"NORMALIZATION" AND "ANTI-NORMALIZATION" IN JORDAN: THE PUBLIC DEBATE By Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas*

The Jordan-Israel peace treaty, signed in October 1994, was accompanied on both sides by high hopes of warm relations between the peoples of the two countries. A wide range of factors, however, led to a deterioration in any public support for the peace agreement on the Jordanian side. These included: the limits of economic benefits arising from the agreement; the slow, and uncertain pace of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; Israel’s 1996 "Grapes of Wrath" operation in Lebanon and attempted assassination of Hamas leader Khalid Mishal in September 1997; the strength of traditional anti-Israel feeling especially among Palestinians; and the vigorous "anti- normalization" movement, led by the Islamic Action Front and the country’s professional associations.

For almost twenty years, from the 1970s process underway, Israelis saw no reason for until the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of continuing enmity between the two countries. 1994, Israel and Jordan maintained quasi- It took a while for Israelis to realize that normal, albeit secret, relations. Jordan’s King Jordanian perceptions were significantly at Hussein reportedly met numerous times with variance with their own. Jordanians had Israeli leaders, and even visited the country. known nothing about secret meetings and Armed clashes along the lengthy border were understandings between their king and Israeli virtually non-existent. During the Gulf War, leaders. Less than four years before, despite Jordan’s neutrality, Israel even Jordanians had loudly cheered Iraqi President officially announced that Jordan’s eastern Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Israel was frontier (with Iraq) constituted its security still demonized in Jordan’s press and certainly border. During all of this period, informed in its textbooks. As one academic rather Israelis had heard of the meetings between plaintively remarked in 1996, "We had no leaders and realized that secret understandings warning that this was going to happen. We existed, and thus considered that Israel had cannot adjust as quickly as His Majesty."(1) achieved peace with Jordan in all but name. What very quickly developed in Jordan When the Declaration of Principles with was a three-tier relationship with Israel. On the PLO was signed in 1993, most expected the first tier, military, intelligence, and that a treaty of peace with Jordan would soon diplomatic connections warmed quickly, now be forthcoming. When the treaty was signed with the full awareness of the Jordanian the next year, Israelis were almost uniformly population. By 1996, most Jordanians already pleased, and the treaty represented one of the referred to it as an "alliance." few breakthroughs with the Arab world in the The second tier was (and is) the Jordanian 1990s that received support from virtually the opposition, mainly from Islamist and leftist entire Israeli political spectrum. Partly, this circles, which steadfastly opposed any was because Israelis regarded the treaty as the opening to Israel under current conditions or, public legitimation of an existing status quo indeed, under virtually any circumstances and the solution did not involve the kind of other than the dismantling of the Jewish state. painful concessions and risks present in Their views represented what had formerly negotiations with the Palestinians and been the loose consensus, basically since Syrians. With a Palestinian-Israeli peace before 1948, in common with the entire Arab world. To true believers in the Palestinian

54 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Compiled by the Faculty Action Network Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas cause, the Hashemites had in any case always anti-normalization process was the Jordanian been suspect, since King Abdullah I’s various professional associations, which had, three flirtations with Zionists in the 1930s and months before the signing of the treaty, 1940s, which eventually resulted in his already threatened disciplinary action against assassination in 1951. However, the actuality members who dealt with Israelis.(3) Not long of relations with Israel now swung them into after, the professional associations were the opposition to state policy, and created the driving force behind the formation of an "anti- greatest rift in the Jordanian domestic normalization committee," which was active consensus. Those absolutely opposed to in researching contacts with Israel with the relations were understood to be in a clear, if aim of "exposing" them. highly determined, minority in the kingdom Results of the Committee’s efforts include as a whole. the fact that the names of normalizers-- The third tier constitutes the general public entitled the "List of Shame"--are now opinion in Jordan. It is possible that for a available on the internet, boycotts are publicly period of about two years, from the signing of urged against all those who work with Israel the Wadi Araba treaty until the year following or Israelis in any context, while legislators are the opening of the Western Wall tunnel in demanding renunciation of the peace treaty September, 1996, that Jordanian popular with Israel. The fact that the regime is now attitudes were somewhat up in the air, and publicly moving against the "anti- perhaps susceptible to change. For example, normalization" forces, which it has usually during the spate of bus bombings in Israel in dismissed as marginal, is an indication of its the spring of 1996, considerable sympathy for concern and the impact the anti-normalizers Israelis was expressed on a personal level. are achieving in Jordanian society. This sympathy began to end with Israel’s This paper will examine the process by Grapes of Wrath campaign. Later, after King which Jordanian public opinion has moved Hussein’s brief honeymoon with Israeli Prime from a state of some openness vis-à-vis Israel Minister Benjamin Netanyahu concluded with to the hostility towards normalization which the violence sparked by the opening of the is now apparent.(4) Western Wall Tunnel in Jerusalem and ensuing incidents, Jordanian public opinion JORDAN ON THE EVE OF THE OSLO turned against Israel, intensifying over the AGREEMENTS next few years. The reality of Jordanian politics and public Events since then, such as commercial attitudes is partly, though by no means fairs to which Israelis were invited but wholly, defined by the fact that over half of boycotted, the Jordanian reaction to the king’s the population is identified as "Palestinian" or sharing the grief of bereaved Israeli parents, is of Palestinian origin(5) (all Palestinians the attempted assassination of Hamas leader living in Jordan have been eligible to receive Khalid Mishal, and various other incidents all Jordanian citizenship, in marked contrast to showed that the vast majority of Jordanians other Arab countries hosting Palestinian would not share their king’s acceptance of refugees). Thus, a very large number of Israel. Jordanian citizens have extended family in the The buzzword for such contacts quickly West Bank and in Israel. That, plus the became "normalization." During the two- year geographic proximity (most Jordanians can, period after the treaty, the concept was and many do, receive Israeli TV broadcasts), discussed fairly openly in the press, and some make Jordanians acutely aware of their Jordanians, though always a minority, powerful neighbor. In general, three out of the actually advocated, even publicly, closer ties top five items on Jordanian TV news appear with Israel. However, by late 1996, such to involve Israel and/or the Palestinian discussions disappeared from the press. territories. Moreover, the influx of an Instead, "normalization" ("tatbi’ah (2) in estimated half million Palestinian Jordanians Arabic) and "normalizer" became solely from the Gulf in the early 1990s--fleeing from words of opprobrium. The spearhead of the the Kuwait war or expelled in retaliation to

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PLO support for Iraq, helped increase the associations developed into an amalgam of sense of resentment and rootlessness, for Islamist and leftist sentiment (the former on which Israel is ultimately blamed. the increase, and the latter on the decline), The general perception in Jordan, both united most strongly by a vehement anti- among Jordanians of both Palestinian origin Israel attitude and a desire to see more of the and East Bank origin is that the large majority power in the country wielded by the of Jordanians of Palestinian origin would professional classes, instead of by the probably prefer to stay in Jordan, even if the monarchy. opportunity were offered to freely cross the Following the Gulf War, the Madrid river. Research on this sensitive point is Conference brought together Israel and PLO discouraged by the government out of fear delegates for the first time, though the latter that more attention given to it would were officially part of the Jordanian exacerbate Palestinian-Jordanian tensions in delegation, at Israel’s insistence. In June this country. However, there is a very strong 1992, the Labor Party was voted into power in empathy with the plight of the Palestinians Israel for the first time in fifteen years and and a feeling that Jordan, with a larger Yitzhak Rabin became prime minister. Palestinian population than any other country, Despite the change, the Madrid framework has a duty to remain faithful to the cause. continued with regular meetings in While if a comprehensive peace treaty were Washington, D.C., but little progress was signed between Israel and the Palestinian apparent. However, in August 1993, leaks of Authority it is probable that most Jordanians secret meetings between the PLO and the would accept it, a significant number of Israeli government emerged. By that time the Palestinian Jordanians would likely consider Jordanian delegation to the Washington talks such a treaty only another betrayal. had reached a general level of understanding The interplay between the strong feelings with their Israeli counterparts. This of support for Palestinians and Jordanian understanding could have very easily taken on domestic politics must also be considered. the form of a framework for talks leading to a From 1957 until 1992, political parties in the peace treaty well before 1993, but the kingdom were officially banned, reflecting the Jordanian--Israeli track of the peace process instability that marked Jordan’s political life had been waiting for progress on the other from the 1950s until the 1970s. The only non- tracks. The Jordanians had been unwilling to tribal and non-governmental political move too far ahead of Syria or the organizations allowed during this period were Palestinians. Meanwhile, in response to their the professional associations, which own stalled talks with the Israelis in functioned as guilds in the sense that Washington, the PLO had turned to secret membership was compulsory in most negotiations in Oslo to break the deadlock. professions; and the Muslim Brotherhood, The official Jordanian reaction to the which was officially regarded as a social, surprise announcement of the Oslo accords religious and cultural organization. Neither was shaped by two main reservations. First, was anti-Hashemite, and relations with the Jordanian officials felt "duped" by the PLO’s government were generally good. However, secret negotiations. While the PLO was both the associations and the Brotherhood to negotiating secretly in Oslo, it had also been some degree served as nodes of opposition, working with Jordan on coordinating the former more from a leftist and pan-Arab committees for the Washington talks. Jordan point of view, the latter serving as the main had felt that it was the natural partner to link exponent of Islamism in the kingdom. After the Israelis and the PLO during in peace parties were officially legalized in 1992, the negotiations. However, no mention of the political nature of both the Associations and direct contacts between the PLO and the the Brotherhood increased. The Brotherhood Israeli government under the aegis of Norway formed the largest single political party in the had been revealed to the Jordanians.(6) country, under the name "Islamic Action Second, the Jordanians held reservations Front" (IAF), while the professional about the nature of the "interim" agreement.

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Jordanian leaders feared that Jericho might countered the Hamas-sponsored become a dumping ground for Palestinians demonstration by holding one of their who would then be eventually evicted to own.(17) When questioned, however, most Jordan.(7) King Hussein also wanted more Palestinian refugees indeed feared that the information on what direction such the result of the "Gaza and Jericho First" plan interim agreement was intended to head.(8) would be to abandon them.(18) On the other However, once the King was briefed by Yasir hand, some Jordanians of East Bank origin Arafat on September 3, 1993, he gave his full saw the Oslo accords as the hopeful first step support to the PLO and the Oslo agreement. towards removing the Palestinians from being Jordan was not in fact displeased that the a concern of Jordan.(19) Oslo agreement broke the log-jam in the Washington talks.(9) Since the PLO, not just PREPARING FOR A TREATY the Palestinian delegation, had agreed in Even before the reports of the secret principle to peace with Israel, Jordan could negotiations in Oslo emerged, however, King now move forward with its own agenda. The Hussein had been preparing the domestic day after the signing of the Oslo accords in arena for the eventuality of making peace Washington, Jordanian and Israeli officials with Israel. Jordanian elections had already signed an agreement on an agenda for peace been scheduled for November 1993. Over the talks.(10) Where this agenda would lead, summer of 1993, a debate over changing the however, was not yet clear. For example, on Election Law had been simmering. With the November 6, the Jordanian government early reports of the Oslo talks, the Jordanian announced it would only sign a treaty with regime quickly moved to amend the law. On Israel along with Syria and Lebanon,(11) a August 17, amendments were decreed by the position that seemed to postpone progress king. The previous ‘open-list’ system, which indefinitely. had significantly benefited the Muslim Like the regime, the Jordanian opposition Brotherhood, was changed to a so-called was caught very much by surprise by the Oslo "one-man, one-vote" system which tended to accords. Most non-PLO groups in Jordan benefit tribal leaders. The opposition was immediately criticized the agreement. The enraged by the decree, yet eventually IAF "categorically rejected" the accord, acquiesced to the change.(20) labeling it a sell-out to Israel.(12) Other The announcement of the Oslo accords put opposition figures joined the Islamists in the election briefly into doubt, though it criticizing the PLO’s concessions in the eventually proceeded as scheduled. The agreement. Arab Nationalist writers, such as change in the election law had its desired Muna Shuqir and Salah al-Qallab, questioned effect. Tribal leaders and pro-government the postponement of an agreement on candidates won a majority of the seats. The settlements, Jerusalem, and especially Islamists and other opposition groups saw refugees. As Israel was the stronger partner in their representation in parliament nearly the agreement, Shuqir saw the Israeli halved. Some new members, such as Toujan interpretation of the vague agreement as the Faisal, even praised the peace process in more "likely to stick."(13) However, both felt general terms but eventually became bitter that the Oslo accords’ main damage was to opponents of normalization.(21) In larger Arab unity and political coordination.(14) terms, however, with the election, King Nevertheless, in the end, Qallab found the Hussein arranged the removal of most risky agreement better than the status quo at obstacles--internal and external--to an the time.(15) eventual peace agreement with Israel.(22) The press reported that public opinion was By July 1994, negotiations with Israel had divided in its support of the PLO’s reached the point where the two sides were agreement.(16) The Balqa’ refugee camp-- willing to formally end the state of war known as a barometer of Palestinian opinion between them. King Hussein and Israeli in Jordan--witnessed demonstrations against Prime Minister Rabin announced the the accord. However, pro-Fatah activists "Washington Declaration" on July 25, 1994,

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 57 Compiled by the Faculty Action Network “Normalization” and “Anti-Normalization” in Jordan: The Public Debate in the presence of President Bill Clinton. The would end Jordan’s international declaration opened the way for final "isolation."(28) Without the treaty, Tarek negotiations towards a peace treaty between Massarweh of al-Rai’ newspaper argued, the Jordan and Israel. Through August and "noose" that surrounded Jordan since 1991-- September of 1994, negotiators quickly and especially after the 1993 Oslo accords-- resolved issues of border, water and economic would "dry up" the country.(29) cooperation. The treaty was signed on The second argument pointed out that in October 26, 1994 in a ceremony at the Wadi the peace treaty, Jordan itself got all that it Araba border point, to the accompaniment of claimed back from Israel. The government, in considerable international acclaim. Most a statement to the lower house of parliament, Jordanians were pleased to bask in Western said that the treaty should quickly be ratified approval. in order "to regain the Jordanian rights in land and water, to protect the county from threats THE DEBATE OVER THE TREATY and conspiracy and to ascertain the As early as July 1994, the government of Kingdom’s borders."(30) Prime Minister Jordan began a media campaign to sway Majali emphasized that Jordan had settled all public opinion towards support the pending its outstanding issues with Israel.(31) agreement.(23) The regime knew that it He pointed out that the Jordanian territory would be difficult to garner public agreement that Israel held was to return to full Jordanian to ending nearly fifty years of hostilities with sovereignty. In addition, Jordan would gain Israel, especially in the absence of a access to additional water resources from the comprehensive accord for Middle East peace. Jordan River and Lake Tiberius. More For this reason, King Hussein personally took important than these, however, was the the lead in promoting the treaty. In contrast to government’s claim that in the treaty Israel most Jordanian government campaigns, in explicitly and conclusively recognized that which the prime minister appeared as the Jordan was not Palestine.(32) Cecil Hourani, main policy actor, King Hussein made it clear in the opinion pages of the Jordan Times, that the peace treaty was "his." Thus, any emphasized that the treaty "puts an end, once opposition to the treaty would be interpreted and for all, to the possibility that a future by the regime as opposition to the monarchy Israeli government might revive" such a itself--with the resultant consequences.(24) claim.(33) Making the same point, ‘Abd al- The campaign attempted to convince Hafiz al-Shakhanibah asked rhetorically in his Jordanians to support the peace treaty with speech to the House, "Weren’t you frightened four major arguments: by the concept of the substitute homeland? First, the regime and its supporters Weren’t you frightened that solving the presented the treaty as a strategic option for Palestinian problem would only be done in Jordan, one in which the country had little Jordan through the establishment of a choice. In order to escape its post-Gulf-war Palestinian state in this country?" For isolation, the government urged that Jordan Shakhanibah, the treaty ended his fears.(34) needed to join the peace camp. King Hussein A third argument presented by the regime argued that in the past many opportunities for pointed to the provisions in the treaty for peace with Israel had been future multilateral negotiations. Issues such as missed.(25)Government supporters in the refugees and economic cooperation were Foreign Affairs committee of the House of scheduled for negotiations not just between Deputies recommended that the house Israel and Jordan, but would include Egypt endorse the treaty as the "best" accord the and the Palestinians as well. Prime Minister regime could have reached given what was Majali argued in his rebuttal to the house "possible and realistic."(26) Economic debate that such problems could not just be commentator Fahd Fanek, for example, resolved bilaterally between Jordan and argued that "those who reject peace must offer Israel.(35) an alternative, which can only be war."(27) Finally, and perhaps most effectively in Government supporters argued that the treaty the short run, the regime endeavored to sell

58 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Compiled by the Faculty Action Network Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas the treaty based on its expected economic an issue of great concern for many benefits to the whole country and its potential Jordanians--and not just those of Palestinian to create significant for new investment in origin.(41) Jordan. This message targeted Jordanians of Other deputies critiqued the treaty on a both Palestinian and East Bank origin. The third point. They rejected the government’s government argued that Jordan had been claim that Jordan had reclaimed its rights to promised by the United States a large package land and water from Israel.(42) They of debt relief and aid. Such a peace dividend especially objected to the provision of leasing would jump-start Jordan’s sluggish economy land returned to Jordanian sovereignty to and provide new jobs--especially in the Israeli farmers, seeing it as a denigration of tourism industry.(36) The government that sovereignty.(43) reminded citizens of the example of Egypt, Finally, opponents of the peace treaty also and the rewards it received for signing the criticized the government for cracking down Camp David accords in 1978. In the popular on political liberties. Since the beginning the imagination, there appeared the possibility of peace process with the Madrid Conference in a new era for Jordan based on American and 1991, the opposition charged, the government Israeli aid and investment. As late as 1996, had been reversing the process of political Jordanians would (seemingly seriously) argue liberalization.(44) The opposition argued that to private Israelis and Americans the need for since the regime could not refute their Jordan to receive a billion dollars of aid to arguments, the government was now stabilize the country and its economy, based attempting to silence them. According to on what Egypt had been receiving since Camp Labib Qamhawi, for the government, "This David.(37) period requires absolute obedience, and this is The opposition generally rejected the why democracy is a luxury that the peace treaty that had been signed with Israel. government will not tolerate or accept."(45) However, it should be noted that most After the signing of the treaty, permits for components of that opposition were marches protesting it were virtually all denied criticizing the actual treaty but not necessarily by the government. Nevertheless, the notion of peace itself, at least in public. demonstrations took place anyway, some of The reasons for opposition can be broken which were broken up by force. For example, down into four general points. on November 28, 1994, Deputy ‘Abd-al’Aziz The first reason given was based on the Abu-Zant was injured after clashes broke out treaty’s abandonment of Arab coordination. in response to a Friday sermon by the Muslim Arab Nationalists and Leftists faulted the Brotherhood. The IAF blamed government treaty for violating the principles of UN agents for the attack.(46) Security Council Resolutions, 194, 237, 242, Opposition politicians criticized the and 338. Thus, the treaty failed "to comply restrictions on dissent to the treaty in the press with the requirements of international and in their speeches during the ratification of legitimacy."(38) However, Islamists also the treaty. IAF spokesman Hamzah Mansour criticized the government for signing a treaty stated that the "government is acting with that "would end Jordan’s ties with other Arab unjustified over-sensitivity"(47) Bassam and Muslim countries.(39) Haddadin, in his speech to the House of Second, the opposition criticized the treaty Deputies, charged the government with for only dealing with the issue of Palestinian restricting public liberties. "Whenever refugees in later multilateral talks. Many in progress was made in the negotiation process, the opposition saw the treaty as "depriving the the government had tightened its grip on the refugees of the right to return to their opposition and limited participation in the homeland."(40) Other Islamists reiterated this decision making process to the smallest point by charging that the treaty only dealt circles and sometimes to a few with the issue of refugees as a humanitarian individuals."(48) Nevertheless, the opposition problem and not as a political one. generally reiterated its commitment to express Muhammad ‘Uwaydah saw this as a delay in

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 59 Compiled by the Faculty Action Network “Normalization” and “Anti-Normalization” in Jordan: The Public Debate dissent through "peaceful and democratic primarily as a stepping stone to the Arab forms of protest."(49) world. Few were interested in or In the end, the treaty was ratified by the knowledgeable about Jordan in its own right. parliament by a vote of 55-23. IAF Deputy Though a section of the Israeli Ministry of Abdullah al-’Akayilah summed up his Foreign Affairs was kept busy drawing up movement’s reaction to the treaty passing the ideas for grandiose peace projects, the actions parliament by saying that he "was not of the government gave no indication that surprised by the result. We cannot but accept Jordan was, or would become, a centerpiece the decision of the majority in compliance of Israeli policy. This gradually became with the democracy in which we live." He apparent to Jordanians. then said that the opposition’s focus would Even those without ideological baggage shift to preparing a program to resist were suspicious, if also somewhat hopeful. normalization with Israel and the "coming "We need time to see if Israel keeps its word" Zionist invasion of our culture."(50) or "Let us see if Israel has really changed," This last point was perhaps broadly the were refrains heard from many academics most effective. It played on the Arab fear of interviewed during this period. This expresses Western/Zionist influence overwhelming the a fundamental difference between the Arab world. Islamists frequently spoke of an perceptions of the two sides. Israelis saw the Israeli plot to invade the Arab world peace treaty as ratifying the fact that there culturally and economically through Jordan. were no state-to-state issues between Jordan This theme has been reiterated by many and Israel, and as a long-overdue formal spokespersons for the anti-normalization.(51) acceptance of Israel’s right to exist. It is important to note that at this point, Jordanians, who had been taught for many except for the hard-line opposition, most years that Zionism was inherently Jordanians were not actively opposed to the expansionistic and violent, needed to be treaty. Many ordinary people were clearly assured that Israel’s attitudes had changed. impressed by the expected economic benefits. Since Israelis had never remotely seen Some saw Amman becoming the new Beirut, themselves in those terms, they could not and Jordan serving as the bridge between imagine why assurance was needed. Israelis, Israel and the Arab world (precisely the fear as well as the Israeli government, often of the Islamists). Tourism was expected to treated Jordanians and Jordan with the benefit quickly and massively. The month brusque, though non-hostile, impersonality before the treaty was signed, the admission for which Israelis are known. Jordanians, who fee to Jordan’s primary tourist site, the looked for more on a personal as well as ancient city of Petra, was quadrupled diplomatic level, were soon disappointed. overnight in expectation of tourists who would divide their time between Israel and THE AFTERMATH OF THE TREATY Jordan. The basic support for the treaty lasted for The perception of Jordanians at this time, about a year and a half. The mood of those during the two years following the treaty, days is captured by an article in LINK gathered from numerous conversations, was Magazine. Israel is portrayed as damaging its that it was Israel that avidly, almost own reputation through over-excitement at the desperately, wanted peace. Many Jordanians prospect of regional cooperation, at the who fully accepted the idea of peace between October 1994, Casablanca Middle East the two countries would have preferred that Economic Summit. Jordanians are shown as Jordan take its time in signing a treaty in cautiously interested in establishing ties but order to obtain maximum concessions. The wary of being identified as having Israeli king was frequently portrayed as succumbing partners. The article includes a prescient to American and Israeli pressure, and not quote from Jordanian economist Riad al- obtaining the best deal for his country. Khouri: "The ice has been broken but the From the other side, Israelis were indeed temperature is still below zero. It could easily supportive of peace, but most saw Jordan freeze over again."(52)

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The next Middle East and North Africa appeared confident that the new government, economic summit was held in Amman, led by Shimon Peres, would carry the process October 29-31, 1995. Jordanian observers forward.(56) King Hussein’s moving eulogy were extremely pleased with its results, and was highlighted around the world. In fact, the even more so that it was seen as recognizing period from Rabin’s assassination until the Jordan as an economic force in the region, end of February 1996 was, in retrospect, the undeniably a direct result of the treaty with high water mark of support for peace and Israel. It was recognized by all that the United normalization. States had been the driving force behind the During that period, the government felt summits and was particularly interested in confident enough to propose amending the new Arab-Israel economic projects. The law on Professional Associations, to weaken results included loan agreements for over their power.(57) The week before that had $300 million from Japan and the World seen the arrest of Engineer’s Association Bank.(53) Head Leith Shbeilat, the most prominent of However, as the first year of the treaty the anti-normalization leaders, on charges of progressed, it appeared that, while no "sedition and slighting His Majesty", based on disasters had occurred, in the relationship, a speech critical of government policies and most promised benefits, other than the MENA predicting economic austerity, as opposed to conference itself, were slow in making an the peace dividend expected by the appearance. Trade grew only slowly.(54) government.(58) While tourism from Israel did appear, it During that time, Israeli Prime Minister barely registered on the economic barometer, Peres and Foreign Minister Ehud Barak as most Israeli tourists came either for day visited Jordan, and King Hussein visited trips, to see only Petra and one or two other Israel. In January, five new bilateral major sites, or stayed only a short time. agreements were signed, thus completing the Moreover, all Jordanians seemed to know that thirteen envisioned by the Peace Treaty of Israeli tourists brought their lunches with 1994. After their festive signing, the them and bought no souvenirs. Even worse, Monitoring Committee set up by the treaty while the number of tourists from third was disbanded, having completed its countries increased after the treaty was mission.(59) At the banquet in Eilat given for signed, it became apparent that many tourists Crown Prince Hassan to celebrate the signing, or pilgrims simply added a day or two in the Prince noted that "today normal life Jordan while spending a week or more in between Jordan and Israel can begin at last". Israel. Many Jordanians regarded this as no Similarly, columnist Musa Keilani wrote in an less than an Israeli plot and an attempt to opinion piece, "We have little reason to doubt damage the Jordanian economy. the Israeli seriousness and interest to develop The hard core of the anti-normalization close economic relations with Jordan."(60) In forces did not, of course, accept the treaty February, Peres announced new elections for without a fight. After failing to have any May 29, and polls showed him 15 points effect on its ratification, the IAF, leftist ahead, a figure that had been fairly steady parties and professional associations tried to since the assassination two months earlier. hold a conference on the subject in Amman. This period of warmth and high After the government twice refused expectations (which was shared on the Israeli permission, it was held in September 1995 on side) ended explosively on 25 February 1996, the premises of a political party, thus with two bus bombs in Jerusalem. Twenty-six obviating the need for permission. 300 people were killed and (77) wounded. The Jordanian attended.(55) government and some of the press were The anti-normalization forces appeared to outraged at the bombers. The Jordan Times suffer a setback in the aftermath of the opined on March 4 that "the bombs are aimed assassination of Israeli Prime Minister at peace." In private conversations, many Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995. Jordanians expressed their sympathy with Jordanians mourned the assassination, but Israelis.

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However, Israel’s response to the ongoing normalization of relations at the popular level bombing campaign in order to stop future are sagging. If anything, its bloodbath in attacks, which involved a comprehensive Lebanon has already moved many Jordanians closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and from the center of the road to openly significant hardship to Palestinians, quickly opposing ties with the Jewish state."(62) On transformed the sympathy into anger. Soon the same day, the Jordan Times editorialized, the press and then the government focused "Israeli bullets have rendered the peace much more on the ongoing closure and the agreements in the region nothing more than Palestinian suffering it entailed, in the process ink on paper."(63) As usual, the Arabic drawing negative conclusions for the language press was even harsher. Sultan al possibilities of Israeli-Jordanian Hattab wrote in Al-Rai’ that the campaign normalization. "destroyed any lingering hope for coexistence On April 9 a new front was opened, when with the Jewish State….The Arabs have no rockets fired by Hizballah in Lebanon rained doubt that Israel does not contemplate a down on the Galilee. Peres, whose popularity genuine peace with its neighbors."(64) among the Israeli public had plummeted in Even on the economic front, expectations the aftermath of the bombing campaign, felt for normalization were receding. Seemingly he had to demonstrate strength and resolve. unrelated to the political disillusionment with Israel began a bombing campaign in Lebanon, Israel, the Jordan Times "Daily Business whose intensity was quickly ratcheted up and Beat," headlined "Israeli market seen unable given the name "Grapes of Wrath." Jordanian to plug Jordan’s trade gap with Iraq." anger, which had been building, was seen in a Businessmen were quoted as saying, "I don’t drumbeat of daily attacks on Israel. The think that any of the Jordanian businessmen Jordan Times, which had been the most pro- will rely on the Israeli market--this is by far normalization of the daily newspapers, unlikely and we are not enthusiastic for this editorialized that the Israeli response to the market." Much of the article contained Katyusha rockets from Lebanon "lacks even warnings against expecting too much from the resemblance of credibility" in its trade with Israel.(65) disproportion.(61) The next day it warned that Jordanian hope for and belief in "peace is being shattered in Lebanon". The normalization never again reached the point Lower House of the Parliament condemned that it had achieved in the first two months of the bombing in a resolution that proclaimed 1996. Having been taught all their lives that that it "expresses to the world the true face of Zionism was inherently expansionistic and the Jewish state." racist, the moderate forces in Jordan had On 18 April, an Israeli shell aimed at nevertheless largely suspended their disbelief Hizballah forces killed at least 100 refugees in and chosen to see a change. When Israel a UN compound in Qana. Jordanian fury at reacted as it always had to attacks, namely, by Israel’s action reached a crescendo. Few retaliating swiftly and forcefully, Jordanians Jordanians could believe that the vaunted, felt betrayed. Though much else was to technically advanced Israeli military had hit happen, the spring of 1996 marked a loss of the compound accidentally, and detailed post- innocence on the Jordanian side that was mortems rejected Israel’s insistence that it had never regained. been unintentional. Virtually no Israeli could Obviously, Israelis viewed the situation imagine any reason that Israel would completely differently. The change, from their deliberately kill civilians in that fashion, point of view, had come from the Arabs, who while Jordanians were seemingly had finally agreed to recognize the fact of unanimously convinced that Israel, utterly Israel’s existence. When it transpired that the callous about Arab life, were simply trying to Palestinian Authority could not do as it had teach a lesson. Columnist Musa Keilani, who undertaken and prevent terror, Israelis had only a few months before was secure in his little doubt that they had to react forcefully in expectations of normalization, wrote "Israel a justifiable defense of its citizen’s lives. should not wonder anymore why its efforts at Likewise, if the Lebanese government was

62 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Compiled by the Faculty Action Network Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas unable or unwilling to control Hizballah, borders, and thus Israel would likewise have Israel must make it painful enough for to persuade it to do so. Lebanon that the government would do so, or In Jordan, and in Israel as well, many felt at least so Israel hoped. From discussions at that the primary reason for the launching of this time with Israelis who wholeheartedly Grapes of Wrath was the need by Shimon supported the peace process, it was clear that Peres to make himself appear a more nothing that had happened since Oslo had aggressive and hardline figure in order to win caused them to reassess these fundamental the election. Whether connected to Grapes of assumptions. Wrath or not, toward the end of the election Given this dynamic, which was based on campaign, rumors appeared that King the absolute certainty of each side that it was Hussein’s preferred candidate was not Peres the victim in the conflict, it is clear that, even the dove, but rather Netanyahu the hawk. if the bus bombings and rocket attacks on the Interviews with well-connected Jordanian Galilee had not taken place, normalization of academics during and soon after the campaign relations would have been difficult. Each side confirmed the impression that the king, believed that it had made fundamental though perhaps not his subjects, was hoping concessions unmatched by the other. for a Netanyahu win. Reasons given for this Palestinian and Jordanian leaders had varied. Some asserted that the king was recognized Israel, despite their belief in the seriously concerned about Peres’s reputed fundamental injustice of its creation. Israelis pro-Palestinian and pro-Syrian orientation. saw that as a simple recognition of reality. On The king, according to this analysis, was the other side, Israelis had agreed to recognize determined that Jordan be Israel’s primary the enemies they saw as sworn to their Arab partner, and was concerned that Peres destruction and accept a process that would might not share this orientation. Others talked presumably lead to a Palestinian state, the of a lack of chemistry between Peres and prevention of which had been the linchpin of Hussein, in contrast to the relationship Israeli policy since 1948. Arabs saw this as a between the king and the martyred Yitzhak minimal, grudging and belated recognition of Rabin, Peres’ longtime political adversary. In only part of the enormous injustice Israel had any case, it was believed in Jordan that no wrought. tears were shed in the Palace when Benjamin This mood in Jordan was well expressed Netanyahu squeaked to victory on May 29, by Jordan Times columnist Walid Sadi, an 1996. The king expressed his "high hopes for attorney and human rights advocate of (Netanyahu’s) success in reaching a just, moderate views. He wrote, four days after the comprehensive and lasting peace for Qana incident, "What worries me is the generations to come." According to the inevitable conclusion that even many Jordan Times, however, based on interviews moderate Arabs are beginning to share, the with Jordanians from various backgrounds, idea that peace between Israel and the Arab Netanyahu’s election was viewed as a blow to peoples is unnatural and what is natural is the the Middle East peace process.(67) continuation of a state of war notwithstanding Whether or not they had a preference all the peace treaties that have been before the elections, many Jordanians were concluded."(66) not overly concerned about the victory of the Arabs cried foul when Israel responded to Israeli Right. For example, at a workshop at attacks. Why should the entire Palestinian or the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Lebanese population suffer for the acts of a Peace of Hebrew University, inaugurating a few fanatics? To them, this showed Israeli program of Israeli-Jordanian academic disdain for Arab life. Israel, however, saw it cooperation which, coincidentally, began the as a people-to-people confrontation, as day after the election, the Jordanian always. The Palestinians had failed in their participants assured their Israeli hosts that the promise to fight terrorism, and thus Israel peace process was irreversible, and that the would have to do it in the only way it could. peace was between countries, not individuals Lebanon had refused to control its own or parties. Their major concern was whether

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 63 Compiled by the Faculty Action Network “Normalization” and “Anti-Normalization” in Jordan: The Public Debate the Likud party had abandoned its "Jordan is contrast to the government’s goal of greatly Palestine" orientation of the late 1980s. increasing economic ties. The government However, this mood of optimism on the part was embarrassed, Israelis were confused, and of Jordanians turned out to be short-lived. the anti-normalizers had achieved their first During the summer of 1996, the Arab clear success. moderates sought to find common ground The agreement on the Hebron deployment with the Netanyahu government. However, between Israel and the Palestinian Authority the attempt ended for most in the Palestinian in January 1997 was hailed by the Jordanian explosion of violence following Israel’s government and the press as a new departure, opening of the "Western Wall Tunnel" in which was particularly important as it was September 1996. King Hussein was seen as a defeat for the Israeli right wing. particularly incensed since, shortly before the Peace--and eventual normalization--seemed opening, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s foreign again within the realm of possibility.(69) policy advisor, Dore Gold, had visited him However, precisely because this was indeed and mentioned nothing of the plans. However, the case, the Netanyahu government now had the tunnel riots energized the anti- to make a gesture to its supporters on the right normalization forces in Jordan, where which turned into a major bonus for the Arab reportedly 37 groups representing a variety of opposition to the process. divergent views joined the IAF in a Israel had long been interested in building declaration calling resistance to "all forms of a housing development on a wooded hill normalization with the Zionist enemy".(68) facing the Palestinian city of Bethlehem but Before the tunnel violence, normalization was inside the expanded borders of Jerusalem. a neutral word for many. It could be Known in Hebrew as Har Homa and in supported or opposed. However, afterward, Arabic as Jabal Abu Ghneim, the hill many turned against normalization, a blow occupied a strategic position, as, if built on, it from which it never really recovered. would effectively prevent any Palestinian The year following the tunnel riots was the linkup of the northern and southern areas of crucial one. Five separate incidents that made the West Bank near Jerusalem. In February the news illustrate the downward progression 1997, the Likud government announced that it of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship. While would build a new neighborhood there. Har only one actually included participation by Homa was viewed as a new settlement by the Jordanian opposition, it could not have Arabs, who warned it would endanger the asked for a better series of events which entire peace process.(70) helped its campaign to discredit the treaty and The reaction from the Palestinian the legitimacy of a Jordanian relationship Authority was immediate. However, it also with Israel. became a major rallying cry in Jordan and In January 1997, an Israeli trade fair was through most of the Arab world. This was held in Amman, sponsored by Israeli precisely the sort of action that Arabs had government institutions and organized by a understood that the Oslo process was intended Jordanian businessman. It was realized on all to prevent, namely, the change of status of sides that, while economics could not make parts of Jerusalem. For many Israelis, the the relationship succeed, the lack of an issue was equally black and white. For them, economic relationship could certainly result in Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghneim was within the failure of the treaty. From all accounts, the Israeli borders of Jerusalem, and therefore a success of the boycott against the trade fair purely domestic issue of building a new pleased and even surprised the organizers. neighborhood. The Israeli peace camp Supported by 20 of Jordan’s 23 recognized opposed Har Homa, though, and staged a political parties, a demonstration against the series of demonstrations there, with no fair mobilized a reported 4000 people. Only a perceivable effect on the government’s few Jordanians braved the protests to visit the intentions. trade fair. The opposition had shown its If the trade fair had symbolized Israeli ability to mobilize the population, in clear economic penetration of Jordan to the

64 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Compiled by the Faculty Action Network Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas opposition, Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghneim was Jordan River, called Naharayim in Hebrew a clear example of what Arabs had always and Bequra in Arabic. seen in Zionism, namely, expropriation of Jordanian reaction illustrated the varied Arab land under transparent (or without) attitudes towards normalization. The regime pretext. As the relationship between Israel and and its supporters denounced the crime in the the Palestinian Authority deteriorated, strongest terms. "It was the most heinous Jordanians who had pointed out that there was crime ever committed in Jordan", wrote Musa no reason for Jordan to be "purer" than the Keilani.(72) However, Keilani went on to Palestinians themselves regarding dealing state explicitly that the only gainer was with Israel, were abashed. Netanyahu and his anti-peace policies, and The cause of the next incident was lost even to imply, with no shred of evidence, that sight of in the light of what subsequently the perpetrator may have intended that result. occurred. Apparently, King Hussein had From all appearances, the majority of requested permission of the Israeli Jordanians disapproved of the attack and government to fly Yasir Arafat to Gaza in his expressed sympathy for the victims.(73) own plane. In what appeared to be However, very soon Daqamsa became a hero monumental insensitivity by whichever Israeli to anti-normalization Jordanians. Police official was responsible, permission was prevented a pilgrimage to his house. Two refused. The king responded with a furious hundred Jordanian lawyers competed to three-page letter sent on March 9 to represent him, led by the Jordanian Bar Netanyahu and very quickly leaked to the Association.(74) press. The king, whose language was usually The king, meanwhile, in a moment etched extremely circumspect, accused the prime indelibly in virtually every Israeli memory, minister, with whom his public relations had came to Israel to visit the homes of the dead been cordial until then, of allowing a situation children, during the seven-day Jewish in which the lives of all Arabs and Israelis mourning ceremony known as the shiva. were "sliding towards an abyss of bloodshed According to tradition, mourners sit on the and disaster, brought about by fear and floors or on low stools to express their grief. despair."(71) Accompanied by television cameras, the king In his letter the king alluded to a number visited each home that would have him, of issues, including Har Homa/Jabal Abu sitting on the floor with the mourners. Israelis Ghneim, a U.S. veto in the UN Security were touched by the human gesture of sharing Council of a condemnation of Israel, delays their grief, which they had never before seen on Israeli withdrawal holding up work on a from an Arab leader. port and airport for Gaza and, most Jordanians were also impressed, but very dramatically, having almost tested the Israeli differently. Unfamiliar with Jewish customs, refusal to allow Arafat to travel on his jet, and it appeared to them that the king was kneeling asking whether the Air Force would have shot to the Jews, abasing and humiliating himself, him down. Such an unbridled personal attack and denigrating the dignity of his office and was out of character for the king, and his country. A storm of condemnation broke expressed eloquently the frustration that he, out and the king found himself on the Israel’s best friend in the Arab world, was defensive domestically, though he had made experiencing in trying to influence the Israeli many friends across the river. government. Netanyahu’s bland response did Eventually, despite his legions of legal nothing to soothe matters. representation, Daqamseh was convicted and However, the letter incident was almost sentenced to life in prison (angering many immediately overtaken by another, more Israelis, who felt that was almost an acquittal tragic event. On March 13, a Jordanian under the circumstances), and remains a soldier, Ahmed Daqamsa, opened fire on a martyr for the anti-normalization cause. group of Israeli schoolgirls from a religious Israelis were perplexed by the spectacle, and school in Beit Shemesh, killing 7. They were were beginning to understand that peace with picnicking on the "Island of Peace" in the

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Jordan was not as simple as it had once crises, only occasionally relieved by news of appeared. cooperation or a new agreement. The stability The worst incident with regard to and progress implied by the term Jordanian pride, however, was still to come. normalization had never had a chance to take The anti-normalization forces could not have root, and the Jordanian public had seemingly come up with a better scenario than the lost its faith in the possibility of achieving it. Khalid Mishal episode to discredit normal What the Israeli public and other observers relations with Israel. Apparently, the Mossad found difficult to understand was that this had had been ordered to kill Mishal, a Hamas virtually no effect on the stability of King leader in Jordan, with a slow-acting poison. Hussein’s reign--which, in any case, was However, the attack was badly bungled and drawing to a close--and the viability of the the perpetrators captured at the scene. The Hashemite dynasty. In a sense, the king and king demanded an antidote, which was most of the public agreed to disagree on this provided, the Israelis were released, and matter, with the rhetoric generally muted, as Mishal quickly recovered. Jordanians were is normal in Jordanian public discourse. On more outraged by the intended assassination one hand, attacks on the king and the than by any other event that had happened Hashemite monarchy are taboo, though since the treaty. While the earlier actions were attacks on the government are acceptable, as against the Palestinians and Lebanese, who one of the prime minister’s roles is to be a had perpetrated the attacks against Israel, this punching bag for public disapproval. If he attack was exactly what the signed peace gets too battered, he is dismissed (the average treaty was intended to prevent. length of King Hussein’s governments over a The Jordanian public response was period of 45 years was under a year). On the predictable but not, apparently, to Israelis. other hand, the government does not, except Even many liberal, peace-oriented Israelis under extreme provocation, prosecute or seemed to believe that the only thing wrong generally act against the anti-normalizers nor with the operation was its failure. After did it "force" any Jordanian to participate in almost 50 years of overt and covert retaliation normalization activities. These were the rules against Israel’s enemies all over the world, of the game that developed. one more hit was barely an issue, except for Much of the year 1998 was taken up with the incompetence it exposed. Yet this the King’s illness, which was only revealed to behavior was explicitly and unambiguously be terminal in the weeks before he died in prohibited by the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, February 1999. He was undergoing intensive exposed King Hussein to ridicule from his therapy in the Mayo clinic for the last half of own people and the rest of the Arab world, 1998 and Crown Prince Hassan was, as and dealt a virtual death-blow to any lingering always, the regent. Jordanian public life was Jordanian feelings of trust toward Israel. The low-key. However, the king did make a conflicting reactions made clear the extreme dramatic appearance, literally from his difficulties facing Jordanian-Israeli popular sickbed, at the Wye River Plantation relations. The King’s mild public reaction to negotiations between Netanyahu and Arafat, the incident confirmed for many Jordanians moderated by President Clinton. His that he was in the pocket of the Israelis, appearance was clearly part of the reason for though, of course, such sentiments could not the formal success of the summit, although be expressed publicly. the agreements were suspended by Netanyahu King Hussein had by no means given up shortly thereafter, based on claims of the fight for peace and for normalization of Palestinian violations, and his government Israel’s relationship with the Arab world. soon fell from power. However, by the end of 1997, it appeared that Jordanian reaction to the king’s role at the battle for the Jordanian public’s Wye Plantation was muted. No one could acceptance of Israel in the framework set up criticize it, since it was a personal by Oslo seemed lost. The peace process itself intervention by the monarch, and certainly the was caught in a seemingly endless series of king’s decisive part was a cause of national

66 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Compiled by the Faculty Action Network Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas pride. The Star solved the problem by quoting King Abdullah II, again as expected, foreign support for the king’s role, and in a continued King Hussein’s policy with regard separate article, indicating the skepticism of to Israel and the peace process. While his the Palestinian inhabitants of Jordanian youth and dynamism were celebrated refugee camps towards the agreement itself, publicly, in private the grizzled veterans of with no word mentioned of the king’s Jordan’s political wars decried his American role.(75) accent and his inexperience. The new, About January 25, 1999, rumors began to Western-educated and -oriented king made it circulate that the king was about to replace his clear that his first priority was Jordan, and brother, Crown Prince Hassan, who had been that he wanted to see a less corrupt, more heir apparent to the throne since 1965, with prosperous country. King Hussein’s his son, Prince Abdallah. Within days, this attachment to Jerusalem soon disappeared became official. Israelis and Americans from Jordanian priorities, seemingly not scrambled to decode the relationship between missed by Jordanians. the unexpected change, the peace process, the In September 2000, the second intifada relationship with Israel, as well as to the broke out. Perhaps if King Hussein had been stability of the dynasty. Within two weeks, alive he might have played some helpful role this speculation became that much more in easing tensions and bridging gaps. At any intense, when the king returned to Jordan for rate, though, Jordan and its new king were not the second time, obviously dying. His death consulted at the Camp David negotiations, nor came on February 7, 1999. were they involved in the outbreak of the second intifada, any more than in the first. AFTER THE DEATH OF KING However, all Jordanians publicly adopted the HUSSEIN cause of the Palestinians, and attitudes toward In fact, the change in the succession had Israel, already distant, became icy. Jordan and nothing to do with Israel. While speculation Egypt fought back an attempt at the Arab and various theories preoccupied the summit to demand that all states break Jordanian public for months, most agreed relations with Israel, but their victory had a that, as his death approached, the king wanted price. After the Jordanian ambassador his son rather than his brother to carry on the resigned, no successor was sent. Israeli dynastic line. As expected, Prince Hassan, diplomats were attacked on the streets of though grievously disappointed, accepted the Amman, leading to a withdrawal of succession without a murmur of public diplomats’ families. Israel soon warned its protest. citizens not to travel to Jordan. King Hussein’s funeral was the most At present, the anti-normalizers have inclusive diplomatic event in years, and some routed the normalizers from the field. Though of Hussein’s bitterest enemies, most notably their leftist and Islamist baggage by no means President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, took the represented the views of a majority of opportunity to extend a hand of friendship to Jordanians, working with Israel and Jordan and its new king. Most observers consorting with Israelis was now seen as an predicted that there was every reason to shore anti-Arab, anti-Islamic act. The blacklist that up relations with Jordan’s Arab neighbors and had been in the process of compilation for concentrate on domestic reform. King years was finally released and generally Hussein had devoted his last five years to available. Many of those who appeared on it reinstating his country in the good graces of were solid and well-known citizens. These the West, led by the United States, and were precisely the people opposed by the creating the relationship with Israel that he Islamists and leftists; Western-oriented, many and the United States had sought. Now, with Christians, often strong supporters of the the peace process seemingly stalled, there was monarchy. every reason to turn inward, which is what he It is reasonable to ask, is this so important? has done. With the Hashemite monarchy still seeing Israel and, with it, the American connection

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 67 Compiled by the Faculty Action Network “Normalization” and “Anti-Normalization” in Jordan: The Public Debate as a strategic requirement, is public opinion The fight over normalization in Jordan is really essential? Jordan is not, after all, a in some real respects a conflict that goes democracy, and certainly not in the realm of beyond the merits of dealing with Israel. On foreign affairs. Jordanian public opinion, the side of the anti-normalizers are Islamists, which would have been difficult to acquire ultimately seeking a Jordanian, or even pan- and easy to lose was perhaps not much of a Islamic state governed by shari’a, plus prize for Israel. assorted leftists and pan-Arabists. The other From a realpolitik point of view this side is more complex. Much of the educated, perception has some merit. Israel still benefits Westernized elite, especially of East from intelligence and other security Jordanian background, would prefer to have cooperation, even if Jordan is more attuned to good economic, political and even cultural the United States than to Israel. The border is relations with Israel, but recognize it is quiet, and the Hamas presence is low-key At impossible without resolution of the least at this point, there appears to be no Palestinian-Israeli dispute. And, as of this question of Jordan breaking relations with point, that does not seem to be very likely. Israel, much less joining the anti-Israel camp However, the anti-normalizers oppose much in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Jordan still of the entire worldview of those whom they has Israeli factories (the number has actually dub normalizers. The Islamists especially do grown since 1999). The borders are (usually) not want to see Jordan Westernized, whether open. or not Israel is involved. Thus, publication of Yet while having some merit, this the "List of Shame" is a blow aimed at their approach is also short-sighted. The fact is that cultural enemies, not just at normalizing with on two major occasions, namely, the 1967 Israel. war and the 1990-91 Gulf war, Jordanian The question now is whether the popular public opinion was probably the major factor feeling against Israel will become so strong in causing Jordan to take the stands it did. that the government will some day have to Now, with a more liberalized political system, acquiesce with overt support by breaking the system is that much more responsive.(76) relations with Israel. Security cooperation Jordan is still Israel’s only likely gateway could still possibly continue, because the fact to the Arab world. If Jordanians are anti- is that the two regimes share important geo- Israel, it is unlikely that any other country will strategic interests. develop significant business or diplomatic Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that the ties. Moreover, Israel now feels surrounded anger and disillusionment now expressed will by a wall of hostility, not that different from disappear in the near future. Thus, it is the situation before 1994. possible that the current Jordanian perception In retrospect, the only way an Israeli- of the ‘real face of Zionism’ will become the Jordanian peace could have succeeded was if reigning orthodoxy, which would constitute an Israeli-Palestinian peace had done so. This the ‘Egyptianization’ of Israel-Jordanian was obvious to the Jordanians, but much less relations. This would be a consummation so to the Israeli government, and certainly not devoutly to be regretted by those who still to the Israeli public. The East Bank Jordanian hope for a Jordanian-Israel popular leadership, and especially the more rapprochement. nationalistic among the East Bank elite (dubbed by many the "Jordanian Likud") for *Paul L. Scham, trained in the U.S. as an its negative attitude towards Palestinians, also attorney, has been a researcher at the Harry had hopes that Jordan’s particularistic S. Truman Research Institute for the national interest could make the treaty work. Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew And it has, on a security level, but not on a University of Jerusalem since July 1996. He popular level, since the majority of the has studied at Columbia, Princeton and the population that is of Palestinian origin will University of California at Berkeley, where he not countenance an "abandonment" of their obtained his J.D. He spent the period Palestinian brethren. February through June of 1996 in Amman

68 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) Compiled by the Faculty Action Network Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas researching attitudes of Jordanian academics 8. BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts towards Israel. (BBC-SWB), 4 September 1993. 9.Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan in the Middle East Russell E. Lucas is an independent scholar Peace Process: From War to Peace with currently working in Jerusalem. He holds a Israel," in Ilan Peleg, (ed.), The Middle East Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown Peace Process: Interdisciplinary University. His dissertation is titled Perspectives. Albany: SUNY Press, 1998. "Institutions and Regime Survival Strategies: p.161. Collective Action and Path Dependence in 10. The Financial Post, 15 September 1993. Jordan." He has held grants from the US 11. Jordan Times, 6 November 1993. Institute of Peace, Fulbright, and ACOR and 12. BBC-SWB, 31 August 1993. is a Research Associate at the Truman 13. Middle East Mirror, 13 September 1993. Institute. 14. Middle East Mirror, 2 September 1993, 13 September 1993, 14 September 1993. A slightly different version of this article will 15. Middle East Mirror, 14 September 1993. be published in an upcoming issue of Israel 16. Jordan Times, 14 September 1993. Affairs. 17. Middle East Mirror, 14 September 1993. 18. The Associated Press, 1 September 1993. NOTES 19. The Guardian, 24 September 1993. 1. Interview by Paul Scham, March 1996. 20. Russell E. Lucas, "Institutions and 2. Ahmad Majdoubeh, Jordan Times, 7 Regime Survival Strategies: Collective Action December 1995. Majdoubeh discusses the and Path Dependence in Jordan," Ph.D. etymology of the word, but also points out dissertation, Georgetown University, 2000. that (already) that it had acquired p.126-136. connotations and assumptions of Israel 21. Jordan Times, 10 November 1993, p.1. politically, culturally, and economically 22. Mark Power Stevens, ed., Post-Election overwhelming Jordan. Seminary: A Discussion of Jordan’s 1993 3. Lori Plotkin, "Jordanian - Israeli Peace: Parliamentary Elections. Amman: Al-Urdun Taking Stock, 1994-1997," Washington Al-Jadid Research Center, 1994. Institute Policy Focus, Research 23. United Press International, 17 July 1994. Memorandum 32 (May 1997), p. 27. 24. Christian Science Monitor, 5 August 4. While it is beyond the scope of the current 1994. paper, it would be instructive to compare it to 25.FBIS-NES, 11/2/94, 42 a roughly parallel situation in Egypt. In the 26. Jordan Times, 6 November 1994. early 1980’s, concurrently with Israel’s 27. International Herald-Tribune, 25 July incursion into Lebanon, Egyptian public 1994. opinion, led by the intellectual class, 28. Fawaz al-Zu’bi, Jordan Times, 6 solidified into solid opposition to Egypt’s November 1994. diplomatic relationship with Israel. Over the 29. Middle East Mirror, 26 October 1994. next twenty years, such opposition became a 30. Jordan Times, 31 October 1994. hallmark of that class, uniting political 31. Jordan Times, 2 November 1994. factions otherwise at odds. Those who support 32. Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public the idea of people- to-people relations Spheres: The International Politics of between Jordanians and Israelis must bear Jordan’s Identity. New York: Columbia that generation-long development in mind as University Press, 1999. p. 166-197 a warning. 33. Jordan Times, 2 November 1994. 5. Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians 34. Jordan Times, 7 November 1994. and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle 35. FBIS-NES, 7 November 1994. East Peace Process. Washington DC: US 36. Al-Dustour, 3 November 1994. Institute of Peace, 1999. 37. Discussions with Paul Scham 6. Middle East Mirror, 2 September 1993. 38. Mustapha al-Shunaykat, Jordan Times, 31 7. Middle East Mirror, 2 September 1993. October 1994.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2001) 69 Compiled by the Faculty Action Network “Normalization” and “Anti-Normalization” in Jordan: The Public Debate

39. Ahmad al-Kassibah, Jordan Times, 6 68. Rami Khouri, Jordan Times, 15 October November 1994. 1996. 40. Ibrahim Zeid al-Kilani, Jordan Times, 6 69. Jordan Times, 18 January 1997. November 1994. 70. Jordan Times, 23 February 1997. 41. Jordan Times, 7 November 1994. 71. Jordan Times, 12 March, 1997. 42. ‘Abd al-Rahim al-’Akor, Jordan Times, 7 72. Jordan Times, 15 March, 1997. November 1994. 73. Jordan Times, 15 March 1997. 43. Hamzah Mansour, Jordan Times, 6 74. Jordan Times, 18 March 1997. November 1994; Toujan Faisal, Jordan 75. The Star, October 29, 1998. Times, 7 November 1994. 76. see Lynch. 44. Al-Majd, 11/14/94; Laurie Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 28 No.2 (Winter1999), p. 52-67. 45. The Star, 3 November 1994. 46. Jordan Times, 29 October 1994. 47. Jordan Times, 29 October 1994. 48. Jordan Times, 7 November 1994. 49. Middle East Mirror, 24 October 1994. 50. Jordan Times, 7 November 1994. 51. See also the opinion article by Ahmed Majdoubeh, JT, 7 December 1995 52. LINK Magazine, (November - December 1995), p. 3. 53. Jordan Times, 4 November, 1994. 54. LINK Magazine, (November - December 1995), p.2. 55. Plotkin, p.28 56. Jordan Times, 5 November 1994. 57. Jordan Times, 16 November 1994. 58. Jordan Times, 10 November 1994 59. Jordan Times, 10 January 1995, 17 January 1995, 20 January 1995. 60. Jordan Times 20 January, 1995. 61. Jordan Times 17 April 1996. 62. Jordan Times, 20 April 1996. 63. Jordan Times, 20 April 1996. 64. Jordan Times, 20 April 1996. 65. Jordan Times, 21 April 1996. On the other hand, an unpublished study indicated that while Jordanian businesspeople understated their actual willingness to deal with Israel, while Israelis, on the contrary, were upbeat in their conversations regarding joint trade, but actually overstated their willingness in practice. Avi Kluger, Muhsen Makhamreh, and Hisham Gharaibeh, "Prospects of Business Cooperation Between Jordan and Israel: The Attitudes of Business Leaders in Both Countries," unpublished manuscript. 66. Jordan Times, 22 April 1996. 67. Jordan Times, 1 June 1996.

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