Number 34 June 2006 Humanitarian Practice Network

HPNManaged by Humanitarian Humanitarian Policy Group Exchange In this issue Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI The Pakistan earthquake response 2 The response to the earthquake in Pakistan: the view from the Federal This edition of Humanitarian Relief Commission Exchange features articles on 4 Humanitarian intervention in a sovereign the response to the earth- ©Reuters/Yannis www.alertnet.org Behrakis, courtesy state: the political fault-lines of the quake in Pakistan on 8 Pakistan earthquake 6 Earthquake jihad: the role of jihadis and October 2005, documenting Islamist groups after the October 2005 practical lessons and key earthquake issues from a range of agency, 8 Humanitarian capacity in the South Asian institutional and staff perspec- earthquake response: a local perspective tives. The focus is on the 10 Responding to shelter needs in post- earthquake Pakistan: a self-help approach response, capacity and view- 12 The Pakistan earthquake and the health point of local and national needs of women actors, and how these inter- 14 Building media capacities to improve sected with those of the inter- disaster response: lessons from Pakistan national community. 16 When is a camp not a camp? When it’s a ‘tent village’ An article by the Pakistan government’s The theme of individual and community 19 Timing matters: capacity-building during an emergency response Federal Relief Commission explores the capacity is explored in articles focusing on key lessons of the disaster for the cash, shelter and local coping strategies, Practice and policy notes government agency charged with and the role of the media in improving 21 Managing humanitarian programmes in least- developed countries: the case of Zambia leading the overall response. As this disaster responses. These articles empha- 23 Land rights and displacement in northern and other articles highlight, humani- sise the importance of looking for oppor- Uganda tarian actors relied heavily on the tunities to implement programmes that 25 Chronic vulnerability in Niger: implications and capacity of the Pakistan army, with prioritise and build on people’s own lessons learned for UNICEF’s emergency international military support, to over- capacities and their own understanding of nutrition response 29 Researching with children in conflict-affected come logistical challenges and reach their needs. settings isolated communities. The army’s 32 Can joint evaluations promote ongoing involvement presented both opportu- The need for humanitarian actors to listen collaborative action by NGOs? nities and dilemmas for local and to communities is further investigated by Endpiece international humanitarian actors, Nicholas Stockton in his end-piece article. 34 The accountability alibi particularly in terms of how humani- Stockton engages with an earlier end- tarian principles are applied and piece by Jan Egeland on OCHA’s approach About HPN understood in a context where the to accountability, and argues that OCHA The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas state plays such a leading part in still has some way to go in putting those Development Institute is an independent forum responding to immediate needs. affected by disasters at the centre of its where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, accountability practices and principles. analysis and experience. The views and opinions An article by Sungi – a local NGO – expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy illustrates how the response also This edition also contains a range of Group or the Overseas Development Institute. relied on the capacity of experi- general policy and practice articles enced national NGOs. Other key focusing on government capacity in Britain’s leading independent local players in the response Zambia, the importance of land issues in think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues included jihadi organisations, northern Uganda, nutritional lessons from which used pre-existing struc- the Niger crisis in 2005, approaches to Overseas Development Institute tures to mobilise resources conducting research with children in 111 Westminster Bridge Road London SE1 7JD rapidly. Again, the engagement conflict-affected settings and NGO collab- United Kingdom of these groups – some of oration through multi-agency evaluations. Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 whom are proscribed – raised We hope you enjoy this issue of difficult issues for interna- Humanitarian Exchange, and as always HPN e-mail: [email protected] HPN website: www.odihpn.org tional agencies. we welcome your feedback. 2 THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE ering from itisgoingtocostbillionofdollars. the worstnatural calamityinPakistan’s history;recov- ened thelives ofthesurvivors. This waswithoutquestion the shockandtrauma, whiletheonsetofwinterthreat- post-quake tremors andconstantlandslidesmultiplied million tonsofdebris.Hundreds of affected area wasstrewn with200 tial utilitieswere disrupted;inall,the structure wasunusableandallessen- collapsed, thecommunicationsinfra- health care unitsandhospitals ov institutions were destroyed, killing Himalayan terrain. Mosteducational square kilometres oftreacherous devastation wasspread over 30,000 bearing thebruntofdisaster. The groups inthismountainousregion economic damage,withvulnerable suffered extensive structural and FrontierNorth-West Province (NWFP) A without shelter. The affectedareas of many more andleavingmillions 73,000 people,severely injuring widespread destruction,killingover P thathitnorthern The earthquake Major-General Farooq AhmadKhan,Federal Relief Commissioner F inPakistan: theviewfrom totheearthquake the The response r with amandatetomanagetheentire spectrumofthe immediately formedtheFederal Relief Commission(FRC), R infrastructure waseithervery poorortotallydestroyed. r No disastermanagementorganisation existedtohandlea The role oftheFederal Relief Commission collapse ofcivil order inthe affectedareas calledfora scale ofthedisaster, theharshweather conditionsandthe W elief effort: elief operation onsuchalarge scale,andtheexisting akistan on8October2005caused ealising thegravity ofthedisaster, thegovernment zad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) and zad JammuandKashmir (AJ&K) ederal ReliefCommission ithin days, the FRC hadtakencharge ofthesituation. ithin days,theFRC The er 18,000students. The majorityof HUMANITARIAN forces oftheteam. were alsotobeapart R F oftheteam. andformapart function through FRC communication andinformationdivisionswould including cabinet,health,interior, foreign affairs; concerned withtherelief andrehabilitation efforts, r Hewasto co-ordinate andmonitortherelief efforts. The Federal Relief Commissionerwasmandatedto eport directly totheprimeminister.eport All agencies or thispurposetheirreps were attachedwithFRC. eps from theconcernedagencies ofthearmed exchange THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE A damagedbuildinginIslamabad,8October2005 W all theagenciesconcerned. developing acommonoperating picture andguidelinesfor UN St weresynchronisation ofrelief ensured efforts through several billionrupees.Inter-agency coordination andthe amountingto for financialcompensationsurvivors, all thestakeholdersandkeyplayers. The planalsoprovided r elaborate NationalActionPlantoensure acoherent ground. The Commissionconceived andimplementedan making, coupledwiththeefficientexecution ofdirectives on r coordinators, lookedafter inter-department andinter- civilian wing,comprisingministerial representatives and therescue andrelief operation,for undertaking whilethe military andthecivilian. The militarywingwasresponsible esponse, spellingoutdomains,policiesandend-statesfor esponse mechanismwhichcouldprovide quickdecision- ithin the FRC itself, thereithin theFRC were twodistinctwings,the r ategic Leaders Group Meetings,whichintegrated the ’s

dollars from itisgoingtocostbillions of P worst natural calamityin this waswithoutquestionthe cluster approach into FRC strategy,cluster approach intoFRC withaviewto

akistan’s recovering history; ©Reuters/Mian Khursheed, courtesy www.alertnet.org courtesy Khursheed, ©Reuters/Mian THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE 3 er is the Federal Relief is the Federal mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Nu arrangements will not work in all arrangements Ad hoc incial and district leaders should play stronger incial and district ov e must cut through red tape wherever it adds delay. it adds wherever tape red e must cut through eople-centred solutions must be found. We must all We solutions must be found. eople-centred ake the media on board by providing access, contin- providing by ake the media on board There must be a full-time disaster management be a full-time disaster must There and effec- plans for a quick with contingency agency, response. tive circumstances. NGOs, international organi- All stakeholders, including must be taken into the govern- sations and donors, confidence. ment’s needs no emphasis. Speedy decision-making Pr roles. and executing coordinating the UNAdequate funding for to enable a is necessary swift international response. and sharing of data with them. uous interaction to mechanisms should be established Appropriate to end-user; the publica- source from aid flows track tion of this information is crucial for transparency. the inaccessibility of earthquake-affectedGiven areas be difficult, links will always and the fact that road quake-prone needed in helipads and landing strips are for communication along with enhanced radar areas, aircraft. for disaster pre- of new strategies The development be considered. needs to paredness needs to be increased of disaster response Knowledge public. within society and among the general All local and international NGOs and UN organisations be kept and this information must must be registered, up to date. that the path of recovery ourselves constantly remind the people who is not for us to determine, but for suffered. most successful relief operation in recent history. It holds history. in recent operation relief successful most importantseveral of best practice in terms for us lessons for the future: • • •W • • •T • • • • • •P to the earthquakeThe world community responded by items and placing assets such as heli- rushing in relief copters, field hospitals, engineering equipment and water plants at our disposal to help earthquake-affectedfiltration priceless who offered people. I would like to thank everyone help to the stricken people of Pakistan. Ahmad Khan Farooq Major-General Commissioner, Government of Pakistan. Government Commissioner, June 2006 Network Paper 55 Network Paper David Loquercio, Mark Hammersley and Ben Emmens David Loquercio, Understanding and addressing staff turnover in humanitarian agencies staff turnover Understanding and addressing erwhelmed by the generosity of the world of the the generosity erwhelmed by ov

re we aff turnover has become a major concern for humanitarian agencies. Unplanned staff turnover is problematic and expensive, is problematic for humanitarian agencies. Unplanned staff turnover has become a major concern aff turnover

ithin the resource constraints, a number of simulta- constraints, ithin the resource ehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA), Authority and Reconstruction ehabilitation akistani diaspora, each did their partakistani diaspora, and help to protect While much discussed, no one has attempted an in-depth study offering a detailed consideration of the causes and conse- consideration While much discussed, no one has attempted an in-depth study offering a detailed support and ideas for furth providing to fill this gap by This paper aims humanitarian sector. in the quences of staff turnover St sometimes or even to new emergencies, but also the capacity of agencies to respond affecting not only learning and efficiency, just to continue existing programmes. action. It discusses the causes of staff turnover, outlines the key elements of a strategy to retain staff and describes what to retain strategy outlines the key elements of a action. It discusses the causes of staff turnover, agencies can do to manage the consequences of staff turnover. olunteers, men and women, aid workers, international olunteers, men and women, aid workers, elief to the earthquake victims. But equally significant esponse, the removal or rescue of the dead and injured, of the dead and or rescue esponse, the removal of provision villages and the immediate eaching remote econstruction. The FRC on the first econstruction. focused its operations The world’s most successful relief operation? most successful relief The world’s It has been claimed that the earthquake was the response community and voluntary organisations, and the work of organisations, community and voluntary v NGOs and global civil society deserves the organisations, Donors in particularhighest praise. need special mention supportfor their generous in providing and assistance r compassion and was the spontaneous outpouring of both at home and the people of Pakistan, by generosity soldiers From witnessed before. on a scale never abroad, workers to local NGOs and the relief and voluntary P and the in general, armed forces The Pakistan the victims. the backbone of the relief provided army in particular, effort, coordi- and extent of cooperation, and the degree have and implementation achieved nation, execution as international national as well by rightly been praised observers, the humanitarian community. and by We W had to be instantly activated, activities neous relief medical damage control, the injured, including evacuating Other elements of goods. of relief help and the provision trauma, psychosocial addressing included the response fallout and the management of the social and economic had to be maintained, Law and order displaced people. of the key challenges we Some restored. and civic order aftermath of the disaster faced in the immediate aspects of the the different concerned prioritising r difficulties around forces, deploy the need to rapidly r the leadership Throughout, food and medical aid. shelter, ideal working provided and the vision of the government and impetus to the FRC,parameters governments, foreign departments donors, the public and all the government concerned, including the armed forces. agency issues. The response was based on a four-fold on was based response The issues. agency conse- and relief, rescue search, comprising strategy, and rehabilitation and recovery quence management, r the Earthquake agency, while a second two elements, R needs. and reconstruction rehabilitation addressed 4 THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE democracy toflourishinPakistan’. than isabsolutelynecessarytopave thewayfortrue forces have nointentionofstayingincharge anylonger nation onassumingpower, armed Musharraf stated:‘The democracy. Inhisfirstaddress tothe establish ‘genuine’ of theprevious regime, andpromised to use hisruletore- leaders, justifiedhisactionsonthebasisofcorruption bloodless coupin1999.Musharraf, likeprevious coup current leader, General Pervez Musharraf, seized power ina Sharif –have eitherbeenexecuted orexiled. The country’s ministers –ZulfikarAliBhutto,BenazirBhuttoandNawaz Pakistan’smilitary interventions. lastthree electedprime and transfers ofpower have alwaysbeenpreceded by hasever beenvotedincumbent politicalparty outofoffice, or indirectly by militarygovernments: despiteelections,no Since thelate1950s,Pakistan hasbeenruledeitherdirectly The politicalenvironment struction period. those intendingtoremain inthecountryintorecon- environment formanyinternationalagencies,especially politics withinPakistan. This inturnaffectstheworking relief mayhave significantramificationsearthquake for alienation ofmainstreamThe politicsof politicalparties. of militaryrule,sectarianism,devolution andthefurther the centre andtheprovinces, Kashmir, thelegitimisation contemporary Pakistan. These includerelations between agencies playsintomanyofthepoliticalfault-lines ‘humanitarian space’, thepresence ofhumanitarian ofemphasisingadepoliticised Despite theimportance tion of, afunctionalandcapablegovernment. quently foundthemselves workingwith,andattheinvita- national economy. Internationalagencieshave conse- threatened thegovernment, thestatestructure orthe substantial damageandlossoflife,hasnotsignificantly P of humanitarianintervention. This isnotthecasein little concernforstatestructures orthepoliticalimpacts apolitical humanitarianimperative, withcomparatively tions, relief agenciescanactundertheprincipleofan r or Afghanistan:environments markedby theabsenceofa ences includestintsinDarfur, Bosnia,Kosovo, East Timor Fo can dismisstheNationalAssembly, approve seniorjudicial L the control ofthearmedforces. In2002,heintroduced the the country’s 1973constitutionandbringingPakistan under Musharraf issuedaProclamation ofEmergency suspending Berating whathetermedPakistan’s ‘sham democracy’, T ofthePakistanearthquake fault-lines H 1 Musharraf, quotedin R ecognised orenforceable statestructure. Insuchsitua- egal Framework Order (LFO),underwhich the president akistan. The 8 October earthquake, whilecausing akistan. The 8Octoberearthquake, eport 40,October2005,p. 1. eport om Bamforth, development consultant om Bamforth, r manyaidworkers,theirformative professional experi- HUMANITARIAN umanitarian intervention inasovereign state: thepolitical umanitarian intervention exchange P akistan: Transition toDemocracy? 1 , ICGAsia not subjecttoparliamentary scrutiny).Combined domestic product (thisisaneducatedguesssinceit ture isbelieved toaccountfor7%ofthecountry’s gross the world’s ninth-largest military, anddefenceexpendi- andeconomicinterests. Pakistan has political support transition, butthecentralisation of the militaryregime’s r and parliamentarypollswere heldthesameyear –the Musharraf –there wasareferendum onhisrulein2002, parliament. Althoughelectionshave takenplaceunder ensure thedominanceofmilitaryover thestateand The combinedeffectofthesemeasures hasbeento military influenceintothebureaucracy. administrative functionsoflocal government, andextended the devolution planalsogave themilitarycontrol ofthe to legalchallengeorreview. that theactionsofmilitarygovernment are notsubject that presidential orders override allotherlegislation,and Finally, theProvisional ConstitutionalOrder (PCO) stipulates provinces was constitutionallyguaranteed. political, administrative and fiscalautonomyofthe ences, andunderminethefederal principleinwhichthe strate democratic legitimacytointernalandexternalaudi- would undermineestablishedpoliticalopposition,demon- depoliticise governance, create anewpoliticalelitethat levels. The purposeofdevolution tolocalgovernment wasto substitute fordemocratisation atnationalandprovincial democracy asa in 2000,theregime introduced ‘grass roots’ opposition tomilitaryrule.Underadevolution planunveiled governments andtoundercut theelectoral basisforpolitical Musharraf hassoughttoremove thepower ofprovincial To democracy, governance, andinter-provincial harmony’. national securityofthestate;andmattersrelating to ‘ amilitarysteeringcommitteewhoseremit covers(NSC), the LFO’s establishmentoftheNational SecurityCouncil r similar powers atstatelevel tothoseofthe president). appointments andappointprovincial governors (whohave 5 4 3 Legal Framework Order, 2002. R 2 strategic matters pertaining tosovereignty,strategic matterspertaining integrityand ole ofthemilitarywasgiven constitutionalpower through ationale forthesewasnotdevolution ordemocratic eport 201,September2005,p. 8. eport Devolution inPakistan: Reform orRegression? Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform Authoritarianism andPoliticalParty Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform inPakistanAuthoritarianism andPoliticalParty achieve dominanceover thedomesticpoliticallandscape, executed orexiled prime ministershave eitherbeen P akistan’s lastthree elected 4 , p. 22. ICG Asia Report 77,p.ICG AsiaReport 1. 5 Fu r thermore, , ICGAsia 2 The 3 establishment of transparent democratic government, but at the centre’s consoli- dation of political, administrative and economic control. Few UN or interna- tional agencies have stopped to consider the political environment in which they find themselves. Some agencies des- cribe their activities as extensions of the ©Reuters/Mian Khursheed, courtesy www.alertnet.org©Reuters/Mian Khursheed, courtesy government, while others, such as UNHCR, provide ‘technical advice’ on camp management. Organisations such as NATO operated under a 90-day man- date in the form of a direct personal invi- tation from Musharraf.

The government’s initial earthquake response was coordinated by the Federal Relief Commission (FRC). As the emergency phase drew to a close and reconstruction got under way, authority A Pakistani army helicopter involved in relief work, passed to the Earthquake Rehabilitation Muzaffarabad, 9 October 2005 and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA). Both agencies are headed by serving army generals, and both were estab- spending on health and education amounts to less than lished without the consent of parliament. Despite the fact THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE 3% of GDP.6 that it controls reconstruction funding, the ERRA is not accountable under its constitution to any jurisdiction in Musharraf’s regime has been strengthened by Pakistan’s Pakistan. UN and international agencies are compelled to international position. Although sanctions were imposed register formally with the ERRA and provide it with project following the 1999 coup, the 9/11 attacks have made proposals and funding sources. Agencies such as UNICEF Musharraf a key ally in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) are Pakistan’s strategic importance – it borders Afghanistan, consequently caught in a conflict of interest between their Iran, India and China – has led to a re-evaluation of humanitarian obligations under the UN system, and the Musharraf’s government. From being a military strong- perceived need to be ‘embedded’ with the army directly, or man with nuclear ambitions, Musharraf is now seen as through the ERRA, in order to secure reconstruction representing forces of pro-Western religious moderation. contracts. In addition, because the ERRA is responsible for Holding elections, albeit fixed ones, and half-hearted undertaking every task linked to reconstruction, the measures to reduce support to jihadi organisations active military-led government has become the key player in in Indian Kashmir have gone some way towards rein- reconstruction. Instead of empowering the affected local venting Pakistan’s military ruler as a moderate democrat. authorities, the ERRA will be the perfect tool for weakening them, and is likely to undermine the legitimacy of local bodies across the affected region. Pakistan’s domestic politics and Issues of mandate and capacity international position have Questions of mandate and capacity have further compli- important, but under-appreciated, cated the humanitarian response. The UN in particular has been underfunded and understaffed, and has consequently implications for humanitarian been dependent on the logistical capacity and local knowl- agencies responding to the edge of the military. The ability of agencies like UNHCR, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) October earthquake and UNICEF to advocate for established UN humanitarian standards has been compromised by the close working relationship with the government established during the The environment for humanitarian agencies emergency phase. This has affected the returns process in Pakistan’s domestic politics and international position have particular. Although a UN Sustainable Returns Taskforce important, but under-appreciated, implications for humani- wrote a strategy paper in keeping with humanitarian princi- tarian agencies responding to the October earthquake; in ples, such as the right to a free and informed choice about effect, agencies may find themselves participants in an where to return, government policy has been coercive. ongoing process of political realignment aimed, not at the Supplies to ‘formal’ camps with more than 50 families were cut off on 31 March, thus leaving the occupants with little 6 A. Siddiqua, ‘Political Economy of National Security’, in V. Kukreja option but to go elsewhere (‘informal’ camps with fewer and M. Singh (eds), Pakistan: Democracy, Development and Security than 50 families were, scandalously, not deemed to fall Issues (Karachi: Paramount Publishing, 2005), pp. 124–25. within the government/UN area of responsibility). The

Number 34 • June 2006 5 government, through the District Coordination Office, from relief and rehabilitation schemes means that army supplied transport to camps as they closed, but there were officers represent the government of Pakistan at every level frequent reports of people being abandoned by the side of of decision-making. While the government’s stated objec- the road when the trucks could go no further. tives may be the restoration of ‘genuine’ democratic government, the establishment of extra-constitutional and With Pakistan deemed a less enticing disaster location parliamentary bodies such as the NSC and the ERRA, and than, say, Thailand, the UN has been accused of sending the manipulation of electoral and administrative systems, out a ‘B’ team to manage what is a particularly complex all suggest a serious attempt by the military to centralise emergency environment. The presence of mainly inexperi- and consolidate political power. In this context, the conflict enced junior staff in the field has affected performance, as of interest between agencies’ ongoing projects, the impera- have ‘mandate issues’. UNHCR, whose main activities are tives of relief coordination and the perceived need to foster focused on refugees, found itself working primarily with close relations with the military government have under- internally displaced people, and the IOM took on a coordi- mined both the effectiveness of relief and the neutrality of nation role for emergency shelter for which it had neither ‘humanitarian space’. Wittingly or unwittingly, the ill- the institutional knowledge nor the expertise (this situation informed presence of the UN and international relief was addressed after secondments from the UK’s agencies in Pakistan has increased the regime’s interna- Department for International Development). Under the new tional legitimacy and helped to entrench the army’s power, Cluster approach, UNICEF was given the coordination role while further marginalising Pakistan’s civil society. in the Protection Cluster. A key element of coordination is the ability to separate the coordinating agency’s institu- Tom Bamforth is an Islamabad-based development tional priorities with the issues to be addressed by the consultant. His email address is: [email protected]. Cluster. UNICEF has, however, found it difficult to extend its institutional protection mandate for women and children to References and further reading include monitoring, tracking and advocacy for basic human- itarian standards among the rest of the IDP population, Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Lahore: who are by definition vulnerable, and whose interests are Vanguard, 2002). the responsibility of the Protection Cluster as a whole. Of Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh more than 300 Union Councils in NWFP, only one had been Thakur (eds), Making States Work: State Failure and visited by a UNICEF monitoring team by the end of May. the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo: UNU Press, 2005). Coordination of the aid effort has also been problematic. OCHA has suffered from a lack of clarity as to its role under V. Kukreja and M. Singh (eds), Pakistan: Democracy, the new Cluster approach to disaster management. In Development and Security Issues (Karachi: Paramount addition to being underfunded and operating in an advisory Publishing, 2005). capacity, OCHA has been undercut by the in-built cross- Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?, ICG Cluster coordination mechanisms of the new system. Asia Report 77, Islamabad/Brussels, March 2004. Conclusion Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military, ICG The national and international humanitarian response to Asia Report 36, Islamabad/Brusssels, July 2002. the earthquake has been profoundly influenced by the pre- Fédération International des Lignes des Droits de eminence of military figures in Pakistan’s political and l’Homme, In Mala Fide: Freedoms of Expression, of administrative structures. This raises important issues of Association and of Assembly in Pakistan, December aid accountability and transparency. The almost complete 2003, www.hrcp-web.org/report_fidh.cfm. exclusion of the civilian administration and elected bodies

Earthquake jihad: the role of jihadis and Islamist groups after the October 2005 earthquake Jawad Hussain Qureshi, ICG

Pakistan’s jihadi groups and other Islamist ‘humanitarian’ placement camps and carried out needs assessments. groups played a prominent role in Pakistan-administered This article explores the part these groups played, Kashmir (PaK) in the aftermath of the 8 October earth- reviews how international humanitarian actors engaged quake.1 They conducted relief and reconstruction work, with them and outlines the political consequences of their provided health services, organised and managed dis- activities, locally, nationally and regionally.

1 This article uses the term jihadi to mean Islamist militant groups (proscribed by the Pakistani government or the UN Security Council) that The jihadi and Islamist ‘humanitarian’ are involved in post-earthquake relief and reconstruction work. The term response ‘Islamist “humanitarian” group’ or ‘Islamist’ refers to any political or Pakistan has 58 Islamic religious parties, and 24 known Islamist militant groups operate in the country. At least 17 THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE THE PAKISTAN humanitarian organisation with an explicit Islamic missionary objective.

HUMANITARIAN 6 exchange Jihadi and Islamist groups were the first to conduct rescue Prominent Islamist ‘humanitarian’ foundations operations, establish initial medical emergency camps, and jihadi groups surgical units and dispensaries for earthquake survivors and send assessment teams to isolated areas. They raised The Jamiat Ulema-I-Islami (JUI) and the Jamaat-I-Islami (JI) are a volunteer army of thousands of madrassa students long the two largest Islamist political parties in Pakistan. Both before the arrival of the Pakistani army, international aid have prominent social wings. The JUI is in a coalition govern- agencies or emergency search and rescue teams. Jihadi ment with Musharraf’s Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML- outfits and Islamist groups provided doctors, clinics, x-ray Q) in NWFP and Balochistan provinces. The JUI is an ardent services, dental care, reconstruction materials, ambu- supporter of the ousted Taliban regime in Afghanistan, while lance services, burials and mosque rebuilding. They also the JI controls the Hizbul Mujahideen, a major militant organi- cared for orphans, the displaced and widows. They organ- sation operating in Indian-administered Kashmir. ised mule transport for relief goods to isolated areas, and commandeered lifting equipment and tents. In the recon- Al Khair Trust, which is connected to JUI, has been heavily struction phase, these groups have established supported by the Pakistani military in its relief and recon- programmes providing cheap reconstruction materials struction work, especially in PaK. The Al Khidmat and subsidised saw mills. Foundation, set up by JI, was one of the main organisations coordinating, collecting and distributing goods in the earth- quake-affected region, and also coordinated manpower from other international organisations. The Al Khidmat jihadi and Islamist groups raised a Foundation’s subsidiary organisations include the Pakistan volunteer army of thousands long Islamic Medical Association, the Pakistan Engineers Forum, the Ghazali Education Trust, and the JI’s Islami Jamiat Talaba before the army or international (student wing) and Tanzeem al-Asataza (teachers’ wing).

aid agencies arrived THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE

Other prominent jihadi groups carrying out relief work include: Interaction with international humanitarian actors • The Al Rasheed Trust, a Sunni organisation based in Whether knowingly or not, international humanitarian Karachi which grew out of the banned Islamist group actors (NGOs, the UN and foreign military assistance Jaish-e-Mohammad. Jaish-e-Mohammad was proscribed teams) established working relationships with some of by the Pakistani government in 2002. The Al Rasheed the banned jihadi groups and other Islamist ‘humani- Trust is banned by the UN Security Council, but the tarian’ groups, either supplying relief goods to jihadi Pakistani government has not outlawed it. camps or coordinating distributions with Islamist groups. • Jamaat-ud-Dawa (the Preaching Society) grew out of the UNHCR supplied camps managed by the JI and Al Rasheed banned Islamist militant organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba with shelters, Jamaat-ud-Dawa distributed US relief aid (Army of the Righteous). Jamaat-ud-Dawa is known to and an American surgeon operated in a Jamaat-ud-Dawa have militant training camps in PaK, and has been at the relief camp. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is reported to have worked forefront of the fighting in Indian-administered Kashmir. with the ICRC, WHO, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, Khalsa Aid (a The Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s ‘humanitarian arm’, the Idara Sikh humanitarian agency) and the Singapore Relief Khidmat-e-Khalq, maintained a field hospital in Agency. Jamaat-ud-Dawa claimed that it received funding Muzaffarabad and Balakot. It also operated ambulance from Singapore, Indonesia and Turkey, and Indonesian services and surgical camps, constructed 1,000 shelters and Turkish doctors worked as volunteers in hospitals and and provided electricity through generators. clinics that it sponsored. Meanwhile, non-sectarian organ- isations like the Edhi Foundation were overlooked by the UN and international NGOs.

Islamist groups banned by President Pervez Musharraf’s Arguably, working with these groups was made necessary government undertook relief and reconstruction work in by the urgency of the crisis, and by the lack of capacity the aftermath of the earthquake. These jihadi and Islamist within international agencies to mount large-scale distri- organisations were also prominent in camp management, butions. Nonetheless, it has contributed to building the running 37 out of the 73 organised camps in and around capacity and legitimacy of Islamist groups in PaK, and has the PaK capital, Muzaffarabad. These groups had a raised their profile as humanitarian actors. A number of presence in every affected district of PaK in the Neelum possible consequences flow from this, and these are and Jehlum valleys, including Muzaffarabad, Bagh, outlined in the following section. Hattian, Dhir Kot, Rawalakot, Haveli and Athmuqam. In their response to the earthquake, jihadi and Islamist The ramifications of the role of jihadi ‘humanitarian’ groups drew on their existing infrastruc- and Islamist ‘humanitarian’ groups in the ture in PaK, their knowledge of the local terrain and their earthquake response close cooperation with the Pakistan army, which provided The most important implications of jihadi and Islamist logistical support and other facilities, including heli- involvement in the earthquake response are likely to be copters, to enable the jihadis to continue their work. felt in the education sector. PaK is one of the country’s

Number 34 • June 2006 7 most literate regions, and the earthquake destroyed ahead of the polls that the Pakistani government and almost all of its education institutions. Integral to jihadi military were strengthening their cooperation with jihadi and Islamist relief efforts was the establishment of and Islamist groups and allowing them to enter the polit- schools and madrassas for young people in PaK. The ical mainstream. The Pakistani government had indicated Deobandi Wafaqul Madaris Al-Arabiya (Pakistan’s largest in April 2006 that the Sunni extremist group Sipah-e- union of madrassas) plans to build 1,500 mosques and Sahaba could enter politics if it undertook not to use its 300 madrassas in PaK and NWFP. The purely Islamic political platform to engage in sectarianism. education that these institutions will provide will inevitably sideline provincial/state curricula. In the Conclusion medium and long term, if the jihadis and Islamist groups The earthquake has exposed the precarious political situ- are allowed to continue with their rigid religious ation confronting international humanitarian actors in curriculum this will radicalise the young in PaK, and will Pakistan. Their close cooperation with the Pakistani form a convenient recruiting base for the militant activities military and jihadi and Islamist ‘humanitarian’ groups has of these organisations. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has openly raised concerns as to how the UN and other international called for all orphans to be handed over to the organisa- NGOs should engage in a country under military rule. In tion for an ‘Islamic education’. the future, the following recommendations for interna- tional humanitarian actors may address some of the chal- lenges such an environment can pose: non-sectarian organisations •Stress local partnerships with secular NGOs and civil like the Edhi Foundation were society groups, rather than ideological or missionary overlooked by the UN and groups. • Maintain knowledge of, and links with, local NGOs and international NGOs civil society groups, especially in disaster-prone areas. • Seek to ensure that elected federal and provincial legislative bodies, rather than the military, oversee and The second effect is likely to be political. PaK has a history scrutinise relief and reconstruction operations. of functioning mainstream secular and nationalist political • Donors and international humanitarian actors should parties, but the ‘goodwill’ created by the jihadi groups encourage the government to create mechanisms to means that they were likely to increase their political influ- allow local NGOs and civil society groups to participate ence following elections in the region scheduled for July in relief and reconstruction. 2006. Such an outcome would distort the development and reconstruction priorities of PaK since the jihadis and Jawad Hussain Qureshi is the South Asia analyst with the the Islamists are working towards a limited Islamist social International Crisis Group (ICG), Pakistan. His email and political agenda for the region. The presence of address is: [email protected]. This article draws in Islamist groups in the PaK legislature would also do little part on the ICG Policy Briefing Pakistan: Political Impact of to help relations with India over Kashmir. There were signs the Earthquake, Asia Briefing 46, 15 March 2006.

Humanitarian capacity in the South Asian earthquake response: a local perspective

Manzoor Ahmed Awan, Sungi Development Foundation

The Sungi Development Foundation has worked in the disaster management into its rights-based development areas affected by the South Asian earthquake since it was and advocacy work. It provided relief assistance following set up in 1989. Its key areas of focus are poverty allevia- flash floods in 1992 in Hazara Division in North-West tion, good governance, gender equity and policy advocacy Frontier Province (NWFP) – the same districts affected by on behalf of deprived and marginalised communities. the earthquake. It also responded to a number of other However, Sungi has also become increasingly involved in disasters, including an earthquake in April 2004 and a humanitarian assistance, and has gradually been devel- winter emergency and summer floods in 2005. Following oping its preparedness and response capacity. This article the 2004 earthquake, Sungi conducted training sessions on describes Sungi’s humanitarian response in the wake of earthquake-resistant housing techniques for masons, engi- the earthquake in October 2005. neers and the general public. Disaster Management Committees (DMCs) were formed and activists were trained Sungi’s humanitarian response capacity to handle emergencies. This capacity-development initia- Sungi is one of Pakistan’s few NGOs engaged in developing tive was supported technically and financially by UNDP and

THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE THE PAKISTAN its humanitarian response capacity, and integrating other partners, including Focus Humanitarian Assistance

HUMANITARIAN 8 exchange THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE 9 mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Nu by March 2006, Sungi had support shelter-related provided than 60,000 affected to more families lunteers across the country and abroad, giving them country and abroad, the lunteers across econstruction (JAC-RC). The JAC-RC raised considerable raised The JAC-RC econstruction (JAC-RC). egularly involved in relief assistance, and coordinated in relief egularly involved elief items and provide medical assistance to earth- elief items and provide Community Based Disaster Management in the earthquake(CBDM) was response community-based emergency Sungi’s institu- of grassroots the involvement made possible by These institutions village committees. tions through reducing ensuring transparency, a key role, played duplication. Committees were and avoiding exclusion r in their areas. work of other organisations the relief these organisations, Sungi facilitated and encouraged Sungi was not providing notably in those sectors where any support, was a shortage there or where of supplies. a DMC of Battagram, area remote In Shimlai, a very during early 2005 took the lead in coordi- developed organisations, various assistance by nating relief in most also active Committees were including the army. for activists took responsibility trained camps, where camp management. Information sharing and coordination Information sharing unit was and coordination information An emergency a key role played Sungi in Abbottabad. It established by espe- and coordination, in information dissemination immediately after the disaster. cially in the days Assessment reports, the maps and data-sets indicating of consid- and immediate needs were extent of damage also Sungi community. use to the humanitarian erable field visits to arrange organisations helped a number of example, For in the affected areas. and set up offices equipment and office, communication, Sungi provided Rescue accommodation facilities to the International district teams regu- Committee (IRC) Sungi’s and Oxfam. larly participated meetings organ- in cluster coordination UNised by agencies. a forum of rights-based civil society Sungi also convened and the Joint Action Committee for Relief organisations, R of hundreds assistance, and mobilised funds for relief vo organisa- relief and placing them with orientation training joined Sungi field teams, than 400 volunteers tions. More helping the agency undertake assessments, distribute r quake-hit communities. As of March 2006, Sungi had provided shelter-related provided had 2006, Sungi March As of support Consider- families. 60,000 affected than to more completed in other has also been work able emergency rehabilitation embarked on Sungi has now sectors, and an emphasis on with programmes, and reconstruction communi- capacity of disaster management building the at all levels. and the government ties, civil society Sungi is one of Pakistan’s few Sungi is one of Pakistan’s its NGOs engaged in developing capacity humanitarian response DP. An Oxfam team joined Sungi in Abbottabad within team joined Sungi in Abbottabad An Oxfam DP. address the immediate needs of the affected popula- address

&K. A partnership GB to was initiated with Oxfam ogramme (TRDP), provided logistic support, (TRDP),ogramme and other provided To Sungi’s earthquake response Sungi’s its network of grassroots humanitarian capacity, Sungi’s institutions and the support partners of its strategic and OICP consortium swiftly to members enabled it to respond minutes of the first devas- the October earthquake.Within GB, Oxfam Oxfam tating shock, Sungi was in contact with and district administrations Embassy, the Norwegian Novib, UN assessment was initiated. A number hours, and a joint rapid and Plan Pakistan including CRS, of other organisations, The first USA, also joined Sungi teams. the Children Save of 8 the evening by assessment report was prepared a coordinated and on 9 October Sungi and Oxfam October, than 20 national and with more joint assessment exercise the first first- These reports provided international NGOs. They were hand information for humanitarian agencies. which has (www.sungi.org), placed on the Sungi website few days Sungi was able a Within updated. been regularly database of affected villages, a comprehensive to develop indicating the extent of the damage. Sungi became an Oxfam International Contingency Plan Contingency International an Oxfam Sungi became prepara- in the (OICP) Partner a key role 1994, and played in the plan for NWFP of tion and implementation and Azad (AJ&K). Kashmir Jammu and plan was A capacity-building which Sungi with the supportdeveloped Novib, of Oxfam Management Community Based Disaster used to strengthen humanitarian A regular (CBDM) working area. capacity in its links were in the organisation, function was established creating with humanitarian agencies and work on developed was initiated. about disaster management basic awareness about 200 DMCs and trained Sungi successfully developed including women, in disaster than 300 activists, more in the effective very These committees were preparedness. during 2005, and rehabilitated response winter emergency facilities and 42 houses damaged 129 health and education during the earthquake in 2004. (FHA), the World Health Organisation and Agha Khan and Organisation Health World (FHA), the Services and Planning Building (AKBPS). tion, Sungi decided to concentrate on shelter, hygiene, on shelter, tion, Sungi decided to concentrate water and sanitation and health in the three food security, and in one district of most affected districts of NWFP, AJ 20,000 households, and a joint imple- shelter for provide GB to with Oxfam mentation mechanism was agreed water and sanitation, health and hygiene and provide placed were key staff members support.livelihood Sungi’s teams to carry out these activities. A member with Oxfam of the OICP Development Rural consortium,Thardeep the Pr partner medical help and financial assistance. NGOs gave Sungi delivered a presentation on the role of civil society ties at local level. A complete shelter package, adhering to in disaster management, rehabilitation and reconstruction minimum humanitarian standards, was developed and at a donors’ conference in Islamabad on 19 November, and delivered. Sungi also supported other organisations with organised an international conference on disaster information, and acted as a link with other NGOs, commu- management and preparedness in developing countries, nity-based organisations and Sungi’s partner grassroots in partnership with the Human Resource Development organisations. Network (HRDN) and ActionAid. It also organised seminars during the World Social Forum 2006, in partner- Sungi faced problems in the procurement of goods due to ship with Oxfam and ActionAid, on the role of civil society, its inexperience in emergency procurements and logistics. government and international NGOs in disaster manage- Partners like Oxfam and UNDP supported Sungi in this ment. A session was delivered on Sungi’s Community area. Sungi and other NGOs present on the ground also Based Disaster Management (CBDM) experience at an confronted high staff turnover due to enhanced job oppor- international conference on sustainable development in tunities and high salaries offered by international NGOs Islamabad, Pakistan. and UN agencies. More than 20 Sungi staff left the organi- sation during the early days of the response, and there Some lessons was a fear that many skilled and experienced staff would Sungi enjoyed a number of advantages in its humanitarian quit. With Oxfam’s support, Sungi overcame this problem response. It had a presence on the ground through organ- by providing a market supplement. Financial assistance ised communities, it had trained activists in humanitarian from donors such as the Norwegian Embassy and Oxfam principles, about 200 experienced staff and clear and Novib helped Sungi to keep good-quality staff on board. strong financial and administrative procedures and moni- Oxfam Novib also helped Sungi to develop a strategic plan toring and evaluation systems. Sungi maintained the to make its programmes current and relevant. quality of its work through geographical and sector- specific strategies, and succeeded in providing carpet Manzoor Ahmed Awan is Director of Operations for the coverage to all affected people, reducing the risk of exclu- Sungi Development Foundation. His email address is: sion, avoiding duplication and minimising relief dispari- [email protected].

Responding to shelter needs in post-earthquake Pakistan: a self-help approach Alexandra Causton and Graham Saunders, CRS

The international humanitarian community faced an loosening of soil and rock on the mountainside after the unprecedented challenge in responding to the shelter earthquake raised the risk of further landslides. needs created by the 8 October earthquake. The scale of the task was huge, with half a million homes in northern The scale of the disaster was also unprecedented: 3.5 Pakistan damaged or destroyed. With winter approaching, million Pakistanis were left homeless, exposed to freezing aid had to be delivered quickly, and in difficult, moun- temperatures and rain. Moving to tented camps in accor- tainous conditions. Meeting these challenges required dance with initial government policy meant losing the creative solutions and, especially, a high degree of October harvest, abandoning animals, leaving assets buried reliance on local knowledge and ingenuity. Drawing on in the rubble and even losing land. Solutions were required initial field evaluations of Catholic Relief Services (CRS)’s in people’s communities of origin, especially at altitudes self-help shelter programme,1 this article explores one where tents would not provide adequate shelter against the approach to maximising local ingenuity to meet priority winter weather. shelter needs. The approach was based on the under- standing that households could find appropriate, efficient Finally, the terrain presented significant challenges to the and durable solutions to rebuilding their homes. delivery of relief. The most vulnerable people lived in dispersed villages often accessible only by foot on narrow Needs and challenges trails up steep mountainsides. Road access was possible The first challenge was the pace at which shelter needed to along the valleys and to some higher locations with smaller be delivered. The disaster struck only two months before 4x4 vehicles. Large-scale transportation of bulky shelter the onset of winter in the northern villages. Located at the materials was problematic, and access was further foothills of the Himalayas, higher-elevation villages can be disrupted by localised landslides. Attempting to coordinate cut off for days by several feet of snow. The previous year, distributions to scattered and difficult-to-reach villages CRS had responded to a ‘winter emergency’ in these areas, required significant investment in logistical resources. In providing food and blankets to remote villages that had some cases, helicopters seemed the only option – creative been snowbound for over three weeks. In addition, the solutions were required to effectively reach higher eleva- 1 The evaluation focused on the Kontch and Siran valleys, sampling tions, solutions that could only be found by individual

THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE THE PAKISTAN 249 households from 23 villages within four Union Councils. families themselves.

HUMANITARIAN 10 exchange THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE 11 mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Nu equired to obtain their own timber, with an timber, to obtain their own equired r

geographic location. In one valley (Siran), households (Siran), location. In one valley geographic re

ell as safeguarding it as a village asset. ell as safeguarding eliance on the resourcefulness of households, combined of households, the resourcefulness eliance on part it as an acceptable egarded of doing business. Another portionAnother was to support in costs labour additional the shelter. building It was noticeable that, as the shelter programme was initi- It was noticeable that, as the shelter programme ated in one village, households in adjacent villages immedi- timber and clear house sites, ately began to salvage that the suggesting that the households recognised material, technical and financial assistance that was going enable them to construct a viable would to be provided Many householders also commented that the dwelling. with some additional invest- materials, tools and cash were, emphasis on salvaging timber from the debris of their timber from emphasis on salvaging on addi- went spending original homes. Most of the extra timber large-section and sawing salvaged tional timber, of this cash at local mills. Sources beams into usable sizes included savings, loans, the sale of assets and compensa- 90% of (although over government the Pakistan tion from compensation before the households had not received beginning shelter construction). Cutting the beams into sections was important to ensure as per the safety princi- was lightweight, that the new roof was a shortage there However, ples of the shelter approach. of sawmills in the villages. In the village of Akhori, families jointly bought a benchsaw and managed the cutting commu- In teams of eight, families transported the beams on nally. Once construc- the houses to the saw. their shoulders from tion was complete, the saw was to be donated to the local as source, school, for use as a potential income-generating w Findings of a field evaluation Findings programme’s indicates that the evaluation The interim r to a range inputs, led technical and financial with material, for the transportof initiatives of local materials, and a high solidarity extending of beneficiary and community degree generally programme shelter what a emergency beyond cash for transport house- encouraged envisages. Providing family organise trucks, use mules, holds to jointly hire and make links with villages in lower members in convoys spaces. storage of temporary for the provision areas Rps1,900 ($33) of the that, on average, Findings reveal Over was actually used on shelter. Rps2,000 cash grant on utilised the full amount exclusively 85% of households amount the actual shelter construction. Of the total grant, spent on transporting the shelter kits to the villages varied by of Rps650 ($11) on transport; in another spent an average Rps1,500 ($26). In some cases, local they spent (Kontch), to in response their prices increased transport providers Although this kind of market behaviour demand. increased one of the potential pitfalls of using considered is generally households a cash or market-based system, recipient r comple- that households also revealed The evaluation of investment with considerable mented the cash grant households It was found that, on average, their own. on the construction spent an additional Rps6,600 ($115) As part households of the shelter process, of their shelter. we means away from efers to the provision r Safe The programme provided The programme is understood as well-built, with is understood as well-built, 2 adequate durable esponding to the shelter needs given general guidance on the range of intended guidance on the range general given the international humanitarian community faced an challenge in unprecedented r by the 8 October created earthquake expected to reuse timber from destroyed houses, and destroyed timber from expected to reuse

vince and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. vince and Azad & Kashmir. Jammu re re o eceived a cash grant of 2,000 rupees ($35). No specific of 2,000 rupees ($35). No a cash grant eceived uses. It was made clear that a portion of the cash was households to find their own meant to enable recipient means of transporting the shelter kit to their house site. assistance to 20,000 households in North-Westassistance to 20,000 Frontier Pr 2 Safe-Adequate-Durable is the chosen approach to operationalising to is the chosen approach 2 Safe-Adequate-Durable guidelines for shelter in cold climates. Sphere natural hazards such as unstable slopes or water courses, the use of a hazards natural and to structure robust a more to provide and roof frame light-weight of a furtherminimise the risk to life in the event earthquake, the use of mesh, and minimising fire wire stone walls and restraining lower-height the use of internal stoves; risks from The shelter approach developed by CRS was designed to was designed CRS by developed approach The shelter above some of the local ingenuity in overcoming maximise and tech- material, financial A minimum set of challenges. and with social animation combined were nical inputs safe, own to build their to enable families mobilisation shelters. and durable adequate The shelter programme shelter The of sufficient covered internal living space with adequate ventilation of sufficient covered and thermal performance; and As a complement to material assistance, each household r attached to the cash, though recipients conditions were we Since structured construction training was not feasible in was not construction training Since structured the short technical assistance focused on time available, adequacy and sharing simple messages on the safety, within the location of the shelters. In a central durability households in attendance, a village, and with the various local carpen- shelter was constructed by demonstration The the key principles in practice. ters to illustrate 13 approximately construction time per shelter averaged per involved four people were days, and on average dwelling. to salvage doors, frames and other materials for cladding. and other materials for doors, frames to salvage the CRS shelter kits to each village, Instead of delivering distribution located identified strategically programme These points could valleys. into the target points on routes Each villages. a number of different be accessed from for collecting and trans- household was then responsible portingmaterials back to their homes. Material assistance was packaged as individual household Material assistance materials, simple, lightweight shelter ‘kits’, comprising mesh reinforce- insulation, wire sheeting, including roof Families and bedding. kits, stoves ment, fixings and tool we appropriate materials and fixings. appropriate ment, sufficient to enable people to build a more perma- what was initially envisaged as an ‘emergency’ shelter nent home. This was clearly indicated in the decision taken programme into the beginnings of permanent housing, and by many households to cut their existing large beams (one also took responsibility for site planning, the sale or of the primary assets of many households) into more transfer of assets and the use of salvageable resources. In manageable sections for use in their new home. the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, given the constraints of pace, space and scale, it was felt that a highly complex logistical operation would be required, and affected households were assumed to have limited oppor- over 85% of households used the tunities or resources to address their shelter needs. The full cash amount exclusively on CRS self-help shelter programme has shown that trusting in the resourcefulness and ingenuity of affected households shelter construction themselves can prompt creative solutions to perceived challenges, and result in far greater long-term impact.

Conclusions Alexandra Causton ([email protected]) is Head of With substantial additional investment by individual house- Programming for CRS Pakistan. Graham Saunders (gsaun- holds themselves, the majority of rebuilt shelters were [email protected]) is Shelter and Settlement Technical adequate and durable, and will be the core or first rooms of Advisor within the CRS Emergency Response Team. new, permanent homes. The extent to which the provision of cash and informed technical assistance contributed to people’s decision to invest in their homes, and contributed References and further reading to the degree of permanence and adequacy achieved, is difficult to assess. Clearly, households had access to CRS Pakistan, Interim Survey of Self-Help Shelter resources that they were prepared to utilise, and basic Program, Siran & Kontch Valleys, February 2006. building skills were available to undertake rudimentary Paul Harvey, Cash and Vouchers in Emergencies, HPG construction. The injection of cash and a raised awareness Discussion Paper, February 2005. of how to build appropriately expanded the range of options available to families to meet their shelter needs. Graham Saunders, Housing, Lives and Livelihoods: Lessons in Post-disaster Assistance from Goma, CRS, The contribution from beneficiaries themselves, in terms of February 2003. materials and labour, was four to five times greater than the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in value of the ‘package’ provided as part of the CRS shelter Disaster Response, Sphere Project, 2004. programme. Households themselves chose to develop

The Pakistan earthquake and the health needs of women Erum Burki, Marie Stopes Society

Although natural disasters do not distinguish between responded to the needs of people affected by the earth- genders, they do have a different impact on men and on quake. MSS focused its efforts in Hazara, Manshera, women. The 8 October earthquake that rocked the Shangla and Battal, providing obstetric and reproductive northern areas of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir was no health care and general emergency medical aid. This article exception. The earthquake affected women physically, is based on observations by MSS concerning the provision mentally and socially. Confronted with such a large of assistance to women in earthquake-affected areas. tragedy, in which more than 70,000 people were killed and 3.5 million made homeless, the government and The shelter response and women other agencies failed to specifically address the needs of Immediately after the earthquake, the first priority for the women, who faced an increase in violence, had limited government and other actors was to provide shelter to the access to aid and had special unmet needs relating to survivors. Most homeless people were moved to tented pregnancy and nursing infants. camps set up by the government and relief agencies. Although these camps provided much-needed shelter and Marie Stopes Society (MSS) was established in Pakistan in basic food rations they did not offer psychosocial support. A 1990, and is an affiliate organisation of Marie Stopes survey carried out by a local NGO, Shirkat Gah, and the Agha International (MSI), a UK-based organisation with partners Khan University (AKU) showed that most of the women in all around the world. Over the years, MSS has provided these camps were suffering from high stress levels due to specialised services to more than 3 million people in living in close proximity to non-relative males. Pakistan through its 50 centres in 20 cities. All MSS clinics provide a full range of reproductive health and family Women who were widowed or were looking after injured

THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE THE PAKISTAN planning services. It was with this expertise that MSS family members faced significant obstacles in accessing

HUMANITARIAN 12 exchange relief goods. This is because society in Pakistan is organ- widows, and was living in a makeshift tent with her ised to protect the family institution, and women play a children and extended family. She was finally able to have critical role in upholding the honour and integrity of the an abortion in a field clinic. family name. Thus, women are chaperoned outside the house so that their safety and reputation can be ensured. Many organisations also took the opportunity to give This restricts their mobility, and was one of the main advice and counselling to women on family planning and reasons why women were not able to access emergency safe sex. These women would have previously been very relief supplies. Camp management and security were difficult to reach. Many women coming to camp clinics critical issues, and incidences of sexual harassment asked for contraceptives because they could not look added to the difficulties women faced. after more children. With many men either dead or away from their families in search of aid and assistance, women had to care for children and elders largely on their own, the earthquake affected women and with few resources. physically, mentally and socially Hygiene and sanitation needs In the initial call for emergency relief, women’s sanitary needs were ignored, and few agencies or NGOs sent Most of the camps were cramped and there was no sanitary supplies. There were also reports of men who private space for spouses, which resulted in tensions and were distributing relief aid taking out sanitary napkins conflict. Fights erupted over minor issues. For example, a and throwing them away because they regarded them as 23-year-old mother of two was taken to a hospital after useless, or were uncomfortable with them. Some her husband assaulted her for not cooking food to his agencies bypassed this problem by handing out sanitary liking. Coping mechanisms for both males and females pads in health kits provided to children, who were told to were non-existent, and domestic violence increased. Child give the pads to their mothers. THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE abuse also rose as parents vented their frustrations on their children. A lack of information and knowledge compounded the diffi- culties women faced. In Shangla, Kohistan District, women The needs of pregnant women came to MSS staff with severe diarrhoea and skin rashes. According to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), immedi- During examination, staff found that they had all recently ately after the earthquake at least 40,000 women in the used the same toothpaste given to them by a relief agency. affected areas were pregnant, and needed adequate The women were asked to bring the toothpaste to the nutrition, medicine and antenatal care to deliver safely. camp; it was found to be hair-removing cream. Even in the best of circumstances, some 15% of these women would require emergency obstetric care. It is likely that the physical and psychological trauma caused by the many women were not allowed to earthquake pushed this figure higher still. see a male doctor and therefore Most of the major hospitals and clinics in the earthquake were denied medical care area were completely destroyed. Many women were not allowed to see a male doctor and therefore were denied medical care. The tradition of observing purdah and being Another particular problem that women faced in the confined to the house is very strong, and women have camps was a lack of appropriate sanitation facilities. In less access to hospitals. Meanwhile, the government- the absence of toilets, men were able to use the fields at sponsored Lady Health Worker (LHW) programme, a any time, but women only felt comfortable venturing out mechanism through which women usually receive medical very early in the morning or at night. In one camp, in support, was severely affected by the earthquake. The Balakot, two cousins were attacked while walking programme, formally known as the National Program of towards the latrine – they shouted for help and were Family Planning and Primary Health Care, uses trained rescued. Too embarrassed or fearful of their security to employees to provide doorstep service delivery, including walk openly to latrines in the camps, many women basic preventive care and contraceptive supplies and relieved themselves in their tents despite the health referrals. Each health worker serves approximately 1,000 hazards. The incidence of urinary tract infections was people in her community. Most lost their lives in the earth- high. Women also no longer had the privacy to wash and quake, making surviving pregnant women more vulner- dry the strips of cotton they use during menstruation. able to miscarriages and still-births. Conclusion At the same time, it is an irony that many more facilities The provision of gender-sensitive and women-focused assis- became available to women in remote mountainous tance should become a priority in relief activities, so that regions due to the earthquake. For example, a 28-year-old women who have been through terrible trauma can live their mother of six children was three months pregnant at the lives with dignity. Efforts to ensure women’s equal participa- time of the earthquake, and desperate for an abortion, tion with men in shaping the response should be main- even though such a procedure is illegal. She lost her streamed in all aspects of the emergency and reconstruction husband in the earthquake, becoming one of 63,000 phase. In the light of their experiences in Pakistan, agencies

Number 34 • June 2006 13 need to ensure that, in the future, they more adequately and decision-making? What barriers prevent women and appropriately address women’s needs. girls from meaningful participation and involvement in decision-making? Is a participatory approach being Under the umbrella of the Joint Action Committee (JAC), a used? loose network of over 100 local NGOs, MSS and other 7. What programmes are in place to prevent and respond local agencies developed the following checklist to ensure to violence, abuse and exploitation against women better provision of relief to women in earthquake-affected and girls, including trafficking? areas. 8. Is data being collected and analysed by sex and age? What is the age and sex breakdown of those who died? General and cross-cutting issues 1. How have men and women, girls and boys been Health and nutrition affected by the disaster and displacement? Have 1. How is the health sector meeting the different health women and men been affected differently by specific needs of women and men? Is access to services equal events, such as the destruction of schools, roads, sani- for men and women? tation facilities, markets and homes? 2. Are there women health providers (doctors, ob-gyns, 2. What are the different coping mechanisms used by midwives)? Do women have access to female health men, women, girls and boys? What resources/support care providers? are they using to survive? Are these in jeopardy or 3. Are reproductive health services available? Is the over-stretched? Minimum Initial Service Package (MISP) being imple- 3. Do women have equal access to resources? What mented? would help increase their access? 4. Are health and psychosocial services available for 4. What specific power structures can be identified within survivors of sexual violence? communities? What are the specific threats or risks 5. What programmes are available to address the facing women and girls in the current environment? psychosocial/mental health needs of the community, 5. What are the prevailing attitudes, religious and particularly for women and girls? cultural norms and practices that affect women’s ability to contribute to and benefit from assistance? Erum Burki is Advocacy Manager for Marie Stopes Society 6. Are women and women’s organisations involved in in Pakistan. Her email address is: [email protected].

Building media capacities to improve disaster response: lessons from Pakistan Adnan Rehmat, Internews

The 8 October earthquake had a devastating impact on the means of finding out what was going on, what to do or media in affected areas. Dozens of journalists were killed or how to get help. went missing, and newspaper offices, broadcasting facilities and press clubs were destroyed. The capacity of the local media was significantly reduced, and local and national with printing presses and press outlets struggled to respond adequately to the tragedy with news and information about the nature and scale of the clubs damaged and dozens earthquake and the progress of the relief effort. of journalists killed, the business The media response of local news generation came Pakistanis first learnt of the disaster from private televi- to a halt sion channels and FM radio stations. It took a couple of hours before the state-owned electronic media broke the news. In the affected regions, there was no private radio or TV, and the only source of mass information – the state- The information gap run Kashmir Radio and TV – was silenced by the earth- To gauge the state of information access, the Pakistan quake: 40 of its 160 staff were killed, and its buildings office of Internews, an international media development wrecked. With the region’s small printing presses and organisation, conducted a snapshot survey two weeks most press clubs also damaged, and with dozens of jour- after the earthquake in Batagram, Balakot and Mansehra nalists either dead or losing relatives, the business of in NWFP, and Muzaffarabad, Bagh and Rawalakot in local news generation came to a halt. The disaster Kashmir. These were generally the worst-hit cities. presented the classic paradox: news about the calamity According to the survey, before the earthquake about 81% and its impact was going out to the world at large, but of households had a radio, and 52% had television sets.

THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE THE PAKISTAN those affected – at least 3.5 million people – had no Of these, three-quarters of radio sets and virtually all TV

HUMANITARIAN 14 exchange THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE 15 mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Nu ehabilitation is critical for ehabilitation the key lessons of the Pakistan the key lessons that information experience are and reconstruction about relief, r survival and recovery one. Production needs include mobile production needs one. Production suitcase’ and are affordable, very stations are radio Support and state private to enable specific local vital so that they can provide outlets to broadcast, FM stations are news and information to victims. If no licensing rules should be the regular available, suspended to enable stations to be established; ‘ needs Infrastructure easy to set up and operate. studios antennas, mobile radio include transmitters, in- usually not immediately available (these are country and need to be imported; and duties all taxes and generators. should be waived) Support teams and journalists for production working for and with media outlets in the disaster z portableequipment such as minidisk recorders, computers, satellite phones, transport and technical support. Support journalistic and media for the broader effortsthe disaster and relief community to cover to Needs include: access with speed and accuracy. as humanitarian relief such information sources and the military; the government organisations, access to technical assistance in the form of satellite equipment and trans- telephones, field production port; and update share and assistance to coordinate, information. ported watching TV; in the follow-up survey, this had survey, in the follow-up portedTV; watching essons from Pakistan essons from elief – the provision of reliable information for survival of reliable elief – the provision also revealed that more people were consuming more consuming were people that more revealed also had of respondents 15% initial survey, In the media. re one of their TV was that all of whom said risen to 24%, Virtually all watched of information. primary sources newspa- gave of respondents channels. A third state-run up of information, sources of their primary pers as one 21% in October 2005. from L Project Information Emergency The Internews Pakistan an often-neglected aspect of post-disaster how shows r in little time (100 days), – can be achieved and recovery of the £300,000 and with little money (about £150,000 funding has been spent to date). project that infor- experience are The key lessons of the Pakistan is and rehabilitation reconstruction mation about relief, and in disaster regions; and recovery critical for survival the to provide that, if the local media lacks the capacity is needed, outside kind of specialised information that The primary focus of and swiftly. help must be provided, media assistance should be: • • • /militant groups), jihadi ur months after the initial information access survey, ithin weeks of the earthquake,ithin weeks Internews, with funding ebuilding the media adio was the obvious answer: sets were cheap (less than were sets answer: adio was the obvious ashmir and NWFP. This work primarily includes devel- This ashmir and NWFP. olunteer broadcasters committed to helping people. committed to helping olunteer broadcasters ebuild media capacities affected by the disaster in ebuild media capacities affected by adio, 21% on newspapers, 15% on TV and 11% on the TV and 15% on on newspapers, adio, 21% a dollar), information could be provided in local provided a dollar), information could be numbers of large could reach languages, and broadcasts the lack of local equipment and expertise,people. Given called on; in the country had to be elsewhere operators Regulatory Media Electronic within a month, the Pakistan non-commercial Authority had issued ten three-month, FM stations outside of the licences to private emergency the usually lengthy bypassed The Authority affected area. (to clear of would-be operators of security vetting process them of links with India or with W Fo the that This showed Internews conducted a follow-up. become a major had rapidly regime new community radio and useful information. In of independent, reliable source in late October 2005, 28% of respon- the initial survey, of as one of their primary sources dents had cited radio this had gone up to survey, information. In the follow-up mentioned at least one of the 70%, and respondents on air at the time of the stations radio emergency seven survey The follow-up survey of choice. as their station R R the by usually controlled frequencies and made available non- licences were The idea was that, since the military. ‘serious’ by they would be taken up only commercial, v the UKfrom launched the Pakistan Switzerland, and to (www.internews.org.pk) Information Project Emergency r K building radio sector, broadcast oping the emergency to small equipment grants facilities, providing production journalists in humani- FM stations, training emergency tarian reporting and distribution of a and the production on daily one-hour news and information programme humanitarian issues, called ‘Jazba-e-Tameer’ (‘The Spirit of a group by was produced The programme of Recovery’). daily travelled The volunteers ten journalism students. the earthquakeacross to report efforts, region on relief affected populations, the inter- including feedback from national and local humanitarian community and govern- ment authorities. In the absence of conventional sources of information, sources conventional In the absence of about when the next earthquakerumours abounded: was tent would get rid on your kerosene due, or that daubing that bottled water was medicinal and of mosquitoes, or not drinking. Against this back- only fit for hand-washing, and practical that a cheap it was imperative ground, access was established. means of information sets were destroyed by the earthquake. the asked When by destroyed were sets of respondents 68% information, of their sources about the of mouth, 28% on word dependent on were said they r not 8% said they were At least local administration. No one anywhere. from information getting any of source leaders as a the mosque or religious mentioned information. general • Distribution of radio sets (preferably one to each faster recovery. The swift deployment of resources in the family, and preferably solar-powered or crank radios aftermath of a humanitarian disaster for local media that require no batteries). In Pakistan, Internews development will improve information within affected imported 10,000 radio sets for distribution among populations, the relief community and international earthquake-affected people, but they remained stuck media, and must be a priority. This will contribute enor- in customs for several weeks, despite permission mously to more effective and accountable local and inter- from the government to import them. national humanitarian responses.

The period between a disaster and the arrival of relief is Adnan Rehmat is Country Director of the Pakistan office of the most crucial time, when lives are saved. Accurate Internews (www.internews.org.pk), an international media humanitarian information flows to and from affected assistance organisation. His e-mail address is: adnan@ populations in local languages are critical for survival and internews.org.

When is a camp not a camp? When it’s a ‘tent village’ Damian Lilly

The Pakistan earthquake on IDPs were living in camps as a 8 October 2005 left more result of the earthquake. than three million people homeless, and hundreds of The displacement of earth- thousands of people dis- quake survivors and their placed. Most internally dis- settlement into myriad camps placed persons (IDPs) lost presented unique challenges their houses, livelihoods for the government and aid and land. Either they took agencies, proving to be one of refuge in host families close the major issues of the relief to their homes or in effort. By December, there ©Reuters/Thierry www.alertnet.org Roge, courtesy Pakistan’s larger cities (such were 25 official camps and an as Islamabad and Lahore), estimated 1,000 self-settled or they settled in IDP camps. This article analyses camps. By December, there the IDP camp phenomenon was concern that there after the earthquake, high- could be a second wave of lighting some of the issues displacement from moun- encountered by national and tainous areas as the onset international actors, as well of harsh winter conditions as the implications for the forced more families from wider emergency relief com- their homes. Although mil- munity. der than expected weather A Kashmiri child looks out of the entrance meant far fewer new arrivals of a tent in Mehnas camp, on the outskirts of From ‘official camps’ to than feared, by the end of Muzaffarabad, February 2006 ‘tent villages’ the winter over 297,000 The main policy and opera- tional challenge involved with IDP assistance in the earthquake response concerned the IDP camp terminology used in the Pakistan scale and range of the different IDP camps and settle- earthquake response ments that sprang up, and in turn how basic services Official (or planned) camp – Government (army or civilian)- could be provided to them. The terminology used for the run camps (usually with more than 50 tents) on purpose- plethora of different types of camps and settlements built sites with a full range of basic services used included ‘official camps’, ‘planned camps’, ‘spontaneous exclusively by the camp population. camps’, ‘self-settled camps’ and ‘tent villages’ (a relatively new arrival in the humanitarian lexicon, introduced by the Spontaneous (or self-settled) camp – Unofficial camps Pakistani authorities). Each of these terms was used inter- (usually with fewer than 50 tents) run by NGOs, political- changeably, and often imprecisely, to describe the various religious groups or IDPs themselves. IDP camps and settlements. Tent village – The Pakistan authorities’ term for any type of IDP settlement or camp, or village with a high concentration The three distinguishing characteristics of the different of tents occupied by earthquake survivors. kinds of IDP camps were: a) whether the camp population

THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE THE PAKISTAN had in fact been displaced from their habitual residence; b)

HUMANITARIAN 16 exchange whether the camp contained over or under 50 tents; and c) larger official camps, where better basic services could be whether the camp was managed by an official agent, namely provided, and which were in any case considered a greater the Pakistan military or civilian authorities. This differentia- risk in terms of disease outbreaks. This arbitrary distinction tion does not diverge greatly from accepted IDP terminology. based on tent numbers was also adopted by the Pakistan However, the multitude of different kinds of camps in authorities, and became the key guiding policy for IDPs, various locations led to much confusion. This confusion was with major humanitarian consequences. more than a problem of semantics – it led to poor analysis of the humanitarian situation, and poor analysis of how it The Camp Management Strategy envisaged that the should be addressed. Pakistan authorities would assimilate smaller sponta- neous camps into an increasing number of larger official In particular, the Pakistan military, which was leading the camps. This did not, however, take place. The Pakistan relief effort, tended to refer to all IDP camps as tent villages. authorities lacked the resolve and capacity to bring about For example, in Battagram district the Pakistan military such a change. Meanwhile, international aid agencies declared the existence of up to 320 spontaneous camps. concentrated on the more familiar setting of the larger However, after various assessments no actual IDP camp was official camps where an acceptable standard of assistance identified. All 320 settlements were in fact made up of could be provided. Consequently, spontaneous camps – families living in close proximity to their homes – a more particularly in urban settings – became a neglected part of appropriate use of the term tent village. the earthquake response.

Genuine internal displacement Although the Camp Management Strategy recognised early The fact that many people were living in tents next to or on the need to organise a task force to address the urgent near their homes after the earthquake made distin- needs of IDPs living in spontaneous camps, this was not guishing IDP camps from the wider population problem- created until January 2006, more than three months after

atic. In many villages, communities congregated in the earthquake, and was led by OCHA, not UNHCR. Despite THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE clusters of tents away from their houses, thus resembling their best intentions, aid agencies were unable to ensure a camp setting. In such contexts, a complete breakdown equal weighting of services to all areas of displacement, of community services, including water supplies, health particularly for IDPs in spontaneous camps with fewer than clinics and schools, had occurred. Yet because the 50 tents. The principal job of the task force in smaller camps affected population had not been displaced and had not was to assess gaps in basic services, including shelter, food, settled in an official site, they could not be considered as health and education. The results of the assessment comprising a camp, and assisted as such. Conversely, a revealed the poor state of these camps. For example, in number of spontaneous camps sprung up purely with the Mansehra district IDPs occupied 15,141 tents with an objective of gaining assistance from the local authorities average of 13 people to a tent, and 6,764 displaced people and aid agencies. had no shelter at all. Seventy per cent of the camps had no access to health services. Oxfam claimed in January 2006 Identifying genuine IDPs accordingly became a key concern. that only a handful of the unofficial camps met Sphere stan- In November, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) dards, and most had missed out on aid provision.2 issued a policy statement urging ‘the need to identify the specific protection and assistance needs that the internally displaced may have on account of their displacement, and many people were living in that may be distinct from those of the broader affected population’.1 However, an official registration process of the tents next to or near their homes, entire camp population was only conducted by the Pakistan making it difficult to distinguish authorities in January 2006. Even after this exercise sponta- neous camps, without genuine IDPs, remained on many IDP camps from the wider camp lists used by aid agencies. population Camps with fewer than 50 tents: a neglected part of the earthquake response The initial lack of assistance in spontaneous camps also The size of camps also mattered in terms of the response. As highlighted the challenges and shortcomings of the part of the Camp Management Strategy developed by the Cluster approach to coordination, which was adopted for Federal Relief Commission (the government agency with the first time in the Pakistan earthquake response.3 In overall responsibility for the earthquake response) and the September 2005, the IASC had decided that UNHCR Camp Management Cluster (the UN-led coordination struc- would not lead any clusters in emergencies caused by ture for camp management), a distinction was made natural disasters. However, UNHCR had worked in between camps with more than 50 tents, and those with Pakistan for many years providing protection and assis- fewer. UNHCR, the lead agency for the Camp Management 2 Starting On the Road to Recovery: Saving Lives and Rebuilding Cluster, made it clear that it would only provide assistance in Livelihoods after the Pakistan Earthquake, Oxfam Briefing Note, 29 IDP camps with more than 50 tents. This policy was adopted January 2006, p. 2. in response to capacity constraints. Priority was given to the 3 As part of the UN humanitarian reform agenda, the Cluster approach 1 IASC South Asia Earthquake Task Force Policy Statement, 14 November provides for greater accountability for sectoral assistance by the desig- 2005. nated lead agency, which should now be common for all emergencies.

Number 34 • June 2006 17 tance to Afghan refugees, and therefore felt compelled to unwittingly, established a working relationship with these assume responsibility for the Camp Management cluster. Islamic organisations, including in some instances It quickly became apparent that UNHCR lacked the banned jihadist groups.4 A number of aid agencies capacity to be the ‘provider of last resort’ – as intended admitted to being unaware of the background of these under the Cluster approach – for assistance in all the groups. Distinguishing bona fide organisations from less camps, particularly spontaneous camps with fewer than legitimate ones proved extremely difficult for outsiders, 50 tents. At one stage, it was left to OCHA to lead the and even for local aid workers. However, their potentially response in these camps. While useful in terms of coordi- problematic links with Islamic organisations also exposed nating inter-agency assessments, this proved problematic the poor contextual analysis of aid agencies. since OCHA is a non-operational agency, and as a result shortfalls in assistance to smaller camps continued. An Conclusion IASC Real Time Evaluation of the Cluster approach in the By March 2006, IDPs from the Pakistan earthquake had Pakistan earthquake response in February 2006 noted begun to return home, and camps in a number of loca- this shortcoming of the Cluster approach. tions were closed. However, many of the challenges outlined in this article remained unresolved. The arbitrary distinction between camps according to whether they had the sheer range of actors 50 tents or more proved particularly problematic, and arguably led to a form of discrimination in the assistance involved in managing the IDP provided. Shortcomings in the coordination of the camps presented serious response were also exposed, and these will provide important lessons for the development of the Cluster challenges to aid delivery approach in future emergencies. The challenge of distin- guishing IDPs from the wider community was the most pressing issue, but this was often sidelined by wranglings The political dimension of camp management over the size of camps and whose responsibility it was to The sheer range of actors involved in managing the IDP assist them. camps also presented serious challenges to aid delivery. Although the Pakistan military was the dominant actor in Damian Lilly worked for the UN Office for the Coordination terms of camp management, others included national of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the earthquake NGOs, political and religious groups and IDPs themselves. response. This article has been written in a personal In December, an attempt was made to transfer responsi- capacity; the views expressed do not represent those of the bility for running the official camps from the military to the UN. His email address is: [email protected]. civilian authorities. This failed, however, revealing the deep disparity of power within the military-dominated government. The civilian authorities, decimated by the earthquake, had little capacity to take on camp manage- References and further reading ment, and the Pakistan military remained in charge of a number of camps. South Asian Earthquake Response: Strategy on Camp Management, UN Camp Management Cluster, December The political affiliation of some of the organisations 2005, http://www.unhic.org/pakistan. managing the camps was also controversial. In particular, IASC Evaluation of Cluster Approach in Pakistan, the government was heavily criticised by the US for February 2006, http://www.unhic.org/pakistan. allowing religious parties and militant groups to support and run a number of camps. Allowing these groups to be IASC Country Team, ERRA-UN Early Recovery Plan, April part of the relief effort was seen as bolstering their 2006, http://www.unhic.org/pakistan. presence in earthquake-affected areas, inadvertently IASC South Asia Earthquake Task Force Policy Statement, empowering extremists and undermining the prospects 14 November 2005. for democratic reform. Starting on the Road to Recovery: Saving Lives and The political-religious groups involved in the relief effort Rebuilding Livelihoods after the Pakistan Earthquake, included Islamic organisations such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Oxfam Briefing Note, 29 January 2006. which had been banned by the government for supporting Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, ICG Asia insurgent activity in Indian-administered Kashmir. Other Briefing 46, 15 March 2006. groups, such as the Al Rasheed Trust, had been listed as terrorist organisations by the UN Security Council because of their links with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 4 Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, ICG Asia Briefing 46, 15 Afghanistan. UN agencies and international NGOs, often March 2006, p. 8. THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE THE PAKISTAN

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HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK 37 A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002) 38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommendations for Practice by A. Smith (2002) 39 Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian action by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths (2002) 40 Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the 1999-2001 Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector in Kenya by Yacob Aklilu and Mike Wekesa (2002) 41 Politically Informed Humanitarian Programming: Using a Political Economy Approach by Sarah Collinson (2002) 42 The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict by Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn (2003) 43 Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster by Sultan Barakat and Rebecca Roberts (2003) 44 Livelihoods and Protection: Displacement and Vulnerable Communities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia by Simon Narbeth and Calum McLean (2003) 45 Reproductive health for conflict-affected people: policies, research and Programmes by Therese McGinn, Sara Casey, Susan Purdin and Mendy Marsh (2004) 46 Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives by Randolph Kent (2004) 47 Missing the point: an analysis of food security interventions in the Great Lakes by Simon Levine and Claire Chastre (2004) 48 Community-based therapeutic care: a new paradigm for selective feeding in nutritional crises by Steve Collins (2004) 49 Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost benefit analysis by Courtenay Cabot Venton and Paul Venton (2004) 50 Cash relief in a contested area: lessons from Somalia by Degan Ali, Fanta Toure, Tilleke Kiewied (2005) 51 Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the parameters of negotiated armed access by Max Glaser (2005) 52 Interpreting and using mortaility data in humanitarian emergencies: a primer by Francesco Checchi and Les Roberts (2005) 53 Protecting and assisting older people in emergencies by Jo Wells (2005) 54 Housing reconstruction in post-earthquake Gujarat: a comparative analysis by Jennifer Duyne Barenstein (2006) 55 Understanding and addressing staff turnover in humanitarian agencies by David Loquercio, Mark Hammersley and Ben Emmens (2006) Good Practice Reviews Good Practice Reviews are major, peer-reviewed contributions to humanitarian practice. They are produced periodically. 1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1994) 2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J. Shoham (1994) 3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jaspars and H. Young (1996) 4 Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996) 5 Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives by J. Telford (1997) 6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced Populations in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1998) 7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies by A. Hallam (1998) 8 Operational Security Management in Violent Environments by K. Van Brabant (2000) 9 Disaster Risk Reduction: Mitigation and Preparedness in Development and Emergency Programming by John Twigg (2004)

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HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK Timing matters: capacity-building during an emergency response Silva Lauffer, RedR-IHE

When a disaster happens, a plethora of well-meaning individuals and organisations of all shapes and sizes rush to the stricken area. Resources are mobilised and staff deployed to the disaster zone. What we then find is that the provision and delivery of services and goods are often far from adequate for the needs encountered locally. Goodwill is not good enough. To ensure appropriateness, account- ability, harmonisation and sustain- ability, policies, procedures and practices need to be streamlined, and ownership by the recipients of aid ensured. For this to happen, dialogue between the different stakeholders needs to be facilitated, information properly managed and best practices

taught and understood. THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE

Problems in the emergency response A camp management training session Although there are many examples of exemplary emergency response conducted by a variety of stakeholders following the ties to deal with disaster must not be underestimated. In Pakistan earthquake, many mistakes could have been Pakistan, it was apparent that many camp residents were avoided. It is clear that there were immense capacity chal- not involved in decisions determining their future or the lenges involved in assisting homeless people in a moun- services provided to them. tainous region of roughly 28,000 square kilometres. Some of these challenges included: Overwhelming demand, remarkable response RedR-IHE has been providing training and learning 1) Inappropriate shelter. support and recruitment services for development and 2) Lack of awareness of humanitarian principles and inter- relief actors for 25 years. In Pakistan, it conducted national standards. capacity-building through tailor-made training courses, 3) Lack of involvement of recipients in decision-making. on-the-job training and individual coaching of almost 1,800 people from local and international NGOs, govern- There was a lack of winterised tents, and people displaced ment departments, the military and UN agencies in by the earthquake had no experience of living in tents or Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Mansehra, Batagram and taking care of them. People did not pitch tents correctly, Islamabad. Obstacles on the ground included further and many collapsed under the weight of snow during the earthquakes, landslides, which prevented some partici- winter, burned down as people used stoves to keep warm, pants from reaching training courses, the absence of or flooded after torrential rains. Siting too was problematic: training venues due to the destruction of infrastructure some camps were set up in rice fields or river beds. and a lack of government and UN policies in the early stages. Methodology-wise, we conducted ongoing in- There was a lack of understanding of the international field/camp assessments to identify dynamic learning standards that are designed to ensure that IDPs can live in needs as they occurred, lend an ear to affected communi- dignified and appropriate environments. For example, the ties and respondents, engage local trainers and transla- Pakistani government closed organised camps and made tors and international consultants, and design training camp populations leave before proper services had been and learning support activities in several languages, set up in alternative locations. Basic human rights and including Urdu, Pashto and English. protection issues were not addressed. Initially, RedR-IHE worked with UNHCR to support camp The lack of involvement by recipients in decision-making managers in organised camps. With the rapidly changing was another major flaw. The first and often most effective context on the ground, however, this programme was responders to natural crises are affected communities constantly evolving. For example, the government’s themselves. With knowledge of their environment and decision that IDPs had to leave the camps meant that we unique coping mechanisms, capacities of local communi- had to cut short our camp management training

Number 34 • June 2006 19 20 THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE WPSecretary forEducation, SchoolsandLiteracy. NWFP andthe setting, wasrecognised andpraised by UNESCO areas. and standard- earthquake-affected This effort, DCTE’s curriculumforitsworkshops9,400teachersin Asaresult,(DCTE). childprotection has beenaddedtothe the Directorate ofCurriculumand Teacher Education of tion andrights-basededucationwere acceptedaspart In Abbotabad,ourtraining sessionsaround childprotec- felt immediatelyinsomecamps. Pr way theyoperated afterhavingreceived training. tors were notaware ofsuchstandards, butchangedthe standards. InPakistan we know thatmanycampcoordina- implemented, toensure basichumanrightsandquality International standards suchasSphere were taughtand those returning totheirplacesoforigin. camp residents; someeven negotiatedpaymentsfor dent andbetterabletoadvocate toimprove conditionsfor in protection andlegalrights,mobilisersfeltmore confi- tration cards couldnotbeproduced. Asaresult oftraining itarian aidwell, notjustsendingthemawaywhenregis- staff membersofalocalNGOtreated recipients ofhuman- launching intoquestionnaires. InMansehra, forexample, people’s losses,forexampleofferingcondolences before saw how somemobilisersbecamemore respectful of empower beneficiaries,andincreased levels oftrust. We motivation techniqueshelpedcommunitymobilisers cation ofthelevel ofsuccessthecourses.Learning Changes inattitudeaftertraining coursesare agoodindi- Cooperation andcommunicationflows. 3. Useofinternationalstandards andbestpractices. 2. Attitudechanges. 1. around impactconcernthefollowing: working environment. Someoftheobservations we made intheir and monitorimpactby revisiting participants information consistently, ensure thequalityofprogrammes developed amonitoringandevaluation systemtocollect R How are organisations orindividualsusingwhattheylearn? experiences the ground: someexamplesfrom RedR-IHE’s Implications forhumanitarianprogrammes on of theGuidingPrinciples onInternalDisplacement. in relation totheteachingofprotection issuesandtheuse ical environment hadtobecarefully considered, especially could beappliedinnon-campcontexts. The complexpolit- programme toprovide capacity-buildingexercises that eal impact often takes time to be measured. RedR-IHE has eal impactoftentakestimetobemeasured. RedR-IHE actices changedovernight, andthebenefitscouldbe HUMANITARIAN homeless people challenges involved inassisting there were immensecapacity exchange the clustersystem. policy decisionsatinternationallevel ontheusefulnessof R shops withseveral clustermembersinfive locations. Emergency ShelterCluster, including facilitatingwork- R Finally, theInternationalOrganisation forMigration asked cult toevaluate. in theflow ofinformation,althoughactualimpactisdiffi- platform tomeet. This made an immediateimprovement Hommes inMansehra, whichgave manyagenciesa situations. AnNGOForum was created with Terre des vital ingredient inqualityresponses topost-emergency Cooperation linkedwithinformationexchange isanother diarrhoea significantlyinthecamp. theadoptionofthistechniquereduced to aparticipant, sand siltandothermaterialscouldactasafilter. According necessarily represent theviewsofRedR-IHE. programme inPakistan. donot The views in thisarticle members thatcontributed tothesuccessofthis [email protected]. Silva wouldliketothankalltheteam London. Heremailaddress is atRedR-IHE, Services Silva Lauffer timing doesmatter! r a rapid response withtheneedtoensure that the dignity. The challengeliesinmarryingtheimperative for issues andbasichumanrightsunderminespeople’s withoutaddressing protection ment ofpoliciesonIDPs safely doesnotprotect beneficiaries,andtheestablish- lighting stoves intentswithoutguidelinesonusingthem not helprecipients harshwintermonths, tosurvive though, isthatthedelivery ofinappropriate shelterdoes attention. willrequireWhat isclear, further support gency response. The precise shapeandformofthat andparcel ofeffective emer- needtobepart support of theresponse. This suggeststhattraining andlearning hadbeenreceived fromuseful ifsuchsupport theoutset R work,andwere directly relevant. useful inparticipants’ light thatcapacity-buildingandtraining events were R Conclusion we close toMansehra, where water-purification techniques One exampleofbestpractice wasidentifiedinSiran camp esponse isbothadequateandprofessional. Here, ecommendations were subsequentlyusedtoinform studyonthe to conduct a‘Lessons Learned’ edR-IHE epeatedly, we were toldthatitwouldhave beenmore edR-IHE’s monitoringandevaluation mechanismshigh- re

increased levels oftrust empower beneficiariesand helped communitymobilisers learning motivation techniques taught by demonstrating how gravel andlayers of is Programme Manager–Humanitarian PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES Managing humanitarian programmes in least-developed countries: the case of Zambia Wilson Zimba, consultant

Humanitarian response in Zambia is currently managed and coordinated by the Office of the Vice-President, the second-highest political position in the country. This level of political clout was assigned to humanitarian response following the devastating drought of 1991–92. The drought caused food shortages across most of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, from Zambia to South Africa. The food crisis required exten- sive food imports and foreign dona- ©Richard Lord/UMCOR tions. It also demonstrated how unpre- pared Zambia was for disasters of that magnitude.

Developing a management structure A farmer in his drought-ravaged fields Following the drought, the govern- ment set up a permanent structure called the Disaster Management Unit within the Office of These problems are exacerbated by the government’s the Vice-President. The Unit’s initial focus was on training, growing tendency to downplay disasters when they occur. and establishing administrative structures in the capital, The government has, for instance, been reluctant to RCIEADPLC NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND Lusaka, and in the provinces. With expertise from the acknowledge food shortages in 2005 arising from drought in Cranfield University Disaster Management Centre in the the rainy season. Food prices have risen amid government UK, and financial support from UNDP and the British claims that the staple grain, maize, was abundant. Foreign Office, the government trained personnel from various stakeholder institutions including government Despite these limitations, notable developments have departments, the police and military and non-govern- taken place in streamlining and guiding humanitarian mental organisations. It was envisaged that, with this response among all actors. The Vice-President has inau- training, the skills base would be broadened and political gurated an official government policy, and a Disaster support built. So much progress was made that, in the Management Operations Manual has been produced. This decade since it was set up, the Disaster Management Unit is a milestone in the development of official humanitarian became a household name across the country. response in Zambia. Both the policy and the manual emphasise devolving power from the centre to the admin- istrative locations closest to where disaster victims live. In government policy emphasises terms of reporting channels, a cluster of settlements, devolving power from the especially rural ones, were to be administered by a satel- lite disaster management committee of elected men and centre to the administrative women. During a disaster, this committee reports to the locations closest to where district disaster management committee, made up of government technocrats and reporting to the Disaster disaster victims live Management Unit in Lusaka. However, to achieve this ambitious level of operations, significant capacity- building programmes will be required. Past experience However, further training efforts have been compromised by and recent failures give little grounds for optimism. squabbles among the various players, which means that, in the long term, fewer people will possess the necessary Special challenges facing humanitarian knowledge to implement government humanitarian policy. response in Zambia In turn, this means continued instability in a sector where Poverty personal, political, religious and racial considerations take Poverty is a cause and effect of disasters. In Zambia, precedence over genuine humanitarian needs and concerns. poverty is so severe and widespread that it is difficult to

Number 34 • June 2006 21 discriminate between disaster victims and the chronically are the worst-hit: HIV/AIDS accounts for three-quarters of poor. According to the latest census, in 2006, between Zambia’s one million-plus orphans. Looking after these 70% and 85% of Zambia’s ten million people live on less orphans is a daunting challenge to Zambia’s humanitarian than a dollar a day. Nearly three-quarters of the country’s response capacity. Although HIV prevention campaigns are children live below the poverty line. This widespread part of health education programmes, Zambian society is poverty poses special challenges for targeting humani- still extremely patriarchal, and the limited control women tarian aid, and marshalling community support among have over sexual matters means that efforts to reduce rates very poor people. It is not uncommon in Zambia for food of HIV transmission have had only limited success. The role to be redirected from victims of disaster to the equally and status of women need to be revolutionised if these needy people charged with administering relief. This has campaigns are to be effective. The government’s Disaster undermined the confidence of donors, who have imposed Management Unit has developed no mechanism to tackle unachievable conditionalities and rules on aid in a bid to issues of HIV/AIDS, and neither government policy nor the curb pilfering. Such conditions only hurt disaster victims. Operations Manual offer clear guidance on HIV/AIDS and gender concerns. Politics As touched on above, humanitarian assistance is heavily Opportunities for Zambia politicised. The government chooses which events are In the face of these huge challenges, Zambia can and has declared disasters. Stated criteria are of no use: political made progress in reducing vulnerability in certain sectors. expedience is all that counts. Elections in particular can be NGOs such as Care, World Vision and Oxfam have deliv- crucial in determining who gets relief, and when. Religious ered a range of services, including water and sanitation, groups also play the influence game, seizing the opportuni- seed multiplication projects, food preservation, livelihood ties humanitarian response offers not only to access donor diversification and income-broadening projects. These funding (a major motivation) but also to win disciples for have had significant impacts on the vulnerability of poten- their institutions. Benevolence is a tool of religious influ- tial disaster victims, especially in rural communities. One ence, especially when it is practiced on a mass scale. can only imagine how much can be achieved if govern- ment departments did the same. The government’s inef- Corruption fectiveness is compounded by high levels of turnover Corruption and bribery are a huge, albeit unacknowl- among staff due to poor conditions of employment and edged, cause of ineffectiveness and inefficiency in mortality and morbidity from HIV/AIDS. One of the humanitarian response in Zambia. Of course, there are missing links in the whole humanitarian equation of some genuine NGOs and faith-based organisations, and Zambia is the low level of expertise among government government policy and the operations manual have recog- operatives, undermining the quality of humanitarian nised the capacity of NGOs and the private sector to do a service that government departments can offer. fair job. But watchdog and security institutions become compromised and irrelevant in the face of corruption. In The enforcement of anti-corruption regulations needs to the Zambian disaster response, community and political be given priority in humanitarian programmes. Coupled leaders short-change the people of what rightly belongs with this, there should be public education on corruption. to them. Corruption in the humanitarian business takes Campaigns against corruption should be treated as a place at all levels. The loser is the disaster victim, who vulnerability reduction activity in themselves. Corruption cannot pay for eligibility, and very few genuine disaster reduces the effectiveness of all services targeted at the victims can offer anything as a bribe. Thus, genuine poor, and as such is a major factor in high levels of vulner- disaster victims usually do not benefit as much as they ability in Zambia. deserve to from humanitarian assistance, which itself is becoming difficult to come by. In terms of HIV/AIDS, a lot has been achieved in raising public awareness of the disease. The majority of Zambians are aware of HIV prevention measures. However, the patri- elections can be crucial in archal nature of gender relations means that women are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and HIV infection. Very determining who gets relief, strong gender development programmes need to be carried and when out alongside HIV/AIDS prevention measures. As long as women are economically dependent on men, and men are inclined to exploit women’s economic weakness, HIV/AIDS is likely to remain an economic and humanitarian obstacle HIV/AIDS in Zambia. Again, this means training of all those in the HIV/AIDS is a huge disaster, with cross-cutting effects on humanitarian business in gender development and individuals, households and communities. Its economic women’s empowerment. Training people at various levels in repercussions include loss of employment, loss of produc- best practice in humanitarian response will enhance tive capacity, high expenditure on treatment for sick family capacity and effectiveness in Zambia. members and the loss of family property or savings through death. For those dependent on subsistence agriculture, Wilson Zimba is a long-time trainer and consultant in there is an urgent need to increase cash income to pay for disaster management in Zambia. His email address is:

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES the extra commodities needed to care for victims. Children [email protected].

HUMANITARIAN 22 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 23 mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Specific legal rights are Specific unambiguous. un-contestable Rights are within a country. are All (including the state) legal obliged to respect proce- are rights, and there courts (through dures of and re- law) for sanction dress. mecha- National law is the which inter- nism through are national conventions supposed to be enforce- able. The right to be compen- sated if the state compul- them from sorily removes their land. Nu gandan Constitution of 1995. elevant to displacement: elevant • • • • acts of parliament Several deal with land rights, but the the two key documents are 1998 Land Act and the U three landowners These give clear sets of rights which are r •

©Reuters/Radu Sigheti, courtesy alertnet.org The right to protect their land from squatters, even if even squatters, their land from The right to protect IDPs upon their these are unwillingly forced are who to temporarily land – unless the state claims the right compensation. their land, paying them full take over including the their land while displaced, Rights over land and the right to compensation if right to cultivate destroys including the state or its organs, anyone, or propertycrops on their land. nership is traditionally communal in northernnership is traditionally Uganda. gandan law recognises what is called ‘customary owner- what is called ‘customary gandan law recognises ecognition of land rights for IDPs (and ‘IDP-hosts’) has wnership is legally equal to having title, though land customary’ on inheritance (e.g. rules rules of ownership If land were owned communally ‘by the clan’, then indi- then the clan’, communally ‘by owned If land were This land rights as owners. vidual families would not have one place to would also mean that displacing them from another within their clan territory would not violate their legal ‘ownership’ rights, as long as they could be found some land – any land – in the place to which they had (Most IDPs in camps in northernbeen moved. are Uganda • • R the question of who is a landowner. been complicated by U ship’ recog- which are of land, i.e. claims to ownership whether or not the claimant has any formal nised locally, papers to ‘prove’ (e.g. title deeds). Customary ownership o is subject to any local held under customary tenure ‘ rights to use land which other members of the or various that land tried to argue Many have family may have). ow northern Uganda A displaced woman in a camp at Awoo, A displaced woman in a camp at Awoo, 1 In most other situations of displacement, IDPs and host communities esistance Army (LRA) is often esistance Army (LRA) ears, the profile of the war ears, the profile are distinguished from each other, and are often considered to have often considered and are each other, distinguished from are confusion, this article avoid uses the term ‘IDP To competing interests. hosts’. 1 Land rightsLand in northern displacement and Uganda in Uganda and Equity Movement Judy Adoko, Land and independent consultant, Simon Levine, Some look to international law and conventions to substan- Some look to international law and conventions tiate claims to rights on behalf of IDPs, and the Universal on Human Rights, to which the Ugandan Convention land rights. National recognises is a signatory, government practical: be more but may law is often overlooked, Do IDPs have land rights? Do IDPs have The context: a decade of displacement The context: a decade of displacement in Uganda Mass displacement in northern began in 1996, Uganda civilians into camps, in ordered when the government most cases without prior discussion with host communi- displace- of government-organised ties. A second round also been ment took place in 2002, and people have camp The current attack. the fear of rebel displaced by 1.5 million, including population is estimated at around the camps are the existing inhabitants of the land where in the same host populations live situated. Since now limited access to land, they are camps, and may also have to be IDPs. considered also generally has been raised, both politi- has been raised, with the cally – especially of the Inter- involvement national Criminal Court – and with a in humanitarian terms, in increase (long overdue) and commitment presence the international com- from one aspect of the Yet munity. crisis continues to escape discussion and attention. One hears talk of ‘rights’, ‘the law’ and ‘justice’ to the in relation situation of internally dis- placed people in the north, but little on the fact of Displace- displacement itself. one’s from ment, being moved to settle land and being forced an issue of else, is somewhere While the legal land rights. concern, land impact of displacement is a humanitarian considered. rarely are rights themselves The long-running conflict in The long-running northern the between Uganda and the Lord’s government R one of Africa’s considered humanitarian catas- forgotten two During the past trophes. y within 5km of their homes.) In other words, hosts would • In humanitarian crises we tend to fall back on generic have no more rights than the clan kin forced onto ‘their’ responses. Land rights are very context-specific. land. • The desire of some agencies to support and remain friendly with the authorities seems to make them reluctant to acknowledge that citizens have rights, and many have tried to argue that that the authorities may be violating those rights.

land ownership is traditionally We would argue that understanding land rights is vital in communal in northern Uganda responding to displacement in northern Uganda (and, we expect, in other crises involving displacement) on two main grounds:

The widespread belief that land ownership in northern •Respect for rights is an integral part of all humani- Uganda is communal is in fact incorrect, and stems from a tarian action. misunderstanding of the concept of ‘ownership’. Research • An understanding of land rights will affect many of our commissioned in 2004 by the Civil Society Organisations interventions. This is partly because humanitarian for Peace in Northern Uganda, an advocacy coalition of catastrophes are not the self-contained ‘case’ to which around 40 local and international NGOs, conclusively agencies respond, but are also the context within showed that land is held as private property in the parts which other tragedies occur, for which attention is of Uganda where displacement has occurred.2 Land is needed but is often absent. The ongoing violation of owned either by families or by households: when people land rights in many different ways is a key current and say that ‘land is owned by the clan’, they are referring to future cause of destitution. something quite different from private ownership. The clan traditionally has the right to make the rules about who owns land, and which rules owners must follow in managing their land. This is analogous to powers which understanding land rights is vital states claim over land which citizens own (such as zoning, in responding to displacement in setting land law, establishing courts of law and planning permission), but is quite different from the right of owner- northern Uganda ship.3 The distinction may be difficult to follow, or seem unduly pedantic, but a simplification of the ideas of ‘clan ownership’ has made it much easier to ignore or downplay The obligation to respect rights in humanitarian violations of IDPs’ rights. response Humanitarian actors have a duty to obey the law (even Violations have included: where the state itself does not). Humanitarian agencies have no right to use people’s land for building schools, • Several hundred thousand people have been forcibly roads or wells without permission from the landowners, displaced by the state, with no compensation offered. and without paying compensation where appropriate. •Trees on IDP land have been burnt down, as security (Agencies have no right to take advantage of forces set fires to remove cover for rebels. landowners by soliciting their permission instead of •IDP and army camps have been set up on private land paying compensation.) Some have done so, and their without permission or compensation. only protection from legal action is people’s ignorance •Public facilities have been constructed on private land, of their rights. without compensation being paid. Where camps have become market centres, local authorities are simply Many grievances underlie the conflict in northern Uganda, taking people’s land, for instance to build roads. including a belief among many IDPs that the government displaced them in order to deprive them of their land. If Are land rights a humanitarian issue? agencies also fail to respect IDPs’ land rights, this only Humanitarian agencies seem uncomfortable with the idea fuels anger; conversely, respecting their land rights would of land rights. There are several possible reasons for this: support a belief that displacement is temporary. Giving people land rights also gives them ‘agency’. When we • The issue is seen as too complicated – the restricted treat people as powerless victims, we reinforce their domain of lawyers. Few agencies have this expertise. sense of powerlessness, fuelling violence and despair. • Land rights have not become part of the humanitarian Land rights are almost the only area where IDPs have the discourse, so few agencies even realise there is a power to oblige us to show them respect. problem. Finally, the whole humanitarian raison d’être rests on a 2 J. Adoko and S. Levine, Land Matters in Displacement: The belief in the value of human rights, including land rights. Importance of Land Rights in Acholiland and What Threatens Them, We should not discriminate. The international community 2004, www.internal-displacement.org or www.oxfam.org.uk. 3 In legal terms, the clan’s traditional rights and powers are akin to a demands respect for the land rights of white farmers in hybrid of holding ‘radical title’, the ‘police powers’ of the state and Zimbabwe, but ignores the same rights of black farmers in

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES judicial authority. Uganda.

HUMANITARIAN 24 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 25 is a Elevated 1 , January 2006, p. Judy Adoko mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Nu Land Matters in Displacement: Do No Harm: How Aid Can SupportDo No Harm: How , 2004, www.internal-displacement.org (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). Rienner, Lynne CO: (Boulder, is a consultant living in Uganda, who has is a consultant living in Uganda, eferences and furthereferences reading eace Or War eace Or or further see www. papers on land rights in Uganda, Nutrition Information in Crisis Situations (NICS 8) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Declaration Universal General 217 A (III),Assembly resolution 1948. F land-in-uganda.org. The ImportanceWhat of Land Rights in Acholiland and Them Threatens or www.oxfam.org.uk. Mary Anderson, P R J. Adoko and S. Levine, elated issues in the Great Lakes region. Lakes region. elated issues in the Great 1 14, www.unsystem.org/scn/Publications/RNIS/NICSv8.pdf. much more than symbolic compensation: this could be this compensation: symbolic than more much displace- of repercussions the political to reduce enough in both the could be immense, The impact of this ment. in and fear) and to IDPs benefit stress direct reducing (by to a stable peace. contributing ‘land rights’ legal Finally, actors with an external provide that the to ensure to pursue the government avenue about Talk rights of IDPs and protected. respected are ‘human rights’ interference’ is often seen as ‘political and but legal rights can be de-politi- can be confrontational, agree- for settling these questions (where The place cised. courts. own All governments country’s ment fails) is in the when the cost of not doing so their people best protect motive law suits is a powerful The fear of will be higher. why not in Uganda? West: the in for governments particularlyin politically easy, is never Humanitarian work The humanitarian mandate conflict situations. sensitive necessary the skills and knowledge obliges us to acquire to relieve and appropriately most effectively to respond humanitarian suffering. If that means under- and prevent engineering and as water as well standing the law, then so be it. malaria control, Simon Levine conflict and food security- on land, worked extensively r Land and of the Coordinator and the Programme lawyer (LEMU).The authors can be in Uganda Equity Movement or [email protected]. contacted on [email protected], acute malnutrition among children under five. acute malnutrition among children levels of mortality, particularly also are among children, of mortality, levels most agencies limit themselves to seeking to understand how people use land, but more is caused by losing land poverty than by farming it badly elevance on resettlement if they choose to ignore the real if they choose to ignore on resettlement elevance that the 2006 UNHCR-ledespect, it is welcome strategy without actually paying ecognise people as land-owners, Annalies Borrel and Lauren Rumble, UNICEF, and Gillian Mathurin UNICEF, Rumble, and Lauren Annalies Borrel UNICEF’s emergency nutrition response Chronic vulnerability in Niger: implications and lessons vulnerability in Niger: implications Chronic learned for Most IDPs the that, on their return, others believe and and will be a potential for land conflicts will be high, This is not inevitable. leading cause of destitution. the could help address Attention to the issues now to marginal Agencies risk confining themselves problem. r almost certain which people are problems this to face. In r of IDPsfor the protection has for the first time recognised and respect The state could show land issues as a priority. r A more detailed understanding of land rights and how rights of land detailed understanding A more can make interventions actually made land are claims to that people problems to the actual responsive far more in the still lose land rights people face. In displacement, being neighbours, widows – disputes with usual ways rela- by having land grabbed in-laws, orphans evicted by The poverty land. local authorities illegally seizing tives, these the difficulties faced by of displacement intensifies to seeking to limit themselves victims. Most agencies techniques), people use land (farming understand how farming losing land than by is caused by poverty but more IDPs In Gulu, an estimated 15% of in 2004 had it badly. who landowners, from land to rent into contracts entered atten- off the land mid-season. Had more them then threw legal rights as tenants, thousands tion been paid to their near-destitution. from been saved of people could have to brought the most common disputes Land cases are dispute-reso- in Acholiland, but legal assistance projects to re-establish lacking. Helping lution mechanisms are customary law courts them to the state and linking a restore judicial system would make justice accessible, a and promote sense of normality amid displacement system that will be essential on return. Land rights and humanitarian interventions humanitarian rights and Land Niger has suffered from chronic malnutrition, rooted in malnutrition, rooted chronic from Niger has suffered decades. A series of for several vulnerabilities, structural and economic shocks has furtherenvironmental exacer- of in high levels resulting bated these vulnerabilities, evident. During 2005, the under-five mortality rate was 4.1 per 10,000 per day, and the crude mortality rate was 1.5 per 10,000 per day.2 In two regions of the country, under-five mortality rates were above the emergency threshold of two per 10,000 per day.3 Based on the findings of a recent eval- uation,4 and using UNICEF’s frame- ©Reuters/Finbarr O’Reilly, www.alertnet.org courtesy work for the causes of child malnutrition, this article outlines the structural roots of Niger’s crisis, and provides a brief synopsis of the lessons learned for UNICEF.

The causes of malnutrition In general, the basic causes of child malnutrition at the national and regional level are rooted in the avail- ability of resources (human, structural, financial), formal and informal infras- A girl stands in front of empty granaries in Tangaba village, tructure and national and regional north-western Niger government polices.5 The underlying causes of malnutrition, acting at the household and commu- earlier fodder deficit caused by drought and a severe locust nity level, encompass several broad areas: care practices, infestation in some pastoral areas, exerted further social and cultural expectations, health services and health pressure, and resulted in many livestock-dependent house- environment and food access and food availability. holds facing a sharp decrease in purchasing power for food commodities. In 2005, purchasing power was reported to The prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding among infants be less than a quarter of its 2004 level, and was weakest in under four months in Niger is extremely low (reportedly only the agro-pastoral and pastoral zones of Niger. 2% in 2000).6 It is recognised that support for exclusive breastfeeding is a priority intervention for child survival.7 In It is generally accepted that food access, rather than food addition, there is very little awareness amongst communi- availability, is the critical factor. The importance of non- ties and families about the consequences of malnutrition for food causes of malnutrition needs to be emphasised, and children and Niger’s patriarchal society means that women underlines the need for complementary initiatives in often do not have access to or control of food supplies. Low health, water, sanitation, feeding practices and care education and early marriage among women are additional sectors. For many malnourished children, food support gender-related factors that impact on nutritional status. will undoubtedly contribute to their nutritional status, but it will not be enough to maintain nutritional status in the Health facilities to cope with malnutrition are generally long term if these other factors are not addressed. weak and under-resourced. The capacity of local health workers to treat and prevent malnutrition and associated illnesses is low. Vaccination against measles is inadequate it is generally accepted that (below 60%), and user fees mean that more than half the population are excluded from health services (an estimated food access, rather than food 63% of the population lives on less than a dollar a day, and availability, is the critical factor UNDP’s Human Development Report in 2005 ranked the country last out of 177).8 Unusually high millet and sorghum prices in regional markets, combined with an Lessons learned 2 MSF, Nutritional Survey and Retrospective Mortality – Overview of Main Early warning, surveillance and assessment Findings, Rural Periphery of the Town of Zinder, Niger, August 2005. In September 2004, the IASC Working Group on Early 3 Nutrition Information in Crisis Situations (NICS 8). Warning – Early Action (EW/EA) recommended strength- 4 UNICEF’s Real Time Evaluation (RTE) of UNICEF’s Response to the ening national and local early warning in Niger, including 2005 Food and Nutrition Crisis in Niger, conducted by Lucien Back, incorporating malnutrition data into analyses and Danielle Fabre and Joaquim Gonzalez-Aleman, January 2006. strengthening the analysis of the impact of rising market 5 See UNICEF’s conceptual framework for malnutrition in emergencies. prices for grain.9 Although surveys conducted late in 2004 6 MICS, Preliminary Report, 2000. See also UNICEF/CDC national survey, October 2006. and throughout 2005 consistently reported high levels of 7 ‘Where and Why Are 10 Million Children Dying Every Year?’, The acute malnutrition, these findings did not trigger timely Lancet, 2003. 9 IASC, Early Warning/Early Action: Lessons and Insights from the 8 UNICEF/CDC national survey, October 2006. See also UNDP, Human Niger Food Crisis of 2004–2005, 63rd Working Group Meeting, 21–22

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES Development Report 2005, http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005. November 2005.

HUMANITARIAN 26 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 27 mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Nu While UNICEF cannot undertake 10 , vol. 4, 1999. 23, no. Disasters ICEF staff based in Niger as has technical nutrition now ICEF and its partners that earlier should recognise engthening and retaining emergency and emergency and retaining engthening r ell as in the regional office to supportell as in the regional changes strategic eview of the Necessity and Feasibility of Targeting Vulnerable Targeting of eview of the Necessity and Feasibility entions, including measles and malaria campaigns. esponsibility for all interventions addressing the under- esponsibility for all interventions addressing technical, leadership and coor- assuming a greater ole by ecur. In Niger, UNICEF and its partners In Niger, did not adequately ecur. crisis, but espond, not only to the existing malnutrition ecognise when there is a deterioration in the nutritional is a deterioration ecognise when there 10 Susanne Jaspars and Jeremy Shoham, ‘Targeting the Vulnerable: A Vulnerable: the Shoham, ‘Targeting 10 Susanne Jaspars and Jeremy R Households’, commodities, addressing infant and young child feeding child and young infant addressing commodities, to reflect policies nutrition national strengthening and activities. survival and other child nutrition emergency r lying causes of malnutrition, UNICEF that should ensure in surveillance that it applies the analytical framework underlying these and early warning sufficiently measures UNICEF is obligated to undertakecauses. Subsequently, that is based on evidence, and where advocacy strategic address that possible design and implement programmes these underlying causes. It is equally important that UNICEF adequate emer- retains (financial, human, technical and capacity gency response localised, nutritional crises, however logistical) to address staff high-calibre In particular, in countries such as Niger. as as well specifically equipped with skills in emergency to in-country, public health nutrition should be retained r and build national capacities and to situation, to develop This would include advise and support timely responses. underlying chronic and capacity to address the resources (which may be causes such as inadequate feeding practices as priority public health inter- exacerbated in crises) as well v of the problem to address In August 2005, a strategy vulnerability acute malnutrition in the context of chronic was implemented. Supported the UNICEF by Regional Africa and Headquarters,Western the Niger Office for and decisive effective a more Country Office has played r its supportdination function in nutrition through to the with NGOs. Health, and in cooperation Ministry of Public UN w levels. at the policy and programme development capacity capacity development St efforts developmental and humanitarian Separating ‘normality’ a false dichotomy between potentially sets up people live obscuring the fact that many and ‘crisis’, the edge of crisis. In situations of perpetually close to reduced populations have where vulnerability, chronic likely to more shocks, crises are capacity to cope with r articulate that included both a strategy for advocate and interventions. response mitigation and emergency UN livelihoods, people’s interventions, such as strengthening and response national capacity for emergency developing access to social services and for improved advocating critical interventions in countries where markets, are exists. UNICEF vulnerability chronic others must and r to crisis, and people also to the factors that predispose the underlying causes. ICEF and its partners the that will also need to ensure so and Mauritania. UNICEF an inter- has developed om 2006, UNICEF plans to undertake national twice-yearly ulnerability analysis: the need for a broader analysis: the ulnerability elatively greater risk, and why. In view of existing resource risk, and why. greater elatively ated into the system and analysed on a monthly basis. ated into the system and analysed on agency proposal for West and Central Africa which focuses and Central West for agency proposal malnutrition; both acute and chronic on addressing early-warning systems including nutritional strengthening to approach a regional surveillance systems, developing malnutrition using a and moderate of severe the treatment establishing community-based approach, decentralised nutrition adequate supplies and stockpiles of emergency A broader regional analysis of the problem of malnutrition analysis of the problem regional A broader in the development strategy effective is critical for more analysis and understanding of the A comprehensive future. cross-border risks associated with changes in regional for programming, should inform priorities regulations trade are of vulnerability Similar patterns as advocacy. as well for instance in Burkina in the region, occurring elsewhere Fa constraints, this analysis could have been extremely useful been extremely this analysis could have constraints, of persistent indebted- problem The for prioritising action. must also be highlighted, groups ness among vulnerable livelihood of the continuing deterioration especially given a long-term systems. Information should be analysed from previous taking into account earlier trends, perspective, livelihood crises and a systematic comparison of different groups’ vulnerabilities. as chronic as well coping strategies, As late as May 2005, analyses still focused on the produc- As late as May 2005, analyses still focused other staples at the expense of of grain tion and availability indicators, such as changes in the import and export regu- to food and market prices, access grain, lations governing of access to health malnutrition. Other factors such as lack services, gender inequality were and practices cultural into the national vulnerability inadequately incorporated Furthermore, analysis and subsequent programming. at were groups analyses failed to identify which population r V malnutrition for understanding framework surveillance system explicitly leads to programmatic action, surveillance system explicitly leads to programmatic in results. which in turn will need to be measured UN Fr disag- nutrition surveys. be appropriately Data will need to and Technical differences. to account for regional gregated for the early-warning logistical support has been provided incorpo- that nutritional indicators are system, to ensure r Establishing a nutritional surveillanceEstablishing that system in Niger to is appropriate information and timely can provide and needs will be a challenge, national capacities to identify This system would need including for UNICEF. seasonal periods of malnutrition), changes (i.e. temporal liveli- different among vulnerability distinguish relative food security and nutritional and combine hood groups and take need to be ‘child-centred’, data. It would also nutritional status. due account of children’s and appropriate action in terms of both treatment and both treatment terms of in action appropriate and to a lack due was arguably This interventions. preventive interpret analyse and capacity to collect, of in-country as a key priority nutrition an inability to raise data, and partner donors and agencies. with the government, UN coordination for essential health services. It should also consider advo- Existing UN coordination mechanisms in Niger, such as cating for access to locally produced low-cost therapeutic the UN Country Team, were slow to acknowledge the foods and complementary foods for young children. severity of the crisis. Coordination between the UN and Overall, UNICEF should support, and should be account- the government, as well as coordination within UN able to, specific capacity development results and agencies, was weak. Funding constraints prevented WFP outcomes within Niger’s government and other national from fulfilling some of its commitments as outlined in a structures. As UNICEF strengthens its own capacity in emer- global MOU between UNICEF and WFP, specifically in gency nutrition, it should be better positioned in the undertaking large-scale emergency supplementary medium term to strengthen the government’s capacity. feeding programmes. The relatively late implementation Neglecting to do so will only lead to inadequate national of general and supplementary feeding contributed to capacity and over-reliance on (often inadequate) interna- greater numbers of severely malnourished children tional capacity in future crises in Niger. requiring treatment in therapeutic feeding programmes. Advocacy Close collaboration and coordination between the different Strategic advocacy is a critical component of UNICEF’s UN and other agencies in Niger is critical, especially in the emergency response. In Niger, however, relatively greater area of nutrition. An adequate UN response in a nutritional emphasis was placed on short-term advocacy, rather than crisis requires that UN agencies work collaboratively, with strategic policy advancements. While retaining a focus on well-defined responsibilities (UNICEF for surveillance, treat- children, UNICEF and its partners must work to ensure ment of malnutrition, infant feeding and Vitamin A; WFP for that rigorous, evidence-based assessments are used to food aid; FAO for food security; WHO for health). UNICEF, as inform and develop a country-based advocacy strategy for the lead UN agency for nutrition, needs to ensure that immediate and long-term change. These assessments are policies and programme priorities are based on a frame- crucial not only for informing agencies about context- work that engages and holds accountable each of these specific priorities, but also for gaining consensus among agencies (including UNICEF itself) for effectively addressing partners, including national authorities, over the severity and preventing malnutrition in emergencies. To a large of the situation and the need for a scaled-up response. extent, the specific roles and responsibilities of UN Evidence-based advocacy in Niger is also required to raise agencies have been clarified. In March 2006, UNICEF the profile of nutrition in general; achieve greater assumed the coordination of technical support for the cohesion between interventions addressing chronic and treatment of malnutrition, WFP will provide food for supple- acute causes; win broader recognition of the various mentary feeding programmes (SFPs) and WHO will coordi- causes of malnutrition (not just related to food); revise nate and implement complementary health initiatives; and change health policies that support more equitable UNICEF will continue to supply nutrition and drugs for the health services; ensure that social, cultural and gender- management of severely malnourished children. Although a related causes are consistently addressed; and make significant step forward, this clarification of responsibilities certain that changes in cross-border (regional) trade regu- is not necessarily applied at the country level across all lations have minimum negative effects on people’s access emergencies. to food. Advocacy must be sustained and systematically communicated to all stakeholders, including the govern- ment, the broader UN family and internally within UNICEF, close collaboration and as well as with donors and regional actors. coordination between the Conclusions different UN and other agencies The chronic and devastating nature of the malnutrition crisis in Niger poses significant challenges for humanitarian aid in Niger is critical, especially in agencies, including UNICEF. An approach which encom- the area of nutrition passes a meaningful shift in policy, programming and advocacy strategies is needed. Significant progress has been achieved by the humanitarian community in recent months to address the crisis in Niger, but the problem of Strengthening and developing national capacity chronic vulnerability and high levels of chronic and acute UNICEF needs to establish a long-term approach to malnutrition persists. Greater efforts are required to under- strengthening emergency nutrition capacity within the stand and respond to this chronic vulnerability. Niger government. The strategy in Niger will require more than intermittent training workshops, and will need to be Annalies Borrel ([email protected]) and Lauren Rumble sustained over a long period. It should focus on leadership work in the Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Unit in skills as well as technical competencies within national UNICEF’s Office of Emergency Programmes, New York. Until structures, and it should focus on achieving greater owner- recently, Gillian Mathurin was also a member of the team. ship of nutrition surveys and surveillance findings, incorpo- Significant inputs into this article were made by UNICEF’s rating emergency nutrition policies into broader public Regional Office in West Africa, the Country Office in Niger health policy and advocating for the abolition of user fees and the Nutrition Section at UNICEF Headquarters. PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES

HUMANITARIAN 28 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 29 No Safe mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Nu They make decisions, on a daily basis, 4 (New York: Women’s Commission for Refugee Women’s York: (New ell as that of others; they should be involved in efforts they should be involved ell as that of others; children under five typically under five children experience the highest mortality in complex emergencies The greatest burden of ill-health in conflict situations is of burden The greatest children. borne by in conflict children by Infectious diseases encountered children the same patterns time and again: settings reveal of changes in behaviour, as a result vulnerable are and nutrition. and vectors micro-organisms environment, as wellbeing, in their own roles play significant Children w health. own their to improve important, with are perspectives and research Children’s new people can offer valuable and young children the potential to lead to more insights which have interventions. effective omen and Children, 2004). omen and Children, What we know What we • • • • for long periods. Within the home, children may play a the home, children Within for long periods. part,considerable often unsupervised, in obtaining and disposing of waste, over- food, collecting water, preparing children. seeing hygiene and washing younger in children In Nepal, homeless and unaccompanied particular may be exposed to risks of HIV/AIDS and other psychosocial and infectious diseases, trafficking little about them, including whether, know We stresses. or when they access services.how In Northern Uganda, villages and night from walk every thousands of children – up to towns internally displaced camps to the nearest to ongoing abductions and 10km away – in response adults, to sleep They do so unaccompanied by violence. in hospital grounds in shelters, bus parks, on verandas, or on the street. which affect their health: concerning water and sanita- and health substance use tion, nutrition, personal safety, In Mindanao in the Philippines, ongoing conflict has care. girls becoming led to earlier marriages, with young mothers have These young mothers in their early teens. not had the opportunity best to feed their to learn how ill-health and infectious them from or protect children at not directed materials are diseases. Health promotion the limited them, nor do these materials recognise within decision-making latitude these girls may have complex family structures. 4 Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and Children, Women Commission for Refugee Women’s 4 Call Home: Child and Adolescent Night Commuters in To Place Northern Uganda W , 2 ibid. 1 (Washington DC: National (Washington , 367, 2006, pp. 690–92; R. , 367, 2006, pp. 3 , pp. 698–99. , pp. The Lancet ibid. Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards (Oxford: Oxfam, 2004). Oxfam, (Oxford: Child Health in Complex Emergencies: Roundtable Child Health in Complex Emergencies: ise childhood morbidity and mortality. Such diseases and mortality. ise childhood morbidity esearch directly with children in these settings. with children directly esearch Horton, ‘The Coming Decade for Global Action on Child Health’, 1 G. Lansdown and R. Karkara, ‘Children’s Right To Express Views and Views Express To Right ‘Children’s and R. Karkara, 1 G. Lansdown Seriously’, Them Taken Have pp. 3–5; and A. Penrose and M. Takaki, ‘Children’s Rights in ‘Children’s Takaki, and M. 3–5; and A. Penrose pp. and Disasters’, Emergencies 2 W. J. Moss et al., W. 2 Migration of Forced on the Demography 2006). Academies Press, 3 The Sphere Project, in Disaster Response The disruption and displacement of families and commu- in children nities in times of armed conflict often results an these have and responsibilities; adopting new roles and potentially health and wellbeing, impact on their own on that of siblings, peers and close adults (sometimes sick Girls in their early teens may them- or elderly relatives). at previously who were be mothers. Children selves school or had been at home or working in the fields may their family need to find paid work, taking them away from While children under the age of five years typically experi- years under the age of five While children ence the highest mortality settings, emergency in complex where may also be affected, especially older children been child health have interventions to promote trans- as to reduce as well disrupted. It is for this reason, guidelines suggest immunising mission, that the Sphere for measles, a condition up to the age of 15 years children that usually affects under-fives. Diarrhoeal diseases, acute respiratory infections, Diarrhoeal diseases, acute respiratory the most malnutrition are measles, malaria and severe to these can be common causes of death in children; added pertussis,meningococcal meningitis. typhoid and Child health in emergencies This article reportsinternational symposium in on a recent practi- and together researchers Manila which brought Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia Uganda, tioners from experiences and expertiseand Nepal to share in relation on infectious conflict and health, with a focus to children, attention to the rationale, The symposium drew diseases. in developing methods and ethics involved approach, to child health issues, including responses innovative r Children comprise a substantial proportion a substantial comprise Children of those The humani- crises and disasters. conflict, affected by in their vulnerability all too well tarian community knows – in particularemergencies to infectious diseases which ra major killers; avertingare deaths is the key health these intervention, such as alongside securing basic needs adequate hygiene, food security, sanitation and water, has highlighted the debate Recent nutrition and shelter. to achieving the health-related challenges tremendous and of applying best Goals, Millennium Development interventions, in child health respecting while still practice rights to participate heard. and be children’s Anthony Zwi and Natalie Grove, University of New South Wales New South of University Natalie Grove, and Zwi Anthony Researching settings conflict-affected in children with 30 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES • • •E needs identifiedwere: gaps.Amongtheinformationandresearch important emerging bestpractice, andhow tobeginfillthese sium stimulateddiscussionabouthow tolearnfrom oped, andethicalconsiderations elaborated. Innovative approaches andmethodshave beendevel- y has demonstrated thevalue ofengagingchildren and S To we interacting withandshapingtheirenvironment. However, r children oftenexhibitstrength andresilience, actively ences. Despitesignificantexposure andvulnerabilities, a muchmore sophisticatedunderstandingoftheirexperi- r R Affected by ArmedConflict Out: New Voices ontheProtection of Young andParticipation People 5 Women’s CommissionforRefugee Women andChildren, Addressing attention. thesegapsdeserves basis onwhichtheymaketheirdecisionsorchoices. esponding tothreats totheirhealth. They takeaction, eflect therealities andconstraints children facerequires oung peopleincommunityresearch andaction. ymposium participants heard aboutrecent workwhich ymposium participants eshaping services andcommunicationstrategies to eshaping services _Involve_Children_in_Research.pdf.) se-web-01.rb.se/SHOP/Archive/Documents/ 2958%20Want_to creative writingandphotography.using cartoons, (Seehttp:// and focus-group discussionsto and methods,from interviews and Peer-Research, aswell asdescribingresearch techniques Learningapproaches, includingParticipatory andAction(PLA) R Save the Children’s graphic projects toexplore unmethealthneeds. in thecommunity, usingdecisiontrees orestablishingphoto- creating mapsofhealthrisksandresources available ofsuchtechniquesinclude be more helpful.Examples collecting opinionsandengaginginproblem-solving might these techniques:identifyingvisualand/orverbal meansfor children who are shyofperformingmaybemarginalised by or ofdiscriminationatpublichealthfacilities.However, be usedtorelay experiencesofhealthorillnessinthefamily, excellent modesofexpression forsomechildren –theymay with andare interested in.Dance,drama androle-play are ability todiscover whatchildren are goodat,feelcomfortable than perfectinganyonetechniqueisthe More important adapt tothedifferent needs,skillsandtalentsofchildren. Effective research approaches mustbeflexibleandableto N HUMANITARIAN esearch? wards amore effective research agenda

ew waysofworking conflict-affected children, in particular how these conflict-affected children, inparticular social relationships amongdisplacedandother Developing adeeperunderstandingofthechanging and tomaintaintheirown healthinconflictsituations. Determining whatenableschildren toberesourceful behaviours andexposure insituationsofconflict. know littleoftheirexperiencesandinsights,orthe stablishing whichfactorspredispose children torisk exchange toolkit provides avaluable discussionofdifferent So You Want To Involve Children in (New York: Women’s Commissionfor 5 The sympo- Y outh Speak •T •W • •W • • and Methods with Children LivinginSituationsofArmed Conflict: Concepts,Ethics R appropriate andsafe. mation, andcanhelpresearchers tounderstandwhatis ties). Children themselves are oftenvaluable sources ofinfor- area have proved sensitive insomecommuni- particularly (visual techniquesthatproduce drawings andmapsofan approaches and anonymitymaypreclude theuseofcertain problematic. Likewise,securityandissuesofconfidentiality mation infront oftheirpeers(ingroup exercises) maybe security inthearea. Encouraging children todiscloseinfor- health issuesorconcernstodowiththearmedconflict the informationthatmayberevealed; thiscouldrelate to Re given totherisksinvolved withdifferent methods. attentionshouldbe in conflict-affectedsettingsparticular In additiontofindingthemostusefulwaysofgatheringdata, v http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib_pub_file/583_filename_in health andotherpoliciesforyoung adolescents.(See used togatherinformationfordeveloping reproductive niques suchasdiary-makingandphotography have been explores howPopulation Fund innovative (UNFPA), tech- Investing When ItCounts esting.pdf.) efugee Women andB. andChildren,Tyrer, 2005);J.Hart searchers willneedtothinkaboutthesensitive nature of conflict? for theirpeersandsignificantothersintimesof health-related decisions? perceive theirhealthneeds,andhow dotheymake practitioners? How dounaccompaniedchildren providers,other adults–teachers,service traditional Aside from family, dochildren draw ontheadviceof by within familiesandcommunities.How isthisaffected impact onresponsibilities forhealth-related decisions and equity, anddeliver sometangiblebenefits? needs assessmentsleadtoimprovements inaccess programme-based activitiessuchasconsultationsand participants. the potentialforensuringreciprocal benefitsfor with dueregard toanyinherent risksordangers,and are mostapplicableindifferingconflictcontexts, Establishing whatchild-centred research methods development andprovision. inhealthcare quality healthcare andparticipation Clarifying thekeyobstaclestochildren’s accessto consultation? What ethicalvalues guidetheirpractice? employ? What dotheywiththeproducts ofsuch dothey mechanisms ofconsultationandparticipation makers, engagechildren, andhow dotheyso? What providersinternational NGOs,keyservice andpolicy- o whatextentdodifferent actors,includinglocaland hat strategies have beenutilisedby children tocare hat stepscanbetakentoensure thatresearch and religion, class,gender, ageorfamilystructure? (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 2006). , publishedby theUnitedNations R esearch PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 31 Infectious Diseases mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June esearch and teach in the esearch r Nu Natalie Grove and will learn most about child will learn most , was held on 9–13 January 2006. It was organ- esearching directly with children esearching directly we if our strategies health issues include and approaches r esponse esearch Centre and De La Salle University, Manila. It was and De La Salle University, Centre esearch or copies of the symposium report and a background aking forward this work will challenge assumptions about this aking forward esearch, including providing opportunities for them to act providing including esearch, children. Throughout such work, identifying how children how work, identifying such Throughout children. is adversity, despite succeeded, have people and young of agencies the role too is understanding So paramount. How children. engage been able to successfully who have these learned through they What have they done so? have What with others? can be shared What lessons processes? which of, they aware are potentials and risks cautions, prior to embarking on such ambi- need to be understood stakeholders, in the end, listen to tious work? Do key NGOs or do governments, to say? How have what children and to what effect? with children, political factions engage T as skills and competencies responsibilities, roles, children’s prevention and the promotion, research to health they relate Ensuring the genuine problems. of health and treatment participation people in health and young of children r and to help responses to influence as co-investigators, We a shift in power. agenda, involves shape the research people – young to listen to and be led by must be prepared find. we to hear the unexpected, and act on what the will not only reveal approaches Adopting innovative people, young and ongoing risks to the health of children demon- they and resourcefulness but also the resilience participa- Enabling greater in the face of adversity. strate and in the planning, implementation children tion by to improving is central of health projects evaluation health outcomes. Anthony Zwi Health and Community Medicine, School of Public Sydney. Wales, of New South University The Manila symposium, entitled among Children in Conflict Situations: Risk, Resilience and in Conflict Situations: Risk, Resilience among Children R Health and Community the School of Public ised by Medicine, in partnershipDevelopment with the Social R the UNICEF/UNDP/World by sponsored Bank/WHO Diseases Research. Tropical in Program Training Special F please contact for the meeting, paper prepared The authors or [email protected]. [email protected] Pilar Ramos- Michelle Gayer, Kelly, Paul acknowledge Jimenez and Johannes Sommerfeld for their contributions to the symposium report. , This 8 Bull WHO , p. 28. , p. Research with Children: (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004). Berghahn York: (New ticipation, however, rarely extends rarely ticipation, however, r (London: Falmer Press, 2000); J. Boyden and 2000); J. Boyden Press, Falmer (London: Pa medical services vertical, and disease- 7 Children and Youth on the Frontline: Ethnography, on the Frontline: Youth and Children ad hoc Health promotion, community child health and community child health Health promotion, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards 6 ticipation and engagement will learn most about child health issues if our strate- r

lue in modifying and refocusing policies, practices and practices policies, lue in modifying and refocusing sponses, elief and development planning. The Sphere minimum Sphere The planning. elief and development 6 W. J. Moss et al., ‘Child Health in Complex Emergencies’, J. Moss et al., ‘Child Health in Complex Emergencies’, W. 6 84, 2006, pp. 58–64. 7 Sphere, 8 P. Christensen and A. James (eds), 8 P. Perspectives and Practices Armed Conflict and Displacement J. de Berry (eds), to children. Models of engaging with children in vulnerable Models of engaging with children to children. and it is clear developed, nonetheless been situations have them. need to listen to them and learn from that we gies and approaches include researching directly with directly include researching gies and approaches We differs from standard practice, which relies on adults, on which relies practice, standard differs from of the perspectives and teachers, to convey usually parents impor- helped, can share if appropriately Children, children. health and environment, tant insights about their lives, is thus of perspectives these decision-making. Appreciating va services. health must take seriously the right of Public to participatechildren them, in health decisions that affect them. which seeks to benefit and in research standards, for instance, state that ‘the disaster-affected for instance, standards, participatespopulation actively in the assessment, design, the assis- of implementation, monitoring and evaluation tance programme’. There is growing recognition of the need for the active recognition is growing There and conflict-affected people in participation of disaster- r Pa specific programmes may decrease mortality may decrease in the shortspecific programmes is unlikely to be sustained unless term, but this reduction implemented – a are programmes comprehensive more so in conflict more challenge at the best of times, but even settings. Addressing health problems through traditional emergency traditional through health problems Addressing re Although public health is traditionally consultative and consultative public health is traditionally Although efforts and relief to be top- tend emergency participatory, the from This results focused. narrowly more and down avert to required needs and urgency often desperate and to and mortality, of morbidity levels high extremely serious conse- more or spreading epidemics from prevent deliv- to work are Interventionsquences unfolding. known consultation or but often with limited with authority, ered opportunityThey to engage with affected communities. insen- intervention are designs which may be built around or local beliefs and perspec- or gender, to culture sitive may fail to take on health. Solutions proposed tives and coping mechanisms that are account of the strategies undermine them. in place, or may already Infectious disease programmes need greater need programmes disease Infectious with communities engagement infectious disease prevention and control all require close all require control and infectious disease prevention genuine participa- the Without linkages with communities. tion and support the best tech- of the communities, even to fail. likely nical solutions are Can joint evaluations promote ongoing collaborative action by NGOs? Malaika Wright and Pauline Wilson, Emergency Capacity Building Project

In October 2005, something unusual happened in Niger. Staff in the country offices of CARE, Save the Children, The Niger joint evaluation illustrates the call to Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and World Vision got together collaborate: to conduct a joint evaluation of their agencies’ responses to the food crisis. None of the country offices had done joint The team noted that the [IWG] Partners were reactive in evaluations before, and their decision to undertake one regard to interagency coordination such that the lack of an stemmed, not from a request by donors, but because they effective NGO forum in Niger is a serious weakness in effec- wanted to learn from each other, and contribute to knowl- tive programming … opportunities were lost for recognition edge in the wider humanitarian sector by making their of Partners’ comparative advantages, establishment of joint findings public. advocacy positions and for peer training. The latter would have been invaluable prior to the emergency intervention. This event might be unremarkable were it not for the typical lack of coordination among NGOs as a whole. Coordination can be difficult for a variety of reasons, including normal • Expand their partnerships with UN agencies: Following competitiveness and the culture of independence so deeply recommendations from the evaluation, CARE and CRS ingrained within the NGO sector. However, it can lead to the are working with WFP to align their emergency rehabili- uneven distribution of aid, and be confusing for beneficia- tation goals and activities, especially through imple- ries, who receive very similar goods and services from menting Food-For-Work activities and stocking cereal different agencies. Such independent action by NGOs has banks with WFP resources. Several NGOs, including created a poor public image for the aid enterprise, and led Save and World Vision, are meeting WFP and UNICEF to to missed opportunities for advocacy, the sharing of coordinate a new round of food distribution. resources and information and more efficient response. As Discussions include how to work together and support a result, numerous evaluations have stressed that NGOs other partners in areas where they are less able to must get better at coordination. distribute food, and how to come up with a set of common indicators to identify zones for targeting. Collaborative efforts are central to the work of Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project, which • Increase their voice at national coordination meetings: supported the joint evaluation in Niger. The project is a By working together to develop a unified national action two-year collaborative venture between World Vision plan for nutritional recuperation, NGOs are able to International, Save the Children-US, CARE International, present a more unified message at national health and Oxfam-GB, Mercy Corps, the International Rescue nutrition coordination meetings, originally sponsored Committee and Catholic Relief Services. In addition to by UNICEF and the World Health Organisation, but now the evaluation in Niger, some agencies involved in the managed by the Ministry of Health. ECB have undertaken joint evaluations in tsunami- affected countries, and an evaluation is currently under A more global perspective way in Guatemala. The joint evaluation in Niger offers by In Niger, the agencies were able to collate their different far the most detailed information on the value of joint perspectives, and this gave them a deeper understanding evaluations for ECB agencies. As such, it will provide of the crisis and its causes. The joint evaluation was about much of the evidence examined here. ‘understanding the crisis, its long-term chronic nature, as well as agency responses, our impact and where to go Joint evaluations and the coordination with recovery efforts’, notes one colleague. The evalua- process tion also found that each agency had its own strengths; by In Niger, the evaluation helped the NGOs involved to: working cooperatively, the four agencies are likely to have a greater impact in their emergency and development • Hold regular coordination meetings: CARE and Save programmes. Such a finding would have been difficult to organised bi-weekly meetings of NGOs in October to discern had each agency done an independent evaluation. share quantitative and qualitative reports, and to discuss the scaling-up and targeting of nutrition activi- Shared technical expertise and local ties. These meetings are now periodic, and are led by knowledge different NGOs on a rotating basis. They have helped Increased communication with partners has allowed for NGOs lobby the government of Niger and the World greater sharing of technical expertise and local knowl- Food Programme (WFP) for support in specific areas, edge, in addition to helping agencies learn about one especially regarding nutrition. In addition, the another’s programmes. The Ministry of Health and agencies credit the joint exercise for prompting them Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), for example, helped train to set up an NGO coordination forum in Niamey, to CARE agents to identify various types of malnutrition and

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES which more NGOs have been invited. to treat moderate malnutrition. In the Zinder region, CRS

HUMANITARIAN 32 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 33 is auline Wilson P mber 34 • June 2006 mber 34 • June Nu is Knowledge Management/Research is Knowledge esources and information and learning among agencies, and information esources eview. In Niger, the four agencies involved in the joint eval- in the joint involved the four agencies In Niger, eview. agencies’ are agencies scrutiny, to public performance to their accountability and their transparency increasing the itself also allows process The evaluation stakeholders. peer to account through to hold one another agencies r to review joint event for a follow-on called uation have of the evaluations the recommendations against progress collaboration. inter-agency and to strengthen Officer with the Emergency Capacity Building Project. Her Capacity Building Project. Officer with the Emergency is [email protected]. email address: Conclusion suggests that joint evaluations evidence The preliminary sharing of collaboration, greater for set a precedent r them with the opportunitytrust, to develop and provide not as competitors but as one another and to regard partners.is also clear that success is highly dependent It of on-the-ground and the level itself, on the process example, For exercise. evaluation engagement in the analysis together whether agencies meet and do some commonalities as they identify and form relationships of the evalua- goes a long way to determining the benefits to set how knows tion. A highly skilled team leader who up short meetings to discussion analytic interagency of the findings, conclusions and recommendations agree that ensure will with agencies on the ground the process the teams in-country, report by is owned the evaluation forward. will be taken and that the recommendations useful for examining the are Individual evaluations and resources complexity of logistics, monitoring, human to which regular financial management, and the extent These aspects are crises. activities mitigate programme important, focusing on from agencies but they often distract and coordination collaboration, question of how the larger and during before, NGO responses can improve advocacy to under- enable agencies after a crisis. Joint evaluations contribution they make to mitigating the stand the collective is importantThis effects of the crisis. so many because and trying to attribute together, agencies often respond impact to any one intervention is difficult. Joint evaluations goals, also help agencies to keep their focus on these larger so that relationships and enable them to form collaborative the quality of their response. improve NGOs can collectively Malaika Wright Manager, Initiative Accountability and Impact Measurement on the more For Capacity Building Project. Emergency visit www.ecbpro- Capacity Building Project, Emergency ject.org. drought and locust infestation. drought by working cooperatively, a likely to have agencies are impact in their emergency greater programmes and development by children and lactating women, (i.e. pregnant groups of age and the elderly). years under five base. oject’s website. This move is significant: by opening up is significant: by This move website. oject’s etting realistic and shared goals shared and etting realistic ision and several local NGOs worked together on food worked together local NGOs several ision and oucher fairs. The government, Save, CARE,Save, World The government, CRS, fairs. oucher both the favourable and less flattering appraisals of and less flattering appraisals both the favourable Helping agencies increase transparency and transparency Helping agencies increase accountability often internal documents are Individual agency evaluations both make it into the public domain. However, that never been have and the Niger evaluation the tsunami evaluation posted publicly on the ALNAP and on the ECB website Pr 1. the food insecurity of households affected reduce To 2. vulnerable the nutritional status of specific protect To 3. their asset enable affected households to preserve To By sharing the goals they set for their programmes, the programmes, By sharing the goals they set for their realistic, they are agencies can begin to assess whether a common on can help them to agree and joint processes goals, and and measurable achievable set of more of the multi- them. A review methods to evaluate develop report indicates that the most likely agency evaluation situa- food emergency in chronic goals they could achieve tions are: One of the objectives of the evaluation was to assess the was to assess of the evaluation One of the objectives short-term of the four agencies’ impact (outcomes) emer- goals The agencies defined different work. gency response to lives, including to save programmes, for their emergency The the economy. security and to strengthen food improve not met, or were that most goals were noted evaluators is not explore did What the evaluators only met temporarily. for an any of these goals are and measurable realistic how food distribution programme. emergency S distributions, which were coordinated at weekly WFP at weekly coordinated which were distributions, and until October. August meetings from government trained staff of the NGO GOAL of the staff trained of implementation in the v V 34 ENDPIECE by that mosthumanitariancrisesare provoked orexacerbated states. Afterall,OCHAmustknow aswell asanyinstitution mixed companythatisthegovernments oftheUN’s member the UnitedNations’,rather thanjustbeholdentothevery tarian actiontobecomemore accountableto‘thepeoplesof reform mightenableinternationalhumani- process ofUN Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator toshow how the fortheUnited promised much.Here wasagoodopportunity Pr ‘Humanitarian Accountability:Putting Principles into F according toEgeland, through ‘buildinga more predictable somehow this excellent principleistobeachieved, them ashumanbeings,with dignityandrespect’. But need toknow about humanitarianismisthatwe willtreat that‘thefirst thing peopleincrisis high-minded assertion major disappointment!Hebegins well enoughwith the W the strategic interests ofitsconstituentgovernments? of thesufferingpeoplesUnitedNations,andlessto United Nationstobendmore tothehumanitarian interests Egeland abouttoissueamuchoverdue clarioncallforthe prevention inthisformofinter-governmentalism. So,was of peoplesnearandfarhasfoundneitherremedy nor ness demonstrated by somanygovernments withthelives Nations hasindeedproven tobenopanacea. The careless- that entrustinghumanitariancoordination to theUnited andnumerousthe DRC otherhumanwastelandsremind us Rwanda genocideandthehumanitariandisastersinSudan, objectives oftheSecurityCouncil,forgoodorill. The integrate humanitarianresources intothewiderpolitical humanitariancoordination isatooldesignedto that UN of Orwellian doublespeak,obfuscatingthesimplereality hasrepresented akind where thediscourseof‘coherence’ ‘ This wrested thehumanitarianleadershipfunctionfrom General AssemblyResolution 46/182inDecember1991. was entrustedwithhumanitariancoordination underUN assuaged thosefears,whenthe‘internationalcommunity’ that It wasonlythehubrisgenerated by ‘theendofhistory’ agencies duringtheCold War. wasrejected asoxymoronic by manyhumanitarian dination’ mental body, theideaof‘UnitedNationshumanitariancoor- assistance. Indeed,becauseofitsnature asaninter-govern- inurgent needofprotection and existence of, ‘peoples’ humanitarian accessto,andsometimeseven denythevery attributed todeliberate actsby governments tofrustrate very oftenitsfailures canbe points itssupporters, the internationalhumanitariansysteminvariably disap- it, concealedby governments. Andwhiletheperformanceof tion are bothperpetrated and,where theycangetawaywith humanitarian protection, disasterpreparedness andmitiga- Nicholas Stockton, HumanitarianAccountabilityPartnership The accountabilityalibi eta’Geneva tothepoliticalhothouseofNew York, from neutral’ or accountabilityenthusiasts,JanEgeland’s article ell, ifthatiswhatyou hopedfor, thenyou were infora actice’, publishedin HUMANITARIAN

bad governance, andthatthemostegregious failures of exchange Humanitarian Exchange in June2005, ability isaboutthese suffering’. Yet, inacrucialsemantictwist, hesays‘account- presence –theactofhumansolidarityinmidst quickly andefficiently, we mustnotneglectthepower of about meansaswell asends…Inourrushtoprovide aid than gettingprogrammes fundedandtrucksrolling. Itis But Egelandalsoopinesthat‘accountability isaboutmore for more money. an alibiforhumanitarianfailure, andapolitewayofasking Somehow, accountability, orrather alackofit,hasbecome appeals. arein theDRC attributedto‘woefullyunderfunded’ r humanitarian presented asaby-product of‘initiallyslow’ funding.So,theDarfurtragedy is ability isafunctionofUN money andmore trained staff. Ergo, humanitarianaccount- this toberealised, theUnitedNationsneedsmore flexible achieved through ‘greater impactontheground’, andfor flexible funding’.Apparently, greater accountabilityistobe r accredited system of certification. accreditedThese internationally system ofcertification. 9000orSAI2000 In duecourse,thismightlead toanISO beneficiaries andofhumanitarian accountabilityinpractice. another tangiblemanifestation ofrespect forthedignityof that willbeusedasthebasis foragencycertification: deriving verifiable standards andperformanceindicators its ‘Principles ofAccountability’,from whichwe are now hasdescribedsuchtangiblesin ments toofferredress. HAP security agreements. Itcanrecord complaintsandcommit- ciaries. Itcanproduce bindingdistributionschedulesand about anagency’s dutyofcare towards itsintendedbenefi- of informedconsent,anditcanestablishaclearcontract r essentially intangibleaboutconsultation.Dialoguecanbe (HAP),we believeability Partnership thatthere isnothing tices, thenhelpisathand.IntheHumanitarianAccount- ofsuitableaccountabilityprac- simply tothe‘intangibility’ whom humanitarianagenciesshouldbeaccountableisdue fromIf theexclusion ofdisastersurvivors thelistof those to tors tomakethemselves accountabletodisastersurvivors. operating procedures thatrequire HumanitarianCoordina- but notone‘beneficiary’.Likewise,there are nostandard consulted over 400membersofthehumanitariansystem, example, Egeland’s HumanitarianResponse Review (HRR) systemic conditionofOCHA’s own stakeholdermap. For ov bility alibi’?)Ofcourse,thiscouldbeexcused asasimple (Mightwe callthis‘thetangi- extended todisastersurvivors. their moneyisbeingused’. Tellingly, thisdutyisnot whom have anindisputablerighttoknow where andhow andthepublicatlarge –allof to ourdonors,partners Egelandacknowledgessurvivors. that‘we are accountable whenitcomestodisaster from thisproblem of‘intangibility’ qualities’. However, itseemsthataccountabilityonlysuffers esponse with‘toomanygaps’,andthefourmilliondeaths esponse capacityandproviding formore predictable and ecorded andtranscribed. Itcandemonstrate theexistence ersight, butotherevidencesuggeststhatitisinfacta intangible (my emphasis)butessential ENDPIECE recognised quality management standards are expressly have nothing better to do than silently, patiently and grate- concerned with making accountability to stakeholders fully wait for international largesse to reach them. measurable and verifiable. Making accountability to disaster survivors tangible. Once the opportunity costs of queuing are more fully understood, so too is the anger of disaster survivors when But surely, the reader might say, Jan Egeland was making relief agencies treat them as if they had nothing better to the more important point that, in the final analysis, do. Such feelings are often exacerbated by the venues humanitarian assistance has to be effective? Is that not chosen for relief aid transactions. Often people have to the best way for humanitarians to achieve accountability? walk for hours or even days to get to a distribution point, Well, not quite. This argument suggests that Egeland sees only to find that the distribution schedule has been accountability as a one-way street, in effect a synonym for changed, that they have missed a vital registration event, transparency. But accountability is also concerned with and that all their effort has been in vain. It is at these taking account of the views, interests and capacities of moments when we can properly speak of disaster victims, stakeholders in a manner that leads to substantive where the opportunity costs of choosing to depend upon changes in programme design and delivery. And this an unaccountable relief agency can be truly deadly. Trying dimension of accountability is not about political correct- to understand the opportunity costs for survivors of ness. Ask Toyota how they became the world’s largest car ‘participating’ in relief work is one very tangible exercise manufacturer. Listening to customers is what made the that not only operationalises the concept of respect for difference for them. But how might this lesson be applied the dignity of people affected by disasters, but can also to humanitarian action? encourage an approach to consent and disclosure that can greatly assist the survivors to make better-informed Since Barbara Harrell-Bond’s ground-breaking study of the decisions, often of a genuine life or death nature. This is impact of international aid on Ugandan refugees in accountability working, as Toyota would recognise it. Southern Sudan, many researchers have noted that people affected by disasters rarely sit down and simply wait for In April 2006 HAP polled its contact list, consisting mainly external help to arrive.1 The biography of a ‘disaster victim’ of staff of aid agencies, to ascertain their perceptions about precedes the stage where aid agencies designate the situa- the quality of humanitarian accountability practices during tion as an emergency, and while survival strategies may get 2005. The survey – completed by 311 respondents – ever more desperate, these are invariably pursued after a confirmed that most experts believe that the quality of pragmatic weighing up of opportunities and risks, humanitarian accountability declines in direct proportion to balancing the need for short-term welfare against the the relative power of the stakeholder. Humanitarian desire for long-term sustainability. Researchers have seen agencies are perceived to be good at accounting to official that peasant farmers almost never eat their seed reserve. donors, fairly good at accounting to private donors and Migration (or voluntary displacement) is usually ‘rehearsed’ host governments and very weak at accounting to benefi- or tested by some members of the family before the whole ciaries. This goes to the very heart of the challenge household moves. ‘Coping strategies’ as diverse as wild confronted by those who wish to promote humanitarian food foraging and writing letters to the diaspora for finan- accountability. The people whose welfare is meant to be the cial support are all undertaken with reasonably well- object of the exercise have the least say (indeed, often informed expectations about returns on the effort involved. none at all) in designing policy or shaping operational prac- In other words, although in absolute terms the income tices. Indeed, even odder, the institutions that deliver the derived may be small, effort is nevertheless expended upon service are also paid to judge the quality and effectiveness activities that yield the optimum economic returns avail- of their own delivery mechanisms. Put in other terms, this able from the opportunities available. So the disaster describes a system where the client is deemed to be the survivor knows that the ‘opportunity cost’ of time spent on least able to define his or her own utility and to judge his or foraging is the value foregone of the ‘next best’ activity, her own satisfaction. This lends support to HAP’s which may indeed be writing a letter to a distant relative. contention that humanitarian accountability has to address a fundamental paradox. Powerful stakeholders – in this It is into this mixed, often battered, but very real economy case donors – can all too easily contribute to the disem- that international relief aid is pitched, with the latter usually powerment of less powerful stakeholders through monopo- constituting a small proportion of the former. Alex de Waal’s lising the demands placed upon, and the outputs of, classic study of the 1984 Darfur famine discovered that agencies’ accountability mechanisms. So, while we would international relief aid amounted to less than 10% of the not dispute that donors and governments have the right to 2 domestic income of most ‘famine victims’. Yet the proce- demand accountability from humanitarian agencies, this ENDPIECE dures and risks associated with obtaining international must not be achieved at the expense of accountability to famine relief involved waiting for hours or even days in the principals – the intended beneficiaries. In the final scorching and incipiently violent queues, with no guarantee analysis, ‘humanitarian accountability’ must surely be of achieving a return on the time invested that would be as firstly to those in need, not those in power. Only when this productive as the ‘beneficiary’s’ next-best survival activity. has been achieved by OCHA will we be able to speak Yet relief workers all too often behave as if ‘disaster victims’ properly of United Nations humanitarian coordination. 1 Barbara Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Nicholas Stockton is the Director of the Humanitarian 2 Alex de Waal, The Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, revised edition Accountability Partnership (www.hapinternational.org). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). His email address is: [email protected].

Number 34 • June 2006 35 Humanitarian Practice Network

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