U N I VE R S IT Y review
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1975 The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force AIR reviewU N I V E R S I TV
Strategic Air l if t A C argo Ca pa bil it y Shortfall...... Gen. Paul K. Carlton. USAF
T he Evol ution of Flexible Respon se in the Post-V iet n a m Era: Adjustment or Transformation? ...... 11 Lt. Col. Laurel A. Maver, USAF Dr Ronald J. Stupak
T he Evol ving Law of Aer ial Ware-are: ...... 22 Col. Jay D. Terry. USAF
Aspec t s of Air Force Strategy Today...... 38 Lt. Col. Joseph H Stodder. USAFR
A ir Power: A N ew Look from an Old Rooftop ...... 49 Nlij Dennis W. Stiles. USAF .Air Forte Review F lexibility in Information Ret r ieva l fob the Base-Level M anager...... 60 Maj. Joseph A. Coleman. USAF Capt. Richard E. Ducharrne, USAF Social Actions Training To Know and To Grow ...... 68 ( apt Frederick M. Bell. US\F In Mv Opinion T actical \ir F om es in a P er iod oe Uncertainty ...... 72 Maj. Cordon V lams'. USAF
M anagement by Objec t ives: C an It Be Used To Impr o ve: Management or Air Forc e Unity? ...... 88 M*| David W KrahenUihl. USAF Books and Ideas Si rprising Vie w s trom the Far East Left ...... ga Brin Gan Noel F Parrish. LTSAF Krt From the Editor i \erte . I lo T he Contributors ...... Ill
lli» iiw n 'mmii T»il A I •rlli*. Oomtiandn
G en er a l Paul K. C arlton
forces. This is directly counter to the ex- would need to be deployed, picking up their pressed desire of the Congress as elected equipment when they landed in the theater representatives of the American people. It 0f operations. would be extremely costly in terms of the But there is the obvious point that these human element, as well as dollars, fuel, and caches of American arms would make ideal equipment. targets for an attacking enemy. It must also • A third choice would be to pre- be recognized that this approach would be position huge garrisons of equipment and almost prohibitively expensive in terms of supplies in forward areas, so that only troops the duplication necessary to keep equip- C-.5A STRATEGIC AIRLIFT 5
value that has a finite capability to expand in a crisis. While we have an impressive usable capability in our force of military cargo aircraft, economic considerations and Congressional guidelines restrict ma c in aircrew-manning ratios and flying-hour utilization rates, which directly relate to our surge capability duration. Conversely, the commercial carriers have sufficient air crews and support facilities to expand flying- hour capability, but they do not have the C-130 necessary cargo-capable aircraft in sufficient numbers to provide all the augmentation needed. The most cost-effective and practical solution at this time would be to provide for greater emergency oversize-cargo capa ment stored overseas while providing iden bility from this country’s civil airline fleet. tical equipment to the fighting units for In other words, we need to buy a standby training purposes at home. In addition, who civil cargo capability. The need is not to can say whether the fight will take place in “take over” civilian aircraft but simply to a location reasonably convenient to our modify existing long-range, wide-bodied pas storage points? senger aircraft and program the modifica • What remains is a fourth choice, tions into the newer jumbos that are not vet and seemingly the only practical one: We built, so that they could be quickly and can measurably increase our capability to easily converted to military airlifters capa deploy crack fighting forces rapidly, directly ble of moving vehicles and large cargo, as from the United States, with the equipment well as smaller bulk cargo items. and supplies they will need to engage an Some commercial augmentation of the aggressor immediately after arriving in the ma c force is already an everyday occur theater. The United States would gain the rence. It reached a peak of 3.6 billion ton- advantage of placing the onus for escala miles per year in 1968 and 1969, at the Viet tion on the other side. This approach to the nam war’s peak, and today it runs about problem, which demands a significant in 900 million ton-miles annually. Even with crease in strategic cargo airlift capabilities, out the modifications we’d like to see in the is the most realistic and the most economi civil aircraft, the craf still represents about cal course to follow, and its benefits are half of the nation’s wartime strategic airlift many. capability and can provide up to 14V2 mil Only air power can deliver quickly the lion cargo ton-miles and IVi million pas reinforcements that can dramatically affect senger ton-miles a day. the outcome of an operation. It is in this But that is far short of the capability that ability to respond to the initial surge re is desirable to counter a full-scale European quirements in the early days of an emer contingency. The majority of the aircraft gency that the nation’s strategic airlift capa available to the craf today are passenger- bility must be increased. Unfortunately, this only varieties. Though there is plenty of surge capability is, at present, a constant space in their main deck compartments, 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
Hoor strengths and door-size limitations craf modification program remains the most render movement of oversize and outsize cost-effective manner of acquiring that im items impossible. And that’s the crux of the portant reservoir of cargo airlift needed to problem. move ready fighting forces. To more than The proposal the Department of Defense double our emergency cargo capability is taking to the Congress is to modify the within the dod would require very high dol equivalent of 110 or more Boeing 747-type lar expenditures, while the same capability passenger aircraft (the 747, the McDonnell could be obtained at relatively low cost Douglas DC-10, and the Lockheed L-1011) through modification of selected civil air by installing either a nose or side cargo door craft. The savings result from the civil car and a cargo floor or a treadway flooring sys rier’s absorbing the normal peacetime cost tem to accommodate vehicles. While the of operating aircraft and paying for main dod must retain its unique airlift capacity tenance, crew, overhead, and system support and characteristic to deal with strictly mili functions. The government investment in tary considerations, nonetheless portions of cludes the price of the modification and the the requirement to meet foreseeable con additional operating and maintenance ex tingencies can be satisfied through judicious penses resulting from operating the modified application of selected U.S. civil air carrier aircraft at a higher gross weight. Conserva resources. To date, the civil cargo industry tive estimates are that to produce the same has not generated the requirements for new airlift capability through organic Air Force outsize-capable cargo aircraft suitable to means would cost a minimum of thirteen both military and civil use, but such aircraft times the estimated cost of the proposed are on the horizon. In the meantime, the airlift modification and enhancement pro-
Augmenting Cargo Capability The Department of Defense proposes to improve MAC’s cargo-carrying ca- pacity by modifying such civilian type passenger aircraft as the 747, DC-10, and L-101J and by developing new groundhandling equipment and air- craft. Boeing's 747 (left) can be modified to accommodate oversize military car- go; the YC-14 (above) is Boeing's proto- type for an Advanced Medium Short Takeoff and Landing Transport (AMST); the McDonnell Douglas YC-15 AMST prototype (right) is also in development. YC-15
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U.S.AIR FORCE 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW gram. Thus, that program is the most cost- the responsiveness of our strategic military effective way of improving the national airlift force by making air refueling more strategic cargo airlift capability. It can pro readily available. This, in turn, will reduce vide a potentially meaningful improvement our reliance on enroute bases and allow us in our nation’s ability to deploy quickly the the flexibility to skirt countries that might military forces and supplies required during deny overflight rights. It will also allow us an emergency. to increase cargo loads in many cases. Except in time of crisis, the modified air- The new Advanced Medium Short Take lifters would be operated in their normal off and Landing Transport, currently in civilian role bv the commercial carriers. The prototype development by both Boeing and carrier would retain ownership and would McDonnell Douglas, is essential to improved be paid at Civil Aeronautics Board rates for cargo airlift capability. The planned capa assisting the military during an emergency. bilities of this new airlifter would feature With this added airlift capacity, we would the ability to operate from runways as short enhance our ability to provide balanced as 2000 feet, with up to 40,000-pound pay- emergency deployments of land or air fight loads. At reduced load factors, using longer ing forces, delivering the right people and runways, the aircraft will carry outsized the right supplies and equipment on a timely cargo weighing more than 60,000 pounds. basis to the right place simultaneously. For A production version of the prototype should example, during a 30-day deployment peri be able to carry a 50,000-pound payload od, we could halve the time to deploy or 2600 nautical miles without refueling. The double the numbers deployed in the same McDonnell Douglas YC-15 prototype rolled amount of time, or we could provide the out this August and is in flight test now. capacity to transport high-priority items by While these new military aircraft are es air that are now relegated to the slower sea sential for the future, more must also be done lift mode, whichever the events of the mo in long-term improvements to the civilian ment demanded. air cargo fleet. The most ideal solution for Of course, modification of existing air the period ten to 15 years from now, and craft must be viewed as a near-term solu beyond, is development by industry of a tion to this airlift enhancement problem. completely new generation of freighters de Complementing the c:raf modification signed exclusively for the cargo market. plan are other proposals to increase our (Today’s civil freighters are no more than cargo airlift capability. These include re passenger aircraft modified to move freight.) quirements to modify our existing military This new concept for a cargo aircraft re strategic airlift aircraft. Also there is the quires considerable mushrooming of the need for acquiring additional advanced commercial air freight market, an expan ground-handling equipment; rapid response sion which was forecast for the 60s and ’70s depends on the proper equipment to onload but which has failed as yet to reach expec and offload the aircraft. tations. Two proposed new military aircraft are If industry increases its demands for air also key elements of the plan to develop transportation of goods sufficiently to inspire additional cargo capability. They are the development of the new aircraft—it appears Advanced Tanker-Cargo Aircraft (atca) and inevitable that that time will come—and it the Advanced Medium Short Takeoff and the military’s requirements are taken into Landing Transport (amst). consideration during the early design phases Procurement of the atca will enhance of the development, an aircraft could be built that would satisfy the needs of both intercontinental routes. As part of a total the armed forces and industry, at little addi air distribution system, the Husky concept tional cost. involves not only a special freighter aircraft ma c has made information available to the but also automated loading facilities, the aircraft industry as to those characteristics supply and control of bimodal containers, and requirements needed and desired in support capabilities, a sophisticated service order for such an advanced aircraft to per for logistics reservations and control for form both the military and civil cargo roles heavy freight, and a simple and efficient most effectively. land /sea interface. One interesting and potentially effective Most of the basic research and develop idea in the civilian domain is embodied in ment necessary to produce this new genera the International Husky Corporation’s con tion of cargo aircraft has been done. No cept for air freighters. One of these pure startling breakthroughs are needed on the freighter aircraft is envisioned as capable technological front. of airlifting a 200,000-pound payload over A breakthrough that is needed, however,
9 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW lies in the legislative area. Enabling legis The Middle East example also provides lation will be required before all aspects of dramatic evidence that airlift can allow us the airlift enhancement program can be to affect the outcome of some wars without realized. involving American combat troops. dod has proposed that airlines be com pensated for the downtime of the aircraft E fficient, r espo n sive airlift is a national during modification and for out-of-pocket ex asset upon which we must be able to count penses incurred because of the added weight fully in times of crisis. We have a fine mili of the modified aircraft. In addition, there tary airlift force in ma c . But the aircraft would be an added payment for each such of our civil carriers must be able to convert modified aircraft committed to craf. Ap to a military role effectively, if we are to proval of this program is fundamental to the meet the demands that may be placed upon nation’s ability to deter aggression with con us. ventional forces. This approach will exploit Thus, support of our airlift enhancement existing national assets at a fraction of the efforts, both military and civil, is essential cost of acquiring new organic military air to our national interest. craft. The problems are complex and time- No one, not even the staunchest air power consuming, but the steps already taken plus advocate, would claim that airlift will be support of those proposed, should provide able to do it all in an emergency. Even at for a better balance between military and the peak of the Vietnam war, less than ten civil capabilities. To achieve this important percent of our supplies and equipment balance, we need better understanding by moved by air. But it was this small per all those involved; we need legislation that centage, which was so highly responsive, will enable future progress to insure our that made the important difference in the continuing leadership in global air mobility; conduct of operations. During the much- and finally, we need the Civil Reserve Air publicized Israeli airlift of late 1973, sea Fleet modifications as an important near- lift actually transported three-quarters of term solution to our cargo airlift shortfall. the total tonnage America supplied the Is The military’s requirement is only a por raelis. However, airlift provided the crucial tion of the total national need for airlift. supplies and equipment that were needed Every facet of our economy, and numerous in hours, not days. In fact, the airlift was official agencies, must become involved if virtually complete when the cease fire was our country is to overcome this problem. signed, but sealift had scarcely begun. The national deficit in cargo airlift capability Presumably, over the long run, the same requires a broad solution, and government would be true in a future contingency, with and industry must cooperate in reaching that sealift moving the overwhelming majority of solution if our nation is to maintain its in the cargo but with airlift bearing the initial dustrial and military punch. Indeed, we must brunt. (Control of the seas would still be maintain that punch if we expect to be able vital, and its loss would immensely increase to control our own national destiny. the reliance on airlift.) Hq Military Airlift Command THE EVOLUTION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IN THE POST-VIETNAM ERA adjustment or transformation?
a m. 0* HE expanding military defense bud impact on doctrine in the form that they are gets since 1950 have caused increas perceived by the leaders who control the state’s ing concern about the formulation destiny. Threat perceptions will vary from T group to group and from individual to indi and implementation of U.S. strategic doc trine. Civilian scholars, as well as govern vidual, but a viable state presupposes a con ment officials, have intensified their study of sensus, or at least an effective accommodation of individual and group perceptions of na military and defense strategies. Particularly tional threat.1 noteworthy has been the application of eco nomics models, scientific management tech To meet the threat, a nation will formu niques, and social-psychological concepts. late a strategic doctrine as a basis for mili In addition, the United States Congress tary structure, weapons deployment, and and the American public have shown in resource allocation. The doctrine provides creasing interest in questioning the how guidelines for the military, at least in broad and why of military spending. In this era terms, so that they can in turn inform the of rapidly expanding technology and arms- civilian leadership responsible for commit race complications with the Soviet Union, ting resources of their requirements. Al the high monetary cost of the defense bud though the political processes, institutional get is probably the main reason for all this trade-offs, and bureaucratic deliberations attention, especially during the current eco are generally very complicated and often nomic inflation. Yet the questions being confusing, the overall strategic doctrine asked include the desire to know how re (with its concomitant parameters) does sig quirements are formulated, how and when nificantly shape the military posture. forces will be deployed, and what strategic Yet there are other factors that affect mili alternatives are available to the United tary posture and strategic planning. Any States in the post-Vietnam environment. attempts to meet all the perceived threats to national security must take into account the resources (or lack of them) available Requirements and Formulation of for defense spending. It has been noted that National Strategic Doctrine U.S. policy is committed to the somewhat ambivalent (though not necessarily incon These increased concerns appear to have sistent) policies of safety through military been major factors in the development of superiority while trying to decrease arma national security policies. “Massive retalia ments significantly.2 tion." “flexible response." and other phrases The government planners are also re have become the jargon of the discussion of strained by multifarious U.S. foreign com national defense planning and strategy for mitments. And finally, institutional interests mulation. of the military services that affect their Obviously one basis for national defense morale, efficiency, and power cannot be strategy has to be the nation’s perceived completely ignored. As James Schlesinger potential threats to the pursuit of its na stated in discussing strategic doctrine and tional objectives. These threat perceptions defense planning back in 1965: “National will be subjective and may vary within a security is too broad a problem to be solved nation’s leadership, and yet they do become by any single professional insight. . . . After one of the primary bases of defense plan all, organizationally speaking, what is more ning. As one writer on the subject notes: irrational than a Marine Corps, yet what Threats to the security of a state make their is more useful?” 3 EVOLUTION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 13
In the end, a good deal of military planning gression against U.S. interests throughout is subjective and relative, sometimes lack the world. It was based on the maintenance ing firm criteria. When policy is formulated, of a large nuclear force capable of destroy it must consider other national objectives ing most of the enemy’s residual strategic and priorities in the division of national re forces and industry with a single massive sources. Primarily on the basis of total na strike. It was directed primarily toward the tional objectives, perceived threats, and Soviet Union, in what was defined as a bi institutional considerations, national strategic polar, zero-sum international system. doctrines are theoretically formulated and The U.S. military services carried on a operationally implemented. conspicuous debate concerning strategy and force posture throughout the fifties. Reliance on massive retaliation gave strong emphasis to the mission of the Air Force (particularly Deterrence under sa c ) and the Navy at the expense of the Massive Retaliation Army. It is generally predictable that pro As President Eisenhower assumed office posals for national force postures will re in 1953, he was committed to reducing de flect interservice rivalries and mission com fense expenditures with the conclusion of petitions. the Korean War. Despite a significant build Such rivalry can become parochial and up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza confusing, but it does give government tion (nato), the defense budget fell bv no policy-makers an awareness of available less than $16.5 billion (27 percent) in the military options. “Early in 1956 General two years immediately following General Maxwell D. Taylor, then Chief of Staff of Eisenhower’s assumption of office.4 Because the Army, formally urged the Joint Chiefs of the military posture was primarily based Staff to endorse a strategy of flexible response upon nuclear weapons and retaliation at rather than massive retaliation.” 6 The Air places and times of our choosing, it removed Force and Navy (led by Admiral Arthur many of the requirements for large-scale Radford) continued to favor reliance on conventional capabilities and sophisticated strategic nuclear weaponry. counterinsurgency forces. Civilian scholars, strategic intellectuals, On 12 January 1954 Secretary of State and the “whiz kids" also began to articulate John Foster Dulles made a policy speech in criticism of the reliance on massive retalia which he stated that the United States would tion doctrine as announced by Dulles. One respond to future challenges “at places and of the more important early attacks was with means of its own choosing.” 5 He ar that written by William Kaufmann in a 19.56 gued that the United States must rely more book entitled The Requirements o f Deter- heavily on its “massive retaliatory power. rence. The basis of his criticism was that The doctrine of “massive retaliation," al general nuclear war could benefit nobody ready put into practice, then became the (in later parlance, the first-strike advantage strategic doctrine of the Eisenhower ad was alleged to be close to zero).7 He per ministration. ceived a Russian-American nuclear war as The massive retaliation strategy assumed suicide (literally the negation of policy), that sufficient nuclear forces in-being could giving massive retaliation the semblance of deter any adversary from launching a direct credibility only under the most dire cir nuclear attack on the United States and that cumstances. additionally they could deter any lesser ag As time went on, more and more strate 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW gists called for additional alternatives and Deterrence through options. In his conclusions to a rand study Flexible Response in 1957, N. C. Peterson noted: "The pursuit of these goals [Communist conquests] seems General Maxwell Taylor, discussing his likely to take the form of local war in many years as Army Chief of Staff, explained: situations. We should not create situations “ . . . we had a division over massive re of military weakness which are an invitation taliation versus what we now call a strategy for the enemy to move.” 8 There was grow of flexible response. By 1958 it was a clean ing advocacy for increasing our tactical capa split right in the middle of the Joint Chiefs bilities in a framework of multiple, flexible of Staff, crying for a decision." 12 He further strategic design. noted that, although it was never formally Although primary doctrine in the 1950s brought before the National Security Coun continued to emphasize massive retaliation, cil, it implicitly appeared before them twice there was some modification in the later annually, at both national policy and budget Eisenhower years. In 1957 Secretary of De reviews. fense Charles E. Wilson told Congress that With President Kennedy’s administra American defense policy “is based on the tion, the concept of greater and more di use of atomic weapons in a major war and verse capabilities for a “flexible response” is based on the use of such atomic weap became the cornerstone of defense policy in ons as would be militarily feasible and the sixties, as General Taylor and most of usable in a smaller war, if such a war the earlier strategic intellectuals had been should be forced upon us. In other words, advocating. While continuing to strengthen the smaller atomic weapons, the tactical and increase the protection of strategic- weapons, in a sense have now become the forces, Kennedy also initiated programs to conventional weapons.” 9 Still, even this enlarge and manipulate nonnuclear forces. modification emphasized nuclear weapons, Brush-fire wars and/or "wars of national rather than “conventional" conventional. liberation” were now becoming a primary It is interesting to note that Henry Kis Communist strategy. Such aggression was singer, after advocating tactical nuclear now perceived as the most serious threat weapons in his 1957 book, changed his em in the cold war. It was therefore announced phasis and argued that a massive effort had that the U.S. intended to have “a wider to be made to keep conflict “below the nu choice than humiliation or an all-out nu clear threshold.” 10 clear action." 13 Capabilities to deter Com The argument continued throughout this munist aggression with conventional forces period. The critics’ chief rallying point was and counterinsurgency tactics became a that unlimited nuclear warfare should not part of U.S. strategic doctrine as the Ken be treated as the sole possible outcome of nedy people saw more and more of the a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Communist threats emanating from the As early as November 1954 Secretary Dulles areas of the third world. reportedly explained that "no such single SecretaryJ of Defense Robert McNamara course had been implied by the positions became the primary architect and director he and Admiral Radford had earlier taken. ” 11 of this new flexible response strategy. It Yet most of the critics felt alternatives would called for a balance of forces that would not be available until additional resources enable the U.S. to be highly selective as to were devoted to nonnuclear conventional the type and intensity of forces and weapons forces. it could deploy under different circumstances EVOLUTION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 15 and in diverse situations. President Kennedy, As such, this new doctrine specifically called in a special message to Congress in March for retaliatory strikes. The new policy, with 1961, described the policy: its constraints and options, became known Our defense posture must be both flexible as “controlled (nuclear) response.” and determined. Anv potential aggressor con There is evidence that there was not templating an attack on any part of the free unanimous agreement on the application world with any kind of weapons . . . must of controlled response bv all the military know that our response will be suitable, se leaders in the 1960s. It seems reasonable to lective, swift, and effective . . . We must be assume that at least some of the top mili able to make deliberate choices in weapons tary leaders perceived the difficulty of in and strategy, shift the tempo of our produc troducing flexibility into plans for general tions, and alter the direction of our forces to nuclear war. General Earle G. Wheeler, meet rapidly changing conditions or objec when questioned in 1968 about Secretary tives at very short notice and under any cir cumstances. 14 McNamara’s famous 1962 Ann Arbor dec laration about military objectives in the Thus, Secretary McNamara quickly imple event of nuclear war, succinctly replied: mented force conversions to accommodate “That is McNamara speaking. Speaking for the required options of flexible response. This the joint Chiefs of Staff, we still have ad new emphasis on building up truly conven hered to our concept. ” 17 Yet, from 1961 tional forces included a de-emphasis of tac on, flexible response remained the dominant tical nuclear weapons. In emphasizing the concept for allocating military resources and separation between nuclear warfare and formulating U.S. defense policy. “other kinds of wars," he later noted: The Berlin Crisis provided the Kennedy Careful analysis revealed two important facts administration with a preliminary applica on this point: One was that strategic nuclear tion of flexible response deterrence. Although forces in themselves no longer constituted a McNamara felt that the outcome of this credible deterrent to the broad range of ag crisis had provided early justification for the gression, if indeed they ever had in the past. capabilities of flexible response, there was The other was that we could not substitute still criticism. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, tactical nuclear weapons for conventional from the floor of the Senate, charged that forces in the types of conflicts that were most likely to involve us in the period of the the administration had practically told 1960’s.15 Nikita Khrushchev: “We do not have the will to use that one power with which we Flexible response also became a part of can stop him; in short, we have the nuclear the Air Force’s strategic nuclear planning. capability but not the credibility." 18 What William Kaufmann, in discussing the Mc kind of results might have been achieved by Namara vears, states: a different response is speculative, but in Accordingly, the proponents of the strategy this case the capability for selective flexible of flexible response, led by General Thomas D. response to Communist aggression seemed White, Air Force Chief of Staff, recommended to work as a deterrent. a posture which would be so designed and The 1961 new look of increased forces to controlled that it could attack enemy bomber and missile sites, retaliate with reserve forces implement the concepts of flexible response against enemy cities, if that should prove neces (with multiple options) called for increased sary, and exert pressure on the enemy to end military expenditures, yet high expenditures the war on terms acceptable to the United for nonnuclear forces did not dominate the States.16 military budget. Commenting on this pile- 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW nomenon, Malcolm Hoag says: "The seem “President Kennedy and his brother Robert ingly budgetary austerity of the McNamara were ardent advocates of coping with ‘wars era reflects a capitalization upon some of national liberation’ by imaginative C-I multiple-option capabilities that, despite techniques, . . . One of the new President’s professed Eisenhower doctrine, had been first acts was to approve the cip and allo preserved.” 19 He notes that restoring con cate .$42 million more in U.S. aid for arvn ventional bomb racks to existing airplanes and the civil guard.” 22 was cheaper than re-creating a tactical air In his book The Essence o f Securiti/, M c force. Additionally, the hardening and mo Namara noted that the U.S. force structure bilizing of strategic missiles had already be under the doctrine of flexible response al gun and only needed to be speeded up. lowed for the deployment of more troops The introduction of new concepts and to Vietnam: forces to fight guerrilla wars ("counterinsur I should emphasize that we have consider gency’ and "nation-building”) also brought able flexibility in meeting other possible con in new training requirements. New training tingencies which require smaller forces, or courses and additional ground troops were those requiring so rapid a build up. For ex required. Yet in the initial planning, prior ample, in the Vietnam conflict we used the to the large deployments to Southeast Asia, forces earmarked for a major Asian contin the programmed increase in manpower was gency to meet the immediate needs in the sum relatively small.20 mer of 1965 and then activated temporary The doctrine of flexible response during forces to meet the longer range needs. The very stability of our own nato contribution the McNamara era is well summarized by during that period is a significant example of Morton Halperin as . . the creation of a the flexibility we developed.23 military force which would remain under tight civilian control at all times and which Was it possible we had too much flexibility, could be used in a variety of different ways too many capabilities, and too many options? to meet a variety of different threats.” 21 In Some strategists say we should have con effect, flexible response was seen as a stra centrated more on localized security in spe tegic doctrine for deterrence and defense cific areas with dense local populations. and also as a technique for controlling the This was tried at various times and places military and military instrumentalities with throughout the conflict, but it can be demon in a civilian-dominated, political-oriented strated that in an objective assessment it diplomacy of coercion. was not found to be very effective or suc cessful. Strategic hamlets, search and de stroy, supply interdiction, selective bombing The Vietnam Experience in the North, and many other tactics were The U.S. military experience in Vietnam employed, but all generated very limited re has caused many people to question the fun sults in the long run in thwarting the insur damental assumptions and operational tech gents in Vietnam. niques of the flexible response doctrine. Some critics seem to say that our appli Probably the essential questioning has been cation of flexible response was not flexible aimed at the application of the doctrine. enough. Bernard Jenkins of the rand Cor The Southeast Asian situation was debated poration made this assessment: "The Army's at the highest levels in the Kennedy admin doctrine, its tactics, its organization, its istration in 1961. Within the context of flexi weapons—its entire repertoire of warfare ble response it can be demonstrated that was designed for conventional war in Europe. EVOLUTION Ob' FLEX WEE RESPONSE 17
In Vietnam, the Army simply performed its utilizing primitive logistics and guerrilla repertoire even though it was frequently war tactics.27 He, like some others, feels irrelevant to the situation.' 24 Although this that the tactics utilized were more suitable argument has merit, it is not an adequate to a European type of conflict or to a con comprehensive explanation. Certainly the flict of protagonists with similar power bases. Special Forces camps and strategic hamlets General Victor Krulak, usmc (Retired), were not designed for war in Europe. Simi feels that allowing U.S. combat troops to lar tactics might be included in fighting become directly involved in combat roles in conventional war in Europe, but these were Vietnam was the mistake.28 He notes that certainly designed for sea counterinsur in 1965, when we started sending combat gency. Jenkins goes on to suggest that Viet- troops into the countryside, the Vietnamese namization is not the solution, as it simply leaders warned us that we did not under transfers our organization and our mistakes stand the complexity of the war. He feels to the Vietnamese. that we could have established the same Still one rand analyst, R. W. Komer. does puppet-puppeteer relationship that worked make a fairly strong case that the often for the Communists; in fact, he quotes Sun emphasized “pacification” program was Tzu: "The battle of the puppets is for the never fully carried out. "There was an im puppets to fight. A puppeteer enters the mense gap between this policy emphasis active conflict only at his peril.” and what was actually done in Vietnam. It is interesting to note that General Mat Counterinsurgency (or pacification) did not thew Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff in 1954, fail in Vietnam. Whatever policy called warned President Eisenhower about mili for. it simply was never tried on any major tary involvement in Southeast Asia. As he scale until 1967-1971.” 2J He feels that later noted in his Memoirs, upon reviewing 1967 was too late, but it is hypothetical the possible use of U.S. air and naval power whether it would have worked earlier. to help the French in Indochina: The use of tactical nuclear weapons in In Korea we had learned that air and naval Vietnam was another possible alternative in power alone cannot win a war and that in deterring North Vietnam. Some might argue adequate ground forces cannot win one either. that such weapons could have destroyed key I lost no time in having (such a report) pass targets more precisely with less loss of human up the chain of command. It reached Presi life and civilian property. Yet there is not dent Eisenhower. To a man of his military sufficient evidence that this is true: and to experience, its implications were clear. The take a giant (qualitative) step in escalation idea of intervening was abandoned.29 without any strong probability of military Flexible response as a doctrine included gain seems strategically foolish. As George not only the maintenance of large conven Reinhardt of rand states: “Such logic ig tional forces so that the U.S. could deter nores reality, [and] Washington’s intense any large-scale Sino-Soviet aggression but fear of triggering nuclear war, . . .” 26 also tactical readiness in order to deter in State Department Adviser Raymond J. surgency and limited wars all around the Barrett largely attributes the “graduated world. As Arthur Waskow put it: “For the response’ portion of flexible response to presence of the fleet showing the flag all our failures in Vietnam. The general theme across the globe, the availability of airlifted of his assessment is that controlled “gradu infantrymen, and the existence of powerful alism will not work in a counterinsurgency indigenous armies, all were thought to work situation in an underdeveloped society, against the possibility of internal Communist 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
Revolutions.” 30 Under the concept of flexi and North Vietnamese. We may have let ble response, such forces came into being our broad flexible response capabilities dic in the 1960s. They, of course, had their major tate our strategy and tactics in what might test in Vietnam; and though we apparently be called “capability overload.” won many battles, we never could deter or (2) There was a failure to understand the defeat the enemy. As Reinhardt stated (in political situation in this limited war. We 1967): “Our arms, at peak efficiency in 1965, repeatedly underestimated the resolve and undefeated in land, sea, or air battle, are motivations of the vc/nva versus the South still mixed in an attrition war with no dis Vietnamese nation. While our strategic cernible end.” 31 planning called for graduated responses un There is growing agreement that the major der a limited-war concept, North Vietnam problem in trying to fight a counterinsurgency was engaged in a total war right from the war in Vietnam was that we did not ever very beginnings of the conflict. fully understand the more significant po (3) There was some ambiguity as to our litical dimensions of the conflict. As Bernard overarching objectives. Were we denying Brodie put it: “Classical systems analysis, sea to the U.S.S.R. and/or China or North despite the yeoman’s work done by Alain Vietnam; or were we nation-building in Enthoven’s office, has had just about zero South Vietnam; or were we fighting Com relevance to everything concerned with munism; or was it a combination of these? Vietnam. Our failures there have been at As time went on, this ambiguity caused de least 95% due to our incomprehension and creasing domestic support for our military inability to cope with the political dimen efforts in sea , as well as confusion among sions of the problem.” 32 military men who had to effect the doctrine Again, “flexible response” as a concept is in a shifting, ambiguous goal-framework. logical, sound, and reasonable, but it may (4) There existed considerable “manage not be able to dictate how, when, and where ment overload.” Even as additional “com to deploy forces. Obviously we learned from bat” units were added, the headquarters/ Vietnam that we cannot send U.S. conven support forces often grew by even greater tional forces to fight every insurgency and numbers. Moreover, the best combat troops automatically achieve rapid success with were often rotated into headquarters areas. more firepower. As Brodie says: “When we This rotation pattern often led to subsidized recall how we discussed methods for demon inexperience, ticket punching, and revolving strating ‘our superior resolve’ without even amateurism among both enlisted men and questioning whether we would indeed have officers. or deserve to have superiority in that com (5) We opted for “scientific" measures to modity, we realize how puerile was our determine how the war was going. Numbers whole approach to our art.” 33 of hamlets pacified, body counts, and kill In sum, the lessons to be learned from our ratios became measures of how we were flexible response experience in Vietnam can doing, without adequate evidence as to be summarized within several major cate whether they were valid (or in some cases gories: reliable) indicators of the “success” of our (1) The “implementation of flexible re endeavors. sponse” was generally imprecise. We had (6) Finally, many of the strategic intellec developed extensive military capabilities, tuals who championed and structured the and there was often difficulty in choosing concept of flexible response in the halls of means of escalation to deter the Viet Cong academe blamed much of the failure of the EVOLUTION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 19
doctrine on the military’s implementing of nuclear power threatens,” but this does not the strategy. Hence, it may mean that stra mean that there has been a return to mas tegic doctrine should never again be formu sive retaliation; rather, it is a statement of lated without the direct involvement of restraint and rethinking in the use of tacti military’ professionals in the initial stages of cal forces. In fact, Secretary of Defense theoretical designing and cognitive mapping James R. Schlesinger has been trying to put —theory and practice, it seems, cannot be more flexibility into our strategic nuclear separated in the formulation of strategic policy, as stated in Air Force Magazine: doctrine.34 “Schlesinger [re] introduced the concept of It is, of course, much easier to cite these nuclear flexibility.” 37 Unlike the U.S. con problems in retrospect, but this is no reason cept of assured destruction, which empha for us to dismiss the lessons as hindsight. sizes the capability to inflict damage on The military and other strategic planners major Soviet urban-industrial-population must attack and adjust the problems of na areas, this new flexible strategy aims to main tional defense and not the critics themselves. tain the ability to selectively destroy an enemy’s essential military targets and/or industrial “choke points.” 38 Strategic Policy The apparent reluctance of the United in the 1970s States to become directly involved in coun We think it is reasonable to assume that terinsurgency fighting does not mean we our current strategic and military planning cannot fulfill treaty commitments. Military continues to be based on the Nixon Doctrine: force can be deployed utilizing options that are favorable to our interests. Support can First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. . . . Second, we shall be given to allies who are firmly committed provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens to their defense. We have continued to sup the freedom of a nation allied with us or of port nato, as well as provide military sup a nation whose survival we consider vital to plies to Israel, Latin America, etc. However, our security. Third, in cases involving other it is clear that we will no longer do other types of aggression we shall furnish military people’s fighting for them, unless they dem and economic assistance when requested in onstrate some signs of being able and accordance with our treaty commitments. But willing to fend for themselves. we shall look to the nation directly threatened During the last two decades U.S. strategic to assume the primary responsibility of pro doctrine lent itself to such conceptual as viding the manpower for defense.35 pects as deterrence, massive retaliation, Obviously, the third statement was spe limited war, arms control, flexible response, cifically adopted for Vietnam and any simi nation-building/counterinsurgency, con lar future conflicts. Such a statement is trolled response, and escalation. Although basically consistent with the concept of the 1950s were dominated by massive re flexible response and no doubt was one of taliation and the 1960s by flexible response, the options the early advocates envisioned. most of the other interrelated concepts were Yet it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. significant in the evolution of and debates will be much more concerned with providing over U.S. strategic doctrine. assistance’ incrementally, for fear that it We have not developed a new all-encom might mushroom into primary combat re passing “strategic phrase” for the 1970s, sponsibility for U.S. combat troops.36 but we must continue to pursue policies The second tenet refers to a “shield if a that will eliminate the horrors of general 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW nuclear war while allowing ourselves to our adversaries’ motivations and objectives. pursue our national interests in a world of In Vietnam, under the concept of flexible nation-states. Since World War II, the United response, we fought a “limited war” with States and the Soviet Union have together “graduated responses” to deter the adver spent more than $2 trillion,39 with the static sary. It now appears that the adversary, result that “neither side can expect to at North Vietnam, was not using parallel con tack the other without receiving a retalia cepts in its calculations. One might say that tory strike that would destroy the attacker North Vietnam was fighting a general total as a modern nation-state.” 40 war right from the start. Morton Halperin, in his book Contempo- In essence, despite all the dialogue de rary Military Strategy, made a statement in voted to a re-evaluation of strategic theory, 1967 that we believe is still an accurate ^especially massive retaliation and the litera- assessment in the 1970s: 'ture dealing with limited war and coercive diplomacy, we believe that American stra Whatever we may choose to call it, we are tegic thinking must come to realize the doomed to peaceful coexistence with our ene mies because we live in a world in which war uniqueness, complexities, and dangers of cannot be abolished, because there is no other engaging in limited conflicts. Much of stra means to settle issues that men feel are worth tegic thinking has failed to keep pace with fighting for. But war—at least war in the sense the rapidly changing international situation. of general nuclear war—can only lead to such Whereas independent and indigenous revo complete destruction that in the final analy lutionary forces were rising to challenge sis, the war could not have been worth fight what were many times corrupt, illegitimate, ing. It is this central paradox which provides and ineffective governments, strategic think the challenge and the setting for discussion ing seemed unable to accept an opponent of the role of military strategy in the current that was not the Soviet Union or Communist era.41 China, or at least controlled by these Com Whatever strategic adjustments, trans munist superpowers. formations, and/or revolutions occur in the For these and other reasons, strategic 1970s and beyond will require an awareness theory—and theories more specifically of of past successes and failures. We must con limited war and coercive diplomacy—focused tinue to be in a position to protect our na too exclusively on situations of superpower tional interests while avoiding nuclear con confrontation. The United States has been frontation, and we must protect ourselves too prone to apply these scenarios formu against the overextension of our resources. lated for superpower conflict to situations All policies and strategies must be analyzed where they may not be applicable. This gap in terms of our objectives. Miscalculations between perceptions and reality has re and errors must be recognized; but success sulted in the problems cited in our analysis. ful programs must also be identified, ana Therefore, a fundamental re-evaluation of lyzed, and continued. strategic doctrine in general, and flexible Additionally, we must remember not to response and limited war in particular, seems allow capabilities to dictate policy. We must essential as we move beyond the Vietnam not accept every conflict on the adversaries’ experience. terms. And it is essential that we understand Miami University. Ohio
Notes trines (Santa Monica: RAND, 1973), p. 9. 1. A. L Ho r e l ic k , Perspectives on the Study o f Comparative Military Doc- 2. For a good assessment see Roswell L. Cilpatric, "Our Defense Needs: The EVOLUTION Ob' FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 21
Long View." in Henry Kissinger, editor, Problems o f Motional Strategy iNew 22. R. W. Komer. Institutional Constraints on U.S.-CVN Performance in Viet- York: Praeger, 1965), p. 136 nam (Suntu Monica. RAND, 1972), p. 131. 3. James R Schlcsinger, “Quantitative Analysis and National Security, in 23. McNamara, p. 80. Kissinger. Problems o f Motional Strategy, p. 10*1 24 Bernard Jenkins, The Unchangeable War (Santa Monica: RAND. 1970), 4. Malcolm YV. Hoag. What Meu. Look m Defense? (Santa Monica: RAND. passim. 19691. p h 25. Korner, p. xi. 5. Quoted in Alvin J. Cottrell. T he Eisenhower Era in Asia," Current His- 26. George C. Reinhardt, America's Crossroads—Vietnam (Santa Monica: tory. August 1969, p. 86 RAND. 1967). p. 20. 6. Robert L. Perry. Tin Ballistic Missile Decision (Santa Monica. RAND. 27. Raymond J Barrett. "Graduated Response and the Lessons of Vietnam," 1967) . p. 21. Military Review. May 1972, p. 80. 7 Colin S. Cray. “What RAND Hath Wrought.' Military Review. May 1972. 28. Victor H. Krulak, "The Strategic Limits of Proxy War." Strategic Review. p. 24. vol. II. no. 1 (Winter 1974), p 52. 8. N. C. Peterson, Remarks on future Wars (Santa Monica. RAND. 1957). 29. Quoted in Cottrell, p. 84. p. 27. 30. Arthur I Waskow, The Limits o f Defense (New York: Doubleday 6c Co., 9. Quoted in William W Kaufmann, The McMamaru Strategy (New York: 1962). p. 36. Harper At Row, 1964). p. 25. 31. Reinhardt, p. 19. 10. Henry L. Trewhitt, McMamaru. His Ordeal in the Pentagon tNew York: 32 Bernard Brodie, "Why Were We So Wrong?" Militanj Review. June 1972. Harper 6c Row. 1971), p. 81. p. 44. 11. Perry, p. 20. 33. Ibid., p. 46. 12. Quoted in Kaufmann. p. 24. 34. For elaboration of this idea, see Ronald J. Stupak and Richard K. Herr 13. Theodore Bauer and Harry Yoshpe. “Defense Organization and Manage mann. "The American Military’ Hero: A Contextual Transformation," a paper ment" (Washington. D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 1970). p. 54. presented at the Section on Military Studies Conference. The International Studies 14. Quoted in Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress .Association, held at the Army War College. November 1974 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 328. 35. Richard M. Nixon, “ U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970 %' i Washington, D C 15. Robert S. McNamara. Vie Essence o f Security (New York: Harper Ac R o w . L\S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp 12-14 1968) , p. 69. 36. See Ronald J. Stupak. American Foreign Policy: Assumptions. Processes, and 16. Kaufmann. p. 51. Projections (New York. Harper & Row. 1976). Chapter 7. 17. Quoted in Hoag. p. 19. 37 Mark B. Schneider, "Nuclear Flexibility and Parity." Air force Magazine. 18. Quoted in Trewhitt. pp. 103-4. September 1974, p. 77. 19. Hoag. p. 3. 38. See John A. Lauder. "Lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey for Con 20. For a summary’ of 1961, 1963. and estimated 1965 force structures, see temporary Defense Policy," Orbis, Fall 1974, passim Kolodziej, pp. 406-7 39. Edd D Wheeler. "U.S. Military Strategy: Paradoxes in Persj>eetive," Air 21. Morton H. Halperm. Contemporary Military Strategy (Boston: Little. Brown University Review. July-August 1973, p. 10. 6c Co.. 1967'. p. 81. 40. Ibid. 41. Malpcrin, p. 12. THE EVOLVING LAW OF AERIAL WARFARE
C olonel Jay D. T er r y The high contracting parties solemnly . . . condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They agree that the settle ment or solution of disputes or conflicts . . . shall never be sought except by pacific means. . . . ("Peace Pact," signed at Paris August 27, I928.)1
INCE man’s first powered aircraft substantially as in 1907, with the exception flight, the international community of the Geneva Gas Protocol of 19254 and the twice has negotiated solemn com series of Geneva humanitarian conventions0 S relating to the treatment of persons in pro pacts that were to deny military violence as a means of settling disputes between na tected status, rather than to the means and tions. In the Nuremberg and Tokyo Inter techniques of inflicting violence. national Military Tribunals, the Paris Peace Despite the stark absence of specific rules Pact was the basis for charges of waging on aerial warfare, the airman is bound by aggressive war, and the thirty years since the general principles of customary inter the signing of the Charter of the United national law, from which were drawn the Nations2 have passed without a general detailed regulatory regimes applicable to war. However, these agreements have not land and naval warfare. However, if there prevented a wide range of localized but is to be meaningful observance of these gen devastating armed conflicts in which air eral principles during the conduct of aerial power has played a significant role. warfare, it will depend only in small part The intent of this article is to review the on the individual’s fear of legal sanction. legal regulation of aerial warfare within the He must be convinced that observance historical process. Thus, while an analysis of makes a direct and realistic contribution to the right of nations to wage war (jus ad the effective waging of armed conflict, and bellum) is inappropriate, it is important to he must be inculcated with an understanding bear in mind a twentieth century paradox and acceptance of the basic practicality of that today leaves the law of aerial warfare moral and humane restraints on the inflic in an extremely nebulous and inchoate tion of violence. condition. Exactly the same considerations apply to Simultaneously with the development of the rule-makers in the current conferences a burgeoning technological cornucopia of at Geneva and Lucerne under the auspices aerial weapons and delivery systems, the of the International Committee of the Red international community, horror-stricken Cross. Otherwise, any agreements reached by the ravages of two world wars, has twice by those conferences may have as little declared an end to violent settlement of in likelihood of acceptance and observance ternational disputes. But at the same time, by nations and combatants as did the Pact during both postwar periods, there has been of Paris. a marked distaste—even fear—of further attempts to regulate the tactics and instru ments of purportedly unthinkable conflicts.3 Rule-Making Prior to World War I As a result, the regulation of belligerent By the end of the Thirty Years War in conduct during war (jus in hello) remains 1648, the nations of Europe were beginning
23 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to maintain armed forces of far greater size dividends, such as reciprocal treatment than the traditional armies of the Middle rather than reprisal and retaliation, econo Ages, which were raised by and owed al my of force as in the case of surrender legiance to individual lords and knights. in expectation of a grant of quarter, and Those later forces and their conflicts had protection of those not directly involved in been largely regulated by complex and combat, both neutrals and inhabitants of formalized codes of conduct socially struc belligerent or occupied nations. tured around the caste concepts of chival ry. The future effect of those concepts orw what we today consider the laws of warfare Lieber Code (1863) has perhaps been overemphasized in the past.6 The early days of aerial combat dur The first formal rules of military conduct in ing World War I may have seen the final wartime were promulgated on a national appearance of chivalrous practices on a basis in 1863 as “Instructions for the Gov broad scale in the midst of conflict.7 ernment of Armies of the United States in the Field," 9 based on a draft by Dr. Fran cis Lieber of Columbia University in con junction with a board of Army officers. This document provided the impetus for various military manuals in other countries; such manuals had been generally adopted by the eventual combatants prior to World War I.
St. Petersburg (1868) Notwithstanding the lessening influence of individual obligations of honor and gen Banning of specific weaponry first occurred tility, nations in the seventeenth century in the Declaration of St. Petersburg,10 where began to adopt, on isolated occasions and in the signatory powers renounced the subsequently as a matter of custom, prac employment of explosive or incendiary pro tices of humanity and restraint based on jectiles weighing less than 400 grams (about quite practical considerations. Perhaps most 14 ounces). Laudable though this effort may overriding was the realization that peace have been, it did little to limit weapon followed upon war, and a continuing balance technology. The practice of nations quickly of power during peaceful relations could not adopted explosive and tracer ammunition, be based on a “Carthaginian” peace, that which proved highly successful in use other is to say, absolute devastation of the enemy’s than directly against enemy personnel, e.g., land and people.8 It is a moot question against aircraft or for sighting on targets. whether this basic principle remains viable More interesting for our purposes is the in the wake of the “total war" and “un preambulatory language of the declaration conditional surrender” standards of the that succinctly stated an international con Second World War and in today’s possible sensus of that period which would motivate scenario of massive nuclear exchanges. future efforts to construct a jus in hello: Of more immediate concern to the com [The signatories] . . . having by common batants in the field was the fact that mod agreement fixed the technical limits at which eration and humaneness brought real the necessities of war ought to yield to the LAW OF AERIAL WARFARE 25
requirements of humanity . • declare as fol explosives from balloons or by other new lows: Considering that the progress of civiliza methods of similar nature." 15 The likely tion should have the effect of alleviating as inhibiting effect of this provision on the much as possible the calamities of war; That nascent instruments of aerial warfare was the only legitimate object which States should not lost on the conferees. In fact, the pro endeavor to accomplish during war is to vision had first been adopted for a period weaken the military forces of the enemy; of five years in 1899. The 1907 declaration That for this purpose it is sufficient to dis was to extend to the termination of the Third able the greatest possible number of men; That this object would be exceeded bv the em Peace Conference, which was never held. ployment of arms which uselessly aggravate During World War I the declaration rapidly the sufferings of disabled men, or render their became ineffective through desuetude. Ap death inevitable; That the employment of plication of the declaration had been con such arms would, therefore, be contrary to ditioned by a “general participation” clause, the laws of humanity. . . .n and, since the declaration had not been .Although the actual objectives of nations at ratified by various belligerents in that war, war have obviously far exceeded the norms it was binding on none. of the quoted text, it is this continuing at tempt to reconcile military requirements Hague Regulations (1907) and the laws of humanity that concerns the diplomatic and expert conferees at Geneva As already noted, the Lieber Code had be and Lucerne today. gun a formalization of regulating the con duct of a nation’s armed forces during war time. At Brussels in 1874 and The Hague in Hague Declarations (1899 and 1907) 1899 there were efforts to draft a generally acceptable code of regulations to apply Again, at the initiative of the Russian gov throughout the international community. ernment, further efforts to codify weapon The 1899 conference produced a convention limitations were made at The Hague in that was revised at the 1907 Second Peace 1899 and 1907. One of the Hague Declara Conference and remains effective as Hague tions of 1899 barred “the use of bullets with Convention No. IV and Annexed Regula a hard envelope which does not entirely tions Respecting the Laws and Customs of cover the core, or is pierced with inci War on Land.1® sions/' 12 This prohibition of dumdum bul Although Hague Convention IV of 1907 lets has through practice become a custom also contained a general participation clause, ary limitation.1,5 Whether the ammunition which was invoked by Germany in 1914, was ever militarily significant is question both the intent of the contracting parties able. and the subsequent practice of nations in A second Hague Declaration of 1899 for dicate that the regulations were generally a bade projectiles solely for the diffusion of codifying declaration of existing customary asphyxiating and deleterious gases.14 The rules of international law, which then and mode of delivery has likely become irrele now apply to all nations whether or not vant in view of the broader provisions and technically bound by the convention and practices regarding these substances, which regulations themselves. will be discussed later. Realizing it would be impossible to draft Finally, the Hague Declaration of 1907 all-inclusive regulations and affirming the renounced “the discharge of projectiles and existence of a prevailing body of law, the 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW signatories stated in the preamble of Hague be overridden by claims of military neces Convention No. IV that: sity unless the rule itself so provides. ... in cases not included in the Regula Article 23.e. [. . . it is especially forbidden] tions adopted by [the High Contracting Par to employ arms, projectiles, or material cal ties], the inhabitants and the belligerents culated to cause unnecessary suffering; remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they The English translation of Article 23.e. result from the usages established among of the 1899 regulations had read “of a na civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, ture” instead of the later version “calcu and from the dictates of the public conscience. lated.” The French text of each provision is “propres. ” In any event, it is clear that illegality can arise either from the inherent Despite the regulations' titular applica characteristics of a specific weapon or from tion to land warfare, the parties were not the use to which a basically lawful weapon blind to the emerging possibilities of aerial is put.20 warfare. Specifically, four articles of the regulations should be noted that either were Article 25. The attack or bombardment, by generally applicable to all modes of conflict whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or were specifically intended to apply to or buildings which are undefended is prohib air operations. Later I shall discuss at greater ited. length how these four articles quoted here The “undefended” standard of Article 25 regulate or have been modified bv practice represents a middle stage in the evolutionary to affect the two major problems involved process of the law as it sought a generally in aerial warfare—the targets and the weap acceptable test for legitimacy of bombard ons of air bombardment. ment targets. Although the conference rec Article 22. The right of belligerents to adopt ord makes clear that “by whatever means” means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. was added to earlier drafts to give the pro vision plain application to aerial opera This article is a simplified statement of tions,21 the article was grounded on historic the fundamental norm that supports the en concepts of static or fixed battlefields. In tire body of the law of war: the principle of that traditional milieu of warfare, “unde limited military necessity allows a belliger fended” or “unfortified” (as in a similar 1874 ent nation to use in armed conflict only draft article) areas referred to those in the those means and amounts of force which are immediate locale of ground operations, not forbidden by international law and which which were therefore subject to uncontested are indispensable to compel the complete seizure and occupation, techniques unavail submission of the enemy with the least ex able to the airman. When those standards penditure of life and resources.1' As the rule were found impractical in aerial opera indicates, the law of war is basically pro tions during World War I, belligerent use hibitive law in that certain measures of rapidly changed to a standard of “military force are forbidden, rather than positive law objective,” which had already been sub which authorizes certain measures of stantially adopted in a separate 1907 con force.18 It follows that what is not for vention on naval warfare.22 I shall return bidden by specific rule or general principle to this issue of military objective. is permitted.19 On the other hand, it will be emphasized infra that any rule that acts Article 26. The officer in command of an as a restraint on measures of force cannot attacking force must, before commencing a LAW OF AERIAL WARFARE 27
bombardment, except in cases of assault, do to stem the inevitable exploitation of the all in his power to warn the authorities. aircraft’s potential against the enemy hin terland, nor could they foresee the inherent This article represented another effort to problems in collateral damage caused by apply directly to aerial warfare a principle the delivery of munitions at increasing of land operations. Again, a similar article heights and speeds. in the 1907 naval warfare convention had World War I, although a pale forecast of been qualified by the phrase “if the mili- the devastating carnage wrought by air op tarv situation permits.” 23 In practice, this erations in the Second World War, soon latter criterion was soon transferred to proved that innovative uses of air power aerial warfare to the extent that no warning would surface in direct proportion to the would be required if it would derogate from prodigious growth of the air services them the success of an aerial mission.24 Article 26 selves; e.g., Great Britain’s Royal .Air Force presumes land warfare conditions of unop- grew from less than 100 aircraft fit for war posed artillery preparing to bombard areas use in August 1914 to over 22,(MX) aircraft from which noncombatants could be re by the end of the war.20 moved upon warning. If the same two con The First World War saw a continual ditions applied to an aerial mission, the expansion in both target practices and fundamental norm of avoiding unnecessary munitions. Initially, air operations were lim injury' to noncombatants would require a ited to the immediate theater of land opera warning; however, lack of defenses against tions. Progressively, bombing was extended aircraft has obviously become an excep to objectives well behind the enemy's lines. tional situation. In addition, if a warning .Although these objectives, such as factories, would allow the enemy to disperse or relo utilities, and communications, became less cate legitimate military objectives, no and less directly related to traditional mili warning would be required even if those objectives were undefended. tary targets, the attackers early showed a regard for minimizing injury to the civilian population. But bv the end of the war it was apparent that weakening of civilian morale had become a primary purpose of city bombing. However, even at that stage, no belligerent ever contended that direct attacks on the civilian population were law ful, except perhaps in the form of reprisals for alleged illegal acts.
the draft Hague Rules o f Aerial W arfare (1923) The Great Wars and Their Aftermaths Since the “undefended concept in air op practice during World War I erations had been generally disregarded by belligerents, the First World War left no Despite their efforts to adjust conventional comprehensive or authoritative body of legal rules to the new modalities of aerial war rules to regulate the conduct of aerial war fare, particularly in Article 25, the drafters fare with anything approaching the spe of the 1907 Hague Regulations were unable cificity by which land warfare is governed 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW by the 1907 Hague Regulations. In response lages, dwellings or buildings is legitimate to that vacuum, a commission of jurists from provided that the military concentration is Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the sufficiently important to justify such bom Netherlands, and the United States met at bardment, having regard to the danger thus The Hague in 1923 and drafted a 62-article caused to the civilian population. 5) A belligerent State is liable to pay com code covering in detail such diverse matters pensation for injuries to person or property as aircraft markings, the status of neutral caused by the violation by any of its officers and private aircraft, and the status of occu or forces of the provisions of this Article. pants of disabled aircraft.26 The draft Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare were never ratified by any nation. Although the rules were n.ver adopted, it may be unwise today to disregard the rules totally or ignore the possibility that a similar drafting effort in the future might gain significant support within the inter national community. The most complex article, and the one which most directly led to the nonacceptance of the rules, pertained The drafters, in recognition of World War to the selection of targets for aerial bom I practice, discarded the “undefended” rule bardment. It merits detailed reading. of the 1907 regulations and adopted the principle that aerial bombardment is au Article 24 thorized when directed at a military objec 1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only tive. At this point, it is enough to suggest when directed at a military objective, that is that any exclusive listing of legitimate ob to say, an object of which the destruction or jectives as in paragraph 2) may necessarily injury would constitute a distinct military be self-defeating in view of the constantly advantage to the belligerent. changing nature and importance of objec 2) Such bombardment is legitimate only tives and the imlikelihood that potential when directed at the following objectives: belligerents will ever agree to possible military forces; military works; military es tablishments or depots; factories constituting immunization of large sectors of a foe’s area important and well-known centers engaged in and economy. With respect to paragraph 3), the manufacture of arms, ammunition, or it seems obvious from our vantage of hind distinctly military supplies; lines of communi sight that aerial powers were not going to cation or transportation used for military pur divest themselves of the opportunity to strike poses. at the enemy’s hinterland simply to avoid 3) The bombardment of cities, towns, vil incidental civilian injury or damage oc lages, dwellings or buildings not in the im curring during attacks on legitimate mili mediate neighborhood of the operations of tary objectives. land forces is prohibited. In cases where Nevertheless, the draft Hague Rules of the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so 1923 were contemporarily regarded as the situated, that they cannot be bombarded with most authoritative statement of restraints on out the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the aircraft must abstain aerial warfare. Further, despite the sub from bombardment. sequent substantial disregard for the limita 4) In the neighborhood of operations of land tions of Article 24 during the “total war forces, the bombardment of cities, towns, vil fare” of World War II, it may be said that LAW OF AERIAL WARFARE 29
Article 22 of the rules was declarator)' of until December 1974.28 That delay had long a fundamental customary norm of all war been the subject of an enormous body of fare: discussion and criticism both within and out side the United States. The issue, of course, Aerial bombardment for the purpose o f ter has now been largely mooted by this na rorizing the civilian population, or destroying tion’s ratification of both the 1925 protocol or damaging private property not of a mili- tarv character, or of injuring non-combatants and the more recent convention banning is prohibited. (Emphasis supplied.) the development, production, and stock piling of biological and toxic weapons.29 What is forbidden, of course, is the in Whether the prohibition on lethal gases tentional direct attack of persons and prop and biological/bacteriological substances erty that are not legitimate military objec arises from customary law or general ad tives. Thus this customary norm does not herence to international agreements, the reach the problem of collateral or incidental fact remains that no nation since the First damage caused to otherwise protected per World War has asserted a right to make sons or objects during bombardment of a first use of those substances during a con lawful military objective. As we shall see, flict. A number of parties to the 1925 this latter issue must be judged bv a test of protocol have reserved a right to respond in proportionality. In addition, the obvious kind to first use by another belligerent. difficulty with Article 22, particularly in With respect to nonlethal gases and herbi view of the inherent disassociation of airmen cides, the President of the United States has from their targets, is to establish the cri asserted a policy that herbicides would be teria and identification of noncombatants used first in war only for clearing of vege and “property not of a military character.” tation within and on the perimeter of mili tary bases and under standards set for their use inside the United States, and that non Geneva Gas Protocol (1925) lethal gases would not be used first except Despite Article 23.a. of the 1907 Hague for riot control, to reduce civilian casual Regulations, which specifically proscribed ties, for rescue missions, and to protect rear- the employment of poison or poisoned area convoys.30 Advance Presidential ap weapons, the First World War witnessed proval will be required for any such use. extensive use of toxic gases having blister ing and choking effects. Consequently, after practice during World War II an abortive attempt in 1922 to affirm the illegality of such substances, the Geneva The conduct of belligerent air operations Gas Protocol of 1925 was adopted bv a large during World War II has been too well portion of the world community.2' The documented to warrant repetition. Suffice protocol incorporated language from a draft it to recall that an enemy’s entire territory 1922 treaty confirming the prohibited use came to be considered a theater of hos in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other tilities. As Hersch Lauterpacht has stated: gases and analogous substances or objects; . . . the practice of the Second World War it went on to extend this prohibition to reduced to the vanishing point the protection bacteriological substances and techniques. of the civilian population from aerial bom Although the United States was an origi bardment. That practice cannot be explained nal signatory, the United States Senate did solely by reference to reprisals adopted by not consent to ratification of the agreement the Allies against Germany, on account either 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
of her own practice of aerial warfare or the haven. At least three serious problems with unprecedented lawlessness of her conduct in such zones seem apparent: whether they relation to the civilian population in occupied could be of sufficient dimensions to accom territory. . . .31 modate the tens or scores of millions of After a comprehensive study of the reports designated noncombatants, whether any of all military tribunals convened following nation could politically survive the segre World War II, the United Nations War gation of its civilian populace into groups Crimes Commission stated that no trials that are immune and those that are pre had been convened on allegations of illegiti sumably fair game, and whether adver mate aerial warfare, and the judgments of saries could rest assured that the immunized the military tribunals contained no rulings areas would remain free of legitimate mili on the lawful limits of air warfare.32 tary objectives. Articles 14 and 15 have In any event, it is clear that, regardless never been implemented. of each belligerent’s claim that he bombed only military objectives while his oppo nent directly attacked civilians, there came Current Status of the to be general acceptance by all that entire Laws of Aerial Warfare cities and their populations were lawfully rules and principles subject to complete devastation. This prac tice of “target area" bombing will be dis The efforts in the 1907 Hague Regulations cussed more fully in connection with the and the 1923 draft Hague Rules to apply to military objective standard. aerial warfare, directly or by analogy, the comprehensively delineated rules of land and naval warfare must be deemed failures. Geneva Conventions o f 1949 The traditional rules had evolved through usage and accommodation over several cen The four Geneva Conventions for the Pro turies, and nations generally have been loath tection of War Victims of 12 August 1949 33 to proscribe broad modes of operations in are binding on some 140 parties, many of advance of their natural development dur whom have entered reservations as to cer ing periods of conflict. tain of the provisions. The purpose of the Even more detrimental to the adoption of conventions is the humanitarian protection limitations on air operations have been the of persons who, by virtue of inherent or incredibly accelerated technological break acquired noncombatant status, are to be throughs of the twentieth century. The last spared to the maximum extent from the seventy years have essentially constituted a ravages of war. continual arms race in the development and With two exceptions, the provisions of exploitation of weaponry and delivery sys these conventions do not go beyond the tems. Within such an environment, no na scope of the 1907 Hague Regulations in tion has felt so secure technologically that directly regulating the conduct of aerial it could forswear certain tactics, usages, or warfare. Articles 14 and 15 of the conven weapons, since it could not predict how tion pertaining to civilians contain proce potential adversaries, by unpredictable tech dures by which the belligerents may enter nical advances, might take highly destructive into agreements establishing “safety zones" advantage of such forbearance. and “neutralized zones,” respectively, in Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that which protected persons would have safe- there is not a legal vacuum in regard to LAW OF AERIAL WARFARE 31
aerial warfare. All the specific and con military necessity that would justify viola crete rules applicable to land and naval tion of the laws of war if required by a warfare derive from the fundamental cus- specific military situation.35 The court in tomarv norm of limited military necessity: Re Krupp and Others said: the amount and kind of force necessary for . . . The contention that the rules and cus a belligerent to compel the submission of the toms of warfare can be violated if either party enemy with the least possible expenditure is hard pressed in any way must be rejected of time, life, and resources must not include on other grounds. War is by definition a risky acts or means that can or should be foreseen and hazardous business. ... It is an essence to cause suffering, injury, and destruction of war that one or the other side must lose, unnecessary to the accomplishment of legiti and the experienced generals and statesmen mate military purposes or disproportionate knew this when they drafted the rules and to the military advantage reasonably ex customs of land warfare. In short, these rules and customs of warfare are designed specifi pected to be gained.34 cally for all phases of war. They comprise the It is these three criteria which act as law for such emergency. To claim that they the restraining limits on military necessity. can be wantonly—and at the sole discretion of Foreseeable consequences causing unneces any one belligerent—disregarded when he sary or disproportionate injury or damage considers his own situation to be critical, are the root of all illegal acts under the law means nothing more or less than to abrogate of war, whether they be violations of spe the laws and customs of war entirely. . . .36 cific humanitarian rules or violations of the three standards explicit in the basic norm of limited militaryJ necessitv.J Reconciling military necessity and hu manitarian efforts to limit the effects of international violence remains a difficult and frustrating task, particularly within the flux of the technologically evolving environment of aerial warfare. Such reconciliation in the form of specific regulation amenable to observance by aviators will come only by (2) The war crimes judgments appear to realistic application of the standards of have resolved earlier unsettled rules as to limited military necessity to the unique the defense of superior orders. It is now capabilities and potentialities of air opera established both in national military law tions. and in the international law of war that a It should be noted that the judgments of mere claim of obedience to the order of a the post-World War II International Mili superior, either military or civilian, will not tary Tribunals and national courts, although constitute a defense to a war crime allega they are binding only on the cases heard tion.37 An order to commit an offense is an and do not constitute a certain precedent illegal order, and the actor is not excused for the future, rejected three concepts which unless he did not know or could not reason the defendants had advanced as legal ex ably be expected to know that the ordered cuses or defenses for acts alleged to be vio act was unlawful. However, his general ob lations of the law of war: ligation to accomplish the orders of his (1) The decisions at Nuremberg and Tokyo superior may serve to mitigate his punish declared invalid the principle of absolute ment. •32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
(3) One of the general principles under are in direct opposition to the fundamental which the war crimes trials were convened nature of the laws of war as prohibitory declared that the official position of a law. The rules that have been adopted by defendant may not be asserted as freeing him custom or agreement have said, “This is from responsibility for an unlawful act on forbidden, but you may do anything else.” grounds that the deed was an Act of State Rules that attempt to list exhaustively all in that he was performing solely in further legitimate military objectives declare, “This ance of his officiality.38 is allowed, all else is forbidden." It is un likely such a standard will be adopted the problems: targets and weaponry
We have, then, the two broad principles of minimizing unnecessary suffering and apply ing only that force which is proportionate to the resultant military advantage. What is the relevance of these standards to the persisting problems of aerial warfare: the selection of targets and the nature and use of weapons? These are immensely difficult dilemmas that have frustrated practically uniquely in the case of military objectives. all efforts in this century to specifically A more fruitful approach may be to seek regulate aerial warfare. agreement on persons and objects that are The historical criteria of bombing only not legitimate military objectives. And here “fortified or "defended" areas were logi we come to the classic distinction of per cally inapplicable to air attacks behind the sons that permeates the humanitarian law lines of land engagement. No targets be of war: the categorization of combatants hind the enemy’s engaged lines are sub and noncombatants. In the St. Petersburg ject to immediate seizure and occupation; Declaration, the legitimate object of war hence they are defended by those very lines fare was narrowly defined as the military of combat engagement. By the time of the forces of the enemy.42 That was likely an draft Hague Rules of 1923, it was clear from unrealistic assertion even in 1868. Modern practice that the international community warfare has been characterized bv a gen had adopted the military objective test. In eral weakening of the immunization of the Article 24 the drafters of those rules fairly noncombatant populace from the immediate defined a military objective as “an object of consequences of war. But, as Lauterpacht which the destruction or injury would con indicates: stitute a distinct military advantage to the . . . it is in that prohibition, which is a belligerent.’’ 39 clear rule of law, of intentional terrorization— Can we be more specific about military or destruction—of the civilian population as objectives? It will be recalled that the 1923 an avowed or obvious object of attack that Rules enumerated a somewhat vague list of lies the last vestige of the claim that war can he legally regulated at all. Without that ir objects and excluded all others.40 A similar reducible principle of restraint there is no limit approach was drafted in 1956 by a group to the license and depravity of force. . . .43 of jurists under the sponsorship of the In ternational Committee of the Red Cross.41 That “irreducible principle was stretched It would appear that such drafting efforts to the limits by the accepted practice of LAW OF AERIAL WARFARE 33
“target-area” bombing in World War II. bullets, projectiles filled with glass, bullets Massive pattern bombing of extensive areas coated with aggravating substances, and containing widespread industrial or military dumdum bullets.45 complexes resulted in near obliteration of But the use of an inherently lawful weap numerous cities and general urban areas. on violates the law of war if that use re The consequent indiscriminate death and sults in suffering and destruction that is destruction to noncombatant persons and unnecessary or grossly disproportionate to property has been justified on grounds that the expected military advantage. Con the areas attacked were so dominated by versely, a weapon designed for the destruc legitimate military objectives that the entire tion of legitimate military objectives is not areas assumed the character of a military illegal per se if such use causes incidental objective, that massive and complex de injury or damage to noncombatants or pro fenses against air attack made discriminate tected property, unless the weapon is de bombing impossible, and that injury or signed or used so as to violate the necessary damage to noncombatant persons and prop and proportional standards. Thus, weapons erty was never the result of forbidden direct that cause indiscriminate destruction of attack but only regrettably, vet necessarily, nonmilitary targets during an attack on law incidental due to their proximity to legiti ful military targets are necessarily illegal mate military objectives.44 by either nature or use. Whether target-area bombing has become This point of indiscriminate weapons de an accepted and indispensable adjunct of serves further comment. The inability of modern warfare or an anomaly of a par a weapon to discriminate among its victims ticular kind of war, it is clear that when an may arise from inaccurate delivery, such as airman is able to discriminate between law “blind” rockets and ballistic aerial ordnance ful and unlawful targets, he must do so; and dropped at high altitude or under stressful he must exercise all reasonable efforts to conditions, or from random and widespread minimize collateral damage to noncom damage upon detonation. Ironically, modern batants and their property. To complain technology is now producing, primarily for that such a requirement tends to expose the the purposes of attaining assured and eco tactical airman unduly to charges of un nomical target destruction, numerous weap lawful behavior while insulating the strategic ons that will lessen significantly indiscrimina aviator overlooks the somewhat analogous tion resulting from inaccurate delivery. These situation between the infantryman, who most precision-guided munitions could presage frequently comes in contact with enemy beneficial consequences for the humanitarian combatants and noncombatants, and the protection of noncombatant persons and artilleryman, who is generally both physi property. cally and sensorilv remote from the objects Finally on the subject of weapons, this of his barrage. article intentionally has not raised the issue Unlawfulness in the case of weapons may of nuclear weapons, principally because it stem from either their inherent characteris is far too complex an issue for a worthwhile tics or the manner of their use. As already discussion in such limited space. There is discussed, few weapons have been accepted now no specific rule making unlawful the as illegal per se, whether by agreement, as employment of nuclear weapons. Further, with gas and biological/bacteriological ma during the thirty years since their first use, terials, or by custom, as in the case of technology has enabled development of barbed-headed lances, irregularly shaped many types of nuclear weapons with a wide 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW spectrum of yields and consequences, many supplement existing conventions, by invit only theoretical. Whatever may be con ing governmental and other experts to meet cluded legally about the two essentially for consultations, and by recommending countervalue atomic detonations that have diplomatic conferences to produce appropri occurred in war, it is extremely risky to ate new agreements.47 make absolute statements about the appli Meanwhile, the 1968 International Confer cation of general rules such as unnecessary ence on Human Rights in Teheran had fo suffering, proportionality, and discrimina cused the interest of the United Nations on tion to all nuclear weapons regardless of human rights in armed conflicts. At the re variations in intended uses or foreseeable quest of the General Assembly, the Secre consequences. However, it is clear that the tary-General conducted broad studies on the some half-dozen nations presently possess status of the entire subject and recommended ing nuclear weapons do not accept the tra courses of action in reports to the General ditional law of war as adequate to control Assembly in 1969 and 1970.48 Those recom such armaments safely without a new re mendations included emphasis on the pro gime of law having specific application. tection of civilians in international con Consequently, nuclear weapon employment flicts; strengthened application of humani is now subject only to social and political tarian law to conflicts not of an international controls rather than legal. The course of character; development of a system of refuges further development of controls is purely or sanctuaries for the protection of civilians; speculative. measures to insure that the ic r c or other international organ can serve in a super visory protective capacity during conflicts; developing humanitarian rules for arm ed conflicts and, in regard to the methods of warfare, identification and prohibition of weapons The past decade has witnessed an acceler and tactics that are unnecessarily cruel, ated program within the international com excessively destructive, or unduly treacher munity to strengthen humanitarian objec ous. tives in the waging of armed conflict. The During the next three years, the ic r c pre most significant aspect of this program has pared and revised two draft protocols to the been the confluence of efforts between the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Each protocol is United Nations and the International Com directed toward the protection of victims of mittee of the Red Cross (ic r c ). armed conflict, but the first relates to inter The ic r c has traditionally exerted a unique national conflicts while the second extends influence in humanitarian law through the only to conflicts not of an international char expertise of its member organizations. But acter. Two conferences of governmental the major culminations of its work, the 1949 experts during 1971 and 1972 had studied Geneva Conventions, have never received and commented on the original drafts. Based effective implementation, and nations gave on those comments, in 1973 the ic r c pre little attention in 1956 to the ic r c Draft sented the two revised draft protocols for Rules for the Limitation of Dangers Incurred formal consideration by the international by the Civilian Population in Time of War.46 community.49 Nevertheless, subsequent international con With regard to aerial warfare, it is im ferences of the Red Cross urged the ic r c to portant to note that the protocols extend continue the development of international to many matters that formerly were con humanitarian law by drafting new rules to trolled only by the 1907 Hague Regulations LAW OF AERIAL WARFARE 35
or by customary law, if any. Various of the in Lucerne during the fall of 1974 for the draft articles cover effects of weapons,50 Conference of Government Experts on forbidden perfidious acts,51 protection of the Weapons that May Cause Unnecessary occupants of distressed aircraft,02 prohibi Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects.57 tion of direct attacks on the civilian popu The conference received and discussed medi lation and objects that either are indispensa cal data and legal criteria relating to five ble to the civilian population or harness categories of conventional weapons: incen dangerous forces (as dams, dikes, or nuclear diary, small caliber projectiles, blast and frag power stations),53 prohibition of target-area mentation, delayed action and treacherous, or disproportionate bombardments,54 and and future weapons. A report was prepared creation of nondefended (in a combat zone) for the Diplomatic Conference, and a second or neutralized (outside a combat zone) lo session of the Weapons Conference is calities that would be immune from attack.05 planned early in 1976. A ten-week second session of the Diplo matic Conference concluded on 18 April 1975.58 Extensive progress was made dur ing Working Group sessions, and the three main committees ultimately adopted agreed language for the majority of the articles in the two draft protocols. Although the com mittee reports were adopted by the plenary conference, no final action was taken on specific articles pending committee agree ment on consensus texts for the complete recent conferences (1974-1975) protocols. The third session of the Diplo The first session of the Diplomatic Confer matic Conference will convene in April ence on the Reaffirmation and Development 1976, upon completion of the second ses of International Humanitarian Law Appli sion of the Conference of Government Ex cable in Armed Conflicts met in Geneva perts on Weapons. during February and March 1974.56 One hundred twenty-five nations participated in the conference. Although the session T his article has broadly delineated the lasted nearly six weeks, more than half of fundamental concepts and forces that have the session was devoted to organizational influenced the law of warfare since the ad and representational issues. The three main vent of military aviation. It has been im committees of the conference adopted five possible to discuss various important sub revised articles out of more than 150 in jects that have major relevance to all the two draft protocols, but none was military personnel but are not directly con adopted by the plenary conference. In addi nected to the conduct of air operations, tion, a technical annex on medical and civil such as the duty and procedures to instruct defense personnel, transports, and installa military personnel in the laws of war, the tions was adopted by a subcommittee but enforcement of the laws of war by either not by its parent committee. international or national sanctions, and the Subsequently, representatives of 49 na role of the senior military officer in the tions, several national liberation movements, process of formulating new or revised regu and various humanitarian organizations met lation of armed conflict. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
The international community has come legal review of weapons and tactics. In to realize that the regulation of warfare the final analysis, he must be amenable to is not the condonation of war. Today’s pro realistic legal regulations that have the fessional airman must accept a serious potential to benefit noncombatants and challenge if mankind is to be spared any their property without unacceptable im of the horrific consequences of modern war pairment of military effectiveness. fare. While it is useless for the law to wave It is not what a lawyer tells me I may do; anachronistic limitations in the face of in but what humanity, reason and justice tell me exorable technological developments, the I ought to do.—E dmund Burke airman should expect and be prepared to Air War College assist in practical and humanely reasoned
Notes
by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), 1. 94 League o f Nations Treaty Series 57. pp. 100-101, 114-15; William V. O'Brien, "The Law of War. Command Re 2. 554 United Nations Treaty Series 143. sponsibility and Vietnam." 60 Georgetown Law Journal 605 1972), p. 616. 3 See general discussions in Josef L. Kunz, "The Chaotic Status of the Laws See generally William Gerald Downey. Jr.. "The Law of War and Military of War and the Urgent Need for Their Revision." 45 American Journal of In- Necessity," 47 American Journal o f International Law 251-62 (1958). ternational Law 1951 >, p. 37ff . L. Murick. "The Distinction between Com 18. See generally Morris Creenspan. The Modem Law of Land Warfare batant and Noncombatant in the Law of W ar." 29 American Journal of In- (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1959). pp. 278-80. ternational Law (1945). p. 680ff. 313-15. Compare Stone, pp. 351-53. 4. "Protocol for the Prohibition of tile Use in War of .Asphyxiating, Poison 19. Richard R. Baxter. "So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency." 28 British ous or Other Cases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” done at Year Book o f International Law 323-45 (1951). Geneva June 17. 1925. 94 leagu e o f Nations Treaty Scries 65. 20. Denise Bindschedler-Robert. "A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed 5. "Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Conflicts.” Report o f the Conference on Contemporary Problems o f the Law o f Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field." done at Geneva August 12, Armed Conflict (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1949. 75 United Nations Treaty Series 31; "Geneva Convention for 1971), pp. 28-29. Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Mem 21. Referred to in Stone, p 621. bers of Armed Forces at Sea," done at Geneva August 12. 1949, 75 United 22. Article 2, "Hague Convent ion No. IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Nations Treaty Series 85; "Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Forces in Time of W ar." done at The Hague. Octolier 18. 1907, 36 Stat. Prisoners of War," done at Geneva August 12, 1949, 75 United Nations 2351, Treaty Series 542, 1 Bevans 681. Treaty Series 135; "Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 23. Ibid.. Article 6. Persons in Time of W ar." done at Ceneva August 12, 1949, 75 United Nations 24. Spaight, pp. 240-43. Treaty Series 287. 25. Ibid., p. 5. Generally in regard to World War I bombing practices, see 6. Hersch Lauterpacht. L.F.L. Oppenheim. International Law: A Treatise. p. Iff. and p. 220ff. vol. II. Disputes. War and Neutrality. 7th ed. (London and New York: Long 26. "General Report of the Commission of Jurists at The Hague. 1923." mans, Green and Co , 1952), p. 227. Compare Julius Stone, LAigal Controls o f 17 American Journal o f International Law i!923), Supplement pp. 242-60, International Conflict (Second Impression. Revised with Supplement 1953-1958) Lauterpacht. pp. 518-22. The rules are reprinted in Creenspan. pp. 650-67. (London: Stevens and Sons. Ltd.. 1959), pp. 337-39. 27. Note 4, supra. 7. J. M. Spaight. Air Power and War Rights. 3d ed. (London. New York, and 28. "Ford Signs Ban on Biological, Gas Warfare," Washington Post. January Toronto: Longmans. Green and Co.. 1947), pp. 240-43ff. This entire book is 23, 1975, p. 15. a fascinating and authoritative, though parochial, study of air operations 29. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. Production and during the two World Wars. Stockpiling of Bacteriological 40. Ibid 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 41. "Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Armed Conflicts," International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva, June Population in Time of War." Report o f the International Committee o f the 1973. Red Cross to the XIXth International Conference o f the Red Cross. Geneva. 1957. 50. Ibid.. Protocol 1. Articles 33-34. Protocol 11. Article 20. 42. Page 25. supra. 51. Ibid.. Protocol 1, Articles 35, 39; Protocol II. Article 21 43. Hersch Lauterpacht. T he Problem of the Revision of the Law of War." 52. Ibid.. Protocol I. Article 39 29 British Year Book of International Law 360 (1952). p. 369. 53. Ibid., Protocol l. Articles 43. 46-49, Protocol II, Articles 26-26 44. Spaight. p. 271; Stone, p. 629; Greenspan, p. 338. 54. Ibid.. Protocol I. Articles 46. 50. 45. Note 13. supra. 55. Ibid., Articles 52-53. 46. Note 41. supra. 56 Report on the Work o f the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation 47. "Protection of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate and Development o f International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Con Warfare," Resolution XXVIII. International Conference o f the Red Cross. Vienna. flicis. International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva, 1974. 1965. "Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in 57. Report on the Work of the Conference o f Government Experts on the .Armed Conflicts." Resolution XIII. International Conference o f the Red Cross. Use o f Certain Conventional Weapons. (Preliminary English Text), International Istanbul. 1969. Committee of the Red Cross. Lucerne. 1974. 46. "Reports of the Secretary General. Respect tor Human Rights in Armed 58. Telephone conversations between the author und Brigadier General Conflicts." First Report. United Motions Document A /7720 (1969>; Second Walter D. Reed. The Assistant Judge Advocate General. United States Air Report. United Motions Document A/8052 (1970). Force, and alternate United States delegate to the Second Session of the 49. "1 Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Aimed Con Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. April 21-23. 1975. flicts," T L Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August ASPECTS OF AIR FORCE STRATEGY TODAY L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Joseph H. S todder, USAFR N the weeks during which this study was being prepared, several events took place that received major public notice and pertain specifically to the subject at hand: (1) on 24 November 1974 President Ford and IGeneral Secretary Brezhnev reached a historic arms limitation agreement at Vladivostok; (2) in the first week of December, the U.S. Air Force accepted delivery of its first operational F-15 fighter at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona; and (3) on 23 December the B-l bomber made its maiden flight from Palmdale, California, to Edwards afb. These pages will examine U.S. military strategy for limited and general war. The examination will be conducted in the contexts of both arms inventory, epitomized by the Air Force’s new tactical fighter and strategic bomber, and arms limitation, reflected in the growing spirit of detente that precipitated the Vladivostok accords. The range and depth of the questions involved in any consideration of military strategy today are staggering. In this brief analysis no pretense is made of resolving any of these questions. The objective, rather, is to attain, as clearly and directly as possible, a reasonable projection of Air Force strategy based on an analysis of some of the salient characteristics of limited and general war. If in the process of this study some insights are provided into these complex and varied ques tions, it will have served a useful purpose. 38 AIR FORCE STRATEGY TODAY 39 Strategies for the Future be negotiating a reduction from present levels of strategic armament and expenditure rather In their meeting last November, President than limited increases to higher levels. The Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev counter-argument comes down to the bald reached an understanding that could have assertion that the Soviet Union simply and profound and lasting influence on future certainly is not prepared to negotiate reduc U.S. military strategy. In essence, the Ford- tion from present levels. It would be bound Brezhnev agreement places limits—both by the projected agreement, along with the qualitative and quantitative—on future stra U.S., to begin negotiation of some reduction from the agreed levels no later than 1980-81. tegic arms production and deployment in That is held to be a gain of sorts, however the United States and the Soviet Union. It tenuous.3 accomplishes this with two arms “caps”: (1) a ceiling of “somewhat less than 2500” The tenuous gain is in favor of the grow on the total number of missile launchers ing spirit of detente, which itself might be that each nation can deploy over the next suspect, according to James N. Wallace, ten years, this “cap” applying to every ele Moscow bureau chief for a U.S. newsweekly: ment of the Triad: land- and sea-based mis . . the ‘spirit of detente’ is still the offi siles as well as strategic bombers; and (2) a cial line—and it is being strongly pushed. ceiling of 1300 on the number of missiles Russia very much wants access to Western fitted with multiple independently target- credits, equipment and technology. . . . But able re-entry vehicle (mir v) warheads.1 analysts warn that the U.S. would be mak The celebrated Vladivostok agreement ing a serious mistake if it thinks the lure of has had predictably mixed reaction. Repre trade and technology can buy either detente sentative George Mahon, chairman of the or any important restructuring of the Soviet House Appropriations Committee, called system. What Kremlin planners hope to get the agreement “of considerable, but not from the U.S. and what they can get by on monumental significance, . . . the best that if they have to are far different things.” 4 could be done at this time.” Senator Mike Although many regard detente with sea Mansfield said that “an equal reduction” in soned apprehension, fearing the tendency of arms would have been better, though he being “lulled into a false sense of security,” recognized the improbability of accomplish the fact is that detente is without doubt the ing it. Paul Nitze, a former sa l t adviser, most powerful single factor influencing U.S. was “disappointed.” He feared that the So global planning today, in both limited and viets would deploy “a new family of mis general war strategy. siles.” 2 Political analyst John Osborne sum What direction will future strategy take? marizes objections to the agreement thus: Without extravagant predictions, some prac tical and realistic projections are possible, The major argument against the projected based on evidence that will be presented in agreement that Senator Henry Jackson and this article. other critics are already making derives from the unquestioned fact that the Soviet Union presently has no MiRved missiles deployed. limited war This agreement, if concluded, would sanction a Soviet build-up from zero to 1320 MiRved Future U.S. military strategy in limited war missiles with several thousand warheads on will undoubtedly be guided by patterns that them. . . . A related argument against the are evident today in international relations. Vladivostok prospect is that the U.S. should It would be pleasant to contemplate the 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW prospect of continually easing tensions in no doubt be acquired in the future. A review international affairs, but all evidence sug of current strategy, however, provides in gests that, though the settings may vary, the dices for gauging the direction of future tensions will remain. The Middle East, which counterinsurgent activity. For example, it has been the scene of sporadic limited-war is evident that insurgency can be more ex action for the past 25 years, will probably peditiously countered with timely exercise continue to be explosive for the foreseeable of intelligent statesmanship and skillful dip future. The shocking events in Ethiopia could lomatic maneuvering than with direct mili trigger new crises involving not only the tary activity, whether overt or covert. But Middle East but even the Indian Ocean if need dictates military involvement, in power crucible. A recent newspaper article either air or Special Forces action, it is considers the growing significance of the certain that future counterinsurgent strate African Horn: gies will reap enormous benefits from the There are those who believe that all the talk lessons of the immediate past. about the “Indian Ocean confrontation” has nothing to do with that ocean, but centers on general war who can get the most firepower quickest to the Arabian boot. . . . It has been said that the The "spirit of detente,’ nourished bv the only advantage soldiers hold over civilians, cold war arms standoff and sharpened in the when it comes to ruling, is the power to kill. Vladivostok accords, pertains to limited-war The world is watching Ethiopia, as the Horn threats in some very specific respects; but of Africa becomes important in the power the obvious preoccupying concern of Presi moves of the East, West and Arab states. What dent Ford and Secretary Brezhnev was in happens there may well depend on one thing: response to the continuing threat of general Can the dirgue [provisional military council] thermonuclear war. From the present per rule, as well as kill? 5 spective, then, U.S. general-war strategy for In the continuing presence of such crises— the next quarter-century would seem to be in South America, in Southeast .Asia, in Eu primarily influenced by two factors: (1) rope, as well as in the Middle East—the need maintenance of the Triad arsenal: Min- is evident for ever more refined and sophis uteman-MiRV, B-l bomber, and Trident- ticated limited-war strategies, not only to Poseidon-MiRv, but modified according to meet but also, if possible, to anticipate and the terms of the Vladivostok and any forth prevent the outbreak of hostilities. coming agreements; and (2) the spirit of In recent military-political reassessments, detente: increasing focus on diplomatic the emphasis in limited-war strategy has rather than military persuasion. gradually shifted away from dependency on In regard to the future of the arsenal, tactical nuclear weapons, though the inven several intriguing speculations present tory and personnel skills are maintained at themselves. First, the development of the a high degree of efficiency (as will be indi Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRv) will cated shortly). There is no reason to expect almost certainly result in broad, sophisti a change in this tendency in future strategic cated refinements in the application of mis planning. Also, as will be shown, limited-war sile strategy. The MaRv, commonly referred strategy has been focusing more and more to as Evader, would have immense advan on effective use of counterinsurgency. Much tages over the fixed-target mir v, in that it has been learned in this area in the last can be guided to selected targets and can two decades, and much more expertise will evade interdiction.6 The amplified versatility AIR FORCE STRATEGY 41 provided by Evader will thus increase the to permit Moscow to achieve economic and formidability of the Minuteman arsenal military superiority over the West in the without jeopardizing the terms of the next decade,” arrives at the conclusion that Vladivostok agreement. if the U.S.S.R. can destroy the Atlantic A second important consideration is the Community in future negotiations without practical limitation on arms development opening its own society, “the present detente and production imposed by current inflation. may not endure for long.” 9 The cost of the B-l bomber, for example, On the positive side, many influential has escalated from the planned $12.2 bil statesmen endorse Secretary Kissinger’s lion to the present $18.6 billion. Because of view of detente as a worthy and workable inflation, the Air Force is considering a re relationship. Senator Edward Kennedy goes duction in F-15 purchases from the original further. Looking “beyond detente,” he calls contract of 72 (over the next year) to a for a broader-based collegiality of negotia more modest procurement of 69.' More tion, “involving all facets of American so over, the economic outlook will, in all like ciety in public debate,” providing extensive lihood, become worse before it becomes visibility for nuclear programs, and relating better. U.S.-Soviet needs to broader world prob Finally, the pressure of technological lems. Of this last aspect of the proposal he progress in arms sophistication may itself says: accelerate arms limitation. At a meeting in . . . the true test will lie in our mutual Moscow, Secretary Kissinger asked these ability and willingness to face the truly great vital rhetorical questions: challenges to mankind for the balance of this If we have not reached an agreement well century: challenges of food, of fuel, of popu before 1977, then I believe you will see an lation, of sharing resources, and of the need explosion of technology and an explosion of for a broader sense of social justice toward numbers at the end of which we will be lucky the poor countries. This will be more likely if we have the present stability—in which it if and when superpower relations reach a will be impossible to describe what strategic point where managing them no longer absorbs superiority means. And one of the questions the primary attention of our statesmen, thus which we have to ask ourselves as a country liberating energies to concentrate on the is what, in the name of God, is strategic su more basic problems for mankind. Here is periority? What is the significance of it, President Ford’s greatest challenge.10 politically, militarily, and operationally, at So the controversy over the virtues of these levels of numbers? What do you do with detente continues. To some, Senator Ken it?8 nedy’s formula may appear Utopian, naive, From almost any conceivable perspec and unrealistic. To others, it envisions a tive today, future strategy centers in detente. promising strategy for the future, the But precisely what detente entails is widely soundness of which may have met its first argued and enormously complex. Manv crucial test last November at Vladivostok. students of Soviet and international affairs If the mutual respect bred of mutual de view it as merely a form of “peaceful co structive power can, indeed, force a cessa existence,” long a Marxist euphemism for tion of arms proliferation and thereby usher nonviolent ideological aggression. William in an era of peace, it will be the most R. Kintner, noting that “Brezhnev last spring extraordinary achievement that any future [1973] assured East European leaders that strategy could accomplish. his policy of detente was a tactic designed Through specific definition of terms and 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW some elaboration of example, let us now mediate end. The prolongation of hostilities consider several aspects of current U.S. would in itself become a bargaining le strategy as they relate to the broader im ver.” 12 peratives of limited-war and general-war Another significant consequence of the situations and particularly as they respond Vietnam lesson for the United States was with increasing persistence to the growing the realization of gradual erosion of public influence of detente. support for this kind of protracted conflict. In his influential book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger foresaw Limited and General War this dilemma: “Limited war is not simply There seem to be as many definitions of a question of appropriate military forces the term “limited war” as there are theo and doctrines. It also places heavy demands rists to debate and analyze the subject. In on the discipline and subtlety of the polit all the efforts to narrow and qualify it, ical leadership and on the confidence of however, some common elements are dis the society in it.” 13 The dilemma, as posed cernible. Robert E. Osgood’s definition will by Kissinger, clearly demands effective, serve as a useful example: a limited war, direct, and timely solutions to any future he writes, is one “in which the belligerents involvements of the United States in limited restrict the purposes for which they fight conflicts. The American people will have to concrete, well-defined objectives that do little confidence in a government that does not demand the utmost militarvJ effort of not take aggressive measures to anticipate which the t>elligerents are capable and that and cope with any insurgent action that can be accommodated in a negotiated set provokes limited war. A brief examination tlement.’ In Osgood’s definition, as in most, of insurgency and counterinsurgency, as the kev features are “concrete, well-defined primary complementary characteristics of objectives,” restricted military effort, and limited war, may be useful, then, in under accommodation to “negotiated settle standing the nature of limited war. ment." 11 Another essential factor is the special insurgency political orientation of the conflict. Theo rists agree that military operations in The history of insurgency reflects a com limited war are subordinated to political plex, often contradictory, pattern of polit objectives. Certainly one of the lessons the ical activity, but, as a number of observers United States learned from the Vietnam have noted, many basic similarities prevail. war was that such conflict could become What Osgood says about limited war in protracted and end in stalemate. This par general applies as well to the specific as ticular potential in the limited-war formula pect of insurgency. He points out that the provided an attractive incentive to the basic techniques “can be combined in North Vietnamese and resulted in a severe countless permutations and combinations handicap for the United States. General and implemented by a great variety of Giap was aware of the vulnerability of the means, but we shall still recognize trip United States in limited war, and he dra wires, pauses, reprisals, denials, thresholds, matically exploited it. As one article ob sanctuaries, bargaining, demonstrations, served, prolongation merely compounded escalation, Mao’s three stages, enclaves, the U.S. dilemma: “Even if peace talks be seize-and-hold, search-and-destroy, and all gin, war costs would not come to an im the rest.” 14 AIR FORCE STRATEGY TODAY 43 What kind of environment generates toward it; the guerrilla band then retreats, insurgency? A typical ready market is pro always maintaining visual contact, and initiates vided by an underdeveloped country threat its attack from another point. The army will ened by social unrest and economic depriva repeat its action and the guerrilla band the tion. The many philosophical divisions and same. Thus, successively, it is possible to keep an enemy column immobilized, forcing it to political hostilities in such an environment expend large quantities of ammunition and offer attractive potential for insurgent ex weakening the morale of its troops without ploitation.13 incurring great dangers.17 While many examples of this insurgency environment exist in the world today, it It is this seemingly ubiquitous and ephem may be well to focus briefly on a specific eral quality of the guerrilla that has so one—insurgency in Latin America—in order eloquently frustrated many of the most to clarify some of the principal factors in sophisticated stratagems of modem warfare. volved. In a perceptive summary of the Today, urban guerrilla activity, along with “new radicalism” of Latin .America, .Alistair associated acts of kidnapping, assassination, Hennessy reviews crucial aspects such as and random terrorism, merely complicates Third World influences, university reform, the ambiguities of insurgency. Recent anti-Americanism, Cuban influence, Chinese events in Uruguay, Guatemala, Panama, influence, urban guerrilla activity, and the and—perhaps most notably—Chile give vivid role of the Church.16 Though Hennessy testimony to the variegated nature of con convincingly depicts the ascendancy of temporary Latin American insurrection. In urban guerrilla activity in Latin America deed, the example of the overthrow of the today, its relationship to—and ultimate de Allende government in Chile provides one pendence on—the celebrated rural move of the fine ironies of national revolution: ment of Castro and Guevara cannot be over the local insurgent forces, who were not al looked. It was Che Guevara who, perhaps together sympathetic with the Allende more than any other single individual, regime, were dramatically revitalized by charted the course of insurgent activity for the martyr quality of the assassination, as Latin America and for much of the rest of is evidenced by such reactions as this one the Third W'orld as well. It was Guevara from a member of Chile’s Communist party: who refined and codified the techniques of The expressions of solidarity are like an ava guerrilla warfare tactics that have been em lanche. They are like a stormy sea driving ployed with devastating effect in conflicts the ship of the junta on the rocks. The move from Vietnam to Palestine. His description ment in support of the Chilean people has of the elusive guerrilla tactic, with its helped arouse the consciousness of large sec analogy to choreography, is especially il tions of Western Europe, on all five con luminating: tinents. People of varying creeds are united by the outrage they feel against imperialist Characteristic of this war of mobility is the and neofascist crimes. The movement encom so-called minuet, named from the analogy passes forces that had never before acted in with the dance: the guerrilla bands encircle unison: Marxist-Leninists and Social Demo an enemy position, an advancing column for crats, Christians, and countless people of dif example; they encircle it completely from the ferent views and faiths.18 four points of the compass, with five or six men in each place, far enough away to avoid Though the tone of this is charged with being encircled themselves; the fight is started familiar Communist hyperbole, the essential at any one of the points, and the army moves message is one that mirrors the many facets 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW of Latin American unrest. All the volatile The lid is now off. Should the killing begin, ingredients are present. With few excep there will be no end to it. The principal con tions, the countries of Central and South straint on civil war is the Ethiopian apprecia America possess a ready market for insur tion and fear of its own pent-up frustration gent action. Throughout Latin America, and its perception that a precipitate release of that energy will destroy the nation.21 threatened local governments are becoming increasingly aware of the need to maintain And of course there are many other areas order through the application of effective of incipient or advanced activity: Mozam counterinsurgent measures. bique, Korea, India, Indochina (still), and, Equally serious, highly organized move perhaps most notably at the moment, Pal ments are reported to be in operation in estine and the Middle East. The govern scattered locations throughout much of the ments opposing these movements represent rest of the world: a kaleidoscope of ideologies. Whether U.S. foreign policy is sympathetic with a par In Thailand ticular government or not is beside the point, since the U.S. does not assume the In 1967 some 1700 guerrillas, aided by 15,000 role of international policeman. The point “sympathizers,” were operating in northeast is that these are unstable communities— ern Thailand. By the end of 1972 they had political “hot spots”—and it is a widely ac reportedly grown to “about 7,700 full-time cepted fact that, regardless of the particular armed guerrillas” (representing a 10 percent political climate in the U.S., specific cir increase over the previous year), plus “three cumstances may combine to compel re or four times that many” supporters in the villages.19 sponse to appeals that are certain to come in the future. In such circumstances, the U.S. military has a clear obligation to be In the Philippines (a Leftist view) prepared to assist, if necessary, in counter No one acquainted with conditions in the insurgent action. Philippines would contest the need for a rev olution of some sort. The contrast between counterinsurgency the sterile luxury of Manila’s wealthy suburbs and the stinking poverty of the ubiquitous All U.S. counterinsurgent operation is under squatters’ settlements invariably shocks the the supervision of the National Security Western visitor. Repression, intimidation, land Council and its Interdepartmental Groups, grabbing, and the perversion of justice have with the active participation of the chiefs been familiar features in many areas of the of diplomatic missions in the countries in Philippines for decades. An annual inflation volved. The role of the military in general rate of 20 percent from 1969 to 1972 had —particularly indigenous military—is to brought public resentment to the boiling “deny the insurgents their base of support." point.20 Though U.S. policy is to “refrain from out right military intervention by U.S. com In Ethiopia batant forces in the internal affairs of newly Ethiopia has been a politically repressed so emerging nations,” the Military Assistance ciety. Moreover, Ethiopians are, in Western Advisory Groups and their mobile assistance psychological terms, a repressed people— teams aid indigenous military units in such partly due to the nature of their Christianity fields as intelligence, counterintelligence, and partly due to traditional cultural forms. and psychological warfare.22 AIR FORCE STRATEGY TODAY 45 One analyst, noting the essential reac stockpile is necessary in the face of a for tionary role of counterinsurgency, stresses midable Soviet buildup of similar weapons. the specific classic rudiments of strategy in He notes former British Defense Secretary present and foreseeable future operation. Denis Healey’s admonition: “I don’t think "Traditional, conventional field campaigns," it would, in fact, make sense for nato to he asserts, "are not enough. If the guerrillas aim at an all-out conventional defense possess mobility, concealment, firepower, against an all-out Warsaw Pact conventional popular support (or acquiescence), and simi attack because all Soviet exercises and train lar tactical advantages, the government ing assume the use of nuclear weapons from must overcome and cancel these advan the word ‘go,’ so I think an all-out conven tages.” In order to accomplish this, the tional attack is very unlikely . . .” 25 counterinsurgent strategy must strive to Air Force Manual 1-1, United States Air "achieve superior mobility, superior fire Force Basic Doctrine, published in 1971, power, better communications," and, in describes the employment of aerospace general, eclipse the insurgent tactics.23 forces in low-intensity nuclear operations. Though it is imperative that the U.S. According to that manual, these operations, military keep an efficient counterinsurgent in a limited-war situation, "may be con force in-being, it is equally imperative that ducted integrally with, and as an outgrowth the overall strategy adapt to the changing of, conventional warfare. The employment roles in international relations. A recent of nuclear weapons in a tactical situation Air University publication, reviewing these is not expected to alter the basic tasks as aspects of the U.S. military role in counter signed to aerospace forces." 26 insurgency strategy, sums it up this wav: Though AFM 1-1 is simply articulating “U.S. special forces have been given the standard Air Force contingency planning, overall mission of counterinsurgency train it must be recognized that many theorists ing. But, it cannot be stressed too strongly, today would construe this thinking, and effective counterinsurgency must be an that of Mr. Cohen and Mr. Healey, as “un across-the-board operation involving all thinkable" strategy.27 In a 1972 Air War Americans, military and otherwise, in a College address, Seymour J. Deitchman host country." 24 presented a knowledgeable analysis of the constraints that apply in current defense tactical nuclear weapons planning in regard to employment of tac tical nuclear weapons and delivery systems. One other aspect of limited war that merits Though Mr. Deitchman ultimately accepts consideration involves the use of nuclear the necessity of maintaining parity in U.S. weapons on a "tactical” or limited level. inventories, he stresses the severe constraints Using the Vietnam experience again as an imposed by today’s pragmatic concerns: example, the clear reluctance of both sides "The decision to use [tactical nuclear to employ tactical nuclear weapons is note weapons] is inhibited by a number of fac worthy. This engagement serves as a strong tors, some political and some military. Un precedent for the design of strategic- derlying them all is the ‘threshold’ problem: policy today. Controversy continues, of the uncertainty about where nuclear escala course, on the subject of tactical nuclear tion will stop once the first such weapon, force employment. Samuel T. Cohen, for however small, is used. The political impact example, argues that despite domestic ob is immediately obvious." 28 jection to it, the nato tactical weapon Finally, Robert Osgood’s sentiments on 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW this question, as on others discussed pre either in diplomatic negotiation or, if nec viously, are generally representative of the essary, in limited-war action. But because prevailing view today: “The difficulty of of the inescapable historical evidence, it settling upon a convincing strategy for might be therapeutic, as well as realistic, to integrating tactical nuclear weapons into consider some of the characteristics of gen limited warfare in Europe evidently re eral war in the nuclear age. mains overwhelming, and the interest in In his skillful analysis of nuclear war, doing so has declined as the credibility of Colonel Donald S. Bussey defines general the West using any kind of nuclear weapons war as “armed conflict between major first, except in circumstances warranting the powers in which the total resources of the risks of general war, has declined.” 29 belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeop ardy.” He emphasizes that the key terms of general war his definition are “total resources” and “na The drift toward modem total warfare had tional survival.” 32 been evident from the beginning of the The strategic objectives of general war twentieth century. Looking back from our fare remain today essentially as Secretary of present point of vantage, we can see that Defense Robert S. McNamara once de everything was moving relentlessly in that scribed them: “first, to deter a deliberate direction. However, to contemporaries that attack on the United States and its allies trend was not always clear, and, when the na by maintaining a clear and convincing capa tions came to grips in World War II, events bility to inflict unacceptable damage on the served at first to obscure the fact that the con flict was total.30 attacker; second, in the event such a war should nevertheless occur, to limit damage Thus begins a chapter of Men in Arms, to our population and industrial capac the incisive yet comprehensive account of ities.” 33 the history of warfare by Richard A. Preston The current U.S. military strategy for and Sydney F. Wise. Total war in our pres general war continues under the guidance ent nuclear age could begin this way, as of the Nixon Doctrine of 1969. Under the inhabitants of this planet are well aware. terms of this doctrine, the United States For this reason total (or general) war is promises seldom evaluated in specific terms by the to keep its treaty commitments; to provide a layman but rather is rejected as a subject shield should a nuclear power threaten the too horrible to. contemplate. For all the freedom of a nation allied to the United horror of war, however, the reality of it is States or of a nation whose survival the U.S. inescapable. “War, not peace, has been considers vital to its security, or to the security mankind’s most faithful companion,” says a of the region as a whole; and to furnish aid provocative newsweekly commentary. It and economic assistance in cases involving goes on to remind us that “in 35 centuries other types of aggression when requested and of recorded history, only one out of 15 has appropriate.34 not been drenched by the blood of the bat The Nixon Doctrine has been amplified tlefield. Today, a world that presumably by the promulgation, in 1971, of the con cherishes peace as fervently as ever never cepts of “realistic deterrence” and “strategic theless keeps 22 million men under arms.” 31 sufficiency.” “Realistic deterrence” refers Hopefully, whatever inevitable conflicts to the “shield” that this country promises to the future has in store will be resolvable provide nonnuclear nations as insurance AIR FORCE STRATEGY TODAY 47 against nuclear blackmail. “Strategic suf With reduced resources, the U.S. must empha ficiency” is partly a realistic prognosis of size (as Mr. Laird has said) advanced tech the causes and conduct of general war and nology, nuclear-capable forces, highly skilled partly a consideration of the degree to but limited manpower, and (as Mr. Nixon has urged) flexible Presidential options. Also, to which national interests would be jeop provide deterrence in the upper two-thirds of ardized by this projected military environ the spectrum, U.S. forces must emphasize ment. “Strategic sufficiency” has two specific multimission capability to operate efficiently meanings: “In its narrow military sense, it and broadly within this range. To support such means enough force to inflict a level of operations, the U.S. command and control damage on a potential aggressor sufficient structure must be able to guarantee the es to deter him from attacking first. In its sential worldwide information and responsive broader sense sufficiency means the mainte ness so that the President could select and nance of forces adequate to prevent the confidently order any one of the variety of United States and its allies from being options at his command.37 coerced.” 33 As has previously been noted, the variety Colonel Bussey, in his discussion of the of options in strategic planning today is deterrent value of our general nuclear represented in the concept of the Triad: forces, observes that “if strategic forces are land-based ic bm’s, manned bombers, and ever employed, they have failed to fulfill submarine-launched Polaris missiles. From their most essential purpose,” i.e., to “re the perspective of the Air Force, the pri strict, to our own advantage, the freedom of mary weapons are the Minuteman ic bm, action” of adversary powers. This, asserts with its multiple independently targetable Colonel Bussey, is the real test of strategic re-entry vehicles (mir v’s ) and the possible sufficiency: future Evader modifications, and the current No one can know, with respect to strategic inventory of B-52 strategic bombers, soon to forces, “how much is enough,” without first be replaced by the B-l. As fundamental answering the question, “What role are you hardware for accomplishing “realistic deter assigning to strategic forces in your overall strategy?” For simple deterrence, a relatively rence,” this equipment has withstood the low level of capability may suffice. For ex test not only in that general war has not tended deterrence, sufficiency demands a erupted but also, perhaps more to the point, much higher level.36 in that sensational scares such as the Cuban In his 1971 Foreign Policy Report, Presi missile crisis have not recurred. The chilling dent Nixon placed strong emphasis on flexi implications of the current Middle East bility and the provision of practical alterna situation are vivid testimony, however, that tive action—what he described as “a full global crises continue and must be dealt range of options.” Commenting on the with in practical and realistic terms. Cer statements of Secretary of Defense Melvin tainly, then, it is in the perspective of pres R. Laird’s 1971 Defense Report and the ent realities such as this, and others sug President’s Foreign Policy Report, Colonel gested in this brief survey, that any strate Kenneth L. Moll summarizes their signifi gies of the future must be considered. cance in regard to current military strategy: Pomona, California Not« World Report, December 9. 1974, p. 27. 1. How U S Really Came Out tn Summit Bargaining." U.S. Newt and 2. The Breakthrough on SALT,” Time, December 9. 1974, p. 19. 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW 3. John Osborne, “Arming Up,” The New Republic. December 14. 1974. 22. "U.S. Policy and Programs for Counterinsurgency," Military Strategy for p. 10. Special Operations, Air Force Reserve Element Training Staff Development 4. James N. Wallace. “Vladivostok—and Arms Control: the View from Course No. 45-0004, prepared by the Air University for Headquarters Air Russia," U.S. News an d World Report, December 9. 1974, p. 28. Force Reserve, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, 1971-72, in Air War College 5. Dial Torgerson. “What if Ethiopia Disintegrates?" Los Angeles Times, Associate Programs vol. IV. ch. 12. 7th ed., p. 10. Hereafter cited as “U.S. Sunday, December 15, 1974. Part 6. pp. 3. 6. Policy and Programs." 6. Robert C. Aldridge, “MaRVing the MIRVs," The Nation, vol. 218, April 23. Commander D. P. Kirchner, USN. "Antiguerrilla Armament.” Ordnance. 13, 1974. p. 463. September-October 1971. in Air War College Associate Programs vol. IV, 7. "Some Real Arms Limitation.” Time, December 16, 1974, p. 35. Figures ch. 12. 7th ed.. p. 37. quoted are valid as of this date. 24. "U.S. Policy and Programs.” p. 12. 8. J. W. Fulbright, “Arms without End,” The Progressive. September 1974. 25. Samuel T. Cohen, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Military Strat p. 23. egy.” Orbis, Spring 1971. in Air War College Associate Programs vol. IV. ch. 9. William R. Kintrier. T h e U.S. and the U.S.S.R.: Conflict and Cooper 10. 7th ed.. p. 35. ation.” The Atlantic Community Quarterly. Spring 1974. pp. 93-95. 26. “Aerospace Forces in Low-Intensity Nuclear Operations," AFM 1-1. 10. Edward M. Kennedy. “Beyond Detente.” Foreign Policy, No. 16, Fall United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Department of the Air Force, 28 1974. p. 29. September 1971, in Air War College Associate Programs vol. IV. ch. 13, 7th 11 Robert E Osgood. Limited War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ed., p. 42. 1957), pp. 1-2. 27. The expression "unthinkable” is borrowed from Herman Kahn's Thinking 12. Larry Elowitz and John W. Spanier. “Korea and Vietnam: Limited War ai>out the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962) and is used in his and the American Political System," Orbis, vol. 18, Summer 1974, p. 511. context. 13. Henry Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. 28. Seymour J. Deitchman. "Concepts and Constraints of Limited War." in Norton. 1957), p. 139. .Air War College Associate Programs vol. IV. ch. 10. 7th ed.. pp. 29-30. .Al 14. Robert E. Osgood. "The Reappraisal of Limited War,” Problems o f most identical views were expressed in Deitchman’s essay. "Limited W ar," in Modem Strategy. Part One, Adelphi Papers, no. 54. The Institute for Strategic- Military Review. July 1971. pp. 3-16. Studies. London. 1969. in Air War College .Associate Programs vol. IV. ch. 10, 29. Osgood, Limited War, p. 7. 7th ed.. p. 14. 30. Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, Men in Anns (New York: 15. See Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr.. Rebellion and Authority Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 295. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970). pp. 52-53. 31. "The Case for War." Time, March 9. 1970. in Air War College Associate 16. Alistair Hennessy. “The New Radicalism in Latin America," The Journal Programs vol. IV, ch. 1, 7th ed., p. 16. o f Contemporary History, vol. 8, January-April 1972, in .Air War College .As 32. Colonel Donald S. Bussey, USA Ret). "General Nuclear War: A Con sociate Programs vol. IV. ch. 13. 7th ed.. pp. 3-13. ceptual Analysis," Perspectives in Defense Management, Winter 1971-1972, 17. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press. Industrial College of the .Armed Forces. Fort Lesley J. McNair. Washington. 1961), p. 24. D.C.. in Air War College Associate Programs vol. IV. ch. 9. p. 26. 18. Volodia Teitelboim. “Chile: Prelude to Future Victories.” Political A f- 33. Quoted in Harland B. Moulton. From Superiority to Parity (Westport. fairs, August 1974. p. 48. Among other Leftist reactions on this subject, see Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc.. 1973), p. 197. also Judith Miller. "Criminal Negligence: Congress. Chile, and the CIA." 34. Military Strategy for Nuclear War. .Air Force Reserve Element Training The Progressive, November 1974, pp. 15-19. Staff Development Course No. 45-0004. prepared by the Air University for 19. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Guerrilla Communism and Counterinsurgency Headquarters .Air Force Reserve. Robins Air Force Base. Georgia. 1971-72, in in Thailand.” Orbis, vol. 18, Spring 1974. p. 107. Air War College Associate Programs vol. IV. ch. 9. 7th ed. p. 9. 20. Cheryl Paver, “Seeds of a New Vietnam,” The Progressive, September 35. Ibid., p. 10. 1974, pp. 30-31. 36. Bussey, p. 34. 21 Joseph S. Murphy and Tadesse Araya, "Ethiopia Exploits Itself,” The 37. Colonel Kenneth L. Moll, USAF. "Realistic Deterrence and New Strat Nation, vol. 219, September 14. 1974, p. 203. egy.” Air University Review, November-December 1971. in Air War College .Associate Programs vol. IV. ch. 9. 7th ed.. p. 40. The Air Force is stepping onto a new plateau of technological sophistication just as U.S. foreign policy finds its footing unusually slippery. It is a time for reappraisal and a detached look at assumptions that have been swept quietly along in the clutter of events. “ Air power" is a term worn smooth by years of friction. Notions about its employment have loosened and tangled. This review of the most evident characteristics of air forces suggests that surprise, shock, and concentration of force are the principles to which they continue to be best attuned. Some re cent employment patterns, however, have wandered from these principles, and there is an attendant danger that they will wander still further or wear comfortable grooves of bad habit. This article does not pretend to be a final word in any way. Much is left unsaid. Gaps and barbs in the treatment will, hopefully, attract counterideas and help to excite both energy and imagination in thinking that addresses the long-range questions facing today's Air Force. D.W.S. HIS article has been written in the and the outlook confusing, which typifies belief that the mid-1970s represent every view from present to future, is espe an unusually steep divide for mili cially strong in 1975. T tary power, and for air power in particular.One possible response, one that may be New concerns and new perspectives chal valuable and stabilizing, is for the Air Force lenge, trouble, and in some cases haunt the to take a step back and examine its basic West. Soviet power grows relentlessly. Ter beliefs about air power. Paradoxically, this rorism wanders like a disease. Military can best be done by lively debate over its spending is a mix of relative shrinkage with future forms. Why, after all, do we have an awesome absolute costs. We have tasted but Air Force? Are there some fundamental have not yet digested new weapons tech principles that still apply to the applica nologies. The sense that pressures are great tion of air power? If basic principles can AIR POWER 51 be identified, what are the employment creates the solution for the future.” 2 concepts and forms of organization that The early thinkers had faced a virgin best express them? In short, is there a frame conceptual landscape, a new open flank in work that can guide Air Force decision a new dimension, and they faced it with makers and give them something solid to the confidence of adolescence. They had hold onto as they cope with the trade-offs more to say because less had been said be and challenges ahead? fore. They could dream because there were The contrast between early and con few facts and little experience to muddy temporary thought on the application of their visions. air power is interesting and instructive. Books on the theory of air power went The giants of theory before World War I out of fashion not long after World War II. and in the colorful decade just after the Since then the subject has been treated war were positive and imaginative. Some most often in historical summaries or woven into broader studies on national strategy. The character of the writing has shifted from energy and advocacy to detachment Books on the theory of air power and appraisal. went out of fashion not long after The initial turn from forward-looking en thusiasm was healthy and appropriate. The World War II. war was over. Its lessons had to be distilled and digested. By 1947 the Air Force had won its independence and could muse over of their writing was visionary, some of it those lessons, while developing its internal was polemic. The stance was confident, structure, in some comfort. and the ideas in book after book projected One part of the digestion process was the inherent characteristics of air forces into the interest and effort given to doctrine in an open-ended future. Billy Mitchell wrote the years after the war. The Air War Col in 1925: “In the development of air power, lege Evaluation Staff, under General (then one has to look ahead and not backward Colonel) William W. Momyer’s direction and figure out what is going to happen, after June 1951, produced a series of valu not too much what has happened. That is able manuals on basic doctrine and its func why the older services have been psycho tional elaborations. Because these manuals logically unfit to develop this new arm to were to be a blend of outlook and definition, the fullest extent practicable with the the tension between law and imagination methods and means at hand.” 1 He was was constant. As General Momyer com brash, admittedly, but full of energy and mented, promise. Major General Orvil Anderson We have found from this past year of research echoed Mitchell’s sentiments after World that the writing of manuals is perhaps one of War II: “If you will only let experience the most difficult tasks in the field of military be your teacher,” he warned, “you can writing. It is creative and yet it must be exact. These requirements dictate thorough have any damn lesson you want. Progress research and imagination on the part of the in the development of military science and author in translating the research into a strategy is vitally dependent upon the sound manuscript that is easily understood and yet ness of the evaluations of past battle ex is complete in context. Unfortunately, there perience and upon the boldness, inspiration are very few individuals who possess this par and depth of the projected thinking which ticular talent. . . . For the most part our 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW greatest difficulty has been a lack of precedent On a broader scale, the American ex in this field of writing. . . . In this attempt to perience in and after 1945 has pushed con strike out on our own, we have encountered ceptual thinkers at all levels into deeper many obstacles that were certainly anticipated, and others that could not be foreseen. Of course, we had encountered the additional In the field of concepts the A ir prejudice in respect to what constitutes doc trine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Force has become a status-quo Thus, we have been seeking for a level of institution, feeling m iddle age and writing that has no definition and is not al ways apparent when one thinks it has been inclined to rephrase proven for- obtained.3 mulas. The manuals, furthermore, were official documents requiring official acceptance and wider thickets of complexity. The and sanction. That meant filters and com atomic spectacle rightfully attracted the promise and a general withdrawal from the best strategic minds and shifted strategic precarious forward edges of thought. Writing speculation both up and around, to a to Lieutenant General Thomas D. White grander perspective and to a preventive in early 1951 on the frustrations of produc cast of mind. These nuclear shadows have ing doctrine, Major General John Barker steadily darkened and multiplied. The pe commented: “It has taken the Air Force culiar use of forces in Vietnam developed five tedious years to get an approved manual habits of experimentation and transient ex on basic air force doctrine.” The many re pediency. Few thinkers at any level pre writings of the manual had resulted “in no tend to understand all the implications of change of importance in the doctrine. The the accelerating and ghostly electronic- changes were in what to include or ex technologies. As Alvin Toffler has pointed clude, how to express an idea, arrangement out with convincing impact, the pace of of subject matter.” 4 change itself and the deluge of information with which we are flooded evoke a kind of intellectual vertigo.5 ... the broad function of doctrine One upshot of the limitations of doctrine is to crystallize, not energize, to joined with a perpetually stronger appreci ation for complexity, nuance, and inter incorporate compacted complexities, relationship is a marked erosion of prophetic not slice through them to provoca- conceptual thinking. Nowhere in the Air Force do we see a bold, bubbling fountain tive visions. of fresh ideas. In the field of concepts the Air Force has become a status-quo institu Although the borders between ideas, tion, feeling middle age and inclined to concepts, principles, and doctrine are vague, rephrase proven formulas. the broad function of doctrine is to crystal The following conclusion from an article lize, not energize, to incorporate com titled, “Aerospace Doctrine in Modern Con pacted complexities, not slice through them flict,” is typical and represents the product to provocative visions. In spite of the at of the forces we have noted: tention to doctrine, visionary energy in the The guiding principle in pursuing national Air Force declined after World War II. objectives is to limit military force to those AIR POWER 53 systems and intensities appropriate for the that are important to understanding the specific issues at stake. Military forces must present conceptual tenor. The simplest shift be used in a manner that denies the aggressor was from forecast to review. Where once his objectives—through persuasion or by de there were theories to test, there were now stroying only those forces necessary to achieve lessons to formalize. The war was cataclys satisfactory war termination. In some instances, mic. The impressions it left were varied and it may be necessary to increase the intensity deep. The role and value of air power in of conflict to signal our national resolve to its conduct became subject to fascination prevent the success of an act or a threat of aggression. This buildup requires superior, and debate which continues today. usable capabilities to provide the graduated More important is a shift from projecting escalation necessary to convince an enemy conceptual notions out of the fundamental that each escalatory step moves him toward characteristics of the weapons possessed to an increasingly critical disadvantage. In sum, deriving these notions from the nature of we must have controllable forces which can the war envisioned. Obviously, there is a provide a flexible response to any level of ag relationship between these poles. The shift gression, supported by strategic superiority at is incomplete and hard to define. the highest level of conflict, if we are to en There are, however, identifiable reasons sure a credible deterrent posture for the for this shift, which may clarify its nature future.6 and extent. Military thinkers and strategists This may be true but is not very useful. The in general since 1945 have been fascinated intellectual product resembles a cotton ball. by the upper and lower ends of the conflict It can absorb, but it cannot direct. spectrum. With the first nuclear detonation, Somewhere on the fringes of Air Force Polyphemus appeared in the cave.° Until thought there should be a continuous, lively awe had had time to settle down to a more dialogue based on the fundamental char experienced and relaxed mood of respect, acteristics, capabilities, and limitations of it was difficult for strategists to think about anything else. Avoiding use of the bomb Somewhere on the fringes of A ir became dominant, but avoidance itself required initiatives. What should they be? Force thought there should he a And what if the initiatives should fail? continuous lively dialogue based What would the character of the battle , field become? Was Douhet suddenly valid? on the fundam ental characteristics, What kinds of forces could sustain combat? capabilities, and limitations of Would an exchange be spasmodic or incre mental? Is there emotional room for serious air forces. thought at all on the subject of nuclear war? Questions and speculation about the air forces. The focus of this dialogue should nature of war itself drove strategic thought be future strength. It should be grand in to a rarefied plane. scope and incisive in tone. Its principal Gradually, confidence in the various um value should lie in stimulation and con brella theories and events in such scattered ceptual energy. places as Indochina, Algeria, Angola, and "Polyphemus is a Cyclops, one of a ruee of one-eyed giants encountered by Homer's Odysseus on his voyage from Troy to Ithaca. Polyphemus sur S in c e World War II there prised Odysseus's band of men in his cave and devoured several of them be fore they blinded him in his sleep and escaped by hiding under the bellies of have been fundamental shifts in perspective his sheep. .54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Guatemala diverted a major portion of air forces are incrementally efficient or that military theory to guerrilla warfare and any weapon system can be rationally ap People’s War. Although the techniques thus plied across the entire spectrum of conflict. employed had been a part of war through Flexibility, interpreted in this way, eventu virtually all its known history, they had not ally makes a noodle out of a sword. been employed so systematically. More im portant, they had not been postulated so poetically as they were in Chairman Mao’s \Me are nearing a significant small red books. Again, from the strategist’s watershed in both our interna- perspective, there were new questions with which to wrestle and tinker. Where exactly tional concerns and our techno- is the battlefield? Is it geographic or psycho logical opportunities, and we logical, or both? What forms should force take to be efficient, or even relevant? The should get a grasp of our central nature of war was crucial. convictions about air power and A key point is that specific, detailed ap plication concepts tended to become deriva the A ir Force before we pass that tive, to grow exclusively downward out of watershed. visions of the nature of conflict. This is perfectly appropriate as one approach to research and development, one approach The period between World War II and to strategy, one approach to the employ the present has contained as many cross ment of forces. The early thinkers in air currents and logjams as any other. Any power theory used this perspective, working casual reader will be able to point out po backward from a vision of future war—to litical influences, personalities, countering possible objectives—to force recipes. But themes, and complicating examples. The they balanced this pole of perspective with arterial channels in strategic thought, how constant concern over the inherent char ever, show a tendency to ignore the rela acteristics of the aerial dimension and air tionship between categorical characteristics forces. What does the new dimension mean? of weapons and their employment. Where are the opportunities it opens? Hopefully, a fresh look from an old direc Where are the quicksands? What principles tion will bring new energy and clarity to can we distill? This desire to identify in Air Force conceptual thinking. There are herent qualities in air power and project some hard, reliable maxims about the ap them gave strength and clarity to early plication of air power—Have we defended theoretical work. old maxims or sought new ones with suf It was partially the rejection of this angle ficient determination? We are nearing a of vision that led to an unorthodox use of significant watershed in both our interna air forces in Vietnam and a tendency to tional concerns and our technological op wedge square weapon systems into round portunities, and we should get a grasp of holes, with experimentation and economy our central convictions about air power and the liveliest of bedfellows and with the the Air Force before we pass that water whole drift of the war an inching antithesis shed. Speculation and debate cut the best of the shock theory of air power. Tactical trail to useful convictions, and speculation and strategic results in Vietnam should about the future is most useful when it is serve as a caution against the notion that most concrete. The contemporary Air Force AIR POWER 55 will gain both balance and energy from a appraisals and the last ounces of perfor reconsideration of the emerging nature of mance. Aerospace forces have a special its weapon systems. role because the aerospace environment offers special opportunities and demands special respect. The perspective is unique. A t least four questions need Increasing speed and the special opportuni direct, reasoned response to maintain the ties and vulnerabilities of forces in space Air Force on a confident, theoretical foot promise to intensify that singularity. In a ing with a forward outlook: (1) Do we need healthy military establishment, pragmatism an independent Air Force? (2) What are the may smear the wiring diagrams, but the emerging fundamental characteristics of Air core areas of force application will be under Force systems? (3) What forms of utilization the direction of environmental expertise. are most appropriate to systems with these For as far as we can see from the 1975 characteristics? (4) W hat are the organiza platform, the broadest natural boundaries tional implications of the emerging force in the military will be defined, as in the structure? past, in environmental terms: land forces, sea forces, and air forces. 1. Do we need an independent Air Force? Mission effectiveness is further reason for independence and unity of command. That we may not need independence is The arguments here are nearly as old as the suggested by duplication of equipment and airplane and need little embellishment. Air roles among the services, the increasingly Force striking power ranges freely in its evident convergence of weapons toward a geographic focus, intensity, and concentra common electronic character, the tendency tion. It is a form of power that cuts but to think and exercise in joint-force packages, does not squeeze. The ability to direct and budgetary pressures, and a tantalizing ele shift this cutting force from the highest, ment of common sense. most informed, and cognizant level is one The requirement for an independent Air of the central lessons of twentieth century Force, however, is sustained by more funda warfare. General Eisenhower summarized mental arguments. In one sense, the en the case at the end of World War II, say vironmental consideration is crucial. Some ing that the employment of air forces under where, under some name, there must be a a single command “assured a maximum of team of thinkers, managers, and operators flexibility, providing a command structure steeped in the air environment who under stand the risks and returns from great speed, distance, and height from the surface of the . . . the risk in fa llin g b eh in d in earth to the depths of space with a sensory a m ajor technological lag is obvi- and intelligent appreciation for the aero space experience. We can expect service ous. It would be like facing fa l- roles to spill over and mingle at the fringes, cons with a flock of pigeons. that infantry officers will fly and pilots will swim, and that many military operations will be joint. This convergence at the points under which all forms of available air power of application makes specialization in the could be concentrated on tactical support preparation of military forces all the more missions or on strategic missions, as the important, to achieve the most realistic situation demanded—in other words, it per 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW mitted the maximum concentration of com consumed in the coming and going. bat air power at the decisive point at the —T h e y e n j o y increasing indifference to decisive time.” ' weather and nightfall, the traditional sup Unity and independence allow the per pressors of air operations. ceptive concentrations of force at critical —T h e y a r e , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , increasing- points that are the hallmark of air power. ly dependent systems, with a large appetite Localized control leads to localized per for fuels and a continuing need to be pam ception and application, with a warlording pered with maintenance, supply, and tendency to hoard and spend for limited, guidance. They crave communications local gains. and require a roost. 2. What are the emerging fundamental —They are increasingly expensive, both characteristics o f Air Force systems? to purchase and to operate. Materials, labor, and the dynamics of technological sophisti At the bone, these characteristics have cation will continue to push unit costs up not changed greatly from the introduction ward, inciting abrasive displeasure. Force of the airplane into war. On the other hand, there are important trends that af sizes will become smaller, which will in turn strengthen the imperative to sophisti fect the application of air power. cate. Sophistication brings new anxieties —Aerospace forces can exploit the free- with its new powers, but the risk in falling dom of maneuver inherent in their medium behind in a major technological lag is to reach and influence virtually any spot obvious. It would lie like facing falcons with on or above the surface of the earth. They a flock of pigeons. can do this visually or physically; that is, they can extract information or they can 3. What forms of utilization are most appropri- deliver firepower, manpower, and material. ate to systems with these characteristics? They can act or react, assemble and dis assemble, with great and increasing speed. —The most effective way to use air Their responsiveness creates a continuous, power both now and for the future is to stabilizing psychological pressure that is eliminate key targets through concentration active even when unfocused. o f force, surprise, and shock. Air forces are —They are increasingly diverse systems, an offensive arm, more effective when used ranging in application from rescue and disaster relief to nuclear delivery. The air battle w ill be m ore and —They are increasingly visible. The sky and ground are full of unblinking electronic more a m atter of electronic acuity eyes. The technological dynamics of recog and avoidance less and less a nition will outrun the dynamics of disguise. , —They are increasingly indirect systems, m atter of pilot skill and ferocity. with standoff weapons and detached target It w ill be im portant to be aggres- acquisition allowing tangential delivery. sive, but more im portant to be sly. —In application, they are not persistent systems. They can recycle and restrike with exhausting effect, but they cannot grind or with initiative and advance planning than squeeze or hold tight. They come and go, in a reactive role or on missions of oppor with a high percentage of time and energy tunity. Merging forces of cost and kill con AIR POWER 57 fidence will reinforce this offensive bias. creasingly fluid and hard to define. The —Through quick reaction, speed, and di primary concern of air forces, once the versity, there will be an increase in the battle is joined, will be disruption across a ability of air forces to interpose themselves wide band of enemy activities beyond the with a specifically preventive aim and to battle zone. The distinction between inter interject a potential for immediate support diction and close air support will fade. ing or resisting actions. This interposition, —As weapons technology moves toward with actual and symbolic impact, will a 99 percent kill probability, wide-ranging, range from rescue to airlift to firing across near real-time intelligence will become es- the bow. The quick erection or bolstering sential. Without virtually spontaneous in of emotional and physical barriers against telligence, the force elements themselves agression will increase in value. Kill con- will be like muscles moving ahead of the senses. A central lesson of the Vietnam ex perience is that the acquisition, digestion, A central lesson of the Vietnam and relay of intelligence trails the reactive experience is that the acquisition, capability of weapons by an enormous gap. This gap should be closed. For the future, digestion, and relay o f intelligence intelligence technologies should be empha trails the reactive capability of sized, and intelligence links should be con sidered vital. Blind firepower is pathetic. weapons by an enormous gap. This —As reliance on command and control, gap should be closed. delicacy of equipment, and costs increase, the security o f key nodes in the support system will take on greater importance. fidence and discretion reinforce this argu Readiness, initiative, and effect of air forces ment. Focus itself will be an important de will rest on converging flows of intelligence, terrent, while readiness across the force control, maintenance, and supply. Blockage spectrum will continue to gain in value. of any one of these streams can quickly —Air superiority will become increasingly become disastrous. problematic, with the continuing refinement —Persistence will not characterize air of electronic acquisition and guidance. Air power in the foreseeable future. Its effects superiority missions will take on an in can be cumulative, but air power is by creasingly point-oriented character, scour nature more like lightning than rain: it is ing airspace around key command and con least effective when applied in driblets trol terminals, bases, and force concentra across a broad front. Its most useful role in tions. The most lucrative targets will be on war is traumatic disruption to inspire col the ground. The air battle will be more lapse or to allow other kinds of forces to and more a matter of electronic acuity and move, enter, and consolidate. Air forces avoidance, less and less a matter of pilot should not hustle targets. skill and ferocity. It will be important to —The nuclear question lies like a fog be aggressive, but more important to be sly. over the entire discussion. The unknowns —The character o f close air support will are overwhelming, but one certainty is that change. Small, accurate antiair weapons strategic deterrence in the form of a power will limit access to the battlefield and the reserve and perceived determination will approaches to the battlefield for both com look closely over the shoulder of any conflict batants. The battlefield itself will be in short of a convulsive strategic exchange. 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW 4. What are the organizational implications be shattered with minimal effort. Without o f the emerging force structure? effective command and control, the finely honed forces of the future will be like a —Air forces should be organized for quick blind man with a scalpel at one extreme, reaction. Preparation is vital, in terms of a puppet with cut strings at the other. both training and readiness posture. Com munications must be open and assured. • Centralization of communications centers, supply stocks, and armaments them —Rising kill probabilities cut two ways. selves offers targets that will be increasingly They suggest that a smaller, more refined tempting as lethality and kill confidence force may be feasible. They also imply grow. that attrition rates, especially in the early stages of conflict, will be high. For a re • Prevalent views of air superiority and sanctuary are distorted. We tend on the one hand to overstate the importance in future war, decisiveness should of pervasive air superiority. The North be the governing principle for the Vietnamese and Viet Cong have operated in South Vietnam for years with obvious management of aerospace forces. air inferiority, and the war of the tunnels survived the war of the air. On the other laxed or poorly trained force, they could be hand, we are habituated to secure bases, catastrophic. Lively intelligence, wide dis our own form of sanctuary, which rein persal, a taut posture, and sophisticated dis forces the enthusiasm for centralization and guise for both the force elements and key ignores the disruptive potential of opposing points in the support entourage will be in strikes. creasingly important. Training for air forces • We exercise our resources as a should incorporate as much realism, par healthy, integral whole rather than a crip ticularly as much of combat’s extemporane pled sum of crippled parts. This amounts ousness, as possible. to self-deception in some scenarios. In fu —The inward stream of intelligence and ture wars, the ability to regain balance may the outward stream of command and con be the critical factor in success. trol communications mast be organized • There was a marked tendency in and guarded as carefully as the weapon sys Vietnam to use air power in the widest tems themselves. In future war, decisive possible range of roles and to apply it with ness should be the governing principle for low-intensity repetitiveness, like a suppres the management of aerospace forces. This sion weapon. A utility-of-air-power curve, will require hard, free-flowing intelligence measuring effectiveness against the prin- and virtually instant, secure communications. The airplane, as a strike instru- G iv en the trends and impli ment, is not an extension of artil- cations identified, there are fundamental lery or the K4-16. internal dangers that must be addressed: • Security and confidence in the ciples of surprise, concentration of force, arterial command and control channels and shock, would show a rapid plummet mast be absolute. There is a tendency to away from an optimum implementation link these channels with nodes that could peak. The airplane, as a strike instrument. AIR POWER 59 is not an extension of artillery or the M-16. consolidate, to let training intensity slacken, Its focus is too fleeting, and it costs too and to trade investment in the support much for that form of application. structure for hardware numbers—constitute • Overall, the vulnerabilities and a question that is as important as any in trade-offs associated with peacetime con dividual weapons imbalance vis-a-vis any venience in organizing and managing the nation, or the sum of such imbalances. emerging force—impulses to centralize, to Hq United States Air Force Notes 1. William Mitchell Winged Defense. The Development and Possibilities 4. Ibid., p. 3 5 a o f M odem Air Power—Economic and Military (New York: G. P. Putnam s 5. Alvin Toffier. Future Shock (New York: Random House. 1970). Sons. 1925). pp. 20-21. 6. Walter S. Van Cleave. "Aerospace Doctrine in Modern Conflict," in 2. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine. A History of Basic The United States Air Force by Brigadier General Monro MacCloskey (New Thtnktng in die United States Air Force 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1967). p. 224. Aerospace Studies Institute. 1971), p. 132. 7. Ibid, p. 60. 3. Ibid. p. 354. air force review N THIS era of decreasing defense expenditures, there is a need to make Air Force operations more efficient. Management information systems contributeI to efficient management by providing managers with the infor mation they need to make decisions on the use of the Air Force resources under their control. Information systems should provide specific informa tion, in the format desired, to any manager with a valid need for that information. However, the standard automated data systems (ads), which are widely used within the Air Force, are inflexible in response to the special information needs of individual base-level managers. Information retrieval systems were designed to provide flexibility in obtaining special information from the standardized systems. However, the diversity in the characteristics possessed by the four major information 60 AIR FORCE REVIEW 61 retrieval systems currently in use at base computer’s role is to provide information to level allows only limited degrees of flexi be used in decision-making. The vehicle for bility. The diversity also results in confusion providing this information is commonly re on the part of base-level managers regard ferred to as a management information sys ing what information they can obtain with tem (mis). a particular retrieval system. The confusion Definitions of a management information could be resolved by developing a single system are as numerous as the authors writ set of characteristics to be included in each ing on the subject. A synthesis of definitions base-level retrieval system. This would indicates that an mis is simply “a system that simplify the procedure that base-level man collects, processes, and provides manage agers must follow to obtain the individually ment information needed for decisions.’’ tailored reports they need to manage Air But regardless of the definition used, the Force resources more efficiently. key element of an mis is output. This out This article is a synthesis of research per put is in terms of management information. formed at the School of Systems and Logis "Within the Air Force, the bulk of mis out tics, afit, to identify retrieval characteris put is produced by standard automated data tics that should be included in any informa systems. tion system and to measure the degree to which current Air Force base-level retrieval system standardization systems possess these desired characteris tics.1 Flexibility of information retrieval in Current usaf data automation planning con standardized base-level management infor cepts have the stated goal of enhancing the mation systems may not be a familiar topic accomplishment of mission objectives to many Air Force managers; therefore, we through the effective and efficient exploita will present a brief overview of manage tion of computer capability.3 Specifically, ment information systems, system stan one of the data automation planning ob dardization, the need for flexibility, evolu jectives is to provide . . data systems tion of base-level retrieval systems, and which are responsive under all conditions current base-level retrieval systems. A sepa to the dynamic needs of commanders and rate discussion of each of these areas will managers. ...” 4 In order to take full ad provide a background and understanding vantage of the capabilities of modem elec of the problem. tronic computers and provide a common understanding of base-level management management information systems systems, the Air Force has undertaken the major project of standardizing computerized The Air Force acquired its first general- data systems. purpose computer in 1952. Since then its A standard automated data system is de inventory has grown to over 1300 general- fined as “an automated data system com purpose computers supported by 23,000 mon to two or more commands and pos people.2 A general-purpose computer is sessing uniform inputs, file content, process defined as one that is designed to handle a ing logic, and outputs.” 5 Standardization wide variety of problems. Within the Air in the Air Force means that each user of a Force this definition is fulfilled in terms of standard system will receive basically iden the massive role computers have played in tically formatted output products. To en support of the information requirements of sure this standardization, functional systems almost every base-level manager. Thus, the (e.g., supply, procurement, transportation) 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW are centrally designed, programmed, and in the format specified by the requestor.9 maintained, but they are applied at each The use of a retrieval system provides Air Force installation that possesses the the flexibility needed to supplement stan functional activity for which the system was dard products in rendering nonrecurring designed.6 management information in a format suit “The Secretary [of Defense] emphasized able to the user.10 In the past, this flexibil that in the future the development and in ity has been provided in varying degrees stallation of standard data systems must by base-level retrieval systems. go far beyond current practices and applied to a much wider range of systems.” 7 The base-level retrieval systems basic assumption is, then, that standardiza tion will be applied increasingly within the In the early 1960s, the only method avail Air Force. While the benefits of standardiza able to the base-level manager to obtain tion are high, there is still a need for flexi specific management information produced bility in order to satisfy the unique infor by a given computer system was to search mation needs of base-level managers. through the reports (listings) produced by that particular computer system. In 1966 need for flexibility the Air Force Audit Agency recognized the computer as an audit tool and developed The Air Force Audit Agency has stated: two retrieval systems for use by auditors in Both auditors and managers make extensive their reviews of the Standard Base Supply use of the standard system products to obtain System, which used the univac 1050-II needed information; however, the standard computer system. The two retrieval systems products do not always provide the informa were relatively simple, compared to cur tion needed in a timely and efficient manner. rent programming standards, and they were As a result, various utility, inquiry, and selec used almost exclusively by auditors, but tion programs must be available to provide they did serve to lay the groundwork for the necessary flexibility in extracting informa the more sophisticated retrieval systems tion from the data base.8 currently in use by base-level operating The key term in this statement is flexibil- managers within the Air Force. ity. If the manager has available for his use In 1968 the Air Force-wide implementa only those output products (reports and list tion of the Burroughs 3500 computer system ings) which the centralized design team (B3500) brought renewed emphasis to flexi found to be justified for inclusion in the bility in information retrieval. The Base standard ads, he may not be able to satisfy Level Military Personnel System incor nonrecurring information requirements. porated the Direct English Statement In Flexibility is needed in information re formation Retrieval System (desire), a highly trieval. This flexibility can be provided in sophisticated one, into the standard system the form of utility, inquiry, or selection for military personnel management. How programs. In this article, these programs ever, this retrieval system could be used collectively will be referred to as a re only by personnel managers. There still trieval system. Retrieval systems are thus was no single retrieval system, nor was one defined as computer programs or routines planned, that could be used to extract in which have the capability to extract specified formation from the data bases of the other data from computer storage, reformat or systems using the B3500, e.g., transporta manipulate these data, and output the data tion, procurement, maintenance, etc.11 AIR FORCE REVIEW 63 In 1970 the Air Force Audit Agency un is identical, the rules for use (syntax) and dertook the project of evaluating the re the capabilities of afams and bl is are quite trieval systems used by some of the major different. public accounting firms in the United • Somewhat similar to bl is in syntax States. Their objective was to determine is the Direct English Statement Informa if the retrieval systems used by the public tion Retrieval System (desire), which is also accountants could be economically adapted a part of the overall B3500 system. How to Air Force usage. The Air Force procured ever, desire can only be used to retrieve the Arthur Young Audit Management Sys information from the personnel system. It tem in 1971 and reprogrammed it for use cannot be used to retrieve management in as a retrieval system on the B3500. This re formation from any of the other functional trieval system is currently in use and is systems that use the B3500. known as the Air Force Audit Management • The Report Program Generator System (afams).12 (rpg), also known as Program 009, offers In the meantime the .Air Force Data the capability to extract information from Systems Design Center was proceeding the supply system that utilizes the univac with the development of the Base Level In 1050-11 computer. Its syntax is considerably quiry System (bl is), which could also be different from that of bu s, afams, and used to retrieve information selectively from desire, but its capabilities are somewhat any system on the B3500 computer. In 1972 similar to all three systems. the early systems used by auditors were superseded by the more powerful Report Each of these retrieval systems was in Program Generator (rpg) as the flexible re dependently designed, resulting in a diver trieval system for use on the uni vac 1050- sity of characteristics among the systems. II supply computer. Thus, four retrieval Because of the wide range of characteristics systems were in use by the base-level man possessed by these four base-level retrieval agers: desire, afams, bl is, and rpg, each systems, base-level managers often become of which we will explain. frustrated and confused in their efforts to use the systems to satisfy specific informa • The Base Level Inquiry System tion requirements.13 A single set of retrieval (bl is) is a retrieval system that can extract system characteristics familiar to all man information from any functional data sys agers could simplify the retrieval process tem which uses the B3500 computer system. and improve the decision process. A functional system is a management infor mation system that applies to a specific the AFIT study area of management, e.g., aircraft main tenance, transportation, procurement. The The study performed at afit to address the B3500 is the general-purpose computer used problem was divided into two stages. The to process information and produce manage first stage of research addressed the ques ment reports for most base-level functions tion: What characteristics should be in with the exception of Base Supply. cluded in an Air Force base-level retrieval • The .Air Force Audit Management system? The answer to this question was de System (afams) is identical to bl is in its veloped from a review of the literature scope of applications. It too can retrieve specifically pertaining to management in information from any data base on the formation systems, information retrieval B3500. Although the scope of application systems, and audit retrieval systems. Each 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW potential characteristic identified was evalu all files contained on the storage media of ated on two basic criteria: (1) the frequency a given computer system. of occurrence in the literature and (2) sound (2) Specify record selection based on logical argument in terms of relevance to these comparisons: less than, greater than, the information needs of base-level man equal to, greater than or equal to, less than agers. or equal to, and not equal to. The second stage of research addressed Specific Selection Criteria. In using a re the question: To what extent are the de trieval system, a manager is interested in sired characteristics included in each of obtaining specific information about certain the four Air Force base-level retrieval sys portions of a file. In the case of a military tems? This question was answered by re personnel file, the commander may want viewing the .Air Force manuals that docu to know which of his officers have a mas mented the four Air Force base-level re ter’s degree. Assuming a single file of mili trieval systems. This documentation review tary officers with a single personnel record was supplemented by an analysis of actual for each officer and no existing retrieval computer outputs of each of the four re system, a complete manual search of a trieval systems. print-out of these records would have to be made. A flexible retrieval system could pro vide the commander with a list of only characteristics those officers with a master’s degree. More specifically, a certain portion of each of Based on the results of the extensive lit ficer’s record would have an area reserved erature review, eight characteristics were for a code denoting “academic education found to be desirable for inclusion in an level.” /Assuming this code was a 5 for a Air Force base-level retrieval system. These master’s degree, the educational level of eight characteristics are summarized and each officer would be compared to a 5. discussed in turn. If a 5 was present, the name of the officer (1) Access each file stored within a com would be printed out on a computer listing. puter system as well as the capability to If a 5 was not present, the record would be make comparisons simultaneously between ignored. This process would be repeated by two or more files. the retrieval system until all officers’ records File Access. Access is defined as the abil had been checked. The 5 used in this ex ity to retrieve data from a computerized ample is called a “selection criterion.” storage medium. Data are normally sub Joseph Wasserman, a noted expert, states divided into files in a given automated data that the selection criteria should also per system. These files are maintained on a mit a record to be selected based on the magnetic storage medium such as mag data’s exclusion or inclusion within a range netic tape, disk, or drum. These media of values or equaling exact values.14 This serve much the same purpose as a standard is normally accomplished by using such office filing cabinet except that, instead of logical expressions as “equal to or greater a clerk removing a file manually from a than.” For example, educational level could filing cabinet, computer programs remove be compared as being “equal to 5, ’ or per- the file from the mechanized storage media. haps “greater than 4 but less than 6. In terms of a retrieval system, maximum (3) Form compound record selection flexibility can be achieved if the given re criteria based on the and and or Boolean trieval system has the capability to access logic connectors. AIR FORCE REVIEW 65 Boolean Logic. The Boolean logic per (5) Perform the mathematical operations tains to the algebraic processes formulated of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and bv George Boole. Boolean logic provides division. the capability to form complex conditions Mathematical Operations. In general, a for the selection of a record.10 Thus, Boolean significant portion of the data contained in relationships are actually an extension of base-level functional systems is quantitative the specific selection criteria characteristic. data. Examples of quantitative data include More specifically, the retrieval system, by unit cost, quantity on hand, quantity due in, stating such relationships as AND or OR. accounts receivable, accounts payable, permits the creation of compound selection quantity shipped, etc. Quantitative data by criteria.16 This type of logic permits a single their very nature lend themselves to mathe retrieval to satisly combinations of two or matical manipulation. For example, to com more conditions simultaneously. pute the total value of all type A widgets To extend the example used in the pre in an inventory, the following computation vious section, assume a commander was would be made: only interested in knowing which company- unit cost quantity total value grade officers had a master’s degree. Assume of tvpe A X on hand of = of type A widgets that the codes for these military grades are widget type A widget on hand 01, 02, and 03 respectively. The desired selection criteria have been compounded. Any automated data system that contains The retrieval system must have the capa quantitative data could be enhanced with bility to accept these multiple criteria. It the flexibility of a mathematical computa must be able to retrieve the records of tion capability included in a retrieval system. those officers with an educational level (6) Specify the output format, including equal to 5 AND a military grade equal to sort, control break, line spacing, page ejec 01, 02, or 03. tion, page headings, column headings, sub (4) Perform random and interval sampling. totals, and final totals features. Statistical Sampling. A sample is defined Flexible Output Format. The reader may as “. . . any subset of elements from the recall that current Air Force policy is to universe or one of its populations.” 17 standardize automated data systems to the Viewing a computerized file as a popula maximum extent possible and that stan tion, a group of records can be considered dardization implies that each user of a a sample or subset of this population. In standard system will receive basically iden performing an analysis of a file, a manager tically formatted output products (printed may not be interested in evaluating each reports). Retrieval systems provide the user record in a file. Instead, he might evaluate with a capability to produce individually a subset or portion of the file. But in order tailored outputs without the high cost of to make a statement about the entire file, programming by conventional methods.18 his analysis would have to be based on The capability to produce individually de some statistical method. Statistical sampling, signed output products is the basic purpose for example, can be particularly useful at of any retrieval system. The presence of this base level. Managers could obtain a point characteristic provides base-level managers estimate and confidence level on the condi with the capability to obtain management tion of certain records or the operation of reports suited to their individual needs. functional systems by using a flexible sta (7) Perform comprehensive edits of the tistical sampling capability. input parameters before processing is begun. 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Edits. The precise method of inputting is summarized in the accompanying tabula retrieval specifications to the retrieval sys tion. A rating of 1 indicates that the respec tem is termed the “syntax” of the retrieval tive retrieval system completely possessed system; syntax means, then, rules for using an individual characteristic. Fractional a retrieval system. In order for a retrieval credit was given for partial implementation run to be successful, these rules must be of a characteristic. The extent to which all followed exactly. A series of edits or syntax eight characteristics are collectively in checks could be performed by the retrieval cluded in each of the four Air Force base- system to determine proper syntax. If im level retrieval systems is indicated by the proper syntax was discovered, the retrieval percentage figure in the last line of the system should print out a message telling table. the user exactly what was wrong with the input or what syntax rule was violated. In Results of Retrieval System Analysis the absence of such edits, retrieval results Characteristic BLIS AFAMS DESIRE RPG would be either nonexistent or unpredicta ble at best, a process that could waste con File access .50 .50 0.00 .50 siderable management time and computer Specific selection criteria 1.00 1.00 1.00 .67 resources.19 Boolean logic 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 (8) Be used without an extensive knowl Statistical sampling .50 .50 0.00 0.00 edge of data processing. Mathematical Ease o f Use. According to the EDP Ana- operations 1.00 1.00 .50 1.00 Flexible output lyzer, a retrieval system should be designed format 1.00 1.00 1.00 .50 for use by executive and operating man Edits 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 agers, without the need for computer pro Ease of use 1.00 .33 1.00 0.00 grammers to translate the retrieval request Total rating 7.00 6.33 5.50 2.67 into a computer programming language. Extent of inclusion 87.500% 79.125% 68.750% 33.375% Thus, an easily used retrieval system . . is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the effective use of an mis by man Thus, the extent to which the eight char agers." 20 Crucial to the effective use of a acteristics are included in the four Air retrieval system is that the user must un Force base-level retrieval systems is as fol derstand the contents of the files from lows: BLIS—87%, AFAMS—79%, DESIRE—69%, which he is retrieving. This knowledge of and rpg—33%. These percentage figures rep files does not imply, however, that the user resent the degree of flexibility in each of must possess an extensive data processing the four retrieval systems for satisfying the knowledge. According to Grant McLaugh unique information needs of base-level man lin, the primary advantage of retrieval sys agers. Thus, bl is provides the greatest flexi tems is the ability of nonprogrammers to bility, with rpg providing the least. These prepare the retrieval system input param relative ratings should be viewed with cau eters.21 tion because each characteristic was arbi trarily assigned equal weight. The reader inclusion in Air Force systems should note that while afams received the second-highest overall rating, it was rated The extent to which these eight desirable relatively low on the ease-of-use scale. Con characteristics are included in the four ma versely, desire had a lower overall rating jor Air Force base-level retrieval systems than afams but was considered to be ex- AIR FORCE REVIEW 67 tremelv easy to use. Given a choice between required. Retrieval systems can provide afams and desire, a user would probably flexibility for Air Force managers, which choose desire, the system that is easier to would help them to become more efficient. use. Ease of use, then, could tend to be the The problem is threefold: (1) The four overriding characteristic in the selection of Air Force systems possess only limited de a retrieval system. grees of flexibility; thus the using managers The comparison of retrieval systems also are limited in what they can obtain. (2) revealed some redundancy among them. The diversity of abilities possessed by in bl is and afams, for example, are very simi dividual systems often causes confusion as lar in both capability and scope of appli to what information is available. (3) There cation. Exclusive of the ease-of-use char is redundancy between systems in capabil acteristic, these two systems had identical ity and scope of application, which results ratings. This is not to say that the two sys in needless costs. tems are identical in every respect, but it The retrieval characteristics identified in does indicate that their capabilities are this research could be used as a basic point generally the same. Additionally, both bl is for development of a desired set of char and afams were implemented to serve the acteristics to be included in all existing, as same purpose: to retrieve information selec well as future, Air Force information sys tively from the data base of any system op tems. The inclusion of this set would pro erated on the Burroughs 3500 computer sys vide added flexibility, reduce redundancy, tem. Redundancy, of course, can be costly. and, perhaps most important, reduce con fusion. It would help Air Force managers to use the costly systems that were designed Air Force managers need information to to provide information for making better make good decisions concerning the alloca decisions and using resources more ef tion of scarce resources. Standard systems ficiently. do not provide all the information that is School of Systems and Logistics, AFIT Notes praisal,” Datamation. May 1967, pp. 22-30. I Joseph A. Coleman, Major. USAF. and Captain Harris Keller, USAF. 11. Computer Inquiry Technique (CIT): Development and Usage, p. 2. Flexibility in Information Retrieval for the Base Level Manager," a mas 12. Air Force Manual 175-118. Air Force Audit Management System. Mav ter's thesis at the School of Svstems and Logistics, AFIT. Wright-Patterson 1974. AFB. Ohio, 29 January 1975 13. Computer Inquiry Technique (CIT): Development and Usage, p. 1. Z Jack B. Robbins Major General. USAF, "Data Automation-How USAF 14. Joseph J. Wasserman, "Computer Audit Packages." Data Management. Is Opening a New Era," Air Force Magazine. July 1974. pp. 65-68. September 1972. pp. 71-72. 3. Air Force Manual 300-1, Air Force Data Automation Planning Concepts 15. Leo J. Cohen, "Data Base Considerations and Implementation Tech 1969-1978 1969. niques." Data Management, September 1972. pp. 40-45. 4 Ibid. p. 3. 16. Guide to Performing System Audit Appraisals, p. 4. 5. Air Force Regulation 300-Z "Management of Automatic Data Processing 17. C. C. Helmstadter. Research Concepts in Human Behavior (New York: Systems." 1971. Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970). 6. Ibid., p 4 18. Crant E. McLaughlin. "ED P Systems Audit," Data Management, Sep 7. AFM 300-1. p. X tember 1970. pp. 33-36. 8 AG Pamphlet 171-1, Guide to Performing System Audit Appraisals. Air 19. Donald L. Adams and John F. Mullarkey, "A Survey of Audit Software," Force Audit Agency. Norton .AFB, California, 1971. Journal o f Accountancy, September 1972, pp. 39-66. 9. Study Guide 30ZR6784-II-1-1, Computer Inquiry Technique (CIT): De- 20. ‘Technical Support for an MIS," EDP Analyzer, November 1969. pp. velopment and Uiage, Air Training Command, Sheppard AFB, Texas, 1973. 1-13. 10. Robert V. Head. "Management information Systems: A Critical Ap 21. McLaughlin, p. 36 SOCIAL ACTIONS TRAINING To Know and To Grow C aptain Frederick M. B el l HE usaf Social Actions (sa ) program of uniform, in and out of social actions kinds includes a broad range of activities, in of activity. But the integrity of a single career cludingT training in the control of drug and field, the unity of action and concern, the alcohol abuse. A former director of the consolidation of programs, energy, and focus Social Actions school made the following came rushing along like a swollen stream headed for surrounding lowlands. Only with remarks at an American Psychological As the establishment of a permanent career field sociation convention in Montreal, Canada, and new training courses did we begin to in August 1973: catch our breath (not because we had more The field of social actions has had a greater time, but because we had greater need) and growth and development during the past two take time to look carefully at the task, or the years than perhaps any career field within tasks, that Social Actions personnel in the Air the military structure since World War II Force are attempting to perform. when science re-created with new dimensions the entire structure in minimum time. New One of the primary tasks sa personnel per vocabulary, new concerns, new techniques, form is the management of drug/alcohol new reports,—all were part of the new struc abuse education and rehabilitation programs, tures created then, and now in social actions. and it is this area of training that this article I do not mean to imply that social actions will describe. grew from nothing during this period of time. That’s not true. It developed from concerns that already existed in fragmented ways. It Department of adapted vocabulary from other military struc Social Actions Training tures and from civilian counterparts. It built on techniques that were available, in and out The Department of Social Actions Training 68 AIR FORCE REVIEW 69 is part of the School of Applied Aerospace learn patterns of behavior appropriate to Sciences, Lackland .Air Force Base, Texas. the Air Force environment within which It is accredited by the Southern Association they work. of Colleges and Schools, Vocational Training Division. Its courses are listed with the Com school curriculum munity College of the .Air Force, Randolph afb, Texas, and Social Actions personnel The curriculum will be described in terms may earn up to two years of college credit of its three aspects: cognitive subjects, small through their sa courses. group activities, and practical application. The purpose of the department is to pro It is noted that sa came into being officially vide training and support for sa programs in October 1971 and that the present school throughout the usaf. This is accomplished curriculum has developed out of the ex through resident courses at Lackland afb, perience of both the school faculty and the through Special Training courses conducted sa personnel in the field, who knew, per bv the department, and through the usaf haps best of all, what was needed in terms Resource Center at Lackland. The Resource of training. Center is built around a library of be The following subjects were taught by havioral science books, documents, films, lecture and/or guided discussion. The pre and unpublished papers. It also houses a sentations were given by school staff and remote terminal with direct on-line access other usaf speakers or by guest speakers to the computerized data banks of the Na serving in consultant status. With few ex tional Institute of Mental Health. These in ceptions the caliber of these speakers was clude the National Clearinghouse for Drug excellent, and their professional credentials Abuse Information, the National Clearing were excellent as well. Several subjects house for Mental Health Information, and covered pertain to the human relations the National Clearinghouse for Alcohol In aspect of sa work and were presented as formation. The Resource Center is thus able supplementary to the core curriculum. to provide the latest information to the paraprofessional drug educator or counselor Administration of Social Actions Offices in a timely fashion as both inquiries and re Cross-Cultural Differences plies may be made by telephone, teletype Women Personnel’s Concerns Social Actions Interaction with the Judicial message, or letter. System The school aims to impart a maximum Social Actions Interface with Law En amount of cognitive data in a highly charged, forcement afFective learning environment. Although Psychological Labeling students are required to know facts, it is Administration of Drug/Alcohol Educa considered equally (or more) important, tion and Rehabilitation Programs because of the nature of sa work, that stu Drug/Alcohol Pharmacology dents be given the opportunity to grow as Introduction to Transactional Analysis human beings. This is possibly the only Principles of Instruction usaf school in which personal emotional/ Values Clarification and Viable Alterna psychological growth is encouraged as part tives to Drug Use of the program of instruction. Students are Counseling Principles and Practices expected to examine their own behavior and As an adjunct to didactic learning, time that of their peers and through structured was set aside daily for small groups of stu and unstructured small group experiences dents to process, with the aid of a faculty 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW facilitator, the cognitive data presented in ing ability, each student must present a the lecture hall. At the onset of the course, short (15-minute) talk on some aspect of small groups of eight to ten members were drug/alcohol abuse to his classmates. These organized, and they remained together talks are recorded on videotape and later throughout the course. In groups, oppor critiqued by the student and a faculty mem tunities were provided to “try out” theories ber. and techniques introduced in the classroom, (4) Group work is frequently used by sa e.g., values-clarification exercises would personnel as one aspect of rehabilitation of follow lectures on that subject. Additionally, drug or alcohol abusers. Therefore, students much time was spent in groups getting each are provided opportunities to serve as facili student to evaluate himself both as an in tators in their small group. This work is dividual and as a group member. The pri critiqued by faculty members and also by mary means of accomplishing this was other group members. through structured experiences taken from the Pfeiffer and Jones series of Handbooks student evaluation for Group Facilitators and from other While enrolled, students are constantly sources. evaluated to insure that they achieve the Cognitive and affective learning forms highest possible level of professional and the foundation for the practicum work that military standards before returning to the climaxes the overall training. There are field. A triangular system of evaluation is four areas of practical application: used: (1) Practice teaching. When students re • Written examinations on each of turn to their bases of assignment, they will the three major blocks of instruction. Stu be required to present drug and alcohol dents must pass each exam to remain in the abuse training to all assigned military per school and in the sa career field. sonnel. Therefore, at the school each stu • Performance checklist for speech dent is required to prepare lesson plans es, written assignments, behavior in struc and then teach drug/alcohol abuse control tured experiences, and practicum work. to military personnel assigned to Lackland • Overall performance. afb. Students are critiqued both by a faculty Failure to perform satisfactorily in one or member and by the students in the class more of these three areas will result in they taught. elimination from the school and from sa . (2) Counseling of drug/alcohol abusers is an everyday task for sa personnel; there fore, emphasis is placed on developing coun M y own reaction to the course is that of a seling skills while at the school. Students graduate student in guidance and counsel do practice counseling with fellow students ing, a usaf drug/alcohol educator and coun on closed-circuit television and are ap selor of twenty months, and a graduate of a propriately critiqued. Students are finally four-week version of the course just com given an opportunity to counsel, under super pleted. In general, I believe the school is vision, airmen assigned to Lackland afb excellent. Academically it compares very who have been identified as drug abusers. well with other schools I have attended, These sessions are also critiqued. both military and civilian. It is apparent (3) sa personnel are frequently asked to that a great deal of time and effort has been give talks on various aspects of drug/alcohol put into making it an academically sound abuse. As an opportunity to develop speak course. On the affective side, I am a little AIR FORCE REVIEW 71 awed with this Air Force school and its In summary, having worked in the field mandate to bring about changes in student for some time prior to this school, I can attitudes, values, and maturity levels. My confidently state that the training is definitely impression is that the school is effective in job-oriented and will serve students well promoting these changes. in their base-level programs. In providing I found the videotaping of speeches and both knowledge and opportunities for per counseling sessions to be a most helpful sonal growth, this school has a uniqueness technique for critiquing. This was particu in keeping with the uniqueness of the Social larly helpful in the nonverbal things that Actions career field. transpired during counseling, not only for He/ Tactical Air Command the client but also for the counselor. Erratum O ur thanks to Colonel W illiam C . Ferguson. H q PA C A F, who called our attention to the incorrect definition of C E P (circular error probable) foot noted on page 40 of the July-August 1975 issue. The definition should have read: ‘ The circular error probable is the radius of a circle encom passing 50 percent of the weapons delivered.” opinion In both analysis and planning we are too prone appearance of uncertainty at a given time is per- to ignore the certainty that things change over haps less interesting than the certainty that time: that a number of years hence national ob- changes in objectives and strategies will take jectives and strategies will be different from what place over time. they are today. In planning for the future the J ames R. Schlesincer Secretary of Defense NITED STATES tactical air forces are presently confronted with a challenging and paradoxical situation. On a global level they consti tuteU a more critically important national resource than ever before. As the events of the past decade have demonstrated, the strategic impasse has driven armed conflict downward into the tactical arena. In recognition of this fact our principal opponent, the Soviet Union, is steadily increasing both the amount and the degree of sophistication of its total military power.1 Ac cordingly, the current United States diplomatic posture favoring international detente requires the backing of a strong, credible deterrent capability across TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN A £ J PERIOD i i f a Wx of W UNCERTAINTY ajor G ordon A. L ong 72 IN MY OPINION 73 the entire spectrum of conflict in order to be to become more pronounced with the pas effective. sage of time and could eventually threaten To United States tactical air forces, there U.S. national security. The purpose of this fore, falls the formidable responsibility of article, therefore, is to examine the nature sustaining the ability to wage effective war of this contradiction, identify specific prob fare on all levels of conflict below general lems that derive from it, and offer sugges war in the face of a steadily increasing threat. tions for their long-term resolution. Unfortunately, global concerns tend not to be considered as urgent as domestic prob The Dimensions of the Contradiction lems, and there is the temptation to put them off. This tendency has been accentu The requirement to maintain a tactical ated bv recent foreign policy reverses, and air capability during periods of austere the United States military involvement in funding and military inactivity is not new Vietnam has left in its wake a profound na to the United States Air Force. In the tional distaste for war and all things mili quarter-century since the Air Force became tary. As a consequence, the United States is an autonomous service, the problem has currently directing the preponderance of arisen twice before, once prior to the Ko its attention inward, as has been its inclina rean War and once prior to Vietnam. In tion at the conclusion of past wars, and is both instances significant deficiencies in becoming increasingly preoccupied with Air Force tactical capability were revealed the host of internal problems plaguing the in the opening weeks of the conflict that nation, problems that demand an ever followed each of the two periods of inac growing share of national resources. More tion. The causes of the deficiencies were over, the effects of inflation and the energy many, but the primary one was the same crisis daily reduce the total amount of re each time: failure to anticipate correctly sources available. Under these conditions the nature of the conflict that was to come. direct, large-scale United States military This failure was due in part to the widely involvement overseas seems highly unlikely accepted belief that U.S. strategic nuclear in the immediate future, and it is only to be forces would provide a deterrent to all expected that budgetary justification for ex types of armed conflict—a belief rendered pensive, technically complex, energy-con explicit by former Secretary of State John suming tactical air forces should prove Foster Dulles’s proclamation of the doc difficult. Thus, with public perception of trine of massive retaliation.2 A corollary to the need for their employment at a low ebb, this doctrine was that tactical air forces the tactical air forces of the United States had become obsolete save as augmentation embark on what promises to be their third for the power of Strategic Air Command.3 period of inaction since World War II in This doctrinal posture had two primary an environment of scarce resources and effects: it greatly reduced the amount of stringent constraints. military resources devoted to acquiring There is a clear contradiction between and supporting tactical air assets; and it the need for an expanded tactical air capa strongly influenced the design characteris bility to counter the Soviet threat, on the tics of the few tactical aircraft and systems one hand, and the strong possibility of years that were approved for purchase, rendering of inaction and increasing scarcity of re them largely unsuited for general purpose sources available to tactical air forces, on use. the other. It is a contradiction that tends There were those who detected the fal 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW lacy of this single-option strategy, notably forces-in-being. Of necessity, we find our the same group of scientists who were pri selves deeply involved in a technological marily responsible for the development of chess match on an international scale—one the atomic bomb itself. As early as 1950 in which we enjoy but scant advantage.6 this perceptive group maintained that there To compound the intractability of the was a considerable likelihood that the world national predicament, we rapidly approach would respond to the developing nuclear the limits of an industrial capacity that has standoff by entering an era of limited war, traditionally been regarded as without lim in which the power of atomic weaponry it. National options are constrained by would be impotent.4 In spite of such efforts increasing scarcity of resources, energy, and to correct the nation’s conceptual error, it funds. “Silent” problems such as inflation, remained unremedied and generally un a depressed economy, and public failure to noticed until the Korean War provided a perceive the need for a strong military in practical demonstration of the correctness times of peace also take their toll. Closely of the scientists’ position. interwoven with these constraints is the Even afterward, much credence was peculiarly relative nature of tactical deter given to the idea that Korea was but an rence. Unlike the forces that support an anomaly in the larger environment of the all-out attack option, the tactical air forces cold war and would not recur.5 For the of a major power require an active opera Air Force the net results of such thinking tional capability suited to both conventional were the initial and nearly disastrous re and limited/regional nuclear warfare in verses of Korea and Vietnam, where defeat order to be credible. This is so because of was averted by the narrowest of margins the relatively less critical stakes involved through the skill and dedication of men fly in limited war. The leaders of other na ing a strange assortment of ancient and tions may elect to test the tactical capa modern aircraft on missions for which they bility of the United States without neces were never intended. In both locales only sarily placing their nation’s vital interests the combination of the limited nature of at risk. It would be logical, therefore, for the conflict and the rapid response of them to do so at any time that they per America’s prodigious industrial capacity ceive a weakness on the part of the United enabled national military and political lead States (either in actual capability or in na ership to recover their lost initiative. tional will) together with an advantage to Nor can the nation count any longer on be gained by exploiting that weakness. In its industrial capability to provide more consequence, tactical air forces must be than token assistance after the fact in future sufficiently strong to be simultaneously capa situations of this sort; the exponential ad ble of coping with such probing attacks vance of technology has denied the United while deterring other potential opponents. States its traditional recourse. Unprece The thrust of this argument is to emphasize dented increases in the potential efficiency further the overriding importance of forces- and lethality of tactical weapons require in-being in the tactical air environment. response times that must be reckoned in Under such demanding circumstances, a minutes. At the same time, the increasingly repetition of the unreadiness that has affected complex design criteria required for prac tactical air forces of the United States dur tical realization of potential capability re ing interwar periods could have disastrous sult in decade-long production lead times. consequences. Such constraints lend new significance to Two conclusions may be drawn from this IN MY OPINION 75 discussion. First, the problems confronting indefensibility of nuclear weapons is over the architects of tactical air forces today come by a technological breakthrough that and in the immediate future are not strictly will serve to negate or considerably restrict military in nature; rather, they involve a their utility. combination of technological, economic, (3) Throughout the period prior to this and political considerations. Second, a sys breakthrough, priority must be given to the tematic procedure is needed for anticipating deterrent requirements of strategic forces.9 both advances in technology and changes in Because the time at which this breakthrough the tactical environment in order that the will occur cannot be accurately forecast, scarce resources available to United States some reference time period is required for tactical air forces can be utilized most planning purposes. A convenient interval effectively. If the design process for tacti for this purpose is the production lead time cal air forces is to be realistic, it must be (pl t ) required for a new major weapon sys responsive to the total context within which tem to become operational. At present, one those forces are likely to be employed; and, pl t is on the close order of ten years.10 most important, it must allow for the in (4) Weapon system development will con evitable alteration of that context over time. tinue to constitute the critical path for defense planners concerned with tactical air forces.11 Personnel considerations are Simplifying Assumptions generally not pertinent in this context ex If one decides to take this broader view, cept insofar as personnel-related costs a way must be found to reduce the result consume a growing share of a shrinking de ing composite problem to manageable pro fense budget. portions. One promising method for accom (5) During the next pl t , armed conflict plishing this reduction is being employed will continue to be a prevalent form of in by the Air Staff Directorate of Doctrine, ternational interaction, particularly among Concepts and Objectives. In their long-range the less developed countries and their neigh planning study, Alternative Future World bors. This conflict will be nonnuclear for the Contests, they identify a small number of most part and, from a United States per possible futures, each with its own major spective, will be on a tactical level of opera theme and simplifying assumptions.7 For tions. It will most probably be subsidized the purposes of this discussion the world of to a great extent by nuclear powers in the future is assumed generally to follow furtherance of their own political ends. the “Dissonant" model0 with several addi (6) U.S. military forces are likely to see tional limiting assumptions: little action during the next pl t , as a result (1) Existence of capable U.S. strategic of widespread resource and energy short nuclear forces will continue to deter gen ages and a reluctance (generated by the eral nuclear war indefinitely. (If for some Vietnam experience) on the part of na reason it should not, the question of the fu tional leadership to commit forces unless ture of U.S. tactical air forces becomes im vital interests are clearly at stake. mediately academic.) (7) In the absence of legislation fixing the (2) The international strategic military military share of government revenues at stalemate will continue until the present some percentage of the U.S. gross national product, resources available to the military The Dnvm^nr world contest postulate* three poles of nuclear power at large will be steadily reduced below their the t S . t he U S S R, and the P R.C . and is interdependent but slightly dis integrative economical!v" present levels during the next pl t . This 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW will be due to a combination of political Schlesinger has termed “Cook’s-Tour plan and economic influences, headed by a grow ning,” rather than deal with uncertainty in ing public perception of the urgency of an explicit manner by multioption analysis domestic problems and an accelerating in or “Lewis-and-Clark planning,” in recog flationary spiral. nition of the alternative courses of action that are certain to appear.12 As Secretary Schlesinger has noted, Major Tactical Air Force Problem Areas Whenever the uncertainties are substantial the balance should shift in the direction of Given an environment described by the Lewis-and-Clark planning. Despite its messi foregoing assumptions, three major prob ness, its relative advantage then increases. lems facing tactical air forces and force The appropriate planning concept is one that planners can be identified: the problem of is conducive to (1) facing uncertainties (not long-term planning, the problem of tactical pushing them aside) and (2) hedging against economics, and the problem of continuity uncertainties (i.e. not biased against hedging). of effort. Nevertheless, in all bureaucracies there are strong pressures to go too far in the quest for Cook’s-Tour planning. . . . The cost of acqui the long-term planning problem escence is neglect of uncertainties, lost flexi bility, neglected and suppressed options, and The innate difficulty of conducting effec less than optimal adjustment to changing tive long-term planning to meet changing opportimities and threats existing in the ex world conditions continually plagues mili ternal environment.13 [See Figure 1.] tary forces in times of peace. Without the adaptive stimulus provided by actual in volvement in combat operations, planners •——•----- •------•------•------• and analysts suffer from a natural tendency to become preoccupied with detail, in the process missing basic changes in the world environment. Consequently strategies and plans tend to diverge increasingly from reality with the passage of time. The resul tant fundamental misdirection comprises the Figure 1. Defense forecasting may range from the heart of the long-term planning problem. The single-oj)tion method o f Cook’s-Tour planning to symptoms are many: increased emphasis on the multioption concept o f Lewis-and-Clark planning. that which is traditional, rejection of inno vative employment concepts (frequently When allowed to persist for even a fraction without trial), inability to distinguish between of one pl t , Cook’s-Tour planning adversely major problems and minor ones, and so impacts on the design of military hardware, forth. Such tendencies are reinforced by the usually restricting its usefulness severely. diminished public and Congressional sup Furthermore, the degree of restriction in port for expensive new military programs, creases as pl t ’s grow longer. Extrapolated which has become almost characteristic of to a logical conclusion, the ultimate result the United States during times of peace. could be fully as damaging as the French More critical still is the temptation to re experience with the Maginot Line in World vert to a single-option type of defense fore War II. casting, which Defense Secretary James R. Because of the extreme flexibility required IN MY onNION 77 of tactical air forces, this tendency toward effect be assessed correctly and considered institutionalization of conceptual rigidity at all levels of United States planning. The during periods of inaction is particularly assessment and consideration are particularly detrimental to both their effectiveness as important in forecasting the evolution of an operational force and their credibility those portions of the military force structure as a deterrent. Because tactical air forces most likely to be affected by enemy reac necessarily operate on an “anyplace, any tion, for example, tactical air forces. time” basis, they occupy themselves during interwar periods by updating their capabili the problem o f tactical economics ties and maintaining proficiency in a wide variety of technical skills. In the absence of The economic problem confronting the Air the empirical facilities laboratory that ac Force has two distinct aspects. The first and tive warfare provides, it becomes the re most obvious is the direct impact of reduced sponsibility of planners and analysts to military purchasing power. As noted earlier, anticipate which of these basic skills and inflation, budget cuts, increasing technologi capabilities will be pertinent at any given cal costs, general scarcity of raw materials, time, and too often in the past this antici growth of personnel-related expenditures, patory function has been found wanting. In and a variety of other factors all contribute view of the stated economic constraints, the to the Air Force’s present economic diffi United States literally cannot afford failure culties. In view of the requirement to give of this sort in the future. priority to strategic forces,16 it seems likely Understanding the nature of the opposi that tactical air forces will bear the brunt tion is another critically important dimen of future force reductions, as has been the sion of the long-term planning problem. In case during both earlier postwar periods. the past, forecasting difficulties have been The total effects of such reductions are compounded by ignorance or misinterpreta magnified by the diseconomies of reduced tion of the nature of the threat, represented production and procurement rates for weap primarily at present by the Soviet Union on systems. Fixed production costs must be and its allies,14 a circumstance which, if distributed over a smaller number of finished permitted to occur in today’s complex mili products when production funds are cut, tary environment, would probably negate causing the price per unit to rise. In this long-term planning efforts altogether. Pres manner a given funding reduction can pro ently the Soviets appear to be pursuing an duce a more-than-proportional reduction integrated grand strategy of gradual ero in net output. Very little of this sort of sion of Western power through political, arithmetic is required to create a destructive economic, ideological, and military attri impact on the capability of tactical air forces. tion, typified by their activities in the Mid But there is another, far more damaging dle East and Southeast Asia. Such a strategy effect that derives from the combination of poses a difficult problem for national and escalating technological costs and economic military policy-makers committed to a inflation. After a weapon system is purchased, strategy of deterrence. There is also the its replacement cost increases under these question of how much effect United States twin pressures until in certain cases it be policy initiatives have on Soviet actions and comes so high that later replacement of vice versa. There are indications that this destroyed or damaged systems is not eco reactive effect is significant.15 If so, it is nomically feasible. Thus the affected sys imperative that the implications of this tems assume the status of national resources, 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW in that their unit replacement costs become port of national policy, a spectrum spanning disproportionately high in relation to the the entire range between national economic- system’s replacement value. Examples of air sanction and the use of nuclear force. Thus craft that have attained this status are the national interests and national military capa C-141, B-52, and F-106; the F-14, F-15, and bility can be viewed as parallel continua, C-5 seem likely soon to join them. The net related by the concept of deterrence. Theo result is a perceptible hesitancy to commit retically, the primary goals of a policy of the affected system to any combat situation deterrence in the nuclear age are (1) to where the risk of its loss appears high, un prevent conflict altogether; or, failing that, less U.S. vital interests are perceived to be (2) to contain conflict at the lowest prac at stake. Clearly there are a number of ticable level (thereby deterring escalation qualifications to this principle. Older sys of conflict); or, failing that, (3) to deter all- tems generally grow to be regarded as ex out nuclear war.18 Deterrence, therefore, is pendable as they approach the end of their as applicable after initiation of hostilities as useful service life spans and follow-on sys before, and it remains an important and tems take their place. Strategic systems, too, active concept along a continuum of conflict tend not to be affected by this phenomenon that parallels national interests and military because they are, for the most part, ex capability. Practically speaking, such an pressly intended for use in support of vital argument makes a case for flexible tactical interests.0 forces able to deter conflict or escalation of Yet consider the effects on tactical air conflict on any level. forces: if the proportions of high- and low- Gaps in tactical capability, however, may cost systems are not balanced properly, there develop in several ways. As noted already, is a distinct possibility of pricing tactical the problem of tactical economics can lead air forces out of their primary role. Any to a discontinuity at the lowest end of the noticeable reluctance to commit tactical tactical spectrum in the event that the least- forces in support of less-than-vital national expensive tactical options grow too costly. objectives would produce a significant lack Allowing specific tactical capabilities to of credibility in the U.S. tactical deterrent degenerate—either in terms of numbers of posture. If suitable alternatives for the available systems able to provide a particular affected systems are unavailable for defense capability or in the design of follow-on sys of less-than-vital national interests, the re tems—can produce an equivalent discontinui sultant gaps in tactical deterrent capability ty at an intermediate level by requiring the tend to invite coercion.17 use of inappropriate or prohibitively expen sive weapon systems as substitutes. At the the problem o f continuity o f effort uppermost end of the tactical spectrum a third type of discontinuity may be caused Because of the necessarily abstract and con through failure to match an improved enemy ceptual character of force structure design, capability or technological breakthrough, it is relatively easy to lose track of the cen thereby placing U.S. tactical forces at a tral issue in tactical force design: the need qualitative disadvantage. for continuity. U.S. tactical forces must be Any time such gaps are allowed to develop designed to provide a continuous and credi in U.S. tactical capability, the possibility ble spectrum of military capability in sup- exists for enemy coercion on corresponding " However, the distinction between tactical and strategic air forces is levels of national interest. Lacking a response Incoming less distinct. A case in point is the use of B-52s in a conventional role when the Iximhing of Hanoi was resinned in December 1972. capability at the level of the coercive at IN MY OPINION 79 tempt, the nation would be faced with a or not to provide replacement airframes decidedly unpleasant choice: either accept from among its own resources must have the additional costs involved in escalating represented a far more difficult choice. More national military response to the next higher to the point, consider the United States’ level of capability available in the national dilemma had it been the primary actor in tactical inventory or simply allow the coer an equivalent tactical situation where the cion to proceed. The grim relevance of tac issues at stake were less than vital. In either tical economics in this regard has recently situation the resulting proposition is un been demonstrated in the fall of Cambodia. compromisingly straightforward: any time A significant factor in the decision to termi an enemy elects to test a discontinuity that nate U.S. military aid to the Khmer Re has been allowed to develop in the spectrum public was the expense involved. Saigon suf of United States tactical deterrence, that fered the same fate for similar reasons. As nation must choose whether deliberately to for these latter types of gap, the Arab-Israeli escalate its response to compensate or to war of October 1973 is perhaps the best re abandon whatever interests are involved.23 cent example. The air arm of the Israeli De An austere environment tends further to fense Forces (id f ), although vastly superior compound this sort of dilemma. It is con to its opposition by virtually every qualitative ceivable that the element of choice may be measure, was nonetheless limited in the total taken away entirely; lead time/response quantity of its resources. Faced with a nu time ratios are presently so great that the merically overwhelming Soviet-assisted Arab misjudgments and miscalculations of today attack, Israeli Air Force leadership delib may well prove impossible to recoup tomor erately and characteristically chose largely row. Such missteps must be anticipated to ignore Arab counterair efforts in favor of early, so that timely action may be taken to providing close air support to the Israeli prevent them. For tactical air forces in times army.19 of peace, this anticipatory responsibility logically devolves upon the long-term plan Furthermore, the idf had been slow to develop ning function. countersystems for Arab/Soviet (air defense) So the argument has come full circle, weapon systems which, as a result, proved so successful during this latest war.20 from long-term planning through tactical economics to continuity of effort and back to The id f lost a total of 115 aircraft during the long-term planning again. What seems to 18-day war, including nearly one quarter be required is an approach to tactical air of their tactical strike forces—losses they force development that is at once broad could ill afford.21 The Arabs, on the other enough in scope to include all three problems hand, with the help of massive Soviet aid simultaneously and carefully balanced so and materiel assistance, felt nowhere near that each is maintained in proper perspec the same proportional impact, although they tive relative to the other two. suffered an exchange ratio that would make a rational man cringe.22 From the Israeli point of view, of course, Some Suggestions the October War involved national survival; Although the following considerations in accordingly, the decision to accept what volved in the design of capable and effective ever losses would be necessary was a fore tactical air forces are necessarily presented gone conclusion. From the United States’ as relatively distinct sets of recommenda position, however, the question of whether tions, each set interacts with the others to a 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW considerable degree. One must therefore take inflation, increasing personnel costs, and care to keep in mind that, like the problems budget cuts on total military purchasing to which they relate, these sets of sugges power remain uncorrected while our oppo tions constitute a system in the sense that nents’ military expenditures continue to in a change in any one area affects the remain crease, the avoidance of duplication of ing two. development effort will soon become a mat ter of vital national concern. Under such circumstances, Department of Defense-wide long-term planning considerations coordination of the research and develop ment efforts of the several services and civil In peacetime, advance planning constitutes ian industry should be strongly advised. If, the primary way of deciding what tactical as was suggested earlier, the impact of air forces of the future should be and what diminishing funds is allowed to fall pri they should be able to do. During periods marily on tactical forces, this sort of total of inaction, a coordinated, centrally di interdepartmental coordination would be rected program for progressive and sys most critically needed at a tactical level. tematic improvement of tactical air capa In anticipation of such a need, it would bilities is vital. What is needed is an approach perhaps be prudent now to establish formal that centers around deriving maximum utili interservice coordination channels at De ty from our present force structure while partment of Defense level, designed to preserving adequate research and develop enable selection of the best products from ment options for the uncertain future (es among a wide variety of research efforts sentially, Lewis-and-Clark planning). The for further development. As such selection ongoing dialogue between Tactical Air should properly be based on detailed threat Command and the Army’s Training and analysis and the projected shape of future Doctrine Command is a firm step in the defense policy, appropriate intelligence right direction. While the United States agencies and national leadership should be presently enjoys a significant technological included in the coordination process. De advantage over its potential opponents, in velopment of new capabilities with the in order to maximize the positive effects of herent flexibility to meet a wide variety of this advantage both developmental guidance potential threats could thus be systematically and a performance yardstick are required. integrated with the advanced employment In the absence of actual warfare as a stimu concepts under which they would eventually lus, a combination of conceptual thought, operate. Grand strategy, operational doc doctrine, and accurate threat analysis must trine, and new equipment could be devel be relied upon to supply both. Such an oped concurrently. If care were taken not to effort would necessarily involve the following stifle creativity, such a procedure would be specific considerations. far more productive than the reactive adap • First, a new approach to research tation of strategy and doctrine to a com and development is needed. To provide an bination of political events and the results adequate number of options, substantial of an unguided research and development funding of decentralized, across-the-board program. (Figure 2) If this new approach military research is essential.24 Yet the were implemented, the position that con United States cannot presently afford to cepts, doctrine, and threat analysis would pursue indiscriminately all of the options occupy in the developmental cycle is sug so provided. Should the adverse effects of gested in Figure 3. IN MY orI MON 81 • Second, great care must be taken • Third, assurance of long-term con to maintain technology in its proper rela sistency in tactical research and develop tion to other planning factors. Although ment is imperative. If necessary, sacrifice essential, technology is not a panacea. The of some degree of present and short-term best possible system in terms of present future capability must be accepted in order state of the art is ineffectual if the nation to insure adequate and continuous funding can afford to purchase only one ol them. in this area.0 Such purposeful dedication to Conversely, outdated and noncompetitive a relatively intangible objective will require systems are equally useless, no matter how considerable discipline on the part of plan great their numbers. Thus it is imperative ners and allocaters of funds, but the impor to strike close to an optimum balance be tance of such consistency cannot be over tween quality and quantity so that future emphasized. Loss of U.S. technological tactical air forces will combine individual supremacy spells defeat in far more certain terms than does a temporary deficiency in present tactical capability. • Finally, greater emphasis must be placed on threat analysis and anticipation of probable enemy developments and capa bilities. This emphasis should extend well into the area of opponents’ military phi- * In particular, long-term commitment must be given to the area of alter nate energy source research. Energy constraints are presently the greatest single limitation to the effectiveness of tactical air forces. CO CO © S> P Co3 Q© , %% Figure 2 (left). Event-motivated cycle of cause and effect o ^ / N '*e'">e ^'Ch Scientific Figure 3 (below). The place of concepts, doctrine, Event and threat analysis in the cause and effect cycle governing political poM'ca' conditions even' system capability with the strengths of ade 1 quate numbers and efficiency. Particular / \ 5> E« Concepts. 0) o *< 3 care must be devoted to the avoidance of £ to doctrine. o > threat — ~ losophy and grand strategy. In particular, to those anticipatable, if not predictable, attention should be given to understanding changes in behavior.25 and taking advantage of the Soviet military If tactical threat analysts can become suffi decision-making process. As Secretary ciently adept at this adaptation process, Schlesinger observed, perhaps the very way in which future tac More allowance can be made in future work tical weapon systems are developed could be for the alteration over time of opponents’ structured to produce costly and inefficient objectives and strategies (partially in response responses on the part of our opponents, to our own moves) and for our own adaptation thereby reducing their total military capa- 82 IN MY OPINION 83 bilitv while preserving for the United States 25-year retention of both the F-15 and the both initiative and a multioption national F - lll should be anticipated (again, barring strategy. a technological breakthrough). • Second, with the HI end of the mix tactical economics thus secured, the long-term area of concern should be LO-end capability, with the ob As tactical forces have little advance indi jective being several dependable, proven cation of where or under what conditions delivery systems that can be adapted as they may be employed, necessity drives necessary to provide employment flexi them toward more flexible capabilities. Yet bility at moderate cost. (In effect, a state- the increasing scarcity of resources avail able to their operation, maintenance, and of-the-art MiG-21. Perhaps the F-16 and replacement dictates economizing. These the A-10 will be able to satisfy these condi conflicting requirements can only be re tions if their lifetime unit costs do not in solved by creating a balanced force within crease appreciably.) which the individual elements are mutu • Third, expanded utilization of vari ally supporting and play multiple roles. A ous exposure-reducing devices is advisable wide qualitative and quantitative range of in view of increasing enemy air defense tactical weapon systems that reinforce one capability. Examples are standoff weapon another can in fact produce a sort of syner systems, guided munitions, and improved gistic effect where capability is multiplied target-detection devices.26 The goal should by virtue of flexibility; this is the idea be be a night, all-weather, precision target- hind the HI-LO mix concept. At present locating and ordnance-delivery capability. this concept appears to be most promising. Not only can attrition be expected to be Care must be taken, however, to preclude less under these conditions but the lack of the LO end of the mix from becoming so such a capability constitutes a limitation expensive or few in number that its em to the employment of tactical air forces ployment in support of less-than-vital na second only to energy constraints. tional objectives cannot be risked. From this • Finally, overcommitment to any basic consideration follow certain specific single option or scenario must be studiously recommendations: avoided. Remotely piloted vehicles, air borne warning and control systems, remotely • First, tactical air force leadership piloted re-entry vehicles, electronic coun should strongly advocate a maximum initial termeasures, and the improved navigation purchase of F-15 airframes. Despite its ex and communications systems presently in pense, it appears to be the only aircraft that development—all should be employed in has the performance characteristics and combinations to help increase total tactical sophistication necessary to support the HI air capability while keeping LO-end cost end of U.S. counterair forces, a considera to a minimum. The central consideration tion that more than justifies its price. The for design and operation of tactical air forces F-15 can be expected to remain competi must continue to be the maintenance of a tive in the tactical air environment at least credible, broadly capable deterrent force in until the turn of the century (barring a spite of diminishing resources. major technological breakthrough), and the present opportunity to procure airframes is continuity o f effort unlikely to recur. In view of the national economic and political climate, a 15- to At the risk of ending on a pessimistic note, 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW one must conclude that the question of how suggestions are intended not to provide tactical air forces are to maintain a con answers but to serve as warning: tinuous and responsive deterrent capability (1) The destructive effect of steady reduc has no easy answer. Discontinuities and tions in available resources may for a time shortfalls are inevitable when the philoso be offset by such intangibles as skill, in phy of doing more with less is carried too genuity, foresight, and perception. Thus a far. To make matters worse, the United systematic effort to stimulate conceptual States has repeatedly exhibited a distressing innovation at all levels of the tactical air tendency to rest on its technological laurels force organization is indicated. Necessary in military matters. Yet it would be a fatal adjuncts to such an effort would be the mistake to relax and accept trends that ap opening of new and meaningful channels pear inevitable, particularly in view of our of communication and use of advanced opponents’ greatly increased activities in management techniques. Recent develop recent years. Accordingly, the following ments in the management field make such IN MY OPINION 85 a program seem entirely feasible. In addi gle that incorporates elements of politics, tion to the many promising applications of diplomacy, economics, and ideology in addi systems analysis in technological forecast tion to military power. Moreover, the future ing,27 at least one technique has already is likely to become conceptually oriented been developed that reduces creative gen to an increasing degree—an environment eration of new concepts to an orderly and characterized by subtle interplay of in easily understood procedure, a procedure tangible forces, where wars may be won that can be taught in a classroom.28 or lost without ever being fought. In such (2) Wars of the future are almost certain an environment tactical deterrence becomes to become increasingly politicized with the a long-term consideration, requiring explicit passing of time while remaining essentially allowance for such varied contingencies as tactical in character. Victories will seldom, attrition at various rates and under varying if ever, be decisive; at best they will be circumstances, enemy technological break phase points in a larger international strug throughs, and wars in several places simul- "Remotely piloted vehicles [below, mounted for launching from a C-130], air- borne warning and control systems [left], remotely piloted re-entry vehicles, electronic countermeasures, ami improved navigation and communications systems . . . all should be employed in combinations to help increase total tactical air capability while keeping LO-end cost to a minimum." 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIAW taneously. These are challenging proposi ing present adverse military, economic, and tions, to be sure, but they must be faced technological trends in terms of this rela squarely if U.S. tactical air forces are to tively long-term view, one could conclude remain a meaningful factor in the inter that the outlook for United States tactical national equation. air forces is far from auspicious. Reversal of (3) Tactical air planners and analysts must these trends will require articulate, logical, recognize that the central problem facing and convincing advocacy of a realistic long tactical air forces during prolonged periods term national security policy, one that ex of inaction and scarce resources does not plicitly recognizes the importance of tac consist merely of individual requirements tical deterrence in the complex environment and capabilities competing for meager of international politics. funds but is instead the maintenance of a Such a profound change in national per total, integrated, continuous tactical deter spective cannot be accomplished overnight, rent capability across the broadest possible nor can it be brought about by the efforts of spectrum of potential threats. Because the Air Force leadership alone. In a very funda present military environment in the United mental sense the fate of United States tacti States is austere, we cannot afford to spend cal air forces lies in the hands of those indi even a small amount of our available limited viduals who collectively comprise them. resources in vain. In this world of accelerat Those who are most intimately concerned ing change, parochialism equates to failure; with tactical air forces and who best realize let us not be guilty of building an aerospace the magnitude of the issues involved must equivalent of the Maginot Line. themselves take the longer view and com municate it to national policy-makers and to the American public. Concurrently, T aken together, the problems and sugges these same individuals must undertake to tions presented in this analysis indicate the sustain U.S. tactical air capability at the need for a radical change in national per highest possible level, holding at bay the spective. As was previously observed, the debilitating effects of inaction and austerity. United States has an unfortunate history of It is a profound commitment and a heavy complacency during times of peace, and it burden. Robert Frank Futrell expressed it would be all too easy to forget that the well in his conclusion to Ideas, Concepts, present superiority of United States tactical Doctrine: air forces is the product of past commit ment—a sustained and dedicated effort . . . men who believed and thought and lived driven by a decade of continuous warfare. in terms of air power were the makers of the modern Air Force. . . . Without a similar be So to forget would be the gravest of errors. lief and thought and dedication to aerospace It is the peculiar nature of our rapidly chang power on the part of the men and women of ing world that actions taken today will de the modern United States Air Force, the fu termine the fate of the United States per ture survival of the United States could well haps ten or twenty years hence. Consider be in jeopardy. Air Command and Staff College Notes (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense /Public Affairs), I. James R. Schlesinger. Address before the Economic Chib of New York January 22, 1975. IN MY OPINION 87 2. Henrv A. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, abridged ed 11. Alternative Future World Context, pp. 1-2. (New York: W. W, Norton. 1969). p. 24. 12. James R. Schlesingcr, Selected Papers on National Security, 1964-1968 3. Lieutenant Colonel Edward O. Stillie. Tactical Air Employment-Current (Santa Monica. California: The RAND Corporation, September 1974, P-5284). Status and Future Objectives.** .Air University Review. November-December 13 Ibid . p. 58. 1967. pp 50-61. Colonel William L. Cray. The Case for Combining SAC and 14. Ibid., p. 24. TAC i Maxwell AFB, .Alabama. Air University. March 1957). p. 20: Colonel 15. Ibid., p. 25. Anas L. Hiipert, Do We Seed a Tactical Air Command? (Maxwell .AFB. Ala 16. Reed, p. 9. bama: Air University. March 1957). pp. 28-29. 17 Ibid., p. 15. 4. Eugene Rabinowitch, Atomic Weapons and the Korean W'ar. Bulletin o f 18. Ibid., pp. 10-12. Atomic Scientists. July 1950, p. 194 ff. 19. "SA -6 Effectiveness ui Mideast War 'Exaggerated,* House Panel Says/’ 5. Kissinger, p. 39. Aerospace Daily, 14 December 1973, p. 243. 6. Stefan T Possony and J. E. Poumelle. The Strategy of Technology Win 20. Kenneth S. Brower. ‘The Yom Kippur War." Military Review, March ning the Decisive War (Cambndge. Massachusetts: University Press of Cam 1974. p. 33. bridge. Inc., 1970). pp. 11-12. 21. Ibid , pp. 25. 26. 7. Alternative Future World Contexts: Phase l Report to an Improved Ap- 22. "Egyptians Say Their SA-6s Are Primitive’ Compared to Russia's.” proach to Att Force Long Range Planning, U5AF Directorate of Doctrine. Con Aerospace Daily, 18 December 1973, p. 261. cepts and Objectives, DCS/Plans and Operations. Washington, D.C.. 1 August 23. Reed. p. 25. 1974 hereafter cited as Alternative Future World Contexts). 24. Schlesinger,. Selected Papers, p. 125. 8 IbuL pp. 9-10. 25. Ibid., p. 35. 9. Colonel Robert H. Reed. The Six Man Croup'. CSAF Six Man C roup W hite 26. William P Schlitz, "Aerospace World," Air Force Magazine, March 1975, Paper on Deterrence. Maxwell .AFB, Alabama. 21 November 1974 This white P 25 paper, in somewhat abridged form, appeared as "On Deterrence: A Broadened 27. Major Joseph P. Martino. 'Forecasting the Progress of Technology,” Perspective” m .Air University Revtew. May-June 1975. pp. 2-17 Air Umierxift/ Review. March-April 1969, pp. 18-19. 10. Lt. Gen. Otto J. Classer. “Shaping the Future." Air University Review, 28. Colonel W. H. Wise, The Future o f the Tactical Air Force and Its Em- November-December 1970. p. 4. ployment, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Air University, February 1948. MANAGEMENT BY OB)ECTIVES Can It Be Used To Im prove Management of A ir Force Units? M ajor David VV. K rahenbuhl UCH has been written about a man right, mbo can encompass any goal-setting M agement technique called Manage procedure, from a highly structured cor ment by Objectives (mbo ). mbo has been porate profit-target system to an individual’s suggested as a management system by which unstructured career plan. to organize the sprawling bureaucracy of the federal government. Management by MBO defined Objectives programs are presently being used in many corporations involving thou This article will use the term “Manage sands of people and billions of dollars worth ment by Objectives” to refer to a structured of assets.1 This widespread use of mbo is management technique of setting goals for causing more and more military managers any organizational unit. George S. Odiorne, to ask how this technique can be related to in his book Management by Objectives, de their own units and their management prob fined this concept as “a system of manage lems. Consequently, a relevant question for ment whereby the superior and subordinate all Air Force managers has evolved: Can jointly identify objectives, define individual Management by Objectives be used to im major areas of responsibility in terms of re prove the management of Air Force units? sults expected, and use these objectives and In my opinion, the answer is definitely expected results as guides for operating the yes. The purpose of this article is to sub unit and assessing the contribution of each stantiate the answer in detail. of its members.” 2 Examining a few key words will ensure better understanding of Odiorne’s definition What Is MBO? How Does It Work? of Management by Objectives. First, he No wonder so many people are confused points out that mbo is a “system of manage —Management by Objectives covers a wide ment,” an overall framework used to guide spectrum of thought. When speaking of the organizational unit and outline its direc mbo , one person may be discussing a sys tion. Then he points out that “the superior tem to manage the federal government and subordinate jointly identify objectives ; while another may think of mbo as the in other words, it is a participative manage process by which an individual sets personal ment procedure that requires commitment development goals. They would both be and cooperation. Third, the definition deals 88 IN MY OPINION 89 with identifying the “results” that are ex result areas, writing objectives, and ne pected; thus mbo concentrates on the output gotiating with the boss. of the organization, evaluating people by First, the manager must identify the key assessing their contribution to this output. result areas of responsibility that are as signed to this unit.4 In other words, just as the MBO process the commander reviewed the whole organi zation in order to set organizational objec To understand how mbo can be applied, it tives, the manager reviews his part of the is necessary to look at the parts of the pro organization in order to set his objectives. cess. mbo can be divided into multiple steps It is important for the individual office or in many combinations, but for the purpose shop manager to identify the areas of his of this article three steps will be discussed: unit where most of the results are obtained. organization objective setting, manager He will usually find that 20 percent of his objective setting, and objective review. area of responsibility will produce 80 per Organization Objective Setting. This step cent of his results. It is important that he requires the top managers of an organiza identify and zero in on these key result tion to review the purpose for which the areas for mbo to be effective. organization exists. In the military, this may After a manager has identified his key require a review of the mission statement areas of responsibility, he is ready to sit and a discussion of its meaning. This is an down and write his objectives. The main cri important requirement, for periodic review teria that he should remember in writing ob re-emphasizes the continuing need for the jectives are that they should be specific, existence of the organization. With this mis measurable, realistic, and results-oriented. ’ sion in mind, the commander or supervisor They should be specific in that there can be and his staff must then set organizational no confusion about what is expected. They objectives in areas where the unit will con must be measurable for later accountability. centrate its efforts during the approaching They must be realistic but still challenging. objective-setting period. These objectives The objectives should be results-oriented, are (1) to provide direction to the entire concentrating on the output of the organi organization and (2) to provide guidelines zation and not on its internal activities or for subordinate-level managers to formulate procedures. their objectives.3 As a result of this organi .After the manager’s objectives have been zational objective-setting step. Air Force written, he enters the participative man managers should realize that a mission state agement phase of this technique. The sub ment is a goal that defines the continuing ordinate manager sits down with his boss purpose of an organization. That mission and they agree on the subordinate’s objec statement, however, does not define specific tives. This requires a realistic commitment methods of accomplishing the goal stated. on the part of both individuals. The agree mbo helps formulate these specific methods ment on the objective signifies the approval that are necessary to accomplish the mis of the expected results (output) required of sion. the subordinate. Progress toward these re Manager Objective Setting. Each individ sults can now be pursued by the subordinate ual manager (e.g., oic, ncoic) in the organi until the requirement is reached or the zation must now determine the objectives goal is changed. for his shop or office. This procedure takes Objective Review. After the setting of place in three general steps: identifying key objectives has been agreed upon by the of 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ficer or nco manager and his boss, the stage a military environment with military man is set for managing by these objectives. This agers should help answer these questions. managing process is the responsibility of the subordinate manager, and it is interrupted authoritative vs. participative management only by mutually arranged, formal review sessions with the commander. In other The military organization is developed on a words, mbo requires that each individual framework of authoritative management. have the freedom to perform a well-defined The Uniform Code of Military Justice pro task without interference. vides the vehicle for a commander to take There are two types of objective reviews precise disciplinary action in situations —intermediate and final.6 The purpose of involving his subordinates. Uniforms and the intermediate review is to determine ranks are always clearly visible to the sub progress and identify problems that stand ordinate, constantly reminding him of his in the way of accomplishing objectives. position in this authoritative structure. Such Most problems are not foreseeable at the examples are numerous, and each seems to time objectives are written; they appear indicate that an authoritative style of man only when action is taken to accomplish agement would be the only style that could the objectives. The result of this intermediate exist in this military environment. session should be either to agree on a plan However, the military manager accom that resolves the blockage of objective ac plishes his mission like any other manager— complishment or to change the objectives. by adjusting his style of management to a The final review is to determine objective given situation. The vast variety of man accomplishment. In this session the sub agement situations in the Air Force natural ordinate’s objectives are reviewed for the ly calls for different management styles, entire period. In addition, the session con and today’s modern, sophisticated leaders centrates on the renewal of the objective are adjusting to this need. For example, a setting cycle by establishing a basis from fighter squadron probably would not be which to plan the objectives for the next managed with the same techniques as a period. The superior gains an additional headquarters staff office. Thus it is recog benefit from this session since it provides nized that, even though the Air Force func him with inputs on which to evaluate the tions within an authoritative framework, re subordinate’s performance." If the focus of quirements for other management styles do the session is on the objectives and it does exist and are being used. Therefore, a man not break down into personal recrimination agement style such as the participative style of the individual, then the review will be a of mbo can be adapted to many of these true appraisal of performance, not per military situations. sonality. Definition of Output. .Another major is sue in applying mbo to a military situation is the definition of output.8 It may be argued that the ultimate output of any military or Can M BO Adapt to the Military ganization cannot be quantified—How do Environment? you measure the utility of national de Now that the mbo process has been re fense? Even though the output of some mili viewed, questions of specific, military ap tary organizations cannot be easily mea plication may still exist. An examination of sured, the requirement for objectives is the major issues in applying this process to still evident. IN MY OPINION 91 For example, a staff office responsible for mbo program is the creation of a subordi formulating policy will have an ultimate nate-centered participative management effect on the mission, even though this ef atmosphere. Such an atmosphere must con fect is difficult to measure. This does not sciously and diligently be created by the detract from the need to establish meaning boss. However, this does not mean that the ful objectives. Such an objective might be boss relinquishes control of his subordinates. to review a unit’s training policy and to Participation is defined as “mental and emo make any necessary changes within 60 days. tional involvement of a person in a group Bv setting such a precise objective, defini situation which encourages him to contribute tion would have been given to the unit’s to group goals and share responsibility in output. them.” 9 This mental and emotional in Dynamic Atmosphere. One of the key volvement does not usurp power from the principles upon which the Air Force is chain of command. founded is flexibility. The ability to change Commitment: The atmosphere desired and adapt is a key to the accomplishment for mbo is built from mutual trust and com of the Air Force mission. Can a manage mitment. Subordinates must be given the ment system of structured objectives exist opportunity to formulate their own objec in the dynamic atmosphere of the Air Force tives. Objectives that are forced upon them without reducing this flexibility? The an by well-meaning bosses will not insure the swer is emphatically yes, because, in an subordinate commitment that is necessary environment of continual change, planning to accomplish the program successfully. and direction become even more important Integrity: In addition, this atmosphere than in other management situations. If requires that there be complete integrity these management techniques are not used, in the superior-subordinate communications the situation soon deteriorates into one of regarding the formulation of subordinate strictly reactionary management. A reaction objectives. There can be no changes of ob ary situation, where managing is done by jectives or objective-measuring systems demands of the in-basket and telephone, without the agreement of both the superior completely ignores the results that are re and subordinate. In other words, mbo dic quired of an organization. Furthermore, re tates that there can be no surprises or mis actionary management gives little evaluation understandings about the original meaning of the activities pursued and gives few indi of objectives when they are reviewed for cations of their importance to the output. accomplishment at the end of the mbo cycle.10 How Can MBO Be Implemented Education. Thorough knowledge of mbo in an Air Force Unit? theory and methods is ultimately important for all participants. If education is con It is evident, then, that the basic concept fined to a flashy handout or a superficial of the mbo technique is simple—deceptively briefing, the mbo program will fail. Time simple. Implementing the technique is far and effort are needed to discuss the impli from being simple. Organizational managers cations of the program thoroughly and to must be aware of some essential require then practice the skills that are required. ments of mbo to assure a successful imple Objective writing, objective setting, and mentation. objective reviewing all demand a learning Setting the Mood. The most important process and a practice session before appli ingredient in the implementation of a unit cation to a real situation. All of this takes 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW time and trouble. Even though the demands time varies, depending upon the degree of of mbo education are taxing, commitment change required in the supervisor’s manage to thorough knowledge and training for the ment style, the difficulty of creating the entire unit will be rewarded in time saved participative atmosphere, etc. Patience and and results achieved in the operation of a commitment to mbo will be needed. successful Management by Objectives pro Changing the Guard. What happens gram. when one or more of the top supervisors Administration. Assistance must be avail are rotated? mbo can actually be a benefit able during the implementation of the pro in this situation. New supervisors should be gram. Air Force managers are already busy, required to operate under their predeces so the administrative procedures of the pro sor’s objectives for a few months until they gram must be kept to a minimum. get their feet on the ground. Then, after mbo Monitors: Young officers with re they are properly trained, they can sit down cent management training could help ad with the boss and negotiate their own objec minister the program by filling the role of tives. This procedure promotes continuity mbo advisers or specialists. Operating at within the unit and cuts down on the “new various levels within the organization, they regime’’ concept. could monitor and coordinate the entire Tailor-Made Management. One of mbo ’s program. Since one of the most important principal advantages is that it can be tailored elements of efficient administration of an to fit units of different sizes and composi mbo program is adhering closely to the time tions. Exactly how the program is de schedule, these specialists could assure that signed is an individual decision, depending the commander’s agenda was met by all upon a unit’s circumstances. participants. For example, one decision to be reached Minimal Paperwork: Objectives are a is the frequency of objective reviews. The personal agreement between superior and time between review sessions will depend subordinate; no one else needs a copy of on the dynamics of the management situa these objectives. In fact, the objectives may tion. The greater the potential for changes be handwritten. Managers should not get in the management environment, the shorter caught in the usual red tape of administra the review period will need to be. Quarterly tion. reviews appear to be ideal in many manage Few Objectives: One of the best ways to ment situations, although some military keep administration procedures to a mini managers feel that monthly reviews will be mum is to concentrate only on a few ob required for their particular organization. jectives. Remember that objectives are As with all other aspects of mbo , one may improvement goals and should not be choose the most pragmatic approach to fit formulated for each routine responsibility; his unit situation. objectives should concentrate on the key Human Relations Problems. The imple results desired. mentation of mbo will meet with the normal Length o f Time To Implement. Imple resistance to change that greets any new mentation of this management procedure proposal. In addition, probably the most will require patience from the commander. serious problem that the manager will face Overnight results are not to be expected. is the feeling from some subordinates that It takes several mbo cycles to firmly estab mbo is a manipulative device. These sub lish this program and in some cases to pro ordinates will feel that mbo exists to de duce realistic objectives. Implementation mand greater output from them. If the IN MY OPINION 93 superior is insensitive to this reaction and ress toward obtaining desired objectives does not dispel it in the objective-setting in key areas of responsibility. A fourth ad session, then he can only expect low-per vantage lies in the fact that Management formance objectives from these individuals. by Objectives aids in the performance Where To Begin. At what level of the evaluation of individual supervisors. This organization does mbo start? The answer is technique concentrates on performance at any level. The only requirement to start criteria for evaluation rather than on be an mbo program in a specific unit is agree havioral trait criteria. ment with the boss.11 There is no demand Even with these advantages, mbo must be that any other level above the initiating of examined realistically. This technique is fice implement a program first. If all higher not a panacea for all management ills; it military echelons need an mbo program will not solve all of management’s problems. before the lower level unit can begin, the In addition, successful mbo implementation program will be greatly delayed, mbo can is not easy. It requires that the manager really be started at any level within the understand sophisticated, modem manage organization. ment theory. He must be able to create a participative management atmosphere within his organization in order for mbo to W hat .are the real advantages of Manage operate, mbo definitely requires commit ment by Objectives in an Air Force organi ment from the participants. Conclusively, zation? First, mbo improves planning. It mbo is a welding technique that joins per requires that an organization and its super sonnel-centered management to results- visors think ahead. Second, it directs the centered management. activity of the organization toward the de Considering these elements, can Manage sired output, mbo ties the individual ef ment by Objectives be used to improve forts of the unit's personnel to the defined management of Air Force units? The au objectives of the organization. Third, it thor’s answer is yes, but the ultimate answer increases communication within the organi to that question can only come from Air zation. It requires that the superior and the Force managers. subordinate periodically discuss their prog Air Command and Staff College No«« AFB, New Mexico; AFCMD. 30 August 1974), pp. 3-5. I EPD Leads the Thirteen 'Most Popular' Management Techniques." 6. Stephen J. Carroll. Jr., and Henry L Tosi, Jr.. Management by Objectives. Administrative Management. June 1973, p. 25. Applications and Research (New' York; Macmillan, 1973), p. 89. Z George S Odioroe. Management fey Objectives (New York Pitman. 1965). 7. Ibid., p. 112. p. 55. 8 Keith Davis. Hunuin Behavior at Work, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill. T Peter F Drucker. The Practice of Management New York: Harper and 1972), p. 136 Row, 1954). p 63. 9. AFCMD 17H-2, pp. 3-15. 4 G 1 Morrisev Management fey Objectives anti Results (Reading. Massa 10 Richardson J. Johnson, “Management by Objectives—a Proven Method chusetts: Addison-Wesley. 1970). p. 21. of Reaching Agreement." AF Civil Engineer. August 1973, p. 15. 5. Pamphlet. AFCMD 175-2. "Management by Objectives/Results" (Kirtland 11. Ihui We fight, get heat, rise, and fight again. G en er a l Nathanael Greene (1780) Struggle, get defeated, struggle again . . . M ao Tse-tunc (1960) SURPRISING VIEWS FROM THE FAR EAST LEFT B rigadier Gen er a l Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret ) This is one of a series of commentaries on theories and assumptions that dominated American military policy during the 1%0s. The first of the series appeared fourteen years ago in the Air University Quarterly Review With only two exceptions, all have been published in its successor, the Air University Review. Most of these commen taries were based on books selected by the Review Editor. Some of the books that served as the basis for these essays, such as The Troubled Alliance by the then obscure Dr. Henry Kissinger, have become landmark volumes in the history of our troubled years since 1960. The most recent and lengthy review of the military policies of the period was based on The Roots of War by the increasingly prominent radical writer and researcher Richard J. Barnet. Within these somewhat bookish commentaries, my views, experiences, and conclu sions were carefully mingled with those of other writers. This was a successful maneuver to avoid the heavy censorship of military opinion that began in early 1961 with the suppression, for several months, of an entire issue of the old Quarterly Re- view which had previously been cleared for publication. Despite the obvious handi caps resulting from such censorship, and occasional penalties, there were advantages. The difficult form of the book review-essay required the citation of various sources of information and opinion, some of which were disagreeable. The practice of exam- 94 ining a variety of sources continues to be useful, even in the relatively free atmosphere of today. Several years have passed since emancipation from doctrinal orthodoxy, yet we re main muted by a pall of discouragement that covers the memory of our fatally com promised efforts in Vietnam. The few who have attempted an examination of our recent failures as the first step to a more fortunate future find that their work arouses little interest. Never was there greater need for research and analysis of military policy or less inspiration to perform the task. Nonetheless, since the lessons of failure can be as useful as the memory of success, all clues to understanding, from whatever source, must now be considered. At this moment we may find the most useful as well as the most disturbing revela tions among the voluminous writings of a few dedicated radicals who have dug dili gently among the ruins and records of our once grandiose plans. As they tirelessly exhume the doomed hopes of our late leaders, they are often as keenly analytical as experienced accident investigators at the scene of a still-smoking crash. N. F. p. F OUR numerous academic radicals, upon a wary public. His knowledge of the O a few have achieved distinction for internal power struggles of China made him their thoroughness in diagnosing our recent curious about those of the Pentagon and military maladies and relating them to pres White House, and he went to work with a sures at home and abroad. Among them, sort of Asiatic detachment. Professor Franz Schurmann of the Univer It is not necessary to agree with Schur- sity of California at Berkeley is the best in mann’s rather foreign political notions to formed and perhaps the most talented. His appreciate the depth and breadth of his recent book, The Logic o f World Power,} research. It was not confined to the Penta is as ungainly as its title, but its disorganized gon Papers but extended to numerous “right- content, once digested, proves him a master wing” and military writings as well as dissectionist of our suffering souls. Beside Asian and especially Chinese sources, in him, the McNamara apologists who con which he is a recognized scholar. Unfor cocted the Pentagon Papers were but clumsy tunately for his readers, Schurmann is Pro amateurs. fessor of Sociology as well as of History. Schurmann seems to have combed with He accepts some of the disciplines of his his teeth the massive twelve volumes of tory and shows respect for facts and events, these papers over a period of at least two but he roams all too freely over the un years. He was pushed into this labor by an fenced field of sociology. Most reviewers, editor who first asked him to write a less- even among his radical cohorts, chose the lengthy analysis and then rejected it. Schur easy way out by questioning his theories mann readily admitted that the subject mat and ignoring his sometimes tedious but often ter was too complex for such arbitrary and convincing analysis of many inescapable shallow interpretations as had been inflicted facts. f Franz Schurmann, The Logic o f World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions o f World Politics (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974, $15.00), xxvii and 593 pages. 95 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Reading the book is recommended only One “deep, dark secret was not openly to those who can spare a fortnight. Instead, talked about even in the secret Pentagon reading the following capsules is suggested, Papers,” though it was announced by the along with the pages indicated for those North Vietnamese. This was McNamara’s who are curious as to Schurmann’s sup removing the Pacific commander in Hono porting arguments or data. The capsules lulu from the chain of command and trying are assembled under headings in the form to run the war directly from Washington, of questions. Quotes are used liberally be making it for a while “McNamara’s war, cause Schurmann’s wording is often skillful, . . . politically, bureaucratically, and or and some statements are so unexpected ganizationally.” (pp. 469-70) that they should be read as written. For “McNamara’s entire policy within the simplification, the nonquotes are summaries Defense Department was designed to con of Schurmann, while my comments that tain the military, and centralizing control are otherwise unidentified are set in italic in his own hands was his means of doing type. that. . . . T h e Pentagon Papers are his story, with the exuberant period of ‘Mc Why Were the Pentagon Papers Written? Namara’s War’ played down and the later periods of disenchantment highlighted.” Thus question is usually evaded hy citing “his- (p- 476) tory' as the motive, but the Papers are as much “The Pentagon Papers, one must remem interpretation as history. It has been said that ber, were commissioned by McNamara as a Secretary McNamara inadvertently “bugged” history of the war from his perspective. That himself with documents instead of tapes. One perspective, by and large shared by the au theory, previously mentioned in this series. has thors, was that of the office of the Secretary them authorized originally for selective use in an expected campaign for the presidency which of Defense, . . . The Papers basically try to would involve members o f the Kennedy family explain the presidential policy of securing and possibly McNamara hirtuself. While Schur- South Vietnam through American ground mann mentions no such motivation, some o f his combat troops." (p. 475) comments are interesting in that connection. “The study [Pentagon Papers) does not Did Military Leaders Advocate report on the actual operations of the American Ground Forces for Vietnam? [covert warfare] units during the Kennedy Most “explanations ' of the Pentagon Papers years,” and the Papers are “exceedingly represented them as loaded with immoral murky about the period just before and af schemes and rated “X also for violence. ter the Kennedy assassination.” (pp. 454, Little distinction was made between military 455) and nonmilitary performances in the totally One section of the Papers is devoted to evil drama. Schurmann is more perceptive. recurring plans for “phased withdrawal” of some of the more than 15,000 advisers in The top-level and decisive Honolulu con troduced under Kennedy. That such plans ference of early June 1964 was more thor indicated a move toward disengagement by oughly reported in the press than in the Kennedy is “simply the opinion of the author Pentagon Papers, which are confused as to of that section of the Pentagon Papers.” All the date. The Papers do record, however, wi thdrawal plans were accom panied by plans that both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, for the introduction of more American and the Commander, Military Assistance planes and air personnel, (p. 447) Command/Vietnam, (General William West BOOKS AND IDEAS 97 moreland) opposed an increase in the num Rusk.” One week later a Johnson speech ber of military advisers in the field. A prin proposed a vast new foreign aid program cipal reason for their opposition, which was for all of Indochina including North Viet overruled, was “the inevitable increase in nam. This was in the “finest tradition of the U.S. casualties.” (p. 485) containment current.” The speech also im In November 1964 “The jcs [Joint Chiefs plied that “Moscow could or should put of Staff], for their own reasons, sought to pressure on Hanoi to accept American avoid a commitment of ground forces to terms, a line espoused by Rusk. The carrot Vietnam and argued instead for punitive air held out a little over a month later was and naval actions.” (p. 434) This statement the bombing halt, and the corollary of that is quoted directly from the Department of was an intensive ground effort to secure Defense edition o f the Pentagon Papers, South Vietnam.” (pp. 496-97) TV.C.A.(c), p. 37. Note the typical editorial- There was no heavy pressure of any kind izing in the curt phrase "for their own to send in troops. “In fact, Maxwell Taylor, reasons. ” whose military theories would normally have The purposeful nature of the Pentagon predisposed him toward a direct American Papers is displayed in comments on the al combat role, underwent a notable shift to most forgotten first movement of combat the right after his arrival as ambassador in troops to Indochina during the Laos crisis Saigon. He became a forceful advocate of of 1962. The deployment of some thousand will-breaking bombing of North Vietnam American troops to the northern Thai border and opposed the introduction of United was proposed by Averell Harriman and States ground combat troops.” (p. 491) The Roger Hilsman (later noted for their success Pentagon Papers state he “had been bom ful promotion of the Vietnam generals’ plot barded with messages and instructions from that resulted in the killing of Diem, a proj Washington testifying to an eagerness to ect against which even McNamara rebelled). speed up the introduction to Vietnam of The Papers say committing these troops U.S. and Third Country ground forces and “was met by exactly the opposition from to employ them in a combat role, . . . the Pentagon that had been expected.” (p. Taylor’s ill-concealed annoyance at these 434) mounting pressures and progressively more “In haste, in secrecy, and in great pri radical proposals changed to outright anger vacy” President Johnson made his great and open protest. . . .” (p. 492) “Taylor decision. On April 1, 1965, he endorsed was ousted in July 1965 and replaced by the “the concept that U.S. troops would engage old anti-Diemist Henry Cabot Lodge.” (p. in offensive ground actions against Asian 496) insurgents.” (p. 491. Pentagon Papers, IV.C.5, p. 59.) The Navy and Air Force Why Did Kennedy, were against it. Even cia director John Johnson, and Their Nonmilitary Advisers McCone was against it, and he was re Insist on Ground Combat Troops for Vietnam? placed. “For all their service to Johnson To those who were not aware of it at the [in public support for his decisions], it is time, the Pentagon Papers reveal American unlikely that any of the Army generals strategy in Vietnam to have been an indeci- (Wheeler, Harold Johnson, Westmoreland) sive “tug-of-war” between those who ad- played a major role in persuading him to vocated increases in American manpower commit troops. . . . Johnson’s most probable on the ground and others who would have confidant on the April 1 decision was Dean made greater use o f air and sea power. This 98 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW appeared to be a military disagreement, but world as the Kennedyites. The right was, we have seen that it was not and that it strange as it may sound, anti-imperialist.” was rather a dispute between military ad- (p. 440) visers and civilian advisers to each president. "Eisenhower was never enamored of all Schurmann finds that each President shifted the talk about limited war” and “he tried more and more toward his civilian advisers to keep containment-type troop commit for reasons that were political and ideological ments to a minimum in East Asia.” (pp. rather than military. Yet it was not basically 290, 439) Since the Army was “the most a civilian versus military issue. Many civil- liberal and democratic of the services” (p. ians formerly in government, such as those 289), in the late 1950s “a kind of alliance who worked with President Eisenhower, had arose between the Army and the liberal agreed with the military all along. Schur- Democrats in Congress. Symbolic of this mann calls these men “rollback right-wingers ” was the growing friendship between Max and associates them generally with con- well Taylor and John F. Kennedy. . . . Tay servatives and Republicans. Naturally, they lor’s notions of limited war presented in were not to be found in Democratic ad- The Uncertain Trumpet eventually led to ministrations. On the other side were the Kennedy’s grand schemes for dealing with “containment liberals, ” who believed not in insurgencies. . . .” (pp. 289-90) "rolling back ” or blunting Communist power “Kennedy knew about the Stilwell epi but rather in containing it through the use o f sode in China and concluded, like most lib ground forces. Aircraft, which might cause erals in the 1960s,” that if Stilwell’s pro “escalation ' were to be employed only in a posed reforms had been carried out the supporting role. The containment liberals Communists might not have won. Barbara also believed, along with most public and Tuchman’s book on Stilwell "makes Vinegar media opinion at the time, that the nations Joe’s commitments to Kuomintang reform we supported in their resistance to Com- seem so progressive and Chiang, backed munist expansion should and could be pres- by American right-wingers, so reactionary.” sured into becoming politically "progressive ” Few reviewers of the book noticed the and "liberal.” Schurmann’s analysis of the striking similarities between Stilwell's rec failure o f this ideology is lengthy and in- ommendations for Chiang and “what the volved, but occasionally it is incisively ex- Kennedyites advocated for Diem. . . . Max pressed. well Taylor was straight in the Stilwell tradi tion, and while in the 1970s he has assumed "Sending in those troops gave Washing that reactionary character common among ton control over South Vietnam, which is many cold war liberals, in the 1960s he what the old New Dealer Johnson wanted was hailed as a progressive addition to the as much as the New Frontiersman Kennedy.” Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regardless of what (p. 446) The alternative to relying on Presi Stilwell’s program might have accomplished dent Diem in Vietnam was to introduce in China, the sending of half a million troops troops and enforce military, political, and to Vietnam had tragic consequences. ‘The economic reforms "that the Kennedyites Army’s failure in South Vietnam was, in the were convinced would lead to drying up the end, containment’s failure.” (pp. 445, 500) insurgency.” (p. 446) “The same idealism that created a welfare imperialism gave rise What Was the Army’s Role to a war imperialism.” (p. 562) “. . . no in the Various Strategies of Vietnam? centrists tried as vigorously and daringly to carry American imperialism throughout the O f the separate attitudes o f the three services BOOKS AND IDEAS 99 toward the Vietnam actions, the Army 's was see no other way out of the dilemma “than the most ambiguous. Although beguiled at to launch a ground war which no one first by Taylor’s vague predictions o f “brush- wanted except for a few none-too-bright fire” wars, which were not supposed to be- Army generals.” (p. 491) come “conventional” wars, most Army lead- “Westmoreland’s tactics of using infantry ers remembered Korea and opposed a com- to make contact with the enemy but moving bat role for U.S. ground forces in Vietnam. back fast so that air power could go in for Kennedy and McNamara had to make it the kill seemed to make the morale factor clear, as Maxwell Taylor has reported, that of the infantryman less important. Unmoti military promotion and enthusiasm for vated South Vietnamese could carry rifles counterinsurgency were inseparable. For as well as unmotivated Americans.” (p. 537) this and other reasons, Army leaders who By mid-1966 it was apparent “that the rose in prominence came to advocate an United States Army could not bring back increasing ground force role in Vietnam. the coonskin” as Lyndon Johnson had hoped, Johnson made General Westmoreland a so Navy and .Air Force commanders argued personal confidant, as we shall see, until for air strikes. Phuc Yen, the lone air base after the Communist Tet offensive. When for Migs in North Vietnam (and a name the General requested more troops than the seldom distributed by media in the U.S., Congress would support, the President re- no doubt for fear of mispronunciation), was lieved him. finally bombed, and the “carrier Enterprise “The most primitive explanation for the began to steam into the Yellow Sea.” Then Army’s enthusiasm about limited war is came the Tet offensive. It was not all the that since its role in modern warfare ap Viet Cong had hoped for, but it flattened peared to be declining, it had to find a new American resolve, (p. 523) “But giving West role and mission, and limited war fitted the moreland more cannon fodder” would have need. . . (p. 289) “In the spring of 1965, meant calling up the reserves, which re the Army was the least of the three services. quired congressional support, and “the ef fect in a presidential election year would Since what counted in interservice rivalrv was sophisticated hardware, the Navy and have been disastrous.” (p. 526) the Air Force had a virtual monopoly, . . . On a visit to Hanoi, with State Depart Vietnam gave the Army a chance. . . . And ment approval, in early 1968, Schurmann what better way of delivering air power than learned that while the North Vietnamese through helicopters, the .Army version of had not been at all impressed by the bomb air power (all three services were preoc ing halts they agreed to negotiate because cupied with air power).’’ Johnson was fear Westmoreland had been “purged.” In the ful that Navy and Air Force proposals might Communist world purges always meant a bring on World War III, so “Westmoreland change of policy, (p. 528) became Johnson’s instrument in Vietnam. “What failed so miserably and drastically What McNamara tried to do in March was the helicopter, so much so that the 1964, make the war Washington’s not Hono United States Army has quietly abandoned lulu’s special preserve, now became a reality its once vaunted helicopter-based battle based on a personal tie between Johnson tactics.” The National Liberation Front man and Westmoreland as well as direct ma c /v- aged to shoot down thousands. “In the lat W ashington chain of command links.” (p. ter years of the war, particularly after the 496) great helicopter defeat of the Laos invasion Few had suspected that Johnson would of spring 1971, safer forms of air power 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW were used, culminating in the use of milk- Southeast Asia en masse, America would run B-52 missions to carpet bomb the enemy respond with (tactical) nuclear weapons, as in rice paddies. What an ending for the it was prepared to do in Europe against mighty B-52, designed to give America su Russian ground forces.” (p. 514) Schumann preme security with its capability to take may not be aware that Maxwell Taylor an- out Russian cities and missile sites!” (p. 501) nounced this policy early in 1961 at the State Department in a “nonattribution” What Was the Air Force Role and Presence meeting with the Washington press corps. Over the Far Eastern Scene? This second nuclear dam against over- whelming Communist ground forces, an- Neither the Washington staffs, the Pacific nounced so early in the Kennedy adminis- headquarters, nor the action in Vietnam tration, would hopefully “shield” U.S. were commanded by the Air Force; yet its ground forces in Asia, exactly as was al- presence and its actions had a subtle but ready the case in Europe. Ironically, the de- powerful impact during the Vietnam phase ployment o f ground forces into Indochina o f the America-China Russia confrontation was to be made practical by the same im- around the periphery o f the two great Com- plied nuclear threat against China that was munist nations. The Air Force responsibility used nearly a decade earlier by President for developing and deploying nuclear weap- Eisenhower to bring about a truce in Korea. onry continued to support America’s de- Again in the early sixties, as in the early clining weight in the global balance o f pow- fifties, the Chinese took seriously a nuclear er. The transfer, and threatened transfer, o f threat, perhaps for the last time. This was not intermediate-range nuclear missiles into less- because o f Secretary Dulles’s overdebated cautious Allied countries had an amazing “massive retaliation” speech following Korea long-range effect, which Schumann is able but because o f a small nuclear deployment to explain from the standpoint of Communist in the late fifties, which was little noticed reaction. Even more interesting at this mo- in this country where it is the fashion to ment is Schumanns recognition, based on pretend that nuclear weapons are not dom- opposition sources, o f the effectiveness o f the inant. ultimate bombing attacks against North In May of 1957 the Pentagon announced Vietnam once they were directed as they the movement to Taiwan of an Air Force might have been directed all along. detachment of Matador guided missiles, Major shifts in the policies of the great nuclear-capable and with a reach of some powers since 1945 have all been related to 600 miles. To American newsmen this had progress in nuclear weaponry by one or no great significance, but to the Chinese more of these powers. “Nuclear subjects and especially to Mao it was a staggering are taboo in .America, Russia, and China be event. Mao was doubly disturbed, first by cause they affect the most sensitive areas the fear that Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan of national security policy.” (p. 304) “Prac might somehow bring about their employ tical arguments about the waste of ‘overkill’ ment, and second by the fact the junior Air are irrelevant inasmuch as what counts is Force officer commanding the small Matador the relative balance of forces between unit was in turn commanded by a Navy America and Russia.” (p. 190) captain who soon came directly under Ad “We know from the Pentagon Papers miral Felix Stump of the new Pacific head that it was established politico-military quarters in Hawaii. This was “a matter far doctrine that if Chinese forces should enter different from the known and accepted BOOKS AND IDEAS 101 threat from the Strategic .Air Command. Western Europe turned out to be a drama . . . at least its command and control struc in Dullesian brinkmanship which actually ture was clean and linked directly to the worked in the long run.” (pp. 268-69) White House.’ (pp. 269, 271, 297) The “containment liberals,” however, The Matadors on Taiwan and the Navy- tried to achieve by the deployment of commanded headquarters in Honolulu, ground forces what Dulles had achieved by along with some rather secret American the development and deployment, or threat missiles emplaced in South Korea, made ened deployment, of nuclear delivery capa 1957 a most uneasy year for the Chinese bilities. “The containment liberals failed Communists. .After a policy crisis, they de to realize that there was a difference be cided the U.S. was at least as dangerous to tween a nuclear balance of power that in their future as the Russians. Swallowing volved only a nuclear arms race (dangerous his pride, Mao in Moscow accepted the as that was) and one that involved the ter Soviet Union as the “one head’’ of “the ritories of countries. . . . Containment lib Socialist camp” and asked for aid in de erals implied that American forces stationed veloping his own nuclear weapons. Since abroad would make the leaders of foreign Britain had just developed nuclear weapons, countries more 'responsible’ and susceptible why not China? Khrushchev, confident in to American control.” But “political in his newly demonstrated ic bm superiority fluence can go both ways.” The liberals over the .Americans, sent technicians to have ridiculed the Russian and Chinese China, (p. 286) Just two years later the habit of reading American right-wing and Russians reneged and called their technicians military journals. “They maintain that the home, thus alienating China and forcing right-wingers are not in control, that they Mao to proceed on his own. In five years do not make policy. Indeed, it has been he succeeded, and Khrushchev fell from the containment liberals who, by and large, power on the same day. have made policy in Washington. But policy Other events leading to the great Russia- and operations are not the same thing, and China schism began in the same fateful policy itself is not always what it appears year, 1957, that saw the Matadors arrive in to be. For the Russians and the Chinese, Taiwan. A nuclear project in Europe was the American right wing was a political similar except that this time the missiles faction,” and sometimes “they were con never arrived. Secretary of State Dulles vinced that the pendulum in Washington frightened the Russians by suggesting in was swinging rightward toward a more ag termediate-range missiles for the German gressive stance on the world scene.” (pp. government of tough Konrad Adenauer. The 297-98) Russians responed as usual by threatening This may he the best answer yet to the moves, such as the Berlin crisis of 1958, puzzling question o f why deterrence has then shifted toward detente and the meet worked, up to now. Hopefully, military and ing between Khrushchev and Eisenhower "right-wing ” journals will continue to be dis- in 1959. In the end Germany received no turbing, and the more pleasant dreams o f nuclear missiles, and China received no self-limiting “brush-fire” wars—such as The more nuclear aid. Four years later Mao Uncertain Trumpet ‘ which Mao Tse-tung sent two emissaries to Moscow, one of read with considerable interest” (p. 267)— whom is his present heir-apparent, but they will no longer be distributed to chief exec- failed to dissuade Khrushchev from signing utives, especially our own. the Test Ban Treaty. “Putting IRBMs in America’s nuclear lapse began in mid- 102 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW 1966, when the Russians accelerated missile China, which blocked any “military plans to production, and the reaction was moderate reduce North Vietnam to ashes, or to mud because of heavy commitments in Vietnam, puddles, as Goldwater proposed,” (p. 558) (p. 505) President Johnson met with Kosygin the Air Force ultimately performed its basic in New Jersey to seek a missile agreement mission. In late March 1972, after Nixon’s but got nowhere. Kosygin would talk only visit to Peking, the Communist forces about Vietnam and the Middle East. The launched a powerful attack against the Russians needed the missiles to compensate South Vietnamese. “In response, Washing for moving substantial forces eastward to an ton unleashed the most ferocious air bom unfriendly Chinese border, (p. 507) Forced bardment in human history.” This ridiculous to accept a weakening deterrent posture statement is one o f Schurmann ’s rare exag- against Russia and mindful of the growing gerations. His following admission is more Chinese capability, .Air Force planners in important (emphasis added): ‘'That bombing the late 1960s shifted their concern toward alone enabled the ARVNs to holdout de- East and Southeast Asia just when President fensively in places like An Loc and to re- Johnson, beginning to despair of accommo capture Quang Tri City. . . . and then, dation with Russia, shifted his hopes toward early in 1973, a ceasefire was signed. seeking agreements with the Chinese, (p. “As the ceasefire went into effect, the 518 ff.) clouds of Watergate gathered in Washing Some months after the event, there was ton. In mid-April 1973, when it seem ed as a report from French diplomatic sources if the air war might again be unleashed that in the spring of 1966 “Peking had trans against North Vietnam, the storm broke. mitted three conditions to Washington for As government in Washington becam e par remaining out of the Vietnam war: that alyzed, only the ferocious bombing of Cam America not attack China, that it not in bodia continued. . . . it was apparent . . . vade North Vietnam, and that it not bomb that Watergate marked a turning point. the Red River dike system.” A short time . . (p. 559) later Johnson and other high officials indi cated in public speeches their agreement What Was the Influence of with such conditions, (p. 515) This under the Navy and Its Doctrines standing meant the end of the bipolar world. during the Indochina Crisis Period? China's nuclear progress would not be The Navy’s roles in the Indochina war in- stopped, and Mao would not intervene in cluded its various functions normal to a Vietnam. The Chinese army would be avail major nonnaval war, but its influence on able as a shield for Mao during his internal decisions was much more evident than dur- revolution against other leaders of the ing the Korean War. This was due prin- Chinese Communist party, (p. 521) Presi cipally to the key positions of the several dent Johnson forlornly hoped for an agree admirals who commanded the Pacific theater ment with Russia on nuclear weapons and and later to the prominence of Admiral Vietnam. Apparently he was ready just be Thomas H. Moorer. Schurmann mentions fore the Democratic convention to fly to this influence repeatedly, and he is especial- Moscow, return as a successful “peace Pres ly disturbed about the “ferocious” admirals ident,” and gain nomination. “The Russian and their continued emphasis, until very occupation of Czechoslovakia dashed that recently, on China as the major threat. hope.” (pp. 529-30) Despite all inhibitory understandings with “From the perspective of the 1970s, BOOKS AND IDEAS 103 when the United States Navy is the domi its views in seminars and journals, “but the nant service, it is hard to remember that dominant tone was set by the defense in until the Vietnam war, the Navy saw itself tellectuals with prestigious Ph.D.s who clus in a loser role.’ (p. 490) The Navy could tered around the office of the Secretary of not qualify for a major role in nuclear deter Defense.” (pp. 424-25) rence until smaller bombs were developed. Through the Vietnam war the Pacific In the interim Admiral .Arthur W. Radford naval commanders, Admirals Stump, Felt, in Congressional testimony strongly attacked Sharp, and McCain, boldly joined with the both the “immorality” of nuclear weapons Air Force and often the Army in urging and also the designation of Russia rather more effective air strikes against North than China as the principal threat. This Vietnam, usually to no avail. From mid- “admirals’ revolt" against nuclear deter 1964 to early 1968, “Invariably the Presi rence came just two weeks after Russia’s dent would be presented with three ‘op first (1949) atomic explosion. After the un tions’ (a hawk one, a dove one, a middling popular Korean War the Navy, again paced dawk one, . . . The middling option was in by Admiral Radford, shifted toward ad variably chosen, . . .” (p. 487) Admiral Mc vocacy of massive retaliation, only to prefer Cain continued to designate China as the the selective delivery of small tactical weap major danger in the Pacific as late as 1972 ons for Dien Bien Phu and after, (p. 289) (p. 545), by which time a “new Navy Bv 1957 the Navy began to go along with geopolitics” appeared, supported by “the The Uncertain Trumpet in its advocacy of military most disenchanted with the Indo quick reaction against “brush-fire" wars, china war, despite the unrelenting enthusi with added emphasis on tactical strikes asm the carrier admirals still showed for it.” from fast carriers. Preparation for limited (p. 556) wars, the likely extension of “Taylor’s The new doctrinal split gave President ‘brush-fire wars,’ ” became much more ac Nixon new options in working with the ceptable to the Navy when it appeared that military, symbolized by his appointments of such wars might be fought on the oceanic Admiral Zumwalt and General Haig. “In periphery of Asia rather than in Europe, 1972, it was surprising to see once bitterly (pp. 270-71) anti-China Navy publications lauding Nix For decades the Navy had seen China, on’s visit to China. Not sentiment but a new rather than Russia, as the greatest threat to geopolitics was the source of that praise. the Western World because it served as Russia, the Russian navy, and varied threats an oceanic outlet for Asian communism. to America’s energy sources (chiefly oil) 'While all United States military leaders were perceived as the most serious threats held hostile views about China, none matched to American national interests. China was in ferocity those of Navy admirals.” (p. seen as weak and mortally imperiled by the 273) Communist China’s leaders, especially threat of Russian nuclear attack." (p. 556) the well-read Mao and his supporters, were Only a few years earlier “Admiral Rick- just as concerned about the Navy. Yet, in over’s submarine zealotry was a dangerous the early 1960s, “The Navy’s geopolitical challenge to traditional Navy doctrine, for views were contemptuously disregarded by it began to substitute Russia for China as the civilian defense intellectuals. Geopolitics the Navy’s principal enemy.” (p. 431) Such was out of fashion and game theory was in. changes serve to illustrate the fact that Moreover, they smacked of right-wing fa “. . . for the military, in addition to the naticism. The Navy managed to expound technical aspects of a weapons system, there 104 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW was the doctrinal aspect, which so baffled powerful administrative force in the cities. and infuriated McNamara.” (p. 430) Al The Communists, of course, would have though the “Kennedyites” suspected, “cor controlled the army and dominated the rectly much of the time, that doctrine was capital, Peking.” (p. 230) merely a cover for power advancement and “Sovietization of the armed forces began power struggle, they never understood how and accelerated rapidly after the outbreak vital it was for any military service.” Mc of the Korean War,” a rare instance in his Namara’s efforts to base everything on “cost tory “of one nation so massively importing effectiveness,” which meant little more the institutions of another.” (pp. 236-37) than more bangs per billion bucks, were After the strongly pro-Russian P eng Te-huai doomed to fail, and “for all its inanities, succeeded Lin Piao as commander, the doctrine was to triumph over systems analy Chinese abandoned their open squad tactics sis.” (pp. 430-31) of the civil war and used “human wave” assaults such as the Russians had used in both World Wars. “Russian advisers were How Deep Is the China-Russia Rift? placed at all echelons of the Chinese armed forces. Russian pilots, as the Russians now The United States government and its armed admit, flew many of the Migs which en forces, particularly the Air Force, were gaged the Americans in aerial combat.” skeptical o f the split between North and (p. 241) East Asia and slow to recognize China as a Mao, whose basic doctrine is “all power separate threat. Now it is definitely real and grows out of the barrel of a gun,” wanted not a “Communist trick, ” but it is wise to his own guns, but a shortage of heavy in examine some episodes o f the complex re- dustry forced him to depend on Russia for lationship between Mao and his three suc- the large numbers of tanks and cannon his cessive Russian counterparts, particularly conventional military “steel eaters” de those events that have often been misrepre- manded. (p. 287) Along with Khrushchev, sented. Many learned Americans have Eisenhower, Macmillan, De Gaulle, and charged that Chiang Kai-shek sabotaged a Ms. Gandhi, Mao wanted the economy as coalition with Mao which was proposed by well as the power of nuclear weapons. While the United States; that the Chinese army and he preached and leftist groups around the air force fought “on their own in Korea; ” world demonstrated against nuclear weap that Mao sought nuclear weapons only in ons, Mao gambled his prestige and China’s desperation; that North Vietnam and China power on that nation’s ability to produce wanted the 1954 Geneva Accords that them. “What Mao was saying was that if a called for elections to unite Vietnam; and strategic (that is, nuclear) defense capability that American military opponents o f em- was substituted for a conventional one, then phasis on lijnited war caused escalation o f considerable savings could be realized, the war in Vietnam. Evidence from the other (p. 256) side is rather different. Ho Chi Minh and his Chinese supporters Mao sincerely wanted a “coalition” gov were pressured in 1954 to accept the divi ernment in the late 1940s because his army sion of Vietnam at the 17th parallel as a of peasants could not manage the economy concession to the French. After the defeat of China’s huge coastal cities; but this at Dien Bien Phu the French government “would have meant, practically, that the was anxious to withdraw from Vietnam ‘liberals’ would have continued to be a without further humiliation. The French BOOKS AND IDEAS 105 renounced an American plan to add a new military impasse, withdrawal, and finally German army to the forces of nato in Eu defeat. rope, and an agreement on Vietnam was With his nuclear program surpassing ex reached at Geneva. “Vietnamese and pectations and the American government Chinese retain bitter memories of the 1954 fearful of his intervention in Vietnam, Mao Geneva Accords. They paid in blood, sweat, in 1966 rejected all pleas from Communist and tears for Moscow s gains on the Euro leaders in other nations to announce even pean front, while Moscow argued that the a vague “joint action” agreement with Rus greater cause of world peace had been sia and rejected an invitation to a Com served.' (p. 226) munist Party Congress convened in Russia. Exactly the same argument was tried in Even the astute North Vietnamese were vain by Khrushchev five years later when put into an almost “hopeless squeeze” by he tried to mollify Mao after renouncing aid the dispute, but they finally “managed to for China ’s nuclear program. Again the Rus- get China and Russia to agree to unre sian fear of Germany was involved, for the stricted transport of Russian supplies across U.S. in return dropped all plans to assist China.” (p. 517) Obviously, Mao hated the other nations, especially Germany, in nuclear Russians. He announced that the Russians weaponry. had been “imperialists” ever since World War II. This term is usually reserved by the Even before the Test Ban Treaty, Wash left, especially the American left, for Ameri- ington and Moscow “began to cooperate or, cans. as the Chinese would sav, collude and com- The Russians supported India in its war pete in a new Holy Alliance to halt revolu against China and encouraged nomadic tribes tion throughout the world. But the war to revolt in China’s Sinkiang nuclear devel clouds were gathering in East Asia. . . opment area. The split became wider un (For the Russians, promotion o f revolution til it produced a small war in 1969. Hatred was an expedient; for the Chinese, a sacred for the Soviet Union seemed to outweigh principle.) A larger war in Southeast Asia “every other foreign policy consideration in had become almost inevitable. “The doc [Mao’s] mind. Russian hatred of Mao per trines generated during the mid-1950s in sonally has by now reached the levels of W ashington had a self-fulfilling prophecy what they felt for Hitler, and their descrip built into them. They taught that limited tions of him are increasingly put in Hitlerian war was bound to come and, therefore, free terms.” (p. 347) men must make preparations to meet it.” So it went. Yet Mao’s personal strong The preparations developed into “a form feelings on the matter were, and are, so of intervention which invariably elicited a influential that the question o f his successor response from the other side.” (p. 328) may be the world 's most important personnel Kennedy had pledged to build forces for problem. such wars, and he planned negotiations with Russia to avoid the most serious risks of Was an Antinuclear Strike their expansion. The negotiations repeatedly against China Considered? failed, and after the split with China the Russians could no longer deliver on a bi “Kennedy had just signed the momentous polar agreement anyway. In desperation, Test Ban Treaty with the Russians in the Johnson finally turned to China and reached face of bitter opposition from his own mili an agreement so limiting that it produced a tary, yet the entire global political structure 106 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW that that treaty promised to generate could tions of war, the central notion of all the crumble in the face of a Chinese atomic policies dominant in Washington was that bomb.” (p. 391) Roger Hilsman takes credit there could no longer be war in the mod for (among other things) suggesting dis em world.” (p. 395) armament talks with China, but nothing Graduated escalation had appealed to the had indicated that China had “the slightest “Kennedyites” because as a tactic it had to intention of ‘disarming’ ” except on hope be applied “by and through the concen less conditions, (p. 392) So far as Kennedy trated power of the Presidency ... as the was concerned, “there were only two President points to this, that, and other tar feasible alternatives to dealing with the gets and his generals humbly obey.” (p. 396) looming Chinese nuclear threat: either take This theme may explain McNamara s prac- them out militarily or work with the Rus tice, which cost several American planes sians to somehow contain China.” But Rus and crews, o f deleting targets, some o f them sia’s influence over China was “mortally antiaircraft targets, from carefully planned threatened” by their dispute. Such loss of missions. Unable to select targets, he could power by Khrushchev, who was working at least maintain his prerogatives by elimi- with Kennedy toward a stable bipolar nating them. world, “would automatically mean a loss Writing from Peking in late 1972, Joseph of power for Kennedy.” (p. 393) Alsop stated that the Russians three years “Since the Kennedy Administration was earlier had vainly asked for U.S. support in rich in intellectual talent, hundreds of brains an attack on China, but this was years after were put to work. . . . One of the ideas that all serious discussion of the matter had emerged was that it might be possible to ceased in the United States, (p. 379) Wisely force the Chinese to sign the treaty by or unwisely, as future events will determine, exerting pressure on them at escalating the “graduated escalation" idea was soon levels of severity. At some point, the dropped, even though it had been publicly Chinese might face the choice of either presented as a viable plan by Kennedy signing the treaty or seeing some of their friends, such as Stewart Alsop. “Some residue prize developmental projects go up in of nonacademic common sense that re smoke. This approach was called ‘graduated mained in the Kennedy and Johnson ad escalation.’ ” At a conference in August ministrations finally convinced policy makers 1964, Schurmann “heard one learned Har that what worked in the equations of the vard defense economist propose ‘graduated game theorists might not work in practice.” escalation’ ”. . . . When a horrified Aus (p. 397) And yet, although in his last days tralian suggested it would require a decla Kennedy seemed to hope for withdrawal ration of war, the learned economist re from Vietnam “. . . it is equally possible plied, “We can arrange for that too.” that even with such a withdrawal he would Schurmann was also asked by “some simi have ordered graduated strikes against larly learned members of the rand Cor China to resolve the nuclear dilemma once poration” to help with some of the game and for all.” (p. 397) problems that would be involved. “What When Russian and Chinese forces clashed was exciting about this notion to the mathe on the Ussuri River in 1969, the idea of matically minded defense intellectuals of willfully warring with China was out of the the time was that it fitted beautifully into question. An American involvement in Asia game theory.” And yet, “Despite the Har would give Russia a free hand elsewhere in vard economist’s comment about declara the world, (p. 507) BOOKS AND IDEAS 107 How Is the American Commitment his final great achievement was to stabilize to Israel Unique? his relations with the United States against Israel is not precisely a part of the con the threat of Russia. What now is the legacy tainment policy, although “Israel s tough o f Mao’s popular gospel o f endless revolu- armed forces play a crucial role in the anti- tion, backed by enormous destructive power Soviet balance of forces in the Middle East. poised against the other great nations o f the The commitment to Israel was ideological world, most o f them relatively short o f man- because it “clearly went against United power? Most Sinologists know a great deal States material interests in the region." less about China than does Schurmann, for (p. 534) China is, for reasons not well ex few have studied that mystery as much. plained, “a vociferous champion of the Before considering one o f his rare specula- Arabs” and an “implacable foe” of the tions about the future, it is interesting to Israelis. Russia has followed the same line. examine one o f his most basic beliefs. . . . for reasons also inconsistent with their When writing as a reasonably disciplined ideology, since few governments are more historian, Schurmann refuses to pose as a “reactionary ” than those of the Arab states. prophet or prognosticator. His analyses of “That Jews were numerous, wealthy, and past events are generally based on wide powerful in America was an obvious reason and profound research that has produced for the commitment to Israel, but not the sound evidence. His sociopolitical theorizing only one. . . . Israel exemplified what the may be overlooked, as may most such exer- Democratic party’s ideology had been cises. We have overlooked it here. However, preaching since the beginning of the cold Schurmann is a most urbane and reasonable war: that a progressive, socialistic, pro- representative o f a large segment o f our American and noncommunist state could academic and intellectual establishment that arise. In spite of Israel s special circum deserves attention not only in spite o f its stances, it seemed that the same could surprising doctrinal dogmas but also be- eventually happen throughout the Third cause o f them. Schurmann's frankness about W orld." (p. .534) But times have changed. his faith in one prophet, the theorist Marx, “Gone are the rapturous days of the kib together with his unstinting admiration for butzim or United States labor leaders plant a lifelong militarist and ruthless conqueror, ing trees in the Judaean hills.” Now a sub Mao, makes him a brilliant phenomenon stantial part of American society, especially that no doubt will grow upon us. youth, has turned inward. The new ideology It may be said that higher educators are operating in Washington is “one that does as frustrated by their welter o f repetitive not require the same kind of popular sup verbiage as are political and military lead- port. . . (pp. 534-35) ers by the recurrent pressures and restric- tions that cripple their effectiveness. Some Hou- Dangerous Is the Sino-Maoist academics and intellectuals accept their Nuclear-Revolutionary Threat? passive role with equanimity, others jealous- ly regard all power as evil and veer toward Ten years ago Mao told Edgar Snow "1 anarchism, while still others identify with shall soon see God, but he did not die. He symbols o f power and become “Kennedy- went on to launch and win the still un- ites,” Leninists, Gaullists, Maoists, or what- believable “cultural revolution,” which ever. insured that he will never become “just an Mao Tse-tung during his long life has old Buddha as he once feared. Perhaps developed a charisma comparable to that of 108 AIR UNIVERSITY REIVEW Mohammed or Napoleon in that he possesses which no sane person would wish upon his a fundamentalist faith in true prophet Marx own people. But Marx argued—as have Lenin as an inspiration to bloody revolution, a and Mao Tse-tung—that ruling classes will long record o f military triumphs against devour themselves in violent competition, great odds, unmatched talents for political destroying what they themselves have built. survival and control, and even a thoroughly Thus, revolution occurs only when the peo destructive philosophy for export to other ple finish the process of destruction and be nations. To top it all, throughout the rise and gin building a new society.” (pp. 563-64) fall o f other great leaders, he has ruled the Revolution, then, is desirable because it is world's most populated nation, which is also inevitable, and it is inevitable because Marx, the most venerable civilization o f the mystic Lenin, and Mao said so. In Schurmann’s East. view, Marx, Lenin, and Mao cannot all be “Look on my works, ye Mighty, and wrong. Though he modifies Marx and has despair!" would be appropriate for Mao but doubts about Lenin, he does not fault Mao. has limited appeal. “Look on my mutable Mao's great contribution is the “notion” of methods, ye unmighty, and arise to over- the “uninterrupted revolution." throw all others!" is M ao’s message. Some “Mao has always been primarily con have looked and despaired, but more have cerned with the revolution in his own coun looked, even from afar, and, disconsolate try, and that concern has made the People’s or bored with their own surroundings, have Republic of China one of the most exciting, come to worship what they saw. Mao speaks experimental, and extraordinary societies in in parables and riddles to underdeveloped a world increasingly made up of dullness minds, and although he wisely reads more or bloodiness.” (pp. 280-81) On balance, than he writes, his red “poor farmer's al- it should be noted that American tv pro- manac" has outsold both Marx and Lenin. ducers are busily demonstrating that dull- His cult has many adherents who will be ness and bloodiness can be combined, and with us long after Mao himself has gone to that some witnesses have judged Mao’s displace Confucius in heaven even as he China to be an equally successful combina- has on earth. tion o f the two in real life. Crimson banners “Nothing has influenced my political can relieve the drabness o f a billion brown thinking so much as years of immersion in blouses, yet blood itself is the surest relief, the writings of the Chinese Communists, as in all sternly regimented societies. At both formal, like the canonical works of home the bloodlettings o f uninterrupted Mao Tse-tung, and the hundreds of mun revolution designed to keep the nation healthy dane pieces in the daily newspapers." (p. are kept under control by the ever present •563) Schurmann now believes “ the greatest army, but when Maoism is exported, it man of vision of the twentieth century who seeks to avoid controls. Schurmann, in one is also an effective leader and unifier is passage, frankly describes this threat. Mao." (p. 535) Schurmann does not call “In the 1960s, the Chinese were seen as himself a Maoist, but he does say “I am the world’s greatest troublemakers, . . . not a Leninist" and indicates frequently American liberals at the time were furious that he is a Marxist. “One cannot be a that the Chinese were stirring up flames of Marxist without believing in the inevitabil revolt in Latin America where they had no ity and desirability of popular revolution. interests whatsoever, not to mention the And it is only self-delusion to think of rev doings of Che Guevara. As the New Left olution as anything but bloody civil war, began to emerge in the advanced countries, BOOKS AND IDEAS 109 the very word ‘Maoism came to mean a while nuclear weapons have none, and we land of anarchist, ultraleftist troublemaking- have all but despaired o f trying to match for-troublemaking s-sake. And when the New or to counter the power o f new systems o f Left began to clash with the older com nuclear missiles poised against us. On this munist parties, as in France, China was the usually cheerful Schurmann makes a invoked as a new Marxist Rome sanctioning chilling observation, perhaps boastful, per- this path to revolution.' (p. 369) haps prophetic. The Maoist New Left is less active around In the 1960s . . the line from Washing the globe today as freakish groups practice ton went, the Chinese were fomenting wars more desperate terrorism, but the growing of liberation, ... to make trouble for the power and prestige o f China could revive free world. More darkly in the background it. The intellectual New Left in America, was the specter of a billion Chinese armed which aspired to scourge the campuses dur- with nuclear weapons ready to blow up the ing the years of the draft, overreached itself world in pursuit of their mad revolutionary in frenzy and lost most o f its overblown ambitions. However distorted this image, academic respectability; but pilgrimages to there was considerable truth to it. Mao was Peking could attract far more Leftists than and remains a revolutionary. He considers ever paid homage to Castro. The lull in all revolution a good thing for peoples, coun this activity may be exhaustion after the tries, and individuals. . . . On the other excesses o f the Vietnam period. In any case, hand, for all his alleged deprecation of the domestic Maoism was never the major destructiveness of nuclear weapons, Mao danger. Ideologies have their limitations made China a nuclear country." (p. 288) San Antonio, Texas from the editor's aerie With this issue, Air University Review bids How well do you think the mission of Air farewell to the Editor who for more than ten University Review is being carried out? years left his distinctive impress on the U.S. Well—85%, Not well—5%, No opinion—10% Air Force professional journal. In August The Air University Review is interesting and Colonel Eldon W. Downs moved on to the informative. Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright- Agree—95%, Disagree—2%, Undecided—3% Patterson AFB, Ohio, where he has assumed the position of Director, Civilian Institutions Its appearance meets high standards. Directorate. During his editorship, the Review Agree—97%, Disagree—1%, Undecided—2% won coveted Federal Editors Association Blue It has helped increase your professional Pencil Awards six times out of the last nine knowledge outside your own field. years. We are pleased to add Colonel Downs Agree—83%, Disagree—6%, Undecided—11% to our complement of Editorial Advisers. It is a stimulating forum for new ideas and diverse views. Colonel Downs is succeeded as Editor by Agree—66%, Disagree—14%, Undecided—20% Colonel Glenn E. Wasson, who was previously What are your reading habits with the Review? the Inspector General to Air University. In Look at but seldom read—3% addition to Colonel Downs’s departure, Major Usually read at least one or two articles—61% Richard Comyns retired from the position of Usually read most or all—36% Acquisitions Editor, and at press time he has Sixty-two percent of the respondents indicated not been replaced. Colonel Wasson is no that they had used the Review within the last stranger to military publishing, having had 12 months as a source of information while articles published in various service journals, preparing speeches, lectures, briefings, including Air University Review. academic assignments, or articles for publication. The returns from our recent reader survey have been computed, and we are happy to Your reaction to the Review is as much a share the results. Although we admit to a necessary ingredient as the flow of manu degree of skepticism concerning the validity of scripts. If you feel strongly about any aspect reader surveys—a suspicion exists that a of the Review, or about any articles therein, disproportionate percentage of those readers it is not necessary to wait for the next survey with favorable inclination are sufficiently to let us know. YVe are receptive to your motivated to fill out a survey—we are never letters at any time, and if, in our opinion, theless encouraged by reader reaction. Based your letter says something that needs to be on 900 returned survey forms, the following said, we will share it with all of our readers. responses were computed: T he Editors 110 the contributors School, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Colonel Mayer has been an instructor in international relations with the University of Maryland. ie u t en a n t olonel oseph todder G eneral Paul K. C arlton is Commander of L C J H. S . the Military Airlift Command, Commissioned in usafr. (Ph.D., University of Southern California) Apnl 1942, he was a B-17 instructor pilot with is Associate Professor of English at California Air Training Command until 1944 when he State Polytechnic University, Pomona. His Air flew B-29s against Japan. Since World War II Force career included troop carrier missions he has served principally in Strategic Air Com during the Korean War and reserve flying as mand with the first atomic bomb organiza D r . R onald J. Stupajc (Ph.D.. Ohio State Uni signments for the next 17 years, ending as a tion; as aide-de-camp to General Curtis LeMay; versity) is Professor of Political Science at C-124 aircraft commander. He is currently as Deputy Commander. 93d Bombardment Miami University. Ohio, but has accepted a assigned as a mobilization augmentee in the Wing; Commander, 4126th Strategic Wing. position as Professor of Political Science and Education Office. March AFB. with additional 379th Bombardment Wing, and 305th Bom Contemporary Affairs at The Federal Executive duty as Liaison Officer for the U.S. Air Force bardment Wing; at Hq SAC as Assistant Deputy Institute for the next two years. He was a post Academy. Colonel Stodder is a graduate of Air and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations: and doctoral fellow of the Mershon Center for War College and author of two recent books as Commander. 1st Strategic Aerospace Divi National Security. He is author of The Shaping on Renaissance drama. sion, then at Fifteenth Air Force until Septem o f Foreign Policy iT969i and American Foreign ber 1972, when he assumed command of MAC. Policy 11975) and has published articles in Orlris. A command pilot with more than 12,000 flying Society, The American Psychologist, and The hours. General Carlton is a graduate of Na Christian Century. tional War College. Colonel Jay D. T erry fLL.B.. Georgetown Major Dennis W. Stiles (M.A.. Georgetown University; LL.M., New York University) is University) is assigned to the Concepts and Director of International Law. Hq USAFE. Objectives Division. DCS/P&O, Hq USAF. Lieu t en a n t C olonel L aurel A. M ayer (M.A.. His judge advocate service has included base He graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy University of Maryland; is a doctoral student legal offices in France. Thailand, and South in 1964 and has been an H-3 and HC-130 at Miami University He is a career intelligence Carolina: staff assignments at Seventeenth pilot during most of his career. His last flying officer, having served in staff positions with .Air Force and Hq USAF. and a tour as Asso assignment was with the 67th ARRSq at Wood- SAC, PACAF. AFSC. and DIA, and most re ciate Professor of Law, United States Air Force bridge, England. Major Stiles won the Com cently as Chief of the Data Input Branch of Academy. Colonel Terry also served in the mandant’s Trophy in Squadron Officer School Foreign Technology Division .AFSC) He is a Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Class 68A and was recently named a Dis graduate of the Defense Intelligence School /International Security Affairs). He is a Dis tinguished Graduate of the Armed Forces /DIA;, the Navy’s Defense Systems Management tinguished Graduate of Air War College. Staff College. Major J oseph A. C oleman (M S.. AFIT School of Systems and Logistics) is .Assistant Comp C aptain Frederick M. B el l (B.S.. Florida Major D avid W. Krahenbuhl(M.S.. University troller (Ninth Air Force Support) of the 363d State University) is Command Drug/Alcohol of North Dakota) is a procurement staff officer, Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TAC). Most Abuse Control Officer. Tactical Air Command. Hq USAF. He has been a missile crew com of his duty has been with the Air Force Audit Prior to this assignment he was Chief of Social mander as well as an /Assistant Professor of Agency, specializing in the audit of electronic- Actions for two years at K. I. Sawyer AFB. Economics and Management at the U.S. Air data processing (EDP) systems. He served with Michigan. He previously served as a Special Force Academy. He served as Director of Re the Auditor General Representative to the Air Agent with AFOS1 for six years with assign search. Contract Management Division. .Air Force Data Systems Design Center and was ments in Miami. Florida; Clark Air Base. Force Systems Command, where he was in supervisor of Auditor/EDP training with the Philippines; and AFOSI Directorate. Washing volved in the initiation of a Management by Department of Comptroller Training (ATC). ton. D.C. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer Objectives program. Major Krahenbuhl is a He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. School. Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Air Command and Staff College, and Industrial Staff College. College of the .Armed Forces. Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, usaf (Ret), (Ph.D., Rice University), is .Assistant Pro fessor of History at Trinity University. He served two tours with the 13th Attack Squadron, C aptain Ric h a r d E. D ucha rme (Ph.D., Syra a tour as an enlisted pilot with the First cuse University) is an .Associate Professor of Transport Squadron, and three tours as com Logistics Management, School of Systems and Major Gordon A. L ong (USMA, M.S.. Uni mander of air training bases, including Tuskegee. Logistics. Air Force Institute of Technology. versity of California, Berkeley; M.P.S., Auburn Later he was Air Deputy at the NATO Defense In his Air Force service Captain Ducharme University) is an Air Operations Staff Officer. College and became Air Deputy for military- has served in procurement, maintenance, per Tactical Air Warfare Center. Eglin AFB. Florida. assistance for Europe and the Middle East. He sonnel. and management engineering. He is He has been an F-4 aircraft commander since served two tours as Sj>ecial /Assistant to the vice-president of the .Logistics Management 1969, an instructor pilot since 1971, and has Chief of Staff. USAF. and retired as Director. Association. This is his second Review article, served in a variety of staff positions at wing Aerospace Studies Institute. Air University. and he has also published in other professional and squadron level. He is a 1975 graduate of Ceneral Parrish is a graduate of Air Command and Air Force journals. Air Command and Staff College. and Staff College and Air War College. S-Ajj • ■ SO*. WM The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “The Employment of Tactical Air Power: A Study in the Theory of Strategy of Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart" by Captain Michael O. Wheeler, USAF, as the outstanding article in the September- O c t o b e r 1975 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel Glenn E. W asson, USAF Editor J ack H. M ooney Managing Editor J ohn A. W est c o t t , J h . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique G aston Associate Editor. Spanish Language Edition Lia M id o si May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W illiam J. D e P aola Art Editor and Illustrator R udolph W. M organ Financial and Administrative Manager ADVISERS C olonel Eldon W. Downs lhi Air Fort i Institute of Technology D k. H ahold M. H el fma n H C olonel John M. C onnolly. |h . // C olonel Ellis C. Stewart, J h . // C olonel II. A. D avis, J h . // F ranc is \V. J en n ings •SAF O ffice of Inform ation C olonel John W. W alton Hii Strategic Air Command C olonel Melville V M adsen //(/ Cnitcd Slates Air Force Academ y ATTENTION Air Vnwersity Ret icle is published to stimulate pro fessional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents reflect the opinions of its authors or the investiga tions and conclusions of its editors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. The Pr°fessiona/ Journal of the United States Air Force A I R U N I VE R S ITY reviewJANUARY-FEBRUARY 1976