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Number 34 June 2006 Humanitarian Practice Network HPNManaged by Humanitarian Humanitarian Policy Group Exchange In this issue Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI The Pakistan earthquake response 2 The response to the earthquake in Pakistan: the view from the Federal This edition of Humanitarian Relief Commission Exchange features articles on 4 Humanitarian intervention in a sovereign the response to the earth- courtesy Behrakis, www.alertnet.org ©Reuters/Yannis state: the political fault-lines of the quake in Pakistan on 8 Pakistan earthquake 6 Earthquake jihad: the role of jihadis and October 2005, documenting Islamist groups after the October 2005 practical lessons and key earthquake issues from a range of agency, 8 Humanitarian capacity in the South Asian institutional and staff perspec- earthquake response: a local perspective tives. The focus is on the 10 Responding to shelter needs in post- earthquake Pakistan: a self-help approach response, capacity and view- 12 The Pakistan earthquake and the health point of local and national needs of women actors, and how these inter- 14 Building media capacities to improve sected with those of the inter- disaster response: lessons from Pakistan national community. 16 When is a camp not a camp? When it’s a ‘tent village’ An article by the Pakistan government’s The theme of individual and community 19 Timing matters: capacity-building during an emergency response Federal Relief Commission explores the capacity is explored in articles focusing on key lessons of the disaster for the cash, shelter and local coping strategies, Practice and policy notes government agency charged with and the role of the media in improving 21 Managing humanitarian programmes in least- developed countries: the case of Zambia leading the overall response. As this disaster responses. These articles empha- 23 Land rights and displacement in northern and other articles highlight, humani- sise the importance of looking for oppor- Uganda tarian actors relied heavily on the tunities to implement programmes that 25 Chronic vulnerability in Niger: implications and capacity of the Pakistan army, with prioritise and build on people’s own lessons learned for UNICEF’s emergency international military support, to over- capacities and their own understanding of nutrition response 29 Researching with children in conflict-affected come logistical challenges and reach their needs. settings isolated communities. The army’s 32 Can joint evaluations promote ongoing involvement presented both opportu- The need for humanitarian actors to listen collaborative action by NGOs? nities and dilemmas for local and to communities is further investigated by Endpiece international humanitarian actors, Nicholas Stockton in his end-piece article. 34 The accountability alibi particularly in terms of how humani- Stockton engages with an earlier end- tarian principles are applied and piece by Jan Egeland on OCHA’s approach About HPN understood in a context where the to accountability, and argues that OCHA The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas state plays such a leading part in still has some way to go in putting those Development Institute is an independent forum responding to immediate needs. affected by disasters at the centre of its where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, accountability practices and principles. analysis and experience. The views and opinions An article by Sungi – a local NGO – expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy illustrates how the response also This edition also contains a range of Group or the Overseas Development Institute. relied on the capacity of experi- general policy and practice articles enced national NGOs. Other key focusing on government capacity in Britain’s leading independent local players in the response Zambia, the importance of land issues in think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues included jihadi organisations, northern Uganda, nutritional lessons from which used pre-existing struc- the Niger crisis in 2005, approaches to Overseas Development Institute tures to mobilise resources conducting research with children in 111 Westminster Bridge Road London SE1 7JD rapidly. Again, the engagement conflict-affected settings and NGO collab- United Kingdom of these groups – some of oration through multi-agency evaluations. Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 whom are proscribed – raised We hope you enjoy this issue of difficult issues for interna- Humanitarian Exchange, and as always HPN e-mail: [email protected] HPN website: www.odihpn.org tional agencies. we welcome your feedback. THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE The response to the earthquake in Pakistan: the view from the Federal Relief Commission Major-General Farooq Ahmad Khan, Federal Relief Commissioner The earthquake that hit northern Pakistan on 8 October 2005 caused widespread destruction, killing over 73,000 people, severely injuring many more and leaving millions without shelter. The affected areas of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) suffered extensive structural and Khursheed, courtesy©Reuters/Mian www.alertnet.org economic damage, with vulnerable groups in this mountainous region bearing the brunt of the disaster. The devastation was spread over 30,000 square kilometres of treacherous Himalayan terrain. Most educational institutions were destroyed, killing over 18,000 students. The majority of health care units and hospitals collapsed, the communications infra- structure was unusable and all essen- tial utilities were disrupted; in all, the A damaged building in Islamabad, 8 October 2005 affected area was strewn with 200 million tons of debris. Hundreds of post-quake tremors and constant landslides multiplied response mechanism which could provide quick decision- the shock and trauma, while the onset of winter threat- making, coupled with the efficient execution of directives on ened the lives of the survivors. This was without question ground. The Commission conceived and implemented an the worst natural calamity in Pakistan’s history; recov- elaborate National Action Plan to ensure a coherent ering from it is going to cost billion of dollars. response, spelling out domains, policies and end-states for all the stakeholders and key players. The plan also provided The role of the Federal Relief Commission for financial compensation for survivors, amounting to No disaster management organisation existed to handle a several billion rupees. Inter-agency coordination and the relief operation on such a large scale, and the existing synchronisation of relief efforts were ensured through infrastructure was either very poor or totally destroyed. Strategic Leaders Group Meetings, which integrated the Realising the gravity of the disaster, the government UN’s cluster approach into FRC strategy, with a view to immediately formed the Federal Relief Commission (FRC), developing a common operating picture and guidelines for with a mandate to manage the entire spectrum of the all the agencies concerned. relief effort: The Federal Relief Commissioner was mandated to this was without question the co-ordinate and monitor the relief efforts. He was to report directly to the prime minister. All agencies worst natural calamity in concerned with the relief and rehabilitation efforts, Pakistan’s history; recovering including cabinet, health, interior, foreign affairs; communication and information divisions would from it is going to cost billions of function through FRC and form a part of the team. dollars For this purpose their reps were attached with FRC. Reps from the concerned agencies of the armed forces were also to be a part of the team. Within the FRC itself, there were two distinct wings, the military and the civilian. The military wing was responsible Within days, the FRC had taken charge of the situation. The for undertaking the rescue and relief operation, while the scale of the disaster, the harsh weather conditions and the civilian wing, comprising ministerial representatives and THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE THE PAKISTAN collapse of civil order in the affected areas called for a coordinators, looked after inter-department and inter- HUMANITARIAN 2 exchange agency issues. The response was based on a four-fold most successful relief operation in recent history. It holds strategy, comprising search, rescue and relief, conse- several important lessons for us in terms of best practice quence management, recovery and rehabilitation and for the future: reconstruction. The FRC focused its operations on the first two elements, while a second agency, the Earthquake • There must be a full-time disaster management Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA), agency, with contingency plans for a quick and effec- addressed rehabilitation and reconstruction needs. tive response. Ad hoc arrangements will not work in all circumstances. Within the resource constraints, a number of simulta- • All stakeholders, including NGOs, international organi- neous relief activities had to be instantly activated, sations and donors, must be taken into the govern- including evacuating the injured, damage control, medical ment’s confidence. help and the provision of relief goods. Other elements of •We must cut through red tape wherever it adds delay. the response included addressing psychosocial trauma, • Speedy decision-making