Syria 2012 Human Rights Report
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Why Concessions Should Not Be Made to Terrorist Kidnappers
European Journal of Political Economy 44 (2016) 41–52 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect European Journal of Political Economy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ejpe Why concessions should not be made to terrorist kidnappers Patrick T. Brandt, Justin George, Todd Sandler ⁎ School of Economic, Political & Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75080, USA article info abstract Article history: This paper examines the dynamic implications of making concessions to terrorist kidnappers. Received 21 December 2015 We apply a Bayesian Poisson changepoint model to kidnapping incidents associated with Received in revised form 23 May 2016 three cohorts of countries that differ in their frequency of granting concessions. Depending Accepted 24 May 2016 on the cohort of countries during 2001–2013, terrorist negotiation successes encouraged 64% Available online 26 May 2016 to 87% more kidnappings. Our findings also hold for 1978–2013, during which these negotia- tion successes encouraged 26% to 57% more kidnappings. Deterrent aspects of terrorist casual- Keywords: ties are also quantified; the dominance of religious fundamentalist terrorists meant that such Kidnappings casualties generally did not curb kidnappings. Changepoints © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY- Game theory Concessions NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Violent ends Dynamic analysis “…we know that hostage takers looking for ransoms distinguish between those governments that pay ransoms and those that do not, and make a point of not taking hostages from those countries that do not pay.” David S. Cohen, US Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 2012 speech to ChathamHouse [Callimachi (2014a)] 1. -
Field Development-A3-EN-02112020 Copy
FIELD DEVELOPMENTS SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC NORTH EAST AND NORTH WEST SYRIA ٢٠٢٠ November ٢ - October ٢٧ Violations committed by ١,٠٩١ the Regime and its Russian ally of the ceasefire truce ٢٠٢٠ November ٢ Control Parties ;٢٠٢٠ March ٥ After the Turkish and Russian Presidents reached the ceasefire truce agreement in Idleb Governorate on the warplanes of the regime and its Russian ally didn’t bomb North Western Syria ever since; yet the regime continued Russian warplanes have ;٢٠٢٠ June ٢ targeting the cities and towns there with heavy artillery and rocket launchers; on again bombed northwestern Syria, along with the regime which continued targeting NW Syria with heavy artillery and ١,٠٩١ rocket launchers. Through its network of enumerators, the Assistance Coordination Unit ACU documented violations of the truce committed by the regime and its Russian ally as of the date of this report. There has been no change in the control map over the past week; No joint Turkish-Russian military patrols were carried the regime bombed with heavy ,٢٠٢٠ October ٢٧ on ;٢٠٢٠ November ٢ - October ٢٧ out during the period between artillery the area surrounding the Turkish observation post in the town of Marj Elzohur. The military actions carried out ٣ civilians, including ٢٣ civilians, including a child and a woman, and wounded ٨ by the Syrian regime and its allies killed Regime .women ٣ children and Opposition group The enumerators of the Information Management Unit (IMU) of the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) documented in Opposition group affiliated by Turkey (violations of the truce in Idleb governorate and adjacent Syrian democratic forces (SDF ٦٨ m; ٢٠٢٠ November ٢ - October ٢٧ the period between countrysides of Aleppo; Lattakia and Hama governorates. -
SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2019: Update on Incidents According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Compiled by ACCORD, 23 June 2020
SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) compiled by ACCORD, 23 June 2020 Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality Number of reported fatalities National borders: GADM, November 2015a; administrative divisions: GADM, November 2015b; in- cident data: ACLED, 20 June 2020; coastlines and inland waters: Smith and Wessel, 1 May 2015 SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2019: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 23 JUNE 2020 Contents Conflict incidents by category Number of Number of reported fatalities 1 Number of Number of Category incidents with at incidents fatalities Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality 1 least one fatality Explosions / Remote Conflict incidents by category 2 3058 397 1256 violence Development of conflict incidents from December 2017 to December 2019 2 Battles 1023 414 2211 Strategic developments 528 6 10 Methodology 3 Violence against civilians 327 210 305 Conflict incidents per province 4 Protests 169 1 9 Riots 8 1 1 Localization of conflict incidents 4 Total 5113 1029 3792 Disclaimer 8 This table is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 20 June 2020). Development of conflict incidents from December 2017 to December 2019 This graph is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 20 June 2020). 2 SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2019: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 23 JUNE 2020 Methodology GADM. Incidents that could not be located are ignored. The numbers included in this overview might therefore differ from the original ACLED data. -
Field Developments in Idleb 51019
Field Developments in Idleb, Northern Hama Countryside, Western Situation Report and Southern Aleppo Countryside During March and April 2019 May 2019 Aleppo Countrysides During March and April 2019 the Information Management Unit 1 Field Developments in Idleb, Northern Hama Countryside, Western and Southern Aleppo Countryside During March and April 2019 The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) aims to strengthen the decision-making capacity of aid actors responding to the Syrian crisis. This is done through collecting, analyzing and sharing information on the humanitarian situation in Syria. To this end, the Assistance Coordination Unit through the Information Management Unit established a wide net- work of enumerators who have been recruited depending on specific criteria such as education level, association with information sources and ability to work and communicate under various conditions. IMU collects data that is difficult to reach by other active international aid actors, and pub- lishes different types of information products such as Need Assessments, Thematic Reports, Maps, Flash Reports, and Interactive Reports. 2 Field Developments in Idleb, Northern Hama Countryside, Western Situation Report and Southern Aleppo Countryside During March and April 2019 May 2019 During March and April 2019 3 Field Developments in Idleb, Northern Hama Countryside, Western and Southern Aleppo Countryside During March and April 2019 01. The Most Prominent Shelling Operations During March and April 2019, the Syrian regime and its Russian ally shelled Idleb Governorate and its adjacent countrysides of Aleppo and Hama governorates, with hundreds of air strikes, and artillery and missile shells. The regime bombed 14 medical points, including hospitals and dispensaries; five schools, including a kinder- garten; four camps for IDPs; three bakeries and two centers for civil defense, in addition to more than a dozen of shells that targeted the Civil Defense volunteers during the evacuation of the injured and the victims. -
Mapping Accountability Efforts in Syria
MAPPING ACCOUNTABILITY EFFORTS IN SYRIA Prepared by the Public International Law & Policy Group February 2013 PILPG Syria Transitional Justice Mapping Evaluation, February 2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS Statement of Purpose 1 Introduction 1 Background on the Syrian Conflict 2 Methodology 4 Legal Framework for Transitional Justice in Syria 5 Syria’s International Legal Obligations 5 International Criminal Law 5 International Humanitarian Law 10 International Human Rights Law 15 Syria’s Domestic Legal Framework 16 The Syrian Penal Code 16 Amnesties in Transitional Justice 18 Amnesties Issued by the Syrian Government 19 Structure of the Syrian Judicial System 22 Supreme Judicial Council 23 Syrian Court Structure 23 Judicial Independence 26 The Transitional Justice Evidence Documentation Process 27 TJE Collection 28 TJE Compilation 28 Facilitation and Training 29 Other Activities 29 TJE Collection in Syria 30 Syrian Groups and Organizations 30 Civil Society Organizations 30 News Agencies 31 International Organizations 31 Intergovernmental Organizations and Bodies 31 Governmental Initiatives 32 Non-governmental Organizations 32 PILPG Syria Transitional Justice Mapping Evaluation, February 2013 News Agencies 33 Needs and Challenges for TJE Documentation Efforts in Syria 33 Deteriorating Security Situation in Syria 34 Coordinating Efforts 35 Lack of Comprehensive International Legal Approach 36 Inconsistent Verification Standards 37 Reaching All Affected Areas and Populations 37 Rape and Sexual Violence 38 Unbiased Documentation of Violations by All -
Reporting ISIS
Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy Discussion Paper Series #D-101, July 2016 The Pen and the Sword: Reporting ISIS By Paul Wood Joan Shorenstein Fellow, Fall 2015 BBC Middle East Correspondent Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. May 2013: The kidnapping started slowly. 1 At first, it did not feel like a kidnapping at all. Daniel Rye delivered himself to the hostage-takers quite willingly. He was 24 years old, a freelance photographer from Denmark, and he had gone to the small town of Azaz in northern Syria. His translator, a local woman, said they should get permission to work. So on the morning of his second day in Azaz, only his second ever in Syria, they went to see one of the town’s rebel groups. He knocked at the metal gate to a compound. It was opened by a boy of 11 or 12 with a Kalashnikov slung over his shoulder. “We’ve come to see the emir,” said his translator, using the word – “prince” – that Islamist groups have for their commanders. The boy nodded at them to wait. Daniel was tall, with crew-cut blonde hair. His translator, a woman in her 20s with a hijab, looked small next to him. The emir came with some of his men. He spoke to Daniel and the translator, watched by the boy with the Kalashnikov. The emir looked through the pictures on Daniel’s camera, squinting. There were images of children playing on the burnt-out carcass of a tank. It was half buried under rubble from a collapsed mosque, huge square blocks of stone like a giant child’s toy. -
Syria 2014 Human Rights Report
SYRIA 2014 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The authoritarian regime of President Bashar Asad has ruled the Syrian Arab Republic since 2000. The regime routinely violated the human rights of its citizens as the country witnessed major political conflict. The regime’s widespread use of deadly military force to quell peaceful civil protests calling for reform and democracy precipitated a civil war in 2012, leading to armed groups taking control of major parts of the country. In government-controlled areas, Asad makes key decisions with counsel from a small number of military and security advisors, ministers, and senior members of the ruling Baath (Arab Socialist Renaissance) Party. The constitution mandates the primacy of Baath Party leaders in state institutions and society. Asad and Baath party leaders dominated all three branches of government. In June, for the first time in decades, the Baath Party permitted multi-candidate presidential elections (in contrast to single-candidate referendums administered in previous elections), but the campaign and election were neither free nor fair by international standards. The election resulted in a third seven-year term for Asad. The geographically limited 2012 parliamentary elections, won by the Baath Party, were also neither free nor fair, and several opposition groups boycotted them. The government maintained effective control over its uniformed military, police, and state security forces but did not consistently maintain effective control over paramilitary, nonuniformed proregime militias such as the National Defense Forces, the “Bustan Charitable Association,” or “shabiha,” which often acted autonomously without oversight or direction from the government. The civil war continued during the year. -
Volume X, Issue 1 February 2016 PERSPECTIVES on TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 1
ISSN 2334-3745 Volume X, Issue 1 February 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 1 Table of Contents Welcome from the Editor 1 I. Articles Who are the Bangladeshi ‘Islamist Militants’? 2 by Ali Riaz Why is Contemporary Religious Terrorism Predominantly Linked to Islam? Four Possible Psychosocial Factors 19 by Joshua D. Wright How Dangerous Are Domestic Terror Plotters with Foreign Fighter Experience? The Case of Homegrown Jihadis in the US 32 by Christopher J. Wright The Nature of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A Strategic Analysis 41 by James Adewunmi Falode II. Interview In Conversation with Morten Storm: A Double Agent’s Journey into the Global Jihad 53 Interviewed by Stefano Bonino III. Research Note If Publicity is the Oxygen of Terrorism – Why Do Terrorists Kill Journalists? 65 by François Lopez IV. Resources Counting Lives Lost – Monitoring Camera-Recorded Extrajudicial Executions by the “Islamic State” 78 by Judith Tinnes Bibliography: Northern Ireland Conflict (The Troubles) 83 Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes V. Book Reviews Michael Morell. The Great War of our Time. The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism, from Al Qa’ida to ISIS. New York: Twelve, 2015; 362 pp.; US $ 28.00. ISBN 978-1-4555-8566-3. 111 Reviewed by Brian Glyn Williams ISSN 2334-3745 i February 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 1 Counterterrorism Bookshelf: Twenty New Publications on Israeli & Palestinian Issues 114 Reviewed by Joshua Sinai VI. Notes from the Editor TRI Award for Best PhD Thesis 2015: Deadline of 31 March 2016 for Submissions Approaching 126 About Perspectives on Terrorism 127 ISSN 2334-3745 ii February 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 1 Welcome from the Editor Dear Reader, We are pleased to announce the release of Volume X, Issue 1 (February 2016) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. -
Return to Raqqa
RETURN TO RAQQA 80' - 2020 MEDIAWAN RIGHTS Produced by Minimal Films [email protected] RETURN TO RAQQA 0 2 SYNOPSIS “Return to Raqqa” chronicles what was perhaps the most famous kidnapping event in history , when 19 journalists were taken captive by the Islamic State, as told by one of its protagonists: Spanish reporter Marc Marginedas, who was also the first captive to be released. MARC MARGINEDAS Marc Marginedas is a journalist who was a correspondent for El Periódico de Catalunya for two decades. His activity as a war correspondent led him to cover the civil war in Algeria, the second Chechen war, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the civil war in Syria, among others. On 1 September 2013, Marginedas entered Syria accompanied by a group of opposition figures from the Free Syrian Army. It was his third visit to the country as a correspondent since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. His main goal during this latest trip was to provide information on the preparations for a possible international military intervention that seemed very close. Three days later, on 4 September 2013, Marginedas was abducted near the city of Hama by ISIS jihadists. His captivity lasted almost six months, during which he shared a cell with some twenty journalists and aid workers from various countries. Two of these were James Foley and Steven Sotloff, colleagues who unfortunately did not share his fate. Marginedas was released in March 2014 and has not returned to Syrian territory since then. But he now feels the need to undertake this physical, cathartic journey to the house near Raqqa where he underwent the harshest experience of his life, an experience that he has practically chosen to forget over the past few years. -
Freedom on the Net 2016
FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016 Syria 2015 2016 Population: 18.5 million Not Not Internet Freedom Status Internet Penetration 2015 (ITU): 30 percent Free Free Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: No Obstacles to Access (0-25) 24 24 Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes Limits on Content (0-35) 26 26 Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes Violations of User Rights (0-40) 37 37 TOTAL* (0-100) 87 87 Press Freedom 2016 Status: Not Free * 0=most free, 100=least free Key Developments: June 2015 – May 2016 • The so-called Islamic State (IS) issued strict regulations on the provision of internet access at cybercafes, requiring business to obtain licenses for setting up operations in Raqqa and Deir al-Zor (see Availability and Ease of Access). • The internet was reportedly restored to parts of Aleppo, which had been shut off from access for seven months due to damage to telecommunications infrastructure. Authorities continue to shut down internet access in preparation for military offensives (See Restric- tions on Connectivity). • At least 17 netizens and citizen journalists remain imprisoned by the regime on charges related to their digital activism. It was confirmed in September 2015 that cartoonist Akram Raslan died while in state custody, likely as a result of torture (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities). • Several activists and bloggers were murdered by IS militants both in IS-controlled ter- ritory and neighboring Turkey, including two members of Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently and a female blogger who wrote about daily life in Raqqa (see Intimidation and Violence). • Russia stepped up cyberattacks against Syrian human rights organizations and opposition groups in a bid to disrupt reporting on human rights violations and obtain intelligence (see Technical Attacks). -
In the Depth of the Abyss
In the Depth of the Abyss 463 media activist killed, 1027 others arrested and kidnapped 1 www.sn4hr.org - [email protected] Report Contents: - Introduction ................................................................................................3 - Report methodology ..................................................................................5 - Executive Summary ...................................................................................6 - Report Details ............................................................................................6 1. Government forces (army, security, local militias, foreign militias).........6 2. Kurdish Democratic Union forces ............................................................10 3. Extremist Groups .......................................................................................11 4. Armed Opposition Factions .......................................................................14 5. Unidentified Groups ...................................................................................15 - Recommendations .......................................................................................16 2 www.sn4hr.org - [email protected] SNHR is an independent, non-governmental, nonprofit, human rights organization that was founded in June 2011. SNHR is a Thursday 23 April 2015 certified source for the United Nation in all of its statistics. A- Introduction As the popular protests began in March 2011 the Syrian authorities realized the crucial role of the media in exposing their -
General Assembly Security Council Seventy-Fifth Session Seventy-Fifth Year Agenda Items 34, 71, 114 and 135
United Nations A/75/644–S/2020/1191 General Assembly Distr.: General 14 December 2020 Security Council Original: English General Assembly Security Council Seventy-fifth session Seventy-fifth year Agenda items 34, 71, 114 and 135 Prevention of armed conflict Right of peoples to self-determination Measures to eliminate international terrorism The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity Letter dated 10 December 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General Further to my letters dated 3 October (A/75/491-S/2020/976), 5 October (A/75/496-S/2020/984) and 31 October (A/75/566-S/2020/1073), I am enclosing herewith the Report on the involvement of foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries by Azerbaijan in the aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) (see annex). I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 71, 114 and 135 and of the Security Council. (Signed) Mher Margaryan Ambassador Permanent Representative 20-17210 (E) 221220 *2017210* A/75/644 S/2020/1191 Annex to the letter dated 10 December 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General REPORT ON THE USE OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS (FTFs) BY AZERBAIJAN IN THE AGGRESSION TO SUPPRESS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ARTSAKH (NAGORNO-KARABAKH) TO SELF-DETERMINATION (as of October 31, 2020) 2/41 20-17210 A/75/644 S/2020/1191 Contents Chapter 1: Overview ........................................................................................................................................