Joint Force Quarterly

Home , Air Marshal (India), Air marshal (Pakistan), Commodore (Pakistan), Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Second Army (Bulgaria), Senior colonel

0125 Cov1 Only 2/24/01 12:58 PM Page 1 JFQJOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

JV 2020

Transformation— An International Perspective

Joint Experimentation Interwar Innovation Summer00 Culmination Point Mission Creep

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. . . the foundation of jointness is the strength of individual service competencies. —Joint Vision 2020

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AWord fromthe U.S. Navy (Brook R. Kelsey) Marines approach Blue Beach during Exercise Chairman Destined Glory 2000.

n September 2000 the Joint Chiefs of Staff ap- in a high risk for the second. This does not mean peared before the Senate and House Armed that our forces would not prevail in either of the Services Committees to assess the readiness of contingencies, but this increased risk translates Ithe Armed Forces. Readiness will be a key issue into longer timelines, loss of tactical advantage, in preparing for a new national security strategy and potential for higher casualties. and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Our first-to-fight forces are the most profes- Our short explanation to Congress was that sional, effective, and flexible in the world. Indeed, the military is ready, but with important quali- no other military could have simultaneously ac- fiers. Being ready means having the capability to complished—with the same level of professional- execute national military ism and competence—high-intensity combat over strategy, including the mis- Serbia, force deterrence and maritime interdiction the post-1997 QDR force, sion of fighting and winning in the Persian Gulf, and peace operations in both some 40 percent smaller two nearly simultaneous Bosnia and Kosovo. Moreover, training operations major theater wars. Although in West Africa and fire fighting assistance than the one which won the Armed Forces can execute throughout the Western United States have Desert Storm, is showing current strategy, the dangers demonstrated our flexibility to respond across the associated with the two the- full spectrum of national requirements. signs of strain ater scenario have increased But such operations have critically stretched over time. The risk factors for the Armed Forces. The post-1997 QDR force, winning the first major war some 40 percent smaller than the one which won are moderate, but the lower readiness rates of Desert Storm, is showing signs of strain. Higher later deploying forces, combined with shortfalls in strategic lift and critical support forces, result (continued on page 4)

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CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman 17 Modernizing the Indian by Henry H. Shelton Armed Forces by Timothy D. Hoyt 6 From the Field and Fleet: Letters to the Editor 23 To Change a Military—

JFQ The Indonesian Experience FORUM by John B. Haseman 11 Transformation—An International Perspective 31 French Forces for the 21st Century by Jeffrey B. Jones

39 Poland Prepares for the Alliance by Jeffrey Simon

45 Creating the South African National Defence Force by James A. Higgs

51 Colombia: Civil-Military Relations in the Midst of War by John T. Fishel

57 Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military—Preparing for Tomorrow 12 The People’s Liberation Army 77 Progress Report on Joint Looks to the Future Experimentation by Charles F. Hawkins by Harold W. Gehman, Jr.

PHOTO CREDITS 83 Comparative Approaches to Interwar Innovation The cover of this issue features MH–53J on training mission (U.S. Air Force/David Nolan). The front inside by Williamson Murray cover shows combat direction center aboard USS Harry S. Truman (U.S. Navy/Tina M. Ackerman); UH–60 crew chief OUT OF JOINT in Kosovo (982d Signal Company/Drew Lockwood); F–16 over South Carolina (U.S. Air Force/Thomas Meneguin); and marine during exercise in the Philippines (U.S. Navy/ 91 Two Hats for the Joint Force John F. Valentine). The table of contents depicts Indian Commander? soldiers on parade (AP Wide World Photo/Ajit Kumar) and French scout, Joint Resolve XI (1st Combat Camera by Damian J. McCarthy and Squadron/Lisa Zunanyika-Carpenter). The back inside Susan A. Medlin cover captures USS Normandy replenishing USS George Washington (USS George Washington/Brian Fleske). The back cover finds sailor scanning ocean (U.S. Navy/Corey Lewis); marines training at Camp Pendleton (13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Combat Camera/ Branden P. O’Brien); F–16 at Lajes air base in Azores (U.S. Air Force/Michael R. Holzworth); and soldier checking safety zone, Kosovo (55th Signal Company/ Tony Vitello).

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SUMMER 2000 / NUMBER 25

COMMENTARY 122 Resourcing the Force: The Legacy of Cold War Strategy by Ronald W. Moore

OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 126 Thomas Dresser White

THE JOINT WORLD 127 Doctrine and Education

OFF THE SHELF 129 Crisis in Korea: A Review Essay 99 Operational Overreach and by Don Oberdorfer the Culmination Point by Milan N. Vego 132 Reinventing Military Institutions: A Book Review 107 Morality and Modern Air War by Ian Roxborough by Jeffrey L. Gingras and Tomislav Z. Ruby 133 Struggles for National Survival: A Book Review 112 Mission Creep or Mission by Antulio J. Echevarria II Misunderstood? by Adam B. Siegel 135 A Revolution in Naval Affairs? A Book Review 116 Cuba Libre! Army-Navy by David R. Mets Cooperation in 1898 by Jonas L. Goldstein

Joint Force Quarterly

Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano LTC James Jay Carafano, USA Director Director of Publications Executive Editor Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief Editor

Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley William A. Rawley Production Coordinator Copy Editor U.S. Government Printing Office Art Director

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 136 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the fense. All previous issues have been published electronically Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. and are available over the Internet at the address indicated Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- below. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S. pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Government Printing Office. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine ISSN 1070–0692 September 2000

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Joint Force Quarterly A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher than anticipated operational and personnel requirements impose a heavy burden on troops and ADVISORY COMMITTEE wear out equipment at a faster rate than antici- VADM Paul G. Gaffney II, USN National Defense University pated. Moreover, the parts of the military that Chairman support the first-to-fight forces—the training BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman base, logistics enablers, and combat multipliers— are not as ready and suffer the consequences as Col Darrell A. Browning, USMC Marine Corps Command and Staff College resources are redirected, reprioritized, and con- Brig Gen Richard B. Bundy, USAF The Joint Staff sumed to sustain near-term readiness. VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN Naval War College The troops are paying the price. They spend more time working on aging equipment at the MG Reginal G. Clemmons, USA National War College expense of honing their warfighting skills. Fur- A. Denis Clift Joint Military Intelligence College thermore, support requirements cost much more in each succeeding year in repair costs, down VADM Scott A. Fry, USN The Joint Staff time, and man hours for maintenance. BG David H. Huntoon, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College We arrested the decline in readiness among MG Robert R. Ivany, USA U.S. Army War College active units, although significant readiness concerns remain at individual unit level within the Brig Gen Edward L. LaFountaine, USAF Joint Forces Staff College services. How was this decline stopped? The Maj Gen David F. MacGehee, Jr., USAF Air War College answer is largely through welcome additions to MajGen Harold Mashburn, Jr., USMC Industrial College of the Armed Forces the topline of the defense budget over the last few years. Col John T. Sheridan, USAF Air Command and Staff College Budget plus-ups have made an important Col John H. Turner, USMC Marine Corps War College down payment on current readiness, but they can only address critical near-term needs. The last QDR, based on a strategy of shape, respond, and EDITORIAL BOARD prepare, was designed to meet the projected Stephen J. Flanagan National Defense University threats of 2015 and stem the movement of re- Chairman sources from procurement to operations and Richard K. Betts Columbia University maintenance. In addition, the review recognized

Col Stephen D. Chiabotti, USAF Air Command and Staff College that it was time to increase investment in procurement after a decision in the early 1990s to Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University cut acquisition as a peace dividend. This assess- COL David M. Cole, USA U.S. Army War College ment garnered a general bipartisan consensus. However, it did not anticipate the degree to COL Robert A. Doughty, USA U.S. Military Academy which the Armed Forces would be engaged in Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University contingency operations, with a deleterious im- Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces pact on readiness. Indeed, within two years, in response to a downward trend in near-term readi- COL G. Chesley Harris, USA Joint Forces Staff College ness rates and continued reductions in COL Timothy S. Heinemann, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College modernization and infrastructure, the Joint Chiefs testified before Congress that an added CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN Naval War College $148 billion was needed to help fix the problem. COL Paul Herbert, USA National War College What happened? Several factors accounted Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College for the sharp and unexpected drop in readiness. Infrastructure was not reduced (base realignment Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation and closure requests were denied). End-strength William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr. Joint Military Intelligence College reductions had to be deferred because of operat-

John J. Mearsheimer The University of Chicago ing tempo concerns. Operations and support costs grew because of higher fuel costs and sus- LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute taining older systems. Unanticipated commit- James H. Toner Air War College ments led to reprogramming scarce dollars. Fi- nally, we had significant unplanned costs LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University associated with new programs such as national LtCol James I. Van Zummeren, USMC Marine Corps War College missile defense and health programs. The impact was significant. This was primarily reflected in both manpower and operations A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL and maintenance accounts, which were funded at

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Shelton

trend, we must reduce the average age of equipment by procuring ships, airplanes, tanks, and other systems. Of budget plus-ups in operations and maintenance funds, 75 percent went to increased operations of forces and bases. Only 25 percent went to preserving combat readiness by purchasing spare and repair parts as well as depot level maintenance. Moreover, we invested in next generation systems by increased research and development efforts. But our commitments to these new systems—such as the Zumwalt class land attack destroyer, joint strike fighter, F–22 Raptor, and future carrier (CVNX)—will not be realized for several years. The QDR process in 1997 took the first step toward increasing procurement by establishing the FY01 goal of $60 billion. This target was intended as a waypoint for increased procurement spending. The simple reality is that having finally reached $60 billion in procurement for FY01, it is increasingly apparent that it is not sufficient to sustain the force. This amount is not enough to buy the requisite number of ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and helicopters to sustain the QDR 97 force structure. This is the message that I have conveyed in recent months. We must accelerate the replacement of rapidly deteriorating ships, aircraft, weapons, infrastructure, and essential military systems in order to sustain the force and preserve future readiness. How much more is required to recapitalize and modernize? This will be a critical issue in the upcoming QDR. To sustain our quality force, maintain unsurpassed warfighting capabilities, and remain engaged in shaping world affairs to support national interests in the future, the Na- tion must provide the necessary resources. The al- Escape and evasion ternative is a more constrained, higher risk strat- training exercises in egy, which in my view is unacceptable for the San Diego. sole world superpower. Most importantly, we cannot continue to ask the force that emerged after the last QDR to bear the burdens of 21st century Fleet Imaging Center, Pacific (Wayne E. Elliott) Fleet Imaging Center, commitments. to maintain unsurpassed I am encouraged that we have begun to ar- warfighting capabilities, rest the decline in readiness. With the support of significantly higher levels the President, Congress, and American people, I the Nation must provide ($10–15 billion a year) than am confident that the Armed Forces will remain the necessary resources expected. That is the bad ready for the challenges ahead. Without question, news. The good news is that our men and women in uniform must continue the executive and legislative to be the best equipped and best cared for mili- branches listened to the Joint tary in the world. They deserve nothing less. Chiefs and increased the topline in defense spending to help mitigate readiness problems and HENRY H. SHELTON protect procurement accounts. Chairman But there is another concern that must be of the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed: the continued fast pace of operations. This high operating tempo has resulted in equipment aging faster than planned. To reverse this

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

achieving strategic aims. This debate is nearly power grids—but none of them won the war. Just Letters... eighty years old, but as Dietz clearly indicates, it is how much they contributed to success is a matter as pertinent as ever. He states that strategic attack for debate. But once again a dictator resisted direct JUST-IN-TIME TRAINING is “far more nuanced than the imprecise bludgeon- assaults on his psyche and leadership capacity. To the Editor—In “Developing Joint Education ing implied in [my article, “The Plight of Joint Doc- This doesn’t denigrate the extraordinary ac- for the Total Force” (JFQ, Spring 00), John Driscoll trine after Kosovo” in JFQ, Summer 99]. Advanced complishments of airmen in the Kosovo conflict, but points to an area that has long been ignored. He technology offers unprecedented capability to strike it does emphasize the need for debate over as- reminds us that the Reserve components are centers of gravity in urban areas with less concern sumptions that underpin strategic attack doctrine, increasingly involved in joint missions and that this over excessive collateral damage....”Dietz con- which infers that attacking enemy will—leaders, is a critical element of the new contract between fuses capabilities with utility. Yet he begs the central population, or both—and the capability of enemy the Nation and Reservists. question just as joint doctrine does: what precisely leaders to control their forces and infrastructure— But there are other joint educational initia- constitutes strategic centers of gravity that new will win wars. This strategy has always seemed tives that complement those addressed by Driscoll. sensor and shooter systems can strike with such possible in theory as well as enticing. But no matter Since 1997 the Center for Civil Military Relations deadly “one bomb for one target” precision? What how accurate the weapons, or how crushing and (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School has in- effects can we predict from striking them? terrifying their effects on civilian populations and included members of the Army National Guard in its In the Persian Gulf and Kosovo conflicts, frastructure, popular will is more resistant and international master’s degree program. These stu- strategic C2 targets included leadership bunkers, enemy leaders more impervious than supposed. dents have daily contact with peers from Partner- bridges carrying fiber optic cable networks, monu- The loss of military and industrial assets has a sig- ship for Peace countries. In addition, part of the ments and buildings that were national symbols, nificant impact but on a delayed basis. In fact, the curriculum earns credit for Phase I under the Pro- power grids, and other targets that sustained enemy effects of strategic attacks appear somewhat akin gram for Joint Education. Consistent with difficulties C4I but were also deemed important to morale. to naval blockades—potentially powerful but slow which Driscoll cites, the National Guard has funded Other targets included WMD sites, ground and air to take effect. development of a distance learning program that forces, and critical industrial facilities. In Desert Another outcome of strategic attacks is their has the advantages of bonding with their interna- Storm practically all such targets identified by intelli- link to the other options available to joint force tional counterparts while reducing time spent in gence sources were struck, often repeatedly, with commanders. Experience is clear: strategic attacks residence. This program is being expanded to in- more sorties than envisioned in the original Instant in combination with other tools of warfare have clude students from the Air National Guard begin- Thunder concept. Their combined effects failed to been indispensable in every American victory since ning January 2001. win the war and often fell short of the desired effect; World War II. This program has led to a new venture in for example, the capability of Iraq to control strategic Thus “necessary but not sufficient” best as- which CCMR will teach pre-deployment, joint, and attacks with Scud missiles continued by primitive sesses war-winning potential in attacks directed combined peace operations to total force units rotat- means (mainly motorcycle couriers). against strategic centers of gravity—not because ing to Bosnia. A week-long seminar will offer critical On the other hand, the synergistic effects of of the tactical impact of attacking forces but rather information, including interagency data for the extra- strategic air, missile, and special operations attacks the nature of target sets. That this fact disappoints ordinary challenges facing NATO. Based on this ex- against Iraq were powerful. Though neither the Iraqi those searching for a silver bullet is understand- perience, CCMR plans to expand training for both leadership nor the Iraqi people were cowed into able, but dangerous if a nation is looking for cheap individuals and units deploying to other peace oper- surrender, or even giving up Kuwait without the and easy military options to solve difficult issues. ations missions. These programs directly support ground assault, the ability of Saddam and his gen- Another question raised by Dietz involves the the shaping component of national military strategy. erals to understand the situation and control their impact of casualties on the employment of the mili- They are low cost, high return, and just-in-time edu- forces (especially once operations accelerated tary. In asserting that I impugned the contribution of cation and training. They will make a cost-effective under coalition ground attack) was seriously de- airmen and the “courage of all warriors” he misses complement to the efforts discussed by Driscoll. graded. These impacts were crucial to the cam- a point that troubles many officers—making judg- —LTC Jonathan Czarnecki, ARNG paign’s rapid success. ments based on surveys and anecdotal data. The Defense Resource Management Despite a decade of continued advances in issue is not the courage of soldiers, sailors, Institute the ability of the Armed Forces to accurately see marines, or airmen. It is the moral courage of politi- Naval Postgraduate School and strike precisely, Kosovo seemed like déjà vu all cal leaders in the face of changing standards on over again. There were attacks on the Serbian lead- the use of force. Media frenzies dramatize each ca- ON DOCTRINE ership, bunkers, air assets, industrial sites, and sualty to an extent that senior officers are increasingly gun-shy on recommending options that may To the Editor—When General Colin Powell approved the establishment of Joint Force Quarterly in 1992, he intended that the journal would inspire debate on joint matters. Thanks to Ronald Dietz for helping to stimulate such a dialogue on two subjects (see Letters, JFQ, Spring 00). The first is strategic attack, defined by Joint WELCOMES Pub 1 as the “direct attack of enemy centers of your lettersJFQ and comments. gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other FAX your correspondence to deep-ranging capabilities” to finesse the fact that (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219 or all properly conceived campaigns contribute to send it on the Internet to [email protected]

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lead to the loss of life. This has nothing to do with operations capabilities? Must ground forces in the acquire nuclear weapons and that Pakistan is un- airmen who understand joint doctrine and the po- Balkans operate under force protection measures likely to forego a nuclear capability as long as India tential consequences of an exaggerated aversion to that inhibit the mission? has one. But I would disagree with his claim that In- casualties in applying that doctrine. In fact, air- I do not claim to have definitive answers to dian foreign policy is nonaligned and that tensions power doctrine was the source of concepts that link these concerns, but I trust that readers of JFQ will in South Asia exist because Pakistan is obsessed maneuver and interdiction, concepts indicating the join in a debate on matters that reside disturbingly with its powerful neighbor, India. He states that the enormous advantages of applying both capabilities close to the heart of the joint doctrine. average Pakistani thinks India wants to destroy his synergistically. —COL Peter F. Herrly, USA (Ret.) nation and make it a province, even though annex- No military leader wants to lose lives, and Paris, France ing territory with millions of Muslims would be certainly no more than needed to accomplish the against India’s interests. mission. But today they must face certain realities: MUTUAL FEARS Are Pakistan’s fears rational? Looking at its smaller families, erosion of patriotism, the role of relationship with India since independence can be the media, and restrictions imposed under interna- To the Editor—In his article “Nuclear Prolifer- instructive. At partition in 1947, a large fraction of tional law. Moreover, were cruise missiles the only ation on the Indian Subcontinent“ (JFQ, Spring 00), the Indian Army opted to join Pakistan, and the tactical means of striking Osama bin Laden or the Kenneth Totty argues that domestic policies and a British asked India to provide it with a fair share of best weapon available in the joint tool box? Did de- drive for regional hegemony have pushed India to arms and ammunition. However, Indian leaders cisionmakers rule out manned aircraft or special

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Symposia Program 2000–2001 Joint Operations Symposium “Quadrennial Defense Review 2001: Options and Issues for the Next Administration” NOVEMBER 8–9, 2000 Pacific Symposium “Enhancing Regional Cooperation Through New Multilateral Initiatives” For details and registration information, MARCH 26–28, 2001 please contact: National Defense University European Symposium ATTN: Conference Directorate 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) MAY 22–23, 2001 Fort Lesley J. NcNair Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 Telephone: (202) 685–3857 / DSN 325–3857 Fax: (202) 685–3866 / DSN 325–3866 e-mail: NDU–[email protected] Internet: www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/symposhp.html

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

blocked the shipment of most of this equipment, MKI long-range fighters. Its air force has hundreds READY FOR WHAT? and some openly spoke of the need to annul parti- of MiG–21 and MiG–27 fighters manufactured News accounts of unready tion. This created a grave sense of insecurity and under Soviet license. Russia is also providing the To the Editor— Army divisions, recruiting shortfalls, and officer re- drove the Pakistanis into alliances with the United aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov cost free because tention rates portray a military that is seriously States. In later years, India sent its forces into the India is buying MiG–29s to base on it. India is also overstretched by a strategy that posits two nearly princely state of Hyderabad, whose ruler did not considering the acquisition and production of nu- simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs). Signs of want to join the federation, and annexed it. This was clear submarines from Russia. a return to the so-called hollow force—combined contrary to the principles India had used to justify Pakistan is painfully aware that the Indian with a new administration and another Quadrennial accession when Kashmir’s Hindu ruler wanted to Strike Corps, equipped with Russian weapons, re- Defense Review—make it expedient to examine join the federation while the Muslim population was mains poised to cut Pakistani in two. Prithvi sur- strategic assumptions. In “Rethinking Two War not given the right to self-determination. face-to-surface missiles, deployed with units on the Strategies” (JFQ, Spring 2000), Michael O’Hanlon In the wake of India’s border war with China Punjab border, can wreak havoc on Pakistani forces makes a good start at it, but he doesn’t go in 1962, the United States and Britain rushed large farther north. Nor can Pakistan ignore the political far enough in his appreciation of the new world quantities of sophisticated military supplies to New signal contained in the location of India’s nuclear disorder. Delhi. Washington asked Islamabad not to use this weapons test site at Pokhran, less than 100 miles O’Hanlon is generally correct in stating that opportunity to take any action in Kashmir, and Pak- from the border. Thus it is not surprising that Pak- “the notion of two Desert Storms has outlived its istan complied. India used the new equipment to istanis live in fear of India. usefulness” and inhibits innovation needed for the form six mountain divisions to defend itself against Unfortunately, nuclear weapons have not im- future. His argument has high-level support. General a Chinese invasion that Pakistan argued was infea- proved the security of either Pakistan or India, since Wesley Clark, USA, stated “the two-war concept was sible to conduct across the Himalayas and incon- both countries live in mortal fear of each other. The never a strategy for the employment of forces . . . sistent with Chinese objectives. Several mountain greatest threat to many countries can come from it was only designed to retain the force structure we divisions later saw action against Pakistan, and an exaggerated sense of insecurity that causes bel- already had.” Another flag officer depicted the two- now are deployed in Kashmir to fight insurgents. In ligerent responses. MTW construct as “a bayonet thrust into the wall to an act of hostility, India exploited Pakistan’s diffi- Both India and Pakistan would be better off preserve a force structure that was in free fall.” culties in its eastern province in 1971 to dismem- by reducing military expenditures and diverting re- Even during the Cold War, the Nation could not have ber the country. Many senior officers in the Indian sources to human development. Spending a billion dealt with an invasion of Western Europe and an at- military wanted to destroy the Pakistani military on dollars on an Agosta-class submarine or $40 mil- tack across the 38th parallel in Korea; fighting two the western borders but were prevented by Ameri- lion on a SU–30 fighter makes it difficult to reduce major wars at once was never a reasonable plan- can pressure. poverty and illiteracy, bigger threats to long-term ning standard for a democracy in peacetime. India’s strong ties to the former Soviet Union security on a subcontinent prone to ethnic, sectar- While providing a sound discussion of the returned its nonalignment policy into a slogan. New ian, religious, and ideological violence. duced threat to U.S. forces in the Middle East and Delhi signed a 30-year treaty with Moscow in 1971 —Ahmed Faruqui Korea and a valid rationale for reducing time, effort, and recently renewed it with Russia for another 30 Danville, California and money invested in organizing, training, and years. India has recently entered into a $3 billion equipping troops for such contingencies, O’Hanlon military agreement with Russia for the joint produc- misses the mark in assessing changes that have tion and marketing of sophisticated military hard- vastly increased demands for operations at the ware, including T–90 main battle tanks and SU–30 lower end of the conflict spectrum. Missions vari- ously known as military operations other than war (MOOTW), stability operations, and peace support operations strain forces today and promise to inex- orably erode capabilities unless the force structure is reconfigured to better meet the demands of a strategy of engagement and enlargement. The Army, as the proponent for MOOTW doctrine, conducts “sustained military operations on land to secure the Nation’s interests at home and abroad.” The Navy and the Air Force will also face changes as the Armed Forces move to a “Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia plus Kosovo plus another peacekeeping mission” force needed to implement national security strategy. Missing an issue? Although O’Hanlon suggests reconfiguring the Army to the extent of “adding a division for a Copies of back numbers of JFQ are available in limited major peace operation,” he doesn’t go far enough. quantities to members of the Armed Forces and One peacekeeping division will not suffice to meet public institutions. Please send your request to the Editor even current demands, and requirements are likely to increase. The three-for-one rule must be applied at the address or FAX number listed on the masthead. to all peace support operations. Maintaining one

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brigade in Bosnia ties up a full division as one do not build a force posture to execute specific will remain indispensable. The two-MTW posture brigade is deployed, another trains to replace it, missions but rather to support U.S. national objec- may remain useful to hedge against uncertain and a third stands down and prepares for future tives. Engagement and enlargement and shape, re- threats and probable conflicts. If done correctly, the operations. The brigade in Kosovo similarly occu- spond, and prepare are our current respective na- QDR process can identify the range of missions the pies a full division. There is no sign that either mis- tional security and military strategies, not fighting a Armed Forces are likely to confront. The focus should sion will end soon nor that the United States will re- war in the Persian Gulf and another conflict on the not be on predicting major theater wars of the future linquish its commitment to peace and stability Korean peninsula. or savings that can be made in endstrength, but on elsewhere in the world. A commitment to peace op- It is operating tempo, aging equipment, and maintaining the role of the United States as the only erations, like conventional war, requires boots on inadequate endstrength—and not a two-MTW con- superpower under any force construct. the ground for an extended time. struct—that are causing wear on the Armed —LTG Theordore G. Stroup, Jr., USA (Ret.) We should specialize ground forces, creating Forces. It is shortsighted to presume that a strategy Association of the United States Army a heavy corps as a strategic reserve that trains ex- focused more on smaller-scale contingencies is a clusively for high-intensity conflict; a middleweight recipe for a reduced endstrength. If the military is To the Editor—Your recent article by Michael corps optimized for peace-enforcement like the in- strained under current force structure by enforcing O’Hanlon resurrected many ideas that have been terim brigades under development at Fort Lewis; no-fly zones and conducting peace operations, a under discussion at the U.S. Army War College. The and a light corps for strategic deployment, urban change to a less-than-two-MTW strategy may in author is accurate in pointing out that the possibility warfare, and peacekeeping. Each would fight out- fact exacerbate operating tempo, personnel tempo, of two major theater wars (MTWs) still exists. numbered and win—but have specialized doctrine, and the aging equipment problems these tasks Preparing for one war is an invitation to having organization, training, equipment, and mindset for bring about. Attempting to save money by planning something nasty arise elsewhere, and the United its assigned roles. for the arguably smaller and cheaper wars of today States is the only power able to stabilize through de- One option is pulling America back from its will only exacerbate long-term risks. Forces can terrence by virtue of its massive power. The larger position as the indispensable nation. But the next and should be sized around current contingencies problem, as he argues under “Something Has to administration is unlikely to diminish our role in the as well as those envisioned for the future. Give,” is that even a two-MTW force sizing matrix is world. It behooves us to begin making the difficult O’Hanlon may be correct in saying that not adequate for existing or projected requirements. transition from a Cold War force justified by an out- something must be sacrificed, assuming the un- In that respect, the DS-DS-+Bosnia formula has moded two-war strategy toward the kinds of forces likely case that the defense budget will be in- merit but still does not do what is needed. the Nation will need to increase democracy and creased to sustain the current force structure and In one sense, the real issue is readiness to perserve security. planned modernization. But under his proposal mis- do many things and the artificiality of attempting to —MAJ John A. Nagl, USA sions that have caused strains will not go away and maintain everyone at C-1 all the time. The hard U.S. Army Command and General neither will the need to modernize and transform, cold fact is that the Army is an expeditionary Staff College particularly for the Army. It is not surprising that force—as defined by Joint Pub 1 if nothing else. since the last Quadrennial Defense Review, strains Given that, the real requirement is to accept it as To the Editor—“Rethinking Two War Strate- on land, sea, and air forces have grown as require- fact and adapt to the requirements that flow from gies” by Michael O’Hanlon is an informative piece ments increased. The Nation will remain globally it. Real expeditionary forces operate on long wave on planning around a two-major-theater-war (MTW) engaged based on its values of democracy and free cycles compared to present operations. This re- strategy based on North Korea and Iraq. The author trade. Thus its military must have the capability to quires a very different infrastructure management proposes an alternative to that construct with a respond to any conflict, from major theater wars to system and institutional flexibility that will be diffi- Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia plan. humanitarian assistance. General Shinseki’s vision cult to adopt. But he omits several key issues. First, as a globally for transforming the Army ensures this capability. The Marine Corps and Navy have operated engaged superpower, the United States must be Transformation is more than new equipment, it is a as expeditionary forces for a long time. Their entire capable of being in two places at once or risk being process that includes training, doctrine, and leader- organizations are focused on a cycle that creates, relegated to the status of a regional power. In ship development. trains, deploys, employs, and recovers. This system switching to any smaller strategy one must visualize “The alternative is attempting to prevail in si- hits Army War College students in the face every the consequences. The Nation will remain a global multaneous worst-case scenarios in the Persian March during the Strategic Crisis Exercise as stu- power for the foreseeable future. But if it does not Gulf and Korea,” according to O’Hanlon, “at the ex- dent regional CINCs holler for more carriers, then retain the ability of a superpower with strong bud- pense of readiness, research, and preparing for the gradually learn that some of them are in the ser- gets and adequate forces, reduced capabilities future.” It defies rational thought to presume the vice life extension program and will not be avail- could subject the Nation to higher risks. And it Armed Forces are prepared if they are unable to able for months! This is not another case of USS should be noted that the two-war posture is not a perform core warfighting missions. A force that is Yorktown returning from the Coral Sea and going strategy but rather a force planning metric. ready to fight two nearly simultaneous wars is by through super-accelerated refit for Midway. This A one-MTW plus one-lesser included MTW definition ready to patrol streets in Kosovo or five-phase system would be new to the Army but plus smaller-scale contingency posture is not so Bosnia, while the opposite can hardly be said. would allow it to tackle present and future obliga- undemanding after first glance. Any smaller capa- The next QDR will be more than a document tions with less strain on the force and better use of bility than two-MTWs is not a pat formula for even or strategy alternative; it is a critical process whose available resources. modest personnel reductions. O’Hanlon declares outcome will be vital to transforming the Army. Re- O’Hanlon’s DS-DS-+Bosnia formula will, by that a new strategy “would permit a force posture gardless of which strategy is proposed, land forces his calculations, net a 5–10 percent reduction in more conducive to executing the types of missions active forces and he argues that allies should be that have recently strained the military.” This asser- added into any equation. The difficulty is that the tion is flawed because civilian and military leaders United States will not always operate with allies. It

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

is just as likely that the Armed Forces may be oper- fact is that most current missions—even those projected capabilities to move it strategically. Other ating with coalition partners with which they have resembling police actions—can’t be executed by assets would be needed to rapidly augment this little in common. As an expeditionary force, the military police units without tactical combat savvy force if necessary. Though many imponderables re- Army might require more people, who can be af- and tanks, artillery, and air support—in other main, the proposition that rapid response is impor- forded, but only if Congress and the American pub- words, unless they are combat units. Thus creat- tant goes back at least to Instant Ready Force, lic are convinced that the increase is connected to ing unique mission units is not a productive use of which General Douglas MacArthur originated as a serious reconfiguration that will provide a signifi- assets. The basic elements of all missions con- Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1930s. If we could cantly better cost-benefit ratio. tinue to rest on disciplined, combat-trained forces. get a high-lethality brigade on the ground in any re- Adopting an expeditionary mentality and in- The British experience in Northern Ireland provides gion within 96 hours, it could go a long way toward frastructure to support it would allow the force to evidence that combat units can perform such reducing the need for 500,000 troops in six always have units ready for major war or various tasks and recover without damage once the pur- months. The calculus is problematic and situation- contingencies. Some would be trained for one and poses of retraining are understood. dependent, but the argument seems sound. some for another. Overexpansion will certainly be A 200,000-strong expeditionary force sug- —COL Douglas V. Johnson, USA (Ret.) needed in low-density/high-demand units, but the gested by O’Hanlon is reasonable given current and U.S. Army War College

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10 JFQ / Summer 2000 0525 Hawkins Pgs 2/24/01 10:08 AM Page 11

Transformation— An International Perspective

ransformation is often considered in terms of a revolution in military affairs—the new doctrine, organization, and technology that may change the nature of warfare. T But such a revolution is just one aspect of broader global trends. National militaries in many countries are being restructured to engage the realities of the 21st century. This JFQ Forum looks at seven countries in different regions of the world to illuminate the modes of transformation that are currently underway with all their inherent promises and risks. The militaries surveyed represent countries of strategic interest to the United States and also reflect many facets of instituting change and the challenges posed by transformation. China, India, and France have experienced militaries that are seeking to enhance their regional capabilities while responding to technological advances, fiscal constraints, and uncertainty on the international scene. Indonesia and South Africa are cases of nations that are re- shaping militaries in the face of profound political, social, and economic change. And Poland and Colombia epitomize disparate nations that have undertaken a significant restructuring in the area of civil-military relations. Collectively, these articles suggest the monumental and expanding scope of transformation as an international phenomenon. For professional officers the implications of this process are important. They reveal both the range of factors influencing military effectiveness as well as diverse perspectives on the shift of power in defense establishments. Moreover, the articles suggest that the United States must be increasingly sophisticated when engaging militarily with a range of countries around the world. Finally, the articles call for a reappraisal of the revolution in military affairs and the strategic consequences of military transformation. JFQ

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The People’s

PLA training along Liberation Army China’s coast.

Looks to the Future AP/Wide Photos (Xinhua) World

By CHARLES F. HAWKINS

estern analysts have to defeat the superior” with an eye long known that Bei- fixed on the year 2030. This is an am- jing is modernizing its bitious effort to undertake but by no W armed forces; indeed means unachievable. the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is With the possible exception of the undergoing a transformation. Through United States, China has analyzed the innovation in doctrine, organization, implications of RMA more than any and technology—the fundamental in- other nation. Although the impact of gredients of a so-called revolution in modern weaponry was predicted by military affairs (RMA)—China is pursu- the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, the ing a capability to allow “the inferior wake-up call for the People’s Liberation Army came with the Persian Gulf War. Major Charles F. Hawkins, USAR (Ret.), is the director of the Historical Evaluation Stunned by the near dominance of and Research Organization Library and associate editor of the International American systems, which bested Soviet Military and Defense Encyclopedia. and Chinese equipment in the air and

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Hawkins

on the ground, the Chinese scrambled to understand what had happened. People’s Republic of China In fact, Chinese analysts have Defense Budget: Estimated at $14.5 billion for 2000; the gross domestic been investigating high-tech warfare product in 1999 was $732 billion ($4,000 per capita). since the early 1980s as the Falklands, Manpower: China, a nation of 1,255,000,000, has a total of 168,483,000 Becca Valley, and air strikes on Libya men between 18 and 32 years of age. Combined active and reserve strength stimulated their interest. But their ef- is estimated at 3,070,000. Terms of service are two years, selective conscrip- forts did not gain support from the tion. Active forces include some 1,000,000 conscripts and 136,000 women; re- central government until more reserve forces may total as many as 600,000 members (all services). cently. China relearned the lessons of Armed Forces: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) includes five compo- Desert Storm in the Taiwan Strait dur- nents (estimated active strength): ministry of defense staff/centrally-con- ing 1996 when its forces did not per- trolled units (130,000, not included elsewhere), strategic defense forces form well in bad weather, and U.S. (100,000-plus), ground forces (1,700,000 soldiers) with some 7,060 main battle naval forces operated at considerably and 700 light tanks, naval forces (220,000 sailors) with 65 submarines (includ- longer distances with greater real-time ing 1 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile boat) and 60 principal surface combat- data and effective military power. With ants, 368 patrol/coastal craft, and 39 mine warfare vessels; some 5,000 the realization that they lagged at least marines; naval air with 25,000 personnel and 507 shore-based combat air- a generation behind technologically, craft), and air forces with 420,000 members and over 3,000 combat aircraft. Beijing redoubled its efforts. Paramilitary Formations: Peo- Then, in 1999, NATO launched ple’s Armed Police (1,100,000 members air strikes against Serbia which of internal security, border defense, once more demonstrated the gap guards, and other organizations). between China and the West. American technology moti- Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Ox- vates Chinese research. Historical ford: Oxford University Press for the Interna- analysis, policy issues, and operational Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). tions research, though important, are only of secondary interest. Word and Deed Parade marking PLA founding. The Chinese make a distinc- tion between a revolution in mil- Various American futurologists itary affairs and a military revolu- and strategists have influenced Chi- tion. They regard the former as a nese thinking on military affairs, ac- process that can be managed— cording to Captain Zhang Zhaozhong. and see America as somehow A member of the Naval Research Cen- AP/Wide P World otos (Xin ua) guiding the ongoing process ter, he cites the Tofflers, William well. The latter will come about Owens, and Martin Libicki, and says when the RMA process is mature, that the push of information technol- perhaps in 15 to 30 years. It will ogy on RMA has forced the PLA navy be the revolution that actually to accept that concepts drive platform changes the established order. decisions rather than the reverse. Precision guided munitions and Zhang recognizes the “advantages and information dominance notwith- disadvantages of using commercial off standing, China is preparing for

AP/Wide Photos World the shelf technology.” Its use promotes this future. But it can’t prepare interoperability, he indicated, but everywhere or in all things “may make it easier for an enemy to equally. PLA thinking calls for picking Many are technological and others are exploit an opponent’s systems.” its developmental challenges carefully more theoretical, while still others look First hand experience is also stud- and concentrating efforts prudently. at the impact of change on the People’s ied to explain the interaction between To meet this daunting task, Chi- Liberation Army and operational capa- advanced weaponry and low tech pro- nese analysts are gathering data from bilities. In short their research extends cedures. The shootdown of an F–117 all available sources in the West. They to technology, doctrine, and organiza- stealth fighter over Serbia during Oper- feel the effort can’t be focused until all tion, with a view to how these three ation Allied Force was examined by Shi possibilities are uncovered and under- areas will affect operational output. Peixin. His explanation of the trap, stood. The effort is dynamic. Individual using successive radar sets, short acti- researchers focus on an array of topics. vation times, and communications linkage and processing at the final

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JFQ FORUM

SAM launch site, was both insightful cause for complacency. China has built in Beijing: “It wasn’t the equal of and mathematically lucid. leapfrogged past competitors before. ours, but it was very impressive by any Huang Haiyuang, a senior re- Chinese missile development owes standard. And they did it in a year.” searcher who has traveled widely in much to Tsien Hsue-shen, a native Although technology is highly the West, summarized seven PLA tech- born scientist who studied in the important, it isn’t the only thing that nological priorities: United States at CalTech and MIT, occupies PLA planners. They need information operations and warfare helped found the Jet Propulsion Labo- something to bridge the gap between air and missile technology ratory, and worked on classified proj- today and their vision of 2030. That precision guided munitions ects during World War II. On the eve of something is found in the domain of defensive weapon technology becoming an American citizen, Tsien doctrine and organization. unmanned aerial vehicle technology got caught up in the Cold War hysteria Landpower. Over the past 15 years military space technology of McCarthyism. Rejected by the na- there has been significant change in naval carrier (air-to-ship integration). tion he sought to adopt, he returned to the way PLA forces operate in the field. Huang explained that the People’s Lib- China and became the undisputed fa- Before rapprochement with the Soviet eration Army has embarked on a two- ther of its missile program. Union in the 1980s, its forces on the phased plan to scale down into a Tsien’s expertise was recently northern frontier altered their defen- smaller, higher quality force while ex- merged with an emphasis on computer sive posture from forward deployed to ploring new concepts and then to technology. When the impact of the arrayed in depth and were thus better Cultural Revolution wore off in able to absorb and defeat a Soviet of- the People’s Liberation Army has the early 1980s, Beijing turned to fensive before it could reach the the burgeoning computer market. industrial area around Beijing. Making embarked on a two-phased plan Convinced that other countries this doctrinal shift came not from ad- to scale down and focus on high such as the United States, Japan, vanced technology but from doubling ground transportation assets in front- technology applications and Singapore held an unsurpass- able lead in hardware, China em- line divisions. Increased battlefield mo- phasized software development bility was key and has become the new focus on high technology applica- and hasn’t been disappointed. For ex- cornerstone of land operations. tions. The first phase is well along, ample, in the late 1990s Chinese mili- Seapower. The PLA navy has been though he added a concluding cau- tary analysts and systems engineers reinventing itself since the early 1980s. tion: “the individual is still the key in took an unclassified tour of a suite of Of the navies in Asia, it has the most fast-paced warfare.” simulations at a federally funded re- manpower with an afloat tonnage and search and development center in the number of combatant ships rivaled Emerging Capabilities United States. This past year it was re- only by Japan, with India and Taiwan The Chinese are trying to catch ported that a similar suite had been a distant third and fourth. In the up in a military competition that they decade before 1993, China increased know can’t be won under ordinary circumstances. They are attempting to achieve extraordinary advantages with a few niche capabilities while treading PLA exercise in the water elsewhere. Can the People’s Lib- Taiwan Strait. eration Army accomplish stovepipe breakthroughs in key areas while maintaining others at minimal levels of acceptable performance? It remains to be seen, but the West should not discount such an effort. Indeed, in some areas the Chinese have demonstrated exceptional advances. Missiles and artillery are their strong suit, as one American military colleague observed. After touring the country in 1996 and seeing firepower demonstrations and intercepts by surface-to-air missiles, he concluded, “the rest of the PLA’s conventional forces are about where we were in the 1930s.” The state of their rocket forces, however, suggests that this might not be AP/Wide Photos (Xinhua) World

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Hawkins

PLA guided missile destroyer. AP/Wide Photos (Xinhua) World

its surface combatant ships by a factor Since the mid-1990s the Chinese have Airpower. We have also seen of two and its mine warfare and sup- concentrated on amphibious lift. Orga- changes in the air and airborne forces, port vessels by a factor of six, for the nizational changes, although benefici- notably the ability to transport troops highest afloat-support ratio in Asia. aries of technology, were not predi- rapidly anywhere within national bor- cated on it. They ders. In addition to establishing a divi- change has enabled the PLA navy to alter would have hap- sion-sized rapid reaction force, other pened in any event, army units have conducted brigade- its maritime strategy from coastal defense and change has en- sized experiments in high-tech warfare. to limited power projection abled the PLA navy to alter its maritime Current and Future Concepts strategy from coastal The main difference between ap- During the same period amphibious defense to limited power projection proaches to warfare is that the United lift capacity stagnated and the number and sustainability. States tends to focus on systems and of submarines fell by half. China has eschewed an aircraft processes while China keys on objects, The afloat support ratio has great carrier capability. Although it would be or the object-space of war. Americans significance. At .63 front line support a source of national pride, such a believe they will dominate any object- vessels to every principal surface com- costly platform is something it chooses space in battle if they get the processes batant, it is three times greater than to defer. PLA would be hopelessly out- right and employ the better systems. Australia, the nearest regional competi- classed by the United States for the But Chinese theorists focus on the ob- tor. A high afloat support ratio indi- foreseeable future and, given increas- ject first and use that knowledge to de- cates a capability to conduct long- ingly sophisticated unmanned aerial fine the systems and processes to term, long-range operations. And a vehicles, future carriers may be quite achieve success. As a superpower we level of .20 or better signifies good sus- different. Furthermore, the immediate have the luxury of affording our ap- tainability while .10 or less is poor. areas of interest are the littorals, and proach; for efficiency they have no the East and South China Seas—areas choice but to follow theirs. where operations can be facilitated by land-based aircraft and missiles. AP/Wide P World otos (Xi ua)

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JFQ FORUM

Senior Colonel Chen Bojiang initially victorious invading army. the Balkans, cloning, Microsoft, hack- studied for a year in the School of Chen believes this is no longer the ers, the Internet, the euro, the Asian fi- Diplomacy at Georgetown University case. No enemy would “let themselves nancial crisis, as well as the world’s on a Ford Foundation grant. He has so easily be involved in a protracted final and only superpower—the United published two books since returning to war with China,” though China might States. These are sufficient. They pretty his post at the Academy of Military Sci- be defeated, because of the excessive much constitute the main subjects on ences in June 1998, both researched cost of campaigning. Moreover, given this planet for the past decade.” during his American stay. These have overall Chinese strategy, “It is also un- made him a celebrity in Chinese mili- allowable to have a protracted war. One should not be surprised that tary circles. Under the conditions of new history, some analysts try to understand and One of Chen’s themes is research the main task of the country is to carry explain the success of American mili- on high-tech warfare, which he notes out the economic construction . . . mil- tary technology in their own terms. has the “feature of variety.” He claims itary actions must be [quickly accom- Nor is it amazing that lacking the that of its patterns “warfare has plished in] scope and time.” Chen wherewithal to compete technologi- reached a new phase, namely, forming wraps up the argument stating that cally in the near term these analysts a cubic warfare with land, sea, air, and “attack as the main resort has an ex- would propose alternate views on doc- space closely combined.” Together traordinary importance on the high- trine and organization to counter a po- with the electromagnetic spectrum, tech battlefield.” tential U.S. threat. But there is a cau- these are the object-space to be domi- Another survey of future warfight- tion. Some Chinese defense analysts nated. Loosely defined, cubic warfare ing concepts appeared in 1998. Unre- also are guilty of altering the evidence might be seen as the rationale for Chi- stricted Warfare by Senior Colonels and making selective use of data to suit nese joint operations. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui is themselves or the Communist Party. Chen’s analysis, like that of many widely read in military circles within Some interpretations are so patently of his fellow analysts, often turns to China and has attracted attention in flawed that one wonders if rhetorical information warfare and operations: the West for urging multiple means— analysis has reached a new plane. This “High-tech warfare has the feature of military and nonmilitary—to strike the is all the more reason to insist on information confrontation.” The com- United States. Hacking into Web sites, transparency in peacetime interaction. mand, control, and intelligence system targeting financial institutions, com- JFQ “is the prerequisite not only for hard mitting terrorist acts, using the media, weapons to play a role, but it is also and conducting urban warfare are Research on this article was facilitated by the target first attacked by the oppos- among the methods proposed. the author’s contacts with Chinese defense analysts over the last decade. In recent years ing side in war. The main [feature] is In an interview that appeared in he has both lectured at the China Defense pluralistic confrontation, including the June 1999 in Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, a Science, Technology, and Information Center acquirement and anti-acquirement, daily newspaper published by the and co-hosted the Sino-U.S. Military Develop- control and anti-control, as well as Communist Party Youth League, Qiao ment’s Workshop in Beijing. usage and anti-usage of information.” noted “the first rule of unrestricted Although this may not be regarded warfare is that there are no rules, with as particularly earthshaking, Chen’s nothing forbidden.” He argues that analysis leads him to insights into how “strong countries make the rules while the People’s Liberation Army may con- rising ones break them and exploit duct itself in the future. Citing the three loopholes....The United States breaks warfares—mobile, positional, and guer- [U.N. rules] and makes new ones when rilla—Chen has asked rhetorically: these rules don’t suit...but it has to Should high-tech warfare operations be observe its own rules or the whole protracted or quick? The answer seems world will not trust it.” obvious to many in the West. Not nec- Questioned about Unrestricted essarily in China, however. Warfare, other PLA officers were quick A great historic strength has been to point out that its ideas had no offi- a large landmass. Combined with a cial status and did not represent the vast population from which to draw doctrine of either the military or gov- fighters, that has meant China can ernment. A pat answer or indicative of conduct protracted wars—mobile, po- divided thinking inside the People’s sitional, or guerrilla. The ultimate suc- Liberation Army? Perhaps both. cessful protracted conflict is the ab- Qiao and Wang have written that sorption over many generations of an “one war changed the world,” and rightly or wrongly that technology is found at the heart of that change. As proof they indicate that “it is only necessary to cite the former Soviet Union,

16 JFQ / Summer 2000 0625 Hoyt Pgs 2/24/01 10:12 AM Page 17

Standing guard at the Red Fort, Delhi.

MODERNIZING AP/Wide Photos World the Indian Armed Forces By TIMOTHY D. HOYT

ndia appears to have embarked on assured nuclear retaliatory capability a major military modernization ef- and a triad of land, sea, and air-based fort. In 1998 it electrified the world weapons. Iby detonating three nuclear de- The budget for 1999–2000 signifi- vices in the Rajasthan desert, followed cantly increased funds for space and by two more tests. Less than a year later nuclear related activities. And the it launched a solid-fuel, mobile, budget for 1999–2000, reflecting the medium-range ballistic missile, the Kargil crisis in Summer 1999, called for Agni-2, with an estimated range of an increase of 28 percent in defense 2,500 kilometers. In August 1999, in outlays. India has announced the pur- the heat of domestic elections, it chase of new frigates, submarines, and drafted nuclear doctrine calling for an perhaps an aging Russian aircraft carrier as well as Mirage-2000 and Su-30 Timothy D. Hoyt teaches in the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown strike aircraft and most recently the ac- University and in the College of Continuing Education at the Naval War College. quisition of new T–90 tanks.

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The army has experienced a short- Siachen Glacier base camp. fall in officers over the last decade and the low quality of recruits is also a concern. Though the portion of the army budget dedicated to payroll and benefits continues to grow, the relative benefits for company and battalion-level officers fell 60–70 percent between 1947 and 1982, spurring an exodus of mid-level officers. Slow promotion rates and the relatively mature age of mid-level officers further complicate this personnel problem. Stores and stockpiles were run down in the 1990s, a period of relative austerity and limited growth in the defense budget. New equipment has been purchased in response to the Kargil conflict. While artillery fire control radars and mountain gear are at the top of the priority list, the big ticket AP/Wide Photos World item is the T–90 tank. Navy. The 1980s marked a high point for the navy in terms of recogni- The State of the Force from China and Pakistan, the former tion abroad and prestige at home. Ac- The Indian defense establishment with nine mountain divisions and the quisition included lease of a Soviet is among the largest in the world, num- latter with three armored and four Charlie-I class submarine, purchase of bering over 1.2 million personnel. The rapid (partially mechanized) infantry former HMS Hermes (renamed Viraat) army is the predominant service in divisions (up from two armored and to provide a second carrier, and fleet terms of prestige and resources. Its share one mechanized). Nineteen infantry di- expansion from 32 principal combat- of the 1999–2000 budget was 55.29 per- visions, fifteen independent brigades, ants to 44 ships. cent compared to 14.8 percent for the and other support units round out the Today the navy seems to be on navy, 22.49 percent for the air force, current army structure. the verge of halting a decade-long de- 6.07 percent for research and develop- As supporters of the Indian mili- cline. The carrier fleet has fallen to one ment, and 1.35 percent for defense pro- tary have pointed out, this posture with the decommissioning of Vikrant, duction. Although India is often por- and the number of frigates and trayed as militarily passive—reacting to ambitious plans for out-of-area destroyers has declined to 20. the acquisition by Pakistan of high Ambitious plans in the late technology or advanced systems—this intervention capabilities cannot be 1980s for out-of-area interven- is not the case. Its nuclear capability has achieved at current spending levels tion capabilities and three car- been under development since the mid- rier task forces cannot be 1940s, and procurement in 1990 indi- achieved at current spending cated that New Delhi initiated acquisi- commits over half of the allotted levels, and indigenous shipbuilding tion of almost every category of budget to fighting a conventional war programs have been plagued by long weaponry. Because Islamabad is unable against Pakistan most do not believe delays and technical problems. to procure modern arms as a result of will occur. The heavy divisions commit- Nevertheless the service demon- U.S. sanctions and its own economic ted to the Pakistani frontier—ill-trained strated significant regional lift capabili- situation, India can be expected to for counterinsurgency operations, ties by intervening in the Maldives and maintain the initiative in obtaining poorly equipped for peacekeeping, and Sri Lanka during the late 1980s. It con- new weapons and technology and to re- too heavy to lift elsewhere—cannot be tinues to show the flag outside the retain a substantial conventional advan- easily used for other purposes, either to gion, including a recent visit by the tage. engage China or for out-of-area opera- jump-deck carrier Viraat to the Persian Army. Although it has shrunk by tions. Pakistan’s deployment of nuclear Gulf and planned exercises in the 120,000 men since 1990, India still has weapons reduces the likelihood of mid- South China Sea. The navy has suffi- over a million soldiers under arms. The to-high intensity armored conflict of cient forces to assert sea control in a army is organized around regional significant duration; the risks of escala- short conflict with Pakistan, but it commands (North, West, Central, tion are simply too great. lacks air cover—particularly early South, and East). It has separate divi- warning—and would be at risk in oper- sional structures to manage threats ations too close to the Pakistani coast.

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Hoyt

Other acknowledged shortfalls include entrenched forces. More serious prob- combat aircraft (ten years behind ini- lack of reconnaissance aircraft, poor lems include declining numbers of pi- tial plans), and the acquisition and sensors, and insufficient standoff mis- lots and insufficient funding for opera- licensed manufacture of Russian siles. The large submarine force, how- tions and maintenance. Su-30MKIs (with some delivered be- ever, provides a sea denial capability. Also lacking are critical force-mul- hind schedule and significant delays in Air Force. The absence of an ad- tiplying capabilities such as airborne setting up production). In the mean- vanced trainer, aging equipment (par- warning and control systems, mid- time, India will rely on older MiG–21 ticularly obsolescence in the MiG–21 flight refueling, advanced electronic airframes and probably lose aircraft at force), and rigorous flight schedules warfare, and sophisticated night-strike an annual accident rate of 20–25 have led to a high rate of accidents. Ef- assets. While Indian analysts paid close planes per year. forts to procure an advanced jet trainer attention to the performance of air- Strategic Forces. Nuclear tests and have been stalled for over a decade. power in the Persian Gulf War, the air draft nuclear doctrine demonstrate an The quality of pilots remains quite force will require substantial increases intention to field some form of nuclear high, as demonstrated in the Kargil in funding to meet expectations. deterrent and operational strategic conflict when units flew difficult strike Efforts to increase air force capa- forces. The draft nuclear doctrine does missions at almost 18,000 feet against bilities include upgrading MiG–21s not explicitly rule out tactical nuclear with Russian assistance (two years be- weapons despite adherence to a no- hind schedule), production of a light first-use policy, and some analysts have raised the tactical nuclear option. India currently has sufficient weapons-grade plutonium for roughly sixty weapons. Growth in Active Paramilitary Strength, 1990–2000 With much larger stocks of reactor- Organization 1990 2000 grade plutonium (which is less effi- State Armed Police 250,000 400,000 cient material for weapons design), the (formerly known as Provincial Armed Constabulary) number of weapons could increase to 750–1,000. Tests of thermonuclear, fis- Border Security Force 90,000 174,000 sion, and sub-kiloton devices have re- (under Ministry of Home Affairs) portedly included a reactor-grade plutonium design, with some analysts Central Reserve Police Force 90,000 160,000 (performs internal security role; under Ministry of Home Affairs) calling for testing both thermonuclear devices and neutron bomb technology. Central Industrial Security Force 70,000 88,600 India has recently tested the 2,500- (guards private sector locations; under Ministry of Home Affairs) kilometer ranged solid-fuel Agni-2 mobile missile, continues to deploy and Railway Protection Forces 70,000 70,000 test land and sea-launched versions of Assam Rifles 40,000 52,000 the tactical Prithvi missile, and pursues (performs security duties within northeastern states; under Ministry submarine-launched cruise and ballis- of Home Affairs) tic missile options. Rashtriya Rifles — 36,000 Whither Transformation? (under Ministry of Defence) Though Indian forces have begun Defence Security Force 30,000 31,000 integrating some new capabilities, in- (provides security at Ministry of Defence installations and facilities) cluding increased use and production of unmanned aerial vehicles, it is un- Indo-Tibetan Border Police 14,000 30,000 clear that they have either the inclina- (under Ministry of Home Affairs) tion or requirement for significant lev- Special Frontier Force 8,000 9,000 els of innovation. Most threats are (mainly ethnic Tibetans; under Cabinet Secretariat) adequately and less expensively managed through a manpower intensive Coast Guard 2,500 8,000 force than through high technology. Like many militaries, the Indian armed National Security Guards 5,000 7,400 (anti-terrorism contingency deployment force; comprising elements of forces are emphasizing computer liter- the armed forces, Central Reserve Police Force, and Border Security acy, but they are having great difficulty Force; under Cabinet Secretariat) in recruiting, promoting, and retaining technicians with revolution in military Special Protection Group — 3,000 affairs (RMA) related skills. (VIP protection)

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1990-1991 (London: Brassey’s, 1989); The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).

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Future Threats Republic of India India faces threats on several Defense Budget: Estimated at $15.9 billion for 2000; the gross domestic fronts: internal separatist insurgencies product in 1999 was $440 billion ($1,800 per capita). and acts of terrorism, Pakistan, China, Manpower: With a population of 1,016,242,000, India has a total of and a maritime or extra-regional threat. 136,290,000 men between 18 and 32 years of age. Active military strength is The internal threat has diminished 1,303,000. Reserve forces number 535,000—army, 300,000; territorial army since 1990 but remains the primary se- (volunteers), 40,000; navy, 55,000; and air force, 140,000. curity concern for the near term. The Armed Forces: India has an army of 1,100,000 soldiers and some 3,414 resolution of the bloody revolt in Pun- main battle and 90 light tanks, a navy with 53,000 sailors and 16 submarines, jab ends a major danger to stability. But 26 principal surface combatants, 38 patrol/coastal craft, 17 mine warfare the Kashmir insurgency continues. The vessels, a force of 1,200 marines, and naval aviation with 5,000 personnel and northeast remains restive, and though 37 combat aircraft; and an air ethnic conflict rages force with 50,000 members and in Sri Lanka there will 774 combat aircraft. be concerns about the Paramilitary Formations: A Tamils. total of 1,069,000 personnel The significance serving in various police, secu- of the internal security, and special units (see figure rity threat is revealed on page 19 for strength of ac- by the increase in tive paramilitary formations). paramilitary forces, which have grown Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, substantially since 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989–90 (to include for the International Institute for Strategic creating at least two Studies, 2000). special units to protect VIPs and to supplement counterinsur- Border Security gency forces). This Force on parade. increase is greater The most important change in AP/Wide Photos (Aijaz Rahi) World than reported declines national security has been the elec- in army strength, sug- tion of two consecutive coalition gesting that internal governments led by the Bharatiya process. Singh is also in charge of one security threats demand more than re- Janata Party (BJP)—the only party fo- of the four committees that reviews assigning personnel from one service to cused on national security issues, in- intelligence policy—another recom- another. Evidently, despite positive cluding nuclear deployment. The party mendation of the report. movement in Punjab and the northeast, promised to undertake a strategic de- Since independence, India has internal security is a resource drain. fense review, establish a working na- demonstrated the near-absolute pri- Although Pakistan is perceived by tional security council, and make other macy of civilian authority over the mil- India as a threat, its capability has structural reforms to improve the deci- itary. BJP came to power advocating re- changed in scope and complexity. A sionmaking process. form in national security, including decade of poor economic performance Thus far the result of these efforts assuring greater military input in deci- and the U.S. arms embargo have de- is mixed. The relative influence of the sionmaking. In a demonstration of this graded the army and air force. While national security advisor, which is new atmosphere, the defense minister’s the army has been expanded by five in- considered critical to reform, is un- committee—composed of the minister fantry divisions, manpower has in- clear. Brajesh Mishra holds the portfo- and service chiefs—actually met. The creased by only 40,000. Most of the lio, but Arun Singh, a veteran of the fact that it had not been convened for 2,320 tanks are obsolescent, with the Rajiv Gandhi administration and one twenty years suggests how little mili- exception of 300 modern T–80UDs, and of the foremost security experts in the tary influence exists in the national se- mechanized forces have older M–113 country, has been appointed the na- curity process. The minimal sugges- armored personnel carriers. Heavy tional security advisor to the foreign tions of the Arun Singh Commission in forces appear incapable of sustaining of- minister. The Kargil review committee 1990, which included devolving pow- fensive action. Moreover, the army report suggested that the national se- ers to theater commanders so service lacks adequate medium altitude air de- curity council is not as yet an impor- chiefs can engage in more long-term fense systems and helicopters and has tant factor in the decisionmaking planning, have not been implemented; experienced difficulty in acquiring and many recommendations have not equipment from any source. The air been publicly released. force relies on aging Mirage III and V variants, Chinese models of older Soviet

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Senior naval leadership in Bombay. AP/Wide Photos (Sherwin Crasto) World

Patrolling forward area of Siachen Glacier. AP/Wide Photos (Ajit Kumar) World

MiGs, and a few F–16A Falcons deliv- weapons, in addition to Ghauri, Sha- of its common border with India—has ered in the 1980s. Any qualitative edge heen, and Chinese-supplied M–11 mis- 220,000 troops, with one armored and Pakistan might once have enjoyed over siles. The nuclear threat has become an four infantry divisions. In 1990 there established part of regional were 19 regular PLA infantry divisions the real threat posed by Pakistan has security affairs, and Pakistani and one regular tank division in these shifted to the two extremes on the experts credit their nuclear districts. China also has been undergo- deterrent with having staved ing modernization, building short- conflict spectrum off several Indian invasions. range ballistic missiles of the M-series Pakistan also supports Kash- and buying naval vessels and advanced India is gone, except perhaps in subsys- miri insurgents and Islamic volunteers, aircraft from Russia. These systems tems and electronic warfare compo- largely from Afghanistan, who want to have been concentrated in the south- nents. The navy is worse off, though it fight India. This support included infil- east to threaten Taiwan. Beijing has maintains a significant force of French tration of Pakistani Northern Light In- participated in incidents that have Agosta and Daphne-class submarines fantry as well as artillery support into troubled New Delhi, including devel- and anti-ship missile capabilities with Kargil in 1999. Analysts on both sides oping intelligence assets in Myanmar U.S.-supplied Harpoons. of the border anticipate further clashes, and port facilities in Pakistan and in- The real threat posed by Pakistan and the border has been hotly con- tervening across the de facto boundary has shifted from mid-intensity conven- tested of late. with India in 1999. tional warfare to the two extremes on China’s conventional threat has Despite Chinese political med- the conflict spectrum—nuclear capabil- declined notably since the crisis of dling and modestly improved capabili- ity and low-intensity conflict and ter- 1986–87. Its forces in Chengdu mili- ties, it is difficult to find a rationale rorism. Pakistan has fissile stocks esti- tary district—which includes Tibet— for excessive concern. Attention by mated as sufficient for thirty nuclear number 180,000, with one artillery and four infantry divisions. Lanzhou military district—which includes most

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Exhibiting surface-to-air three years, the military is hollow. The missiles, Panchkula. force structure has been maintained at the expense of its serviceability and sustainability, a range of weapons systems acquired from multiple sources stresses logistics and support services, and force multipliers to increase the overall capability of fighting units have not been acquired. Outside influences have substantially decreased external threats. A large military, bolstered by a nascent nuclear force, provides a deterrent to any hostile state. Relative security from external threats thus suggests that the current force structure, barring major shifts in resources, is adequate. Lower tech, manpower-intensive forces also form the basis for dealing with primary threats: ethnic or class-based separatist movements, possibly AP/Wide Photos (Aman Sharma) World aided by external interests. Again, relative success in containing and in some Beijing has been conspicuously fo- cases resolving insurgen- cused elsewhere, particularly on the cies suggests that this cur- United States and Taiwan. New para- Jaguar fighter climb- rent force structure and or- digms of warfare are clearly intended ing from Srinagar ganization are sufficient to be applied to other, asymmetrically air base. for India’s needs. advantaged adversaries to the east. Barring an outbreak of unrest in Tibet, Maintaining adequate it is unlikely that China will increase defenses does not suggest AP/Wide Photos World its forces in the region. The primary hostile intent toward Indian concerns involve its nuclear re- neighboring states. Capa- lationship and support for Pakistan in enough to deter virtually any adver- bilities may be improved incremen- the form of conventional and uncon- sary or coalition of adversaries from tally; but the pursuit of revolutionary ventional weapons and production fa- sustained assault on its territory and to increases appears unlikely at best. cilities. Addressing either issue defend against all but the most dire There is no predictable threat that through a buildup of conventional scenarios. India is attempting to India cannot manage with its existing arms is problematic at best, because of achieve even more conspicuous levels or planned acquisitions and force pos- the difficult terrain along the Hi- of security by threatening Pakistan ture. Innovative technological solu- malayan border and the obvious ex- with an ill-defined strategic concept of tions are expensive, not perceived as pense of acquiring sufficient force to limited war. necessary, and endanger existing bu- coerce a state as formidable as China. reaucratic and organizational prefer- The extra-regional threat is no- An Adequate Force ences. Even under the BJP govern- tional at best. India has misgivings The late 1980s were a high point ment, with increased emphasis on about use of international interven- in the influence of Indian armed foreign and defense policy, there is no tions to resolve human rights abuses forces. Military thinkers, particularly vision of military reform, much less and their implications for national General Krishnaswarmy Sundarji, and revolution. Indian national security sovereignty. This issue is particularly defense intellectuals such as Arun policy demonstrates continuity with cogent given the similarities between Singh, had unprecedented influence tradition rather than a new vision of Kosovo and Kashmir. However, it is on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In- military affairs. Its neighbors should not clear what leverage New Delhi dian forces were involved in regional find this fact reassuring. JFQ could gain by increasing defense ex- crises with both Pakistan and China. penditures. Its armed forces are capable But the death of Gandhi and the economic crisis of 1990–92 reduced the status of the armed forces. Despite higher levels of spending in the last

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General Tyasno Sudarto inspecting ground forces. AP/Wide Photos (Dita Alangkara) World To Change a Military— The Indonesian Experience By JOHN B. HASEMAN

here is no better example of life, but it is faced with tremendous military transformation pressure to transform. today than the Republic of Indonesia is inherently centrifu- T Indonesia. Since 1997 that gal. The world’s largest archipelagic nation has undergone dramatic change state, it is fragmented geographically in political leadership, economic status, into over 17,000 islands and some 300 and social relations. The armed forces, ethnic and linguistic groups. The Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI), is the largest Islamic nation, it has significant most dominant sector in Indonesian minorities of Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists. Glaring imbalances in economic distribution and social levels Colonel John B. Haseman, USA (Ret.), is a consultant on Southeast Asian affairs add friction. Each of these components and has served as defense attaché in Jakarta. of diversity is reflected in the military.

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Indonesian Regional Military Command (KODAM) Geographic Areas

Philippine Sea THAILAND Manila KODAM Boundaries: Bangkok CAMBODIA PHILIPPINES KODAM Number: Phnom Penh IV Andaman Sea VIETNAM KODAM Headquarters: (including Jakarta Regional Gulf South China Military Command KODAM) of Sea Thailand

BRUNEI Bandar Seri Begawan MALAYSIA Natuna Besar MALAYSIA Pulau Medan Kuala Lumpur Simeulue Borneo Singapaore Halmahera Pulau I SINGAPORE Nias VIII Sumatra Kalimantan Balikpapan VII Pulau Kepulauan Pulau Siberut Sula Bangka Sulawesi Jayapura VI (Celebes) Ceram Billiton Palembang Buru Irian Jaya

Java Sea II Ujungpandang PATTIMURA Jakarta Kepulauan Semarang Aru Indian Madura Kepulauan Bandung Tanimbar Ocean Java Surabaya Sumbawa Arafura Bali Flores III Denpasar Sea Lombok IV Timor V Sumba Timor Sea IX AUSTRALIA Gulf of Carpentaria

A Sea of Change most serious foreign problems involve been hard pressed to organize con- Indonesia’s political power struc- overlapping claims of sovereignty in stituencies because the government ture is going through the greatest the South China Sea between Indone- often assumes that they intend to change in three decades. The economy sia and its fellow members in the Asso- compete against the ruling party and has been hit with its worst depression authorities or other since the early 1960s. There are also in- many current problems were caused by ethnic groups. Tradi- tional ethnic leaders tense social problems. TNI is encoun- three decades of tight political autocracy tering these challenges while it retains were stripped of power, responsibility for maintaining security, and their responsibili- defending the country, and implement- ciation of Southeast Asian Nations ties were passed to government-ap- ing change within its own structure. (ASEAN) and China. Indonesia itself pointed leaders at the regency and vil- Indonesia has discovered that it is has no such claims. lage level who frequently managed extremely difficult being the third The military leadership has always interethnic relations by calling out the largest democracy in the world after identified internal stability as the army or police. more than 30 years of autocratic rule. greatest security issue. Violence be- In short, many current problems The reasons are numerous and inter- tween ethnic and religious groups were caused by three decades of tight twined. Key to meeting these chal- vexes reform. Clashes between Am- political autocracy during which it was lenges is a secure and stable environ- bonese Moslems and Christians, impossible for any type of alternative ment within which to implement Dayaks and Madurese, and Sumatran authority to emerge, practice leader- political, economic, and social reforms. Bataks and Flores Catholics constitute ship, or develop a following. The re- The nation does not face any sig- only the most recent outbreaks to sulting vacuum at the head of emerg- nificant external threat. An increas- wrack the country. Ethnic leaders have ing political, ethnic, and social groups ingly assertive China looms as the has encouraged demagoguery and vio- most worrisome regional danger. The lence. Indonesia needs a strong central

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Merdeka guerrillas has inflamed pas- Republik Indonesia sions on both sides. Unlike East Timor, only annexed Defense Budget: Estimated at $2,271 million for 2000; the gross domes- in 1976, Aceh has always been part of tic product in 1999 was $140 billion ($4,000 per capita). the nation. And although problems in Manpower: With a population of 206,213,000, Indonesia has a total of East Timor attracted only minor public 28,809,000 men between 18 and 32 years of age. Active military strength is attention in past years, today most In- 297,000. Reserve forces number 400,000. Selective conscription is authorized donesians are keenly aware of the situ- for 2 years. ation in Aceh and are adamantly op- Armed Forces: Indonesia has an army with an estimated strength of posed to permitting the province to 230,00 and some 355 light tanks; a navy with 40,000 sailors and 2 sub- split off. marines, 17 surface combatants, 36 patrol/coastal craft, 12 mine warfare ves- A third cause of unrest is the di- sels, a force of 13,000 marines, and naval aviation with 1,000 personnel (but version of wealth to the central gov- no combat aircraft); and an air force with 27,000 airmen and an inventory of ernment. The Acehnese resent the fact 108 combat aircraft. that only a tiny percentage Paramilitary Formations: of earnings from its huge An estimated 195,000 person- natural resources return to nel serve in various police, se- the province. curity, and special units. Irian Jaya remains a se- Source: International Institute for curity concern as well. Small Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University and uncoordinated separatist Press for the International Institute for groups have conducted Strategic Studies, 2000). antigovernment operations for years. With a change in government, those groups have begun to coordinate their efforts, increasing the government to keep its volatile threat of separation. How- population at peace with itself. ever, it remains to be seen In addition to this vio- just how determined the col- Elite KOSTRAD troops lence, internal security prob- lectively-named Free Papua marching in Jakarta. lems have involved separatist Movement is about breaking AP/Wide Photos (Charles Dharapak) World groups in East Timor, Aceh, and off. As elsewhere, its griev- Irian Jaya. Some are guerrilla ances include the low return groups whose goal is to secede from East Timor is now a ward of the United the province receives from its natural the country and gain formal inde- Nations, pending independence. resources as well as resentment of the pendence for their regions. Others Events in East Timor have encour- government and military attitude to- represent a disaffected regional popu- aged separatists in the northwestern ward the local tribal population. lace whose grievances center around province of Aceh. The Acehnese have economic and social exploitation by historically opposed rule from Jakarta Damaged Legacy, Daunting the central government but who do whether by the Dutch or the independ- Future not advocate formal independence. ent government of Indonesia. Violence Many will look at emerging politi- East Timor was the most trying se- escalated dramatically after Soeharto re- cal and economic policies for solutions curity problem in 25 years. In the signed and many of the troops who had to these problems. But the key to words of the Foreign Minister, Ali controlled the uneasy security environ- change lies, as always, with the armed Alatas, it was “a pebble in Indonesia’s ment in the province were removed. forces and their ability to support re- shoe.” That pebble caused a major The rise in confrontation is rooted form and enforce domestic security. wound for the nation, damaging its in- in many causes. One is historical oppo- TNI has been the backbone for govern- ternational image and consuming sition to outside rule. Another is the ments ever since independence. Often countless billions of rupiah and taking legacy of violence inflicted by the In- embroiled in political warfare during thousands of lives. Under an interna- donesian security forces under Soe- the Sukarno years, the military and tionally managed process the people of harto and since. The tendency of the principally the army became the pri- East Timor opted for independence, an army to treat all civilians as actual or mary instrument of power for the 32 effort that was beset by violence perpe- potential guerrilla supporters, which years of the Soeharto order. But despite trated by pro-Indonesian militias contributed to failure in East Timor, the years of dominance over political covertly supported by a small element has harmed government pacification affairs the army never seized power and of military and civilian hard liners. efforts. A record of egregious human few believe that there is a coup in the rights violations on the parts of both the army and the separatist Aceh

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1998—that led to the decline in the Significant Military Reforms prestige of the armed forces. Today the national press is revealing a legacy of Removing the national police from the military chain of command military complicity in human rights Abolishing staff positions in socio-political affairs at TNI headquarters and abuses. No longer under attack by in- subordinate regional commands ternational news media and foreign Abolishing the post of assistant for security and order at TNI headquarters human rights activists alone, the (usually a national police officer) armed forces are vilified by the domestic press as well as the public. Their Requiring that all military personnel in civil government posts either retire reputation has also been damaged by from the armed forces or return to normal military duties serving as a political tool of the Soe- Reducing dedicated military seats in Parliament from 100 to 75 in 1990 and harto government. Only after TNI re- to 38 in 1998, and totally eliminating them by 2004 gains popular respect can it effectively Prohibiting any role by the military in day-to-day political activity help to restore the economy and implement political reform. Prohibiting political party bias Revelations of alleged military Maintaining neutrality in the 1999 general election and all future elections atrocities have stunned the rank and file of the armed forces and outraged Revising doctrinal publications and instruction to reflect the changing role of the military in society. the nation at large. TNI leaders are in a quandary. The government is determined to investigate crimes against citizens in Aceh and to institute legal proceedings against senior officers im- making. Indonesia can be said to have Some facets of the role of the plicated in East Timor. It is understood a government with a powerful military, armed forces in society are particularly by the armed forces that any scrutiny but not a military government. subject to change. The process has al- of past events must be perceived as The armed forces have a unique ready begun as profound transforma- fair and complete. This will be diffi- dual mission (dwi-fungsi). Instead of tion sweeps through the political, eco- cult. But it is essential to the restora- separating military and civilian politi- nomic, and social environments. First, tion of military prestige that the cal spheres of influence, this system the military must be called to account probes move forward. combines them. For years the political for human rights abuses. Its actions in The investigation of such allega- role of the military was all-inclusive, Jakarta, Aceh, Irian Jaya, and the former tions could destabilize TNI leadership intrusive, and the dominant force in province of East Timor have galvanized by summoning active and retired sen- the country’s social and political life. ior officers to the bar to ac- This doctrine is now the focus of in- only after TNI regains popular respect count for their own actions tense debate and demand for change. and those soldiers who The dwi-fungsi system and its terri- can it effectively help to implement served under them. The torial organizational structure, which political reform concept of command re- parallels civilian government down to sponsibility, implemented the village level, are the two primary only in the 1990s, is weak instruments through which the mili- public opinion and demands for action. and unevenly applied. And the degree tary has dominated political affairs the Second, it must undertake basic reform to which officers may be legally called past four decades. It is these two in- in its overall political role, including the to account for the actions of troops struments which reformers, both controversial dwi-fungsi doctrine, and in under their command in the past is within and outside the armed forces, its structure and leadership. unprecedented in Indonesian history. target for change. And it is the degree Officers complain that they are of reform of these key instruments Regaining Prestige criticized for human rights violations which encompasses the greatest range TNI has plunged to its lowest- when taking forceful action to end or of debate within both the army and ever level of public esteem. A proud avoid violent confrontations yet are the civilian leadership. Military re- institution born of the independence censured for failing to act. To a force formers agree that considerable change struggle against Dutch colonialism, its poorly trained and equipped for non- is needed, primarily in those aspects of doctrine has always stressed the im- lethal crowd control the issue is often behavior best categorized as political. portance of its popular mandate as an stark: allow a town to be ravaged by a But all except the most zealous reform- army of the people. marauding, out of control mob or stop ers also feel that dwi-fungsi will remain, Ironically, it was the dramatic the damage with deadly force. There is albeit in altered form. move toward democracy—which could seldom any middle ground. not have occurred without the role played by the military leadership in the resignation of Soeharto in May

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Internal reform has been a wrenching experience. While military personnel are trained and indoctri- nated to take part in the political and social life of the country, reform stresses that they return to military tasks. Many officers have long advo- cated removing the armed forces from politics and providing more time to focus on professionalization. During the Soeharto era such thinking was anathema and its advocates found their careers stifled, but since then such officers have increasingly been advanced. Not all senior officers support reform. The so-called status quo faction favors the longstanding system that Indonesians being provides perquisites and lucrative post- briefed aboard retirement government and quasi-busi- USS Germantown. ness posts to senior officers. The TNI DOD commander in chief has lately promoted both factions, advancing reformers and status quo supporters In 1999 the former commander in East Timor by pro-Indonesian mili- alike. His logic typifies the dilemma of chief of the armed forces, General tias—reportedly supported and con- balancing both varied approaches to Wiranto (who is now coordinating trolled by hard-liners in special forces reform and alternate power centers to minister for political and security af- and intelligence operatives—and fail- control the rise of new leaders. fairs), issued a public apology for past ing to control it. Prior to dropping his The contest for influence between military violence. According to press reelection campaign, Bacharuddin reformers and status quo officers is accounts, he told soldiers who peace- Habibie chose Wiranto as his vice pres- only the most recent contest among fully secured Parliament during the idential running mate. But the criti- senior ranks. The army in particular election of President Abdurrahman cism of the general was so rampant has been noted for loyalties among Wahid and Vice President Megawati that a group of senior officers in- academy classmates and dominant per- Sukarnoputri, “We are sorry for the vic- formed him that they would not sup- sonalities. During the 1980s the com- tims, and we will pray for them. We port his bid to secure the presidency or peting poles were represented by the ask for forgiveness from people who the vice presidency. charismatic armed forces commander feel we did wrong, from the victims, in chief and intelligence czar, General from the students....The reform Doctrine and Leadership L.B. (“Benny”) Moerdani, a Christian, process is for the people, not the presi- TNI leaders issued a white paper and those opposed to the influence of dent, not for the head of the military, that outlines transformation goals the military intelligence community. but for the people only.” while also supporting political and so- Moerdani lost his post after criticizing Wiranto has been implicated by cial reform in government and society. the growing avarice of the children the national human rights commission A primary target is dwi-fungsi. and cronies of Soeharto. The armed for being cognizant of the violence in forces then went through a de-Moer-

Changing Face of Indonesia’s Military Leadership

Position Soeharto Era Incumbent Wahid Era Incumbent Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto Admiral Widodo Army Chief of Staff General Subagyo General Tyasno Sudarto Commander, Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto Lieutenant General Djadja Suparman Commander, Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS) Major General Muchdi Major General Syahrir Commander, Jakarta Regional Military Command (KODAM) Major General Syafrie Syamsoeddin Major General Ryamizard

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or unwillingness to control pro-Indone- Intervention in East Timor sia militias in East Timor, and he may find himself under judicial scrutiny for n May 1999 Indonesia authorized the United Nations to organize and con- his role in the violence. duct a consultation to determine whether East Timor would accept special Contests for power among senior autonomy within the republic. In June 1999 the Security Council estab- I military officers have distracted many lished the U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). In agreements reached one Indonesian officers from addressing is- month earlier, UNAMET was tasked to oversee a transition pending a deci- sues of professionalism and reform. sion. Perhaps more significantly, the leaders The East Timorese voted in August 1999 to begin a process leading to- are so personally concerned with polit- ward independence. The Security Council then authorized the International ical maneuvering that they have not Forces East Timor (INTERFET), under a unified command structure led by Aus- devoted sufficient attention to devel- tralia, to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UN- oping a vision for the future of the AMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance within force capabilities. At its armed forces. peak, Operation Stabilize drew on almost 10,000 personnel from 47 coun- Senior TNI leaders have always at- tries. In support of the operation, the United States established U.S. Forces tended to military politics under a INTERFET. During this effort, a U.S. joint force of 425 servicemembers was de- controlled system that promoted ap- ployed to Darwin, Sydney, and East Timor, supported by 5,000 naval person- proximately equal numbers of officers nel on board five ships. from every defined faction and cohort The U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was formed group so competition would prevent in October 1999 to exercise legislative and executive authority during the any individual from dominating the transition. Immediately thereafter the mission set up headquarters in Dili. armed forces. Soeharto was master of The change of command from INTERFET to UNTAET was completed in Febru- this tactic. He and several of his com- ary 2000 and its operations are ongoing. JFQ manders in chief practiced this version of divide and rule to ensure dominance of the military. The rise of contenders usually pro- danization process in which intelli- The opposite pole was a larger duced a commander who either se- gence officers and Christian officers group of competent officers whose ca- cured the loyalty of all groups or perceived as loyal to Moerdani had reers were carefully balanced against whose personal loyalty to the presi- their careers blocked. The so-called tac- Prabowo but who were always one step dent was so unquestioned that he had tical professionals were beneficiaries as behind or had one good assignment the legitimacy to control the armed field experience and tactical command too few. Prabowo’s overweening ambi- forces. The same practice exists in the became more important for advance- tion and arrogance soon antagonized post-Soeharto era. There continues to ment than assignments in the military most senior officers. He was accused of be a balance among groups of senior intelligence service. complicity in the disappearance and officers competing for influence. The Meanwhile, the ambitious death of antigovernment activists as new government has cleverly juggled Prabowo Subianto, first in his class at well as in leading troops suspected of key positions. the military academy and the U.S. atrocities in East Timor and Aceh. In contrast to the Soeharto era, Army Special Forces Officer course, Prabowo and his clique lost power and when the president commanded the any hope of leadership after Soeharto loyalty of the country’s five most pow- contests for power have left the scene. erful officers, the leadership today is Today the contest is between those more diverse. Although unquestion- distracted many officers loyal to Wiranto, now a senior cabinet ably loyal to the institution of the from addressing issues member, and reformers, loosely coa- presidency, these senior officers do not have personal loyalty as a group to ei- of professionalism lesced around Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah and to a greater ther the most powerful military figure extent Lieutenant Generals Agum in the country, General Wiranto, or soon became recognized as a future Gumelar and Soesilo Bambang even to the president. leader. The son of a preeminent econo- Yudhoyono. But in a demonstration of TNI leaders, whether intentionally mist and, far more significantly, power, Wiranto placed Gumelar and or not, have returned to the traditional Soeharto’s son-in-law, he gathered Yudhoyono in the Wahid cabinet where practice whereby divided loyalty is de- friends and classmates around him they are less likely to be competitors. liberately perpetuated to ensure that who combined professional compe- Wirahadikusumah is a regional com- no officer has the complete allegiance tence with ruthless ambition. mander in far-off Sulawesi, where his re- of the armed forces. Thus the advent of formist influence is less than it would democracy in Indonesia has resulted in be in policymaking circles in Jakarta. a return to apolitical institutional loy- Wiranto is stained by his own inability alty. TNI will support the presidency but not the individual in uniform

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the armed forces in every facet of gov- Protesting for independence of ernment. Aceh province. There is considerable belief that this doctrine remains valid. A respected senior civilian official in the Wahid government told the author: There is still no substitute for the army territorial structure in rural Indonesia, where the civilian government is simply not adequate. The [noncommissioned

ndonesia’s armed forces—Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI)— Iconsist of the army, navy, air force, and police. A reorganization carried out in 1985 modified the chain of command. Four multiservice Regional Defense Commands (KOWILHANS) and the National Strategic Command (KOSTRANAS) were disbanded and the Military Regional Command (KODAM) or area command was established as the key organization for strategic, tactical, and territorial operations conducted by all services. The chain of command now flows directly from the ABRI commander in chief to the ten KODAM commanders. JFQ

officer] in the village still has a role to play. But in urban [areas] there is now an adequate civilian structure and some changes should be made there. Justified by dwi-fungsi as a so- ciopolitical force, in reality this struc-

AP/Wide Photos (Dita Alangkara) World ture enabled the armed forces to keep tabs on potential and real opponents of the government, stifle traditional (Wiranto) most likely to be in a posi- level—where major generals head re- local leaders, control campuses, censor tion of power. This circumstance gional commands—down to noncom- regional newspapers, and ensure sup- should support a slow but steady trend missioned officers responsible for one port for Soeharto through the Golkar toward political and military reform. or more villages. The structure is based Party. In return, the military on every on the military’s experience in guer- level gained extra-budgetary income Future Organization rilla warfare, in which intimate knowl- for troop support—and lined the pock- An internal debate is underway as edge of the terrain, population, and re- ets of many officers. to how the armed forces should be or- sources is vital. This territorial structure is the ganized to carry out their missions The official explanation for the subject of controversy. Most civilians under a democracy. The exchange is structure is that it allows commands to realize that it is needed to some degree most pertinent to the army, which be- learn every detail of each region to pre- for internal stability. But the military cause of the dwi-fungsi doctrine has pare for an outside invasion, when the role in the political system is being re- been organized for both territorial/po- army would melt into the countryside duced and the dwi-fungsi system is litical and tactical/operational roles. and conduct guerrilla warfare. In real- under pressure. The territorial structure More than half of the army is assigned ity, the Soeharto era changed the is its most visible component and is to the territorial structure, which paral- thrust of the territorial structure to thus among the easiest to attack. The lels civil government from province population control. An extensive do- central position of this organizational mestic intelligence effort gathered data on every aspect of life and involved

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structure is now at the heart of an unprecedented public debate among senior officers. Under the Habibie government, in response to high levels of ethnic and religious violence across the country before and after Soeharto resigned in May 1998, the armed forces made plans to add up to eight two-star regional commands to maintain order. These new commands would have returned the territorial structure to the level that existed through 1981 (when streamlining reduced the number of regional commands from sixteen to ten). Status quo officers claimed that expanding the territorial structure would improve security. Their argument was flawed because the military had already committed itself to a reduced political role; expanding rather than reducing Security forces blocking the territorial structure would reverse demonstrators near Parliament. that trend. But under the status quo, officers also covet the perquisites of serv- AP/Wide Photos (Dita Alangkara) World ice in the structure: personal power, income, and political stature. U.N. commander in Reformers countered expansion East Timor conferring plans by decrying the costs of estab- with Admiral Widodo. lishing new commands and emphasizing the military commitment to reducing its political prominence. These officers think that some province-level commands should be consolidated, and one leading reformer called for all the territorial structure below province level to be abolished. This plan would save money in a time of economic difficulty and make more resources available for traditional tactical units. There are advantages and disadvantages to both sides of this issue, but the significant point is that such a debate is underway at all. It never would have occurred during the Soeharto era and is a positive indication that re- formist tendencies are expanding in the formerly closed universe of the AP/Wide Photos (Joel Rubin) World armed forces. Senior military leaders have not made a final decision, but some form has also indicated that regional com- is underway which provides reassur- of reduced presence seems most likely. mands will become more flexible in ance that military reform is moving The newly-appointed army chief of adjusting to the social tenets of the forward. The psychological conse- staff, General Tyasno Sudarto, has im- various regions. quences of change can be overcome plied that lower level territorial struc- and will result in transforming TNI ture should be abolished in urban The Indonesian armed forces re- into a more responsive, responsible, areas but retained in rural districts. He main the single most powerful seg- and representative institution. JFQ ment of national society. Though small in numbers, their influence is wide- spread. Unprecedented internal debate

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French Forces

Keeping an eye on Sarajevo. ECPA for the 21st Century By JEFFREY B. JONES

espite the fact that it is not An Engaged Ally integrated into the NATO France plays an important role in military structure, France is a defending Western interests and also Dpivotal security partner for compares favorably with other allies in the United States. While its defense terms of defense policies—which sup- policy is marked by independence, its port those of the United States—as military capabilities complement those well as levels of spending sufficient to of the Alliance. With their role in dis- maintain a capable and credible force. suasion, prevention, projection, and Perhaps most noteworthy is the protection, the French armed forces are considerable involvement of France in global, nuclear, conventional, and un- peace operations and commitment to conventional, and are being trans- an effective nuclear and conventional formed to become significantly smaller, defense posture as part of its strategy restructured, and more professional. and that of the Atlantic Alliance. Despite often distinctive views on collective defense and international secu- Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones, USA, is Defense and Army Attaché at the American Embassy rity, Paris has consistently demon- in Paris and is a former commander of the 4th Psychological Operations Group. strated a solid political and military

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and conventional capabilities con- Republique Française tribute to the NATO deterrent posture and have been a force for stability Defense Budget: Estimated at $27 billion for 2000; the gross domestic worldwide, particularly in Africa. product in 1999 was $1.4 trillion ($24,000 per capita). France is arguably a global power, Manpower: With a population of 59,425,000, France has a total of with over 46,000 military personnel 6,241,000 men between 18 and 32 years of age. Active military strength is outside its borders or in its territories. 294,430 (including 18,920 women) for the army, navy, and air force, plus Troops serve as sovereignty forces in members of the central staff, Service de santé, and Service de essences (the overseas departments and territories National Gendarmerie is also part of the armed forces; see separate listing and bilaterally under defense agree- below). In 1999 Reserve forces, which are currently undergoing reorganiza- ments with African states. Preposi- tion, total 419,000—army, 242,500; navy, 97,000; and air force, 79,500. tioned forces in Africa and the South Armed Forces: France has an army of 169,300 soldiers and some 834 Pacific have sought to provide stability main battle tanks; a navy with 49,490 sailors and 11 submarines, 35 principal and military assets in those areas where surface combatants, 40 patrol/coastal craft, 21 mine warfare vessels, a force American presence is modest. France of 2,000 marines, and naval avia- is proud to be one of the top three tion with 3,500 personnel and 52 peacekeeping nations in the world. combat aircraft; and an air force Its First Armored Division and with 60,500 members and an in- Franco-German Brigade are assigned ventory of 517 combat aircraft. to EUROCORPS, which would come Paramilitary Formations: A under the command of Supreme Al- total of 94,950 personnel (includ- lied Command Europe in time of ing 4,970 women) serve in the war. Troops in Germany have been national gendarmerie—a para- drawndown as part of overall re- military police force—which is structuring of forces, though some comprised of territorial and mo- 9,500 remain. bile forces as well as naval and air Paris collaborated closely with forces gendarmeries, an anti-ter- Washington on the diplomatic, po- rorist unit, the Republican Guard, litical, and military levels to achieve and other specialized units. a cessation of hostilities in Bosnia Source: International Institute for under the Dayton Accords and to Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press implement a viable peace settle- for the International Institute for Strategic ment. Its diplomatic and political Studies, 2000). leverage was instrumental in gaining the cooperation of the warring parties. It was the largest troop contributor to the earlier U.N. Protec- tion Force (UNPROFOR) and subse- commitment to allies and security quently became one of the largest partners, most recently in the contributors to Implementation Balkans, but also in Cambodia, Force (IFOR). When IFOR was suc- Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, and the Per- Les Champs Elysées. ceeded by Stabilization Force (SFOR) sian Gulf. It backs a European Secu- in 1997, France remained a primary rity and Defense Identity (ESDI), ECPA contributor of manpower, resources, which one day could enable Europe and leadership and continues to to react to regional crises in which the France is a global power, work closely with the United States United States is not engaged. through diplomatic avenues to en- Beginning in 1996, France em- with over 46,000 military force full compliance with the Dayton barked on the most intense effort to re- personnel outside its border Accords. A French general officer cur- define its relationship with the Alliance or in its territories rently is in command of the multina- since President Charles de Gaulle with- tional division in south Bosnia. drew from the integrated military structure thirty years earlier. In 1998 Presi- larger European role in the Alliance. Kosovo dent Jacques Chirac and the Socialist Paris remains an active participant in France joined with the United government under Prime Minister Li- the political consultative process and States and other nations during 1998 to onel Jospin gave considerable impetus an overall supporter of Alliance goals constrain violence in Kosovo by politi- to this effort. France is continuing to and objectives. Its considerable nuclear cal means. At the end of that year, with work with allies to implement interme- the international community mobilized diate measures while pressing for a to enforce a cease-fire and the decision

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by the Alliance to use force, it agreed to act as the lead nation, contributing 800 soldiers to the NATO-directed Kosovo Extraction Force ready to intervene should monitors require protection or evacuation. During air operations conducted in March–June 1999, it was the second largest contributor, deploying ground attack, surveillance, combat air patrol, and refueling aircraft as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. With almost 8,000 troops on the ground, its commitment was significant. The French learned many lessons during Operation Allied Force. Politi- cally, for the first time since the Cold War, Europeans intervened in a major crisis; and the majority of ground forces were European. Paris had an important voice in operational matters and maintained control of its forces. Thus a predominant political theme from its perspective is the need to construct a European defense identity. Militarily, the French saw the Kosovo experience as validating their technological sophistication, acquisition policies, and reorganization plans. Another reinforced lesson was the need for interoperability. In addition to its role in the bombing campaign, France was the only European nation to deploy a range of intelligence and surveillance platforms: Helios satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, heli-borne air- Le Triomphant. ground radar systems, electronic collec- tors, and drones. Throughout the cam- ECPA paign France had to synchronize these assets with the capabilities of other AUF–1 self-propelled coalition forces. howitzer near Mostar. There were also a number of deficiencies, although many had already been programmed for correction. The French noted problems in the acquisition, integration, and exploitation of real-time intelligence, tactical transportation, aircraft identification, satellite navigation of weapons, precision strike munitions, air defense suppression, and bomb damage assessment. They knew that gaps in technology must be overcome for a better balanced coalition effort with the United States. Fundamental Change The French programming law for 1997–2002 began a period of change that will transform the military into a Signal Company, Combat Camera (Brian Gavin) Signal Company,

th professional force capable of rapid 55

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force projection. In 1997 the total number of personnel in the defense establishment was slightly over 574,000, of which 305,627 were career, 169,520 were draftees, and 98,969 were civilian. Though France is committed to maintaining the unilateral capacity to meet national interests, it acknowl- edges a growing requirement to project expeditionary forces and provide corresponding theater joint command resources to work with allied forces. To- ward that end defense policymakers have identified the following priorities: commanding/conducting joint operations in a national or multinational framework intelligence, protection, and strategic mobility surveillance and protection of national territory force projection and support rebuilding additional forces should a major threat reappear. Standing guard in Ferizaj, Kosovo. Signal Company, Combat Camera (Milton H. Robinson) Signal Company, th

Army 55 France is currently downsizing, restructuring, and professionalizing its army and expects to meet most of its economy of resources. Two corps and brigade and regimental operational self-imposed deadlines by the end of seven division headquarters were elimi- planning and exercises, but without 2002, with complete reorganization by nated in 1999. The building blocks of permanently assigned forces, these 2015 when an entire new generation the operational forces are the remaining headquarters also have a mission of rap- of systems should be fielded. The goal 85 regiments, grouped under eight idly deploying to organize the nucleus is acquiring the capability to rapidly combined arms brigades and one avia- of a NATO-style division headquarters deploy either a force of 50,000 for tion brigade in addition to four combat or a national joint task force headquar- NATO non-article V contingencies or a support and two logistics brigades. Regi- ters. The new corps level headquarters, force of 30,000 to high-intensity re- ments will be task-organized for both Land Force Command, was formed in gional conflicts for up to a year, while training purposes and during opera- 1998 from Third Corps Headquarters simultaneously maintaining 5,000 per- tions, albeit not necessarily with the and the Rapid Reaction Force and is lo- sonnel for low intensity combat or same peacetime brigade headquarters. cated in Lille (not far from Supreme peace operations. Moreover, four force headquarters are Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in The army has reorganized accord- being formed to replace the division- Mons, Belgium). In addition to its role ing to principles of modularity and level commands. Responsible for as headquarters for army operational forces, this headquarters will function as a Figure 1. Army-to-Army Training command and control organization for the Activity U.S. Army French Army Location NATO environment— Company exchange 82d Airborne Division 11th Parachute Division France/U.S. the headquarters for a Mountain training 1st/10th Special Forces Battalion 27th Mountain Division France multinational corps or Battery exchange XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery 11th Parachute Division France/U.S. the core of a combined Military police platoon exchange 21st Theater Army Area Command 601st Regiment Contrôle Routier France/Germany joint task force. Proposed legisla- Airborne training Rigger Company, U.S. Army Europe St. Cyr France tion will decrease the Language training 21st Theater Army Area Command St. Cyr Germany formerly optimistic Cadre exchange 101st Airmobile Division 4th Airmobile Division France figure of available reserves from roughly Platoon exchange 101st Military Intelligence Battalion 54th Signal Regiment France/Germany 250,000 to 100,000. Company airborne training Southern European Task Force 11th Parachute Division France/Italy

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schooling and many assignments now Mirage 2000C. require English proficiency as well as familiarity with Allied army organization and weapons systems. There have been delays in some programs such as the MISTRAL air defense and TRIGAT antitank missile systems. Big ticket items such as the latest Leclerc tank and Tiger attack helicopter have been preserved. Modernization of C4I capabilities is a top priority as seen in the fielding of an enhanced information system that allows the transfer of data to multiple tactical levels in real time. A follow-on tactical communications system is also in the works. Moreover, there are continuing advances in wheeled vehicles, optics, small arms, lasers, electronics, intelligence, and information systems. An important element of the pro- Combat Camera Squadron (Greg L. Davis) (Greg Combat Camera Squadron st 1 fessional army is the 30,000-member Troupes de Marine. Originally formed to Figure 2. Army-to-Army Exchange Program serve in the colonies—first under the Signal Company, Combat Camera (Milton H. Robinson) Signal Company, t Navy Ministry and later the Ministry 55 U.S. Army French Army of War—they were known as Troupes St. Cyr, Coetquidan U.S. Military Academy, West Point Coloniales or La Coloniale during the th Doctrine and Training Staff, Paris U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe first half of the 20 century. Because the majority were career soldiers, tran- Army and Joint Staff Course, Paris U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth sitioning to an all professional force Signal School, Rennes U.S. Army Signal School, Fort Gordon was relatively easy. Some of the most Aviation School, Le Luc U.S. Army Aviation School, Fort Rucker highly decorated units in the French Engineer School, Angers U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood army belong to Troupes de Marine, and they have played a dominant role in Infantry School, Montpelier U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning recent interventions. Moreover, many Armor School, Saumur U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox senior army leaders have come from Artillery School, Draguignan U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill their ranks, including the current chairman of the joint staff. There are U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca 18 regiments and 6 battalions (compa- U.S. Army Air Defense School, Fort Bliss rable in size to U.S. battalions) as well XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg as several other units which are de- National Simulation Center, Fort Leavenworth ployed independently. Troupes de Ma- rine still are rotated overseas, acting as military advisors in former African colonies which maintain security agreements with Paris. officers and NCOs must now learn When discussing interoperability with allied forces, Navy operational English as well as NATO French army leaders list three In terms of tonnage, French naval staff procedures areas for emphasis—equip- forces are the fifth largest in the world, ment, information systems, ranking behind the United States, Rus- and procedures. Officers and sia, Britain, and Japan. The five-year Some 50,000 will be assigned to the NCOs must now learn operational defense reform and restructuring plan National Gendarmerie, a police force English as well as NATO staff proce- will cut the size to 45,000 sailors and under the control of the Ministry of dures, which are routinely used in na- 11,000 civilians with 80 ships by 2002. Defense. Moreover, the army will also tional training and exercises. Interop- Reserves will be reduced in strength to benefit from the new system which erability requirements are changing 6,000 sailors. assigns a company of reservists to army education and personnel sys- each regiment. tems. Officers are also on notice that

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Foch and USS Dwight D. Eisenhour.

Figure 3. Navy-to-Navy Exchange Program

U.S. Navy French Navy

Super Etendard pilot aboard Foch F/A–18 instructor pilot (VFA–106) Marine Nationale Arresting gear officer, Charles de Gaulle Arresting gear officer, Lakehurst, New Jersey Instructor, French Naval Academy, Brest Instructor, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. Maryland and U.S.-built E–2C Hawkeye. Begun EOD diver, Cherbourg Mine warfare instructor, Ingleside, Texas in 1986, it was designed from the keel CDC officer, Duquesne, Toulon Division officer, USS Kauffman up to be compatible with the U.S. SEAL, Commando Hubert, Toulon SEAL Team 2, Little Creek, Virginia Navy F/A–18 and has the same basic catapult and arresting gear systems as Dauphin SAR helo pilot, Toulon Flight instructor, Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi Nimitz class carriers. Foch will be de- E–2C NFO, Lorient E–2C NFO (VAW–120), Norfolk, Virginia commissioned as Charles de Gaulle becomes operational. Aging embarked fixed-wing aircraft are being retired. Rafales replaced The four operational headquarters an indicator of the strong commitment modernized F–8P Crusaders in 1999. are the Mediterranean fleet based at to NATO operations in the Balkans, the The strike and reconnaissance roles Toulon, Atlantic fleet at Brest, Indian 36-year-old Foch with its battle group will be filled by two squadrons of laser Ocean fleet in Djibouti, and Pacific sortied two weeks early from Toulon in guided bomb-capable Super Etendards fleet at Tahiti. Most of the power pro- January 1999 for duty in the Adriatic in until replaced by a strike version Rafale jection fleet, Force d’Action Navale, in- response to the Kosovo crisis and rein 2005. The Alizé early warning air- cluding the carrier Foch, anti-air war- mained on station until June, even after craft will be replaced by the E–2C fare ships, and amphibious ships, is American carriers had withdrawn. Hawkeye in 2000, an enormous im- based in Toulon. The highest navy priority is com- provement in early warning capability. Like the army, the French navy has pletion of the nuclear-powered carrier A fleet of 28 Atlantique maritime pa- worked with American forces since the Charles de Gaulle, which displaces trol aircraft is being supplemented by Revolutionary War and maintains close 40,000 tons and accommodates 40 air- Falcon 50 maritime surveillance relations to this day. Its ships patrol craft, including the new Rafale fighter planes. The helicopter fleet will be up- every corner of the globe protecting na- graded with 27 NH–90 utility and anti- tional interests in overseas territories submarine warfare helicopters. and supporting Alliance objectives. As

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French jumpmaster over Fort Bragg, Rodeo 2000. U.S. Air Force (James E. Lotz) U.S. Air Force

range M–51 submarine-launched bal- Gaulle as well as the E–2C Hawkeye, listic missile, to be fitted in all Le Tri- E–3F AWACS, and Rafale will have the

Marine Nationale omphant class submarines. As the new Link-16 data link. The carrier will have boats enter the fleet, those of L’Inflexi- a joint maritime command informa- French officer briefing ble class will be decommissioned, tion system terminal and also the joint coalition pilots, Bright maintaining a permanent force of four. operational tactical system. A Franco- Star ’99/’00. Each year five French naval offi- American naval working group meets

Combat Camera Squadron (Jim Varhegyi) Combat Camera Squadron cers travel to New London for discus- every six months to enhance the com- st 1 sions on submarine tactics and systems patibility of communication and com- developments with American counter- bat systems. parts. Their visit includes opportunities Six nuclear attack submarines are to use submarine tactical training simu- Air Force based in Toulon, with at least one de- lators. In addition, all tactical pilots re- Exhibiting many of the same ployed at all times. Operations typi- ceive training up through carrier quali- strengths as its American equivalent, cally take place in the Mediterranean fication at Meridian Naval Air Station. the French air force is modern and tech- and Atlantic, but there are deploy- France, Italy, and Britain have en- nically sophisticated. Like other serv- ments to the Indian and Pacific Oceans gaged in the tripartite Horizon anti-air ices, it is undergoing profound changes as well. Six new-generation Barracuda warfare program, which will be fully in force structure, professionalization, class nuclear attack submarines will compatible with NATO systems. How- and force projection capabilities. begin replacing older models on a one- ever, with Britain’s withdrawal from The air force has global commit- for-one basis in 2010. All diesel sub- the program, the future is unclear. In ments that in 1998 consisted of 14 bi- marines are being phased out. The accord with doctrine on developing lateral and 9 NATO or Partnership for mass of the nuclear deterrent is con- more deployable forces, the navy Peace exercises as well as 11 deploy- tained in four nuclear-powered ballis- launched two 12,000 ton Foudre class ments as permanent detachments or in tic missile submarines based in Brest, transports and plans to construct two support of operations. It has more also with at least one deployed at all even larger ships capable of embarking than a thousand aircraft, including times. The new generation 9,000 ton a JTF staff. fighters, C–135 tankers, C–130 and Le Triomphant joined the fleet in 1997 To keep up with the C4I goal of C–160 transports, and assorted small and Le Temeraire in 1999. Vigilant will continued interoperability, Charles de transport aircraft and helicopters. arrive in 2003 and a fourth in 2008, The service has responded to coincident with the 8,000 kilometer evolving challenges since the Persian

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Gulf War. Because France does not perceive a direct threat from a European power, moving to an all volunteer

because France does not perceive a direct threat, moving to an all volunteer force is designed to project power

force is designed to project power. The air force has been striving to improve interoperability with nations in Europe as well as NATO. One example occurred in 1998 when eight Mirage USS Anzio with French destroyer Mountcalm. 2000s, two C–160 Transalls, and 200 personnel took part in Exercise Red U.S. Navy (Shawn Eklund) Flag in Nevada. Using iron bombs and laser guided munitions, the French were highly successful in this realistic The air force is undergoing a tran- VIP protection, raids, deception, psy- exercise, which validated their training sition, adapting to new missions which chological and civil-military opera- and tactics and demonstrated a high require flexibility, rapid reaction, and tions, humanitarian assistance sup- degree of interoperability. sustainability. It trains and is interop- port, and tailored communications Although exercises like Red Flag erable with U.S. and other NATO forces links. Equipped with state-of-the-art can be critical in gauging progress in and seeks opportunities to improve its technology, it can be reinforced by the training and testing new tactical ideas, ability to operate in joint and com- 11th Airborne Brigade, 27th Mountain the best indicator of how effectively air bined environments. The acquisition Brigade, and 13th Airborne Dragoon forces operate together is a real crisis. of the Rafale and modernization of the Regiment for reconnaissance and intel- The French have flown alongside the Mirage 2000 will provide a highly ef- ligence collection, and by naval forces. United States in Operation Southern fective force well into the 21st century. It complements the intervention/pro- Watch, in the skies over Bosnia, and in The changing nature of the threat and tection role of the national gen- Kosovo. They have furnished 800 of need for mobility, however, will create darmerie and the French counterparts the 1,800 troops to the Kosovo Reac- problems because of the age of French to the Defense Intelligence Agency and tion Force prepared to evacuate ob- assets, which do not meet require- Central Intelligence Agency. servers. French personnel took a princi- ments established for the future. The pal role in leading an Alliance government is looking at various op- France and America are bound by operation for the first time since leav- tions which cannot be realized until common strategic interests and shared ing the integrated command structure. 2010. Meanwhile, France will use tacti- values. In crises that outstrip individ- The air force deployed six C–130s, two cal lift assets and sealift and rent out- ual nations or collective resources, C–160s, and a DC–8 to move supplies sized cargo lift. partners must take advantage of their necessary to establish operations in respective capacities, technological Skopje and to deliver humanitarian aid Special Operations strengths, forward presence, and les- to Albania and Macedonia. More re- With headquarters located on an sons which enhance interoperability. sources are sustaining ground opera- air force base inside a mountain north Understanding capabilities of the tions in Kosovo. Throughout the NATO of Paris, the Special Operations Com- French armed forces and rebuilding air operations, the French were the sec- mand was organized in 1992 and rep- bridges are mandates for the future. ond largest contributor, with over 100 resents the only truly joint command France has been a traditional ally of dedicated aircraft. Their reconnaissance in the French military. The headquar- the United States. As Charles De Gaulle assets included Crecerelles and CL–289 ters is manned by 60 officers and reportedly remarked to Dwight Eisen- drones as well as Cougar Horizon heli- NCOs from each service, with liaison hower during the U–2 Crisis in 1960, copters, which operated in concert from both the national gendarmerie “I do not know what Khrushchev is with the joint surveillance and target and military health services. This com- going to do, nor what is going to hap- attack radar system (JSTARS). mand oversees foreign military assis- pen, but whatever he does, or what- tance, special unit training, hostage ex- ever happens, I want you to know that traction and rescue, combat search and I am with you to the end.” JFQ rescue, counterterrorism, direct action,

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Poland USS Clarke prior to being turned over to Polish navy. AP/Wide Photos (Gary C. Knapp) World Prepares for the Alliance By JEFFREY SIMON

n March 1999, Poland, Hungary, tential reflects its stability, which can and the Czech Republic joined be attributed to a remarkable transfor- NATO. Of these three new mem- mation in civil-military institutions. I bers of the Atlantic Alliance, only More than any other former member of Poland enhances Allied military capa- the Warsaw Pact, the Polish Republic bilities. Poles are currently participating has been able to adapt to the NATO in Allied operations on the ground. The model for modern Western forces. 18th Air Assault Battalion is serving with the U.S.-led multinational brigade The NATO Standard in eastern Kosovo. In part, Poland’s po- Together, the Brussels Summit on the Partnership for Peace (PFP) pro- Jeffrey Simon is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at gram in 1994, the Study on NATO En- the National Defense University, and the author of NATO Enlargement and Central largement released in 1995, the Madrid Europe: A Study in Civil Military Relations. Summit in 1997 which invited the

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Restoration of military prestige, trust- Rzeczpospolita Polska (Polish Republic) worthiness, accountability, and operational effectiveness. Having emerged from the commu- Defense Budget: Estimated at $3.2 billion for 2000; the gross domestic nist period when the military was controlled product in 1999 was $157 billion ($7,400 per capita). by the Soviet High Command through the Manpower: With a population of 38,648,000, Poland has a total of Warsaw Pact and was often an instrument of 4,422,000 men between 18 and 32 years of age. Active military strength is oppression, post-communist civil communi- 217,290. Reserve forces number 406,000—army, 343,000; navy, 14,000; and air ties must perceive the military as being force, 49,000. under democratic control. In addition to in- Armed Forces: Poland has an army of 132,750 soldiers and 1,704 main stitutional and constitutional checks and balances, general staffs must be accountable battle tanks; a navy with 16,860 sailors and 3 submarines, 3 principal surface to civil officials. A legal framework and code combatants, 25 patrol/coastal craft, 24 mine warfare vessels, and naval aviation of conduct for professional soldiers and con- with 2,460 personnel and 28 combat scripts that would allow soldiers to dis- aircraft; and an air force with 46,200 obey illegal orders is also required. Fi- members and 267 combat aircraft. Raising Polish flag at nally, military training levels and Paramilitary Formations: A total NATO headquarters, equipment must also be sufficient to of 21,500 personnel serve in border March 1999. protect the state. This calls for adequate guard and police units. social support and a predictable stream of resources. Source: International Institute for Strate- gic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Interna- Making the Journey tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). The transformation to a democratic state has been a continuous though fractious process of multi- stage development in Poland. It began in 1988 on the eve of the three new members and implemented collapse of the Soviet empire. After the enhancement of PFP, and the a decade of unrest, the communist Membership Action Plan (MAP) government reached an accommo- launched at the Washington Summit dation with the opposition. The of- in 1999, created coherent principles ficial Polish United Worker’s Party for enlarging the Alliance. NATO estab- recognized pluralism for political lished explicit conditions for member- and trade unions. In return, a pow- ship including active participation in erful new office of president was PFP, MAP, and Allied operations, per- established under Wojciech forming democratic political institu- Jaruzelski, who quickly wrested tions, privatized economies, respect for control of the National Defense human rights, and orderly foreign rela- Council—together with both the tions. Other standards were democratic defense and interior ministries— control of the military and substantial

AP/Wide Photos (Dusan Vranic) World from the Communist Party and interoperability and political compati- placed it under his own control. In bility with NATO. April 1989 the council was further To meet the civil-military criteria on defense budgets and extraordinary com- restructured from a supra-governmental four conditions appear necessary: missions investigating security violations. agency to a state organ subordinate to A clear division of authority between Committees need staff expertise and suffi- parliament, further distancing the mili- the president and government (prime minister cient information to support the review of tary from direct party control. defense programs and liaison with defense and defense/interior minister). This must be The overwhelming defeat of the established by a written constitution or and interior ministries and to develop bi- Communist Party in the general parlia- public law, designating who commands and partisan consensus. Similarly, intelligence controls the military, promotes officers in oversight committees should provide access mentary elections of June 1989 and peacetime, holds emergency powers in a cri- to opposition parties. choice of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the sis, and has authority to declare war. Under- Peacetime government oversight of first noncommunist prime minister lining these formalities must be evidence of general staffs and commanders through civil- stimulated further reforms. Parliament respect and tolerance between the executive ian defense ministries. Defense ministry man- exerted greater authority after the elec- and legislative branches. agement should include preparation of the tions, and reformers controlled a third Parliamentary oversight of the military defense budget, access to intelligence, in- of the upper house (Sejm) and senate. through control of the defense budget. This au- volvement in strategic and defense planning An ad hoc group of Solidarity leaders to include force structure development, thority should include defense, security, and members of parliament formed and foreign affairs committees to provide arms acquisitions, deployments, personnel minority and opposition parties with infor- development, and military promotions. mation and allow consultation, particularly

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Simon

foiled efforts to draft a new constitu- Central Europe tion. Frustrated, Walesa pushed for par- FINLAND liamentary elections two and a half years early. Elections in October 1991 Helsinki Oslo selected the nation’s third consecutive NORWAY Stockholm Tallinn noncommunist prime minister, Jan ESTONIA Olszewski, which presented another opportunity to revise the national security RUSSIA structure. As a result of these elections, SWEDEN LATVIA executive and legislative institutions Riga were fully democratic although glaring Baltic Sea DENMARK weaknesses remained: a heavily frag- Copenhagen LITHUANIA mented and weak coalition government RUSSIA Dn and the absence of a constitution. Vilnius Gdansk Debate over a constitution sparked Minsk Elbe a political showdown between parlia- POLAND BELARUS ment and president. Ambiguity in au- Poznan thority and differences in interpreta- GERMANY Berlin Lodz Warsaw tion over command and control caused the downfall of the Olszewski govern- Lubin ment, including the first civilian de- Prague Kiev fense minister, Jan Parys, who exacer- Krakow UKRAINE THE CZECH bated the confrontation by alleging D ne REPUBLIC str that Walesa had been planning contin- e ub SLOVAKIA Rhine an gencies to rule by martial law. A Sejm D Bratislava Vienna MOLDOVA commission investigating the charges Danube Budapest AUSTRIA exonerated the president. HUNGARY ROMANIA Chisinau A new government under a noncommunist prime minister, Hanna Suchocka, brought hope of cooperation among the parliament, ministry, and oversight groups within the ministry of with his resignation and call for new president. In October 1992, the new defense. Bronislaw Komorowski and elections, the stage was set for further defense minister, Onyszkiewicz, imple- Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Solidarity civil- change. Votes cast in December 1990 mented an interministerial commission ians, became deputy defense ministers brought Solidarity leader Lech Walesa on defense ministry reform. In addi- and began to eliminate the Main Politi- to the presidency and the appointment tion, military courts and intelligence cal Administration (a Communist of Jan Bielecki as the second noncom- were subordinated to the civilian de- organ of control) from the military. munist prime minister, initiating a fense minister, who proposed further Civilians also took control of contact new round of military reforms with reform. The Onyszkiewicz initiatives with other countries and international power shifting from a partially com- encountered resistance, however. At- organizations, in part to ensure that munist parliament to the president. tempts to fuse civilian and military Moscow did not exercise command of Walesa chaired the defense council, budget and personnel activities and set providing reformers with de up an independent department for Walesa chaired the defense council, facto control of the military managing infrastructure and acquisi- providing reformers with de facto and police. He also exercised tion were blocked by the general staff. oversight of the defense min- Ministry efforts were further lim- control of the military and police istry through the National Se- ited by Walesa’s appointment of Gen- curity Bureau, responsible for eral Tadeusz Wilecki as chief of the Polish forces through the Warsaw Pact. developing military doctrine, conduct- general staff. Wilecki continued to ar- Meanwhile, Piotr Kolodziejczyk, an in- ing threat analyses, and drafting the rogate power by bringing his military dependent-minded admiral, became reorganization of both the defense district commanders under the general defense minister and General Zdzsislaw ministry and general staff. staff. As a result, that body effectively Stelmaszuk, who had not attended a As Walesa gained greater control, maintained autonomy by playing off Soviet staff college, became chief of the reform proved difficult to implement. civilian defense ministry oversight general staff. Tensions between the communist-dom- against the authority the generals gar- Even as Jaruzelski’s prestige fell inated Sejm on the one hand, and the nered from presidential support. Thus after the elections, noncommunists as- senate and president on the other, four parties struggled for control of the sumed positions of authority in civil- military: parliament, presidency, de- ian and military institutions. Then, fense ministry, and general staff.

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the military, precipitating a constitutional crisis. Under the interim constitution the prime minister was required to consult with the president on selecting a defense minister. Walesa forced the reappointment of his old ally, Kolodziejczyk. The admiral immediately loosened control over the military. In November 1993 he reduced and consolidated the defense establishment and granted the general staff greater authority by transferring civilian departments back to the military, establishing new military directorates, and placing intelligence and counterintelligence duties under the purview of senior officers. Kolodziejczyk’s initiatives were followed by the Drawsko affair, which threw fragile civil-military relations into further turmoil. At a September 1994 meeting of military cadres at Drawsko Pomoskie training grounds, Wilecki voiced support for Walesa’s position to have the general staff function directly under the president rather than report to the defense ministry. The remarks drew parliamentary attention. A Sejm defense committee investigation revealed tensions among a general staff supporting direct presidential control, a parliament determined to play a supervisory role over the military, and a constitution that failed to distinguish a proper balance of power. The committee equivocated in its findings. Though it criticized the president for his behavior at Drawsko, it failed to react even after Walesa pre- Lech Walesa sented awards to Wilecki and other top with workers in military commanders after the inci- Gdansk, 1983. dent. Drawsko and the Sejm report further undermined trust between parlia- AP/ Wide Photos World ment and president. Kolodziejczyk resigned, contributing to the Pawlak government’s collapse. In November 1992 further consti- and foreign affairs. Inability to compro- The conflict between president tutional reform offered an opportunity mise blocked further progress. and parliament reached crisis propor- to clarify legislative and executive au- Elections were again crucial to tions. A civil-military quagmire re- thority. It failed because of continued transformation. The Sejm and senate sulted from not delineating the spe- ambiguity. Lack of consensus was evi- contests of September 1993 were a bit- cific authorities of the president and dent in seven drafts submitted to the ter setback for those political parties defense ministry and from the inabil- constitutional commission. The defense which emerged from the Solidarity ity of the Sejm to exercise effective committee of the Sejm, for example, movement, with the return of commu- oversight. It also reflected the failure of opposed presidential oversight of a na- nists who took control of parliament the civilian officials in the ministry to tional guard. There were also diverse and formed a coalition government. exercise control over senior officers on views on the role of the executive in ap- The appointment of Waldemar Pawlak the general staff. pointing ministers of defense, interior, as prime minister led to a renewed battle with the president for control of

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organization and control in a bipartisan manner. Land Forces Command was established with military districts subordinated to it rather than the general staff. In 1998 the general staff was restructured into a joint staff. With these final changes, Poland institution- alized civil control over the military prior to acceding to NATO. Unfinished Revolution Poland struggled for a consensus on the organization of a modern defense establishment. The demise of the Communist Party created a void. The control of the armed forces became the centerpiece of a constitutional contest for power. The way the general staff played the president against the prime and defense ministers brought the military an independence not found elsewhere in Central Europe. Thus the general staff gained enormous influence vis-à-vis civilian institutions. This independence was facilitated by Walesa’s desire to finally seize control from the communists and by instability at the top levels of the defense ministry. Since the passage of the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister and a new constitution, efforts at solidify- ing ministerial management responsibility and oversight of the general staff can be seen as relatively successful. Yet Celebrating Polish tension between the president and army day at Banja government remain. Current problems Vrucila, Bosnia. result from the continued inability to Signal Company, Combat Camera (James V. Dowen, Jr.) Combat Camera (James V. Signal Company, d delimit presidential authority in the 982 area of defense affairs. The capacity of the Sejm for oversight has shown remarkable improve- Elections intervened to shape the a deputy defense minister to deal with ment, but limitations persist. Since its defense revolution. After the inaugura- the budget and increased civilian over- beginnings in 1989–90, the Sejm de- tion of Aleksander Kwasniewski in sight. In addition, the chief of general fense committee has only slowly devel- December 1995 and the formation of a staff formally became a deputy minister. oped an expert staff. In particular, its socialist government under Prime Min- These changes wrested control from the chairman publicly recognized short- general staff and subordinated falls in supervising military intelli- Poland struggled for a consensus generals to the defense ministry. gence. He also acknowledged that al- The September 1997 return though the Supreme Chamber of on the organization of a modern of the Solidarity-led government Control has slightly improved its abil- defense establishment led by Jerzy Buzek and a new ity to monitor the defense budget, it form of cohabitation with a so- will take years before the Sejm can de- cialist president under a new con- velop the methods employed in ad- ister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, parlia- stitution redefined the powers of the vanced democracies. ment searched for a legislative solution president and administration. Both Despite limited support mecha- to the problems of civil-military con- branches tackled the issue of military nisms, legislators have exerted greater trol. The result was the enactment of influence. Parliament has exercised the Law on the Office of the Defense some control through constrained Minister in February 1996, which added budgets. In addition, the Sejm has

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Each new member faces three challenges. The first is military integration. If they succeed in this effort the Alliance will be strengthened and poised for further enlargement. But if these new members fail to meet force goal targets, and if NATO concludes that the first enlargement tranche has added consumers rather than produc- ers, the commitment to enlargement could be undercut and regional security could be compromised. Second, integration is not so much an issue of modernization as it is building an institution that is widely supported by society and government, and whose forces can fulfill Alliance tasks such as territorial defense, rapid NATO training at Camp reaction, and meeting out-of-area com- White Eagle, Kosovo. mitments. Signal Company, Combat Camera (Jason Heisch) Signal Company,

d Third, even though PFP has been 982 critical in developing a sense of regional stability, NATO must not focus on new members. Moreover, the new demonstrated limited supervision over 1995 reversed a slide that had begun in members—beyond meeting force goal military administration. It began with 1986. While it represents a commit- targets and voicing support for the the Defense Reform Law in 1996 and ment of 2.08 percent of the gross do- partnership—must devote resources to rules on military rotation and term mestic product in 2000, there is an ap- the program. limits on general staff assignments and parent—albeit unrealized promise—to As a former partner, Poland is par- army reform. The increased oversight increase this level of spending to 3 per- ticularly helpful in dealing with such also has been evident in questions on cent. Moreover, compared with Hun- challenges. It can help other nations acquisition (such as helicopters, fighter garians and Czechs, Poles hold the more effectively implement PFP. Part- aircraft, and artillery) as well as person- armed forces in high esteem. Finally, ners should note the Polish experience nel policy and other reforms. Poland has developed institutions for in establishing a solid foundation for Despite initial limits, the defense intergovernmental security planning civil-military relations. ministry has shown significant struc- with a capacity to prioritize national tural and functional differentiation objectives. Fair and open elections, compro- since the interministerial commission. mise and restraint among competing The reform concept and subsequent The Way Ahead parties, constitutional experimentation actions appear to hit the mark. Efforts As an enlarged NATO becomes a and reform, and transparency in the po- to empower the ministry by providing reality, Poland and other new members litical process all contributed to forging accountability, subordinating and lim- must define their military role in Euro- new state structures for civil-military re- iting the functions of the general staff pean security. Their decisions are par- lations in Poland. By combining these to civilian authority, and reforming ticularly vital in light of criteria often elements with sensible defense reorgan- the armed forces through budgetary cited by the current members of the ization and a modicum of material and measures and acquisition practices Alliance in justifying enlargement, popular support, this new member of have been appropriate objectives. which include promoting stability the Alliance has demonstrated that the In addition, the nation has tackled through institutionalizing common NATO model is viable. JFQ the issue of preparedness. Personnel values, enhancing core tasks through have been cut and readiness problems strengthened territorial defense and have been evident in all services as well contributions to rapid reaction forces, as the Polish element of Implementa- and developing capabilities for out-of- tion Force (IFOR)/Stabilization Force area operations. (SFOR) in Bosnia. Contrasted with NATO will soon be able to meas- other countries in Central Europe, ure these objectives against evolving however, a defense budget increase in realities among new members. The extent to which these newcomers realize their potentialities will greatly influence the future of the Alliance.

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Creating the South African National Defence Force

Combined exercise By JAMES A. HIGGS off African coast.

he creation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is arguably T one of the success stories in the history of the Republic of South Africa. But questions persist about its role, budgetary allocations, personnel structures, and equipment procurement. Over the last decade, SANDF has had to deal with radical downsizing and restructuring like the militaries of many other nations. It also had to adapt to a domestic revolution that brought an end to apartheid. The demands placed on the armed forces ranged from integrating tens of thousands of members of regular and guerrilla formations under democratic control to participating in peace operations. Establishing a new force is proving an immense undertaking. First, the military must develop a shared institutional culture that is both acceptable to diverse ethnic backgrounds and generates the esprit necessary for unit cohesion. Second, it must recruit, train, and deploy this force as defense competes with other government sectors for budgetary resources. Third, it must build legitimacy among those mistreated by the security forces under the previous regime. Transforming a Military

South African Department of Defence During the early 1990s the Sub- council on Foreign Affairs of the Tran- SALUT, SALUT, sitional Executive Council developed an understanding of the factors that

Courtesy of would influence the future political and security environment. It recognized that close links would exist be- James A. Higgs is a senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst tween regional and national interests and recently served as a research associate at the South African Institute of International Affairs.

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commanded substantial resources. On Republic of South Africa the other hand, fiscal constraints introduced by such a decline make the Defense Budget: Estimated at $1.9 billion for 2000; the gross domestic expensive process of reform particu- product in 1999 was $128 billion ($5,800 per capita). larly demanding. Manpower: With a population of 40,300,000, South Africa has a total of As a high profile institution on 6,049,000 men between 18 and 32 years of age. Active military strength is which state survival may depend, the 63,389. Reserve forces number 87,392—army, 85,228; navy, 1,070; air force, armed forces have a tremendous re- 442; and military health service, 652. sponsibility. It is well that reform is Armed Forces: South Africa has an army of 42,490 soldiers and 168 main battle tanks (128 in storage); a navy with 5,190 sailors and 2 submarines, 9 patrol/coastal craft, and 8 mine warfare vessels; an air force with 9,640 airmen and 87 combat aircraft; and medical health service of 5,550. Source: International Institute for Strate- gic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Interna- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).

which could be threatened by deteriorating relations stemming from refugee Secretary Cohen migration, drug trafficking, arms trans- in Cape Town.

fers, and cross-border ethnic, national- DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) ist, and extremist activities. Following this analysis measures were proposed peace and security in Africa and Southern underway given that the process of “to prevent conflict, the monitoring of Africa in particular....South Africa does transformation may take decades. events, becoming involved in preven- not now, and will not in the future have tive diplomacy, and ways to influence aggressive intentions towards any state. It The Ghost of Apartheid the emergence of a constructive new is not confronted by any immediate con- The former military was closely order on the continent in a positive ventional military threat, and does antici- identified with the policy of apartheid. and significant manner.” pate external military aggression in the The creation of SANDF has thus been South Africa also drafted an in- short to medium term (+/- five years). a most delicately balanced process of terim constitution outlining six func- ...[The] size, design, structure, and institution-building and one that in tions for the defense force: services in budget of the SANDF will therefore be de- some ways represents the task con- protection of the nation; international termined by its primary function. fronting the whole country. obligations; preservation of life, This vision for the armed forces This balancing act is illustrated by health, and property; provision of es- brought with it new fiscal realities. The two potentially conflicting imperatives sential services; upholding the law; fact that the defense budget as a per- for change. First, social needs for and social upliftment. greater legitimacy required combining A white paper released in 1996, eight statutory and nonstatutory forces, Defence in a Democracy, further speci- the former military was transforming an institutional culture fied requirements for the future. closely identified with the from an apartheid state agency to a Among other concerns it addressed the more transparent, accountable, and strategic situation in which South policy of apartheid representative force, and cutting de- Africa must operate, human resources, fense spending in accord with domestic and civil-military relations. It also cent of gross domestic product fell priorities for reconstruction and devel- noted that South Africa from 4.7 in 1988 to 1.6 in 1996, for ex- opment. Primarily focused on person- is no longer isolated internationally. It has ample, meant that spending was cut nel issues, this process has concen- been welcomed into many international by almost two-thirds. Some might re- trated on integrating a regular, organizations, most importantly the... gard this adjustment as a fitting price white-led, high-technology conven- [ United Nations,] the [Organization of to extract from an institution that for- tional force with irregular, guerrilla, African Unity], and the Southern Africa merly held a privileged position and and predominantly black revolutionary Development Community. South Africa is forces. Furthermore, the importance of in fact expected to play an active role in this process has made it necessary to these forums, especially with regard to conduct the transformation quickly.

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Afrikaners. Although such beliefs were Participating in peace operations. confined neither to Afrikaners nor South Africans, they built a cohesive esprit as the military closed ranks to deal with a perceived threat. The culmination of this perception was adop- tion of the idea of total onslaught and the state response—total strategy. The old military followed the British model: a regimen enforced without qualification and symbols of discipline such as drill and ceremony, dress regulations, and good timekeep- ing. While these traditions still prevail in Britain, efforts made over the last thirty years ensure that discipline is not the principal motivation for obey- ing orders. Effective leadership of a more informed, socially aware soldiery South African Department of Defence has increasingly been introduced by

SALUT, SALUT, communicating reasons underlying orders. As a result there was a major di- vergence between British and Afrikaner Courtesy of military cultures. Part of the South African attitude was linked to the conscript-based forces found in the United DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) One major structural difficulty Obstacles to Integration Kingdom of the 1950s more than to confronting SANDF was the shift in The ethos of the South African the highly technological all-volunteer budget allocations from what might be Defence Force derived from a variety of force in Britain today. characterized as typical of industrial- sources: Afrikaner culture, the irregular The origins of this military ethos ized military in 1990 to an unbalanced warfare experience of the Boers, were not exclusively European. distribution by the end of the decade. African cultures within the ranks, the Though the leadership was undeniably The proportion of resources devoted to regular force ethos of the British mili- dominated by whites, black Africans personnel tripled while that allocated tary, and colonial experience. Notwith- constituted a large segment of the rank to the capital costs of equipment re- standing the odious activities of some and file. There were Zulu battalions placement fell by two-thirds. elements of the armed forces between and Bushman units as well as those The rationale for reallocating re- 1985 and 1993, examining the old members who predominantly spoke sources provided by political and social ethos can inform the current situation Afrikaans. Maintaining a language dis- imperatives for integration will be ex- surrounding the integration process. tinction was likely derived from the amined later. But such a policy has a The old ethos is traced to the for- British, who believed that troops fight severe impact on the capabilities of the mation of the Union Defence Force fol- hardest when they operate as an en- armed forces to fulfil their constitu- lowing the British victory in the Anglo- larged family, and this notion is most tional responsibilities. The effect on Boer war of 1898–1902. It drew on both easily generated among those of com- the navy is that the entire fleet will British and Boer military traditions. The mon ehnic stock. reach obsolescence simultaneously. To Boers stressed hierarchy, respect for au- Nonstatutory Forces rectify this situation, a ministerial plan thority, team spirit, Christian values, has been issued to restore the balance self-reliance, and a capacity to prevail The ethos of nonstatutory forces of spending for operational and per- against the odds. This ethos required (NSF) is derived from their irregular na- sonnel outlays, in the process reducing that in times of emergency citizens ture, the anti-apartheid revolutionary SANDF to a total level of about 70,000. must take up arms and commit horses, struggle in which they were engaged, Underlying this effort are needs servants, and their lives to defending and the stage of history in which they for a structure, lines of command, con- the nation. That spirit was institutional- became politically active. Also signifi- stitutional relations, and management ized in the commando system. cant were the ideological basis of their of civil supremacy over the military During the Cold War many mem- struggle, the extent of their training in that are the basis of good democratic bers of the armed forces considered foreign states, and their cultural origins. practice and constitutional govern- communism as anti-Christian, partly Considerable diversity existed in ment. Democracy was a prerequisite because of teachings propagated by NSF, with generational differences dis- for the establishment of SANDF. the Dutch Reform Church, whose tinguishing those who became active dicta were accepted uncritically by

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SANDF Officer Corps: Racial Composition

Army Navy Air Force Grade African Asian Mixed White African Asian Mixed White African Asian Mixed White GOs/FOs O10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O9 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 O8 11 0 0 11 1 0 0 5 1 0 0 6 O7 29 0 2 49 2 0 1 20 3 0 0 23 Field/Company O6 52 0 4 258 6 1 0 94 10 0 0 147 O5 167 0 34 495 2 5 6 125 40 0 3 352 O4 279 2 80 532 24 2 8 96 64 1 4 244 O3 479 4 82 705 7 3 6 67 91 4 14 299

Source: South African National Defence Force.

in the early 1960s, mid-1970s, mid- The commissar or political officer the African National Congress had to 1980s, and 1990s. Whether their polit- was an integral part of the force in the avoid reverse racism, whereby whites ical radicalism truly increased with struggle against apartheid and there is in general rather than the regime were each generation is unclear, but the ir- considerable evidence that it is affect- cast as enemies. There was consider- regular nature of their military service ing the command ethos of SANDF. This able success toward this goal, partly be- gave them an entirely different back- issue provokes controversy between cause of the rhetorical skills of Nelson ground than their conventional force proponents of the Western and com- Mandela and the utilization of whites contemporaries. Indeed many entered munist systems. General Andrew within the organization and subse- the nonstatutory forces during the Mosondo has pointed out that the quently in government. Attitudes har- waning months of the struggle with commissar has undermined the author- bored toward whites by Umkhonto we little or no training and were disdained ity of commanders since Marxist- Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the as klipgoeier (stonethrowers). Leninists inaugurated the concept of African National Congress, and Azan- party in the army. The proper ian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), many entered nonstatutory forces role of a commissar is acting as the military wing of the Pan-Africanist during the waning months of the second in command, knowing Congress, would be influential in their troop attitudes, being accessible approach to integration into a force struggle with little or no training to members of the unit, and giv- undergoing transformation but domi- ing advice to the commander. nated by members of the old military. Whether it was a result of revolu- But military professionals remain suspi- tionary fervor or cultural inheritance, cious of this practice of advising the The Induction Process many of the older NSF members felt chain of command in matters such as The administrative induction of that young recruits were intolerant of morale. the former NSF components is a potent authority in general and state agencies Despite these concerns, one re- symbol of the art of the possible. If the such as the police and armed forces in tired general has still suggested that individuals who had opposed each particular. there is potential for applying the other with force could reconcile them- The ideological basis of the strug- commissar system to African troops. selves, virtually anything is possible in gle often included a strong element of He was shocked to accompany a gen- the rest of society. Even before the elec- Marxism, which was reinforced by eral on unit inspections and hear the tions of 1994, planning for SANDF was training in communist countries. three-star cross-examined by private well under way. The interim constitu- Twenty-three nations hosted NSF soldiers on his decisions and even told tion provided for future armed forces training, from nearby Lesotho to the that one was unsound. But on reflec- through the Transitional Executive Soviet Union and Cuba. The diversity tion he found that the practice was not Council (TEC) and Subcouncil on De- of experiences gathered was both an only useful for communication up the fence. In this way various political par- advantage in terms of skills and a chal- chain but also a safety valve for per- ties and their armed wings would have lenge when it came to standardized sonnel to let off steam. confidence in the conduct of the mili- procedures. The struggle against apartheid tary during the election and some sense sensitized many people to race as a po- of what would happen afterwards. litical issue. Under such circumstances

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other. They were dominated on the Southern Africa military side by ranking officers from the statutory forces because of their technical expertise, and on the NSF ZIMBABWE side by MK because of its political experience. The council tasked work- Windhoek groups and required that results be de- BOTSWANA MOZAMBIQUE livered every three or four weeks. The groups would produce a proposal Gaborone about a particular problem and ad- NAMIBIA Pretoria Maputo journ, then individuals would report Mbabane the consensus achieved to the princi- SWAZILAND pals of their respective organizations. The principals would often disagree with decisions taken by junior col- Atlantic Maseru LESOTHO leagues, but workgroups were not al- Ocean lowed to change their positions. When SOUTH AFRICA groups presented views to the council, Indian various representatives would at least Ocean be forewarned of agenda items. JMCC would then decide whether to accept, Cape amend, or reject workgroup proposals. of It became the task of the chairman to Good Hope present the conclusions to the Sub- council on Defence. The diversity of views in JMCC led to difficulty in reaching decisions at the early stage. The process was described as utterly frustrating by one participant because so much work went into achieving consensus in workgroups only to have issues re- opened by the council. But this layered process also had the advantage of binding individuals from different origins with divergent views. One example was the appointment of the British Military Assistance and Training Team. The decision was made to select a neutral body to monitor implementation of council decisions. JMCC decided on foreign help South African Department of Defence Delivering relief and the suggestion was made to the

supplies to flood SALUT, Subcouncil on Defence to choose a mix victims. of representatives from both NATO and African states. The subcouncil accepted Courtesy of the proposal for overseas assistance but rejected the idea of a mixed team as too cumbersome. In the event the United The subcouncil drew its members The Joint Military Coordinating Kingdom emerged as an acceptable from the African National Congress, Council (JMCC) was established by candidate to the statutory force side be- government, and National Party in the TEC and reported to the Subcouncil on cause it was a Western power and to person of the deputy minister of de- Defence. The chairmanship rotated NSF members because of the favorable fence. The Pan-Africanist Congress and participants came from all major impression that MK members formed (PAC) was not represented because it political factions. JMCC formed six of British efforts in the front-line states was not party to TEC, having rejected workgroups: personnel, intelligence, during the struggle. the idea of nonviolence. This situation operations, logistics, finance, and A certified personnel register would later cause considerable admin- (CPR) was established as one basis of istrative difficulty. negotiation for the implementation of

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National Congress. The success of issue arose when MK advisers began Mangosuthu Buthelezi in including proposing ranks for their personnel. It the Inkatha Freedom Party in the elec- should not be surprising that their cri- tions also resulted in the induction of teria differed from the formal qualifica- an element of the KwaZulu Self Protec- tions of the statutory forces. For exam- tion Forces. ple, MK might rank an individual as a Integration required assessing in- lieutenant colonel because of his stand- dividuals for placement, including their ing in the organization while the statu- rank. Paper qualifications normally tory forces might assess his experience would be the basis of an assessment, as that of a lieutenant—the difference but NSF claimed with justification that between commanding a platoon of such an exercise would be biased in thirty soldiers and a unit of six hun- favor of the statutory forces because the dred. In compromise, an officer might opportunity to administer exams was be given the rank of major, but bridg- limited during the guerrilla campaign. ing training would be necessary to Military medics and MK psycholo- make him effective in his new position. gists debated the virtues of various psy- Language also presents a range of chometric tests to determine the po- training, fairness, and leadership issues. South African Department of Defence tential of individuals to reach the Some stem from lack of formal educa- standard necessary for entry, either tion while others are attributed to lan- SALUT, SALUT, Providing medical into the ranks or as officers. Eventually guage difficulties, even though SANDF assistance. the British team produced a test ac- officers have referred to the latter ex- Courtesy of ceptable to all parties. The challenge planation as an attempt to cover failure then became persuading personnel in training. The question of language is that it was not an attempt to exclude not confined to the former NSF since the integration process. Once on the former NSF members. some retraining of statutory force offi- register the personnel would eventu- cers was required to be conducted in ally become members of the new force. Demobilization and Integration English. This practice has been an ob- The element of compulsory conscrip- The interim constitution of 1993 stacle for those Afrikaner officers whose tion might explain in part why 14,000 allowed all MK and APLA members on spoken English is less fluent than their on the register declined to report to the register to enter SANDF under cer- ability to comprehend. In concert with the assembly points. tain conditions. For those who were the other issues and with continued al- deemed unhealthy, legations of racism within the ranks, integration required assessing individuals uninterested, or too the debate over the importance of lan- old, a law was en- guage proficiency suggests that much for placement, including their rank acted in December work remains. 1996 which author- Inevitably NSF failed to keep ade- ized demobilization benefits. The transformation of the South quate files, which made devising CPR a A racial shift took place during the African military has been a huge and painstaking process. For instance, indi- first three years. The African cohort in- unprecedented task. It will be widely viduals often had a nomme de guerre as creased from a third of the old military studied by those interested in funda- well as a given name with different to a half of SANDF. White representa- mentally changing the ethos, composi- spellings. Thus a person could have tion dropped from just under a half to tion, and purpose of military institu- multiple registrations. Some individuals less than a third, while Asians re- tions. JFQ had one or more ID numbers while oth- mained at around 1 percent and so- ers had none. Because CPR was com- called coloured personnel to less than puter based, it would not accept entries 12 percent. without a number, which caused delay Fewer than half of this force are and anguish. drawn from the former military. The induction process began even SANDF personnel with no previous af- before the 1994 elections, with the filiation are joining at a recruitment military merging with forces from rate of roughly 1,850 per year. Person- nominally independent homelands— nel with experience only in SANDF are Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, projected to outnumber former MK and Ciskei—and armed wings of the members by 2001. Pan-Africanist Congress and African Such a complex process inevitably encountered difficulties, especially when induction meant entry into an Afrikaner-led organization. An early

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Formation at Tres Esquinas in coca- growing Amazonian lowlands.

Colombia Mazalan) AP/Wide Photos (Ricardo World Civil-Military Relations in the Midst of War By JOHN T. FISHEL

ivil-military relations deal not nongovernmental organizations, espe- only with who makes deci- cially those groups focused on human sions about the use of force rights. In this context, assessing civil- C but what is decided. Any dis- military relations in Colombia requires cussion of civil-military relations must appreciation of several factors: a long- address how the military relates to standing democratic tradition, the evo- elements of civil society, including in- lution of the defense sector since the surgents, nacrcotraffickers and other Cold War, and the efforts by the armed criminals, paramilitary militias, and forces to stabilize civil-military relations in a war-torn society. Praetorianism John T. Fishel is a professor in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at Unlike most countries of Latin the National Defense University and the author of Civil Military Operations in America, Colombia has not been signif- the New World. icantly involved with praetorian rule

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into conflict with Gomez. The political Republica de Colombia crisis erupted in June 1953 when Gomez was ousted by Pinilla, who as- Defense Budget: Estimated at $2 billion for 2000; the gross domestic sumed the presidency with the backing product in 1999 was $77 billion ($5,800 per capita). of moderate elements within the Con- Manpower: With a population of 42,400,000, Colombia has a total of servative Party. A century of military 5,195,000 men between 18 and 32 years of age. Active military strength is obedience to civilian authority ended. 153,000. Reserve forces number 60,700—army, 54,700; navy, 4,800; and air By offering amnesty to any guer- force, 1,200. rilla who would disarm, the new presi- Armed Forces: Colombia has an army of 130,000 soldiers and 30 light dent initially held out a real incentive tanks (in storage); a navy with 15,000 sailors (including coastguardsmen) and to end the violence. He also pledged to 4 submarines, 4 surface combatants, 27 patrol/coastal craft, a force of 8,500 conduct a nonpartisan administration, marines, and naval aviation with 100 personnel; an air force with 8,000 which provided an members and 72 combat aircraft; added inducement to and a national police force with return to a peaceful 95,000 personnel. Colombian independence day, society. Coupled with Source: International Institute for Strate- July 20. war weariness these gic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Interna- steps resulted in re- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). duced violence until 1956. Then the economy, which had been quite vigorous because of high coffee prices, took a downturn as despite its tumultuous early history. the coffee market col- The nation was wracked by civil wars lapsed. By then it was between partisans of the Liberal and also apparent that the Conservative parties in the 19th cen- general, aside from tury, generally without participation by being partisan, was its small professional army. On the one building a political or- occasion in which the military took AP/Wide Photos (Ariana Cubillos) World ganization in the sides, the reaction almost led to its dis- manner of Juan Peron appearance. Not until after the War of war known as La Violencia effectively of Argentina. Thus violence rose again the Thousand Days (1899–1902) and destroyed the elite political balance be- and the public was increasingly disaf- the long peace that followed was a pro- tween Liberals and Conservatives in fected by authoritarian rule. When the fessional force firmly established. place since 1902. president tampered with the electoral During the period of peace from La Violencia began as a street riot process in 1957, a military junta de- 1902 to 1948 the army was generally in Bogota (known as Bogotazo) that posed him. The junta, in turn, was suc- not considered to be a political instru- erupted in the wake of the assassina- ceeded by the National Front government. Only under the presidency of tion in 1948 of Liberal Party leader and ing arrangement, which resulted in Alfonso Lopez (1934–38) did signifi- presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer power sharing between the Liberals cant civil-military conflict surface. A Gaitan. Rural violence, which had and Conservatives until 1974. Since Liberal, Lopez was suspicious of the begun as early as 1946, raged out of that time there has been power alter- Conservative orientation of most of control in much of the nation after Bo- nation in generally free and fair elec- the officer corps. He began intervening gotazo. From 1948 to 1950 military of- tions. There has been no threat of a in promotions, seeking officers sympa- ficers replaced Liberal cabinet officers military coup since 1958. As a recent thetic to his ideas on social reform. who had left the coalition government U.S. defense attaché observed, the mili- Nevertheless, as one author noted, as a result of La Violencia. They cooper- tary is apolitical. ”only one minor conspiracy to depose ated with the radical Conservative Its members avoid interfering in internal Lopez surfaced in the military president in closing the Liberal-domi- domestic politics to a degree not witnessed (1936)...despite his repeated attacks nated congress and supported the un- in many other Latin American countries. on the armed forces.”1 Another more contested election of 1950 that led to This is an admirable fact: I’ve served in serious coup in 1944 attempted to the Conservative dictatorship of Presi- some countries where the U.S. embassy overthrow Lopez during his second dent Laureano Gomez. was always on a “coup watch”....Hap- term but it also failed. No further The violence, government-ordered pily, that is not something I’ve had to coups were attempted until the civil repression, and divisions within the watch closely in Colombia because the Conservative Party brought the army chances of a coup there are extremely re- leadership, especially its popular com- mote.2 mander, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla,

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Andean Ridge

Caribbean Sea

NICARAGUA

Caracas Atlantic COSTA RICA San Jose Ocean Panama VENEZUELA PANAMA

Georgetown GUYANA Paramaribo Pacific Cayenne Bogota FRENCH Ocean COLOMBIA SURINAME GUIANA

Quito BRAZIL ECUADOR

PERU

Civil-Military Relations has argued that they have become a The minister serves in a chain of In spite of 52 years of civil war second army. command that runs from the president, that began with La Violencia, the com- While it may no longer be useful, as commander in chief, through the demand, control, and organization of the integrating the police into the defense fense minister to the armed forces com- Colombian armed forces have continu- mander. Indeed, this has ously evolved in a direction that sup- integrating the police into the defense been the case since the ports the development of democratic establishment has not had a discernible ministry was formed. Fur- civil-military relations. ther, it is common today One action of the Gomez govern- impact on civil-military relations in 13 of the 18 countries ment that led Pinilla to seize power in Latin America, an in- was the politicization of the national establishment has not had a dis- crease reflecting a trend toward ration- police. This force was established dur- cernible impact on the dynamic of alization of defense organization. ing the presidency of Alfonso Lopez as civil-military relations. That issue re- Despite the positive development a counterweight to the army but it lates to the way the government has of having a civilian minister in the took the conservative Gomez regime to organized the Ministry of Defense in- chain, implementation has suffered make the police an agent of the party. ternally and with respect to the other from the high turnover of ministers. One of the first acts of the Pinilla gov- parts of the executive branch. Colom- For example, in the first two years of ernment was to move the national po- bia adopted a single defense ministry the Andres Pastrana presidency there lice from the Ministry of the Interior earlier than many Latin American were two ministers of defense, contin- to the Ministry of Defense in an effort countries. Moreover, early in the ad- uing a trend begun under Gaviria and to depoliticize the force. The police re- ministration of President Cesar Gaviria his successor, Ernesto Samper. Short main under the latter ministry today, (1990–94) the first civilian in the coun- tenure coupled with inexperience has separate from the army but residing in try’s history was named minister of de- led to inconsistent and ineffective de- the same ministry. But although defense. Since then every minister has fense policy. Another development was politicization succeeded, the police been a civilian. the designation of a civilian vice min- have been militarized as a result of the ister with responsibility for day-to-day insurgency and the fight against drugs. technical functions such as budget and One civilian in the Ministry of Defense

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Right wing paramilitary southwest of Bogota.

Firing mortar at suspected FARC stronghold. AP/Wide Photos (Oswaldo Paez) World

finance, infrastructure, and acquisi- of the Office of Management and Bud- tion. At present, the vice minister is get in the United States, though far not in the chain of command, al- more powerful. though this subject is now being de- These developments in civil-mili- bated, suggesting that his future role tary relations in the executive branch will be carefully delineated. are among the most democratic in the Colombia is also moving toward region. Civilians occupy key positions greater jointness. A joint staff located within the chain of command and also within the Ministry of Defense is sub- within the ministry as well as the of- ordinate to the minister. Moreover, fice that allocates the national budget. the several joint commands include Moreover, civilians in these positions not only two or more services, but are increasingly educated in the core also the national police. The latter are competencies of defense and national most involved in insurgency and nar- security. Despite a high turnover in de- cotrafficking. fense ministers, Colombia demon- AP/Wide Photos (Oswaldo Paez) World Since a civilian became defense strates the principles of democratic minister, Colombia has developed a civil-military relations. cadre of experienced civil servants to people the ministry. Some are former Defense University in Washington, A Bloody Struggle junior officers but most have never which gives them a common frame of The current civil war, which served in the military. Increasingly they reference with members of the armed began with La Violencia a half century are graduates of the Center for Hemi- forces and National Planning Office, an ago, degenerated from a typical civil spheric Defense Studies at the National executive agency responsible for the war between the two traditional parties national budget, a role similar to that

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into political banditry, rebounding into a new political conflict with Marxist-Leninist guerrillas, then was transformed again into a conflict that is sometimes fought over politics and at others over narcotics.3 The present struggle has raised new issues. Earlier, Colombia’s conscript/cadre army allowed high school graduates who were drafted to serve their military obligation in noncombat assignments. This exemption was regarded as right and proper when the nation was at peace. But when the insurgency and narco war heated up in the 1980s the draft inequity became more and more apparent until it threatened civil-military relations. Legislation to remove Naval patrol boats on the combat exemption was expected to Putumayo River. be implemented in September 2000. Another major problem arises from AP/Wide Photos (Javier Galeano) World the conduct of counterinsurgency operations and the relationship between the armed forces and paramilitary militias constitutions, it is not specified for attributed to insurgents in the same that are combating the insurgents. each kind of military mission...legal years ranged from 21 to 38 percent. Colombia is a historically violent coun- provisions probably overstate the de- The exact relationship between try that has known only relatively brief gree to which political leaders actually the armed forces and paramilitaries is supervise military con- unclear. According to a study by Colombia is a violent country that has duct.”4 According to the Human Rights Watch, “Implicated in Colombian Commission of extra-judicial executions, disappear- known only brief periods of peace Jurists security forces were ances, torture, and threats, Mobile responsible for 54 percent Brigade Two is reported to be closely

AP/Wide P World otos (Oswaldo Paez) periods of peace. Its civil wars have been of political killings in 1993. This was linked to paramilitary groups operat- exceptionally brutal, with each side reduced to 16 percent in 1995 and 18 ing in northern and central Colom- committing atrocities. Thus it is hardly percent in 1996. It declined still fur- bia.”6 Nevertheless, there is evidence surprising that the current conflict is ther to 7.5 percent in 1997 and 2.7 that some charges of human rights vio- noted for its viciousness. percent for the first nine months of lations by the armed forces and their This conflict pits the state against 1998.5 Two preliminary conclusions collusion with paramilitaries is based two significant insurgent movements, can be drawn. First, tightening govern- upon accounts which are dated or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of ment supervision of security forces is completely manufactured, originally Colombia—Fuerzas Armadas Revolu- resulting in greater respect for human reported in the European media, and cionarias de Colombia (FARC)—and the rights. Second, security forces have then recycled in Colombia and/or the National Liberation Army—Ejercito de some way to go before they conform United States. Moreover, some allega- Liberacion Nacional (ELN)—as well as to the principles of civil-military relations have appeared several times. As several paramilitary militias and narco- tions in a fully positive manner. has been noted: traffickers (who are allied with insur- But the problem is more complex Some Colombian authorities, such as gents and militias) depending on the because of the relationship between General Fernando Tapias, Commanding locale. In addition, the narcotraffickers the armed forces and paramilitaries. General of the Armed Forces, and General have sought to corrupt state agencies The latter are clearly responsible for a Rosso Jose Serrano, Director of the Na- to conduct their nefarious business large number of political killings. In a tional Police, profess to see no difference without hindrance. mirror image to security forces, the between the paramilitaries and the guerril- In fighting on multiple fronts the Colombian Commission of Jurists las, regarding each as a threat to state au- armed forces—and to a lesser extent stated that responsibility for such thority. Others, such as some military the police—have had considerable op- killings on the part of paramilitaries commanders, take a live and let live atti- erational autonomy. As two observers rose from 18 percent in 1993 to 46 per- tude. Some regard the paramilitaries as al- have concluded, “while civilian au- cent in 1995 and 1996, and then to 69 lies in the war against the insurgents.7 thority is alluded to within national percent in 1997 and to 76 percent in the first nine months of 1998. For comparison purposes, political killings

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Nonetheless, the armed forces have made strides in implementing policies to promote democratic institutions, even in the midst of war. JFQ

NOTES Guerrilla skirmish, Mount Montezuma. 1 J. Mark Ruhl, Colombia: Armed Forces and Society (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1980), p. 23. 2 William C. Spracher, “The Colombian Armed Forces and National Security,” Crisis? What Crisis? Security Issues in Colombia, edited by James L. Zackrison (Washington: Na- tional Defense University, 1999), pp. 66–67. 3 This interpretation runs counter to the conventional wisdom which sees a break between the period 1948–57 and the birth of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in 1962. But it can be argued that the FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda (also AP/Wide Photos World known as Tiro Fijo), began his career as a Liberal guerrilla in 1948, was a Liberal ban- dit from about 1954 to 1962 when he joined The ambiguous if not ambivalent a sham since so few officers have been FARC, and then rose to become its leader. 4 relationship between the armed forces convicted or even disciplined. The David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers? Mili- and paramilitaries, coupled with al- data, however, does not conceal the tary Missions and Civilian Control in Demo- leged and actual human rights viola- real progress made in the attitudes of cratic South America,” Armed Forces and Soci- tions by security forces, makes the con- the armed forces toward human rights ety, vol. 26, no. 3 (Spring 2000), p. 420. duct of civil-military relations in in recent years. Thus part of the prob- 5 Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz, Colombia problematic at best. The lem confronting Colombia is public Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the forces “need to fundamentally change perception, which each side seeks to Crossroads (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army the way they deal with their civilian manipulate in a conflict. Thus far, War College, Strategic Studies Institute, population. They need to end—defini- those opposing the military have been 1999). tively—the human rights abuses which more successful, aided by its flawed 6 Quoted in Patricia Bibes, “Colombia: have marred their interaction with the human rights record. The Military and the Narco-Conflict,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement (forth- civilian populace, remove the violators There are still reasons for opti- coming). from military and civilian ranks, and mism. The Colombian armed forces 7 Marcella and Schulz, Colombia’s Three prosecute in civilian courts those who have generally avoided praetorian am- Wars, p. 14. should be charged with civil crimes bitions unlike many Latin American 8 David Passage, The United States and and abuses.”8 According to interviews militaries. The ministry is organized Colombia: Untying the Gordian Knot (Carlisle much of this is taking place. The to enhance civilian decisionmaking Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strate- armed forces are working closely with authority, including the general orien- gic Studies Institute, 2000), p. 21. the United Nations to address human tation on employing forces. In addi- rights issues within the law of war tion, there will be a sizable increase in while General Tapias is seeking better educated and trained civilian profes- communication on the part of the mil- sionals within the Ministry of Defense itary with human rights groups. and the office which controls the na- With respect to impunity, many tional budget. cases are being heard in civilian courts, and privileges that once excluded mili- Colombia faces a complicated tary members from prosecution are be- civil war in which the performance of coming a thing of the past. Despite the both the military and police has some- fact that jurisdiction over human times damaged civil-military relations. rights violations has been passed to the This has been manifest in human civil justice system, some nongovern- rights violations, dealings with violent mental organizations argue that this is paramilitary militias that abuse human rights, and the perception of impunity for offenses committed by the military.

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Joint Vision

2020 documentation

America’s Military— Preparing for Tomorrow

Summer 2000 / JFQ 57 1225 JV 2020 Pgs 2/24/01 11:36 AM Page 58

JOINT VISION 2020

disappear. The strategic concepts of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility will continue to govern our efforts to fulfill those responsibilities and meet the challenges of the future. This document describes the operational concepts necessary to do so. If the Armed Forces are to be faster, more lethal, and more precise in 2020 than they are today, we must continue to invest in and develop new military capabilities. CJCS Vision... This vision describes the ongoing transformation to those new capabilities.

documentation Dedicated individuals and innovative organizations As first explained in Joint Vision 2010, and depend- st ent upon realizing the po- transforming the joint force for the 21 century tential of the information revolution, today’s capa- to achieve full spectrum dominance: bilities for maneuver, strike, logistics, and pro- Persuasive in peace tection will become dominant maneuver, precision Decisive in war engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection. Preeminent in any form of conflict The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will re- he U.S. military today is a force of su- main the key to operational success in the future. perbly trained men and women who The integration of core competencies provided by are ready to deliver victory for our Na- the individual services is essential to the joint T tion. In support of the objectives of team, and the employment of the capabilities of our national security strategy, it is routinely em- the total force (active, Reserve, National Guard, ployed to shape the international security envi- and civilian members) increases the options for ronment and stands ready to respond across the the commander and complicates the choices of full range of potential military operations. But our opponents. To build the most effective force the focus of this document is the third element of for 2020, we must be fully joint: intellectually, our strategic approach—the need to prepare now operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and for an uncertain future. technically. Joint Vision 2020 builds upon and extends the This vision is centered on the joint force in conceptual template established by Joint Vision 2020. The date defines a general analytical focus 2010 to guide the continuing transformation of rather than serving as a definitive estimate or the Armed Forces. The primary purpose of those deadline. The document does not describe coun- forces has been and will be to fight and win the ters to specific threats, nor does it enumerate Nation’s wars. The overall goal of the transforma- weapon, communication, or other systems we tion described in this document is the creation of will develop or purchase. Rather, its purpose is to a force that is dominant across the full spectrum describe in broad terms the human talent—the of military operations—persuasive in peace, deci- professional, well-trained, and ready force—and sive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict. operational capabilities that will be required for In 2020, the Nation will face a wide range of the joint force to succeed across the full range of interests, opportunities, and challenges and will military operations and accomplish its mission in require a military that can both win wars and 2020 and beyond. In describing those capabili- contribute to peace. The global interests and re- ties, the vision provides a vector for the wide- sponsibilities of the United States will endure, ranging program of exercises and experimenta- and there is no indication that threats to those tion being conducted by the services and interests and responsibilities, or to our allies, will combatant commands and the continuing evolution of the joint force. Based on the joint vision implementation program, many capabilities will

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JOINT VISION 2020

The evolution of these elements over the next two decades will be strongly influenced by two factors. First, the continued development and proliferation of information technologies will substantially change the conduct of military operations. These changes in the information environment make information superiority a key enabler of the transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint force and the evolution of joint command and control. Second, the Armed Forces will continue to rely on a capacity for intellectual and technical innovation. The pace of technological change, especially as it fuels changes in the strategic environment, will place a

premium on our ability to foster innovation in documentation our people and organizations across the entire range of joint operations. The overall vision of the capabilities we will require in 2020, as introduced above, rests on our assessment of the strategic context in which our forces will operate.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis) (Val U.S. Air Force Three aspects of the world of 2020 have significant implications for the Armed Forces. First, the United States will continue to have global in- be operational well before 2020, while others will terests and be engaged with a variety of regional continue to be explored and developed through actors. Transportation, communications, and in- exercises and experimentation. formation technology will continue to evolve and The overarching focus of this vision is full foster expanded economic ties and awareness of spectrum dominance—achieved through the in- international events. Our security and economic terdependent application of dominant maneuver, interests, as well as our political values, will pro- precision engagement, focused logistics, and full vide the impetus for engagement with interna- dimensional protection. Attaining that goal re- tional partners. The joint force of 2020 must be quires the steady infusion of new technology and prepared to win across the full range of military modernization and replacement of equipment. operations in any part of the world, to operate However, material superiority alone is not suffi- with multinational forces, and to coordinate mili- cient. Of greater importance is the development tary operations, as necessary, with government of doctrine, organizations, training and educa- agencies and international organizations. tion, leaders, and people that effectively take advantage of the technology.

Figure 1. Full Spectrum Dominance

Dominant Maneuver Peacetime Engagement

Information Precision Engagement Superiority and Deterrence and Conflict Prevention Technological Full-Dimensional Protection Innovations

Focused Logistics Fight and Win

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Second, potential adversaries will have access The potential of such asymmetric ap- to the global commercial industrial base and proaches is perhaps the most serious danger the much of the same technology as the U.S. military. United States faces in the immediate future— We will not necessarily sustain a wide technologi- and this danger includes long-range ballistic cal advantage over our adversaries in all areas. In- missiles and other direct threats to U.S. citizens creased availability of commercial satellites, digi- and territory. The asymmetric methods and ob- tal communications, and the public Internet all jectives of an adversary are often far more im- give adversaries new capabilities at a relatively portant than the relative technological imbal- low cost. We should not expect opponents in ance, and the psychological impact of an attack 2020 to fight with strictly industrial age tools. might far outweigh the actual physical damage Our advantage must therefore come from leaders, inflicted. An adversary may pursue an asymmet- people, doctrine, organizations, and training that ric advantage on the tactical, operational, or enable us to take advantage of technology to strategic level by identifying key vulnerabilities achieve superior warfighting effectiveness. and devising asymmetric concepts and capabili- Third, we should expect potential adversaries ties to strike or exploit them. To complicate mat- to adapt as our capabilities evolve. We have supe- ters, our adversaries may pursue a combination rior conventional warfighting capabilities and ef- of asymmetries, or the United States may face a fective nuclear deterrence today, but this favor- number of adversaries who, in combination, cre- able military balance is not static. In the face of ate an asymmetric threat. These asymmetric such strong capabilities, the appeal of asymmetric threats are dynamic and subject to change, and approaches and the focus on the development of the Armed Forces must maintain the capabilities niche capabilities will increase. By developing necessary to deter, defend against, and defeat and using approaches that avoid U.S. strengths any adversary who chooses such an approach. and exploit potential vulnerabilities using signifi- To meet the challenges of the strategic environ- cantly different methods of operation, adversaries ment in 2020, the joint force must be able to will attempt to create conditions that effectively achieve full spectrum dominance. delay, deter, or counter the application of U.S. military capabilities.

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FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full The ultimate goal of our military force is to spectrum dominance. accomplish the objectives directed by the National Achieving full spectrum dominance means Command Authorities. For the joint force of the the joint force will fulfill its primary purpose— future, this goal will be achieved through full spec- victory in war—as well as achieving success across trum dominance—the ability of U.S. forces, operat- the full range of operations, but it does not mean ing unilaterally or in combination that we will win without cost or difficulty. Con- with multinational and interagency flict results in casualties despite our best efforts to Sources of Friction partners, to defeat any adversary and minimize them and will continue to do so when control any situation across the full the force has achieved full spectrum dominance. effects of danger and range of military operations. Additionally, friction is inherent in military oper- exertion The full range of operations in- ations. The joint force of 2020 will seek to create uncertainty and chance cludes maintaining a posture of a “frictional imbalance” in its favor by using the

strategic deterrence. It includes the- capabilities envisioned in this document, but the documentation unpredictable actions ater engagement and presence activi- fundamental sources of friction cannot be elimi- of other actors ties. It includes conflict involving nated. We will win—but we should not expect frailties of machines and employment of strategic forces and war in the future to be either easy or bloodless. information weapons of mass destruction, major The requirement for global operations, the human frailties. theater wars, regional conflicts, and ability to counter adversaries who possess smaller-scale contingencies. It also in- weapons of mass destruction, and the need to cludes those ambiguous situations re- shape ambiguous situations at the low end of the siding between peace and war, such range of operations will present special challenges as peacekeeping and peace enforcement opera- en route to achieving full spectrum dominance. tions, as well as noncombat humanitarian relief Therefore, the process of creating the joint force of Signal Company (James V. Dowden, Jr.) Signal Company (James V. d operations and support to domestic authorities. the future must be flexible—to react to changes in 982 The label full spectrum dominance implies that the strategic environment and the adaptations of U.S. forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, potential enemies, to take advantage of new tech- and synchronized operations with combinations nologies, and to account for variations in the pace of forces tailored to specific situations and with of change. The source of that flexibility is the syn- access to and freedom to operate in all domains— ergy of the core competencies of the individual land, sea, air, space, and information. Addition- services, integrated into the joint team. These ally, given the global nature of our interests and challenges will require a total force composed of obligations, the United States must maintain its well-educated, motivated, and competent people who can adapt to the many demands of future joint missions. The transformation of the joint force to reach full spectrum dominance rests upon information superiority as a key Figure 2. Range of Military Operations enabler and our capacity for innovation.

combat Information Superiority Information, information processing, noncombat and communications networks are at the core of every military activity. Throughout Military War Military Operations Other Than War history, military leaders have regarded in- Operation formation superiority as a key enabler of victory. However, the ongoing information General Fight and Win Deter War Promote Peace U.S. Goals and and revolution is creating not only a quantita- Resolve Conflict Support U.S. tive, but a qualitative change in the infor- Authorities mation environment that by 2020 will result in profound changes in the conduct of military operations. In fact, advances in in- Examples Large Scale Combat Peace Enforcement Freedom of Navigation formation capabilities are proceeding so Operations Counterterrorism Counterdrug rapidly that there is a risk of outstripping Attack/Defend/Blockade Show of Force/Raid/Strike Humanitarian Assistance our ability to capture ideas, formulate oper- Peacekeeping/NEO Protection of Shipping ational concepts, and develop the capacity Nuclear Assistance U.S. Civil Support to assess results. While the goal of achiev- Counterinsurgency ing information superiority will not

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change, the nature, scope, and rules of the quest but the continued evolution of organizations and are changing radically. doctrine and the development of relevant train- The qualitative change in the information ing to sustain a comparative advantage in the in- environment extends the conceptual underpin- formation environment. nings of information superiority beyond the mere We must also remember that information su- accumulation of more, or even better, informa- periority neither equates to perfect information, tion. The word superiority implies a state or condi- nor does it mean the elimination of the fog of tion of imbalance in one’s favor. Information su- war. Information systems, processes, and opera- periority is transitory in nature and must be tions add their own sources of friction and fog to created and sustained by the joint force through the operational environment. Information superi- the conduct of information operations. However, ority is fundamental to the transformation of the the creation of information superiority is not an operational capabilities of the joint force. The end in itself. joint force of 2020 will use superior information Information superiority provides the joint and knowledge to achieve decision superiority, to

documentation force a competitive advantage only when it is ef- support advanced command and control capabili- fectively translated into superior knowledge and ties, and to reach the full potential of dominant decisions. The joint force must be able to take ad- maneuver, precision engagement, full dimen- vantage of superior information converted to supe- sional protection, and focused logistics. The rior knowledge to achieve “decision superiority”— breadth and pace of this evolution demands flexi- better decisions arrived at and implemented faster bility and a readiness to innovate. than an opponent can react or, in a noncombat situation, at a tempo that al- Innovation lows the force to shape the Joint Vision 2010 identified technological in- Information superiority—the ca- situation or react to changes novation as a vital component of the transforma- pability to collect, process, and dis- and accomplish its mission. tion of the joint force. Throughout the industrial seminate an uninterrupted flow of Decision superiority does not age, the United States has relied upon its capacity information while exploiting or automatically result from infor technological innovation to succeed in mili- denying an adversary’s ability to formation superiority. Orga- tary operations, and the need to do so will con- do the same (Joint Pub 1-02); nizational and doctrinal tinue. It is important, however, to broaden our achieved in a noncombat situation adaptation, relevant training focus beyond technology and capture the impor- or one in which there are no and experience, and the tance of organizational and conceptual innova- clearly defined adversaries when proper command and con- tion as well. friendly forces have the informa- trol mechanisms and tools Innovation, in its simplest form, is the com- tion necessary to achieve opera- are equally necessary. bination of new things with new ways to carry tional objectives. The evolution of infor- out tasks. In reality, it may result from fielding mation technology will in- completely new things, or the imaginative recom- Information environment—the creasingly permit us to inte- bination of old things in new ways, or something aggregate of individuals, organiza- grate the traditional forms in between. The ideas in Joint Vision 2010 as car- tions, and systems that collect, of information operations ried forward in Joint Vision 2020 are indeed inno- process, or disseminate informa- with sophisticated all-source vative and form a vision for integrating doctrine, tion, including the information it- intelligence, surveillance, tactics, training, supporting activities, and tech- self (Joint Pub 1-02). and reconnaissance in a nology into new operational capabilities. The in- fully synchronized informa- novations that determine joint and service capa- tion campaign. The develop- bilities will result from a general understanding of ment of a concept labeled what future conflict and military operations will the global information grid will provide the net- be like, and a view of what the combatant com- work-centric environment required to achieve mands and services must do in order to accom- this goal. The grid will be the globally intercon- plish assigned missions. nected, end-to-end set of information capabili- An effective innovation process requires con- ties, associated processes, and people to manage tinuous learning—a means of interaction and ex- and provide information on demand to warfight- change that evaluates goals, operational lessons, ers, policymakers, and support personnel. It will exercises, experiments, and simulations—and enhance combat power and contribute to the suc- that must include feedback mechanisms. The cess of noncombat military operations as well. combatant commands and services must allow Realization of the full potential of these changes our highly trained and skilled professionals the requires not only technological improvements, opportunity to create new concepts and ideas that may lead to future breakthroughs. We must foster the innovations necessary to create the joint force of the future—not only with decisions

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the most relevant and productive aspects of new concepts, capabilities, and technology. All individuals and organizations charged with experimentation in support of the evolution of our combat forces must ensure that our natural concern for husbanding resources and ultimately delivering successful results does not prevent us from pursuing innovations with dramatic if uncertain potential. There is, of course, a high degree of uncertainty inherent in the pursuit of innovation. The key to coping with that uncertainty is bold leadership supported by as much information as possible. Leaders must assess the efficacy of new

ideas, the potential drawbacks to new concepts, documentation the capabilities of potential adversaries, the costs versus benefits of new technologies, and the organizational implications of new capabilities. They must make these assessments in the context of an evolving analysis of the economic, political, and

Signal Company (Milton H. Robinson) technological factors of the anticipated security th

55 environment. Each of these assessments will have uncertainty associated with them. But the best innovations have often come from people who made decisions and achieved success despite un- certainties and limited information. By creating innovation, the combatant commands and services also create their best opportunities for coping with the increasing pace of change in the overall environment in which they function. Although changing technology is a primary driver of environmental change, it is not the only one. The search for innovation must en- compass the entire context of joint operations— which means the Armed Forces must explore changes in doctrine, organization, training, matériel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities as well as technology. Ultimately, the goal is to develop reasonable approaches with enough flexibility to recover from errors and un- foreseen circumstances.

CONDUCT OF JOINT OPERATIONS

The complexities of the future security envi- Combat Camera Squadron (Jim Varhegyi) Combat Camera Squadron st

1 ronment demand that the United States be prepared to face a wide range of threats of varying levels of intensity. Success in countering these threats will require the skillful integration of the regarding future versus present force structure core competencies of the services into a joint and budgets, but also with a reasonable tolerance force tailored to the specific situation and objec- for errors and failures in the experimentation tives. Commanders must be afforded the oppor- process. We must be concerned with efficient use tunity to achieve the level of effectiveness and of time and resources and create a process that synergy necessary to conduct decisive operations gives us confidence that our results will produce across the entire range of military operations. battlefield success. However, an experimentation When combat operations are required, they must process with a low tolerance for error makes it have an overwhelming array of capabilities avail- unlikely that the force will identify and nurture able to conduct offensive and defensive operations and against which an enemy must defend.

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Other complex contingencies such as humanitar- and technological demands that call for adapt- ian relief or peace operations will require a rapid, ability, innovation, precise judgment, forward flexible response to achieve national objectives in thinking, and multicultural understanding. The the required timeframe. Some situations may re- Nation will continue to depend on talented indi- quire the capabilities of only one service, but in viduals of outstanding character, committed to most cases, a joint force comprised of both active an ethic of selfless service. and Reserve components will be employed. Our people will require a multitude of skills. The complexity of future operations also re- The services will play a critical role in perfecting quires that, in addition to operating jointly, our their individual specialties and the core compe- forces have the capability to participate effec- tencies of each organization. In addition, every tively as one element of a unified national effort. member of the total force must be prepared to This integrated approach brings to bear all the apply that expertise to a wide range of missions tools of statecraft to achieve our national objec- as a member of the joint team. Our servicemem- tives unilaterally when necessary, while making bers must have the mental agility to transition optimum use of the skills and resources provided from preparing for war to enforcing peace to ac- by multinational military forces, regional and in- tual combat, when necessary. The joint force ternational organizations, nongovernmental or- commander is thereby provided a powerful, syn- ganizations, and private voluntary organizations ergistic force capable of dominating across the en- when possible. Participation by the joint force in tire range of operations. operations supporting civil authorities will also The missions of 2020 will demand service- likely increase in importance due to emerging members who can create and then take advantage threats to the U.S. homeland such as terrorism of intellectual and technological innovations. In- and weapons of mass destruction. dividuals will be challenged by significant responsibilities at tactical levels in the organization and People must be capable of making decisions with both The core of the joint force of 2020 will con- operational and strategic implications. Our vision tinue to be an all volunteer force composed of in- of full spectrum dominance and the transforma- dividuals of exceptional dedication and ability. tion of operational capabilities has significant im- Their quality will matter as never before as our plications for the training and education of our servicemembers confront a diversity of missions

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Military operations will continue to demand extraordinary dedication and sacrifice under the most adverse conditions. Our total force, composed of professionals armed with courage, stam- ina, and intellect, will succeed despite the complexity and pace of future operations. Interoperability Interoperability is the foundation of effective joint, multinational, and interagency operations. The joint force has made significant progress toward achieving an optimum level of interoperability, but there must be a concerted effort toward continued improvement. Further improve-

ments will include the refinement of joint documentation doctrine as well as further development of common technologies and processes. Exercises, per-

U.S. Navy (Leland B. Comer) sonnel exchanges, agreement on standardized operating procedures, individual training and education, and planning will further enhance people. The tactics of information operations, the and institutionalize these capabilities. Interoper- coordination of interagency and multinational ability is a mandate for the joint force of 2020— operations, as well as the complexity of the mod- especially in terms of communications, common ern tools of war all require people who are both logistics items, and information sharing. Informa- talented and trained to exacting standards. Rapid tion systems and equipment that enable a com- and dispersed operations will require men and mon relevant operational picture must work from U.S. Navy (C ris Desmond) women who are part of a cohesive team, yet are shared networks that can be accessed by any ap- capable of operating independently to meet the propriately cleared participant. commander’s intent. The evolution of new functional areas, such as space operations and information operations, will require development of Interoperability—the ability of systems, appropriate career progression and leadership op- units, or forces to provide services from portunities for specialists in those fields. The ac- other systems, units, or forces and to use the cumulation of training and experience will create services so exchanged to enable them to op- a force ready to deploy rapidly to any point on erate effectively together (Joint Pub 1-02). the globe and operate effectively. The joint force of 2020 will face a number of challenges in recruiting and retaining the out- Although technical interoperability is essen- standing people needed to meet these require- tial, it is not sufficient to ensure effective opera- ments. First, expanding civilian education and tions. There must be a suitable focus on procedural employment opportunities will reduce the num- and organizational elements, and decisionmakers ber of candidates available for military service. at all levels must understand each other’s capabili- We will continue to focus on our members’ stan- ties and constraints. Training and education, expe- dard of living and a competitive compensation rience and exercises, cooperative planning, and strategy to ensure we attract the quality individu- skilled liaison at all levels of the joint force will not als we need. Second, the increasing percentage of only overcome the barriers of organizational cul- members with dependents will require a commit- ture and differing priorities, but will teach mem- ment to family-oriented community support pro- bers of the joint team to appreciate the full range grams and as much stability as possible, as well as of service capabilities available to them. close monitoring of the impact of the operations The future joint force will have the embed- tempo. Finally, our increased dependence on the ded technologies and adaptive organizational Reserve component will require us to address the structures that will allow trained and experienced concerns of our Reserve members and their em- people to develop compatible processes and pro- ployers regarding the impact on civilian careers. cedures, engage in collaborative planning, and The Department of Defense must meet these adapt as necessary to specific crisis situations. challenges head-on. These features are not only vital to the joint force, but to multinational and interagency operations as well.

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information in its multinational context. That context can only be appreciated if sufficient regional expertise and liaison capability are available on the commander’s staff. A deep understanding of the cultural, political, military, and economic characteristics of a region must be established and maintained. Developing this understanding is dependent upon shared training and education, especially with key partners, and may require organizational change as well. The overall effectiveness of multinational operations is therefore dependent on interoperability between organizations, processes, and technologies. Interagency Operations documentation The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing U.S. Navy (David Tucker) priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard their relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality. Additionally, Multinational Operations these organizations may lack the structure and re- Since our potential multinational partners sources to support extensive liaison cells or inte- will have varying levels of technology, a tailored grative technology. In this environment and in approach to interoperability that accommodates the absence of formal command relationships, a wide range of needs and capabilities is neces- the future joint force must be proactive in im- sary. Our more technically advanced allies will proving communications, planning, interoper- have systems and equipment that are essentially ability, and liaison with potential interagency compatible, enabling them participants. These factors are important in all as- to interface and share infor- pects of interagency operations, but particularly Multinational operations—a mation in order to operate in the context of direct threats to citizens and fa- collective term used to describe effectively with U.S. forces cilities in the U.S. homeland. Cohesive intera- military actions conducted by at all levels. However, we gency action is vital to deterring, defending forces of two or more nations usu- must also be capable of op- against, and responding to such attacks. The joint ally undertaken within the struc- erating with allies and coali- force must be prepared to support civilian author- ture of a coalition or alliance (Joint tion partners who may be ities in a fully integrated effort to meet the needs Pub 1-02). technologically incompati- of U.S. citizens and accomplish the objectives ble—especially at the tacti- specified by the National Command Authorities. cal level. Additionally, many All organizations have unique information of our future partners will have significant spe- assets that can contribute to the common relevant cialized capabilities that may be integrated into a operational picture and support unified action. common operating scheme. At the same time, the They also have unique information requirements. existence of these relationships does not imply Sharing information with appropriately cleared access to information without constraints. We participants and integration of information from and our multinational partners will continue to all sources are essential. Understanding each use suitable judgment regarding the protection of other’s requirements and assets is also crucial. sensitive information and information sources. More importantly, through training with potential In all cases, effective command and control is interagency partners, experienced liaisons must be the primary means of successfully extending the joint vision to multinational operations. Techno- logical developments that connect the informa- Interagency coordination—the coordination systems of partners will provide the links that tion that occurs between elements of the lead to a common relevant operational picture Department of Defense and engaged U.S. and improve command and control. However, the Government agencies, nongovernmental or- sharing of information needed to maintain the ganizations, private voluntary organizations, tempo of integrated multinational operations also and regional and international organizations relies heavily on a shared understanding of opera- for the purpose of accomplishing an objec- tional procedures and compatible organizations. tive (Joint Pub 1-02). The commander must have the ability to evaluate

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Dominant maneuver—the ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational developed to support long-term relationships, col- tempo in the achievement of assigned mili- laborative planning in advance of crises, and com- tary tasks. Widely dispersed joint land, sea, air, patible processes and procedures. As with our space, and special operations forces, capable multinational partners, interoperability in all of scaling and massing force or forces and the areas of interaction is essential to effective intera- effects of fires as required for either combat gency operations. or noncombat operations, will secure advantage across the range of military operations Operational Concepts through the application of information, de- The joint force capable of dominant maneu- ception, engagement, mobility, and counter- ver will possess unmatched speed and agility in mobility capabilities. positioning and repositioning tailored forces from widely dispersed locations to achieve operational objectives quickly and decisively. The employment of dominant maneuver may lead to achieving objectives directly, but can also facilitate em- gathering of timely feedback on the status, loca- ployment of the other operational concepts. For tion, and activities of subordinate units; and an- example, dominant maneuver may be employed ticipation of the course of events leading to mis- to dislodge enemy forces so they can be destroyed sion accomplishment. The joint force will also be through precision engagement. At times, achiev- capable of planning and conducting dominant ing positional advantage will be a function of op- maneuver in cooperation with interagency and erational maneuver over strategic distances. Over- multinational partners with varying levels of seas or U.S.-based units will mass forces or effects commitment and capability. directly to the operational theater. Information The capability to rapidly mass force or forces superiority will support the conduct of dominant and the effects of dispersed forces allows the joint maneuver by enabling adaptive and concurrent planning; coordination of widely dispersed units;

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military operations. In a conflict, for example, the presence or anticipated presence of a decisive force might well cause an enemy to surrender after minimal resistance. During a peacekeeping mission, it may provide motivation for good-faith negotiations or prevent the instigation of civil disturbances. In order to achieve such an impact, the commander will use information operations as a force multiplier by making the available combat power apparent without the need to physi- cally move elements of the force. The joint force commander will be able to take advantage of the potential and actual effects of dominant maneuver to gain the greatest benefit.

documentation Precision Engagement Simply put, precision engagement is effects- based engagement that is relevant to all types of operations. Its success depends on in-depth analysis to identify and locate critical nodes and targets. The pivotal characteristic of precision engagement is the linking of sensors, delivery systems, and effects. In the joint force of the future, this linkage will take place across services and will incorporate the applicable capabilities of multinational and interagency partners when appropriate. The resulting system of systems will provide the commander the broadest possible range of capabilities in responding to any situation, including both kinetic and nonkinetic weapons capable of creating the desired lethal or nonlethal effects.

Precision engagement—the ability of joint forces to locate, surveil, discern, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational U.S. Navy (Franklin P. Call) U.S. Navy (Franklin P. tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations.

force commander to establish control of the battlespace at the proper time and place. In a con- The concept of precision engagement ex- flict, this ability to attain positional advantage al- tends beyond precisely striking a target with ex- lows the commander to employ decisive combat plosive ordnance. Information superiority will power that will compel an adversary to react from enhance the capability of the joint force com- a position of disadvantage, or quit. In other situa- mander to understand the situation, determine tions, it allows the force to occupy key positions the effects desired, select a course of action and to shape the course of events and minimize hos- the forces to execute it, accurately assess the ef- tilities or react decisively if hostilities erupt. And fects of that action, and reengage as necessary in peacetime, it constitutes a credible capability while minimizing collateral damage. During con- that influences potential adversaries while reas- flict, the commander will use precision engage- suring friends and allies. ment to obtain lethal and nonlethal effects in Beyond the actual physical presence of the support of the objectives of the campaign. This force, dominant maneuver creates an impact in action could include destroying a target using the minds of opponents and others in the operational area. That impact is a tool available to the joint force commander across the full range of

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conventional forces, inserting a special operations Focused Logistics team, or even the execution of a comprehensive Focused logistics will provide military capa- psychological operations mission. In other cases, bility by ensuring delivery of the right equip- precision engagement may be used to facilitate ment, supplies, and personnel in the right quanti- dominant maneuver and decisive close combat. ties, to the right place, at the right time to The commander may also employ nonkinetic support operational objectives. It will result from weapons, particularly in the arena of information revolutionary improvements in information sys- operations where the targets might be key enemy tems, innovation in organizational structures, leaders or troop formations, or the opinion of an reengineered processes, and advances in trans- adversary population. portation technologies. This transformation has In noncombat situations, precision engage- already begun with changes scheduled for the ment activities will naturally focus on nonlethal near term facilitating the ultimate realization of actions. These actions will be capable of defusing the full potential of focused logistics. volatile situations, overcoming misinformation Focused logistics will effectively link all logis- campaigns, or directing a flow of refugees to relief tics functions and units through advanced infor- stations, for example. Regardless of its application mation systems that integrate real-time total asset in combat or noncombat operations, the capabil- visibility with a common relevant operational ity to engage precisely allows the commander to picture. These systems will incorporate enhanced shape the situation or battlespace in order to decision support tools that will improve analysis, achieve the desired effects while minimizing risk planning, and anticipation of warfighter require- to friendly forces and contributing to the most ef- ments. They will also provide a more seamless fective use of resources. connection to the commercial sector to take advantage of applicable advanced business practices

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JOINT VISION 2020 documentation Marine Division (Tyler J. Mielke) Marine Division (Tyler d 2 Focused Logistics Transformation Path FY01: implement systems to assess customer confidence from end to end of the logistics chain using customer wait time metric FY02: implement time definite delivery capabilities using a simplified priority system driven by the customer’s required delivery date FY04: implement fixed and deployable automated identification technologies and information systems that provide accurate, ac- and commercial economies. Combining these ca- tionable total asset visibility pabilities with innovative organizational struc- FY04: for early deploying forces and tures and processes will result in dramatically im- FY06 for the remaining forces, implement a proved end-to-end management of the entire Web-based, shared data environment to en- logistics system and provide precise real-time sure the joint warfighters’ ability to make control of the logistics pipeline to support the timely and confident logistics decisions. joint force commander’s priorities. The increased speed, capacity, and efficiency of advanced transportation systems will further improve deployment, distribution, and sustainment. Mutual support vulnerability of logistics lines of communication, relationships and collabora- while appropriately sizing and potentially reduc- Focused logistics—the ability to tive planning will enable oping the logistics footprint. The capability for fo- provide the joint force the right timum cooperation with cused logistics will effectively support the joint personnel, equipment, and supplies multinational and intera- force in combat and provide the primary opera- in the right place, at the right time, gency partners. tional element in the delivery of humanitarian or and in the right quantity, across The result for the joint disaster relief, or other activities across the range the full range of military opera- force of the future will be an of military operations. tions. This will be made possible improved link between op- through a real-time, web-based in- erations and logistics result- Full Dimensional Protection formation system providing total ing in precise time-definite Our military forces must be capable of con- asset visibility as part of a common delivery of assets to the ducting decisive operations despite our adver- relevant operational picture, effec- warfighter. This substan- saries’ use of a wide range of weapons (including tively linking the operator and lo- tially improved operational weapons of mass destruction), the conduct of in- gistician across services and support effectiveness and efficiency, formation operations or terrorist attacks, or the agencies. Through transforma- combined with increasing presence of asymmetric threats during any phase tional innovations to organizations warfighter confidence in of these operations. Our people and the other and processes, focused logistics will these new capabilities, will provide the joint warfighter with concurrently reduce sustain- support for all functions. ment requirements and the

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JOINT VISION 2020 documentation Marine Division (Tyler J. Mielke) Marine Division (Tyler d 2 U.S. Air Force (Mitch Fuqua) U.S. Air Force

military and nonmilitary assets needed for the capabilities in other locations. There is a critical successful conduct of operations must be pro- need for protection of the information content tected wherever they are located—from deploy- and systems vital for operational success, including ment, to theater combat, to redeployment. Full increased vigilance in counterintelligence and in- dimensional protection exists when the joint formation security. The joint force of 2020 will in- force can decisively achieve tegrate protective capabilities from multinational its mission with an accept- and interagency partners when available and will Full dimensional protection— able degree of risk in both respond to their requirements when possible. the ability of the joint force to pro- the physical and informa- Commanders will thoroughly assess and manage tect its personnel and other assets tion domains. risk as they apply protective measures to specific required to decisively execute as- The capability for full operations, ensuring that an appropriate level of signed tasks. Full dimensional pro- dimensional protection in- safety, compatible with other mission objectives, is tection is achieved through the tai- corporates a complete array provided for all assets. lored selection and application of of both combat and non- The joint force commander will thereby be multilayered active and passive combat actions in offensive provided an integrated architecture for protection, measures within the domains of and defensive operations, en- which will effectively manage risk to the joint land, sea, air, space, and informa- abled by information superi- force and other assets, and leverage the contribution across the range of military ority. It will be based upon tions of all echelons of our forces and those of our operations with an acceptable level active and passive defensive multinational and interagency partners. The result of risk. measures, including theater will be improved freedom of action for friendly missile defenses and possibly forces and better protection at all echelons. limited missile defense of the United States, offensive countermeasures, security Information Operations procedures, antiterrorism measures, enhanced in- Information operations are essential to telligence collection and assessments, emergency achieving full spectrum dominance. The joint preparedness, heightened security awareness, and force must be capable of conducting information proactive engagement strategies. Additionally, it operations, the purpose of which is to facilitate will extend beyond the immediate theater of operations to protect our reach-back, logistics, and key

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engaged in humanitarian relief operations. Such operations will be synchronized with those of multinational and interagency partners as the situation dictates. New offensive capabilities such as computer network attack techniques are evolving. Activities such as information assurance, computer network defense, and counterdeception will defend decisionmaking processes by neutral- izing an adversary’s perception management and intelligence collection efforts, as well as direct attacks on our information systems. Because the ultimate target of information operations is the human decisionmaker, the joint force commander will have difficulty accurately assessing

documentation the effects of those operations. This problem of battle damage assessment for information opera- Combat Camera Squadron (Jim Varhegyi) Combat Camera Squadron st

1 tions is difficult and must be explored through exercises and rigorous experimentation. The continuing evolution of information op- and protect U.S. decisionmaking processes and, in erations and the global information environment a conflict, degrade those of an adversary. While ac- holds two significant implications. First, opera- tivities and capabilities employed to conduct infor- tions within the information domain will become mation operations are traditional functions of mil- as important as those conducted in the domains itary forces, the pace of change in the information of land, sea, air, and space. Such operations will environment dictates that we be inextricably linked to focused logistics, full di- expand this view and explore mensional protection, precision engagement, and dominant maneuver, as well as joint command Information operations—those broader information opera- and control. At the same time, information oper- actions taken to affect an adver- tions, strategies, and con- ations may evolve into a separate mission area re- sary’s information systems while cepts. We must recognize quiring the services to maintain appropriately de- defending one’s own information that nontraditional adver- signed organizations and trained specialists. systems (Joint Pub 1-02). Informa- saries who engage in nontra- Improvements in doctrine, organization, and tion operations also include ac- ditional conflict are of partic- technology may lead to decisive outcomes result- tions taken in a noncombat or am- ular importance in the ing primarily from information operations. As in- biguous situation to protect one’s information domain. The formation operations continue to evolve, they, own information and information United States itself and U.S. like other military operations, will be conducted systems as well as those taken to forces around the world are consistent with the norms of our society, our al- influence target information and subject to information at- liances with other democratic states, and full re- information systems. tacks on a continuous basis regardless of the level and spect for the laws of armed conflict. Second, there degree of engagement in other domains of operation. The perpetrators of such attacks are not limited to the traditional concept of a uniformed military adversary. Additionally, the actions associated with The Variables of information operations are wide-ranging—from Information Operations physical destruction to psychological operations to multidimensional definition and meaning computer network defense. The task of integrating of information—target, weapon, resource, information operations with other joint force oper- or domain of operations ations is complicated by the need to understand the many variables involved (summarized in box). level of action and desired effect—tactical, Our understanding of the interrelationships operational, strategic, or combination of these variables and their impact on military objective of operations—providing infor- operations will determine the nature of informa- mation, perception management, battle- tion operations in 2020. The joint force com- field dominance, command and control mander will conduct information operations warfare, systemic disruption, or systemic whether facing an adversary during a conflict or destruction nature of situation—peace, crisis, or conflict.

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JOINT VISION 2020 documentation U.S. Navy (T. Vahn Nequin) Vahn U.S. Navy (T.

is significant potential for asymmetric engage- Command and control is most effective ments in the information domain. The United when decision superiority exists. Decision superi- States has enjoyed a distinct technological advan- ority results from superior information filtered tage in the information environment and will through the commander’s experience, knowl- likely continue to do so. However, as potential edge, training, and judgment; the expertise of adversaries reap the benefits of the information supporting staffs and other organizations; and revolution, the comparative advantage for the the efficiency of associated processes. While United States and its partners will become more changes in the information environment have difficult to maintain. Additionally, our ever-in- led some to focus solely on the contribution of creasing dependence on information processes, information superiority to command and control, systems, and technologies adds potential vulnera- it is equally necessary to understand the complete bilities that must be defended. realm of command and control decisionmaking, the nature of organizational collaboration, and Command and Control especially the human in the loop. Command and control is the exercise of au- In the joint force of the future, command thority and direction over the joint force. It is and control will remain the primary integrating necessary for the integration of service core com- and coordinating function for operational capabil- petencies into effective joint operations. The in- ities and service components. As the nature of creasing importance of multinational and intera- military operations evolves, there is a continual gency aspects of the operations adds complexity need to evaluate the nature of command and con- and heightens the challenge of doing so. Com- trol organizations, mechanisms, systems, and mand and control includes planning, directing, tools. There are two major issues to address in this coordinating, and controlling forces and opera- evaluation—command structures and processes, tions and is focused on the effective execution of and the information systems and technologies the operational plan; but the central function is that are best suited to support them. Encompassed decisionmaking. within these two issues, examination of the following related ideas and desired capabilities will

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JOINT VISION 2020 documentation U.S. Navy (Shane McCoy)

serve as a catalyst for changes in doctrine, organi- control. First, leaders of the joint force must ana- zation, and training. lyze and understand the meaning of unit cohe- Commanders will need a broad understanding sion in the context of the small, widely dispersed of new operational capabilities and new (often highly units that are now envisioned. Second, decision- automated) supporting tools in order to be capable of makers at all levels must understand the implica- flexible, adaptive coordination and direction of both tions of new technologies that operate continu- forces and sensors. ously in all conditions when human beings are The staffs that support commanders must be or- incapable of the same endurance. Third, as new ganized and trained to take advantage of new capabili- information technologies, systems, and proce- ties. Commanders and staffs must also be capable of command and control in the face of technology failure. dures make the same detailed information avail- Commanders will be able to formulate and dis- able at all levels of the chain of command, leaders seminate intent based upon up-to-date knowledge of must understand the implications for decision- the situation existing in the battlespace. making processes, the training of decisionmakers Joint force headquarters will be dispersed and at all levels, and organizational patterns and pro- survivable and capable of coordinating dispersed units cedures. The potential for overcentralization of and operations. Subordinate headquarters will be small, agile, mobile, dispersed, and networked. Faster operations tempos, increased choices among weapons and effects, and greater weapons Command and control—the exercise of au- ranges will require continuous, simultaneous planning thority and direction by a properly designated and execution at all levels. commander over assigned and attached Expanding roles for multinational and intera- forces in the accomplishment of the mission. gency partners will require collaborative planning capa- Command and control functions are per- bilities, technological compatibility/interoperability, formed through an arrangement of person- and mechanisms for efficient information sharing. nel, equipment, communications, facilities, Finally, as these and other changes take place and procedures employed by a commander in over time, we must carefully examine three as- planning, directing, coordinating, and con- pects of the human element of command and trolling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (Joint Pub 1-01).

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control and the capacity for relatively junior leaders to make decisions with strategic impact are of From Vision to particular importance. Experimentation It has often been said that command is an art and control is a science—a basic truth that Joint Vision 2010 (1996) will remain. Our thinking about command and Concept for Future Joint Operations (1997) control must be conceptually based rather than 21st Century Challenges and Desired focused on technology or matériel. Joint com- Operational Capabilities (1997) mand and control is a nexus—a point of connection. It serves as a focal point for humans and Joint Warfighting Experimentation technology, our evolving operational capabilities, Program established, ACOM (JFCOM) as and the capabilities of the services. The develop- executive agent (1998) ment of effective joint command and control for Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan the future requires rigorous and wide-ranging ex- (1998)

perimentation, focused especially on organiza- CJCS Instruction 3170, Requirements documentation tional innovation and doctrinal change. Generation System (1999) JFCOM Joint Experimentation Campaign IMPLEMENTATION Plans (1999 and 2000). Joint Vision 2010 has had a profound impact on the development of U.S. military capabilities. By describing those capabilities necessary to achieve success in 2010, we set in motion three important efforts. First, Joint Vision 2010 estab- 2020 builds on this foundation of success and lished a common framework and language for the will sustain the momentum of these processes. services to develop and explain their unique con- The foundation of jointness is the strength

U.S. Navy (S ane McCoy) tributions to the joint force. Second, we created a of individual service competencies pulled to- process for the conduct of joint experimentation gether. Our objective in implementing the joint and training to test ideas against practice. Finally, vision is the optimal integration of all joint we began a process to manage the transformation forces and effects. To achieve that goal, the inter- of doctrine, organization, training, matériel, lead- dependence of the services requires mutual trust ership and education, personnel, and facilities and reliance among all warfighters and a signifi- necessary to make the vision a reality. Joint Vision cantly improved level of interoperability—especially in the areas of command and control and sustainment. This interdependence will ultimately result in a whole greater than the sum of Figure 3. From Concepts to Capabilities its parts and will contribute to achieving full spectrum dominance through all forces acting in concert. The synergy gained through the interdependence of the services makes clear that jointness is more than interoperability. The joint force requires capabilities that are beyond the simple combination of service capabilities, and joint experimentation is the process by which those capabilities will be achieved. Doctrine To ensure unity of effort and continuity for Organization joint concept development and experimentation, Quality Force Training the Secretary of Defense designated the com- Leadership and Education mander in chief, Joint Forces Command as the Operational 2010 2020 Matériel executive agent for experimentation design, Concepts Personnel Facilities preparation, execution, and assessment. Annual campaign plans provide focus to this effort and continuity in experimentation. The results of this Implementation Program iterative experimentation cycle are forwarded as comprehensive recommendations for changes in doctrine, organization, training, matériel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities and lead to the co-evolution of all those elements. The experimentation and implementation

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joint team capable of success across the full range of military operations.

This vision is firmly grounded in the view that the U.S. military must be a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance. Its basis is four- fold: the global interests of the United States and the continuing existence of a wide range of potential threats to those interests; the centrality of information technology to the evolution of not only our own military, but also the capabilities of other actors around the globe; the premium a continuing broad range of military operations will place on the successful integration of multi-

documentation national and interagency partners and the interoperability of processes, organizations, and systems; and our reliance on the joint force as the foundation of future U.S. military operations. U.S. Marine Corps (Brook R. Kelsey) U.S. Marine Corps (Brook Joint Vision 2020 builds on the foundation and maintains the momentum established with Joint Vision 2010. It confirms the direction of the process supporting the transformation of the ongoing transformation of operational capabili- joint force is also dependent upon combatant ties, and emphasizes the importance of further command and service exercises and experimenta- experimentation, exercises, analysis, and conception activities. The combatant command and tual thought, especially in the arenas of informa- service visions support the joint vision by provid- tion operations, joint command and control, and ing guidance for these individual efforts that are multinational and interagency operations. congruent with the Chairman’s vision. Thus, in This vision recognizes the importance of their own experimentation venues, the services technology and technical innovation to the U.S. may develop recommendations with joint impli- military and its operations. At the same time, it cations and will forward them to the appropriate emphasizes that technological innovation must joint experimentation activity. be accompanied by intellectual innovation lead- To effect transforming and enduring ing to changes in organization and doctrine. changes to our joint military capabilities, the ex- Only then can we reach the full potential of the perimentation and implementation process must joint force—decisive capabilities across the full include construction of a wide range of scenarios range of military operations. Such a vision de- and imaginative conflict simulations to explore pends upon the skill, experience, and training of the shape of future operations. Such intensive the people comprising the total force and their exploration of alternative concepts of operations leaders. The major innovations necessary to oper- can help the U.S. military choose innovations ate in the environment depicted herein can only that take the greatest advantage of combinations be achieved through the recruitment, develop- of new ideas and new technologies. The rapid ment, and retention of men and women with the pace of such changes will then drive further de- courage, determination, and strength to ensure velopment of the experimentation and imple- we are persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and mentation process to field improved capabilities preeminent in any form of conflict. JFQ for the joint force. The linchpin of progress from vision to ex- Joint Vision 2020: America‘s Military—Preparing for perimentation to reality is joint training and edu- Tomorrow was published by the U.S. Government Print- cation—because they are the keys to intellectual ing Office in June 2000. (Approval authority: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; office of primary responsibility: change. Without intellectual change, there is no Strategy Division, Directorate for Strategic Plans and real change in doctrine, organizations, or leaders. Policy (J-5), Joint Staff). Thus, the implementation process is dependent upon incorporating concepts validated by experimentation into joint professional military education programs and joint exercises. In this way, individual servicemembers and units become a

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Progress Report

Joint combat search and rescue training. U.S. Navy (Martin Maddock) on Joint Experimentation By HAROLD W. GEHMAN, JR.

ach service has an experimentation pro- hand, JFCOM is forging a program that satisfies gram, but who does the joint part? In those concerns in the near and far terms. 1998 U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM), Ethe predecessor to U.S. Joint Forces Com- Laying the Foundations mand (JFCOM), was designated as the executive The goal of JFCOM is a broad and uncon- agent for joint experimentation. The action was strained exploration of concepts and technologies taken in concert with Congress, which was con- that will add value and provide empirical data to cerned over preparing for security challenges in support decisions. The effort has two purposes: to an evolutionary fashion, without sufficient atten- sustain and widen the qualitative superiority of tion to the future. With its marching orders in joint forces over potential enemies and to prevent surprise attacks utilizing new concepts and weapons. JFCOM will conduct evaluations not Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN (Ret.), served as Commander in only to find new technologies but also to learn Chief, Joint Forces Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, the best tactics, techniques, and procedures for and earlier as Vice Chief of Naval Operations. employing a joint force. Moreover, it is looking at

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ways to expand interagency and allied involve- maintain an edge over extant threats and capital- ment. A key point in structuring a program is to izes on JFCOM assets. One aspect is the sponsor- meet current and future requirements. True ex- ship of advanced concept technology demonstra- perimentation is an iterative process intended to tions that can be quick on-ramps for promising gain knowledge before making expensive deci- solutions to existing problems. sions on future forces. The second (mid-term) axis focuses on Joint ACOM produced an implementation plan to Vision 2020 and how concepts, technologies, and provide the intellectual and organizational basis advanced information systems can support the for this mission. When the Joint Experimentation evolution of a joint force. Using platforms or Directorate (J-9) was activated in October 1998, their derivatives, this axis consists of activities the foundations had been laid for working with which seek to enhance synergy and effectiveness, the services, unified commands, defense agencies, enabling full spectrum dominance over emerging industry, and academe on exploring new con- threats facing the Armed Forces. cepts. Consideration had been given to the scope The third investigates revolutionary concepts and intent of the program, especially in relation and technologies to transform the joint force, fa- to existing service experimentation. cilitating continued success against challenges in the revolution in military affairs. This far-term Initial Accomplishments axis seeks breakthrough discoveries in technol- The pace of establishing the program has ogy, policy, and man-machine interface. been fast and furious, with implementation in JFCOM updates every component of the less than a year. Much work went into gathering campaign plan annually to ensure staying on the warfighting concepts with transformational cutting edge. Demonstrating the dynamic nature promise, winnowing them down, and identifying of the process, some of the concepts in Campaign high payoff ideas for experimentation. The se- Plan ’99 were removed or modified for the follow- lected joint concepts, experiments, and related ing year. Nine concepts made the cut. activities are collected in an annual campaign Rapid decisive operations serves as an over- plan, which serves to focus on the most com- arching integrating concept for the other joint pelling challenges facing commanders as well as initiatives. Its characteristics are immediate, high- informing the services. tempo, continuous overwhelming operations, Joint experimentation is a balanced program and the ability to shape and control the battle- that moves along three axes. The first looks at space, integrate application of precision effects how off-the-shelf technologies can enhance con- and dominant maneuver, and minimize the need cepts, including interoperability problems involv- for protracted campaigns. ing current systems. This near-term axis helps

Evolution of a Command U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was established on October 7, 1999, with responsibility for joint force integration, training, experimentation, doctrine development, and testing as well as its role as a combatant command. When its earliest predecessor, U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), was established in 1947, it was one of the original unified commands. At that time it was primarily a maritime command with responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean, especially sealanes between the United States and Europe. From the outset, LANTCOM devoted most of its assets to protecting the north Atlantic against So- viet submarines. NATO created the Allied Command Atlantic in 1952 with headquarters adjacent to LANTCOM in Norfolk and designated the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, as Supreme Al- lied Commander, Atlantic. LANTCOM received responsibility for the Caribbean in 1956 and events in Cuba in 1959 transformed this area into a turbulent region. Other operations in the area included the Dominican Re- public (1965) and Grenada (1983). Changes in the Unified Command Plan in 1997 transferred oversight of the Caribbean to U.S. Southern Command. Increased emphasis on jointness led to significant changes in the LANTCOM mission and its re- designation as U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) in 1993. With calls for improved interoperability among the services, the Joint Chiefs recommended that ACOM be assigned responsibility for joint training and integration. Changes in the Unified Command Plan also directed that ACOM assume peacetime control over U.S. Army Forces Command and Air Combat Command. Today, JFCOM is the provider, trainer, and integrator of joint forces. JFQ

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82d Airborne jumping at McGuire Air Force Base. Marine Division Combat Camera (Donald R. Storms, Jr.) d 2 Marines at Twentynine Palms. Communications Squadron (Scott H. Spitzer) Communications Squadron th 305

Attack operations against critical mobile targets Joint interactive planning seeks new planning is aimed at improving detection, decision, and and decision support tools to enable faster inter- engagement of a maneuvering enemy. It ad- active, simultaneous, and parallel planning. Dy- dresses threats to warfighting namic tasking and retasking of forces, quicker de- capabilities posed by mobile cisions, and control over the operational tempo adaptive joint command systems, including theater are key elements. and control investigates ballistic missiles and inte- Common relevant operational picture provides alternatives to headquarters grated air defense systems. commanders and subordinates on all levels with Adaptive joint command timely, fused, accurate, assured, relevant informa- and components to leverage and control investigates alter- tion. Building a single integrated air picture is an information technology natives to joint force head- important subset of this concept. quarters and components to Focused logistics enabling early decisive opera- leverage advances in infor- tions is focused on providing commanders with mation technology. Improving synchronization improved joint and service support through of joint operations, an adaptive joint force struc- fused, tailored, time-definite logistics. It includes ture, and reducing the footprint of joint headquarters are the primary objectives.

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less dependence on fixed port facilities and im- The results of this experiment influenced the proved business practices and information fusion. development of technology, doctrine, tactics, Information operations recognizes the need to techniques, and procedures. They suggest that protect and assure friendly information while technology development to improve attack oper- permitting commanders to disrupt, deny, exploit, ations is on track and that real-time sensor man- or destroy enemy capabilities. It is a key element agement and having a man-in-the-loop are essen- of information superiority. tial. They also imply that methods other than Forcible entry operations focuses on rapid de- direct attack may be equally effective at neutraliz- ployment and employment of joint forces to pen- ing theater ballistic missiles. Analysis and follow- etrate and conduct decisive operations in hostile on experiments are continuing. territory. It considers alternatives to overcome de- Another critical element of the program is denial of access to strategic areas and facilitates fol- veloping strong partnerships with a wide range of low-on sustained combat operations. organizations. Advanced technology workshops Strategic deployment seeks an optimum mix of have gathered experts from the Armed Forces, in-theater forces, deployment assets, pre-posi- governmental agencies, industry, and academe to tioned matériel, and near-theater staging alterna- shape the joint force after next. Together with tives to enable rapid decisive operations. Key service battle lab representatives, the command goals are faster joint force projection, quick tran- has formed the Alliance of All Service Battlelabs to sition to combat, and support to rapid intra-the- foster debate and identify opportunities for exper- ater maneuver. iment teaming. This group complements the work of the JFCOM Joint Battle Center. In addition, international experimentation has been addressed. Future military operations will involve coalition partners, which is reflected in a dialogue on experimentation with allies. The first step was supporting NATO in its new concept development and experimentation program by sharing what ACOM learned in its first year of joint experimentation. What the Future Holds Finite amounts of time, people, and money, and the staggering catalog of ideas on which to experiment, call for discrimination. Concepts Communications Squadron (Anna M. Hayman) Communications Squadron th

5 chosen for FY00, and those selected for subse- B–2 at Minot Air Force quent campaign plans, must demonstrate certain Base. qualifications to make the cut. To provide a starting point and minimize re- Experiments on attack operations against dundancy, ACOM developed a baseline from all critical mobile targets exemplify the iterative and sources of past concept development and experi- refining nature of the program. Building on past mentation efforts and ongoing or planned activi- events, the current iteration integrated lessons of ties which might be used to explore a selected the Kosovo campaign. The requirements for lo- concept. So far the command has completed base- cating, tracking, and eliminating mobile air de- lines for six of the nine experimentation concepts. fense systems in that campaign were virtually Baselining has jumpstarted experimentation identical to those addressed in the attack opera- and made it more efficient. For example, in Au- tions against mobile theater missiles. Mobile air gust 1999, some 46 defense agencies met for the defense systems were added as targets in experi- first time to pool their experience in attack opera- ments during the year. There are plans to expand tions. These agencies continue to interact this investigation, then evaluate findings from through bilateral discussions and as part of the experiments in 1999 against this broader opera- investigation of the attack operations against crit- tional environment. ical mobile targets concept. In conjunction, the Another area in which dynamic change is ex- first joint experiment explored the dynamics of pected involves rapid decisive operations. A recent attacking mobile target sets such as mobile the- analytical wargame explored three candidate con- ater ballistic missiles, air defenses, and command cepts for conducting such operations within a and control systems. This offered insights into coping with time-sensitive targeting and asym- metrical tactics, techniques, and procedures used by agile, innovative enemies.

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To accelerate the benefits of the program, a Millennium Challenge ’02 event may be added if service agreements, manpower issues, and funding are resolved. Though collaboration with the services was rapid for Millennium Challenge ’00, it was only an initial step in a program of some complexity. Based on many issues involved, the command is looking at what would be needed to execute an intermediate step in FY02, using initial service elements of their transformed forces in a consolidated, integrated experiment. JFCOM is also increasingly involved in international concept development and experimentation programs. The purpose is to ensure that the future joint force can rapidly form coalitions of willing international partners and prosecute oper-

Marine Division Combat Camera (Donald R. Storms, Jr.) ations as a combined force. This is essential to the d 2 desired endstate in each concept. The first allied Combined arms liaison officer is serving with the joint experi- exercise, Twentynine mentation team, and additional nations are Palms. common scenario. The game engaged senior deci- preparing to commit personnel. International sionmakers in a seminar environment with a rigor- work is greatly enhanced by the fact that the ous, constructive, nonattrition-based simulation. Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Command, One element was understanding how precision al- also serves as NATO Supreme Allied Commander lows maneuver to shape the battlespace and create Atlantic, and by the benefits of work being done opportunities for precision engagement. under NATO in the same area. The FY00 program culminates in the first of a Finally, looking beyond Joint Vision 2020, a series of exercises designed to synchronize then matter of growing interest is innovation and integrate major service field experiments. Called transformation, focused on technological, organi- Millennium Challenge ’00, it is being conducted zational, and doctrinal concepts that will shape in September 2000 as simultaneous and near-si- the joint force after next. Seminars, workshops, multaneous experimen- and games are pulling together the sharpest minds many ideas and technologies tation events in partner- to identify concepts and technologies that may ship with the services revolutionize military capabilities. While these no- may be achievable sooner than and unified commands. tions address the future, they are part of an adap- originally thought, with a much It offers a joint context tive exploration. Many ideas and technologies for the Air Force Joint Ex- may be achievable sooner than originally thought, earlier operational impact peditionary Force Experi- with a much earlier operational impact. ment, the Army Ad- vanced Warfighting Experiment, the Navy Fleet Joint Requirements Battle Experiment-Hotel, and the Marine Corps The revisions in the Unified Command Plan Millennium Dragon. in 1999 also provided JFCOM with a mandate to This exercise is focused on rapid decisive op- promote jointness. Vital to this responsibility is erations and examines means to enhance the involvement in the joint requirements process, joint deployment process; develop tactics, tech- particularly in the development of capstone doc- niques, and procedures for joint collaborative umentation. Accordingly, the command has planning tools; and identify essential elements of begun to advocate jointness and interoperability the common operational picture and served as a in generating requirements. An initial analysis prototype of future experiments. It is synchro- identified several areas calling for an aggressive nized with the annual Ulchi Focus Lens exercise joint advocate, so JFCOM took the lead in the fol- to develop and validate the JFCOM precision en- lowing: gagement concept of operations. combat identification In addition to offering a joint scenario, tools, theater air and missile defense and context for service experimentation, the series global information grid acts as a venue for exploring the operational as- information dissemination management. pects of rapid decisive operations, which will cul- The command is moving pragmatically by choos- minate in a major integrating event in FY04. ing areas with a high payoff. Doing a few things right is better than doing many poorly. Through

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a deliberative process, nine joint warfighting in JROC and the Defense Acquisition Board. The areas that will have the greatest immediate im- command selectively engages in those issues that pact on joint warfighting have been selected: fall within its focus and offer the greatest oppor- theater air and missile defense tunity to advance joint equities. This approach command and control has developed a healthy partnership between combat identification JFCOM and the services. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Many incorrectly presume that joint require- attack operations against critical mobile targets ments address only matérial. In fact the JFCOM joint deployment process mandate includes all doctrinal, organizational, joint simulation system training and education, leader development, and battlefield awareness personnel areas as well. For example, the recom- deep strike and battlefield interdiction. mendation arising from initial experimentation At the same time JFCOM has many opportunities into attack operations against critical mobile tar- to influence the development and approval of all gets is an organizational and doctrinal proposal mission needs statements regardless of acquisition for a critical mobile target attack cell within joint category or origination source. Each is affected by task forces. the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Additional legislative initiatives have en- or the Joint Staff interoperability certification hanced the ability of JFCOM to furnish input on process, ensuring that mission need statements the full range of requirements. The Defense Au- are reviewed for interoperability compliance. thorization Act for FY00 amended Title 10 to JFCOM also influences the staffing of serv- strengthen the voice of unified commanders in ice-generated operational requirements. This is the resourcing process and requires the Chairman critical because these documents define program to submit an annual report to Congress on re- performance parameters for improving interoper- quirements by August 15 of each year. The report ability. These parameters describe the particulars consolidates the integrated priority lists of re- of capabilities within a larger operational archi- quirements of combatant commands and CJCS tecture and include the definition of the joint in- views on these lists. JFCOM regards this develop- formation exchange requirements for measuring ment as a means of strengthening the role of the program success. By reviewing service mission joint warfighter in the process. While CINC inte- need statements JFCOM can help integrate capa- grated priority lists will continue to go directly to bilities across functional components. the Secretary of Defense for action, the Chairman will submit a consolidated integrated priority list to Congress highlighting critical CINC warfighting deficiencies to be resourced.

The JFCOM joint experimentation program has completed the first steps toward becoming a major influence in transforming the joint force. The accomplishments of FY99 set the conditions for continuing, accelerating, and expanding the work. The impact of the first year of the program is seen in greater cooperation among service experimentation programs, valuable lessons learned from initial experimentation, greater synergy of effort, and more precise focus on emerging needs of the warfighting CINCs. Campaign Plan ’00 provides an effective construct for building on the accomplishments of this increasingly successful effort for the Armed Forces. JFQ Combat Camera Squadron (Jim Varhegyi) Combat Camera Squadron st 1 Intelligence analysts, Roving Sands 2000. Once JROC or service acquisition executives approve a requirements document, it migrates from requirements generation into system acquisition. JFCOM has the opportunity to participate on every level of decisionmaking from the integration process team level to CINC involvement

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French tanks and cavalry in assembly area.

Comparative Approaches National Archives to Interwar Innovation By WILLIAMSON MURRAY

ilitary organizations encounter it and is crucial in testing concepts and technol- conceptual problems during peri- ogy, although what Clausewitz refers to as the ods of innovation. First, since the difference between “war on paper and real war” M future is rarely obvious, the process often obscures their lessons. is dominated by ambiguity and uncertainty. Sec- Experiments do not occur in a vacuum. They ond, the conditions of war can seldom be repli- are related to concepts about the nature of war. cated in peacetime. Experimentation in peace- Moreover, they are vital in transmitting doctrine time, along with coherent analyses of recent to combat forces and providing a framework combat experience, drives innovation or retards around which training and preparations for war occur. To an extent they can furnish a test—albeit not entirely realistic—of how concepts work in Williamson Murray is a senior fellow at the Institute for Defense practice. Finally, experiments occur in human or- Analyses and coauthor of A War to be Won: Fighting the Second ganizations. Consequently, political and organi- World War.

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Some historians hold that armies focus on Field radio, German 2d Command Group. the last war, which explains why they do badly in the next. That claim is generally misleading since military organizations rarely study what actually happened, but rather what they believe happened. They thus do not address discomforting issues, which is the only way to learn from the past. In the case of Germany, however, Seeckt established no fewer than 57 committees on World War I. He remarked that “it is absolutely necessary to put the experience of the war in a broad light and collect this experience while the impres- sions won on the battlefield are still fresh and a major proportion of the experienced officers are still in leading positions.”1 The lessons learned were combined in two doctrinal studies in 1923 and 1924 that provided Germany with the most reliable tactical doctrine available in Europe. In 1932 three senior generals, including the future commander in chief of the army, Werner von Fritsch, and future chief of National Archives staff, Ludwig Beck, rewrote the 1923 and 1924 studies. Publication of Die Truppenfuhrung formed the framework for the preparation and conduct zational agendas of institutions affect the realism of ground operations during World War II. of experimentation—and what is learned. This doctrine did not use a top down ap- The role of experiments in the innovation proach, but rather stressed friction, uncertainty, process during the interwar period suggests much and the requirement for junior officers to assume about the attributes that enhanced change or de- responsibility and exercise judgment. What is tracted from it. This analysis traces experimenta- more, substantial parts of Die Truppenfuhrung dealt tion in German, French, and British militaries with the greater use of tanks at a time when the and concludes with observations about experi- army did not have a single armored fighting vehi- mentation and innovation during a sustained pe- cle. In fact, it even suggested that “when closely riod of peace. The purpose is not to imply paral- tied to the infantry, the tanks are deprived of their lels with the past, but rather to determine the inherent speed.” This is critical because it meant limits within which experiments might further that by the early 1920s Germany had a coherent innovation in an uncertain future. combined arms doctrine that emphasized decentralized command and control (mission type or- Lessons Learned ders), speed, surprise, and aggressive exploitation During the interwar years military culture in of any weaknesses in enemy defensive systems. Germany was very receptive to innovation for a Development of Wehrmacht panzer forces number of reasons. Nevertheless, it did not set took place during the 1930s within the context of out to create what pundits combined arms doctrine. Tank pioneers empha- the lessons learned provided early in World War II called sized that panzer units must include integral Blitzkrieg warfare. Instead it forces such as motorized infantry, artillery, engi- Germany with the most aimed to evolve capabilities neers, and signal troops. Doctrine stressed the reliable tactical doctrine that addressed current as ruthless, mobile, and rapid exploitation of break- well as long-range opera- throughs by panzer units. Yet such thinking was available in Europe tional and tactical problems. inherent in the doctrine of other combat The crucial point in develop- branches at the time. Thus new panzer divisions ing armored mechanized warfare came in the simply extended the principles on which German early 1920s, when General Hans von Seeckt as- doctrine rested, which explains why infantrymen sumed command of the army. Responding to the like Erwin Rommel and artillerymen like Eric von demand under the Treaty of Versailles for massive Manstein found it relatively easy to command ar- downsizing, which reduced the officer corps by mored formations. 80 percent, Seeckt placed the general staff in firm control of the army. Putting the educated elite in charge led to a thorough and realistic assessment of World War I.

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Hindenburg during maneuvers, 1931. National Archives

Testing for Effect A report in 1926 on the experimental armored The German army conducted experiments force maneuver stated that tanks could substan- within an existing framework. The object was to tially increase the exploitation of breakthroughs test doctrine and concepts, not to prove them. in enemy front lines. It also suggested that the Consequently there were few scripted drills, and Reichswehr undertake serious experiments in how the goal was to push units to the breaking point to defend against tanks breaking into rear areas— —to discover how things went wrong and why. in other words, execute a mobile defense in There was little room for events in which all the depth. Almost immediately after British maneu- objectives were met. Although the Germans were vers in 1934, the chief of the general staff circu- still involved in lessons learned processes focused lated an extensive report on what occurred on on World War I, Seeckt was already urging officers the Salisbury Plain and what it meant for the rap- in new directions. In 1922, with limited re- idly rearming army, which had yet to establish its sources, the army conducted a major experiment first panzer division. in the Harz Mountains with motorized troops. The appointment of Adolph Hitler as Chan- Seeckt’s observations on that event reveal why cellor in January 1933 changed the situation of Germany was successful in mechanized warfare the Reichswehr. At his first meeting with senior of- innovation. In circulating the after action report ficers he authorized a massive buildup and told he made the following observation: them to disregard the prohibitions imposed at Versailles. In 1935 an experimental, battalion- I fully approve of the Harz exercise’s conception and level force of tanks impressed Fritsch and Beck leadership, but there is still much that is not clear enough that they approved the formation of about the specific tactical use of motor vehicles. I three panzer divisions.2 Again, the German army therefore order that the following report be made did not leap into the future; it organized tank available by all staffs and independent commands as brigades to work with infantry as well as motor- a topic for lectures and study. Troop commanders ized infantry divisions and set about learning must see to it that experience in this area is widened how mechanized units could extend the capabili- by practical exercises. ties of combined arms forces. Seeckt sought to engross the whole force in an in- In fact, there was opposition among senior tellectual transformation. leaders to the notion of armored exploitation of Although they possessed no tanks, the Ger- mans learned much from the British experiments with mechanized forces between 1926 and 1934.

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The aim was not to make the organization look good or even to identify who failed, but to learn. From the Top Down No army was as influenced by World War I as the French. Casualties, which totalled over a million and a quarter dead, exercised a baleful influence over civilian as well as military leaders. But France did not make an extensive study of the conflict. Influenced by its heavy losses in the many failed offensives of the first three years of the war, the army concentrated on the successes of summer and fall 1918, particularly First Army operations conducted by General Eugene Debeney. Because Debeney became the director of the war college, selection of First Army experiences was hardly surprising, but it did not contribute to a full understanding of tactical and op- National Archives erational issues. In August 1918, with careful German armored car in articulation of firepower, limited infantry ad- Bavaria. vances, and tight exercise of command and con- breakthroughs until the Polish and French cam- trol, Debeney scored a significant success against paigns. Future field marshal Gerd von Rundstedt the Germans with relatively light losses. But in commented to Guderian during an exercise with no sense were his attacks typical, even in 1918. armored units, “All nonsense, my dear Guderian, Nevertheless, heavy German casualties in all nonsense.” Yet within his skepticism there was spring 1918—nearly a million in a period of four a willingness to adopt what was useful and possi- months—did not make exploitation tactics entic- ble. The occupation of Austria in 1938 saw con- ing to the French. In fact, the disaster in 1940 was siderable difficulty with deploying mechanized caused by a consistent refusal to believe that the forces; nevertheless the army built on that experi- Germans could move with the speed their doc- ence to improve its fledgling armored forces. trine called for. As the French historian and re- The Germans also used wargames to experi- serve officer Mark Bloch observed in 1940: ment with mechanized formations. In summer Our leaders, or those who acted for them, were inca- 1935, before the army possessed its first armored pable of thinking in terms of a new war....The rul- division, Beck studied the uses of armored corps ing idea of the Germans in the conduct of war was in paper exercises. Thus by late 1935, when ar- speed. We, on the other hand, did our thinking in mored divisions were just terms of yesterday or the day before. Worse still: faced France did not make an beginning to be formed, by the undisputed evidence of Germany’s new tactics, extensive study of the conflict Beck recommended using we ignored, or wholly failed to understand the quick- panzer divisions against ened rhythm of the times....Our own rate of progress long-range objectives as was too slow and our minds too inelastic for us ever well as an independent force “in association to admit the possibility that the enemy might move 3 with other motorized weapons.” And, in 1936, with the speed which he actually achieved.4 the general staff considered utilizing a panzer army in war. France did not adopt the iterative approach Yet it was not until the Polish campaign that a of the 57 committees organized by Seeckt nor substantial number of senior officers became con- conduct a wide ranging examination of what vinced that the rapid exploitation of mechanized went right and wrong during World War I. Lead- forces offered real possibilities. In Poland the high- ers who were bent on imposing their views on est level at which Germany employed panzers was the army did not create an atmosphere that en- corps. This was also true in the following year in couraged debate. The commander in chief France. It was only during the invasion of the throughout the late 1930s, General Maurice Soviet Union that panzer armies appeared. Gamelin, established the high command as the The underlying German approach to experi- sole arbiter of doctrine early in his tenure. From mentation was keeping options open rather than that point, all articles, books, and lectures pro- closing them. Experimentation elucidated the duced by serving officers required command ap- possible, and everything was rigorously evalu- proval. As one officer later noted, “everyone got ated to include combat lessons learned analyses. the message, and a profound silence reigned until the awakening of 1940.”5

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Foreign observers in French Alps, 1937. National Archives

The pace of German rearmament under the that originated in German infiltration tactics of Third Reich admittedly alarmed France, though World War I, could overturn accepted and com- intelligence exaggerated its speed. Nevertheless, bat-tested methods. The concept of a tightly con- there was little interest in foreign writers, even trolled and centralized battle belonged to an- while Germany paid attention to thinkers such as other era, and the sense of chaos and futility that J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart either directly emerged after the performance of the French in or indirectly. Both chauvinism and official dicta 1940 revealed an inability to force its method of stifled interest in such influences. fighting on the Germans. In the event, French doctrine stressed tight Although some claim that this state of affairs control, with artillery dominating all operations. arose because of doctrinal predilections, there is Manuals emphasized that firepower provides “a more to the story. The French approached experi- remarkable strength of resistance to improvised mentation in the same fashion as their doctrine fortifications.” The army would only go on the and concepts of war. The purpose of these under- offensive under “favorable conditions after the as- takings was not to test ideas but to prove the pre- sembling of powerful material means, artillery, conceived notions of those who authorized ex- tanks, munitions, etc.”—a recipe for disaster. periments and field trials. The high command proved slow in establish- Looking Good ing even relatively modest experiments such as Some historians may contend that inordi- creating an armored division. Through the late nate emphasis on firepower prevented the 1930s interminable discussions took place on the French from understanding how improvements higher levels, with Gamelin invariably arguing in tactical mobility, coupled with techniques that such proposals needed further study rather than precipitating action. The result was that while proposals for experiments with mechanized forces appeared regularly on meeting agendas, the

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French cavalry on patrol. National Archives

French did not establish their first armored divi- meet the coming challenge; equally important sion until December 16, 1939—two and a half was a general unwillingness to learn from the de- months after the Polish catastrophe. There were feat of the Polish army in September 1939. admittedly problems with tank production, but Exercises on both sides of the Rhine in 1937 such issues were no more daunting than those underlined differences between the opposing confronting the Germans. It was the will to move forces. French maneuvers, highly scripted with in new directions that was lacking. top-down control, offered little latitude for initia- French exercises and experiments were tive by subordinate commanders. Moreover there highly stylized and scripted. Their top-down na- was scant emphasis on unit testing. On the other ture is suggested by the fact that Gamelin forbade hand, foreign observers came away from German maneuvers with medium tank maneuvers either terrified or impressed. The units unless a member of the British sensed the energy and drive of the Ger- in the interwar period the high command was present. man army to test the organization to the break- Royal Air Force conducted The September 1930 ma- ing point under realistic conditions. The exercise neuver in Lorraine typified a sys- force largely consisted of infantry and artillery, experiments that should tem which placed a mechanistic but the stress on combined arms tactics was thor- have been alarming approach at the heart of every- oughly modern. thing the army did. The German attaché acidly commented that Tragic Misdirection the “infantry did not know how to attack.” Even In the interwar period the Royal Air Force Gamelin had to admit that the exercise was “not (RAF) conducted experiments that should have an attack but a funeral procession . . . the infantry been alarming. Aerial combat during the Spanish following the tanks like hearses.”6 French inter- Civil War suggested that air superiority would be war attitudes towards experimentation carried critical in the next war. But there was admittedly over into the conflict. The army spent relatively no way of testing the vulnerability of bombers to little time over the winter of 1939–40 training to fighters. Moreover the British displayed little interest in learning from others about either air-to- air combat or bombing accuracy. The most glaring

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Murray National Arc ives Courtesy U.S. Air Force History Office Courtesy U.S. Air Force Wellington bomber during training exercise. problem arose in evaluations of RAF experiments would be impossible in wartime against defended tar- with bombers throughout the 1930s. Target iden- gets. They took place in daylight and in good weather. tification and bombing accuracy remained issues There were hardly any tests as to what could be done until the outbreak of World War II. In May 1938 at night or in cloudy weather. Under these conditions the assistant chief of air staff admitted: some squadrons were able in practice to produce a It remains true...that in the home defense exercise high degree of accuracy. But in the large scale exer- last year, bombing accuracy was very poor indeed. In- cises which approached more closely to war condi- vestigation into this matter indicates that this was tions, their deficiencies were exposed. ...The Manual probably due very largely to failure to identify targets of Air Tactics contained minute instructions on the rather than to fatigue. various kinds of bombing, special attention being given to high-level bombing in daylight. Most of this Asked in the early thirties how air crews would was necessarily based on theoretical reasoning since locate targets at night or in bad weather, future there had been so little practical experiment.8 Air Marshal Arthur Tedder replied derisively, “You tell me!”7 Some within Bomber Command recognized Experiments generally tested little. As the of- the extent of the problem. In May 1939 the ficial historians of Bomber Command noted: commander of 3 Group admitted that, according to experimentation, crews could at best bring Thus, the Bombing Committee [established to con- their aircraft within fifty miles of targets by dead sider bombing accuracy] had to rely on the trials at reckoning. But for the most part the RAF leader- the armament training camps and theoretical reason- ship were in denial. The rejection was so strong ing. But the trials provided no test for the identifica- that it took the devastating analysis of the Butt tion of a target. They were often made at levels which Report in 1941 (after nearly two years of war) to indicate that barely a third of crews were getting

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within five miles of their targets (an area of no Third, both experimentation and innovation less than 75 square miles). Confronted with the must be historically connected to the recent past possibility that the government might suspend as well as understanding the unchanging nature the strategic bombing offensive, Bomber Com- of war—that fog, friction, and ambiguity will in- mand got interested in a broader definition of terfere with the conduct of operations regardless technology than simply having faith that the of technological advances. Military institutions bomber would get through. that distorted or failed to examine recent battles This definition had consequences for areas ran into substantial problems in the interwar pe- other than bombing accuracy. In March 1940 Air riod. Their experiments failed to address real is- Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding advised the Air Min- sues. Moreover, militaries that entirely rejected istry that Bomber Command would need long history based their doctrines and conceptions on range escort fighters to execute a strategic bomb- fallacious technological assumptions. Those sup- ing campaign against Germany. He received the positions drove experiments in irrelevant direc- following reply: tions, and lessons that might have been learned It must generally speaking be regarded as axiomatic were ignored. that the long-range fighter must be inferior in per- Finally, military culture was integral in de- formance to the short-range fighter. . . . The question veloping realistic and effective experiments that has therefore been considered many times, and the examined the potential of innovation and exer- discussion has always tended to go in circles....The cises that contributed to the process. It had to be conclusion has been reached that the escort fighter receptive to learning from tests and drills. Not was a myth. A fighter performing escort functions surprisingly, a culture that encouraged critical would, in reality, have to be a high performance and study of even the most closely held beliefs inno- heavily armed bomber. vated most intelligently. The creation of feedback loops depended on honesty and a sense of the One year later Prime Minister Winston Churchill importance of learning. Those who valued look- asked the same question and received a similar ing good rather than demanding rigor may have reply from the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Sir achieved their goals in the short term but paid in Charles Portal. Churchill stated that this response blood for their shortsightedness over the long “closed many doors.” term once war came. JFQ The top-down RAF approach constrained experimentation to such an extent that only some of the possibilities were examined. Experiments NOTES were carefully circumscribed to support doctrinal 1 preconceptions that bordered on the ideological. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, Kan.: Uni- This situation not only resulted in a force largely versity Press of Kansas, 1992), p. 37. Seeckt posed the irrelevant to events in 1939, but one that only following questions to the committees: “What new situ- adapted after extraordinarily heavy casualties. ations arose in the war that had not been considered before the war? How effective were our prewar views in A number of points can be drawn from the dealing with the above situations? What new guidelines experimentation in the 1920s and 1930s. First, it have been developed from the use of new weaponry in appears that top-down leadership usually re- the war? Which new problems put forward by the war sulted in flawed experimentation. Though inno- have not yet found a solution?” vation requires support from the top, experi- 2 Robert J. O’Neill, “Doctrine and Training in the ments and exercises must test precepts and German Army,” in The Theory and Practice of War, edited by Michael Howard (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 157. conceptions. Top-down leadership breeds institu- 3 Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearma- tional biases against ideas emerging from below. ment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), Such an approach leads to experiments that con- pp. 42–43. firm revealed doctrine rather than provide objec- 4 Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat (New York: Norton, tive testing. 1968), pp. 36–37, 45. Second, effective innovation requires an 5 Andre Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France (New York: identifiable enemy. Germany intended to fight Praeger, 1968), p. 47. both Poland and Czechoslovakia and eventually 6 Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France France. When enemies remain undefined, it is and the Limiting of Military Planning (Lawrence, Kan.: difficult to develop a coherent concept to fit na- University Press of Kansas, 1996), p. 139. 7 Guy Hartcup, The Challenge of War (London: tional strategy or even the next war. Brassey’s, 1967), p. 126. 8 Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1961), pp. 117–18.

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M–1A1 during Persian Gulf War. for the Joint Force Commander?

By DAMIAN J. McCARTHY and SUSAN A. MEDLIN

DOD

lthough the Persian Gulf War was and executed in 1990 and 1991. The campaign waged a decade ago, it should con- presented the Commander in Chief, Central tinue to be studied. Joint doctrine Command (CINCCENT), with challenges that A has not resolved many contentious could have been avoided with a more dynamic issues raised during that conflict. Among them is theater command and control structure and pre- whether a joint force commander (JFC) should be scriptive doctrinal guidance. dual hatted as a service or functional component commander. The following article assesses doc- Joint Doctrine trine for organizing both joint force and compo- Subordinate forces can be organized in many nent commands. It then considers organization ways. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Fi- (UNAAF), declares that “a JFC has the authority to nally, it examines the ground operations planned organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.” JFCs can establish functional component com- Major Damian J. McCarthy, USAF, is a member of the crisis action group mands and designate commanders (see figure 1, at Allied Air Forces South and Major Susan A. Medlin, USA, is serving Possible Components in a Joint Force). The pri- at U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; they collaborated on this mary factors in selecting a functional component article while attending the Armed Forces Staff College.

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operations component commanders, but only in Figure 1. Possible Components of Joint Force regard to JFACCs does it state that “the joint force commander will normally designate a joint force Joint Force air component commander.” If JFCs do not desig- Commander nate a functional component commander they are effectively in control of this function and dual hatted. For example, if JFCs decide not to desig- Army Air Force Naval Marine Corps nate a joint force land component commander Component Component Component Component (JFLCC) but employ both Army and Marine Corps units through maritime and Army forces com- Army Forces Air Force Forces Naval Forces Marine Forces manders, they provide unity of effort between the (ARFOR) (AFFOR) (NAVFOR) (MARFOR) forces and act as both JFC and JFLCC. Commanding the Storm Joint Force Special Joint Force Land Joint Force Air Joint Force Maritime

out of joint The coalition organized in the Persian Gulf Operations Component Component Component Component consisted of forces from 33 nations, presenting General Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, CINCCENT, Forces/capability Forces/capability Forces/capability Forces/capability with serious difficulties for command and con- made available made available made available made available trol. For political reasons, Schwarzkopf agreed operational control command relationships determined by joint force commander upon a parallel command structure, with the Arab forces under Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia acting as Commander, Joint Theater of Operations. According to one assessment, by allowing Khalid to wield authority commander are the nature of operations, service over what would become known as Joint Arab force mix, and service command and control ca- Task Force, “Schwarzkopf at once lightened his pabilities. Usually the service with the preponder- own overburdened workload and smoothed rela- ance of forces provides the functional component tions with the Saudis.”1 Moreover, CINCCENT or- commander. Joint Pub 3-0, Doc- ganized theater air components under a func- joint doctrine provides no trine for Joint Operations, further tional command and named Lieutenant General defines conditions under which recommendation, except Charles Horner, Commander of U.S. Central Air JFCs establish a functional com- Force, as JFACC to provide centralized planning, for JFACCS, on designating ponent as when “the scope of decentralized execution, and the integration of operations requires that similar functional components both service and allied air capabilities. capabilities and functions of Given the magnitude of CINCCENT respon- forces from more than one serv- sibilities, naming a joint force land component ice be directed toward closely related objectives commander would have enhanced the unity of and unity of command and effort are primary effort. Schwarzkopf was conscious that his span considerations.” Joint Pub 3-0 concludes its con- of control could be overextended by his many sideration of the organization of forces with three tasks: “I found myself mired in administrative statements: chores: briefing congressional delegations, giving Most often, joint forces are organized with a press interviews, heading off cultural problems combination of service and functional components with the Saudis, and fielding bureaucratic ques- with operational responsibilities. tions from Washington.”2 General Colin Powell, Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Marine USA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re- Corps, and Air Force components will still have Special peatedly suggested that Schwarzkopf establish an Operations Forces organized as a functional component. overall commander for ground forces, fearing that JFCs will normally designate a joint force air the land offensive was consuming too much time component commander (JFACC), whose authority and and energy on the part of CINCCENT. responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s concept of operations. But Schwarzkopf decided to retain JFLCC responsibilities. It was not politically possible to Joint Pub 3-0 includes figure 1 above, which put Arab forces under U.S. control or the prepon- is also used in Joint Pub 0-2 as an example only derance of U.S. forces under Arab command. of how to organize a joint force. CINCCENT was also reluctant to create another Joint doctrine provides no recommendation, major staff headquarters, which would be re- except for JFACCs, on designating functional quired to control both Army and Marine Corps components. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of De- fense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines joint force land, maritime, air, and special

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compete with both the Marine Corps and Arabs Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan. for attention from CINCCENT. “This rather con- voluted arrangement certainly went against the principles of simplicity and unity of command,” according to one official history. “That it was made to work as smoothly as it did was attributed to the powerful personalities and professionalism of the senior commanders.”3 The Scheme of Battle Schwarzkopf had devised a plan whereby VII Corps would make the main attack. On the right flank, the Joint Arab Task Force and Marines began the offensive with artillery and naval gun- th

fire, while 4 Marine Expeditionary Brigade out of joint feinted an amphibious landing off the coast of Kuwait. The Arab and Marine attack into Kuwait would fix the enemy in position and distract it from the flanking maneuver in the west. On the left flank, XVIII Airborne Corps would conduct simultaneous ground and air assaults. VII Corps DOD (Jose D. Trejo) would start the main attack 24 hours after the offensive began, breaking through the weak western Figure 2. U.S. Command Relationships part of the enemy line to reach the rear of the forward enemy forces in Kuwait, attack their flank, and destroy three Republican Guard divisions in National th Command southern Iraq. On the left flank, the 24 Mecha- Authorities nized Division would support the attack forward to the Euphrates and block the Iraqi retreat. Disconnects between the Army and Marine Supporting Commander in Chief, Unified Central Command / battle plans appeared as planning for the ground Commanders Joint Force Land offensive evolved. The Marine Corps had origi- Component Commander nally conceived an amphibious assault on a port Central south of Kuwait City (rejected by Schwarzkopf), Command Rear and a deliberate attack toward Kuwait City to fix and distract enemy forces. The poor performance of the Iraqis at Khafji led the Marines to believe

U.S. Central that the enemy was vastly overrated. Major Gen- U.S. Army U.S. Marine U.S. Naval Special Command eral William Keys, the 2d Marine Division com- Forces Corps Forces Forces Operations Air Forces / Central Central Central Command Joint Force Air mander, pushed for an accelerated tempo as Command Command Command Central Component found in his war plan. He believed that “the way Command to win a quick victory and hold down losses was to push as much combat power through the Marine Special Army Naval Air enemy fortifications as fast as possible, bypassing Forces Operations Forces Forces Forces Ashore Forces Ashore enemy pockets of resistance and thrusting into the enemy rear.”4 The Marines ended up with a two-pronged attack: the 1st Division would conduct a supporting attack on the right while the 2d Division carried out the main attack on the left, punching forces, and perhaps Arab forces as well. Instead, through the Iraqi forces and racing north to seize Lieutenant General John Yeosock, USA, Comman- the high ground west of Kuwait City. This would der of Third Army, would oversee the two U.S. cut off the escape route for the forces in the urban corps along with French and British forces (U.S. center and southern Kuwait. General Walter command relationships are shown in figure 2). Boomer, the Commander of U.S. Marine Forces As JFLCC, Schwarzkopf had control over the Central Command, estimated that his forces Marine Corps and the option of bypassing would arrive in Kuwait City within three days. Yeosock and going straight to corps commanders. This created numerous demands. Yeosock had to

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Ground Tactical Plan

Samawah Euphrates River Iraqi Forces Nasiriyah Allied Forces Logistics Bases IRAN

Salman Basra IRAQ Safwan Objective Collins out of joint

Persian Gulf

d Rafah 82 Airborne 4th and 5th Division Marine Kuwait Brigades 24th Infantry British 2d Armored st City Division 1 Armored (afloat) French Cavalry Division st 6th Light Regiment 1 Cavalry Division Armored Saudi 48 Hours Division 101st Airborne Mechanized Division 3d Armored Infantry 1st Brigade, Cavalry 2d Armored Regiment Egyptian Division 12 Hours XVIII Shubah 1st Armored 3d Armored 1st Infantry Syrian Airborne Division Division Division Forces Saudi Task Corps (Mech) Forces VII d Corps 2 Marine st Joint Division 1 Marine Khafji Division Hafar al Batin Forces Joint Army Central Command Command Forces North Marine Command Central East SAUDI ARABIA Command

By contrast, the Army commanders, Yeosock as a holding force.”5 Schwarzkopf was concerned and Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, of VII about the plan. He thought it overly cautious, Corps, focused on a methodical attack where with emphasis on advance, stop, regroup, ad- available combat forces were vance, stop, regroup. CINCCENT iterated his in- the Army commanders massed to deliver maximum tent for the ground offensive. power. Franks was determined I do not want a slow, ponderous pachyderm focused on a methodical to mass three divisions before mentality. This is not a deliberate attack. I want VII attack where available taking on the Republican Corps to slam into the Republican Guard. . . . The Guard. He was particularly combat forces were massed idea is not to get to intermediate objectives and then concerned about any scheme stop to rearm and refuel. If you have divisions sitting that would leave his forces around, you will present a huge target for chemicals strung out with a piecemeal, one-unit-at-a-time and you will lose. You cannot have VII Corps stopped attack on a narrow front. for anything.6 When Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney arrived in Riyadh with Powell to review the Schwarzkopf was right. As one observer ground offensive on February 8, 1991, there was notes, the attack by VII Corps “was, by design, “an opportunity to iron out the disconnects deliberate and cautious...clearly designed for among the services. But even senior commanders evading risk of any disorganization while the gave little thought to how an accelerated Marine corps won maneuver room. The cost of that care 7 attack might affect execution of the Army plan. was obviously paid in time.” Whatever the Marine Corps did, they were seen

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The Storm in Action Schwarzkopf believed that VII Corps would The JFACC arrangement under Horner push forward throughout the night, closing on worked fairly well. Coalition aircraft flew 109,976 Objective Collins in the morning. The goal, a flat sorties, dropped 88,500 tons of bombs, and shot desert area west of the main Republican Guard down 35 enemy aircraft. By appointing a joint positions, would serve as a jumping off point for force air component commander Schwarzkopf an attack on those enemy divisions. However, achieved unity of effort in air operations though Franks worried that his forces would run out of not without controversy. Since Horner had no daylight before completing their move through functional ground counterpart, each service com- the breach in enemy lines, clearing minefields, ponent had to make a case for air support indi- and marking passage lanes. As the attack pro- vidually during the campaign. The Army, in par- gressed into evening, a 20-kilometer gap opened ticular, felt slighted, believing it lacked adequate between lead units and armored divisions moving representation during planning. through the breach. Franks decided to halt after Despite problems with targeting as well as informing Yeosock. “I advised him that we would

tactics and procedures, the overall air component more than likely suspend offensive operations for out of joint mission was successful and set the conditions for the night but would continue other combat oper- the land battle. The ground campaign began on ations such as aviation and artillery, as well as fin- February 24. The initial Marine distraction turned ish the passage of the remainder of the two ar- into breakthroughs as they pierced enemy front mored divisions across the berm....We would 8 lines in several places. Reports indicated only then resume offensive operations at first light.” minor firefights, with few casualties and growing Yeosock didn’t tell Schwarzkopf of this plan. numbers of prisoners. Schwarzkopf was faced with As a result, Schwarzkopf made no attempt to slow a decision. If he stayed with the original plan and down either the Marine offensive on the right launched the main attack in 24 hours, the flank, which was advancing rapidly toward th Marines moving forward on the right flank might Kuwait City, or the 24 Division, which had pushed hard through the night on the left flank, penetrating over 60 miles into Iraq by morning. Early on February 25, Schwarzkopf was surprised to learn VII Corps had halted. He was beginning to see the campaign as shifting from deliberate attack to exploitation and was concerned over the methodical advance of VII Corps, fearing that the enemy might escape the trap. “I began to feel as if I were trying to drive a wagon pulled by race horses and mules.”9 He ordered the 24th Divi- sion to slow its advance because of the disconnect with VII Corps, which continued to attack throughout the day (like other coalition forces) yet again stopped for the night, some 20 miles short of the objective. On the next morning, Schwarzkopf learned that the enemy was beginning to retreat from Kuwait City. He was appalled to find that only a few elements of VII Corps had reached Objective Collins. He called Yeosock and expressed dismay,

DOD (Dean Wagner) “John, no more excuses. Get your forces moving. Lieutenant General We have got the entire...Iraqi army on the run. 10 Horner with Saudi be exposed to counterattack. Early success could Light a fire under VII Corps.” squadron commander. also spook the enemy, causing it to retreat before As the day unfolded it became clear Republi- coalition forces could encircle and destroy it. can Guard divisions were organizing a retreat. After speaking with Yeosock and Khalid, Schwarzkopf then removed the brakes from the th Schwarzkopf decided to launch the main attack 24 Division, ordering it to push forward and in the afternoon. The only dissenting opinion seal off the Euphrates Valley. That day, Yeosock came from the Commander, Joint Arab Task reported to Schwarzkopf that VII Corps had fi- Force, on the left flank of VII Corps, who was un- nally reached Objective Collins and would attack able to react quickly to the change in plans. as soon as the armored divisions were on line. Schwarzkopf was willing to accept that risk as long as VII Corps was ready. Late that afternoon the main attack was launched.

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M–60A1 with mine- clearing devices leads AAVs into Kuwait. out of joint DOD

Yeosock called Franks and said that Schwarzkopf divisions, retreating toward Basra. Coalition was unhappy with his progress. According to forces continued to pound Iraqis moving north Franks, this was the first that he heard of this from Kuwait City. In midafternoon the corps cut criticism. That afternoon VII Corps began engag- through the Medina Republican Guard Division, ing the westernmost elements of the Tawakalan and a remaining division, the Hammurabi, was Republican Guard Division. on the run. Yeosock reported that this division would be destroyed in the next 24 hours. Powell contacted Schwarzkopf and reported that Powell contacted Schwarzkopf later that af- the pressure to declare a cease-fire was increasing ternoon and reported that the pressure to declare a cease-fire was increasing. Kuwait was essentially liberated, and media coverage of mounting Iraqi Franks then reported to Schwarzkopf. Each casualties was making the White House uneasy. man gives a different account of this conversation, Schwarzkopf asked for another day to destroy the with Schwarzkopf claiming that he had to push Republican Guard. The Chairman relayed his Franks to attack east into the Republican Guard. By concern to President George Bush and called contrast, Franks has said that he discussed his Schwarzkopf again to report that the President progress and future plans and that Schwarzkopf contemplated declaring a cease-fire in six hours. was pleased. To further complicate matters, inter- Bush declared it at midnight on February 27. national pressure was mounting for a cease-fire, Kuwait was liberated with minimal coalition ca- and Schwarzkopf knew that the opportunity to de- sualties. However, Schwarzkopf failed to achieve stroy the enemy was beginning to disappear. one major objective, destruction of the Republi- On February 27 the Joint Arab Task Force lib- can Guard. As later analysis revealed, the Ham- erated Kuwait City. VII Corps reported that it had murabi Division escaped largely intact, as did sen- destroyed the Tawakalan Republican Guard Divi- ior Iraqi officers. sion overnight and were pursuing the other two

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Marines entering Kuwait airport. out of joint DOD (David McLeod) DOD

the Marine Corps caused the main attack to be Enemy vehicles in advanced on very short notice. Euphrates valley. Although Schwarzkopf expressed concern over the way Franks viewed the battle during the planning process, he did little to change it. He DOD (Dean Wagner) conveyed his reservations to both Franks and Yeosock before the ground offensive, but he did not remove either one from command; nor did In large part, the failure to complete the de- he send either Yeosock or Lieutenant General struction of the Republican Guard was caused by Calvin Waller, USA, the Deputy CINC, forward communication and synchronization problems on during the ground campaign. Instead, from head- the ground. The most serious breakdown in the quarters in Riyadh, he was continually surprised chain of command occurred between Franks and by the slow advance of VII Corps. Together with Schwarzkopf. The former was fully engaged in Yeosock and Franks, Schwarzkopf must accept making contact with the enemy as the latter began some responsibility for the escape of the Ham- to demand a pursuit. It was Yeosock’s task to rec- murabi Division, because as joint force com- oncile the conflicting views, to either get Franks to mander he was ultimately accountable for the su- move faster or Schwarzkopf to slow down. His fail- pervision of ground operations. ure to do so exacerbated the problem. As JFLCC, Schwarzkopf was responsible for Reflections on Command the synchronization of the ground campaign. As Desert Storm has demonstrated, prob- But, as one critic noted, he allowed “each service lems arise when JFCs are dual hatted as func- to attack the way it preferred, with little thought tional component commanders. One problem is about how an attack in one area would affect the fighting in another.”11 Thus the early success of

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focus. Can a single commander pay adequate at- stronger voice in the prioritization of the air ef- tention to critical, immediate, diverse responsi- fort and the design and conduct of the overall bilities? Schwarzkopf confronted many issues campaign during Desert Storm. both before and during the ground attack. Prior to the counteroffensive he supervised every as- The Gulf War was successfully executed. But pect of coalition, joint, and land component its shortfalls also provide valuable food for force planning as well as dealing with sensitive thought. The issue of dual hatting is one case in issues from international politics to media rela- point. There may never be another Desert Storm, tions. Once combat operations began he was en- but there will certainly be occasions when a deci- gaged in the actual land battle as well as conflict sion will be made to dual hat JFCs as functional termination. Where was his attention needed the component commanders. Any operation on the most—on the fighting at the front or on Wash- scale of Desert Storm will inevitably present simi- ington and terminating the war? As JFC and lar challenges. Given the capabilities of the Armed JFLCC he had to deal with competing priorities Forces, the necessity of conducting coalition oper-

out of joint personally and simultaneously. ations, and the probability that future campaigns The second problem is another consequence will call for high tempo, simultaneous activities, of dual hatting: where does a JFC staff focus, on JFCs will require a strong command network. the JFC mission or JFLCC issues? Plans should be made for sufficient staff support, Schwarzkopf stated that he did not theater assets, and service capabilities. The opera- want another staff, but this meant tional reach of JFCs must not be limited by a that the JFC staff had to support paucity of theater assets that prevent the estab- him in both roles. Perhaps JFCs lishment of supporting functional commands. A with decades of experience could more dynamic theater command system must be function as JFC and JFLCC, but matched by better doctrine on JFLCC operations will their staffs have call on the and perhaps even a prohibition against dual hat- same level of expertise? Can one ting CINCs in large-scale contingency operations staff have the resources for both where greater efficiencies can be found in effective functions? Even if Schwarzkopf and responsive functional commands. JFQ was not overtasked in his dual roles, problems of synchronization in the ground battle suggest that NOTES his staff was unable to provide the 1 Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti, In the Eye of the assessments required for decisions Storm (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991), based on unfolding events. p. 221. Another consideration is inte- 2 H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, General grating operations among func- H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Doesn’t tional components. If there is no Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 363. DOD (Pedro Ybanez) DOD (Pedro joint force land component com- 3 Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Certain Vic- Lieutenant General mander or staff then there can be tory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington: Gov- Yoesock. no lateral communication with the joint force air ernment Printing Office, 1993), p. 141. 4 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The or special operations component commanders or Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf their staffs. In addition, if JFCs are dual hatted (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p. 291. there is a subordinate relationship with these 5 Ibid., p. 305. component staffs. For example, had there been a 6 Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, JFLCC to address apportionment with a JFACC, pp. 433–34. the commanders might have been able to resolve 7 Richard M. Swain, Lucky War: Third Army in Desert issues before appealing to JFC. But the corps com- Storm (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command mander essentially had to skip a level of com- and General Staff College Press, 1994), p. 335. mand and bring component issues to JFC. 8 Tom Clancy and Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Into The Schwarzkopf attempted to ameliorate this prob- Storm: A Study in Command (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1997), p. 279. lem by using Waller to resolve cross-functional 9 Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, problems. But this solution suffered from the p. 456. same drawbacks as Schwarzkopf faced himself— 10 Ibid., p. 461. competing priorities and a lack of the dedicated 11 Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, p. 432. staffs to deal with intractable joint issues. Ground commanders can address JFCs as JFLCCs, but they will always be JFCs just as their staffs will always be JFC staffs. If, for example, CINCCENT had appointed a JFLCC, the Army may have felt it had a

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Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma at Midway.

Operational Overreach and the Culmination Point Naval Historical Center By MILAN N. VEGO

robably no concept of operational art is Application to Levels of War as complex as culmination. In an arti- Culmination did not receive proper atten- cle entitled “Why Strategy Is Difficult” tion until operational art was revived during the Pthat appeared in these pages in Sum- late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, the Army mer 1999, Colin Gray discounted the utility of has given more attention than other services to the concept of culminating points. Yet despite its the concept. Nevertheless, it is applicable to all problematical nature this element of operational functional, joint, and combined operations. theory has demonstrated utility in explaining the The notion of a culmination point is identi- conduct of campaigns and will remain an essen- fied with Carl von Clausewitz, who described it as tial construct for understanding future wars. the moment when “the remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace.” Once past, the chance of victory would be Milan N. Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military foreclosed unless an enemy yielded without en- Operations Department at the Naval War College and the author of gaging in decisive combat. An enemy would pre- Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. vail if it choose to fight. Culmination could be

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culminating points can take place in sequence or simultaneously. Hence possession of the superior position can wax and wane as commanders adjust to the loss of critical capabilities or gain new advantages as combat operations progress. Strategic culmination arises in the course of war and can be reached only once. In strategic culmination, focus is placed on forces available in the future rather than those on hand. Thus the point arrives when a favorable ratio of military and nonmilitary resources has diminished until the chances for a successful outcome are foreclosed and attackers go on the defensive or risk defeat. Relationships Culminating points on various levels of war can affect each other in profound ways. One on a lower level almost invariably affects one on the next higher level. Sometimes a culminating point on the tactical or operational level has opera- Courtesy NDU Special Collections tional or strategic implications. For example, the Battle of the Bulge. German failure in the all or nothing counteroffensive in the Ardennes during December 1944 characterized as a point reached by attackers or had far-reaching strategic consequences. The op- defenders in terms of time and space after which erational objective was to seize the port of stated objectives can’t be accomplished, and con- Antwerp by splitting and then destroying Allied tinued efforts to reach them would significantly forces in the northern and southern sectors of the heighten the risk of failure or defeat. This point is Ardennes. The Germans planned to commit 28 to reached when there is a decisive shift in relative 30 divisions—including 12 panzer or panzer combat power. grenadier—in a surprise move toward the Meuse A point of culmination exists for both at- River and proceed without delay toward the tackers and defenders on every level of war. The coast. They hoped to split 1st U.S. Army and lower the level, the easier it British 21st Army Group and destroy them near culminating points on various is to determine. The higher Antwerp and Brussels. Adolph Hitler wanted to the level, the more com- derail the Allied timetable for the thrust into Ger- levels of war can affect each plex the influences that many to allow the bulk of his forces in the west other in profound ways cause a culmination of to move eastward to defend against the Soviets. friendly and enemy com- The offensive began on December 6 and had bat power. Thus a culmina- some tactical gains. However, it began to lose motion point for either side is difficult to anticipate mentum due to ammunition and fuel shortages. on the operational or strategic level because of Because of steadily rising losses, Hitler finally ad- the factors affecting it. mitted on January 8 that the offensive had failed. Tactical culmination occurs in the course of a In the process the Germans lost 100,000 men, major engagement. It is caused by actions on the 800 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft that could not be re- scene or decisions on higher levels. Culmination placed, opening the door for the final Allied push principally relates to the direct application of com- into Germany. bat power, which is normally reduced if not regen- Another form of interaction is when attackers erated in timely fashion during battle. Failing reju- or defenders overshoot the culmination point on venation, a tactical force must stop its actions or the higher level by inflicting a major defeat on the continue to fight and risk failure. If a force can pre- next lower level. This is likely when battles result vent or postpone culmination but opts against it, in significant losses in offensive power, thus weak- that force facilitates its own culmination. ening gains from a previous operation or cam- On the operational level culmination may paign. For example, the Battle of Midway in June occur during a major operation or at a given point 1942 was an operational victory for Allied forces in a campaign. In the course of a campaign several and an operational defeat with strategic consequences for the Japanese, who lost four large carriers, 332 aircraft, and their best pilots. From then on the strategic initiative shifted steadily.

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British tank crews in North Africa. National Archives

Recipe for Defeat the group would sweep along the Caspian Sea and Arrival at the point of culmination can be capture Baku. Army Group B would build up its caused by various factors. On the tactical level, at- defenses on the Don River and thrust toward Stal- tack or defense can be temporarily overextended ingrad and destroy Soviet forces, seize the city and by exhaustion on the part of commanders and crossings along the Rivers Don and Volga, and their forces or depletion of supplies. Among other block traffic on the river. Other units would ad- things, this problem could be solved by simply re- vance quickly to Astrakhan to block the main wa- placing the commander or entire units, sending terway on the Volga. reinforcements, or rushing in provisions. The Germans concentrated an entire army A common cause of culmination on the oper- group at one point—Rostov. Hence the chance to ational level is the pursuit of multiple objectives encircle still strong Soviet units beyond the Don without regard for space, time, and force. For ex- was missed. In addition, terrain, weather, and fuel ample, the decision made by Hitler in July 1942 to shortages worked against the group. By the begin- pursue two operational objectives simultaneously ning of August an army of two German and one (the Caucasian oilfields and Stalingrad), which Romanian corps totaling eight divisions was as- were in divergent directions, was the principal rea- signed to support the drive toward Stalingrad, son for the defeat at Stalingrad and subsequent which was to last just over three weeks. Army turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. Group A was directed to concentrate its remaining Hitler specified that the task of Army Group A was motorized units for a drive toward Maikop. Hitler to encircle and destroy Soviet forces southwest of overestimated the results of the German summer Rostov-on-Don and seize the east coast of the offensive in southern Russia and became preoccu- Black Sea, thereby taking out the Black Sea Fleet. pied with seizing oilfields in the Caucuses, thus At the same time fast units would protect the east- neglecting the thrust toward Stalingrad. ward flanks and seize the area around Grozny and block the Ossetian and Georgian roads. Finally,

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Terrain also affects culmination. Defenders might have unrealistic expectations of subordi- can usually use it to deplete advancing forces, like nate commanders or forces. These and similar er- the case of the Soviet offensive in southern Russia rors could be significant in reaching or overshoot- in early 1943. Unfrozen rivers delayed the ad- ing one’s culminating point. vance by canalizing Soviet attacks. Villages pro- Lack of logistical support is also a cause of vided defensive positions for the Germans. The culmination; for instance, poor organization of mobile units lacked vehicles to advance over in- the forward movement of supplies and lack of hospitable terrain. Intermittent thaws exacerbated transportation, ammunition, fuel, or food. Con- the already tenuous supply situation by turning stant combat and overextension of supply lines portions of the countryside into quagmires which exacerbate the problem. Ever-lengthening supply bogged down transportation. Although attackers lines and corresponding sustainment difficulties can overcome the effects of terrain by speed and were principal reasons for the failure by General intensity, operating at higher tempo has draw- Erwin Rommel to continue his offensive beyond backs that can degrade attacking forces. El Alamein in 1942. The drive into Egypt culmi- Distance impacts on both offense and de- nated in late June because of exhaustion after al- fense. The width and depth of a theater can cause most five weeks of continued combat that began dispersal of combat power, a special problem for at Gazala. By early July German forces were woe- attackers. For example, the unsuccessful Soviet of- fully short of manpower, especially infantry. fensive in southern Russia Their line of supplies was some 1,600 miles while if superior mass is dissipated pursued German troops un- that of the Allies from Egypt was roughly 100. interruptedly along a 750- Both attackers and defenders can reach cul- prior to attaining the mile long front, which in minating points because of a lack of intelligence. objective, the principle of the south attained a depth For example, during the first battle of El Alamein the offensive—the initiative of 435 miles. Soviet spear- in July 1942 Rommel lost his intelligence assets, heads became thinner and making it more difficult to determine an accurate —is foreclosed thinner and eventually came picture. A culmination for attackers can also occur to a halt. Overextension and when their forces move faster than intelligence weakening of Soviet combat power was the main support. Commanders and their staffs can reach reason the German counteroffensive succeeded. wrong operational conclusions, although they are Time is another factor and it generally fa- otherwise in possession of good intelligence. The vors defense. Defenders seek to delay decisions Soviet High Command and front commanders and use time to increase their relative advantage completely misread German intentions and capa- while attackers must hasten decisions because bilities both prior to and during their unsuccess- the passage of time benefits the enemy. Causes of ful offensive in southern Russia. culmination intensify over time and space. These The premature arrival or overshooting of a factors interact to bring an attacking force to the culmination point is rarely a result of any single point of culmination. factor, no matter how dominant. For example, Still another contributor is the reduction of the Soviets culminated in southern Russia be- combat power through attrition, possibly exacer- cause of logistical difficulties, highly attrited bated by fatigue and disadvantage in position, ter- troops and matériel, lack of reserves, poor intelli- rain, or weather. Here the culminating point is in- gence, and unawareness of their limitations. fluenced by the ability to concentrate force at a Stalin and his generals were too sure of success. A critical point to gain surprise, shock, or momen- poorly prepared and broad linear offensive was tum. Another factor is the inability to protect planned along a 750-mile front. No operational friendly forces. If superior mass is dissipated prior reserves existed or were created, forcing the Sovi- to attaining the objective, the principle of the of- ets to pull divisions out of line to meet new oper- fensive—the initiative—is foreclosed. Numerical ational requirements, thus creating additional superiority does not ensure success; rather it is the vulnerabilities. Commanders also failed to mass application of superior combat power at the deci- whatever combat strength they had, thereby lim- sive place and time. The Soviets violated the princi- iting their offensive potential. They allowed de- ple of mass repeatedly in offensives by advancing pleted divisions to continue to fight ineffectively over broad fronts in multiple directions to seize instead of regrouping the remaining tanks, ar- ever-expanding objectives almost simultaneously. tillery, and soldiers into fewer but stronger units. Further, commanders might be overly opti- Higher headquarters constantly pressured subor- mistic or pessimistic in assessing operational or dinates to maintain the momentum to accom- strategic situations. Their perception of enemy ca- plish assigned missions, resulting in units bog- pabilities or intentions might be wrong. Or they ging down in unsuitable tasks. The Soviets also misread operational conditions, wrongly assuming the Germans were retreating. Otherwise they

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Destroyed German tank outside St. Vith. National Archives

might have recognized that their own culmina- consequences if logistical sustainment proves in- tion was rapidly approaching. adequate. To reach a decision more quickly, commanders might overextend their forces on a tem- Methods for Victory porary basis, but that is always risky. A prudent Both sides seek to obtain their objectives be- operational commander should weigh all the fac- fore reaching culmination. Attackers must delay tors to measure the importance of success against their culmination point in time and space while the chance of failure. defenders try to hasten it. Attackers can forestall The task of defense is hastening culmination arrival at or overshooting their point by better for attackers before they reach their objectives. force protection to lower rates of attrition, main- Among other things, defenders can speed culmi- taining the initiative and high operational nation for attackers by inflicting high attrition tempo, and ensuring timely arrival of reinforce- with combined ground-air attacks. They can de- ments or commitment of reserves. They can also rail the attack timetable by offering unexpectedly properly sequence major operations, plan sound strong resistance at selected points. They can also tactical and operational fires, and employ opera- interdict lines of supply by striking at road or rail- tional pauses. In addition, they can apply ma- road junctions, depots, or bridges to neutralize neuver, unity of effort, simplicity, and security. vital facilities, thereby causing a ripple effect on An offensive culmination can be delayed by the logistic infrastructure. Defending commanders proper synchronization of logistics, allowing who realize that an attack has passed its culmina- commanders to control the tempo of their action point can then shift to the counterattack. At- tions. This is more important on the operational tackers must then go on the defensive, but with- than the tactical level because of larger factors of out the inherent advantages of defending. space, time, and forces and correspondingly direr Given the luxury of waiting, defenders may reduce the strength of attackers faster than their own capabilities while protecting their main

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sources of power. But they will eventually ap- sequencing. Operational tempo is related to in- proach a defensive culminating point. Then they termediate objectives. The more there are, the will no longer benefit from waiting, and their slower the tempo. If not properly phased, an op- losses yield no further relative advantage over at- eration may culminate too soon. Hence a culmi- tackers. There is no guarantee defenders will suc- nating point could be prevented by planning an ceed unless they obtain a safe margin of relative operational pause after a given intermediate ob- combat power. Thus defenders should direct their jective is reached and prior to starting the next efforts not only against enemy forces but against one. To maintain momentum, highly mobile sec- elements of their logistical sustainment. The ond echelon units and reserve forces must be or- essence of the plan by General Douglas ganized and maintained throughout an opera- MacArthur to land 150 miles behind the North tion. The proper time for employing them must Koreans by besieging the Pusan Perimeter was be anticipated during planning and reassessed in cutting off their supply lines, thus bringing on execution. Relative combat power can shift if op- operational culmination faster than through attri- posing forces appear when they are not expected tion. X Corps not only cut off supply lines but by an enemy. Combat power is always more ef- forced the enemy to face threats from two direc- fective when either used in conjunction with tions. Synchronized with the landing, Eighth surprise or in attacking enemy flanks and rear. Army launched an offensive to break out of the An adequate deception plan is also advisable. Pusan Perimeter. The impact of the Inchon landing caused the rapid disintegration of the North Reminders for Commanders Korean army. A vital consideration for commanders dur- Another option is trading space for time and ing execution is sensing the culminating point preserving combat power while stretching out in order to defeat an enemy before reaching it. enemy supply lines. As lines grow they become For commanders who don’t balance ends and more vulnerable, compelling an enemy to assign means, this decision can cause a mismatch be- more resources to defense tween combat and sustaining resources that and thus weakening its might bring culmination before reaching the ob- commanders should analyze all ability to advance. An- jective. In any event, precise knowledge of pertinent factors that affect other way to accelerate friendly and enemy combat power is needed to the point of culmination reach assigned objectives. arrival at the culminating point is by attacking selected Commanders who are fixated on the current before assigning objectives modes of transport or re- or next engagement will have trouble realizing the quiring an enemy to culmination of their combat power in a timely carry supplies and rein- way. To succeed they must envision the actions forcements by more time-consuming and vulner- necessary to gain and maintain the initiative. In able methods. For example, during the Soviet of- that way they can anticipate strains and stresses fensive in southern Russia, the Germans focused on their forces. Operational commanders must on attacking enemy railroads, thereby forcing the outwit an enemy and be impervious to ambiguity Soviets to use motor and horse transport. on the battlefield. They should search for weaknesses, bypass enemy strengths, and contain hos- Guidelines for Planners tile forces. If an enemy reacts unexpectedly, plans When planning an operation or campaign, should be altered to maintain the initiative. commanders should analyze all pertinent factors Intelligence is important in identifying and that affect arrival at the culminating point before evaluating indicators of premature culmination. assigning objectives. The ability to assess combat Diverse sources ranging from technical to human power is directly related to ability to visualize both intelligence should be used. Among other things the situation and trends in relative combat power command, control, and communications systems weeks or months ahead. The higher the level of should operate in concert with intelligence dur- command, the broader the perspective must be. ing the execution phase. Another great challenge Elements of operational design that directly is the execution of a maneuver and associated influence arrival at the culminating point in- fires. Logistics must continue to work. Moreover, clude objectives, sequencing, phasing, reserves, force protection is critical. First and second eche- surprise, deception, and center of gravity. Culmi- lon units and reserves should be fully protected as nation may be avoided by calculating the num- should rear areas and services. ber and the scale of intermediate objectives and The inability of commanders to anticipate the arrival of points of culmination has often caused setbacks—even the failure of entire operations. In the first battle of El Alamein in July

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Vego Naval Historical Center Unloading men and equipment at Inchon. 1942, the Germans reached their operational cul- Defenders should be alert to an error by at- minating point, thus creating preconditions for a tackers in continuing the offensive after reaching British counteroffensive and eventual victory. Yet culmination, then exploit the situation or miss neither side foresaw or acknowledged the culmi- the opportunity for victory. In the Franco-Pruss- nating point although indicators were present. ian War the Germans reached this point twice Initially Rommel apparently sensed that the without the French noticing. The first instance British had gained the tactical initiative. He had occurred in September 1870 when the German only 26 operational tanks, stretched supply lines, offensive stalled. By then they had almost half of and exhausted troops and faced increasingly stiff their army involved in the siege of Paris and the British resistance. Late on July 3 he admitted de- fortress of Metz. About 150,000 German troops feat and gave the order to dig in. For the next few surrounded the French capital, but the invasion days Afrika Korps repulsed repeated British at- was delayed because of a lack of siege equipment. tacks but with only a slight margin. Rommel still At the same time, the Germans faced a threat did not acknowledge passing his operational cul- from fresh armies raised in southern France to re- mination. After several days of rest, he attacked lieve the siege of Paris. Miraculously the Germans and was repulsed again. The men and matériel he did not suffer setbacks because the French in expended were critically needed later in the second battle of El Alamein.

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Soviet heavy cruiser Molotov in Black Sea. Naval Historical Center

Metz surrendered by late October, and the Ger- Applying this concept requires skill on the mans resumed the offensive. By mid-December part of commanders and their staffs, especially the Germans reached a second culminating on the operational and strategic levels, because point, a rare occurrence in history. The great suc- the result of premature culmination or failure to cesses achieved by German armies on the Somme take advantage of enemy culmination are more and Loire were not exploited because of lack of severe and durable than on the tactical level. Op- forces. The Germans were unable to seize Le erational commanders must identify factors that Havre, Lille, and Bourges, and instead captured cause friendly and enemy forces to reach culmi- unimportant objectives such as Chartres, Orleans, nation, then plan action to prevent or hasten the and Beauvais. Yet the French were unable to take occurrence. Intangible elements of combat advantage of the situation and the war ended power, specifically leadership, morale, discipline, with the fall of Paris. doctrine, and training, remain critical. So operational commanders, who must pay attention to The concept of the culminating point re- tangible elements of combat power that affect or mains relevant. While its theoretical underpin- cause culmination, also must focus on unquan- nings were essentially postulated by Clausewitz, tifiable elements that significantly or even deci- its content has undergone change. The opera- sively affect it. JFQ tional level has emerged. The factors affecting culmination are more diverse and difficult to quantify. Thus applying the concept is harder, especially in low intensity conflict when the linkage between strategic and tactical levels is more blurred than in operational warfare. Also, factors that affect culmination are largely unquantifiable. Although theory is critical in sensing the arrival of a culminating point, it doesn’t guarantee success. Historical examples facilitate a proper understanding of theory, but they can’t provide a path to the future.

106 JFQ / Summer 2000 1725 Ruby Pgs 2/24/01 12:26 PM Page 107 (Johnny Grasso) USS Theodore Roosevelt Morality and Modern Air War By JEFFREY L. GINGRAS and TOMISLAV Z. RUBY

he Armed Forces should promote Targets must not be attacked unless they are morality in warfare, consistent with necessary to the outcome of a war. According to our cultural norms and national strat- one writer, the necessity for war “can only justify egy of advancing democracy and the the killing of people we already have reason to T think are liable to be killed.”1 This precept requires rule of law. Air operations can be conducted on the strategic and operational levels under just war that noncombatant casualties be avoided. Non- principles while minimizing casualties on both combatants are personnel who do not directly sides and bringing a swift end to conflicts. This serve in or support the military, such as those may require the military to institutionalize cer- working in industry, supply, or administration. tain changes, develop new weaponry, and recon- Bombardment that adversely affects noncombat- sider some operational procedures. ants disproportionately to the necessity of de- There are two fundamental areas of just war stroying the intended targets is deemed immoral. theory: jus ad bellum (justification for going to Such effects range from targeting and striking war) and jus in bello (just conduct of war). In exe- noncombatants directly to inflicting short- or cuting air campaigns, dilemmas revolve around long-term detrimental effects on them. the latter and focus on questions of military ne- Simply stated, proportionality means that cessity and proportionality. commanders must use appropriate weapons and tactics for the task at hand. Weapons that produce more damage than is required are prohib- ited. Proportionality is not only about excessive Major Jeffrey L. Gingras, USAF, is assigned to the U.S. Air Force Doctrine harm but weighing “injury to the permanent in- Center and Major Tomislav Z. Ruby, USAF, is a member of the faculty at terests of mankind against the contribution that the Air Command and Staff College. mischief makes to the end of victory.”2

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MODERN AIR WAR

Recent Perspective threatened the lives of airmen and noncombat- Operation Allied Force, the NATO bombing ants on the ground. campaign in Serbia, presented two especially In addition, further analysis suggests that compelling moral questions. The first was trans- joint planners should never have sent many of lating political objectives into military strategies the targets forward because of a lack of military for effects-based targets within moral guidelines. significance to the stated objectives and the likeli- The second was the need to be honest and consis- hood of disproportionate collateral damage. tent in selecting military objectives to carry out Moreover, while persistence is a tenet of aero- the strategy. space power, it does not require that targets be On March 24, 1999, President William Clin- reattacked after the desired effects are achieved. ton stated three objectives: Attacking numerous targets may have made

a powerful statement of coalition resolve but at a Fighter Wing (Chani Devers)

to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO opposi- th cost to Allied credibility. Through television, tion to aggression and support for peace 110 to deter the Serbs from attacking helpless Koso- newspaper photos, and the Internet the world var Albanians and make them pay if they continued saw numerous incidents of collateral damage and to damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against noncombatant death in Serbia. Was it worth the Kosovo by diminishing its military capabilities. risk to reattack targets near concentrations of noncombatants? Evidence emerged from inter- The joint force air component commander views with witnesses that raised questions. For in- (JFACC), Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF, stance, an apartment block was hit on May 31 re- was tasked to transform the objectives into target- portedly killing 11 people and injuring 20. The ing guidance. One of his first chal- targets were a publishing house and regional tele- lenges was a glut of assets. Accord- repeated strikes against vision and radio offices near a hospital and bus ing to one report, “By late April, station. At a press briefing the next day, NATO certain targets may NATO had more combat planes spokesman Jamie Shea said one bomb went 60 than targets to hit. Both [General have been legal but meters long. Although 19 of the 20 bombs hit Wesley Clark, USA, Supreme Allied their targets, did those targets justify dropping 20 not morally justifiable Commander Europe] and the air- bombs so close to an apartment block, bus sta- men putting together each day’s tion, and hospital? In another case, NATO repeat- tasking orders were frustrated.”3 NATO began the edly bombed a barracks in Leskovac, which was conflict over Kosovo with a master file of 169 tar- empty six months before the hostilities started. gets. It ended with 976 filling six volumes. Ini- The attacks left few windows on nearby homes tially, with so few targets and more planes flowing and disrupted medical care at a hospital for the duration of the conflict. Repeated strikes against Tracking target aboard certain targets whose necessity did not outweigh USS Theodore Roosevelt. collateral damage may have been legal but not morally justifiable. Much of the difficulty in determining appropriate targets came during planning. According to remarks by one senior officer at the Air Force Doctrine Symposium in March 1999, the joint air operations planning process didn’t take the steps to ensure noncombatant protection. Rather, it skipped from determining objectives directly to picking targets without matching desired effects with weapons or platforms. The NATO chief of (William L. Vandermate) targets agreed, stating that targets were added so quickly in order to build a large list that there was not time to do a proper workup on them. This process wasted lives and resources without returning operational or strategic advantages. USS Theodore Roosevelt In fact, regular Serbian forces, moving into Kosovo and conducting the worst atrocities after into the theater, the list of approved targets grew. the first night of Allied Force, were garrisoned Even then, approved targets were attacked after outside Kosovo and parked in cantonments as being functionally or totally destroyed. It ap- NATO flew the initial sorties into Serbia. Had peared the Allied objective was a particular sortie rate rather than a desired endstate. From a moral standpoint, this wasted resources and needlessly

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Gingras and Ruby Fighter Wing (Chani Devers) th 110 A–10 pilot checking map before mission over Kosovo. (Jason Scarborough)

F–14 preparing for strike, Allied Force. USS Theodore Roosevelt

NATO flown against those forces the first night their control over the military. French Prime Min- rather than targets in Belgrade, the Allies might ister Jaques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony have achieved all three stated objectives in far Blair, and President Clinton all determined to “re- less time while minimizing (likely eliminating) view targets that might cause high casualties or nonproportional collateral damage and leaving affect a large number of civilians.”4 infrastructure intact. However, NATO initially ig- Had General Short structured the air effort, nored forces in favor of infrastructure. But de- according to one BBC report, he would have stroying bridges in Novi Sad, hundreds of miles arranged for the Serbian leadership to wake up north of Kosovo, had no impact on forces in the “after the first night...to a city that was smok- province. NATO claimed that the result was that ing. No power to the refrigerator and...no way residents were inconvenienced by losing easy ac- to get to work. He believes that in very short cess to Belgrade. Again, morality requires that tar- order, Milosevic’s staunchest supporters would gets be relevant. Inconveniencing was not a have been demanding that he justify the benefits stated objective. The linkage between targeting of ethnic cleansing, given the cost.”5 Such a strat- the bridges and the strategic goals of the cam- egy would not have been moral in the context of paign were highly debatable. this war, which is why civilian leaders from the Beyond hurting people, destroying bridges United States, United Kingdom, and France re- on the Danube and along the main north-south tained target approval authority. line of communication in the region adversely af- The real question, however, was why more fected commerce and trade in Central and Eastern appropriate targeting guidance and supervision Europe. Thessalonica in Greece, once the major were not implemented at the outset? That leads port for goods entering Central Europe, has been to a second and broader issue: selecting objectives seriously impacted since the destroyed bridges in war that can be achieved justly, and conveying made roads through Yugoslavia impassable. them down the chain of command to planners as well as to the public at home. Both military and Political Disconnect civilian leaders must be consistent in articulating As target selection became an issue so did ap- and transmitting objectives. That should drive proving them. As noncombatant casualties rose, planners to justly accomplish stated goals. civilian leaders asked what was being hit and why. When they were not satisfied that target necessity was being proportionately balanced against noncombatant casualties, they exercised

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This was not the case in Allied Force. The ob- mainly serve to damage the economy. It is not jectives stated by the President did not match clear that this goal is worth pursuing because those stipulated by NATO Secretary General Javier damage to electrical power has very serious collat- Solana on April 1, 1999: eral damage effects due to its impact on medical 7 stop the killing in Kosovo care and other essential services for civilians.” end the refugee crisis; make it possible for exiles to return Future Operations create conditions for political solutions based Overall the NATO effort was troubled. on the Ramboulliet Accord. Whether anything was learned from shortfalls in The contrast in wording from an address by the campaign is unclear. Official lessons learned Clinton nine days earlier was enough to cause a from Allied Force failed to mention how to re- serious difference of opinion regarding how to duce noncombatant casualties. conduct the war. American planners, ordered to Future operations must pay greater attention damage the capacity of Serbia to wage war, sub- to minimizing this peril. Today societies are jected a range of targets to attack. Other members largely interconnected and interdependent both of the Alliance did not recognize that U.S. objec- within and among countries. Attacking one part tive as a NATO aim and would not agree to cer- of a society will impact elements not related to tain targets. This dispute over guidance inserted the war effort. This presents a moral dilemma friction into the process of coordinating multina- America cannot shy away from. tional planning staffs and into the operations of Destroyed factories no longer produce goods the coalition as a whole. for an enemy state, but neither do they make Another issue was a lack of forthrightness goods for export. Economies that are closely tied with both the military and the public. The media together, such as Yugoslavia and Greece (which is repeatedly quoted NATO leaders who remarked a NATO member), have serious impact on neigh- that harming civilians bors when shut down in wartime. The Greeks, for the long-term consequences of was never an objective. example, have noted the effect of the conflict For example, on March over Kosovo on their economy and the need for targeting must be given greater 25, 1999, General Clark the European Union to rebuild the infrastructure weight in an increasingly told reporters that the of Yugoslavia to return commerce and industry to air campaign was “not pre-war levels. As this example illustrates, the interdependent world an attack against the long-term consequences of targeting must be Serb people” and NATO given greater weight in an increasingly interde- “was taking all possible measures to mini- pendent world. mize...damage to innocent civilians or nearby To apply morality to aerial bombardment, property that’s not associated with the target.” we must employ available technology to wage ef- Yet although the Allied struggle was with Milose- fective campaigns while minimizing the impact vic, not his people, Serb civilians viewed the war of weapons on noncombatants. For targets close in a very different light. Bombs dropping from to noncombatants, we must use nonlethal means NATO planes were hostile regardless of their po- which only affect military capabilities or develop litical purpose. In fact, as the war continued, lethal methods to destroy targets while reducing NATO put greater pressure directly on the Serb collateral damage. Several concepts, such as small people. Press coverage reveals that later in the smart bombs (SSBs), have either been successfully conflict the Allied leaders accepted the notion tested or are under development. that, while avoiding civilian deaths, they needed The Air Force Research Laboratory Arma- to inflict a degree of pain on the populace. “The ments Directorate is developing precise weaponry West hopes that Serbs, seeing hospitals and busi- with very small warheads. SSBs could deliver a nesses without water and electricity, will turn hardened weapon with extreme precision using their wrath on [Milosevic].”6 This shift in policy diminutive warheads that increase lethality with failed to match NATO rhetoric and thus undercut reduced explosives. No longer must weaponeers the credibility of military operations. select multiple large blast/fragmentary weapons The changes in Alliance operations not only in the 500 to 2,000-pound range for point targets. lacked transparency but were of questionable mil- In Allied Force, the avowed goal of dropping itary value and hence perhaps not morally defen- major bridges in Yugoslavia was to destroy the sible. Karl Mueller of the School of Advanced Air- fiber optic cables running over them. SSB technol- power Studies says “attacks on electrical power ogy might have hit the cable pipe but left the bridge standing. It might also have had the accuracy to strike a media facility across the street from a hospital while leaving patients uninjured.

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Gingras and Ruby

operational practice that must be changed. Perhaps with new technology planners will become more discriminating in the use of fires.

To maintain the Nation’s role as a global leader, the Armed Forces must conduct wars with a high degree of morality. We have allowed ourselves to accept a certain level of civilian casualties as inevitable. But many may not be necessary. There is no obligation to threaten the majority of a population with death, injury, or loss of liveli- hood when their country or a neighboring country is engaged in a conflict with the United States. While not all noncombatant casualties can be avoided, it is immoral to produce casualties disproportionate to the necessity of attacking a given target. To wage moral operations, we must choose objectives that rapidly lead to the desired endstate. If it is likely that noncombatants will be affected when striking targets, the proportionality decision should be made at no lower than the JFACC level to create appropriate linkage between operational requirements and strategic objectives. Moreover, technologies should be fielded that can achieve desired effects with less collateral damage. American decisionmakers must recognize that military actions have consequences that Combat Camera Squadron (Jeffrey Allen) (Jeffrey Combat Camera Squadron st 1 reach far beyond the battlefield and affect people F–16 with KC–135 outside the borders of an enemy state. Certain ac- over Kosovo. tions are simply wrong and must be avoided. JFQ The Air Force also has small unpiloted combat aerial vehicles under development that have extended range and precision locating capability. NOTES Such weapons can deliver a small warhead onto a 1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: hardened target over extremely long distances Basic Books, 1992), p. 144. while keeping friendly aircrews out of harm’s way 2 Ibid., p. 128. and greatly reducing noncombatant casualties. 3 Dana Priest, “Target Selection Was Long Process,” Achieving military objectives with both min- The Washington Post, September 20, 1999, A-11. 4 imal risks to friendly forces and zero collateral Priest, “Bombing by Committee,” The Washington Post, September 20, 1999, A-1. damage conforms to several principles of war, es- 5 John A. Tirpak, “Washington Watch: Short’s View pecially economy of force and security. While of the Air Campaign,” Air Force, vol. 82, no. 9 (Septem- achieving objectives initiated by political leaders ber 1999), p. 43. and refined by operational commanders is the 6 Rowan Scarborough, “Bombing Utilities Could military mission, it can be argued that, given Backfire, Experts Warn,” The Washington Times, May 25, available technology, such objectives can be 1999, A-14. reached with fewer risks to friendly forces and 7 Ibid. noncombatants. Requirements must be written to 8 Phillip Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower achieve a certain effect, but not necessarily the (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Force History and Mu- total destruction of a target set along with numer- seums Program, 1995), p. 20. ous civilians. One authority noted that “airpower is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is an- alyzing the effects of air operations.”8 Many planners of joint aerospace operations instinctively increase the number of bombs to be dropped on a target because they think the mission requires it. They don’t trust bomb damage assessments and find it easier to ensure that a target is completely destroyed than to look for the effects. This is an

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Conducting building- to-building sweep.

Mission Creep or Mitchell) U.S. Navy (Terry Mission Misunderstood? By ADAM B. SIEGEL

n the decade of the 1990s the term mission a basis for avoiding actions. The validity of some creep became a buzzword. Changing views of actions was defended despite the threat of mission roles and missions brought greater promi- creep. The term even found its way down to en- Inence to the underlying phenomena the listed personnel, who explained certain actions as concept described. Even though its precise mean- necessary to avert mission creep. All this took ing is uncertain, mission creep influences military place without defining the term. The lack of any operations on the policy, operational, and tactical common definition produced a trump card that levels. The time has come to examine why this stifled debate and led to rejecting tasks that may concept arouses such passions. have been justifiable aspects of the military mis- In an operations order, the Supreme Allied sion. Richard Holbrooke, chief negotiator of the Commander Europe stated that Implementation Dayton Accords, asserted: Force (IFOR) should “avoid mission creep” during The military did not like civilian interference Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and Herze- “inside” their own affairs. They preferred to be given govina (December 20, 1995–December 20, 1996). a limited and clearly defined mission from their civil- In his operational plan, the commander of both ian colleagues and then decide on their own how to NATO Southern Region and IFOR indicated that carry it out. In recent years, the military had adopted “mission creep is to be resisted.” The term arose in a politically potent term for assignments they felt other contexts throughout Joint Endeavor, with were too broad: “mission creep.” This was a powerful commanders citing the threat of mission creep as pejorative, conjuring up images of quagmire. But it was never clearly defined, only invoked, and always Adam B. Siegel is a member of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center in a negative sense, used only to kill someone else’s and formerly worked at the Center for Naval Analyses. proposal.1

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Siegel

A key question was where proper civilian Alternative Framework control over the military ended and mission Tensions over mission creep derive partly creep began. It was debated in staff meetings, from a notion that distinct civilian and military around negotiating tables, and by the media (or political, economic, cultural, humanitarian, or (which often pushed for greater NATO involve- developmental) missions exist in places like ment in nonmilitary aspects of Bosnia. Though that may be true, all missions concepts of mission creep the war-to-peace transition). must support an overall objective. Thus rather revealed anxieties on Various mission creep con- than separate missions, a more accurate concep- cepts arose in discussions on option might be the civil-military mission, with the part of civilians and erations in Bosnia. Usually they diplomatic, military, and other roles in support of military parties alike reflected divergent views on em- such objectives. Then much of the controversy ploying military force. These would be centered on realigning mission-essential concepts of mission creep also tasks rather than engaging in unsuitable activities. revealed institutional and personal anxieties on Policymaking would be enhanced by a the part of civilians and military parties alike. broader definition of mission creep, one that di- vides it into categories. Such an effort would also Command Concerns provide a framework for appreciating mission In no small part concern over mission creep change. Four categories of mission change have derives from fears that military forces might be ei- emerged, each with its own rationale. ther misused or events could put an operation Task accretion is the accumulation of added into greater danger. Examples include: tasks viewed as necessary to achieve initial mission Losing focus on what matters. Some fear that di- objectives. Such changes generally occur on the verging from military missions will lead commanders ground as the man on the spot believes necessary.

U.S. Navy (Terry MitcU.S. Navy (Terry ell) to focus more on secondary issues, taking attention and Task accretion happens not because of changes in assets away from vital areas. This assumes that initial desired outcomes but rather changing perceptions planning and mission statements capture the most im- of what is required to achieve objectives. portant needs and that anything that happens later dis- During Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, torts planning. This reflects the view of those who do not want the military engaged in civilian tasks. Marine Corps and other forces restored basic utili- Losing focus on security risks. Involvement in the ties in northern Iraq to encourage Kurdish refugees civil sector can lead forces to lose perspective and misdir- to return to the cities. Such actions were not in- ect their traditional focus on maintaining a secure envi- cluded in initial tasking nor envisioned during ronment. This view assumes that increased military in- planning for movement into Iraq but were deemed volvement in the civil sector puts forces at greater risk. necessary for achieving mission objectives. Loss of certainty. Many individuals and organi- Mission shift occurs when forces adopt tasks zations prefer clearly delineated tasks.2 Nontraditional not initially included that, in turn, lead to mis- duties usually create uncertainty. sion expansion. There is a disconnect between Entanglement. Engaging in additional tasks on-the-scene decisions to involve forces in addi- makes it more difficult to withdraw when missions are completed than if forces adhere to limited mandates. tional tasks and political decisionmaking about Added costs. The assumption of civil tasks can objectives. cost money and lives. Some fear that forces may bear In 1993, a French army general flew to Sre- such burdens without adequate compensation. This brenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina and denounced concern can be driven in part by outside players who Serbian attacks on the city as part of a drive to en- view the military as rich by comparison to their own or- gage the U.N. Protection Force in its defense of ganizations and question why the military cannot per- refugees and other civilians. His actions and the form more nontraditional roles. reactions of Bosnian Muslims created pressure for Misuse of military capabilities. This fear arises the declaration of safe havens. That basically from nongovernmental organizations which believe the shifted the character of the U.N. mandate. military should not be engaged in certain activities (and that it is an expensive instrument for some nontradi- Mission transition comes about when a mis- tional roles) and from officers who decry the impact of sion undergoes an unclear or unstated shift of ob- humanitarian assistance on combat readiness. jectives. This occurs at higher headquarters and Professional distaste. Some members of the mili- in political sectors in an environment of gradual tary prefer not to be involved in what they perceive to and perhaps unclear or unrecognized modifica- be do-gooder humanitarian or law enforcement tasks tion. The changes may neither be explicitly stated such as drug interdiction which risks corruption. nor lead to reevaluation of forces involved and Each of these anxieties helped drive the dis- assigned tasks. cussion over operations in Bosnia. Colored by differing interpretations, they add to the challenge of understanding various perspectives on mission creep.

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MISSION CREEP

Escorting food convoy to Biado, Somalia. U.S. Navy (R.J. Oriez)

Although it is harder to provide a clear in- Missions change like the tasks required to stance of mission transition, one might be sup- achieve them. Denying this reality only com- port by the United States to U.N. operations in pounds the problem. These four categories explain Somalia in 1993. The available record indicates why military involvement is transformed during that the administration was moving toward a an operation. They provide a framework for un- new policy while the derstanding when such changes might lead down task accretion and mission leap military continued oper- a dangerous path. ations in pursuit of ob- It is apparent that task accretion, mission reflect the reality that not jectives established fol- shift, mission transition, and mission leap are everything can be foreseen lowing attacks on U.N. part of conducting peace operations. In fact many and U.S. forces. If politi- efforts—such as IFOR—represent them all, at least before conducting an operation cal leaders made the as possibilities. Rather than just decrying mission transition to a new pol- creep, this approach offers a focus on real prob- icy and changed mission objectives, as seems pos- lems which are generally lumped under the term. sible, they did not clearly communicate this shift Task accretion and mission shift refer to bot- in orders to the military. tom-up situations where on-the-ground factors Mission leap occurs when missions are radi- drive change. Mission transition and mission leap cally changed and thus alter military tasks. These are top-down; decisions taken away from the are explicit choices, whether or not political or scene lead to some form of mission change. Task military leaders recognize their implications. accretion and mission leap are inevitable parts of When several NATO members began relief an operation, illustrating conscious decisions efforts for Kurdish refugees in Turkey in 1991, it reached at higher headquarters or on the scene to was a short-lived emergency program. Within change or radically modify mission constraints. days it became a coalition mission to help Kurds They reflect the reality that not everything can be return home (including safe havens in northern foreseen before conducting an operation—that sit- Iraq). Some Allied nations maintained assistance uations are not always static and thus responses to to the Kurds in Iraq for more than five years, and them may not be either. no-flight enforcement continued until 1998. Serious problems arise with mission shift or transition. In both cases there are disconnects between political objectives and military operations.

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Siegel

To understand issues related to mission creep, a key is ensuring the consistency of military activities on the ground with political objectives. This requires a commitment to clearly identify mission goals. Both political leaders and military commanders must engage in constant dialogue to ensure congruity. This becomes all the more critical when the nature of an operation changes. The following three situations can create the greatest risk: changes in policy that do not lead to reviews of force structure or tasks shifting environments and actions on the ground that do not lead to reviews of policy decisions about force structure, tasks, missions, or policy that are not made in relation to the true purpose of a military operation and are divorced from the realities on the ground. This sort of approach—linking objectives, guidance, planning, and tasks—typically occurs most significantly at the onset of operations. Such reviews do not always take place as operations are Signal Company (Nicholas J. Blair)

th extended or marginal changes are made in guid- 55 ance, which increases the possibility that political Manning checkpoint, and operational realities become separated. Joint Endeavor. U.S. Navy (R.J. Oriez) They lack clarity regarding desired endstates, In identifying the dangers of evolving tasks which constitutes an aggravating factor. Policy and missions, both civilian and military leaders guidance and interaction between engaged forces must evaluate those missions and tasks on all and higher headquarters are needed to avoid mis- levels of command. They should not lose sight of steps in such shifts and transitions. the relationship between political objectives and military operations. Decisionmakers must grasp Misguided Typology why privates on the ground do or do not under- In developing terminology to explain mis- take a task. Without that common view, a mili- sion change perhaps the focus should be turned tary operation will risk becoming divorced from to defining long-term objectives for using force political aims. This is the true peril—that an op- and assuring that the resulting tasks accord with eration might inadvertently head toward failure them. In sum, a number of factors contribute to due to a lack of understanding of the relation- mission creep. The fact is that operations are not ship between actions on the ground and long- static. Missions change because tasks or endstates term objectives. JFQ change. In essence tasks change because the situations are different than expected or shift in unexpected ways. NOTES This view of mission change suggests that 1 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Ran- policymakers and planners must explicitly state dom House, 1998), p. 216. their assumptions about missions and that each 2 One definition of mission creep is derived from sit- should have an information requirement. Thus uations in which the military moves from well-defined no military plans should be considered complete or achievable missions to ill-defined or impossible ones. unless assumptions are directly associated with This implies setting up forces for failure since missions some means to verify their validity. become unachievable. Accordingly, some may fear that When new information calls any assumption mission creep results from efforts to blame the military into question it should prompt evaluations of for the failures of others. Such a definition also leads to missions, forces, and tasks. If tasks are at issue, loss of certainty. the forces deserve examination. If endstates are the concern, operations must be fully reviewed, including the forces.

Summer 2000 / JFQ 115 1925 Goldstein Pgs 2/24/01 12:35 PM Page 116

Cuba Libre! Army-Navy Cooperation in 1898 U.S. Army Center of Military History Bloody Ford, July 1, 1898 by Charles Johnson Post By JONAS L. GOLDSTEIN

n April 11, 1898, President William George Dewey defeated the Spanish at Manila McKinley asked Congress for authority Bay. Dewey, subsequently promoted to admiral, to intervene in Cuba to end the con- then assisted land forces under General Wesley O flict between the Spanish colonial gov- Merritt in capturing Manila. This victory crippled ernment and local insurgents who had launched efforts by Spain to bolster forces in the Caribbean a revolt in 1895. A declaration of war was issued or threaten America on a second front. Neverthe- on April 25. Initial combat occurred half a world less, overestimating Spanish seapower, municipal- away when naval forces under Commodore ities along the eastern seaboard of the United States called for defense against marauding Span- ish ships, while Washington rushed to blockade Cuba. Against a backdrop of unprecedented Lieutenant Commander Jonas L. Goldstein, USN (Ret.), served with the global engagement, the services drafted joint Veterans Administration and is a prolific journalist and poet. plans for projecting U.S. power abroad.

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Goldstein

Blockade of Santiago de Cuba

as Kettle Hill ua m 012 G Santiago de Cuba s a L Nautical Miles Bay of Battle of Santiago de Cuba San Juan Hill 1 July 1898 Spanish Fleet 4 Cruisers 2 Destroyers Las Cruces American Advance From Daiquiri

i R

a Punta Gorda Battery u J

n a S

Estrella Battery Socapa Battery Morro Castle Morro Battery

American Fleet 4 Battleships 4 Cruisers Daiquiri (U.S. landing site) USS Brooklyn 3 Gunboats (Schley’s Flagship) USS New York (Sampson’s Flagship)

Service Responses The Navy response was not surprising. The At the outset of the war, the Navy was better department had been relatively well organized prepared than the Army in both organization and since the Civil War. The Secretary of the Navy ad- weaponry. The fleet had four first-class battle- ministered the service with support from an able ships: USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, USS Oregon, Assistant Secretary, Theodore Roosevelt. Although and USS Iowa, as well as a second-class battleship, there was no chief of staff, civilian officials USS Texas. Among other major surface combat- worked with bureau chiefs, who were rotated so ants were armored cruisers, including USS New that naval leadership remained responsive.

U.S. Army Center of Military History York and USS Brooklyn, which were fine vessels for The Navy had also given thought to fighting their day. The Navy also had six double-turreted future wars. Prior to the conflict, its strategic monitors and activated 13 outmoded monitors of thinking was concentrated at the Naval War Col- Civil War vintage. Finally, there were 18 smaller lege, where alternatives were considered regard- vessels useful against ships of their own class or ing a possible war with Spain. Creative thinking in blockades, helpful since a strategic goal was in the schoolhouse was matched by energetic blocking Cuban ports under Spanish control. training in the fleet. At sea and ashore, naval offi- In addition, when war broke out the govern- cers invested in readiness. As Roosevelt stated: ment transferred 13 revenue cutters along with Except actually shooting at a foe, most of the men on their officers and crews to the Navy. These were board ship went through in time of peace practically not only important for the blockade but in trans- all that they would have to go through in time of war. porting troops to Cuba. Congress also appropri- The heads of bureaus in the Navy Department were ated $50,000,000 for national defense. Because for the most part men who had seen sea service and the War Department had not yet finalized its expected to return to sea.1 plans, the bulk of the money went to the Navy, Secretary of the Navy John Long created the which bought civilian vessels—including 123 Naval War Board in March 1898. Its original mem- merchant ships and yachts—and outfitted them bers were Roosevelt; Captain Arent Crowninshield, for war. Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; Rear Admiral

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Montgomery Sicard, recently detached from Com- The bureau chiefs were for the most part elderly in- mander in Chief, North Atlantic Squadron; and competents.3 Captain Albert Barker. Some of the members as- At the outset of the war, the Army numbered sumed other duties once war was declared. Its per- roughly 28,000, with twenty-five infantry, ten manent members included Sicard (as chairman), cavalry, and five artillery regiments. These units Crowninshield, and Captain were not prepared for a war with Spain since the at the outset of the war, Alfred Thayer Mahan. The Army assumed it would play a subordinate role to the Army numbered roughly board proved valuable during the Navy and that the fundamental mission of the conflict both to the Secre- land forces was defending the Nation’s borders. 28,000, with twenty-five tary and the President. As This view explains much of the indifference in infantry regiments Long said: the War Department until mid-April 1898. It was eminently fitted to coordi- As Secretary of War Russell Alger wrote: nate the work of the department and the fleet, and to The War Department had, on April 23, accomplished keep a general surveillance over the larger strategic and some little extra work on the coast defenses; it had technical questions which could not be dealt with by ready for use enough 30-caliber rifles to arm the the commanders in chief of the several squadrons. 33,000 men added to the regular Army, and enough . . . To my mind the board possessed high intelligence 45-caliber Springfields for the volunteers; but that and excellent judgment, and its service was invaluable was all.4 in connection with the successful conduct of the war.2 After much discussion with Congress, the ad- Although the Navy was fairly well prepared, ministration decided to create a volunteer army the Army was not. As Roosevelt stated: to serve beside the regulars. An initial call for vol- The War Department was in far worse shape than the unteers was confined to members of the National Navy Department....[After the Civil War] the only Guard, with quotas for each state according to way in which the Secretary of War could gain credit population. It was also decided to form national for himself or the administration was by economy organizations of volunteers—a concept that pro- . . . through [reduction in the size of the Army]. duced the famous Rough Riders. Congress passed a bill to that effect on April 22. The next day, the President issued the call for 125,000 volunteers. On April 26 Congress authorized a regular army of 64,719. Thus the stage was set for launching a Rough Riders major land campaign against the Spanish. leaving Tampa. Strategic planning by the Army before the war was minimal, although some thinking went into an invasion of Cuba. Once war came vigorous action was stifled by the indifference shown by the President toward the War Department and weak Army leadership. Moreover, the assumed primacy of naval operations—by gaining control of waters around Cuba before an invasion—made land operations of secondary concern. War by Consensus An early example of joint planning and execution was manifest in Washington by a council of war convened at the White House on May 2. Because the President lacked faith in his Secretary of War and his senior military assistant, General Nelson Miles, he increasingly played a major roll in formulating joint strategy. In this instance, he joined Secretary of War Alger along with Miles, Long, and Sicard. Landing sites and a naval convoy of the invasion force were dominant issues, with little discussion of the ground war to follow. After war was declared, the Navy instituted a blockade of Cuba. The next step was determined to be the destruction of the Spanish fleet an- chored in the Bay of Santiago de Cuba, but it was soon realized that success would depend on an Naval Historical Center

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Marines skirmishing, Guantanamo. Naval Historical Center

expedition ashore. This introduced substantial to proceed under naval escort to Santiago. When problems. To carry out the invasion, the Army he received the order, he could not obey. His base had to procure sufficient transports, made diffi- was chaotic with guns in one place, mounts in cult by the Navy commandeering vessels for the another, and ammunition somewhere else. More- blockade. The Army finally obtained ships by se- over, there was confusion between civilian crew curing transports with civilian crews in charge. members on Army transports and base support The Army planned the invasion throughout staff. Problems abounded, including an inability May. There was a consensus that control of the to unload railroad cars at the right piers. After a sea around Cuba was vital to an invasion. How- delay of over a week the force was ready to pro- ever, there were differences re- ceed on June 7 but was further frustrated when because of the inexperience garding the roles of the two the Navy believed that Spanish ships had been services. The Navy believed spotted, stalling sailing until June 14. of civilian crews on troop the landings would support ships, the Navy had to herd the destruction of the enemy No Misunderstanding the makeshift flotilla fleet while the Army envi- The main invasion force was V Corps: two sioned the objective as a vic- divisions and an independent infantry brigade, a torious land campaign. At first dismounted cavalry division, four field artillery the Army planned for debarkation near Havana, batteries, and a handful of auxiliary troops. This followed by an all-out drive on the capital. How- force sailed into the Bahama Channel aboard 32 ever, General Miles determined that Spanish densely packed coastal steamers. A convoy of strength in the area was too great and that the naval vessels joined the flotilla off Key West and strike should concentrate on the naval base at began the slow voyage toward Cuba. Largely be- Santiago de Cuba. cause of the inexperience of civilian crews on On May 31 General William Shafter—who troop ships, the Navy had to round up and herd had an expeditionary force of some 17,000 men the makeshift flotilla. As Richard Harding Davis, in Tampa—was ordered by the War Department

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a journalist who accompanied the convoy, re- Morro Castle on the east side of the channel en- called, “We traveled at the rate of seven miles an trance, but Shafter felt the price would be too high. hour, with long pauses for thought and consulta- Sampson and Shafter decided to seek advice tion. Sometimes we moved at the rate of four from leaders of the Cuban insurrection. The two miles an hour, and frequently we did not move American officers were pulled ashore with their at all....We could not keep in line and we lost staffs by a Navy gig and met General Calixto Gar- ourselves and each other, and the gunboats and cia beyond the coastal cliffs. After Shafter stated torpedo boats were kept busy.”5 Fortunately, as his concern, Garcia recommended debarment at Long added, “Not the slightest attempt was made Daiquiri, 18 miles east of Santiago, which was ac- by the Spanish gunboats lurking in the harbors ceptable to all parties. As a deception, the Navy of Cuba to prevent the American transports with bombarded not only that location but other sites the Army on board from safely reaching their simultaneously to distract the Spanish. destination.”6 On June l the joint force still faced the Deploying and convoying the invasion force daunting task of getting troops ashore. Long ca- was the most notable example of Army-Navy co- bled Captain H.C. Taylor, who commanded the operation during the war. The teamwork was out- convoy: “The Army will probably ask you to assist lined in a dispatch to Shafter: the landing with the boats of your convoy, and to With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are di- cover the attempt with some of your small ves- rected to take command on transports, proceed under sels, which may be done, exercising due 10 convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de caution.” In the spirit of this message, Sampson Cuba, land your force...under the protection of the agreed to lend the invasion force all the steam Navy . . . and cover the Navy as it sends its men in launches and pulling boats with crews that could small boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of be spared. Furthermore, command of the opera- the Navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now re- tion was put under a naval officer, assisted by a ported to be in Santiago harbor.7 beach-master ashore. Cooperation between the services at Daiquiri proved excellent, though As troops sailed to Cuba—indeed throughout arrangements were complicated when some civil- the war—the President was deeply involved. ian shipmasters commanding Army transports re- Leadership on this level assured completion of fused to expose their vessels to danger by moving joint strategic planning. As Commander in Chief, close to the enemy-held shoreline. McKinley alone had the authority to ensure After the successful landing, cooperation be- united action by the Armed Forces. Although the tween the two services deteriorated as the Army Navy Department did not require close scrutiny proceeded toward Santiago by an indirect route. in executing its approved strategy, the War De- The Navy urged a more direct attack, although it partment lacked efficient leadership, making in- was reluctant to risk its ships in a head-on en- tervention by the President most helpful. His per- gagement by advancing straight into the harbor sonal secretary noted that the “President seemed defenses. Even when the Spanish naval force was to grow more masterful day by day and exhibited destroyed, the Navy refrained from attacking the infinite tact and gentleness and graciousness in channel and forts because of fears of mines and 8 dealing with men.” artillery. As Long commented, “The international McKinley fostered the teamwork between situation . . . did not permit us to take the risk of the services in Washington, with a war room in throwing our armored vessels away on the mines the White House connected by telegraph. He also in Santiago Harbor when there were no Spanish brought military leaders together and assured vessels to attack and destroy. We could not afford their efforts were harmonious. With Presidential to lose one battleship.”11 Yet, despite debate over support, field and fleet commanders ensured in- the next step in the campaign, and which force terservice cooperation. On June 29, a dispatch should assume greater risk, these disagreements from the War Department to Shafter stated, “The did not end interservice teamwork. Long directed President directs that there must be no misunder- the Navy commander to confer with his Army standing between the commanding officers of the counterpart to do everything possible to secure naval and land forces in and around Santiago and the surrender of the enemy, then left the matter 9 the signal officers of the Army.” to his discretion. From that point Sampson and Shafter ensured the cooperation of their forces Command Conference through consultation and mutual agreement. On June 20 the American force arrived off Shafter’s troops began a general attack on Santiago. Admiral William Sampson’s chief of staff July 1 and fought several bloody engagements. guided his flagship among the blockading naval vessels. Sailors lined the rails and cheered the troops. Sampson wanted the Army to storm lofty

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Goldstein Naval Historical Center Hoisting flag over Camp McCalla, June 1898. Two days later some of the Spanish force at- NOTES tempted to escape by sea but were driven back or sunk in sharp exchanges with the U.S. fleet. On 1 Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York: July 17 the enemy garrison at Santiago surren- Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), p. 222. 2 dered. Following the success of the Cuban opera- John D. Long, The New American Navy (New York: Outlook Company, 1903), pp. 162–63. tion, U.S. forces landed on Puerto Rico on July 25 3 Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 223. and took control of the island after dealing with 4 Russell A. Alger, The Spanish-American War (New token resistance. By the end of the month Spanish York: Harper and Brothers, 1901), pp. 14–15. opposition in the Caribbean theater had ended. 5 Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Cambridge, Mass.: Literary Guild of America, 1931), p. 256. The American victory was due as much to 6 Long, The New American Navy, p. 20. the weakness of Spain as to strategy and ability. 7 H.C. Corbin, dispatch to Major General William R. Still it facilitated U.S. dominance in the Shafter, May 31, 1898. 8 Caribbean and the annexation of Hawaii, Guam, Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: and Puerto Rico as well as control of the Philip- Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 233. 9 Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Vol. 1 pine islands. The United States had emerged as a (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, world power to be duly considered by the nations 1993), p. 67. of Europe. 10 Alger, The Spanish-American War, p. 81. Operations during the Spanish-American War 11 Long, The New American Navy, p. 24. reflected a profound military transformation. At the same time, flaws in service cooperation demonstrated that the services would have to re- shape its capabilities for a new century. Actions during the war offer lessons on the magnitude of that challenge. Army-Navy cooperation was no substitute for joint doctrine, integrated command, and functional capabilities. JFQ

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Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. commentary Communications Squadron (Brad Fallin) Communications Squadron Resourcing the Force th 100 The Legacy of Cold War Strategy By RONALD W. MOORE

hroughout the Clinton administration structures were underfunded by as much as $30 critics have bemoaned shortfalls in re- billion per year. sources relative to national strategy and The gap between strategy and resources T force structure. A lapse in acquisition is prompted a lively critique of an administration frustrating recapitalization efforts and depleting lacking a national security vision. The Clinton the operations and maintenance account approach perpetuated a grand strategy dating through unprecedented levels of deployment. back to World War II. Moreover this strategy will Some estimate that both the Bottom-Up Review guide security policy into the next administration and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) force and, together with emerging domestic and international trends, perpetuate a mismatch for the foreseeable future. This will result in both the fre- quent use of military force in limited-objective Ronald W. Moore is assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense interventions and increasing tension in civil-mili- and completed this article while attending the National War College. tary relations.

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Moore

The Mismatch militarily preeminent and consolidated its role as The principal factor which contributed to a a world power by constructing what one former disconnect between strategy and resources during Secretary of State has called “a global liberal eco- 1 the current administration is an expansive idea of nomic regime.” national security interests together with a man- But as recounted by John Gaddis in Strategies date to balance the budget. The QDR requirement of Containment, Washington did not always devote (echoed in national military strategy) is com- sufficient resources to support its superpower role. prised of three broad and open-ended elements: He depicts cycles in which various Presidents pur- shaping the international environment, respond- sued asymmetric containment with defense strate- ing to the full spectrum of crises, and preparing gies such as New Look under Eisenhower and dé- now for an uncertain future. The related goal of tente under Nixon. Defense assets were full spectrum dominance outlined in Joint Vision deliberately reduced and risks increased even in 2020 is also a task of boundless proportion. the face of the monolithic Soviet threat. Cold War Despite an ambitious strategy and visionary security requirements were not fully underwritten

requirements, spending levels have declined. Mili- even when higher cost symmetric approaches commentary tary cuts have been an essential part of the admin- were adopted, like flexible response under istration plan to balance the budget because de- Kennedy, since the United States relied on nuclear fense outlays amount to half of all discretionary deterrence to offset conventional disadvantages. spending. In constant terms, defense spending is Extended deterrence was another aspect of down 30 percent from Cold War levels, and pro- Cold War strategy that resulted in the mismatch. curement has dropped by 45 percent. The Armed Our strategy was initially affordable because of Forces have declined by 20 percent from the base overwhelming nuclear predominance, but it be- force level of the last administration in terms of came increasingly expensive when the emphasis active duty personnel as well as active component shifted to conventional forward defense in re- combat brigades, ships, and tactical air wings. sponse to Soviet nuclear forces in the late 1950s. To marshal assets to support an expansive As the nuclear posture of the Soviet Union strategy in times of fiscal constraint, the Clinton increased, so did U.S. forward deployments. By administration has sought traditional elixirs: al- the mid-1980s some 450,000 Americans were per- lies, technology, and defense reform. Unfortu- manently stationed ashore in both Europe and nately these solutions do not meet the need. Our the Pacific. Even this expensive posture, combined with the threat of nuclear response, was Communications Squadron (Brad Fallin) Communications Squadron allies in Europe and Asia remain critically depend- t not our entire deterrent. One key ingredient was

100 ent on U.S. military capabilities while America continues to be ambiva- sheer political will and declaratory bravado, an- the strategy-resource mismatch lent toward allied efforts other element that exceeded tangible budgets. to assume a larger secu- The third aspect of Cold War strategy was is a legacy of the Cold War rity role within their re- the unprecedented size of the peacetime military. gions. Technological so- Both the cost and influence of the Armed Forces lutions are costly and introduce risk in an contributed to an unaffordable strategy. As environment of asymmetric threats. Reform initia- Samuel Huntington pointed out in The Soldier and tives, such as streamlining procurement and right- the State, two facets of the professional military sizing infrastructure, languish under bureaucratic ethic are the emphasis on the magnitude and im- inertia and domestic political agendas. mediacy of perceived threats and the relentless Thus current strategic ends and available need to enlarge and strengthen the force. The in- means remain mismatched. This disconnect is fluence of the military on strategy during the not uncommon and reveals the degree of risk in- Cold War, given both its ethic and substantial volved in strategy. But current strategy breaks economic and political impact on domestic af- down in two respects: the risk has become unac- fairs, inclined the Nation toward a budget-busting ceptable and, more importantly, in failing to link defense posture. ends and means, the strategy does not inform pri- Moreover, the size and capability of the orities and tradeoffs to assist in risk management. Armed Forces throughout the Cold War fueled what has been called the tyranny of means. For Dubious Heritage most of this period, particularly after the Vietnam The strategy-resource mismatch is a legacy War, the United States maintained a world-class of the Cold War. Its first aspect was the hege- military, trained and equipped with advanced monic strategy adopted by the United States after weaponry and capacity for unparalleled power World War II. America came out of that conflict projection. Essentially it was too capable not to be employed in pursuit of hegemonic interests yet insufficient to fully accomplish them.

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VE–Day parade in Red Square, 1965. commentary AP/Wide Photos World

The fourth aspect of the Cold War legacy is The end of the Cold War has brought about reflected in program budgeting and acquisition. a repeat of history, including crisis and conflict in In search of ever-greater technological advances, the nonindustrialized world. These areas will un- and compounded by inefficiencies dergo most of the growth in world population, the end of the Cold War in procurement practices, defense leading to the migration of predominantly young planners had a systematic bias to- people to urban centers. There, social ills such as has brought about a ward overestimating weapons per- disease, overcrowding, unemployment, and crime repeat of history formance and underestimating life will be exacerbated, overwhelming inefficient cycle costs. This so-called discipline governments. Conflict will breed under these ab- gap led the Pentagon to produce ject living conditions, fueled by cheap and ample fewer or less capable weapon systems than stipu- conventional weapons and exploited by desper- lated by the funding level. By not providing the ate, ambitious leaders. The resulting conflicts will budgeted force structure, which was inadequate spread across failed states and produce refugees, to implement a hegemonic strategy, dysfunc- displaced persons, and human rights abuses. tional planning exacerbated the mismatch. Moreover, threats to vital U.S. interests remain, including proliferation of weapons of mass Future Prospects destruction and missile technology as well as the Emerging trends will perpetuate the ends specter of terrorism and cyberwar. In response, and means mismatch. Two important trends are complex and expensive programs for missile de- instability and globalization—including eco- fense, the militarization of space, and the protec- nomic interpenetration and the revolution in in- tion of critical infrastructure will compete for fi- formation technology—by heightening the sig- nite defense resources. Also affecting vital nificance of distant events and accelerating their interests are the uncertain futures of the brittle overall impact. As one writer commented, “One and illegitimate regimes in the friendly Gulf awkward corollary of being a global superpower is states, shifts in the dynamics of power in Asia, that anything anywhere in the world involves at and the ever-present question of Russia. least a tenuous tie to some strategic interest.”2 Not only will such risks require greater assets than are likely to be available, but expansive perceptions of the threat tend to intensify. “Each time the United States pushes its security interests

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the United States is not measuring up to its obligation to enforce the rules might call into question its claim to be the hub from which the spokes of the international system extend.”4

An unavoidable consequence of hegemony— particularly in a crisis-prone environment—is a continuous pattern of prolonged intervention, often for limited objectives. For the United States, deterrence will be less efficacious because of the nature of intra-state conflict and a growing array of nonstate-sponsored threats. Moreover, incon- stant policies in the past have weakened deterrence and thus “made it extremely difficult for

the United States to achieve its objectives without commentary actually conducting military operations.”5 Intervention for limited objectives goes Communications Squadron (Blake R. Borsic) Communications Squadron

d against the grain of the American way of war, 52 which is identified by strategies of annihilation in Fighters over northern support of unlimited war aims. This tradition is Germany, 2000. marked by conflicts that feature military abso- outward,” one observer noted, “threats to the lutism and autonomy in which overwhelming new security frontier will be apprehended.”3 force is used to defeat a particular enemy and Turning to the domestic scene, two trends achieve unambiguous objectives.6 Restricting mil- likely to sustain the mismatch are demographic itary absolutism or autonomy in future wars is shifts and political consensus. Compared with the likely to result in greater tension between civilian AP/Wide P World otos end of the Cold War, minorities are projected to and military leaders in planning and executing grow from 25 to 35 percent of the national popu- interventions. The tension will increase as the lation by 2020, with the proportion of those who military is persistently asked by its political mas- are foreign-born or second-generation forecast to ters to do more than it can afford, in missions at increase from 40 to 55 percent. With so many odds with professional ethics, and with opera- people with foreign ties, political constituencies tional and tactical level decisions made under may be more attuned to international affairs. Also, close civilian oversight. Americans aged 65 and over will be the fastest Relations will be further soured by competi- growing segment, estimated to move from 12 to tion among the services for scarce resources and 17 percent. The graying of the population will ex- the difficulty of obtaining increased funding ab- acerbate constraints on discretionary outlays, sent a classic threat on the horizon. JFQ which in turn will compete with defense budgets. More importantly, there is a domestic consensus firmly in favor of a major national role in NOTES world affairs. This is underscored by the conver- 1 Benjamin Schwarz, “Why America Thinks It Has to gence of competing political groups in support of Run the World,” The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 277, no. 6 proactive hegemony. Compare, for example, the (June 1996), p. 93. neoconservative veterans of the Reagan era who 2 Anthony Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons still advocate activism on the world stage and neo- of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo: Summary Briefing to liberals who promote intensified engagement and the USAF/XP Strategy Forum (1999), p. 11. shaping, under the rubric of preventive defense. 3 Christopher Layne, “Rethinking American Grand A contrary position, that the Nation should Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty- share substantial responsibility for maintaining First Century?” World Policy Journal, vol. 15, no. 2 (Sum- mer 1998), p. 18. the global liberal economic regime, requires unac- 4 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Policing Utopia: The Military ceptable constraints on our freedom of action Imperatives of Globalization,” The National Interest, and is out of step with the political mainstream, no. 56 (Summer 1999), p. 11. which wants to maintain the role as world leader. 5 Barry M. Blechman and Tamara C. Wittes, “Defin- As one analyst concluded, “Any suggestion that ing Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 114, no. 1 (Spring 1999), p. 5. 6 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A His- tory of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloom- ington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. xxii.

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OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General Thomas Dresser White (1902–1965) Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

VITA orn in Walker, Minnesota; graduated from U.S. Military Academy (1920); completed infantry school (1921); served with 14th Infantry (1921–24); attended primary and advanced flying school (1924–25); 99th Observation Squadron (1925–27); studied Chinese language in Peking (1927–31); served at Headquarters, Air Corps (1931–34); appointed assistant military attaché to Russia (1934) and Italy (1935); completed Air Corps tactical Bschool (1938) and command and general staff school prior to being assigned to Office of the Chief of Air Corps; appointed military attaché and chief of U.S. military air mission to Brazil (1940); served as assistant chief of staff for operations and chief of staff, Third Air Force (1942–44); named assistant chief of air staff for intelligence and deputy commander, Thirteenth Air Force (1944); commander, Seventh Air Force (1945–46); chief of staff, Pacific Air Command (1946–47); commander, Fifth Air Force (1947–48); director of legislation and liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (1948–50); Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1950–51); director of plans and deputy chief of staff for operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (1951); named Vice Chief of Staff (1953) and Chief of Staff (1957); died in Washington, D.C.

The United States must win and maintain the capability to control space in order to assure the progress and pre-eminence of the free nations. If liberty and freedom are to remain in the world, the United States and its allies must be in position to control space. — General White quoted in The Aerospace Force: Defending America in the 21st Century. U.S. Air Force

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THE JOINT WORLD

The third chapter evaluates planning Doctrine and execution of multinational opera- MULTISERVICE tions. Processes such as mission analysis MULTINATIONAL must master the increased coordination SOLUTIONS OPERATIONS and decisionmaking involved in combin- The mission of the Air Land Sea ing the interests and objectives of two or Application (ALSA) Center is developing Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine more national militaries as well as their publications and studies on multiservice for Multinational Operations, recounts the respective governments. Planning and tactics, techniques, and procedures characteristics and complexities of multi- execution steps require conscious efforts which facilitate joint information national operations. This volume has to increase respect, rapport, knowledge, exchange and operational solutions for been under development for some years and communication at every step. warfighters. Anyone can recommend a and was the subject of an article entitled The final chapter examines opera- project. Once a void in existing multiser- “Making the Case for Multinational Mili- tional concerns in various environments vice procedures is identified, the subject tary Doctrine” by Jay M. Vittori which —land, maritime, air, and space—as well is forwarded to a joint actions steering appeared in Joint Force Quarterly (Spring as information operations, search and committee representing the doctrinal 1998). Even though most of the princi- rescue, et al. commands and comprised of general/flag ples and processes described in this pub- A series of appendixes contains a officers from all services who decide lication can be applied to unilateral mili- listing of questions on multinational whether to pursue a project. Once a pro- tary operations, it is focused on larger planning, descriptions of multinational gram is approved, the services are asked multinational issues. Overcoming differ- operations involving significant Ameri- to provide subject matter experts to meet ences on viewpoints and capabilities can participation, and a compilation of at ALSA, where action officers act as facil- requires the attention of force command- major references. A three-page glossary itators with service experts to develop ers, their staffs, and associated personnel. of abbreviations and acronyms is fol- multiservice solutions. Approved solu- The first chapter points out that lowed by a six-page listing of terms and tions are often produced within a year. multinational operations rest on a diffi- definitions. JFQ Current projects include Army- cult political foundation: achieving and Marine Corps integration, aviation in maintaining sufficient cohesion between urban terrain, bomber-maritime opera- two or more nations to integrate their ALLIED PUBLICATIONS tions, brevity codes, explosive ordnance forces to achieve a common objective. disposal, combat airspace command and NATO recently ratified several doc- Whether an operation involves existing control, air and missile defense coordina- trinal publications: AJP-01(A), Allied Joint agreements in an alliance or temporary tion, risk management, suppression of Doctrine; AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistics; arrangements in a coalition, each enemy air defense, defense of fixed sites, AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Aerospace Operations; requires significant efforts to overcome theater missile intelligence preparation of AJP-4.10, Allied Joint Medical Support Doc- the challenges presented by multina- the battlefield, and an introduction to trine; AJP-3.6, Electronic Warfare; and tional planning and execution. Decisions the tactical digital information link. AJP-4.6, Multinational Joint Logistics to visit unity of effort and effective con- Further information on ALSA can be Center. Other pubs under development trol on multinational operations affect found at http://www.dtic.mil/alsa. JFQ political unity. Obstacles in direction, include AJP-2.2, Counterintelligence and coordination, and support increase with Security; AJP-2.5, Handling Captured Per- differences in doctrine, capabilities, lan- sonnel, Equipment, and Documents; AJP-3, Education guage, and culture and should be met Allied Joint Operations; AJP-3.4.1, Peace with deftness to build trust among Support Operations; and AJP-4.5, Host PHASE I PJE nations, leaders, and institutions through Nation Support. JFQ personal contact and liaison efforts. This During academic year 1999–2000, volume also reveals that there is no sim- the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and ple solution. Each operation is unique GROUND FORCE Naval War College developed a tailored because of converging interests, capabili- program leading to a diploma from the ties, and the degree of familiarity of the COMMANDER College of Naval Command and Staff, participants. The Army and Marine Corps are including phase I certification under the The next chapter discusses com- developing a Joint Force Land Component Program for Joint Education (PJE). The mand and control over forces under Commander (JFLCC) Handbook that relevant courses are offered by faculty more than one national chain of com- focuses on multiservice tactics, tech- members of the Naval War College who mand. The three basic options for com- niques, and procedures. The final coordi- are permanently assigned to NPS. A three- mand are: integration under a lead nation draft has been released for review. course sequence meets the requirements nation, in parallel with some form of Approval and distribution is programmed of professional military education as coordination cell, or a combination of for November 2000. In addition, at the established by the Chief of Naval Opera- both. Only the lead nation option Joint Doctrine Working Party meeting tions and approved through accreditation ensures unity of effort, while a parallel held in April 2000, the Army proposed of the College of Continuing Education at structure or combination requires at least developing a joint pub on JFLCC opera- the Naval War College. Moreover, the two multinational force commanders. tions. The proposal was approved and program covers all mandatory learning This chapter reviews considerations for designated Joint Pub 3-31, Command and areas outlined in the CJCS officer profes- selecting the most appropriate option. Control for Joint Land Force Operations. JFQ sional military education policy.

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The program presents courses in strategy and policy, national security decisionmaking, and joint maritime New from NDU Press operations. In September 1999 the strategy and policy curriculum replaced maritime strategy courses. The joint maritime operations and national security decisionmaking courses can replace or supplement other offerings and be taken voluntarily. Phase I credit can only be earned by completing a three-course sequence: strategy and policy, national Essays security decisionmaking, and joint maritime operations. To provide maximum 2000 flexibility, the NPS program offers day- time and evening classes or mentored independent study. All versions of the courses are academically rigorous. The program enables students to earn a degree from NPS, a diploma Presenting the winners awarded by the Naval War College, and credit for phase I PJE. Students who can- th not complete all diploma requirements at of the 19 annual NPS can enroll in the remaining courses by seminar or correspondence through essay competition: the College of Continuing Education at a subsequent duty station. Additional information is available in the Naval Charles K. Hyde Postgraduate School catalog at http://www.nps.navy.mil. JFQ “Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policymakers and Senior Military Officers” JFQ ESSAY CONTEST The two winners of the 1999–2000 William J. Bayles Joint Force Quarterly Essay Contest on “Moral and Ethical Considerations Military Innovation are LTC Antulio J. for Computer Network Attack as a Echevarria II, USA, who took first prize with an entry focusing on a strategic and Means of National Power in Time of operational concept to integrate impera- War” tives described in JV 2020, and LTJG Shannon L. Callahan, USN, who won both the second and junior officer prizes John G. Fox with an essay on military applications of “Approaching Humanitarian nanotechnology to future warfare and Intervention Strategically: The Case strategic competition. The number of essays submitted of Somalia” in 1999–2000 was more than double those in the previous contest. Moreover, Douglas B. Rider 52 percent of the essays were entered by “Establishing a Commercial military officers in the rank of major or lieutenant commander or below. Of Reserve Imagery Fleet: Obtaining Surge Imagery Capacity the contestants, 26 percent were Army, from Commercial Remote Sensing Satellite Systems during Crisis” 10 percent Navy, 8 percent Marine Corps, and 35 percent Air Force. The balance of the entrants were civilians. Of the mili- John F. Kirby tary entrants 8 percent were members of “Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational the Reserve components. Function” The winning entries and other selected essays from the contest will be published in issue 26 (Autumn 2000) of the journal. JFQ

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Wickham, who concentrates on the United States, both men were sea- CRISIS IN KOREA developments in Seoul, offers gripping soned professionals and highly regarded details on the death of Park, including an at home. Each respected the other, as A Review Essay by insightful portrait of his assassin, Korean their accounts make clear, while at the DON OBERDORFER CIA Director Kim Jae Kyu, and substan- same time recognizing the differences in tial new material on maneuvering within their assignments. the South Korean military which fol- The two books provide tangible evi- Korea on the Brink: From the lowed. His account is presumably based dence of the crucial roles of CINCs and “12/12 Incident” to the Kwangju on official reports since the work lacks ambassadors in policymaking. Wickham Uprising, 1979–1980 source notes. and Gleysteen received great leeway by by John A. Wickham Gleysteen emphasizes the political their masters in Washington and, in Washington: National Defense deliberations between Washington and Wickham’s case, by the Commander in University Press, 1999. Seoul but is less detailed on events in Chief, Pacific Command, in Honolulu. 241 pp. $20.00 [ISBN 1–57906–023–4] Korea. His narrative begins earlier than Moreover, what they suggested from the Wickham’s, offering background on field was usually adopted as policy by efforts by President Jimmy Carter to their superiors. Part of the reason is that Massive Entanglement, Marginal withdraw U.S. troops from Korea, which the seizure of the American embassy in Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis Gleysteen observed as an official in the Iran only days after the assassination of by William H. Gleysteen, Jr. State Department before becoming Park and the invasion of Afghanistan by Washington: Brookings Institution ambassador and which he thinks con- the Soviets in December 1979 distracted Press, 1999. 242 pp. $17.95 tributed to Park’s assassination. attention from Korea, making microman- [ISBN 0–8157–3170–1] Gleysteen also takes his account beyond agement less practical for Carter and his Wickham’s, including efforts to protect aides. Another factor was that U.S. offi- longtime opposition leader Kim Dae cials on the scene have historically Jung in late 1980 and early 1981, in played significant roles in Korean policy he period between the assassination which Washington assumed a decisive (Carter’s proposed withdrawal of U.S. Tof President Park Chung Hee in Octo- role. Putting minor differences aside, the troops, an initiative of uncertain origin, ber 1979 and full American acceptance of general and the ambassador observed is one notable exception.) Even today, his strong arm successor in early 1981 the key actors and events through ambassadors and CINCs are living proof was among the most violent in modern remarkably similar eyes. that—at least in Korea—such officials are Korean history—and most dangerous in It was probably inevitable given the not simply messengers. U.S.-Korean relations. In that short time, circumstances that Wickham became Nonetheless, the conclusions that Park’s 18-year regime ended at the hands deeply involved in political issues as Wickham and Gleysteen reach are not of his intelligence chief; a coup in the Gleysteen assumed a major role in mili- how powerful they were in dealing with night installed an obscure general, Chun tary affairs. Civil-military differences in Korean affairs, but how powerless. The Doo Hwan; brutal suppression of a revolt overseas operations would have been dis- title of Gleysteen’s book succinctly cap- by Chun fueled fierce domestic emotions ruptive in such a crisis. Fortunately for tures that view, which Wickham also that have never entirely subsided; and a shares. “The era of America’s paternal secret deal struck between Chun and the influence over the [Republic of Korea] incoming administration of President Gleysteen and Wickham Ronald Reagan provided tangible proof in Seoul, 1981 of American recognition of Chun in return for commuting a death sentence imposed on a prominent Korean dis- senter, Kim Dae Jung. General John Wickham, USA, commander of U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea, and Ambassador William Gleysteen, the senior American diplomat on the scene, were at the helm of U.S. military and political power in Seoul at the time. Working independently, they have produced accounts of their respective roles in these turbulent events. And fortu- itously, Korea on the Brink by Wickham and Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influ- ence by Gleysteen appeared within weeks of each other. Together these books constitute an extraordinary record of the situation in Seoul and the American response. Both men substantially enlarge our knowledge of this crucial period.

Don Oberdorfer is the author of The Two

Koreas: A Contemporary History. Courtesy of John A. Wickham

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had passed,” declares the general. “Any- for a faction ready to restore constitu- As both authors acknowledge, the one who believed that we were in any tional authority by force. As the general efforts they recommended and imple- position to order a halt to this coup was and the ambassador saw it, the prospect mented were ineffective in curbing Chun badly out of date.” Later, after Chun had of a shootout within the army was during the period covered in their books. suppressed the rioting in Kwangju and fraught with grave danger. Few other They do considerable soul-searching in moved toward assuming the presidency, decisions caused Gleysteen such personal the final analysis over what more they Wickham remembers thinking that “we anguish: “I deeply regretted having to could have done. were little more than helpless bystanders blight an effort designed to ‘correct’ [the Wickham, who does not hide his as Chun shrewdly maneuvered toward coup] but felt that to encourage a strug- anger at Chun and his associates, con- total power.” gle within the Korean army would have cludes that a coup was probable if not The fundamental limitation on been madness.” inevitable after the death of Park but that their leverage, as both realized from the The most controversial develop- there was little he or his command could start, was the nature of American ment confronting both men—one still have done to stave it off. He recounts involvement on the bitterly divided politically charged in South Korea—was that the policy of keeping Chun at a dis- peninsula. U.S. military presence, repre- action by ROK special forces and other tance after he seized power and pressur- sented by 37,000 members of the Armed troops in viciously suppressing the insur- ing Chun to abide by constitutional Forces half a century after the armistice, rection in Kwangju at a high but unde- processes was “fundamentally sound” if is intended to deter hostile action from termined cost in lives. It was the home marginally successful. He expresses doubt the North and provide leadership and area of Kim Dae Jung, whose arrest by over symbolic penalties initially levied muscle if deterrence fails. Any open or Chun ignited public demonstrations against Chun, such as postponing the extended discord in the ROK military, or that turned into organized revolt. Many security consultative meeting or with- between American and South Korean Koreans hold the United States partly holding foreign military sales credits. He leaders, risks undermining deterrence responsible for what is known as the suggests instead that vigorous economic and encouraging North Korea to inter- Kwangju massacre because of a belief sanctions might have generated more vene. Wickham recalls the reflexive mes- fostered by Chun that the U.S. com- public protests against Chun but does sage from Secretary of Defense Harold mand authorized the use of deadly force not deal with the instability that could Brown in conveying the news of Park’s by releasing units which attacked civil- have ensued. demise. “Assassins have just killed Park ians from other duties. Gleysteen remembers that he could Chung Hee,” Brown announced by tele- As both men have done in the past, think of “no measures that would have phone to Wickham, who had just arrived Wickham and Gleysteen seek to set the altered the basic character of a contest home on a scheduled visit. “We’re wor- record straight by indicating that ROK between domestic forces over which we ried that the North Koreans might capi- special forces units which did most of the had little if any real control.” He is more talize on the confusion by attacks with killing had never been under American philosophical than Wickham about their agents in South Korea or, worse, by command and that the 20th ROK Infantry Chun and his actions, noting that the an attack along the demilitarized zone.” Division, which restored order with far regime turned out to be relatively compe- There is little evidence that Pyongyang less loss of life, had been withdrawn from tent though highly unpopular and that did anything to exploit the turmoil in U.S. control before the uprising. Wick- because of internal pressures it ultimately Seoul other than spread propaganda and ham discloses that he was more involved gave way to restoration of legitimate unsuccessfully infiltrate agents, but the in proposals to use the 20th Infantry Divi- democratic rule. A large part of possibility of intervention was a priority sion troops than previously known, but Gleysteen’s anger is directed at Carter’s for U.S. policymakers. As Gleysteen indi- he and Gleysteen disclaim prior knowl- “ill-conceived and ill-timed” initiative to cates, “Our security commitment and edge of what ROK special forces planned withdraw American troops and the “abra- military presence in South Korea to do. However, given the complex situa- sive, confrontational” implementation of inevitably became overriding concerns in tion and persistence of strong emotions human rights policies. times of upheaval, largely because of the which persist to this day, it is unlikely Based on these well-written and threat we perceived from North Korea.” these books will quell passions about well-reasoned books, the lesson is that Both Wickham and Gleysteen were Kwangju among South Koreans. U.S. power, while of great importance to opposed to the coup organized by Chun the military balance on the peninsula, but powerless to reverse its course with- was a minor factor in the calculations of out endangering South Korean security. those who sought and wielded power in At the moment of crisis, Wickham found South Korea. This is more true today that his command of ROK forces facing Missing an issue? than in 1979–81. But it is also true that the North was merely theoretical, as the end of the Cold War altered the units left assigned positions without per- Copies of back numbers of nature and dimensions of U.S. stakes in mission. Neither he nor the ROK leader- JFQ are available in limited the region. A repeat of the unpalatable ship whose units were being outflanked quantities to both members incidents contained in these two books had any but the sketchiest ideas of of the Armed Forces and to would probably generate much stronger what was happening. “Even after all U.S. reactions, economic as well as politi- these years, I still consider [Chun’s] public institutions. Please cal, than when their authors were actions immoral and harmful...moti- send requests to the Editor assigned to Seoul. Militarily such events, vated almost completely by personal at the address or FAX number which seem unlikely today, could tempt gain,” Wickham writes. Yet both he and the body politic in this Nation to recon- Gleysteen rejected a proposal at the time listed on the masthead. sider its firm commitment to the security for a countercoup secretly presented by a of South Korea. JFQ senior ROK officer who claimed to speak

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New from NDU Press Korea on the Brink: From the “12/12 Incident” to the Kwangju Uprising, 1979–1980 by John A. Wickham

“This book focuses on a period that begins with the death of President Park in October 1979 which led to the ‘12/12 Incident.’ My account of these events sheds light Koreaon how political military policy is formulated within the U.S. Government and, more importantly, on how policy is shaped and executed in the field. For it is the high-level officials in the field who ultimately bear responsibility for the success or failure of American policy. Korea on the Brink is written from the perspective of the military commander entrusted to maintain the armistice and defend Korea, should war occur. My objective was not to present a definitive history of this period, a task For more NDU Press that others will eventually achieve. offerings visit the National Defense Rather, it was to record and reflect on University Web site those significant people and events on the Internet at http://www.ndu.edu that I observed as commander of allied forces, who numbered almost half-a-million military personnel. Drawing on To order, call the U.S. Government Printing Office at contemporaneous notes, messages, and memory, I have (202) 512–1800, visit a GPO bookstore, or write to: sought to faithfully relate the facts as I saw them at the Superintendent of Documents time and have analyzed them in the intervening years.” U.S. Government Printing Office —from the preface to Korea on the Brink Washington, D.C. 20402

GPO on-line: access.gpo.gov/su_docs/sale.html

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United States by the dean of American trend from modern, through late mod- REINVENTING military sociologists, Charles Moskos, ern, to postmodern, or have focused on summarizes the state of research and what is in fact a coincidence in time and MILITARY establishes the Armed Forces as the model place of largely unrelated trends. The var- INSTITUTIONS against which to compare those of other ious dimensions of the model may need nations. This is followed by chapters on to be disaggregated and examined in A Book Review by Britain, France, Germany, the Nether- detail to determine their relationship. lands, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Australia, The Postmodern Military has ramifi- IAN ROXBOROUGH New Zealand, Switzerland, Israel, and cations for the meaning of professional- South Africa which shift the evidence to ism. Officers will have to be more The Postmodern Military: Armed determine whether the postmodern label broadly educated in political, cultural, Forces after the Cold War applies. Not only does this approach pro- and other affairs. This volume suggests Edited by Charles C. Moskos, vide an opportunity to evaluate the post- that such a trend will produce new role John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal modern thesis, but it offers a vital com- models for officers. Less clear are the New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. parative perspective. While they have implications of postmodernity for the 286 pp. $45.00 many trends in common, marked differ- nature of warfighting. Here the emphasis [ISBN 0–19–513328–5] ences exist among the countries. More- by the contributors on embracing peace- over, there is ample disagreement among keeping and humanitarian intervention authors to provoke reflection. has diverted attention from the impact here have been profound changes in If readers are tempted to quibble of sociological change on how postmod- Tthe nature of military institutions in over the use of the term postmodern, it ern militaries fight. This book raises but recent years. As wars have become less should be noted that the authors apply it does not answer these provocative ques- prevalent and threat perceptions have largely as a synonym for post-Cold War tions. If there is less commitment to the evolved, militaries have increasingly and are not committed to the rhetorical nation-state, what will motivate war- taken on peacekeeping and humanitar- and philosophical excesses normally fighters? What conflicts of interest ian operations. They are also being associated with postmodernist social sci- might ensue? Will more socially and cul- reduced to smaller professional forces of ence theories. Since the term essentially turally diverse militaries affect small- volunteers with the support of more means contemporary or present, readers group cohesion in combat? civilian employees. There is more joint- are free to apply whichever label seems This volume poses further questions ness. The role models for officers are to be the most congenial. for a research agenda. The editors have gravitating from the warrior and man- A more critical issue is whether the done a great service by moving beyond ager to include the soldier-scholar and cluster of identified trends is as coherent the United States to other countries; but soldier-statesman. Postmodern militaries as suggested by a single model. Greater most are either European or of largely include more women, are more tolerant female participation in the labor market European settlement. A comparative vol- of homosexuals, and accept a greater sep- and growing divorce rates, both of which ume that looks at militaries in what was aration of family from institutional life. result in the separation of military family formerly known as the Third World is Moreover, as militaries are civilianized, members from institutional military life, needed. How has postmodernity affected soldiers and their civilian counterparts have been underway for decades inde- militaries in those nations? What might look more alike. In moving away from pendent of the end of the Cold War. Nor such perspectives suggest about the the citizen-soldier armies of the modern is it clear that issues of cultural diversity nature of military institutions and the period, and as nation-states loosen their and lifestyle, increasing tolerance of frequency of war in other regions of the grip on the imagination of citizens, pub- homosexuality, or diminishing identifi- world? It is outside the core countries of lic attitudes are growing more apathetic. cation with the nation-state are bound the West that America’s future enemies As armed forces decline in prestige, there up with other dimensions of the model. are likely to be found. Perhaps there is a is more tolerance for conscientious objec- Indeed, some contributors point out this dark side of postmodernity in the Third tion. Finally, militaries are engaging the fact. It is also striking how issues such as World that must be understood as much media actively and positively. race and ethnicity, or intense politicizing as sociological changes in Western mili- The cluster of sociological changes of gay rights, a factor so salient in the taries, about which this volume is that define the emerging militaries of the United States, are more muted elsewhere. informative and rewardingly thought- 21st century are the dominant theme of This raises the question of whether the provoking. JFQ The Postmodern Military. Edited and writ- authors have really discerned a global ten by leading military sociologists, this book may be the most authoritative study of the sociological basis of contemporary militaries in print. A first-rate Look for work, it brings serious research to bear on important policy issues. The editors offer a far-ranging introduction by placing current changes in Joint Force Quarterly historical context. The chapter on the on the Joint Doctrine Web site

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm Ian Roxborough is professor of history and sociology at the State University of New JFQ York at Stony Brook.

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the problem is perspective. When com- industry and economics on warfare; the STRUGGLES FOR pared to the so-called cabinet wars of the significance of military reform; and the 18th century, the wars of the l9th century conscious or unconscious shift in con- NATIONAL SURVIVAL seem to have become more total in terms ception from limited to total war (even if of ends, ways, and means. However, in the latter term didn’t come into common A Book Review by comparison to the wars of the classical usage until much later). The extent of ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II age, or those of the 16th, 17th, or even political, cultural, economic, and mili- 20th centuries, this observation does not tary mobilization required for modern On the Road to Total War: hold up. To complicate matters, one can combat has long served as a discriminat- The American Civil War and find exceptions in the past to prove any ing criterion for the question of total war. the German Wars of Unification, rule. Not surprisingly then, the essays by Total mobilization equaled total war, at 1861–1871 Förster and Nagler only discuss a few pos- least with regard to the question of sible definitions of total war, all of which means in the ends-ways-means equation. Edited by Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler Cambridge: Cambridge University have limitations, and leave readers to But as these essays indicate, this measure Press, 2000. develop their own. A subsequent essay by is no longer adequate. Though the 705 pp. $100.00 Mark Neely reminds us that the notion resources used to wage the Civil War far [ISBN 0–5215–6071–3] of total war can be defined so totally that exceeded those of previous American no conflict, let alone the Civil War, wars, not every available resource was would qualify. Carl Degler concludes this engaged. Similarly, many resources were he essays collected in On the Road to section of On the Road to Total War by left untouched in France and Germany. It TTotal War make worthwhile reading reconsidering conventional ideas on the is unlikely that history will ever reveal a for anyone interested in American or similarities and differences between the truly total war in the Hobbesian sense, German history, or military history in emerging American and German nations where every soul is a combatant and general. It represents the first in a pro- and how they might affect an investiga- every asset is a weapon, because achiev- jected series of five volumes based on tion of total war. ing that condition would demand perfect papers from conferences held in the The second set of problems con- bureaucratic efficiency in terms of mobi- United States and Germany on the concerns nationalism and leadership. Essays lizing all dimensions of national power tentious topic of total war. This volume in this section by Richard Beringer, Hans throughout a war. It would also make addresses problems concerning national Trefousse, Stig Förster, and Edward Hager- war an end in itself by depriving political survival within the context of the Ameri- man examine the relationship between and military leaders of the opportunity can Civil War and the German Wars of national or regional identity and the will to select only those ways and means Unification, which can be regarded as to fight, political and cultural mobiliza- most likely to produce success. Perhaps defining events of the l9th century. The tion, and the interplay between political more than any other, this part of the other volumes in this series (which will and military leaders in developing strat- book focuses on the inadequacy of cur- be reviewed in future issues of this jour- egy. The basis of a soldier’s identity and rent definitions of total war. nal) focus on the periods leading up to its relation to his will to fight have been In the fourth section, Jörg Nagler, th World War I, the interwar years, and objects of study since the mid-19 cen- Phillip Paludan, and Donna Krug explore World War II. The editors of the book at tury at least. Schools of thought differ the home front in the Civil War, while hand, Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, have over whether the dynamics are ideologi- Alf Ludtke, Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau, done a superb job of arranging the cal or psychological. The essays by and Jean H. Quataert do the same for the essays, though some have little to do Beringer and Trefousse reveal that the Franco-German War. Although some with total war per se beyond references soldier’s identity, as well as that of the essays suffer from an excessive use of jar- in the introductory and concluding para- population at large, was not only com- gon, they shed light on the importance graphs. The value of this collection isn’t plex but situational. Whether rebels saw of public opinion, the role of women, the answers that it offers on total war, themselves as Confederates, Virginians, and the idea that the homeland served as but rather in the fact that it enlarges the or natives of Richmond depended largely another front that had to be protected understanding of what soldiers and civil- on the context within which one or and cultivated (or propagandized) in sup- ians, generals and statesmen, and their more of their loyalties came into play. port of actions on the battlefield. Such contemporaries thought was at stake in Förster and Hagerman explore the rela- recognition has become prevalent with two major conflicts of the l9th century, tionship between the logic of policy and the advent of sociological and gender how prepared they were to sacrifice grammar of war from the standpoint of studies. It is practically a truism to say blood or treasure to win, and whether in people’s war and an increasingly industri- that generals win battles but popular the end they believed that what was alized democracy faced with being ripped commitment wins wars. Here the tradi- gained was worth the price. apart by civil war. tional notion of total war proves inade- The first set of problems considered The third section focuses on mobi- quate. Although the full mobilization of in this book deals with basic questions of lization and warfare. Essays by Herman society is nearly impossible, women and th definition and correctness in compari- Hattaway, Arthur Marwick, Joseph minorities in l9 century America, Ger- son, concerns that have plagued histori- Glatthaar, Stanley Engerman, Matthew many, and France, who were previously ans for years. Indeed, a suitable defini- Gallman, Ulrich Wengenroth, Manfred untouched by mobilization, found them- tion of total war remains elusive. Part of Messerschmidt, William Serman, James selves engaged in complex ways. But the McPherson, and Wilhelm Deist address changes in traditional social and gender problems such as creating, mobilizing, roles during the course of conflict might Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, and developing armies; the impact of reveal more about the phenomenon of USA, is a member of the Strategic Studies total war than the segment of the popu- Institute at the U.S. Army War College. lation mobilized.

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Lincoln visiting officers at Antietam. U.S. Army

The next problems pertain to the model of warfare on U.S. military institu- more as a specter than a model of future reality of war. Earl Hess, Thomas tions from 1871–1914, Richard Current warfare. However, other research suggests Rohkramer, Michael Fellman, Robert examines the effect of the Civil War on that Volkskrieg evolved between 1871 to Tombs, Reid Mitchell, and Manfred the rise of America as a world power, 1914 into the concept of national war, Botzenhart look at the experience of com- Gerd Krumeich investigates the influence meaning a conflict that involved the full bat within the context of total war to of people’s war on German and French extent of national power. The work of determine whether it was in some way thinking up through World War I, and Colmar von der Goltz, Fritz Hoenig, and more total than previous wars. The sub- Annette Becker explores the ways in the younger Moltke emphasized that this jects covered include new tactics and which war memorials defined the last was the war of the future and show that technologies, guerrilla fighting, siege war- war while creating expectations for the German military thinking was headed in fare, and life as a prisoner of war. These next. National and military legacies are this direction and was not alone. Ameri- historians have set themselves a tall task, often neglected in efforts to understand can, British, French, and Russian theo- for by most accounts war is always total the phenomenon of total war. Perhaps rists held similar views. The point is that for those on the sharp end of the bayo- the criteria for comprehending the char- some notion of total war existed before net. We simply can’t determine whether acter of war should extend beyond casu- 1914, even if the term was coined some- the reality of combat was any more terri- alties and devastation to include how the what later. ble (or total) for a Roman legionnaire at course of history was changed. After reading the 32 essays in On the Cannae than for a Union infantryman at In the concluding chapter, Roger Road to Total War, one cannot help but Gettysburg. Only in the eye of a histo- Chickering provides some useful com- conclude that Clausewitz’s trinitarian rian, whose perspective is long term, do ments on the simultaneity and historio- structure for understanding war—as a such differences exist. The best that an graphical legacies of these wars, the function of the interplay of political historian can do is identify the changes organizational and institutional dissimi- forces, enmity, and chance—was correct that occurred in warfare and attempt to larities of participating armies, and after all. It is ultimately far more interest- interpret how those changes affected whether the conflicts can be considered ing and useful to consider the character those who experienced them. These chal- the precursors of total war. On the last of war in such a framework than to lenges notwithstanding, scholars, stu- count, he seems to surmise that the regard it as suggesting an ultimate telos, dents, and especially soldiers will find Franco-German War was the quintessen- or compare it to an ideal construct such this section useful for its many details on tial case of massive mobilization for lim- as total war, which none has yet or likely combat in the mid-19th century. ited aims, while the issue in the case of ever will attain. On this point at least the The sixth part of the book focuses the Civil War remains divided into two contributors to this volume, for whom on the legacies of the Civil War and the camps (represented by McPherson and consensus is a rarity, might agree. In any German Wars of Unification. Jay Luvaas Hagerman on one hand, and Neeley on case, readers should draw their own con- addresses the influence of the Prussian the other). Chickering also concludes clusions from this volume. JFQ that Volkskrieg (people’s war), an important phenomenon in both wars, served

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A REVOLUTION IN NAVAL AFFAIRS? A Book Review by DAVID R. METS

American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941 by Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1999. 280 pp. $39.95 [ISBN 1–5575–0382–6]

he Royal Navy held a substantial lead USS Langley, 1923. Tin aircraft carrier development in

1919. But by 1941 it was largely out- Naval Historical Center classed in doctrine, organization, and technology by the United States. The This book indicates that part of the Although not a pilot himself, Reeves conventional explanation is that the air British problem indeed resulted from cre- played an essential role by operationaliz- prospects of the Royal Navy were ruined ating a separate air force responsible for ing concepts emanating from the Gen- in 1918 when the Royal Air Force (RAF) all military aviation. But that was one eral Board and Naval War College. He was established and given responsibility factor among many and the authors do took them to sea aboard USS Langley and

U.S. Army for military aviation. American and British not dwell on it. They acknowledge that gave substance to the idea that airplanes Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941, RAF operations won the Battle of Britain. had an offensive role, even hinting that reveals that there is more to the story. The pilots serving onboard carriers were they could serve as the main naval strik- The book explains the more rapid naval RAF officers until 1937, and their ing force. He began developing shipboard advances in the United States than in advancement was linked to their parent handling procedures that ultimately Great Britain. service. Thus the commanders of British enabled the Navy to put many more One can hardly imagine a better carriers at the onset of war were not avia- planes aboard carriers and use them at a group of authors to build a synthesis. tors. But neither did the Royal Navy have far higher sortie rate than was possible in Norman Friedman is one of the leading an officer like Admiral William Moffett, a Britain. Thus, the authors argue, Ameri- specialists on naval studies in America, bureaucratic politician of the first order can carriers were able to get airborne Thomas Hone has done much of his with impeccable battleship credentials pulses of airpower sufficient to achieve research on naval affairs in the interwar (having sailed with Alfred Thayer results. Reeves was the imaginative oper- period, and Mark Mandeles has focused Mahan). Nor did it have a powerful ator who complemented the bureaucrat on command and control, organization, organization like the Bureau of Aeronau- Moffett to the benefit of the Navy. and innovation. Together they bring tics to act as an advocate of aviation and In sum, the reasons for American expertise on strategy, institutional provide a protected career track for superiority included imaginative senior culture, and technology to the subject young flyers. Still less did it have an personalities, an institution that sought at hand. imaginative officer like Admiral William information and generated ideas, a cadre Britain had three carriers on the line Sims at the helm of a war college with a that experimented with those ideas in during World War I while the United long gaming tradition. games, and an operator who developed States had none. But many American offi- Sims and others at Newport were procedures, tactics, and organizations at cers who served in Europe went home testing naval aviation concepts well sea. Essential to their success was the impressed with aviation in the Royal before USS Langley joined the fleet. Ideas Bureau of Aeronautics under Moffett, Navy and were determined to do some- that emerged from wargaming boards which provided a home for aviators, thing about it. They had the additional plus those drawn from experiences of the fought internal battles over budgets, stimulus of the campaigns of General Royal Navy with early carriers contri- guarded against perceived onslaught by Billy Mitchell, which threatened to bring buted to concepts that helped win the the Army Air Service, and persuaded the RAF model to America. From the out- war in the Pacific. Neither Sims nor other Congress to provide funding for seven set, the concern was that the great advan- gun club admirals of the General Board USS Essex class carriers along with eight tages of aviation for naval warfare would of the Navy fit the stereotypes of battle- battleships that were under construction not be realized if the Navy did not con- ship sailors or mossbacks that branded a when the Japanese struck. trol every dimension of its growth. generation of leaders. Far from being American and British Aircraft Carrier close-minded, they provided much of the Development, 1919–1941, is a well written thinking before it was possible to experi- synthesis based on an extensive look at David R. Mets is a professor in the School of ment with carriers at sea. the literature of the period. It develops Advanced Airpower Studies at the Air Nor did the Royal Navy have an an impressive understanding of what equivalent of Admiral Joseph Reeves. military innovation is all about. JFQ Command and Staff College.

Summer 2000 / JFQ 135 2325 PS/C3 Pgs 2/24/01 12:49 PM Page 136

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