Iraq: Return/Internal Relocation

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Iraq: Return/Internal Relocation Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Return/Internal relocation Version 5.0 September 2017 Preface This note provides country of origin information (COI) and policy guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the policy guidance contained with this note; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies. Country information COI in this note has been researched in accordance with principles set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI) and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, namely taking into account its relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability. All information is carefully selected from generally reliable, publicly accessible sources or is information that can be made publicly available. Full publication details of supporting documentation are provided in footnotes. Multiple sourcing is normally used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and corroborated, and that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of publication is provided. Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of views and opinions. The inclusion of a source is not an endorsement of it or any views expressed. Feedback Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team. Independent Advisory Group on Country Information The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office‘s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office‘s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN. Email: [email protected] Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/ Page 2 of 57 Contents Policy guidance ........................................................................................................ 5 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Basis of Claim .......................................................................................... 5 2. Consideration of Issues ................................................................................... 5 2.1 Credibility .................................................................................................. 5 2.2 Internal relocation ..................................................................................... 5 2.3 Feasibility of return ................................................................................... 9 2.4 Documentation ......................................................................................... 9 2.5 Certification ............................................................................................ 13 3. Policy summary ............................................................................................. 13 3.1 Internal relocation ................................................................................... 13 3.2 Feasibility of return ................................................................................. 13 3.3 Documentation ....................................................................................... 14 Country Information ............................................................................................... 15 4. Return of Iraqi nationals ................................................................................. 15 4.1 Returns to Baghdad ............................................................................... 15 4.2 Returns to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) ........................................ 17 5. Documentation............................................................................................... 18 5.1 Civil registration system.......................................................................... 18 5.2 Overview of key documents ................................................................... 22 5.3 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) ....................................................... 23 5.4 Civil Status ID Card (CSID) .................................................................... 25 5.5 Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) ............................................................ 29 5.6 Iraqi National ID Card (INIC) .................................................................. 31 6. Redocumentation ........................................................................................... 32 6.1 Assistance .............................................................................................. 32 6.2 Passport ................................................................................................. 35 6.3 Civil Status ID Card (CSID) .................................................................... 36 6.4 Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) ............................................................ 40 7. Entry to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) ................................................... 42 7.1 Entry requirements ................................................................................. 42 7.2 Residency requirements ......................................................................... 45 7.3 Entry restrictions ..................................................................................... 49 Page 3 of 57 8. Entry to areas outside the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) ............................. 54 8.1 Entry restrictions in KRI-controlled areas outside the KRI ...................... 54 8.2 Entry restrictions in Baghdad and the south ........................................... 55 Version Control and Contacts ............................................................................... 57 Page 4 of 57 Policy guidance Updated: 11 September 2017 1. Introduction 1.1 Basis of Claim 1.1.1 Whether a person: (i) can feasibly return to Iraq based on their documentation; and (ii) can, in general, relocate elsewhere in Iraq if they are unable to return to their registered place of origin; and (iii) is at risk, based on their lack of documentation, of serious harm sufficient to breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Back to Contents 2. Consideration of Issues 2.1 Credibility 2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. 2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). 2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). Back to Contents 2.2 Internal relocation a. Relocation in general 2.2.1 In the country guidance case of AA (Article 15(c)) (Rev 2) [2015] UKUT 544 (IAC) (30 October 2015) (hereafter referred to as ‘AA Iraq’) – which replaces all other Country Guidance on Iraq – the Upper Tribunal held that internal relocation is possible, in general, to the areas that do not meet the threshold of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (QD). 2.2.2 The Court of Appeal, in the case of SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940 (13 July 2012), stated that ‘decision makers and tribunal judges are required to take Country Guidance determination into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, are adduced justifying their not doing so’ (paragraph 47). 2.2.3 Since AA Iraq was promulgated, the security situation has changed. In particular: Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Leavent) have lost territory; Page 5 of 57 Government of Iraq (GoI) and/or associated forces have regained control of some areas; the level of violence has declined; and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are returning to their areas of origin See the country policy and information note on Iraq: Security and humanitarian situation. 2.2.4 Therefore, internal relocation is, in general, possible to all areas of Iraq except: a. Anbar governorate (but possible to the areas Daesh no longer controls, including the Fallujah, Ramadi and Heet districts), b. Ninewah governorate, c. the parts of Kirkuk governorate
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