BOLIVIA 2019 Final Report

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

BOLIVIA 2019 Final Report European Union Election Expert Mission BOLIVIA 2019 Final Report [Flag of host country] General Elections 20 October 2019 European Union Election Expert Mission BOLIVIA 2019 FINAL REPORT General Elections 20 October 2019 EU Election Expert Missions are independent from the institutions of the European Union. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy and position of the European Union. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 3 2. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 5 3. POLITICAL CONTEXT ......................................................................................................... 5 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS EU EOM RECOMMENDATIONS .................... 7 5. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM .................................................... 7 5.1 Electoral system ................................................................................................................... 7 5.2 Legal framework .................................................................................................................. 8 6. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ......................................................................................... 9 6.1 TSE´s decision-making ...................................................................................................... 10 6.2 TSE´s transparency and communications .......................................................................... 11 6.3 Operational aspects of the elections ................................................................................... 11 7. VOTER REGISTRATION .................................................................................................... 13 7.1 Out-of-country registration ................................................................................................ 14 8. REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES ................................................................................. 14 8.1 Presidential and Vice-Presidential primary elections ......................................................... 14 8.2 Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidate resignation issues ........................................ 15 8.3 Legislative Assembly candidates ....................................................................................... 15 9. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................................ 16 9.1 Campaign messages ........................................................................................................... 17 9.2 Use of state resources ......................................................................................................... 17 10. CAMPAIGN FINANCE ..................................................................................................... 18 10.1 Sources of campaign finance ............................................................................................ 18 10.2 Limits on campaign spending .......................................................................................... 18 10.3 Oversight of party and campaign financing ..................................................................... 19 11. MEDIA ................................................................................................................................. 19 11.1 Access to media during the election campaign ................................................................ 20 11.2 The role of social media ................................................................................................... 21 12. PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN ....................................................................................... 22 13. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES ........................................................ 23 14. PARTICIPATION OF VULNERABLE GROUPS .......................................................... 24 14.1 Participation of people with disabilities ........................................................................... 24 14.2 Participation of LGBTI groups ........................................................................................ 25 15. CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION ..................................... 25 16. ELECTORAL DISPUTES ................................................................................................. 26 1 16.1 Candidate challenges ........................................................................................................ 26 16.2 Electoral justice in relation to campaign violations ......................................................... 26 16.3 Monitoring of media compliance ..................................................................................... 28 16.4 Complaints and appeals on election day and during the results process .......................... 28 17. POLLING, COUNTING AND TABULATION OF RESULTS ..................................... 28 17.1 Voting ............................................................................................................................... 29 17.2 Counting ........................................................................................................................... 29 18. RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT ................................................. 30 18.1 Preliminary results system (TREP) .................................................................................. 30 18.1.1 Decision to stop the TREP ........................................................................... 31 18.1.2 Decision to re-start the TREP ...................................................................... 31 18.2 Final results ...................................................................................................................... 31 18.2.1 Irregularities and TEDs/TSE response to irregularities ....................................... 32 18.2.2 Announcement of Final Results ........................................................................... 33 18.3 Post-election context ........................................................................................................ 34 18.3.1 OAS audit and reactions to the audit ................................................................... 35 18.3.2 Audit findings and recommendations .................................................................. 35 18.3.3 Consequences of the audit report ......................................................................... 36 19. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................... 37 2 1. SUMMARY • The general elections in Bolivia were held on 20 October 2019 to elect the president and vice- president, as well as the Legislative Assembly of 130 deputies and 36 senators. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) declared the incumbent president Evo Morales the winner. There were widespread irregularities, confirmed by an Organisation of American States (OAS) audit released on 10 November, which recommended fresh elections with a new TSE. Evo Morales resigned on the same day and was replaced on 12 November by opposition President of the Senate Jeanine Áñez, with the support of the Constitutional Court. The new government will need to set the date and timelines for the new elections and lead political negotiations about the appointment of new TSE members. • The event that defined the 2019 general elections was the controversy over Morales´ candidacy. Morales and his party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), ignored the results of the 2016 referendum to abolish the constitutional presidential term limits. A controversial Constitutional Court decision followed in 2017, declaring the term limits unconstitutional, which allowed Morales to compete for a fourth consecutive term in office. This generated a fierce debate and was extensively criticized. There was a widely held belief that Morales was very reluctant to relinquish power. • The elections were marked by a widespread fear of fraud before they took place and numerous allegations of fraud after they took place. There was very low public confidence in the impartiality of the TSE, perceived as subject to government control. The TSE did little to redress the lack of confidence in their impartiality. They did not take action against the blatant misuse of state resources, they blocked the publication of an opinion poll that gave poor results to Morales, and they were slow to explain unusual increases in the voter register, including the out-of-country register in countries with high numbers of MAS voters. In the year leading up to the elections, three TSE members resigned and there were widespread resignations and dismissals of senior staff, leading to a perception of the TSE´s increasing politicisation and loss of technical capacity. • The 2018 Political Organisations Law introduced internal democracy within parties. Presidential primaries were held for the first time in January 2019. However, these primaries were held on an unexpectedly short timeframe and all nine presidential tickets stood unopposed. Opposition candidates speculated that the real motive for holding the primaries was to give legitimacy to Morales´ controversial candidacy. The opposition was unable to unite behind one single
Recommended publications
  • Analyzing Bolivia's 2020 General Elections (PDF)
    ELECTION REPORT ✩ Analyzing Bolivia’s 2020 General Elections Final Report Analyzing Bolivia’s 2020 General Elections Final Report 2021 June The Carter Center One Copenhill 453 John Lewis Freedom Parkway NE Atlanta, GA 30307 www.cartercenter.org Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 INTRODUCTION 11 RECOMMENDATIONS 12 CONCLUSIONS 16 CONTEXT 16 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTIONS 17 VOTER REGISTRATION 18 ELECTION CAMPAIGN 20 CAMPAIGN FINANCING 21 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 21 ELECTION DAY 24 RESULTS AGGREGATION AND PUBLICATION 25 The preliminary results system 25 Official results aggregation 26 OUT-OF-COUNTRY VOTING 27 FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 28 IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON THE ELECTION 29 NATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION 29 PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION 30 PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN 31 Political violence against women 34 PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 34 PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 35 LGBTQI PERSONS 35 YOUTH 36 DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA 37 ANALYSIS OF FACEBOOK POLITICAL ADVERTISING DURING THE 2020 BOLIVIAN ELECTIONS 38 ANNEX A: DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA 41 ANNEX B: ANALYSIS OF FACEBOOK POLITICAL ADVERTISING 61 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The October 2019 elections were followed by a post-electoral crisis that was characterized by extreme polarization between the country’s political and social forces and numerous episodes of violence. Nonetheless, in the midst of this crisis, complex negotiations enabled the unanimous approval of the Nov. 24, 2019, Exceptional and Transitory Law for holding general elections. The law decreed the cancellation of the October 2019 elections and established deadlines for a new Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) to organize a new electoral process. From the time the TSE was constituted as a result of wide political consensus, the task of the election administration was particularly challenging: to organize elections in a short timeframe with largely new personnel and a significant part of its infrastructure demolished — all in the context of extreme political polarization.
    [Show full text]
  • Bolivia Faces New Polls in Shadow of Fraud Row
    Bolivia Faces New Polls in Shadow of Fraud Row Crisis Group Latin America Briefing N°43 Bogotá/New York/Brussels, 31 July 2020 What’s new? Bolivia is set to hold a presidential election on 18 October. Besides the challenge of holding the poll amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the legacy of 2019’s disputed poll, which provoked violent unrest and led former President Evo Morales to flee the country, means that both sides mistrust the election system. Why does it matter? In late 2019, an agreement to hold new polls under reformed election authorities curbed unrest. Still, the 2019 vote remains controversial, as does the role of Organization of American States observers, whose statements shaped perceptions of rigging. Amid deep social and political polarisation, another flawed poll could trigger further instability. What should be done? The EU, UN, donor countries, Bolivia’s neighbours and international NGOs should provide technical and political support to the electoral authorities, deploy as robust monitoring missions as is feasible, and press the main political forces to commit publicly to accept results or pursue grievances in the courts, not by protesting. I. Overview On 18 October 2020, a year after a troubled election triggered fraud allegations and deadly unrest culminating in President Evo Morales’ flight from the country, Bolivians are due to return to the polls. Standing in the way of a fair and undisputed vote is the practical hurdle of the COVID-19 pandemic, now raging across much of South Amer- ica and which has already forced election delays. Yet a more fundamental obstacle to ending the bitter aftermath of Morales’ resignation are Bolivia’s political divisions, which have been further embittered by arguments over the 2019 vote and the elec- tion system’s legitimacy more broadly.
    [Show full text]
  • Bolivia » Luis Arce Catacora
    » Biografías Líderes Políticos » América del Sur » Bolivia » Luis Arce Catacora Luis Arce Catacora © luchoxbolivia.org Bolivia Acttualliizaciión:: 10 marrzo 2021 Presidente del Estado Plurinacional (2020-) Luiis Allbertto Arce Cattacora Mandatto:: 8 noviiembrre 2020 -- En ejjerrciiciio Naciimiientto:: La Paz,, deparrttamentto de La Paz,, 28 septtiiembrre 1963 Parttiido pollííttiico:: Moviimiientto all Sociialliismo--IInsttrrumentto Pollííttiico porr lla Soberraníía de llos Puebllos ((MAS-- IIPSP)) Proffesiión:: Conttadorr,, economiistta,, ffunciionarriio de banca y cattedrráttiico Editado por: Roberto Ortiz de Zárate Presentación Luis Lucho Arce, candidato del Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) y ex ministro de Economía de los gobiernos de Evo Morales, ganó en la primera vuelta la elección presidencial del 18 de octubre de 2020 en Bolivia. El postulante del partido izquierdista que gobernó el país sudamericano durante 14 años y fue desalojado del poder en la protesta poselectoral de noviembre de 2019 se impuso con más del 50% de los votos al ex presidente y periodista Carlos Mesa, de la coalición Comunidad Ciudadana, y al empresario conservador Luis Fernando Camacho, de la coalición Creemos. Arce tomará posesión de la jefatura del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia en noviembre, con un mandato quinquenal y reemplazando a la presidenta interina, y adversaria política, en el último año, Jeanine Áñez. El dirigente electo, cuya candidatura fue seleccionada por el masismo como alternativa a la del procesado en el exilio Morales, presenta su victoria como un hito para "recuperar la democracia" en Bolivia y anuncia un "Gobierno de unidad" comprometido con "la estabilidad y la paz social". Su programa, centrado en los aspectos sociales y económicos, encara como más inmediato desafío la crisis de la COVID-19, que forzó el retraso de una repetición electoral inicialmente prevista para mayo.
    [Show full text]
  • LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR a DAILY PUBLICATION of the DIALOGUE Monday, October 5, 2020
    LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR A DAILY PUBLICATION OF THE DIALOGUE www.thedialogue.org Monday, October 5, 2020 BOARD OF ADVISORS FEATURED Q&A TODAY’S NEWS Diego Arria Director, Columbus Group POLITICAL Devry Boughner Vorwerk Will Bolivia’s Next Covid-19 Death CEO, DevryBV Sustainable Strategies Rates Reportedly Joyce Chang Global Head of Research, Election Put an End Falling in Region JPMorgan Chase & Co. Latin America, which has been hit Paula Cifuentes hard by the coronavirus pandemic, Director of Economic & Fiscal Affairs, to Political Unrest? is seeing falling rates of new Latin America & Canada, Philip Morris International reported cases and deaths from Marlene Fernández Covid-19. Corporate Vice President for Page 2 Government Relations, Arcos Dorados Peter Hakim BUSINESS President Emeritus, Inter-American Dialogue Guyana, Exxon Donna Hrinak Sign Deal to Senior VP, Corporate Affairs, Royal Caribbean Group Develop Payara Jon E. Huenemann Offshore Oil Field Former Corporate and Government Senior Executive Guyana’s government and MAS party candidate Luis Arce (center) campaigned in Cochabamba last week. // Photo: Arce James R. Jones U.S.-based oil major ExxonMobil campaign via Twitter. Chairman, have signed an agreement for Monarch Global Strategies the development of the offshore Craig A. Kelly Interim Bolivian President Jeanine Áñez on Sept. 17 with- Payara oil field. Senior Director, Americas Page 2 Int’l Gov’t Relations, Exxon Mobil drew from the country’s upcoming presidential election, John Maisto saying she wanted to unify opposition against Luis Arce, the Director, U.S. Education POLITICAL Finance Group Q candidate of former President Evo Morales’ MAS party. How Nicolás Mariscal will Áñez’s withdrawal affect the race? What issues are Bolivian voters Nicaragua Eyes Chairman, Grupo Marhnos most concerned about? Will the Oct.
    [Show full text]
  • Bolivia Coup Led by Christian Fascist Paramilitary Leader and Millionaire – with Foreign Support
    Bolivia Coup Led by Christian Fascist Paramilitary Leader and Millionaire – with Foreign Support By Max Blumenthal and Ben Norton Region: Latin America & Caribbean, USA Global Research, November 13, 2019 Theme: Intelligence, US NATO War Agenda The Grayzone 11 November 2019 Bolivian coup leader Luis Fernando Camacho is a far-right multi-millionaire who arose from fascist movements in the Santa Cruz region, where the US has encouraged separatism. He has courted support from Colombia, Brazil, and the Venezuelan opposition. *** When Luis Fernando Camacho stormed into Bolivia’s abandoned presidential palace in the hours after President Evo Morales’s sudden November 10 resignation, he revealed to the world a side of the country that stood at stark odds with the plurinational spirit its deposed socialist and Indigenous leader had put forward. With a Bible in one hand and a national flag in the other, Camacho bowed his head in prayer above the presidential seal, fulfilling his vow to purge his country’s Native heritage from government and “return God to the burned palace.” “Pachamama will never return to the palace,” he said, referring to the Andean Mother Earth spirit. “Bolivia belongs to Christ.” Far-right Bolivian opposition leader Luis Fernando Camacho in Bolivia’s presidential palace with a Bible, after the coup | 1 Bolivia’s extreme right-wing opposition had overthrown leftist President Evo Morales that day, following demands by the country’s military leadership that he step down. Virtually unknown outside his country, where he had never won a democratic election, Camacho stepped into the void. He is a powerful multi-millionaire named in the Panama Papers, and an ultra-conservative Christian fundamentalist groomed by a fascist paramilitary notorious for its racist violence, with a base in Bolivia’s wealthy separatist region of Santa Cruz.
    [Show full text]
  • Bolivia – a Color Revolution – Or a New Surge for Latin American Independence?
    Bolivia – A Color Revolution – or a New Surge for Latin American Independence? By Peter Koenig Region: Latin America & Caribbean Global Research, November 17, 2019 Theme: Police State & Civil Rights, US NATO War Agenda Like Túpac Katari, indigenous Aymara leader more than 200 years ago, confronting the Spaniards, Evo Morales was betrayed and ‘dismembered’ by his own people, recruited and paid by the agents of the most destructive, nefarious and murderous dark elite that governs and has governed for over two hundred years our planet, the United States of America. With their worthless fiat-Ponzi-pyramid money, the made-out-of-thin-air US dollar, they create poverty throughout the globe, then buy off the weak and poor to plot against the very leaders that have worked for years to improve their social conditions. It’s become a classic. It’s being called a Color Revolution, and it’s been taking place on all Continents. The list of victim-countries includes, but is not exhaustive – Colombia, Honduras, Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, in some ways also Uruguay (the current left- leaning government is powerless and has to remain so, otherwise it will be “changed”… that’s the name of the game) – and now also Bolivia. – Then there are Georgia, Ukraine, Iraq, South Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan, Indonesia; and the lawless rulers of the universe are attempting to “regime change” North Korea, Syria, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua – and on a larger scale China and Russia (I just returned from China – where the Government and people are fully aware what Washington’s intentions are behind every move they make).
    [Show full text]
  • Especial-Camacho-Pumari
    Domingo 20 de junio de 2021 ESPECIAL Historia de un gobierno corrupto Capítulo: Camacho y Pumari, golpistas disfrazados de cívicos 2 ESPECIAL Domingo 20 de junio de 2021 Redacción Central El ahora gobernador del departamento de San- ta Cruz, Luis Fernando Camacho, inició su acti- vidad política en 2002 como militante del Mo- vimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), de Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, ahora prófugo de la justicia por la masacre de 2003. uis Fernando Cama- cho nació el 15 de fe- brero de 1979 en la ciudad de Santa Cruz Lde la Sierra, es hijo de José Luis Camacho Parada, quien desde 1981 hasta 1983 presi- dió el Comité Cívico. Además fue presidente de la Federa- ción de Empresarios Privados de ese departamento desde 1992 hasta 1994. MNR En 2002, Luis Fernando Camacho inició su actividad política como militante de del MNR, partido político de Víctor Paz Estenssoro, que en 1985 implementó el mode- lo neoliberal a través del De- Fue vicepresidente de la Unión Juvenil Cruceñista creto Supremo Nº 21060, de- jando sin fuentes de empleo a miles de bolivianos. Esa decisión marcó el inicio Camacho inició su actividad de la capitalización de las em- presas estatales en 1997 con el gobierno de Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR), después con política con el MNR en 2002 el Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) de Jaime Paz Zamora y Acción Demo- crática Nacionalista (ADN), del fallecido dictador Hugo Ban- segundo vicepresidente hasta Cívico pro Santa Cruz, Luis Fer- zer Suárez. LÍDER UNIONISTA 2017. Ese mismo año, Cama- nando Camacho se opuso tenaz- Y PRESIDENTE cho asume la vicepresidencia mente a la repostulación de Evo UNIÓN JUVENIL CÍVICO CRUCEÑO del Comité Cívico hasta 2019.
    [Show full text]
  • The Language of International Human Rights Law As a Foundation for the Prevention, and Peaceful Resolution of Ethnic, and Political Conflicts in Bolivia
    Pace International Law Review Volume 32 Issue 2 Spring 2020 Article 1 April 2020 The Language of International Human Rights Law as a Foundation for the Prevention, and Peaceful Resolution of Ethnic, and Political Conflicts in Bolivia Yuri Mantilla Liberty University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Yuri Mantilla, The Language of International Human Rights Law as a Foundation for the Prevention, and Peaceful Resolution of Ethnic, and Political Conflicts in Bolivia, 32 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 171 (2020) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE LANGUAGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE PREVENTION, AND PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF ETHNIC, AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN BOLIVIA Yuri Mantilla TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction ............................................................. 172 II. The Bolivian Case and Ethnic Conflicts Around the World ................................................................. 173 III. Causes of Ethnic Conflicts in Bolivia ...................... 181 IV. The Current Bolivian Historical Context and the Use of Legal Discourse as an Instrument of Warfare .................................................................... 187 V. International Legal Discourse and the Importance of Constructing a Culture of Respect for Human Rights in Bolivia ................................... 198 VI. The Sources of International Human Rights Legal Obligations .................................................... 202 VII. The Importance of Minority Rights .......................
    [Show full text]
  • Bolivia's Coup Plotters in Jail As Elections Loom
    Bolivia's coup plotters in jail as elections loom https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article7077 Bolivia Bolivia's coup plotters in jail as elections loom - IV Online magazine - 2021 - IV554 - March 2021 - Publication date: Sunday 21 March 2021 Copyright © International Viewpoint - online socialist magazine - All rights reserved Copyright © International Viewpoint - online socialist magazine Page 1/3 Bolivia's coup plotters in jail as elections loom Five months after Luis Arce's landslide election victory as president of the Republic, the president of the "interim" government, Jeanine Añez, was arrested and remanded in prison on 14 March 2021 for the crimes of "terrorism, sedition and conspiracy in the context of the November 2019 coup". Imprisoned with her are former Justice Minister Alvaro Coimbre and Energy Minister Rodrigo Guzmán. The sentence expected by the Minister of Justice is 30 years in prison because, in addition to these accusations about the organisation of the coup, there is also a demand for justice for the victims of the Senkata and Sacaba massacres perpetrated by the forces of repression with impunity in the first weeks of the coup. Contestation within the MAS This judicial firmness was accompanied by a political reorientation defined by the new president as "moderate socialism". The main social measure implemented as soon as he took office was the announcement of the new hunger voucher, aimed at the four million poorest people in the country. At the same time, in the context of the economic crisis aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, there will be no pause in the exploitation of the subsoil.
    [Show full text]
  • Toward Freedom's Bolivia Reader Here
    Marcher with sign to ‘Cancel Decree 4078, Call for Elections Immediately.’ The decree was passed by interim president Jeanine Áñez making military impunity explicit. Photo courtesy of Chaski. Toward Freedom's Bolivia reader: Voices on the political and social crisis Following the October 2019 elections in Bolivia Published on January 15, 2020 1 Contents Note of introduction to TF’s Bolivia Reader January 15, 2020 by Dawn Marie Paley Upheaval in Bolivia Lurches Towards Disaster November 8, 2019 by Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar New Elections are Not Enough November 10, 2019 by Huascar Salazar Lohman The Extreme Right Takes Advantage of a Popular Uprising November 11, 2019 by Raul Zibechi Kristallnacht in Bolivia November 11, 2019 by Maria Galindo Bolivia’s Lesson in Triumphalism November 15, 2019 by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui Evo’s Fall, the Fascist Right, and the Power of Memory November 16, 2019 by Raúl Zibechi Professors in La Paz Call on International Academics to Prioritize Peace, Reconciliation November 18, 2019, by Professors at the Graduate Center of Development Sciences at the University of San Andres Report from the Funeral Procession from Senkata to La Paz November 23, 2019 by Chaski Clandestina The Complex Path to the Present Catastrophe December 2, 2019, by Huascar Salazar Lohman Latin America: The Importance of Speaking without Uniforms December 10, 2019 by Nuria Alabao Letter from El Alto: The Politics of Fear is the Raw Material of Polarization December 11, 2019, by Magali Vianca Copa Pabon Requiem for the “Process of Change” in Bolivia December 26, 2019, by Vladimir Díaz-Cuellar 2 Introduction to TF’s Bolivia Reader By Dawn Paley January 15, 2020 Dear Readers, During most of the year, I am surrounded by a powerful group of Bolivian activists and scholars.
    [Show full text]
  • ELECCIONES GENERALES BOLIVIA 2019 4 Al 6 De Noviembre
    4 al 6 de noviembre ELECCIONES GENERALES BOLIVIA 2019 FECHA TITULAR FUENTE DOCUMENTACIÓN ADJUNTA https://twitter.com/LosTiemposBol/ status/1191392295033044994 04 NOV Bolivia solicita reunión de emergencia Consejo Permanente OEA https://twitter.com/lamajoferrel/ status/1191382169270280194 https://twitter.com/tanlogico/ status/1191339076357632000 04 NOV Desbloqueo con alta violencia en Irpavi y Calacoto https://twitter.com/noticiasfides/ https://twitter.com/pagina_siete/ status/1191372497578541061 status/1191349660566392834 https://www.eldeber.com.bo/155468_evo- 04 NOV Reunión Evo con cooperativistas mineros se-reune-con-cooperativistas-mineros- en-la-paz En entrevista en BTV, la Defensora del Pueblo afirma: "Se gene- ran acciones de violencia que empiezan con hechos de discrimi- https://twitter.com/DPBoliviaOf/ 04 NOV nación y racismo, pero también por un tema de odio. Una vez que status/1191356156754706437 empiezan con el intercambio verbal acaban en violencia física en varios de estos casos". Un grupo de seguidores del MAS llegaron a la Línea Verde del teleférico para impedir que la población use ese medio de trans- https://twitter.com/noticiasfides/ https://twitter.com/rcbolivia/ 04 NOV porte. Producto del hecho, se registraron altercados entre dichos status/1191370239927357446 status/1191380255120019458 seguidores y los pasajeros. Choferes que desbloquearon violentamente en Irpavi, persiguie- https://twitter.com/OBNegra/ 04 NOV ron a bloqueadores hasta la estación del Teleférico. Esto ocurrió status/1191366450851799042 esta mañana (04 nov), Irpavi, La Paz https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/ Balance general del conflicto ingresando a su tercera semana pais/20191104/bolivia-ingresa-tercera- 04 NOV (Los Tiempos) semana-consecutiva-protestas-paros- defensa-del-voto https://twitter.com/diarioeldeber/ 04 NOV Riberalta inicia paro de 48 horas y cierra oficinas públicas.
    [Show full text]
  • The Bolivian Crescent As an Instability Factor Visit Web Receive Newsletter
    Opinion Paper 54/2021 07/05/2021 Mayumi Yasunaga Kumano* The Bolivian crescent as an instability factor Visit Web Receive Newsletter The Bolivian crescent as an instability factor Abstract: The political crises that Bolivia has experienced since the beginning of the 21st century stem from the existence within the country of two opposing projects whose contradictions manifest themselves on the political, economic and social levels. The stability of the country from 2009 to 2019 hid a deep rift between two blocs that would end up colliding in 2019. The power struggle between these projects has plunged Bolivia into political chaos on two occasions, once during 2008 and the most recent, in 2019. Keywords: Bolivia, Eastern crescent, Santa Cruz, Pro Santa Cruz Committee, Latin America, Instability. How to quote: YASUNAGA KUMANO, Mayumi. The Bolivian crescent as an instability factor. Opinion Paper. IEEE 54/2021. http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2021/DIEEEO54_2021_MAYYAS_Bolivia_EN G.pdf and/or link bie3 (accessed on the web day/month/year) *NOTE: The ideas contained in the Opinion Papers shall be responsibility of their authors, without necessarily reflecting the thinking of the IEEE or the Ministry of Defense. Opinion Paper 54/2021 1 The Bolivian crescent as an instability factor Mayumi Yasunaga Kumano Introduction Bolivia has enjoyed from 2009 to 2019 a political and economic stability that had not experienced in a long time. Indeed, Bolivia inaugurated the 21st century with a string of revolts that questioned the political, economic, and social model that had prevailed in the country for decades. The political crises that Bolivia has experienced since the beginning of the 21st century stem from the existence within the country of two opposing projects whose contradictions are manifested both on the political, economic, and social levels.
    [Show full text]