jordan's largest gas supplier and was supposed to provide the Hashemite Kingdom with an estimated 45 million m3 of gas from the Leviathan field.71 This field was the most significant find in offshore Israel, as it contains an estimated 622 m3 of natural gas reserves. This finding created the potential to generate high revenue and what is more, to improve Israel's relations with Jordan. For the kingdom's energy market this trade was vital, as after undergoing a serious gas supply crisis in 2009 they needed another reliable provider with enough natural gas resources. Jordanians understood that despite their intricate relationship with Israel, the Jewish country is the most stable source of natural gas, reliable for long-term and short-term cooperation.72 Therefore, as it's possible to see, there are many sectors where cooperation is feasible, and to a certain extent fruitful for keeping warm relations between the Hashemite Kingdom and the Jewish State. As the treaty shows, there are so many potential areas of cooperation, and
69 Eichner, I. November 2014. Israel sees sharp rise in tourists from Arab states. Accessible via: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4592358,00.html 70 Jewish Virtual Library. 2018. Israel-Jordan Relations: Overview of Bilateral Cooperation. 71 Ibid. 72 Foster, A. November 2017. Natural gas discoveries: Economic Momentum for Geopolitical Stability. The Jerusalem Post. Accessible via: https://www.jpost.com/Diplomatic-Conference/Natural-gas-discoveries- Economic-momentum-for-geopolitical-stability-515604
42 although in some cases it is more difficult to take advantage of them, both countries are trying to do so.
Looking at the treaty itself, and considering the attitude of both countries, there is an area deserving a lot of attention, as it might be holding the biggest potential of them all. As Chapter 1 implied, it is worth focusing on Article 6 of the treaty, which dealt with the water issue. In that article, the parties agreed on “recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their water problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of cooperation between them […]. The parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international cooperation.”73 Annexe 2 of the Wadi Araba Treaty then further elaborated on collateral matters, like how many million cubic meters could be pumped from the Yarmouk and Jordan river. The Joint Water Committee, comprised of three members from each country, was developed for helping to find sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional quantity of drinkable water. The quality of water had to be equal for both the supplying country and the supplied country at any given location. Both countries also committed to guaranteeing easy, unhindered access to equipment and personnel and to systems for maintenance and operation. The countries also agreed on cooperation in developing plans for purposes of increasing water supplies and improving water use efficiency through bilateral, regional or international cooperation.74 Although many details were yet to be defined, this area had already been recognized as one of great importance, what was practically undebatable when thinking of what kind of threat would water scarcity present for both countries.
What even added on the accuracy of the issue was the fact that Jordan was number two globally when it came to water scarcity. From inside the country, they didn’t have additional resources and what is more, the big influx of refugees coming to the country in recent years
73 Kinghussein.gov.jo. The Jordan-Israeli Peace Treaty. Articles 6-15. Article 6. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html 74 Kinghussein.gov.jo. The Jordan-Israeli Peace Treaty. Annex II: Water Related Matters.
43 have increased the water demand.75 They now compromise around 15% of the population, which has been a huge challenge for the water sector, presenting a 21% increase in water needs. In addition, due to the global climate change, Jordan's rainfall has been continuously decreasing, while on the contrary, average temperatures have been increasing. The Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, formerly the most important sources of water for the Hashemite Kingdom, have been struggling to supply enough water to meet such demand. Along with large refugee flows and climate changes, droughts became more severe, because of what Jordan has faced greater pressure to find any solution.76 Such water shortage cannot be overlooked and Jordan should consider its options in order to avoid any possible worsening of the situation.
In this case, abstractedly speaking, Israel might be the answer. Even though in past Israel also struggled with water problems, throughout the time it became a game changer in this area. Due to its growing experience with new technologies, technological companies became the main engine of the whole Israeli economy. Thanks to the perfect mixture of sophisticated agriculture, Israeli industry, financial services and modern technologies, Israeli water agriculture happened to be one of the best in the world. Called a “start-up nation”, Israel for a longer period belongs to the list of countries with the highest investments into the field of science and research, which undoubtedly contributed to its position as the world leader in water conservation.77 Its expertise, in combination with the more and more urgent water shortage issues, is a contributing factor to better communication and strengthening of relations between Israel and Jordan (and most conveniently, also with other neighbours). Many experts from different countries visited Israel to get inspired about how to manage water resources properly. Israel's technique is based on drip irrigation, alongside with precise wastewater management; they improved treatment techniques and incentives available to farmers to switch to reclaimed sewage water, which ended up in
75 Searle, C. June 2018. Red Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project Interview – Catherine Searle [Video File]. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jyvmulu4K4o 76 Hurt, W. November 2018. No Shortage of Challenges: Jordan's Water Crisis. Accessible via: http://harvardpolitics.com/world/no-shortage-of-challenges-jordans-water-crisis/ 77 SIEGEL, Seth M. Budiž voda: izraelská inspirace pro svět ohrožený nedostatkem vody. Praha: Aligier, 2016, 183-190.
44 recycling approximately 80% of its water.78 Without regard to any occurring disputes with its neighbours, Israel also realized the importance of information sharing and cooperation in the field of water management, as the urgent need for more water resources leads to a cease-fire and could help to resolve other, collateral issues. That was why in 2002 all three parties, Israel, Jordan and Palestine, started negotiations about the so-called Red-Dead Project.
3.2 The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project
All three parties are intertwined more than is visible at first sight. Not only due they share borders, which makes them physical neighbours, but also all of them use the same water streams and underground water sources, which basically makes them natural partners in terms of dealing with water problems. That’s why Israel started, already in the 1990s, with various workshops and training for Palestinians and Jordanians, who would come to Israel for a few days to learn about possible ways of effective water management. Those initiatives led to further ideas about possible joint projects for the future which is how in 2005 the negotiations for the long-awaited desalination and water conveyance project started.
The origins of such project stem back to 2002, though, when Jordan’s King Abdullah approached Israeli PM (at that time Moshe Katsav) about saving the Dead Sea and fighting the water shortage. First of all, they agreed on holding a joint dialogue but later, at the request of the World Bank, formed a trilateral relationship including Palestine. For their surprise, the World Bank did not provide funds for the proposed pipeline infrastructure immediately, but instead it conducted a series of studies that at the end recommended a 110-mile pipeline which was supposed to connect the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, crossing the Jordanian territory. The study further recommended a desalination plant and two hydropower plants to be built alongside the pipeline. Speaking of capacity, the pipeline was supposed to carry up to two billion m3 of seawater per annum. To make
78 Schwab, J. December 2017. Israel Is the Unsung Hero in Water Management. Accessible via: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/israel-is-the-unsung-hero_b_9212810
45 things clear and official, in December 2013 Jordan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, to implement the first phase of the project.79 The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project, as it was named, was supposed to go through more phases, with the first one involving the construction of a desalination plant north of Aqaba, which would process 80-100 mcm of water per year. Jordan was supposed to choose the contractor by April 2015 and constructions started at the end of that year, with an implementation that lasted almost two years. Then, in March 2017, the Kingdom's first desalination plant was opened, with the clean water used for drinking purposes and agricultural and industrial needs.80 The first step was finally completed, opening up space for the realization of other phases.
The pipeline which was to be constructed was supposed to carry salt brine from the Red Sea to the desalination plant. In hopes of saving the Dead Sea from evaporation, salt brine would be piped to it after desalination. The desalinated water would be later distributed or sold among all interested parties. In these initiatives, Jordan was trying to establish stronger ties with Israel in an effort to manage water resources in its less developed environment. Such an attitude was very convenient for Israel, as having a strong, economically stable neighbour was way better than an unpredictable and a weak one. Since that time, Israel has been enabling Jordan to store water resources in the Sea of Galilee, just because the Hashemite Kingdom didn’t have enough stock capacity on its own.81 What is more, pursuant to a 2015 water-swap agreement with Jordan, Israel would annually deliver 53 million m3 of water to Jordan and the deal confirmed that Israel would be annually buying 34 million m3 of water from Jordan (produced in new desalination factory in Aqaba), in exchange for doubling Israeli's water supplies to Jordan to 106 mil m3 per annum.82 This exchange and
79 Namrouqa, H. February 2018. Jordan to go ahead with Red-Dead water project despite Israel withdrawal. Accessible via: https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Jordan-to-go-ahead-with-Red-Sea- Dead-Sea-project-542417 80 Guardian development network. March 2014. Jordan hopes controversial Red Sea Dead Sea project will stem water crisis. Accessible via: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/mar/20/jordan- water-red-sea-dead-sea-project 81 SIEGEL, Seth M. Budiž voda: izraelská inspirace pro svět ohrožený nedostatkem vody. Praha: Aligier, 2016, 228-233. 82 Hurt, W. November 2018. No Shortage of Challenges: Jordan's Water Crisis. Accessible via: http://harvardpolitics.com/world/no-shortage-of-challenges-jordans-water-crisis/
46 cooperation between them were vital; Jordan would not have been able to build a desalination plant on its own. The Red Sea was the only place where Jordan has access to the sea and its salt water but is also far from the place where water is needed, as most of the citizens live far north from Aqaba. Had extra costs for transport of water from the Red Sea to Amman been added to the whole budget for this project, it would have ended up being economically infeasible for Jordan. Israel, on the other hand, had a lot of agricultural holdings in the desert near the Red Sea, where the desalinated water could be used. Jordan could then use water stored in the Sea of Galilee, which was way closer to Amman, thus cutting down a lot of transport expenses.83 Both countries realized this convenience and that is why they decided to engage in such an agreement.
Due to the fact that all of them were natural partners in water resources, their interdependence was so profound that the only logical outcome would be their cooperation. Both Jordan and Israel have been trying to comprehend all the benefits they might have gained from such a project, not speaking of Palestinians. Because of the water agreement, not only would they get a water supply to the West Bank but also create enhanced political cooperation with Israel. If they decided to see the Red-Dead project (and water overall) as a means of regional cooperation rather than a symbol of national identity, it could change the whole narrative. Water would be therefore perceived as a commodity which could be distributed, sold, bought and most notably, finally help to solve this urging water crisis. All three parties would realize their interdependence and the crucial need for cooperation, where backing out would mean harming not only the other two parties but also itself.
It is necessary to perceive this complex issue through a different prism, not as a question of territories and hostility, but as a chance to use politics for solving one of the most urgent problems in the region. Water management would be handled through a set of policies, not to show off control or division, but rather to amplify a potential coming up out of mutual collaboration. Such an initiative could lead to an acceptance that all three parties are pivotal in relation to one another and cannot bail out on each other. Israel, Jordan and Palestine
83 SIEGEL, Seth M. Budiž voda: izraelská inspirace pro svět ohrožený nedostatkem vody. Praha: Aligier, 2016, 233-240.
47 have a unique chance to use water as a tool to reach long-term solutions instead of short, ineffective ones and thus preventing them from (either verbally or physically) attacking and accusing each other of the problems they are facing. Looking at the whole issue from the point of constructivism, there is a huge possibility the common discourse could be changed. Thereby, none of the relationships is fixed but on the contrary, is changeable through communication and interaction. If the actors are willing to cooperate because of shared values they are able to find, it creates a very different set of identities and hence collectively shared meanings for each of the actors. If those areas of cooperation are to be found, they could create a new social identity towards each other and would incline towards keeping good and tighter relations. While all of this could be considered as the best scenario possible, at the same time it's important to realize what kind of shortcomings might go hand in hand with such an audacious project.
3.3 Possible shortcomings of the Red-Dead Project
While this project comes with many visible advantages and possibilities for all parties, this thesis doesn’t want to omit possible drawbacks that might accompany it. It is understandable that project like the Red-Dead one comes with some deficiencies and for the sake of objectivity, it is important to mention and evaluate them as well. After assessing many different aspects of what might be seen as shortcomings, this thesis decided to focus on four areas that might present a threat to the successful realization of this project. Those four areas are still closely intertwined, and the categorization was made primarily in order to keep them clear and comprehensible for the reader.
First of all, let’s have a look at the financial side of the project. In terms of money, carrying out such an audacious plan, including infrastructure, construction works, pipe supply, tunnel excavation and other additional costs would present a price of approximately ten billion dollars.84 In order to keep the water-swap agreement, Israel needs to purchase water from
84 It is important to keep in mind that the estimated set of unit costs is not final yet and that is why many sources differ in assuming what is going to be the final price. Such a project embodies a lot of collateral costs including also the costs of connections to the national grid, project management costs or institutional Establishment costs. Further information provided in the Final Feasibility Study Report by the WorldBank:
48 a Jordanian desalination plant, while the cost of this water is particularly high, regarding the fact that Israel is able to desalinate at half the prospective cost. The purpose of that agreement was not only about money, though, but also prospective in terms of stability. As had already been explained in the previous chapter, such regional cooperation that covers the area in the Jordan Valley, which is prone to be aimed at by terrorist organisations, is vital to keep the stability of all parties and prevent any terrorist group from establishing control. Speaking of which, Israel must find guarantors for the project and supply guarantees or compensation to the contractor if any terrorist attack would be carried out. This might be a difficult promise to keep considering the vulnerability of the area.85 Israel, therefore, took a rather hesitant stand toward the realization of the project, as all things considered, it needed to rethink all pros and cons that go along with it.
Secondly, there is still a notion of quite a complex relationship between all three parties. And in spite of the former thought, which was to focus on regional cooperation and water issues that require urgent measurements, the project has become politicized to a great extent. Relationship with Palestine, already a subject of many discussions, is also difficult to assess even when it comes to water issues. Both countries might enhance their cooperation, as if Israel would be able to improve the quality of Palestinian water network, it would be a win for both. Israel could thereby protect their own sources more effectively (as it would be easier to detect the place of origin of water pollution and consequently possible to fight it), while Palestinians would certainly get to receive the water of better quality. But instead of trying to find a joint solution, Palestine surprisingly used its water problems as a political argument against Israel. The Palestinian Authority opted for arguments like “inhuman attitude” of Israel toward Palestinian territories when talking about issues as quintessential as water. Even in the Gaza Strip, which has the worst problems with water, there is a prevailing opinion that the situation had been caused by Israeli restrictions that hindered the import of goods and free movement of persons. Additionally,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/5174616-1416839444345/RSDS- Summary_of_Final_FS_Report.pdf 85 Coren, O. January 2019. Jordan Won't Budge on Red Sea-Dead Sea Project – and Israel will Pay the Price. Accessible via: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-jordan-won-t-budge-on-red-sea-dead- sea-project-and-israel-will-pay-the-price-1.6874643
49 they claim that damage to their water infrastructure was caused due to Israeli military operations in the territory. Israel thereby continues to play a big role in the Palestinian water narrative, but more like a villain rather than a hero.86 The whole issue becomes some sort of a stand-off, as Palestinians are not able to solve their water problems on their own and not trying to create a mutual dialogue with Israel may come at their own expense. If both sides really want to pursue further cooperation and improve the water situation, they need to think pragmatically and start cooperating without holding a grudge toward each other. Shaming discourse and an effort to politicize the topic should be replaced by a purposeful discussion about possible solutions.
Thirdly, not only Palestine and Israel have had some difficult time to find common ground, but the same could be applied for the relationship between Israel and Jordan. Despite their shared initiatives to continue with the project, there had been situations that delayed its realization. As was already mentioned in the previous chapter, the 2017 killings of two Jordanians by an Israeli security guard at the Jewish state embassy in Amman released a huge fire of reproach, resentment and condemnation by both sides, placing the blame on each other. Those events postponed any further project initiatives for a longer time, as neither citizens nor political elites were willing to get over such injustice. And when things finally settled down a bit, the next year another problem aroused. Pursuant to the peace treaty, Jordan (more respectively King Hussein himself) decided to lease areas of Naharayim and Zofar87 to Israel to cultivate. The treaty further stated that twenty-five years after the initial signing, each party had the option of discontinuing the lease of the land, if done in advance. That was exactly what Jordan decided to do, stating it would not renew the land lease agreement, which was in strong accordance with the public opinion in the Kingdom.88 And even though according to the treaty, Jordan had a full right to do so, it did spark negative response among Israelis. Israeli agricultural minister Uri Ariel threatened to reduce Israel's water supply to Jordan if the decision would not be reversed. Some further
86 SIEGEL, Seth M. Budiž voda: izraelská inspirace pro svět ohrožený nedostatkem vody. Praha: Aligier, 2016, 218-222. 87 Baquara and al-Ghamr in Arabic. 88 Nirenstein, F. October 2018. Jordan Challenges Israel on Land-Lease Agreement. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Accessible via: http://jcpa.org/jordan-challenges-israel-on-land-lease-agreement/
50 calls on “punishing” Jordan with water cuts were discussed among political elites in Israel, addressing that such a decision was a mere provocation from the Hashemite Kingdom. One way or another, the agreements regarding water issues between the two countries are intact, therefore Israel is not really able to apply such measurements.89 The concerning part is that this situation showed that both countries might choose to save their reputation and prestige along with granting public preferences, rather than thinking pragmatically and obviously, within a legal frame of the Wadi Araba Treaty.
And last but not least, the fourth area that should not be omitted is the environmental impact of the project. Concerns over the damage that this project could cause to the environment and a special composition of the Dead Sea have been echoing around since the very beginning. A 2014 World Bank feasibility study on the project said that if no action was taken, the area near the Dead Sea would be in serious danger. The lake's water level is already declining by more than one meter per year. It would suffer from more sinkholes, landslides and mud flats that could affect terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, industry and tourism,90 which obviously would have a great impact on economies of both countries. Furthermore, heavy logistics, as an inevitable part of this project, may have tremendous consequences on the environment. Therefore, the environmental feasibility of this project in general has been highly questioned. The water transfer from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea could be, according to environmentalists and scientists, threatening its unique characteristics and affect salinity or evaporation rates and overall would not alleviate severe water shortages in the area.
Moreover, organisations like EcoPeace Middle East criticized the project for failing to address the root causes of the decline of the Dead Sea. They claimed that the main cause is the appropriation of more than 90% of the water from Jordan River to the north for domestic and agricultural use as well as mineral extraction by both Israel and Jordan. Additionally, the distribution of water alone is a very contentious issue, as most aquifers
89Nassar, T. October 2018. Israelis urge cutting water supply to Jordan. The Electronic Intifada. Accessible via: https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/tamara-nassar/israelis-urge-cutting-water-supply-jordan 90 WorldBank. March 2017. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program. Final Feasibility Study Report: Summary. Report NO. 12 147 RP 05.
51 happen to be in the West Bank, which sparked a lot of discontents. Palestinians claimed that they had been severely deprived of water resources and denied access to the economic potential of the Dead Sea, especially in comparison with Israeli settlements in that area.91
As it is possible to see, this project really has a lot of potential. The first stage was successfully completed, feasibility has been assessed, but how would the whole situation evolve is now up to the three parties. All presented shortcomings are clearly related to each other, bouncing back to the hostility that all sides tend to project on each other instead of trying to find ways to use the perspective of the Red-Dead project. Heavy funding, mistrust and accusations among parties, along with the environmental danger, create a frightening mixture of possible failure. If the realization of the project isn't properly justified and backed up by political elites, citizens, scientists and most importantly all three parties, it would be very difficult to finish searching for contractors and other agents to support the project and of course, to simply carry it out. If they fail to meet those requirements, not only the project but also the whole fragile status quo in the Middle East might be put in danger. All three parties need to realize that they own the narrative and they can change it if they desire to do so. They, along with their identities and collective perception, constitute their intersubjective structures. These structures then define their behaviour and motivation for such behaviour, which later leads to a creation of state preferences and thus state interests. Thereby, if they are able to shift their interests toward pragmatic, regional cooperation based on mutual respect and accepted interdependence, they really can constitute a major change in their relations. Not seizing such an opportunity that this project presents would be a missed chance to embrace principles they agreed upon in the Preamble of the treaty.
91 Environmental Justice Atlas. January 2018. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance project, Israel, Jordan and Palestine. Accessible via: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/red-sea-dead-sea-water-conveyance-project
52
Conclusion
Before this thesis answers its main hypothesis, it is important to remind the reader of two aspects that might have influenced an outcome that is about to be presented. The first one is the nature of the qualitative methodological framework in which was this research conducted; more precisely a documentary analysis. Just because the thesis was working mainly with the secondary sources, it was sometimes difficult to avoid bias already present in the existing articles. Such research is non-sequential in its operationalism, which could possibly lead to some sort of alteration or misinterpretation of collected information. This thesis tried to find and assess available information with regard to the quality of the source, relevance of provided information and personal background of the author, as all of those variables tend to alter the objectivity of a source to a certain extent.
The second thing to keep in mind is the complexity of this topic. Israel and Jordan both have protracted history full of (sometimes) small, yet important events that affected themselves and the relationship they have with each other. Within this large time frame and intricate, closely intertwined issues still ongoing to this day, it is difficult to sum up all external and internal variables in relatively small volume as this thesis presents. On the other hand, that is why constructivism was chosen as the main theoretical background, as it helps to provide different comprehension of what looks like a given narrative. It helps to deconstruct already existing reality into small segments influenced and shaped by a common identity, values, beliefs and perceptions, therefore scrutinize them on the micro- level rather than merely focusing on the outer picture. It is still very much vital for the reader to realize those two main limitations that could have affected how the research had been shaped, thus answering the hypothesis in a way that is in accordance with the collected information.
After having an opportunity to understand the relations between Israel and Jordan throughout the history, with regard to issues they have been dealing with and areas they have been collaborating with each other, it would be too presumptuous to say that the Wadi Araba Peace Treaty is in jeopardy. Both countries went through a storm of mutual mistrust,
53 blame, reproach but also a strong need for cooperation and realization of common enemies, goals and pragmatic notion of their proximity and strengthened ties. Since the Partition Plan, there were disagreements about how to shape the future of the Middle East but the ruling powers didn’t seem to hear it out. With time more actors started entering the arena, for example, the establishment of PLO and its negotiations with both countries reshaped their relations. PLO was assessed through two different prisms; as a liberation organization for Palestinians and as a terrorist organization by the international community. This occurrence is a great example of how identity is created through a common narrative, rather than simply given.
Moreover, 1967 and Israel's takeover of the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan added a new dimension to the issue of migration and refugees and added some fuel to an already complicated relationship between the Jewish state and the Hashemite Kingdom. Even though the situation was not easy, both countries tried to pursue further talks, leading to what ended up being the friendliest and the least problematic negotiation within the whole Middle East peace process. By signing the treaty, they committed themselves to the promotion and achievement of peace in the Middle East, based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights. Therefore, through this interaction with one another, they created a new conception of reality, strongly counting on their cooperation in order to address their common goals properly. Political elites, therefore, created a new social setting and they were expected to act in accordance with it; also with a pressure that was put on them by their citizens and the international community.
Even nowadays, it is not difficult to spot that political elites of both countries are still relying on the treaty heavily, perceiving it as a vital framework for their stable cooperation. Although citizens mostly do not share such excitement and friendly approach toward the treaty, it’s clear that decisions lay in the hands of the powerful. Certainly, they need to hear their people out, but that doesn’t mean their discontent is putting the treaty in danger. Understanding all variables affecting the region, what might be in danger instead, is not the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan but rather the fragile status quo in the Middle East. There is no doubt this state of affairs has been greatly challenged, dealing with new actors emerging especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Islamist or Salafist inspired
54 movements who all shared desperate desire to change the systém, brought even more chaos to the region. And while issues like the Palestinian question might seem to divide Israel and Jordan further from each other, leaving Palestinian territories trapped in a vacuum of uncertainty and exasperation, a common enemy like ISIS seems to bring them back together. Their desire to break down the caliphate and terror Daesh sought to establish opened door for intelligence sharing and enhanced cooperation, coming hand in hand with a certain set of benefits. Jordan can still learn a lot from its more skilled neighbour as only through security collaboration they can successfully fight against corrosive powers and ensure that their nations will not succumb under the rule of extreme Islamism. Instead, they would be capable of combating domestic terrorism with greater efficiency. However, they have to be careful about how to carry out this security cooperation. Although for both of them this topic is one of the top priorities, they have different comprehension of how to obtain it. For Jordan, the desire for a righteous resolution of the Palestinian question might outweigh the benefits of cooperation with Israel. On the other hand, for Israel, concerns about their own security might trump the potential pros of cooperating with Jordan.
So, indeed with such interpretation, a perception of the treaty might be different, especially in the eyes of people worn down by ongoing disputes, fights and insufficient living standards in some areas. But changed perception doesn’t necessarily mean changing importance or value the treaty yields. Because of the treaty, both countries realize shared responsibility for what might happen next in the Middle East and despite the fact that their opinions about future relations might differ to a significant level, they committed to a specific goal. Speaking of which, according to the Article 6 of the Wadi Araba Treaty, both countries committed to recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their water problems through various projects of regional and international cooperation. This area is undeniably the most promising for them, as they have massive interdependence in using the same water streams and underground water sources, which basically makes them natural partners in terms of dealing with water problems.
That is why the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project encompasses significant potential, presenting a common ground of cooperation for Israel, Jordan and Palestine. This project could lead to an acceptance that all three parties are pivotal in relation to one
55 another and bailing on one another would cause serious damage to all of them. Instead of further politicization of the topic, accompanied by shaming discourse when they have different perceptions about how could such cooperation continue, they have a unique chance to use water as a tool to reach long-term solutions for problems they have been facing in the region. The treaty certainly provided a starting point for improvement of their intricate relationship back in 1994, and projects such as Red-Dead are proof that they are willing to keep promises they bound themselves to. It does indeed shape their relationship in a positive way, as without regard to whatever disputes they might be dealing with, it reminds them there are many areas worth cooperating at, therefore helping to establish better future for the Middle East. If they realize that in contrast to the outer environment in the region they may be much stronger together than on their own, the legacy of the Wadi Araba Treaty could bring fruitful outcomes and more stable territory for all of them.
56
57
Bibliography
Aberbach, D. 2012. The European Jews, Patriotism and the Liberal State 1789-1939: A Study of Literature and Social Psychology. Routledge Jewish Studies Series. Routledge. ISBN 978-11-3615895-7. Allison, G. August 2016. Why ISIS Fears Israel. Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center. Accessed 03-29-2019. Accessible via: https://www.belfercenter.org/index.php/publication/why-isis-fears-israel Al Jazeera. 2013. Kill Him Silently: Mossad vs Khaled Meshaal. Accessed 03-16-2019. Accessible via: https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2013/01/201312210472621589.ht ml AlJazeera. December 2003. The Second Intifada. Accessed 03-26-2019. Accessible via: https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2003/12/20084101554875168.html Al-Masri, H. April 2016. The West Bank for Jordan and Gaza for Egypt. MEMO: Middle East Monitor. Accessed 03-26-2019. Accessible via: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160405-the-west-bank-for-jordan-and-gaza-for- egypt/ Al-Sharafat, S. August 2018. Assessing Jordan's National Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism. The Washington Institute. Accessed 03-29-2018. Accessible via: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/assessing-jordans-national-strategy- to-combat-violent-extremism Barari, H. 2014. Jordan and Israel. A Troubled Relationship in a Volatile Region. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Amman. Deposit NO.: 2014/9/4608. Bligh, A. 1998. Jordanian-Israeli Strategic Partnership in Historical Perspective. Policy Paper No. 2, Ariel Center For Policy Research, Israel. Brahimi, A. 2019. The caliphate is over, but Isis will be back in another form. Accessed 03- 29-2019. Accessible via: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/26/caliphate-isis-islamic-state- guerrilla
58
Center for Israel Education. May 10, 2018. Golda Meir Has Secret Meeting with King Abdullah in Amman. Accessed 03-12-2019. Accessible via: https://israeled.org/golda-meir- secret-meeting-king-abdullah-amman/ Coren, O. January 2019. Jordan Won't Budge on Red Sea-Dead Sea Project – and Israel will Pay the Price. Haaretz. Accessed 04-10-2019. Accessible via: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-jordan-won-t-budge-on-red-sea-dead-sea- project-and-israel-will-pay-the-price-1.6874643 Čejka, M. Izrael a Palestina. 2015. Minulost, současnost a směřovaní blízkovýchodního konfliktu. Barrister and Principal, Brno. ISBN 978-80-87474-90-7. Eichner, I. November 2014. Israel sees sharp rise in tourists from Arab states. Accessed 04-05-2019. Accessible via: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4592358,00.html Environmental Justice Atlas. January 2018. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance project, Israel, Jordan and Palestine. Accessed 04-09-2019. Accessible via: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/red-sea-dead-sea-water-conveyance-project Foster, A. November 2017. Natural gas discoveries: Economic Momentum for Geopolitical Stability. The Jerusalem Post. Accessed 04-05-2019. Accessible via: https://www.jpost.com/Diplomatic-Conference/Natural-gas-discoveries-Economic- momentum-for-geopolitical-stability-515604 Gal, Y. 2018. Fruit of Israeli-Jordanian peace still on the tree. Accessed 03-30-2019. Accessible via: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5209464,00.html Gibbs, J. 2013. Structuration theory. Accessed 03-17-2019. Accessible via: https://www.britannica.com/topic/structuration-theory Guardian development network. March 2014. Jordan hopes controversial Red Sea Dead Sea project will stem water crisis. Accessed 04-09-2019. Accessible via: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/mar/20/jordan-water-red-sea- dead-sea-project Halevy, E. 2018. The Real Story Behind the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Deal. Accessed 03- 143-2019. Accessible via: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-the-real-story- behind-the-israeli-jordanian-peace-deal-1.5976491 Hasan, H. December 2017. Remembering the First Intifada. MEMO: Middle East Monitor. Accessed 03-26-2019. Accessible via: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171209- remembering-the-first-intifada-2/
59
Hasan, H. September 2017. Remembering the Second Intifada. MEMO: Middle East Monitor. Assessed 03-26-2019. Accessible via: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170928-remembering-the-second-intifada/ Hurt, W. November 2018. No Shortage of Challenges: Jordan's Water Crisis. Harvard Political Review. Accessed 04-07-2019. Accessible via: http://harvardpolitics.com/world/no-shortage-of-challenges-jordans-water-crisis/ IMRA: Independent Media Review Analysis. February 2016. Export Institute publishes export data to Jordan over the years. Accessed 05-04-2019. Accessible via: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=70053 Jacobson, V. A. May 2015. Israeli school bus bombing survivor reunites with nurse who saved him - 45 years later. Accessed 04-04-2019. Accessible via: https://legalinsurrection.com/2015/05/israeli-school-bus-bombing-survivor-reunites-with- nurse-who-saved-him-45-years-later/ Jewish Virtual Library. 2018. Israel-Jordan Relations: Overview of Bilateral Cooperation. Accessed 03-30-2019. Accessible via: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/overview-of- israel-jordan-cooperation Karsh, E. 2004. Review of The Jordanian-Israeli War 1948-1951: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. King´s College, London. Khoury, J. 2017. Murderer of Seven Israeli Schoolgirls Released by Jordan, Shows No Remorse for Killings. Accessed 03-16-2019. Accessible via: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/jordanian-soldier-who-killed-seven-israeli-girls- released-shows-no-remorse-1.5447559 Kinghussein.gov.jo. The Jordan-Israeli Peace Treaty. Accessed 04-07-2019. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html Kumar, R. 2014. Research Methodology. A Step by step guide for beginners. Sage Publications ltd, London. ISBN 978-1-4462-6997-8. Lieber, D. July 2017. Amid Temple Mount Tumult, the who, what and why of its Wafq rulers. The Times of Israel. Accessed 03-30-2019. Accessible via: https://www.timesofisrael.com/amid-temple-mount-tumult-the-who-what-and-why-of-its- waqf-rulers/ Lukacs, Y. 1999. Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process. Syracuse University Press. Accessed via Google Books 03-15-2019. Accessible via:
60 https://books.google.com/books?id=Mv8R- o_b0acC&pg=PA196&lpg=PA196&dq=israel+jordan+peace+treaty&source=bl&ots=Hb0rf d1sdr&sig=tNk5NH8Sh6frt48Xc8IbhYiKX4o&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NEe8UvrLNIaK0AWS- 4HoDQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=israel%20jordan%20peace%20treaty&f=true Makovsky, D. July 2017. Israel and Jordan Act to Ease Jerusalem Crisis. The Washington Institute. Policy Analysis: Policywatch 2837. Accessed 03-30-2019. Accessible via: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israel-and-jordan-act-to-ease- jerusalem-crisis Micallef, J.V. January 2018. The Arab Spring: Six Years Later. Huffpost. Accessed 03-28- 2019. Accessible via: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-arab-spring-six- years_b_14461896) MidEastWeb. 2002. UN GA Resolution 303. Accessed 03-11-2019. Accessible via: http://www.mideastweb.org/ga303.htm Mitha, F. The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of „Cooperation“. Middle East Policy Council. Volume XVII, Nr. 2. Accessed 03-30-2019. Accessible via: https://mepc.org/jordanian-israeli-relationship-reality-cooperation Morris, Benny. 2008. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press. Accessed 04-13-2019. Accessible via: https://search-ebscohost- com.ezproxy.muni.cz/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,uid&db=nlebk&AN=278 429&lang=cs&site=eds-live&scope=site. Naghi, N. February 2017. The Value of Security Cooperation with Jordan. Israel Policy Exchange. Accessed 03-30-2019. Accessible via: https://israelpolicyexchange.com/2017/02/value-security-cooperation-jordan/ Namrouqa, H. February 2018. Jordan to go ahead with Red-Dead water project despite Israel withdrawal. The Jerusalem Post. Accessed 04-09-2019. Accessible via: https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Jordan-to-go-ahead-with-Red-Sea-Dead-Sea- project-542417 Nassar, T. October 2018. Israelis urge cutting water supply to Jordan. The Electronic Intifada. Accessed 04-12-2019. Accessible via: https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/tamara- nassar/israelis-urge-cutting-water-supply-jordan
61
Nirenstein, F. October 2018. Jordan Challenges Israel on Land-Lease Agreement. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Accessed 04-12-2019. Accessible via: http://jcpa.org/jordan-challenges-israel-on-land-lease-agreement/ Office of the Historian. 2017. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948. Accessed 03-11-2019. Accessible via: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war Only NTA NET Political Science. February 9, 2019. Social Constructivism in International Relations [Video File]. Accessed 03-17-2019. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_M0Rls8yERU Potter, J.1996. Representing Reality. Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction. Sage Publications Ltd, London. ISBN 8-8039-8411-1. Przyborowski, E. October 2018. Why Jordan is next for ISIS. The National Interest. Accessed 03-29-2019. Accessible via: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east- watch/why-jordan-next-isis-34792 Ruiz, G. February 2018. The Heroic Tale of Operation Entebbe, Israel’s Most Daring Rescue Mission. Accessed 04-04-2019. Accessible via: https://allthatsinteresting.com/operation-entebbe Sasley, B. March 2002. Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1. Schenker, D. 2014. Twenty Years of Israeli-Jordanian Peace: A Brief Assessment [Policy Analysis]. Policywatch 2328, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Searle, C. June 2018. Red Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project Interview – Catherine Searle [Video File]. Accessed 04-07-2019. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jyvmulu4K4o Schulze, Kirsten T. 2012. Arabsko-Izraelský konflikt. CPress, Brno. ISBN 978-80-264- 0000-4. Schwab, J. December 2017. Israel Is the Unsung Hero in Water Management. Accessed 04-08-2019. Accessible via: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/israel-is-the-unsung- hero_b_9212810 SIEGEL, Seth M. Budiž voda: izraelská inspirace pro svět ohrožený nedostatkem vody. Praha: Aligier, 2016. ISBN 978-80-906420-2-7. Speckhard, A. March 2017. Drivers of Radicalization into Violent Extremism in Jordan. International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism. Accessed 03-29-2019. Accessible
62 via: https://www.academia.edu/32337905/The_Jihad_in_Jordan_Drivers_of_Radicalization_in to_Violent_Extremism_in_Jordan The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Building Bridges East and West. Accessed 03-13- 2019. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods7.html The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Fruits of Stability. Accessed 03-12-2019. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods2.html The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Disaster of 1967. Accessed 03-12-2019. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods3.html The Library. Treaty of Peace Between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The State of Israel. Accessed 03-13-2019. Accessible via: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html TRT World. May 14, 2018. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and Nakba explained [Video File]. Accessed 03-11-2019. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTMRMX7Pw5U UN Peacemaker. 1994. Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Volume 2042, 1-35325. Accessed 03-14-2019. Accessible via: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IL%20JO_941026_PeaceTreatyI sraelJordan.pdf UN Security Council. Resolution 242 [PDF]. Accessed 03-13-2019. Accessible via: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch3.pdf Van der Ree, G. February 2014. 04 Social Constructivism [Video File]. Accessible via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-4Pw_60EgM Von Hein, M. September 2017. 1972 Munich Olympics massacre: an avoidable catastrophe? Accessed 04-03-2019. Accessible via: https://www.dw.com/cda/en/1972- munich-olympics-massacre-an-avoidable-catastrophe/a-40405813 Worldbank. March 2017. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program. Final Feasibility Study Report: Summary. Report NO. 12 147 RP 05. Accessed 04-11-2019. Accessible via: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/5174616- 1416839444345/RSDS-Summary_of_Final_FS_Report.pdf
63