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Psychology.” American Journal of Philology 106 rating these prescriptions into its basic principles is (1985): 1–31. Excellent recent analysis of Democri- consequentialist. tus’s moral theory. “Deontology” is commonly used in moral philos- McGibbon, Donald. “Pleasure as the ‘Criterion’ in De- ophy to refer to nonconsequentialist moral concep- mocritus.” Phronesis 5 (1960): 75–77. Nill, Michael. Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, tions. The most distinctive feature of deontological Antiphon, and Democritus. Leiden: Brill, 1985. In- moral conceptions is that they define fundamental cludes bibliography. principles of right and justice in terms other than Stewart, Zeph. “Democritus and the Cynics.” Harvard taking the most effective means to promote maxi- Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958): 179–91. mum good. KANT’s (1724–1804) moral philosophy Taylor, C. C. W. “Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in is a primary example of a deontological moral con- Democritus.” Phronesis 12 (1967): 6–27. ception. His implies: (1) a Voros, F. K. “The Ethical Fragments of Democritus: The strong deontological thesis, that duty is discernible Problem of Authenticity.” Hellenica 26 (1973): 193– without reference to any particular end, but rather 206. by reference to prior and independent principles ———. “The Ethical Theory of Democritus: On Duty.” Platon 26 (1974): 113–22. (which Kant held to be implicit in practical reason); ———. “The Ethical Theory of Democritus: What Is the (2) an “overridingness thesis,” that moral reasons ‘Criterion’?” Platon 27 (1975): 20–25. outweigh all other reasons; and (3) an inescapability thesis, duty applies to all rational agents and gives Michael Nill them reasons, whatever their particular ends. [(2) and (3) are not peculiar to deontological views, and (3), and perhaps (2), need not be endorsed by all of deontology them.] Other familiar deontological theories are the The term “deontology” is a modern combination of pluralistic intuitionisms of W. D. ROSS (1877– Classical Greek terms, and means the study or sci- 1971) and H. A. PRICHARD (1871–1947), John ence (logos) of duty, or more precisely, of what one Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness,” Robert NOZICK’s ac- ought to do (deon). In contemporary moral philos- count of “side-constraints,” and T. M. Scanlon’s ophy, “deontology” is used most commonly to refer contractualism. to moral conceptions which endorse several theses To say deontological theory does not characterize regarding the nature of duty (the right), the nature right or justice as conduct promoting the greatest of (the good), and the relationship between the overall good does not mean deontology is oblivious primary ethical concepts of the right and the good. to consequences. Any moral conception which ei- ther formulated its principles of right and justice, ignoring their consequences, or which held that in- I. The Right: Right Conduct is Not what dividuals are to obstinately observe MORAL RULES Maximizes Ultimate Good without regard to the consequences of actions, It seems a truism that, given the means, we ought “would simply be irrational, crazy” (Rawls, p. 30). to maximally realize our ends, and given the ends, Nothing intrinsic to deontological views excludes we ought to take the means that best promote them. means–end reasoning. What they hold, rather, is Traditionally, philosophers have agreed that, how- that the rightness of actions and INSTITUTIONS can- ever complex the idea of rationality, it involves, in not simply be defined instrumentally, as what max- part, these maximizing imperatives. Many have imizes some (nonmoral) good; among the most basic found the maximizing account of rationality also to moral principles are nonmaximizing principles. In be sufficient: to be rational is simply to maximize this sense, deontological theories cover a wide range something. Assuming that ethical conduct is subject of moral conceptions; they include all nonconse- to rational assessment, this leads to the idea that quentialist views. conduct is morally right if and only if it maximizes In addition to moral conceptions, “deontology” is the Ultimate good inhering in states of affairs. Given also used to refer to moral principles, or to moral the means, total good is to be maximized; and given rules, at all levels of generality. Deontological prin- the good, right conduct is any means that most ef- ciples are fundamental to deontological conceptions; fectively promotes it. A moral conception incorpo- they specify certain basic moral reasons governing

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ACTION (RIGHTS, duties, distributions, moral ends, TION. While commonsense moral rules appear to and the like), and do so other than in terms of what command actions (or inactions) categorically, it is promotes the greatest (nonmoral) good. Kant’s first difficult to formulate a sensible and learnable moral formulation of the Categorical Imperative—“Act rule that is without qualification. For example, “Do only on that maxim through which you can at the not lie,” if taken as absolute or exceptionless (“Never same time will that it should become a universal lie, whatever the consequences”) conflicts with law”—is an example (Kant, Ak. 421). Other ex- other moral rules and moral ends of equal or greater amples are many of W. D. Ross’s prima facie duties importance (e.g., our deontological duty to protect (the duties of FIDELITY, reparation, justice, GRATI- the innocent, or to rescue others in distress). TUDE, and perhaps nonmaleficence). Ross also lists Consequentialists often take the fact that no two prima facie consequentialist duties, BENEFI- moral rule is without exception as evidence of the CENCE and self-improvement, requiring agents to truth of CONSEQUENTIALISM. The dire consequences promote the greatest good (others’ INTERESTS, and of following entrenched moral rules under extreme one’s own self-perfection). Endorsing these conse- circumstances are imagined, which challenges our quentialist principles does not make Ross’s moral intuitions regarding prohibitions against killing or conception consequentialist, since he holds that to violence to persons (e.g., lifeboat examples: throw- decide one’s duty all things considered, the prima ing one overboard to save five). It is not clear what facie duties are to be balanced against one another, these examples prove (especially when people dis- not by reference to what best promotes ultimate agree on their resolution), except that no ordinary good, but by intuition of their weights under the cir- moral rule is absolute, and that consequences of ac- cumstances (Ross, pp. 21–27). tion often do matter in deciding what is the right As deontological conceptions (like Ross’s) may thing to do. Deontological conceptions can account include consequentialist principles, so too might for standard exceptions to moral rules by incorpo- consequentialist views include deontological prin- rating exceptions into the rule; and most, if not all, ciples, so long as these are subordinated to the fun- deontologists can avoid the implications of dire con- damental consequentialist principle of right. One ex- sequences of action on the basis of their first prin- ample is JOHN STUART MILL’s (1806–1873) indirect ciples of right and the moral reasons these principles . Mill held that the principle of LIB- incorporate. What deontological conceptions do not ERTY—that people should have a basic right of equal do, however, is accommodate consequences in the liberty to act as they choose, so long as they do not way consequentialists do, by maximizing overall harm the basic interests of others—should govern good as ascertained from an impersonal point of political constitutions and social conventions with- view. out exception. Mill conjectured it to be empirically For example, if it is reasonable to reject a rule true that, by realizing this and other principles in its (“never torture the innocent”) as applying to the social institutions, a society would best promote the most extreme circumstances (when one’s nation is greatest overall utility. facing nuclear destruction), then contractualism A deontological rule or constraint is a moral im- provides a justification for this exception on the ba- perative that commands action or inaction of a spe- sis of nonconsequentialist principles and reasons; cific type in appropriate circumstances without ref- namely, it would be unreasonable to expect people erence to reasons, ends or consequences. (Examples: to agree to this rule as absolute, observing it under “Do not kill, lie, cheat, or steal.” “Keep your prom- the most extreme circumstances, and reasonable for ises and commitments.” “Honor thy father and them to reject it, when following the rule means that mother.”) Most ordinary moral rules are deontolog- nearly all that people value is to be obliterated. No ical in form, which is only to say that they are for- appeal is made in contractualist argument to the mulated as unqualified imperatives without refer- greatest overall good impersonally construed as a ence to reasons or specific ends they may realize. The reason for rules, since it is unreasonable to expect reasons or ends that justify moral rules, or the qual- contractualist agents to sacrifice their interests to ag- ifications rules are subject to, may be understood as gregate good. Instead decision is based on reflection implicit within them. The most important role of on the consequences for each individual of action moral rules and constraints lies in MORAL EDUCA- according to rules, and asking whether, in light of

392 deontology these consequences, it is reasonable to expect each treat humanity merely as a means, but always as an to accept or reject a proposed moral rule. end-in-itself” (Groundwork, K 429). This prescribes the final end of moral action—the “humanity” of persons. For Kant, the value of (the humanity of) II. The Good: Basic Moral Values are not persons is incomparable, “beyond all price”; because Maximizable of their humanity, persons have a kind of value, their A second feature endorsed by deontological con- dignity, which puts them beyond the domain of value ceptions is also best understood by way of contrast optimization. Moral principles and rules affecting with consequentialism. Characteristic of consequen- persons should then be formulated, not to maximize tialism is an optimization thesis: value (the good) is personality or even personal interests, but in order maximizable, and total good is to be optimized. On to respect the kind of value that persons possess. To this account, (1) goodness is a property of states of respect the value of persons is to respond appropri- affairs that is scalar, admitting of quantitative judg- ately to their dignity, which Kant deemed persons ments (or at least judgments of more or less); have by virtue of their moral and rational capacities (2) what is ultimately good ought to be promoted as for PRACTICAL REASONING and autonomy. These val- the end of all action; and (3) to promote value is to ues (the humanity, dignity, and autonomy of per- maximize its total. sons) provide the basis for understanding Kant’s de- For many, the optimization thesis seems apt, if not ontological principles and clarifying the moral duties compelling, in the case of certain goods, especially we owe to one another. That these values are not to PLEASURE and avoidance of pain. The values of HAP- be maximized by right conduct (whatever this might PINESS, knowledge, creativity, LOVE and FRIENDSHIP, mean) is evident from Kant’s claim that the second and (more controversially) desire-satisfaction have formulation of the Categorical Imperative has the also been seen as maximizable. It is not so clear that same content as the first (cited above); to respect all these goods sensibly allow maximization. For ex- the humanity of persons as an end-in-itself is real- ample, while love and friendship are goods each per- ized when agents act as if the rule of their action son ought to experience, it cheapens these goods to were a universal law. maximize the number of one’s loves and friends; Kant is only one example of how a deontological moreover, given the importance of pursuing other conception conceives of the basic values providing goods, it is questionable whether we ought even to ultimate moral reasons as nonmaximizable. Many maximize love and friendship toward particular per- deontologists (e.g., Rawls, Scanlon, DWORKIN, Noz- sons. More importantly, even if some goods are sen- ick) resemble Kant in maintaining that the basic sibly conceived as maximizable, others clearly are moral attitude toward these values is respect, not not. Consider the intrinsic value of human life, or of maximization. Others may advocate different non- persons, their DIGNITY, and their autonomy. To say maximizing views of value (e.g., divine command human life has intrinsic value does not imply that theories). we ought to maximize population growth—quite the contrary. It means that we are under a duty to III. The Priority of Right over the Good respect the lives of existing (and future) persons, by recognizing (among other things) that all are owed The third essential feature of deontological con- basic moral duties, and by affording all certain basic ceptions follows on the first two; it describes the HUMAN RIGHTS. Consequentialism, it is sometimes relationship between principles of right (stating ab- argued, stems from the misconception that all value stract duties, rights, fair distributions, and other is maximizable (c.f. Anderson, ch. 2; Scanlon, ch. moral reasons) and the pursuit of (nonmoral) goods. 2–3). As a result it misconceives the value of human In the course of practical or social reasoning about life (c.f. Dworkin), of persons (Kant), and other val- what we (as individuals or as representatives of ues fundamental to morality. groups) ought to do, principles of right have prior- The thesis that the fundamental values providing ity over considerations of (nonmoral) value (e.g., reasons for morality are not maximizable is implicit happiness, efficiency, or human EXCELLENCE). Con- in Kant’s second formulation of his Categorical Im- siderations of right have priority over the good in perative—“Always act in such a way that you never two ways. First, principles of right limit the goods

393 deontology that may be pursued: they rule out certain ends as to pursue a lesser end that is not a means to this unworthy of pursuit (e.g., dominating others, or dominant good, is morally impermissible. It conflicts harming them for pleasure), rendering them entirely with the controlling duty to always adopt means and impermissible. Second, principles of right are instru- ends that maximize the one rational good. Since this mentally regulative: they constrain the means that it injunction always applies, there is no room left for may otherwise be rational (optimal) to adopt to the free adoption of permissible ends or the pursuit achieve permissible or obligatory ends (c.f. Rawls, of particular interests, no place for a plurality of in- pp. 30–32, 564–66). The priority of right en- trinsic goods, or for the free activity of practical ables a deontological moral conception to provide reasoning. an account of permissible conceptions of the good. Because deontological views do not understand It is especially important to conceptions that value the right and the good in maximizing terms, their agents’ rational autonomy, or freedom to determine structure is quite different. Morality is conceived, their good. not as a constantly controlling injunction, but as The priority of right does not necessarily mean constantly regulative of deliberation and action ac- that particular moral reasons (e.g., having made a cording to other legitimate principles (of prudence, promise) always outweigh reasons of PRUDENCE,or law, custom, etiquette, or instrumental rationality other reasons of individual or social good. It may generally) as one pursues permissible or obligatory well be permissible to breach relatively unimportant ends. Conjoined with the finality thesis, the “prior- commitments (e.g., to visit grandmother) for the ity” of the priority of right means that deontological sake of realizing one’s own good (e.g., to realize a principles of right have priority in the course of prac- crucial job opportunity), so long as there are other tical reasoning and judgment over all other consid- moral reasons that excuse one from commitments erations of value and the principles and reasons in- when important occasions or emergencies intervene. strumental to promoting them. Moral principles are The priority of right should not then be confused then supremely limiting and regulative conditions with the more general claim that moral reasons over- on an agent’s pursuit of values. The priority of right ride all other reasons (reasons of law, ETIQUETTE, is characteristic of deontological moral conceptions PROFESSIONAL , and social custom, as well as in so far as they constrain the adoption of ends, value). This claim, the finality or “overridingness” means–end reasoning, and maximizing conduct by thesis, says that moral reasons have priority over all prior nonmaximizing principles of right. other considerations in practical reason, so that once moral considerations have been taken into account, IV. The Independence of Moral Reasons and practical reason has reached its conclusion and is the Moralization of Value final—there are no higher reasons to appeal to. De- ontologists also generally affirm the finality of moral A moral conception, to be convincing, needs to reasons, but then so too do most consequentialists. address such questions as why people should care Utilitarians, for example, contend that we are obli- about doing what is right and just, whether doing gated to revise our aims and restrict our actions, to one’s duty is a valuable activity, whether morality is bring them in line with the demands of promoting compatible with human nature, and how it advances aggregate utility. But this does not mean that utili- human interests. Any moral conception lacking a tarians affirm the priority of right. For notice what conception of the good would seem to have no an- overridingness implies within the context of conse- swer to these questions, and is at best incomplete. quentialism’s maximizing understandings of the Consequentialism, in part, is designed to respond to right and the good. Consequentialism does not see these sorts of issues. Deontology is often depicted its principles simply as having regulative priority as, and criticized for, being devoid of any conception over other legitimate practical principles; for strictly of the good. This criticism stems from many deon- speaking there are no other legitimate practical prin- tologists’ rejection of a prior and independent con- ciples that the duty to maximize could have priority ception of value, or persons’ (nonmoral) interests, to. In effect, consequentialist principles occupy all as necessary to the definition of principles of right of deliberative space. To do anything except take the (c.f. Prichard, Ross, Scanlon, and perhaps Kant). most effective means to maximize ultimate good, or This position is not common to all deontological

394 deontology views (e.g., Rawls relies on a “thin theory” of the will to do justice for its own sake is not arbitrary or good to define principles of justice). Still, deontol- irrational, since morally motivated agents act from ogists agree that morality is not simply a matter of principles all would agree to from an impartial po- promoting prior nonmoral interests (see thesis I). sition where all are equally represented (Rawls, pp. Moral reasons carry their own justification. This sug- 477–78). Acting for these moral reasons is nonar- gests a fourth feature of deontological conceptions, bitrary, since by doing so we respect others as moral the independence of moral reasons: moral reasons persons with the rational and moral capacities for apply independently of the good caused, and are practical reasoning, and treat them in ways moral themselves sufficient to provide REASONS FOR persons can see to be justified (Rawls, p. 586). Here ACTION. respect for persons is not a separate nonmoral value If moral principles are not definable as what best that is promoted or “maximized” by acting on rea- promotes the good, what are the reasons deontolog- sons and principles. Instead people manifest respect ical theory provide for agents doing their duty? This for others as (moral) persons by acting morally for is one of the most controversial areas of deontology. the sake of principles reasonable persons could W. D. Ross argued that agents already have suffi- agree to. Respect for persons, like human dignity, is cient reason to do their duty, simply because it is a moral value that can only be described by reasons right. But this only prompts a restatement of the ini- which justify independently of nonmoral good. tial question: what reason do agents have for doing This suggests another thesis held by many (if not what is right? Simply because acts are right is not all) deontologists, the moralization of value: the sufficient reason for doing them, or for caring about concept of the good (human or social) cannot be morality. Without such a reason, many contend, mo- fully characterized in nonmoral terms, without ref- rality seems arbitrary and irrational. More generally erence to prior, independent moral reasons and prin- without an account of morality’s relation to the hu- ciples. Kantians again provide good examples of man good, morality, if not irrational, is still nonra- moralized conceptions of the good. They maintain tional, and rational people cannot consistently be the essential human good can only be characterized motivated to do what is right. in terms of acting on and for the sake of moral prin- Most deontologists recognize these issues, and ciples. Kant says, “The only thing good without contend that a moral conception does not need to qualification is a Good Will.” A Good Will for Kant define moral principles in terms of what best pro- is a steadfast proclivity to act on and for the sake of motes nonmoral values or interests in order to pro- the Moral Law. Since moral principles for Kant are vide sufficient reasons for acting, or to afford a con- not empirically given, but are implicit in our (pure) ception of the good. Morality itself is a good, not practical reasoning, to act from a Good Will is to just for others, but for the agent; for without it a act from a law we “give to ourselves” out of our person’s life is severely diminished. We have reason reason, and this is to be autonomous. Somewhat to do what is right for its own sake, not “simply analogously, Rawls argues that having an effective because it is right” (as Ross maintained), but be- sense of justice is essential to a person’s good, cause acting for moral reasons expresses an impor- since by consistently acting justly for the sake of tant part of ourselves and our relations with others. justice, persons exercise and realize the moral pow- Scanlon’s contractualism provides one approach ers of practical reasoning. These powers constitute to the independence of moral reasons. He argues moral agents’ nature as free and equal, and reason- that we have sufficient reason to care about morality able and rational. When agents realize the moral for its own sake, since the desire to do what is right powers by acting for the sake of principles of jus- is the same as the desire to justify ourselves to others tice, they achieve the good of moral autonomy on terms that it would be unreasonable for them to (Rawls, sect. 86). reject. By acting on rules it would be unreasonable Finally, to relate this fourth feature of deontology for others to reject, we act for reasons they can see to the first mentioned: if the complete good cannot to be justified (insofar as they are reasonable), and be described without referring to antecedent moral respect others as independent persons with the ca- principles, then basic moral principles cannot be de- pacities to govern their lives according to reasons fined, as consequentialists contend, simply in terms (Scanlon [2], chapter 4). Similarly, Rawls insists the of what maximizes the good. For prior moral prin-

395 deontology ciples are already implicit in the good, and stand in 1993. Esp. chapter 3. Rejects maximizing conception need of a different (nonmaximizing) specification of value as appropriate for the values of human life and personhood; argues that equal concern and respect is and justification. This indicates a flaw in so-called the appropriate attitude toward persons. rights-consequentialism as a moral conception, Frankena, William. Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice which holds that it is right to maximize respect for Hall, 1963. Esp. pp. 13ff. Elaborates on deontology/ persons and their rights, and/or minimize violations teleological (consequentialist) distinction. of rights (the implication being that we are obligated Freeman, Samuel. “Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the to violate the rights of the few whenever this leads Priority of Right.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 to greater respect for others’ rights). While a moral (1994): 313–49. Clarifies deontology, priority of right, and the moral good in context of Rawls’s conception conception might incorporate this as a subordinate of justice. consequentialist principle, it is difficult to see how a Herman, Barbara. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cam- moral conception could coherently have this maxi- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. Chapter mizing norm as a basic principle. For prior nonmax- 10. Challenges traditional view of Kant as a deontolo- imizing moral principles, which specify people’s gist, as well as deontology/consequentialist distinction. rights and imply duties of respect, are already part Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of of the maximand that is to be promoted. Morals. [1785]. A number of philosophers recently have ques- ———. Critique of Practical Reason. [1788]. tioned the classification of moral conceptions as de- Prichard, H. A. Moral Obligation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949. Advocates a deontological view, often ontological. (See, e.g., Herman; or Korsgaard on called “perceptual intuitionism,” which says that right Kant in this encyclopedia.) Their general concern is and wrong are properties inhering in situations, which that nonconsequentialist views differ in so many we come to know by intuition. ways that the deontology classification is confusing Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Har- and often misleading. Particularly it is objected that vard University Press, 1971. Sets forth a Kantian de- traditional deontological views are unconcerned ontological conception of justice; discusses deontol- with questions of value, or are incapable of accom- ogy/teleology distinction and idea of priority of right, pp. 24ff, 30ff, 40. modating the moral good. In this section, I have sug- Ross, W. D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon gested ways deontological views might meet this Press, 1930. Intuitionist view which contends that duty objection. is decided by applying various prima facie duties, which are weighed against one another to decide one’s See also: ACTS AND OMISSIONS; AUTONOMY OF duty all things considered. MORAL AGENTS; CONSEQUENTIALISM; CONTRACTAR- Scanlon, T. M. “Contractualism and Utilitarianism.” In IANISM; DELIBERATION AND CHOICE; DUTY AND OB- Utilitarianism and Beyond. Edited by Amartya Sen and LIGATION;DWORKIN; ENTITLEMENTS; FINAL GOOD; Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM; GOOD, THEORIES OF Press, 1982. THE; GRATITUDE; HUMAN RIGHTS; INSTITUTIONS; IN- ———. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, 1998. His contractualism holds TUITIONISM;KANT; LIBERTY;JOHN STUART MILL; that conduct is wrong insofar as it violates rules that MORAL ABSOLUTES; MORAL EDUCATION; MORAL REA- could not be justified to reasonable persons. SONING; MORAL RULES; MORAL SAINTS;NOZICK; Scheffler, Samuel, ed. Consequentialism and its Critics. OUGHT IMPLIES CAN; PRACTICAL REASON[ING]; PRAC- Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Good expla- TICAL WISDOM; PRESCRIPTIVISM;PRICHARD; RATION- nation of consequentialism in introduction, followed ALITY VS. REASONABLENESS;RAWLS; RIGHT, CON- by articles for and against by Rawls, Scanlon, Bernard CEPTS OF; RIGHTS;ROSS; TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS; Williams, Derek Parfit, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Philippa Foot, and others. UTILITARIANISM; VALUE, CONCEPT OF. Samuel Freeman Bibliography Anderson, Elizabeth. Value in Ethics and Economics. Cam- Descartes, Rene´ (1596–1650) bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. Argues against consequentialist thesis that value is a property French philosopher and mathematician whose epis- inhering in states of affairs that is maximizable. temological and metaphysical inquiries radically al- Dworkin, Ronald. Life’s Dominion. New York: Knopf, tered the history of Western philosophy. Descartes

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