Immigration, Protest, and the Politics of Latino/A Identity

Immigration, Protest, and the Politics of Latino/a Identity

By Heather Silber Mohamed

B.A., Tufts University, 1998 M.Sc., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2002 A.M., Brown University, 2008

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island May 2012

This dissertation by Heather Silber Mohamed is accepted in its present form by the Department of Political Science as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date______Marion Orr, Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date______James Morone, Reader

Date______Wendy Schiller, Reader

Approved by the Graduate Council

Date______Peter Weber, Dean of the Graduate School

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VITAE

Heather Silber Mohamed (née Heather Ilene Silber) was born in Gainesville, Florida on February 16, 1978. She completed her B.A. in International Relations and Spanish at Tufts University in Medford, MA in 1998, and earned an M.Sc. in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2002. Prior to the start of her Ph.D. program, Heather spent six years as a policy advisor in the U.S. Congress, working successively for the late Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), Congressman John F. Tierney (D-MA), and former Congressman Marty T. Meehan (D- MA). Heather was awarded an A.M. in Political Science from Brown University in 2008. As a graduate student, Heather presented her work at several regional and national conferences, funded in part by competitive travel grants from the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the Midwest Political Science Association Latino/a Caucus, which honored her with an award for the best paper by a Latino graduate student. Based on her academic achievements, she also received a number of scholarships and fellowships to support her dissertation research, including the Belfer Family Graduate Fellowship in Public Policy and the Stanley J. Bernstein Graduate Fellowship, both from Brown University, as well as the John A. Garcia Scholarship for advanced methods training, from APSA’s Political Methodology Group. Additionally, Heather spent two years as a Dissertation Fellow at Brown’s Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity in America.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

On some level, I have always been fascinated by the ways in which context, and becoming the “other,” can change one’s own identity and perspective. My maternal ancestors hail from Poland and Macedonia, while my father’s side of the family is

Cuban-Jewish, a population that defies many of the generalizations about either demographic group. Over half a century after my relatives fled Cuba, for many family members, this experience continues to color their perspectives on politics and life in the

U.S. This enduring influence has helped to shape my own ideas about the diversity underlying the “Latino experience,” and has also guided my search for a better understanding of the dynamic relationship between politics and identity than I found in the existing academic literature.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the intellectual and financial support of countless friends, colleagues, and institutions. My greatest intellectual debt is to my two mentors. My former advisor, the late Alan S. Zuckerman, was instrumental in encouraging me to undertake this project. Of all of Alan’s Ph.D. students, I was in the earliest stages of my dissertation research when we lost him prematurely. I am proud to be the last of his students to finish my degree, and am honored to have been a part of his legacy. My current advisor, Marion Orr, ensured that I would reach this point. Marion helped me through the most challenging of professional

times, and brought new perspective and inspiration to my project. Both Alan and Marion spent countless hours reading my work and helping me to develop my ideas. I benefitted immeasurably from their wisdom and guidance, as well as their kindness and patience.

My other committee members also provided essential feedback, insight and motivation throughout this process. Wendy Schiller always pushed me forward, giving me critical direction and deadlines, while Jim Morone enthusiastically shared his visionary perspective and incredible knack for big picture ideas. Their comments, strategic advice, and support were invaluable in the development of my work.

Beyond my formal dissertation committee, I benefitted greatly from the wisdom and guidance of other faculty members at Brown. Marty West provided crucial methods training, and helped me to test some of my early ideas. I was also fortunate to receive intellectual support and generous feedback from other faculty members in the Political

Science Department and the Taubman Center for Public Policy, including Melani

Cammett, Jack Combs, Pauline Jones-Luong, Susan Moffitt, Richard Snyder, and

Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro. Outside of Brown, Ezra Zuckerman and Nicholas Valentino provided helpful comments and encouragement.

The Brown University Graduate School and the Department of Political Science provided numerous grants and fellowships that allowed for my research and training. For much of the project, I was privileged to work as a Dissertation Fellow at Brown’s Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity in America, and am grateful to the Center and to

Evelyn Hu-DeHart for providing that opportunity. Grants from the American Political

Science Association and Brown’s Political Science Department enabled me to advance

my methods training and acquire key skills for analyzing data. I also benefitted from participating in Brown’s Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences fellowship program.

I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to my friends and peers at Brown for their thoughts, feedback and encouragement, and for sharing in all of the ups and downs of graduate school life. My dear friend and study partner, Eli Feiman, provided critical support throughout this process, particularly in the early years. This journey would not have been nearly as much fun without Fulya Apaydin vom Hau, Hussein Banai, Maria

Angelica Bautista, Erin Beck, Gavril Bilev, Catherine Corliss, Mila Dragojevic, Angelica

Duran Martinez, Emily Farris, Ana Leticia Fauri Gaspar, Jeremy Johnson, Hilary Kaplan,

Amy Kracker Selzer, Shruti Majumdar, Andrea Owens-Jones, and Dikshya Thapa.

Outside of the academy, I owe a special thank you to Sònia Muñoz, who consistently shared her wisdom and expertise, helping me to navigate all aspects of the

Ph.D. and beyond.

My family has also been a constant source of love and support throughout this process. I am particularly grateful for the help of my two mothers. My mom, Esther

Negrin, sacrificed repeatedly throughout her life to ensure that the best educational opportunities were available to me, always providing inspiration and encouragement along the way. Over the last few years, my mother-in-law, Seema Mohamed, provided essential support, happily caring for her granddaughter so I was able to complete several critical stages of this project. I also give my thanks to Rachel Silber Anderson, Darrell

Anderson, and Shabana and Wali Mohamed.

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Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to the two most important additions in my life, both of whom have joined me since the start of graduate school: my husband Nick and my daughter Miriam. Nick’s endless support, advice, wisdom, and love have been indispensable. He has helped me work through the challenges and celebrate the joys of this process, always providing critical perspective and encouragement along the way.

Miriam quite literally grew with my project, joining me at numerous conferences even before her birth. I look forward to the day when she is able to read and understand my work.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 ...... xi CHAPTER 2 ...... 33 CHAPTER 3 ...... 65 CHAPTER 4 ...... 101 CHAPTER 5 ...... 138 CHAPTER 6 ...... 169 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 193 APPENDIX A ...... 217 APPENDIX B ...... 227 APPENDIX C ...... 232 APPENDIX D ...... 238

LIST OF TABLES

1.1 Change in Latino Population by 5 Largest Subgroups, 2000-2010 1.2 Persons Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status by Country of Last Residence, FY 1920-2009 3.1 GSS and LNS Responses, Ascriptive Characteristics of Being American 3.2 Ascriptive Characteristics of Being American (Ordered Logit) 3.3 Predicted Probabilities, Importance of Being Born in the United States 3.4 Predicted Probabilities, Importance of Being Christian 3.5 Predicted Probabilities, Importance of Speaking English 3.6 Predicted Probabilities, Importance of Being White 3.7 LNS “Quasi-Experiment” Breakdown 3.8 Immigration Protests and Defining American (Ordered Logit) 3.9 Predicted Probabilities, Importance of Being Born in the United States 3.10 Predicted Probabilities, Importance of Being Christian 3.11 Predicted Probabilities, Importance of Being Speaking English 3.12 Predicted Probabilities, Importance of Being White 4.1 Mean Characteristics of Respondents in Treatment and Control Groups, Full Sample 4.2 Mean Characteristics of Respondents in Treatment and Control Groups, Spanish Speakers 4.3 Effect of Spring 2006 Protests on Respondent Self-Identification, Full Sample 4.4 Effect of Spring 2006 Protests on English- and Spanish- Speakers 4.5 Effects of Spring 2006 Protests on American Self-Identification, by Ancestral Subgroup 5.1 Self-Identification of Latinos versus Latinas 5.2 Relationship between Gender and Self-Identification (Ordered Logit) 5.3 Respondent Self-Identification without Gender (Ordered Logit) 5.4 Split Sample: Latinas, Latino Men and Self-Identification 6.1 Demographics of Latino Population in Select States

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 2006 Immigration Protests by Percentage County-Level Latino Population 3.1 American Self-Identification by Country-of-Origin 4.1 Pre- and Post- Protest Level of Identification as American 4.2 Change in Predicted Probabilities for Identifying ‘Very Strongly” American, Pre- and Post- 2006 Protests (by National Origin Subgroup) 5.1 Percent of Respondents Feeling Very Strongly American, by Subgroup 5.2 Predicted Probabilities, Pan-Ethnic Identity 5.3 Predicted Probabilities, American Identity 6.1 Map of Omnibus Immigration Legislation

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

From politicians to the press to political science, public figures ranging from former Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-CO) to television personality Lou Dobbs to the late Samuel Huntington have expressed outrage over immigration, and particularly, the threat that immigrants pose for what it means to be American. Critics argue that new arrivals are failing to embrace a traditional American identity, and as a result, they threaten to transform fundamental aspects of “American” culture (Huntington 2004a).

More recently, these critiques have been echoed on the stage of the 2012 Republican primary debates, with the party’s leading candidates proclaiming that election ballots should not be printed in a language other than English.1

From the perspective of immigrants, though, what does it truly mean to “become”

American? And, how do political and social context affect the process of “feeling

American”? This dissertation begins to answer these questions, with a focus on the growing Latino population in the U.S. I argue that within this diverse community, what it means to be American is not fixed. Rather, being or feeling “American” is a moving target that changes over time, along with political and social context.

Specifically, my dissertation will focus on two research questions: Under what conditions, and in which ways, does the contentious debate over immigration policy

1 This discussion took place at the Republican primary debate in Tampa, Florida on January 23, 2012. 1

impact self-identification among Latino subgroups in the United States? And, how does the experience of multiple marginalization affect Latino self-perception? In addressing these questions, I seek to advance our understanding of the evolving process of self- identification among different segments of the Latino population. Indeed, this project is grounded in the idea that scholarship must do a better job at understanding the diversity within the heterogeneous Latino population in order to develop stronger theories about the relationship between politics and identity.

Perhaps more than any other public policy area, the discussion over immigration policy emerges out of ideas about what America should be, who Americans are as a people, and how our country should act as a nation. Within the context of this heated political debate, polarizing terms such as “us” and “them” are regularly defined and redefined by those on both sides of the immigration question. In this dissertation, I argue that within certain segments of the Latino population, the contentious discussion over who counts as American may have very real consequences for self-identification. To explore the role of political context, I focus specifically on the massive wave of immigration protests that swept across the U.S. between March and May of 2006 in opposition to H.R. 4437. Also known as the Sensenbrenner Bill, this legislation, passed the House of Representatives in December 2005, proposed a range of punitive immigration-related reforms. As the Senate moved to consider the legislation, between

3.5 and 5.1 million people, many of Latino descent, demonstrated across the country in protest. (Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Barreto et al. 2009).

These protests provide a unique opportunity to study the relationship between politics and identity in a highly charged political environment. Using data from a national survey conducted before, during, and after this time period, I compare similar

Latino respondents interviewed before and after these protests to test the effects of these events. Specifically, I examine ideas about what it means to be American and whether or not individuals would place themselves in this category.

Diversity within the Latino population is another central theme of this dissertation. I contend that in order to understand the effects of the immigration protests, we must look beyond the broad “Latino” pan-ethnic label. For instance, depending on one’s national or ancestral origin subgroup, an individual may have had very distinct experiences, both before and after coming to the U.S. Likewise, the experience of Latino men and Latinas may vary greatly, as do Latinos with heterogeneous versus homogenous social networks, and those of different immigrant generations. 2 In each of these cases, depending on an individual’s experience, he or she may develop a distinct conceptualization of what it means to be a member of the American majority, the Latino

“other,” and whether or not these categories may coincide. In this dissertation, I seek to better understand this diversity. Although I focus specifically on the Latino population, my research is poised to contribute to our understanding of the complicated relationship between politics and identity more broadly.

2 The Spanish term “Latino” may refer exclusively to men, or to a combination of men and women. In contrast, “Latina” refers specifically to Latina women. Following Hardy-Fanta (1993), while Latina may be used alone to refer to women, if referring specifically to men, Latino men will be employed. 3

Latinos in the U.S.: The Demographic Imperative

Latinos are currently the fastest-growing minority group in the United States

(U.S. Census Bureau 2007), and in 2003, they officially overtook African Americans as the country’s largest minority group (Segura and Rodrigues 2006).3 At the time of the

2010 Census, there were an estimated 50.5 million Latinos living in the United States, or

16% of the overall U.S. population, compared to just 35.3 million in 2000; indeed, over half of the total population growth in the United States during this ten year period reflected growth in the Latino population (Ennis et al. 2011). In political terms, the role of Latinos in electoral politics is also growing. Between 1998 and 2008, the Latino share of the national electorate doubled, from 3.6% to 7.4% (Rodriguez 2009). Moreover, as was evident in the 2008 presidential election, high concentrations of Hispanic voters in key swing states such as New Mexico, Nevada, Florida and Colorado leave this population poised to play an increasingly important role in the nation’s political process.

Indeed, some analysts argue that the Latino population will be the deciding factor in the

2012 election, with residents in these states as well as Arizona potentially propelling

President Obama to victory even if he loses other seemingly critical states in the Midwest

(Scherer and Dias 2012).

As this population expands, it is also becoming increasingly diverse. Table 1.1 demonstrates the growth of the Latino population since 2000, focusing specifically on the five largest national origin subgroups. As the table demonstrates, Mexicans comprise almost two-thirds of the Latino community in the U.S. today, and much of the overall

3 Latino and Hispanic will be used interchangeably to refer to a broader pan-ethnic identifier for those of Spanish-speaking descent. 4

growth within the Latino community has occurred within this subpopulation. However, other subgroups are also growing fast. For instance, over the last ten years, the

Salvadoran population in the U.S. increased by over 150% (Ennis et al. 2011). These numbers have very real implications both for U.S. communities and for American politics.

Table 1.1 Change in Latino Population by 5 Largest Subgroups, 2000-2010

2000 2010 Change, 2000-2010 Origin Number % of Total Number % of Total Number % of Total TOTAL 35,305,818 100.00 50,477,594 100.00 15,171,776 43.00 Mexican 20,640,711 58.50 31,798,258 63.00 11,157,547 54.10 Puerto Rican 3,406,178 9.60 4,623,716 9.20 1,217,538 35.70 Cuban 1,241,685 3.50 1,785,547 3.50 543,862 43.80 Dominican 764,945 2.20 1,414,703 2.80 649,758 84.90 Salvadoran 655,165 1.90 1,648,968 3.30 993,803 151.70 Source: U.S. Census Bureau (Ennis 2011)

In addition to diversity by country-of-origin, recent scholarship also documents the spread of Hispanic immigrants into “new settlement areas,” adding additional geographic variation to this already heterogeneous population (Marrow 2005; Massey

2008). 4 Moreover, a growing body of research highlights variation within the Latino community based on language proficiency (García Bedolla 2003; Abrajano 2010), immigrant generation (García Bedolla 2005), gender (Jaramillo 2010), and other factors.

Yet, within this rapidly expanding population, our understanding of the ways in which ethnic identification and politics interact remains limited. Much of the current literature takes a broad theoretical leap by assuming these connections rather than

4 Scholars point to a number of states across the country in which the Latino population has doubled or nearly tripled. In the literature, the number of states cited on “new destination” lists may vary. By one measure, Marrow (2005) points to eight “new Hispanic settlement states” – Arizona, Nevada, Georgia, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, and Massachusetts. 5

studying the intervening variables that may exist between “identification” and “identity.”

Moreover, too often, scholarship fails to disaggregate among Latino subgroups and examine the wide variety of experiences found within the Latino community.

Recent scholarship from both American and comparative politics highlights the need to more closely examine the various ways in which one’s identities might be activated under different circumstances (see, for instance, Varshney 2007; Lee 2008;

Chandra 2009). Given the growing political importance of this country’s Latino population, a better understanding of the malleable nature of identity within this population is timely from a theoretical perspective. Moreover, given the relationship between identity and political behavior, my research also has extensive practical implications regarding this politically important, and rapidly growing, population.

The Identity-to-Politics Link, or the Politics-to-Identity Link?

Existing literature on minority politics in the U.S. widely agrees that under certain conditions, a relationship exists between identity and political behavior. This research demonstrates that self-identification can have widespread consequences for individuals, communities, and democracy more broadly. Disagreement exists, however, over the mechanisms underlying this link.

Within Latino politics, specifically, many scholars contend that self-identification is a key variable that shapes the way Latinos participate in politics (see, for instance,

Hardy-Fanta 1993; Pardo 1997; but see DeSipio 1996). Schildkraut (2005b) suggests that self-perception can work in competing directions, resulting either in increased political engagement or alienation. Focusing on Latinos, she finds that absent 6

perceptions of discrimination, individuals who self-identify primarily as American are more likely to vote than those who self-identify in pan-ethnic or national origin terms.

García Bedolla (2005) takes a more qualified view, arguing that not all identities mobilize equally. Rather, psychological and contextual factors must be taken into account. This project builds on the conditional nature of García Bedolla’s findings to further explore the relationship between politics, context, and identity.

Looking beyond the Latino community, Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse (2003) highlight psychology research which finds that, under some circumstances, positively identifying with a national group can result in higher self-esteem. Schildkraut (2005a) demonstrates that individuals may use various aspects of an American identity to interpret political events and public policy questions. More recently, Wong (2010) argues that the psychological boundaries of one’s communities – both local and national

– define individual attitudes over government policies and redistribution. In sum, existing literature demonstrates that self-identification has a range of practical implications for our democracy, from the decision to participate to perspectives on distributive and other public policy issues. Likewise, the outcomes associated with self- identification have theoretical repercussions for the nature of our democracy, as well as the extent to which individuals become an active member of their polity.

The variables underlying this identity in the first place, however, remain less clear. Indeed, as Lee (2008, p 458) explains, existing literature primarily assumes an

“identity-to-politics” link, implying that “individuals who share a label— e.g., African

American, Latino, Asian American, Arab American—will also share common political

goals and interests and act in concert to pursue them,” rather than specifying when or how this link evolves. Much of the literature regarding the “identity-to-politics link” draws on concepts developed in the study of African American political behavior. Within this subfield, the idea of group consciousness is used to explain higher rates of political participation in the African American community than would otherwise be predicted using traditional models that emphasize socioeconomic status (SES) (Miller et al. 1981;

Shingles 1981). As Miller et al. explain, “Evidently, feeling a common identification with others in one’s social stratum and believing that the interests of one’s own group are in conflict with those of other groups does not inevitably mean that people will act on these attitudes” (p 498). Instead, Miller and his colleagues distinguish between pure identification with a group and politicized group consciousness.

Dawson (1994) seeks to explain the mechanism behind politicized group consciousness by developing the concept of “black utility heuristic,” in which judgments are made through the prism of a racial-group calculus. Underlying the black utility heuristic is a sense of “linked fate,” which causes individuals to perceive their interests as connected to other members of the same in-group. Consequently, group interests are prioritized over one’s own; group interests guide individual behavior, rather than the other way around. Invoking Downs (1957), Dawson contends that as long as race persists as a dominant force in determining African Americans’ success, it will continue to be “rational” for blacks to act in the interest of group – rather than individual – benefits.

The extent to which these concepts can travel to describe the Latino experience in the U.S has been the subject of much scholarly debate, with researchers employing different measures of group consciousness as they attempt to test the validity of this concept. In one such early study, Leighley and Velditz (1999) conclude that group consciousness is not easily applicable to other racial and ethnic groups. In contrast,

Stokes (2003) finds that different aspects of group consciousness are more important for different subgroups, while Sanchez (2006) concludes that group consciousness has a greater impact on political activity directly tied to the Latino community than it does on general participation. However, his study is limited in that he looks only at voting and

“Latino-related” activities, neglecting many other forms of political involvement.

Variation in measurement across these studies limits our ability to generalize from their findings. More broadly, however, I believe this line of research shares a deeper problem in that the independent variables are so broadly encompassing that they verge on tautology. While the extent to which one prefers their in-group or feels society is to blame for their situation may certainly be expected to affect political behavior, these variables reveal little about how these feelings develop or the underlying process of identity formation. Nor do these concepts adequately account for variation within a population, particularly one as heterogeneous as the Latino community. Moreover, within the Latino population, all of these studies rely on the (disputed) validity of a pan- ethnic identifier, or “generalization of solidarity among ethnic subgroups” (Espiritu 1992, p 6). Traditionally, however, the Latino population in the U.S. has self-identified based on ties to their home country or ancestral origin rather than with a broad, unifying identity (García 2003; Fraga et al. 2006). In other words, in the language of Abdelal et 9

al. (2006, p 696; see also Abdelal et al. 2009), these studies presume a higher level of contestation, or “degree of agreement within a group over the content of the shared identity,” about being Latino than may actually exist.

I attempt to close this gap in the literature by examining the relationship between exogenous events, gender, social networks, and identity. In so doing, I invert the causal arrow in Lee’s concept of an “identity-to-politics” link. Rather, I argue that under certain conditions, a “politics-to-identity” link may exist in which politics can transform individual identification rather than the other way around. Instead of a unidirectional link, as much existing literature assumes, I suggest a more interactive process.

Underscoring the diversity within the Latino population, I likewise argue that the effect of political events may vary based on factors such as country-of-origin or linguistic abilities. Moreover, I suggest that certain aspects of social context – gender and social networks – also contribute to Latino self-perception. I argue that in order to better understand diversity in Latino political behavior, we must first better understand the dynamic process of self-identification within this population. This dissertation begins to work toward that goal.

Latinos, Identity and the Immigration Policy Debate

The heated passions and rhetoric roused in the debate over immigration policy often call into question what it means to be American. I argue that the tenor of this political debate stands to impact not only immigration policy itself, but for many individuals, it can affect their very sense of belonging. Moreover, in a society whose political culture has long been defined by egalitarianism and participation (Tocqueville

[1848] 1969), the exclusion or alienation of large segments of the population may threaten the underlying premise of the political system.

On one side of the issue are staunch anti-immigrant advocates like former

Republican Congressman Tom Tancredo, who has forcefully argued that immigration and multiculturalism have resulted in an “identity crisis” about what it means to be

American. As Tancredo explains, "Sure, there's that nostalgic part of me that idealizes an

America that probably never existed. But, an America more homogeneous, yes. It is not a white America, which is something I've heard people attacking me for all the time. We've always been a nation made up of so many different people, but it seemed to me there was more of an attempt to assimilate. So yeah, I long for that " (Pappu 2007). As Tancredo demonstrates, echoing the “nativist” arguments of previous generations, these activists generally seek to protect a certain vision of America and what it means to be American – accurate or not.

On the other side of the issue, immigration advocates likewise invoke an historical vision of America to argue for immigration reform. For instance, at an April

10, 2006 rally on the National Mall in Washington D.C., the late Senator Edward M.

Kennedy (D-MA), one of the key advocates for comprehensive immigration reform in the

U.S. Senate, told a crowd of over 200,000 protesters, “I look across this historic gathering and I see the future of America. As President Kennedy proclaimed a half century ago, we are a Nation of Immigrants. And today, we stand together as brothers and sisters to shape

America's destiny - old Americans, new Americans, future Americans - all joined together for the common good… This debate goes to the heart of who we are as

Americans” (Kennedy 2006). I argue that the heated public rhetoric of immigrants as

American, or alternately, of immigrants as unwelcome and foreign, are not without consequence for the Latino community.

Rather, I contend that messages about whether or not immigrants count as

American are poised to shape individuals’ very image of what it means to be American, and whether or not one fits into that category. However, given the heterogeneous nature of the Latino community, the effects of these messages may operate differently for distinct subgroups of this population. I argue that Latino responses to the immigration debate, as well as broader perceptions of what it means to be American, will be conditional upon this variation.

To date, our understanding of the nuanced ways in which the diverse Latino community responds to immigration issues remains relatively limited. Previous scholars point to the construction of a pan-ethnic identity as the primary vehicle for political mobilization in the face of adversity (see, for instance, Padilla 1986). A small but growing body of research examines Latino views on immigration more specifically, with much of this work focused on California’s Proposition 187 (1994), a ballot initiative that sought to deny undocumented immigrants access to a range of social services.5

Following the approval of this initiative, scholars highlighted short-term increases in

Latino political participation in California, measured by indicators such as voting and naturalization levels (see, for instance, Jones-Correa 2001; Hajnal et al. 2002; Huntington

2004a; Ramakrishnan 2005). Generally speaking, however, this literature relies on a

5 While California voters approved Proposition 187, it was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the courts. 12

revised version of V.O. Key’s (1949) concept of ethnic “threat,” while generally ignoring questions of identity and variation within Latino populations. Rather than explore the mechanisms underlying these increases in participation, this literature largely assumes homogeneity, ignoring very real, empirical differences among Hispanics (but see Newton

2000; García Bedolla 2005). Indeed, reports indicate that nearly one quarter of Latinos voted in favor of Proposition 187 (Newton 2000; García 2003). Moreover, when Arizona addressed a similar initiative in 2004 (Proposition 200), Latino turnout again increased, but an estimated 50% of Hispanic voters cast their ballots in support of this proposal, as well as subsequent immigration-related provisions (Leal et al. 2008) .

Most contemporary accounts of the spring 2006 marches continue to repeat assumptions about monolithic Latino behavior and increased feelings of pan-ethnic unity within this community (see, for instance, Barreto et al. 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado et al.

2009), without exploring possible mechanisms behind this purported link. As such, these contributions miss the opportunity to develop a more fine-grained understanding of the relationship between ethnic identity, exogenous events, and public policy.

A few notable exceptions exist. For instance, de la Garza et al (1991) introduce the concept of “Mexicanness” as a scaled variable that includes celebrating holidays and other aspects of Mexican heritage. They find that a high ranking on their scale is linked to support for immigration rights. On the other hand, both that work and Hood et al.

(1997) conclude that Latinos in areas with large illegal populations demonstrate more restrictive attitudes on immigration issues. These findings defy explanations that emphasize feelings of co-ethnic affinity in the literature cited above (for a discussion of

this perspective, see Newton 2000). Rather, they suggest that in communities with many illegal residents, non-Latinos and legal Latinos alike may come to view the undocumented population as “the other.”

In a qualitative study of two Mexican communities in the Los Angeles area,

Garcia Bedolla (2005) explores variation in identity and political cohesion in response to

Proposition 187. Highlighting the stigma associated with new Latino arrivals in the U.S., she finds that many later-generation immigrants actually opt to distance themselves from their co-ethnics. Her explanation emphasizes inter-generational relations, socioeconomic status, and language differences. This process results in seemingly counterintuitive identity choices and behavior that contradict a “co-ethnic affinity” hypothesis.

Quantitative evidence of this phenomenon is illustrated by a 2010 survey of Arizona voters commissioned by the National Council of La Raza, which finds that 90% of foreign-born voters oppose that state’s restrictive immigration law, compared to 67% of fourth generation Latinos (Latino Decisions 2010). My research extends this line of analysis by looking specifically at the effects of social and political context on identity choices, emphasizing variation by nationality and gender.

Constructivism, Protest Politics, and Intersectionality

Across the discipline of political science, our understanding of ethnicity has advanced significantly since early “essentialist” theories that assumed it to be fixed and unchanging (Geertz 1973). Literature increasingly highlights the need to disaggregate identities, emphasizing that groups are not always as cohesive as might be assumed (see, for instance, Horowitz 1985; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Brubaker 2004). Other scholarship

also highlights the need to more closely examine the various ways in which one’s identities might be activated under different circumstances (see, for instance, Varshney

2007; Lee 2008; Chandra 2009). However, disagreement exists over the extent to which one’s sense of identity may change, as well as the underlying mechanisms behind such changes. Further, the dynamic, contextual nature of identity makes these questions difficult to address using conventional survey methods, whose fixed categories are typically unable to capture changing contexts as well as the fluid nature of identities (Lee

2009).

To explore the questions outlined above, this project has theoretical grounding in three main bodies of literature. First, drawing on scholarship from comparative politics, I employ a constructivist perspective, which emphasizes that ethnicity is not a static phenomenon, and that people may identify with multiple groups, the salience of which may vary depending on the circumstances. Within the constructivist school, instrumentalists argue that political leaders, events, and institutions can affect people’s self-identity, particularly in the short-term (see, for instance, Bates 1981; Chandra 2004;

Posner 2004). This approach drives the main hypotheses presented in the third and fourth chapters, which explore the ways in which the spring 2006 immigration protests affected perceptions of what it means to be American, as well as individual self-identification, for certain segments of the Latino population. Likewise, this theory undergirds the second chapter, which studies the various ways that Latino activists have developed their message about identity over time.

Second, I draw heavily on intersectionality theory, which emphasizes the interaction between variables such as gender and race or ethnicity in helping to understand an individual’s life experience (see, for instance, hooks 1984; Crenshaw

1994; Hardy-Fanta 2006; Hancock 2007b). Specifically, this literature argues that the effects of multiple forms of difference are not purely additive, but that different marginalizations reinforce each other in a multiplicative fashion. The issues advanced by the women’s movement in the United States, for instance, are often particular to white women, and may not address the needs of African American or Latina women

(Strolovitch 2007). Consequently, to truly understand an individual’s life and choices, it is important to disaggregate within groups.

I incorporate this body of literature in two ways. First, and more generally, I build on this theoretical insight throughout the dissertation to argue for the need to look more closely at the variation between Latino subgroups. For instance, I emphasize that with respect to immigration issues, very real differences exist within the Latino population based on one’s country of origin or ancestry, and this variation has consequences for the ways in which individuals may relate to public policy and political debate. Second, I apply the ideas of intersectionality to the general Latino population to study the relationship between gender and self-identification. I suggest that to better understand identity choices and the larger process of immigrant incorporation, we must also be mindful of the distinct experience of having multiple marginalizations (for instance, being a Latina woman rather than a Latino man). In Chapter 3, I examine whether variation exists in the ways that Latino men and women define being American;

in Chapter 5, I study the differences in self-identification between Latino men and women.

Finally, sociology literature on social movements explores the ways in which movements and protest may alter identity. For instance, Gould (1976) develops the concept of a “participation identity,” referring to the way an individual identifies with social protest and the effect this experience can have on social identification. Gould contends that a participation identity can develop because of critical events, normative and instrumental appeals, social networks, and collective mobilization. Likewise, Snow and McAdam (2000) highlight the link between the collective identity of a movement and the transformation of identities that may occur among participants. They hypothesize that identities are constructed based on a combination of framing and collective action

(see also Strkyer et al. 2000).6

Indeed, this latter body of research and its emphasis on popular participation also speaks to a tradition in American politics literature dating back to Alexis de

Tocqueville’s famous early descriptions of life in America. For Tocqueville ([1848]

1969 ), the habits of direct participation in government are part of the civic-mindedness that characterize and distinguish Americans from other societies, preventing them from living under a “tyranny of the majority.” I extend these arguments to suggest that, in the modern media age, both participation and observing mass participation may change participants by making them feel more American.

6 My thanks to Ezra Zuckerman for suggesting this body of literature. 17

Country-of-Origin and Political Socialization

As mentioned above, and drawing on concepts from intersectionality literature, one central argument in this dissertation is the importance of understanding the diversity within the Latino population, broadly defined. A large body of research on political socialization establishes that political attitudes and partisanship are established at an early age, defined primarily by parental preferences and formal education (Campbell et al.

1960; Hyman 1959; Valentino and Sears 1998; Jennings and Niemi 1968). Abrajano

(2011) emphasizes that this form of political socialization is absent for foreign-born immigrants. I suggest that this socialization is not absent, but different. Indeed, in important ways, both newcomers to the U.S. and their children are likely to be socialized through the lens of their previous experiences, shaping their perceptions of life in the

U.S.

Recent scholarship has begun to emphasize the importance of varied socialization experiences to our understanding of group identification and citizenship. For instance, focusing on young black men, Weaver and Lerman (2010) argue that exposure to the government primarily through the criminal justice system is a key form of political socialization that negatively affects the likelihood of political participation within this population. Likewise, McClain et al. (2009, p 480) argue, “In assuming that the racial cues and U.S.-constructed identities affect all groups in the same way, we detach racial minority groups not only from their historical experiences in the United States but also from their unique perceptions and interpretations of that experience.” My dissertation extends these arguments in two related ways. First, as mentioned above, I contend that

when studying the Latino community, we must bear in mind the varied experiences of members of different ancestral origin groups with respect to the U.S. government, immigration policy, and the judicial system. Second, I argue that perceptions of group identification and whether or not one is included in a certain category may also be shaped by personal or familial experiences prior to arriving in the U.S.

Indeed, many of the arguments in this dissertation emphasize variation based on country-of-origin or ancestry. Latinos in the U.S. hail from more than 20 different countries. Although Latinos are generally perceived to share a common language and culture, in terms of political culture and history, individuals arriving in the United States may have had a vastly different experience. Latinos may arrive seeking economic opportunity; they may also come to the U.S. as refugees from a bloody civil war, military takeover, or single-party rule. Some may come from prosperous democracies, while others may have no experience with democracy, and no understanding of the basic underpinnings of the American political system. This diversity undoubtedly shapes the perspective through which individuals view political life in the U.S, as well as their perceived sense of belonging within a democratic polity.

Throughout the dissertation, I focus specifically on the five largest Latino subgroups in the U.S., which constitute over 80% of the Latino population nationally.

The following section presents a short discussion of U.S. immigration policy and history with respect to each of these subgroups: Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans. As background on the rate and pace of migration by subgroup, Table

1.2, below, presents information on the number of new arrivals from each country

obtaining permanent resident status since 1920 (excluding Puerto Ricans, who, as U.S. citizens, do not apply for this status).

Table 1.2 Persons Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status by Country of Last Residence, FY 1920-2009

Country of Last Residence 1920-9 1930-9 1940-9 1950-9 1960-9

Mexico 498,945 32,709 56,158 273,847 441,824

Cuba 12,769 10,641 25,976 73,221 202,030

Dominican Republic - 1,026 4,802 10,219 83,552

El Salvador * - 597 4,885 5,094 14,405

Country of Last Residence 1970-9 1980-9 1990-9 2000-9 2010

Mexico 621,218 1,009,586 2,757,418 1,704,166 138,717

Cuba 256,497 132,552 159,037 271,742 33, 372

Dominican Republic 139,249 221,552 359,818 291,492 53, 890

El Salvador * 29,428 137,418 273,017 251,237 251, 237

*Note: These figures do not include recipients of Temporary Protected Status, including an estimated 229,000 with this status from El Salvador. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011), 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.

Puerto Ricans: Conquest, Citizenship, and Territorial Status

Puerto Ricans became Americans “by conquest,” as a byproduct of the 1898

Spanish-American war. In the early twentieth century, Puerto Rico officially became a

U.S. territory, and all Puerto Ricans officially became U.S. citizens under the 1917 Jones

Act. Consistent with territorial status, Puerto Ricans living on the island receive U.S. citizenship at birth.

Puerto Rican migration to the mainland began in full force in the 1940s and 1950s, when employers in the Northeast began to actively recruit workers from the island. Most

subsequent migration to the continental U.S. has been the result of labor flows. As Portes and Grosfoguel (1994) observe, Puerto Rican migrants to the U.S mainland tended to be from the lower economic strata, while middle and upper class Puerto Ricans remained on the island. Consequently, Puerto Ricans on the mainland have consistently demonstrated higher levels of poverty in comparison to other Latino groups (U.S. Census Bureau

2003).

Cuban Exiles in the U.S.

As for Cuban immigrants, the first big wave of arrivals came to the United States starting in January 1959, when Fidel Castro rose to power on the island, and continued through the 1960s. Many of these early arrivals were well-educated and prosperous, bringing substantial assets with them to the United States. In the broader international context of the Cold War, the U.S. Government called on groups of Cuban immigrants for political support, including assistance during the Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961). Moreover, many Cubans were aided by the Kennedy Administration’s Cuban Refugee Program, which provided direct financial and relocation assistance to an estimated 250,000

Cubans, and has been referred to as, “one of the most generous assistance packages ever granted to any foreign group” (Portes and Grosfoguel 1994, p 62; see also Wilson and

Portes 1980).

Cubans in the United States are primarily an exile community, and historically tended to view themselves as such, rather than as long-term settlers in the United States

(Rieff 1995; de los Angeles Torres 1999). A second round of Cuban immigrants arrived beginning with the Mariel boatlift of 1980, after Castro declared that any Cuban wishing to leave for the U.S. could do so. In the months that followed, an estimated 125,000

Cubans emigrated to Florida, including many from Cuban jails and mental health facilities (Glass 2009). This exodus lasted until October 31, 1980. This latter group, and subsequent immigrants who have arrived even after the boat lift ended, tended to be more working class; like most other contemporary immigrants from Latin America, the majority emigrated in search of improved economic opportunities (Eckstein and Barberia

2002). Those arriving prior to the 1980s were primarily white and middle- or upper- class, though recent immigrants are more diverse (Rieff 1995).

Most Mariel refugees settled in Miami (Glass 2009), where the presence of an established Cuban community facilitated their arrival. Regardless of cohort, Cuban emigrants have also maintained a distinct advantage with respect to U.S. immigration policy when compared to other immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean.

Under the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), those who arrived in the U.S. illegally became eligible for legal resident status after 366 days. The CAA lasted for nearly 30 years, ultimately shifting into what is now known as the “Wet Foot/ Dry Foot” policy.

Under this policy, Cubans who are found at sea are returned to Cuba unless they have sufficient evidence for an asylum claim. However, all those who make it to U.S. soil are able to qualify for legal resident status. Although Cubans do not have birthright citizenship like Puerto Ricans, they do receive preferential legal treatment in comparison to other Latino immigrant groups. Early collaboration and distinct treatment in terms of citizenship policy has resulted in a different relationship with the U.S. government than that of other Latino groups, especially among early arrivals.

Politically, Cuban Americans are also distinct from other Latinos; whereas most tend to support the Democratic party, Cubans have historically had a strong Republican

bent. For instance, presidential election polling from Florida International University suggests that in Florida’s Miami-Dade county, an estimated 81% of Cubans voted

Republican in 2000, though the figure declined to 63.9% in 2008 (Bishin and Klofstad

2011).7 This political leaning, particularly strong among earlier immigrants, is rooted in fervent anti-communist sentiment and a commitment to strengthening the embargo against Cuba to overthrow Castro. Political events such as a long-standing disappointment in President Kennedy’s failed efforts in the Bay of Pigs invasion and the repatriation of Elian Gonzalez in 2000 have further strengthened this partisan preference

(Bishin and Klofstad 2011).

Mexican Americans: Conquest, “Amnesty”, and Enduring Migration

Compared to other Latino groups, the migration of Mexicans into the United

States is notable both for its extended history as well as the large number and duration of migrants crossing the border. Many Mexicans also became U.S. citizens by conquest, to some extent, as a result of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Under this treaty,

Mexico ceded to the United States the territory that now constitutes California, Nevada, and Utah, as well as parts of Arizona, New Mexico and Wyoming. Existing residents of those states were given the option to stay in the U.S. or return to Mexico.

The flow of Mexican immigrants north to the U.S. ebbed and flowed throughout the century, with the first major wave in the 1910s-1920s (for details, see García Bedolla

2009). Between the 1940s and 1960s, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans came to the

U.S. under the Bracero program, through which Mexican workers were employed in the agriculture and railroad sectors (Massey et al. 2002). Following the termination of that

7 See Bishin and Klofstad (2011) for a discussion of the changing demographics of the Cuban vote. 23

program in 1964 and subsequent immigration reforms, Mexicans were subject to visa caps for the first time, and were forced to compete with nationals from other Latin

American and Caribbean countries for entry into the United States. Despite the formal termination of the program, however, a culture emphasizing migration to the U.S. for employment had been established. Consequently, in the aftermath of the bracero program, undocumented immigration increased substantially (Massey et al. 2002).

The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) provided amnesty to a large number of undocumented immigrants (for a discussion of the political debate over

IRCA as well as a description of the legislation, see Chapter 2). While statistics vary about the number of immigrants benefitting from IRCA’s provisions, by most estimates, nearly 3 million people, mostly Mexican, attained legal status as a result of the legislation

(Zolberg 2006). Since the 1980s, despite increased economic cooperation with Mexico, the U.S. has only heightened border enforcement (Massey et al. 2002). While no special labor provisions have been enacted for migrants of Mexican origin, due largely to immigration provisions regarding family preference coupled with the vast number of

Mexicans living in the U.S. with family abroad, in recent years Mexicans have been the largest legal immigrant group in the U.S. For instance, in 2008, nearly 94% of Mexican immigrants who received lawful permanent residence status did so under the family- based immigrants provision, including 111,703 immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and

66,693 receiving family sponsorship (Terrazas 2010). As of 2009, an estimated

6,650,000 Mexicans lived in the United States illegally, constituting nearly 62% of the overall estimated illegal population (Hoeffer et al. 2010).

Dominican Republic

Migrants from the Dominican Republic began to arrive in the U.S. in the late

1960s, following the assassination of dictator Rafael Lenóidas Trujillo and the ascent to power of Joaquin Balaguer. Political exiles constituted most of the early migrants, who were aided in their settlement by the U.S. government (Itzigsohn 2009). The worsening economy on the island resulted in large-scale emigration in the 1970s and 1980s. Most migrants in that period had some level of basic skills and resources, and worked in blue- collar occupations or the service sector; only a small number of these recent immigrants were political asylees (Portes and Grosfoguel 1994; Migration Policy Institute 2004).

Dominican migrants have since received neither special preference nor targeted restrictions, with nationals who entered legally doing so primarily through the work certification process. Between 1990 and 2000, the Dominican population in the United

States grew by nearly 90%, primarily as a result of immigration; as of 2004, an estimated

109,000 , or 13-15% of the Dominicans living in the U.S., were here illegally (Migration

Policy Institute 2004).

El Salvador

Immigrants from El Salvador have a more complicated history. As in other

Central American countries, in the 1980s, El Salvador experienced a bloody civil war, fueled by Cold War adversaries of the era. El Salvador’s war spanned from 1980 until

1992, during which time the U.S. contributed more than six billion dollars in military and economic aid to the Salvadoran government, while the opposition, an alliance of left- wing insurgents, received substantial assistance from Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and other countries of the Communist bloc (Buergenthal 1994). Estimates indicate that

more than 75,000 Salvadorans were killed during the war (Benjamin-Alvarado et al.

2009), and that the conflict created an estimated 500,000 internally displaced peoples as well as over 1 million emigrants, primarily to Mexico and the U.S. (Zolberg 2006). A subsequent International Truth Commission report determined that the Salvadoran government was responsible for 85% of the deaths that took place, while just 15% were attributed to insurgent activity (Wood 2008). Additionally, by 1987, an estimated 10% of the country’s population had fled to the United States.

As the U.S. aligned itself with these countries’ governments abroad, at home, they denied asylum claims from refugees of these nations. To protest these refusals, in the mid-1980s, the “sanctuary” movement emerged in the United States, in which a number of religious organizations and activists declared their communities to be safe spaces for these political refugees. In 1985, activists sued the U.S. government for discrimination against asylum applicants from El Salvador and Guatemala in what became known as the

ABC case (for American Baptist Church, the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit); the following year, the government convicted eight religious activists of conspiracy and alien- smuggling for their protection of refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala (for details, see Coutin 2000).

The first legal steps to resolve these asylum claims were taken in the 1990

Immigration Act, which established Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and designated

Salvadorans as the first recipients. TPS essentially provides a renewable safe haven for those who cannot return home due to extraordinary circumstances such as natural disaster or civil war. To be covered under TPS, nationals must meet a number of conditions, including continual residence in the U.S. prior to the country’s designation. In 1994, the

Bush Administration granted Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) to nearly 200,000

Salvadorans who had received protection under the initial TPS statue (Wasem and Ester

2006).

Hundreds of thousands of nationals from El Salvador have also received other forms of legal protection through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American

Relief Act (NACARA) as well as through political asylum proceedings (Wasem and

Ester 2006; Gammage 2007). El Salvador received TPS designation again in March

2001. Technically, TPS is short-term, requiring federal renewal every 6 to 18 months, and applies only to those who have lived in the U.S. continually since each country’s original designation. As of 2006, an estimated 229,000 Salvadorans remained in the U.S. under this policy (Wasem and Ester 2006).

According to current estimates, after Mexicans, Salvadorans constitute the second-largest illegal population in the U.S., totaling approximately 530,000 (Hoeffer et al. 2010). As indicated above in Table 1.1, rapid and significant growth has also occurred in the Salvadoran population within recent years. Indeed, immigration from across the “Northern Triangle” of Central America has increased dramatically over the last two decades, with 63% of immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras arriving in the U.S. since 1990, representing an influx of more than 1.6 million people

(Rosenblum and Brick 2011).

Elisabeth Wood (2008) examines the types of social transformations that may occur during civil war. In the case of El Salvador, for instance, she contends that the extreme violence that characterized the war caused many who were previously pacifists to join the anti-government insurgency. She also highlights the polarization of political

identities that occur over the course of civil wars, arguing that such shifts may persist not only over time, but also over space, as refugees flee the violence of war and bring their experiences with them to their new homes. I suggest that this experience may have continued repercussions for emigrants, potentially distinguishing Salvadorans from other

Latino subgroups in the U.S.

As this brief overview reflects, very real differences exist in the life trajectory of individuals who fall under the broad pan-ethnic label of Latino. Likewise, based on one’s country of origin, an individual may receive very different treatment under U.S. immigration law. As a consequence, we can expect the immigration policy debate to resonate differently with various segments of the Latino population. Moreover, this range of experiences and interactions with the judicial system are likely to have real consequences for political socialization and participation, as well as an individual’s sense of belonging in the United States.

Methodology and Chapter Outline

Within the diverse Latino population in the U.S., I seek to better understand the

“politics-to-identity” link by studying the varying ways in which the immigration policy debate can affect self-identification. I suggest that being American is not a fixed category; rather, for immigrants in the U.S., what it means to be American is likely to change over time, as well as with political and social context. I also study the relationship between gender and identity, examining the ways in which the experience of having multiple marginalizations may affect self-perception. Throughout the dissertation, the diversity of the Latino population is another key theme, highlighting the need to disaggregate beyond the broad pan-ethnic label. 28

I approach these questions using a combination of historical analysis and quantitative methods. To better understand the relationship between politics and identity,

I believe we must first examine the rhetoric employed by leaders of the Latino community to discuss immigration issues and being American. To do this, I incorporate a combination of newspaper accounts and secondary literature. My analysis of the relationship between identity and political context is undertaken primarily through the use of household survey data. Throughout the dissertation, while varying data sources are used, I draw primarily on Phase One of the Latino National Survey (LNS, 2006), which was conducted between November 2005 through August 2006.8 The survey includes a total of 8,634 respondents across fifteen states and the Washington, DC metropolitan area; unlike most previous datasets focusing on Latinos, the large sample size of the LNS allows for disaggregation by country-of-origin and other variables, which provides new opportunities to investigate the diversity within the Latino population.

The wave of 2006 immigration protests occurred in the middle of the data collection for the LNS. The coincidence of these events presents the unique opportunity to implement a quasi-experimental research design to evaluate the effects of the protests on Latino views about what it means to be American, as well as individual self- identification. Indeed, a central theme of this dissertation is the power of political events, and the framing of these events by Latino elites and the media, to change self-perception.

The second chapter provides historical context for these arguments by examining key developments in immigration policy and the changing tone of Latino activism over

8 Principal investigators for Phase One of the survey include Luis Fraga, John Garcia, Rodney Hero, Michael Jones-Correa, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Gary Segura. 29

time. Looking at Latino mobilization in distinct historical periods, I call attention to the evolving ways in which Latino elites have described what it means to be both American and Latino. I argue that over time, this conceptualization changes as a result of strategic framing; the larger political context of the day (for instance, the influence of the civil rights movement and black nationalism); and in response to contemporary public policy debates. The evolving language of Latino organizations and leadership over the past century demonstrates interesting variation in the ways that these groups have advocated for their communities and conveyed what it means to belong in the U.S.

The following two chapters develop the quasi-experimental research design and test hypotheses regarding the effects of the spring 2006 protests. Chapter 3 explores how

Latinos define being American in ascriptive terms. First, the chapter compares Latino perceptions of what it means to be American with the opinions of Whites and African

Americans. Second, I look at variation in the way American is defined between Latino subgroups, based on nationality and gender. Finally, I examine the ways in which perceptions of what it means to be American change before and after the 2006 immigration protests. I find that after these events, Latinos were less likely to perceive

American as a closed category based on ascriptive characteristics than comparable respondents interviewed before these events.

Chapter 4 examines the impact of the 2006 protests on self-identification within the Latino community. Drawing on the assumptions of existing literature, I test whether

Latinos interviewed after the protests have greater pan-ethnic sentiments than comparable respondents interviewed earlier. I fail to find support for this hypothesis. Instead, I find

that consistent with the strategic framing of the 2006 protests outlined in Chapter 2, in which elites emphasized that Latinos were also American, certain segments of the Latino community increasingly self-identify as American after these events. Underscoring the heterogeneous nature of the Latino population, these effects are concentrated among those subgroups most affected by the immigration debate.

In Chapter 5, I focus on the effects of gender and social context on self- identification. Specifically, I find that compared to Latino men, holding all else equal, women are less likely to identify as American and more likely to identify as Latino/a. In an attempt to understand this variation, I study the relationship between social networks and self-identification. I find that networks work differently for Latino men and women, with some variables more important for one gender than another.

Finally, Chapter 6 discusses policy developments since 2006. In the absence of federal immigration policy reform, most efforts to change immigration law have occurred at the state and local level. This chapter focuses on initiatives introduced at the state level, including an explosion of punitive legislation and sweeping omnibus proposals in a number of states. Focusing in particular on Arizona, Georgia, Alabama, and South

Carolina, I examine the varying protests and organizing that occur in response to these state-level actions. I also discuss possible extensions of my research within this new policy domain.

In sum, I find that while some aspects of self-identification may be relatively constant over time, other questions of identity may be more malleable. I contribute to our knowledge of the process of identity formation by demonstrating that opinions on what it

means to be American as well as individual self-identification can be changed by social and political context and, relatedly, by the strategic framing efforts undertaken by elites.

My research also underscores the stark variation within the Latino population, and the need to disaggregate the “Latino” experience, being mindful of variables such as country- of-origin and gender in order to better understand the incorporation process.

Collectively, these findings help to advance our understanding of the relationship between politics and identity, and the role of political and social context in shaping identity choices.

CHAPTER 2

From Assimilation to Latino Unity to “We Are American”: Immigration Policy and the Evolution of Latino Rhetoric, 1900s-2006

In Chapter 1, I pose the question, under what conditions will the debate over immigration politics change Latino self-perception, and in which direction(s)? Drawing on constructivist literature (Lee 2008; Chandra 2009), I argue that identities can be

“activated” under different circumstances. Moreover, I suggest that political leaders, events, and institutions can affect not only individual self-identification (Chandra 2004;

Posner 2004), but also the way that certain individuals interpret the very meaning of identity categories. Likewise, I draw on literature that argues protest and social movements can transform identities among participants, with identities constructed through both framing and collective action (Gould 1995; Snow and McAdam 2000;

Stryker et al. 2000).

In this chapter, I develop the foundation for these arguments by examining both the evolution of immigration policy and the changing rhetoric of Latino activism since the start of the twentieth century. In a recent discussion of immigration policy developments, Rogers Smith (2011, p 546) argues that Americans, Mexicans and

Mexican Americans “have had their identities, values, and interests shaped by coercively enforced U.S. policies.” I contend that it is not only U.S. policies, but also the responses of activists, social movements and the media that shape Latino self-identification. In particular, I argue that identity formation is an interactive process, shaped not only by

individual traits and characteristics, but also by the legal system and the messages of social movements and elites. Finally, drawing on literature about the role of the media in politics, I suggest that participation may not be a necessary prerequisite for identity transformation. Rather, during a time of heightened political contestation, media coverage of elite messages may be sufficient to activate changes within members of the

Latino community for whom the immigration issue is particularly salient.

Psychological research on social identity theory finds that in-group favoritism will develop even under conditions of minimal and artificial difference (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1979).1 As Huddy (2001) points out, this scholarship generally assumes that the creation of group boundaries results in a social identity. However, one limitation of social identity theory is that it struggles to explain how identity may be acquired in cases where it is not ascriptively assigned (Huddy 2001). Likewise, literature on group consciousness focuses primarily on its consequences, rather than its origins (Miller et al.

1981; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Stokes 2003; Sanchez 2006). I seek to fill this gap in the literature by examining the ways in which social movements, elites, and the news media may shape identity choices in response to ongoing political events. While my focus here is on the issue of immigration and Latino politics, this framework may also be extended to other cases and contexts.

This chapter will provide critical historical context for the broader theoretical arguments advanced in this dissertation. To begin, I present an overview of major developments in U.S. immigration policy (see Appendix A, Table 2.1 for a timeline),

1 Psychologists distinguish between aspects of one’s social identity, such as group membership or relationships with others, and personal identity, or private feelings of self and individuality. See Cheek and Briggs (1982) and Leary (1986) for a discussion of these distinctions. The present analysis focuses primarily on social aspects of identity. 34

with emphasis on policies affecting Latinos. During each relevant period, this chronology also includes a discussion of Latino activism. Specifically, I demonstrate a shift in rhetoric over time, from assimilation in the early twentieth century, to the

Chicano and Puerto Rican Nationalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, to Latino

Unity in the 1996 immigration protests, and finally, back to being American in 2006.

This historical discussion is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, by providing a brief synopsis, I seek to demonstrate the evolution of both public policy and the language of activism prior to 2006. This background demonstrates that in contrast to Latino movements at the end of the twentieth century, in 2006, elites returned to a strategy from nearly a century ago, seeking to portray their community as “American” rather than as a

Latino “other.”

Additionally, I highlight theories of political communication, examining the unique role of the Spanish language media in the 2006 protests. The chapter will close with a broader discussion of the relationship between public policy, social movements, and the media with respect to these events. Overall, this chapter establishes the foundation for subsequent arguments about the effects of the protests on changing perceptions of what it means to be American and on individual self-identification.

An Historical View: US Immigration Policy Developments and Movement Responses

The government of the United States has set rules surrounding citizenship virtually since its inception, with the establishment of a Naturalization Rule in 1790, which provided citizenship to any “free white person” of good character residing in the

U.S. for at least two years (First Congress 1790). In the early 19th century, during the era of Manifest Destiny, the U.S. expanded rapidly westward, extending its reach into

Mexico with the Mexican-American War (1846-1848). Under the Treaty of Guadalupe

Hidalgo, which concluded the war, the U.S. acquired nearly half of Mexico’s territory, including what is now California, Nevada, and Utah, as well as parts of Arizona, Nevada,

New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming. This territorial acquisition also changed the demographics of an expanding nation; Mexicans who remained in this territory were given the option to obtain U.S. citizenship, which nearly 75,000 pursued (Smith 2011).

These new citizens were frequent subjects of discrimination, but in many cases also became the foundation of the labor force in this newly acquired territory.

Following the American Civil War, action on immigration moved primarily to the federal level. In 1868, Congress ratified the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, which established that all individuals born in the U.S. are automatically U.S. citizens.2 While some earlier judicial decisions gave states “police power” over new immigrants, by the

1870s, the Supreme Court ended state or local control over immigration policy; under

Henderson v. Mayor of New York, the court officially placed the issue under the domain of the federal government. In the wake of a national economic recession, the first immigration quotas were imposed in the 1880s, with Chinese immigrants as the primary target (Zolberg 2006). In sum, this period established the foundation for federal control and restrictions on immigration in the U.S., and marked the beginning of national origin quotas.

2 This amendment has recently come under fire by anti-immigration advocates, who seek to eliminate “birthright” citizenship. 36

1900s-1950s: Quotas and Assimilation

Following World War I, the U.S. began a largely restrictive era of immigration policy featuring extensive national origin quotas. The 1921 Quota Act, for instance, established an annual cap of 350,000 immigrants, with European immigration limited to

3% of the number of foreign-born citizens of each nationality living in the U.S. at the time of the 1910 census.3 A series of new laws in the 1920s further revised this policy, with a 1927 provision reducing the overall quota to 150,000 and nationality limits to 2% based on the 1920 census. This system of national preference essentially formed the foundation of U.S. immigration policy until 1965. In 1928, Congress debated placing immigration restrictions on the Western Hemisphere, but ultimately defeated the proposal; opponents argued that these efforts specifically targeted Mexico (Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006). The National Origins Act of 1929 further solidified country and ethnic preferences as the basis of U.S. immigration law, with 70% of admissions reserved for emigrants from Northern and Western Europe and just 30% reserved for those from

Southern and Eastern Europe.

During the 1930s, nearly 1.5 million Mexicans lived in the U.S., making them the nation’s largest immigrant group (Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006). As the Great

Depression plagued the U.S., and the employment situation worsened for countless

Americans, Mexican Americans – even some born in the U.S. – increasingly became the subject of intense discrimination, employment and otherwise. Ultimately, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans were subject to “repatriation,” in which they were deported or

3 The decade of 1900-1910 represented the peak of the immigrant influx in U.S. history. In contrast to the 1921 quota of 350,000, over 1 million immigrants entered the U.S. in 1905 alone (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2011). 37

coercively forced to emigrate (Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006). While actual numbers vary, some estimate that as many as a million people, including both U.S. citizens and non-citizens, were forcibly removed during this time period (Johnson 2005).

In the 1940s, the U.S. initiated the Mexican bracero program in an attempt to respond to labor shortages in the agriculture and construction industries. The program, which has been described as an “institutionalized….form of indentured labor,” allowed for temporary employment of Mexican nationals in these fields (Hardy-Fanta 1993, p

408). While the bracero program was blamed by many for encouraging the flow of illegal workers (Hardy-Fanta 1993), when it expired in 1963, employers increasingly turned to illegal workers to meet the continued demand for labor. Indeed, the bracero program created a culture of temporal migration among certain Mexican communities that continued even after the program ended, transforming into subsequent waves of unauthorized migration (Massey et al. 2002). During this time period, President

Eisenhower also established a border control program, known as Operation Wetback, which is credited both with a decline in illegal immigration and an increase in anti-Latino discrimination.

In the first half of the twentieth century, a number of southwest states codified discriminatory practices, including restrictions on Latino voting and jury service. Several organizations developed to fight these measures, and in particular to defend the rights of

Mexican Americans. Yet, in sharp contrast to later movements that emphasized cultural difference, in their fight for civil rights, these nascent organizations emphasized assimilation. Moreover, highlighting a tension between different immigrant generations that has persisted over time, many established Mexican Americans distanced themselves

from newer arrivals. Indeed, some even argued for limits to further immigration in an attempt to counter any stigma against their community (Smith 2011).

The advocacy organizations that developed in the early twentieth century generally represented the Mexican middle class, and promoted increased civic participation. The Order Sons of America (OSA), established in 1918, was one such early organization of Mexican Americans in the southwest whose mission focused on activities related to incorporation in U.S. politics. In 1929, the OSA and two related organizations merged to form the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), which remains the oldest and largest Mexican-American civil rights organization (Marquez 1993). At the beginning, LULAC’s membership was restricted to U.S. citizens, including individuals born in the U.S. and naturalized citizens (San Miguel 1983). LULAC sought reform within the existing social, political and legal order, arguing that social change should occur at the individual level rather than the group level. For instance, while the organization fought to end discrimination against braceros and other migrant workers, its membership simultaneously distanced itself from these individuals, instead emphasizing

Americanism and assimilation as a means of upward mobility (Beltrán 2010).

Likewise, though the organization highlighted some aspects of Mexican culture,

LULAC also took great pains to emphasize its commitment to American culture. For instance, it made English the group’s official language and adopted “America” as its song. Indeed, as Marquez (1989, p 369) describes, “LULAC's call for loyalty to the

United States Government, "100% Americanism," and the adoption of the English language were attempts to placate a hostile Anglo American majority and demonstrate that the Mexican American people could become loyal and productive citizens of the

United States.” This perspective foreshadows the strategies of Latino organizers nearly a century later, during the spring 2006 protests, in which organizers once more mobilized around the theme that Latinos are American. In the meantime, however, Latino activism would first travel down a different path, emphasizing cultural nationalism and difference.

1960s-1970s: Repeal of Quotas and the Rise of Cultural Nationalism

The foundation for the modern immigration system was established with the 1965

Immigration Act, which repealed the earlier national origin quotas. Instead, the Act developed a new system of preference in immigration policy based on two primary factors: family reunification and employment skills. The law established an overall immigration ceiling of 270,000 annual immigrants, with a 20,000 cap per country.

Additionally, overall ceilings were established for the Eastern Hemisphere (170,000) and the Western Hemisphere (120,000). While several subsequent revisions to the various ceilings have been enacted since 1965, the basic guiding principles of family reunification and professional skills continue to define contemporary immigration policy

(McCabe and Meissner 2010).

These changes to the immigration code were enacted against the backdrop of broader societal shifts underway in the 1960s, and particularly the Civil Rights

Movement. Still facing discrimination despite a number of significant legal victories achieved by LULAC, many Latinos grew increasingly frustrated with the organization’s emphasis on Americanism and assimilation. Inspired by the black nationalist movements of the day, the Chicano and Puerto Rican Movements emerged as a counterpoint to earlier Latino organizations. These new movements emphasized difference rather than

similarity to other Americans, politicizing traditional culture, which they employed as a tool to recruit members and maintain group solidarity (Parra et al. 1976; Marquez 2001).

Diverse in both membership and scope, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Chicano movement developed around the ideology of cultural nationalism, or Chicanismo.

Emphasizing that Mexicans were united by a shared historical struggle and indigenous past, and drawing on the literary, visual, and performing arts, the philosophy of

Chicanismo helped bring together different segments of the Mexican American community, including activists, cultural figures, and intellectuals (García 1997). Under this broad umbrella, a number of different organizations emerged across the southwestern

United States, highlighting distinct issues of importance to the Mexican American community in the fight for social justice. For instance, under the leadership of César

Chavez, the United Farm Workers of America organized widely publicized strikes to improve conditions for migrant workers in California. In Colorado, Rodolfo “Corky”

Gonzáles helped to unite the youth movement and define the meaning of chicano through his poetry as well as his efforts to organize the 1969 Chicano Youth Liberation

Conference. In New Mexico, led by Reies López Tijerina, the Federal Alliance of Land

Grants fought for the land rights of Mexican individuals and small communities, based on ownership patterns prior to the Mexican-American War (1846-48). As Barreto et al.

(2009, p 747) explain, in contrast to more recent Latino advocacy, the Chicano movement focused, “not on Latinos as an immigrant group but rather as an ethnic minority suffering from institutional neglect and systematic exploitation.” Some organizations within the

Chicano movement even went so far as advocating for the physical separation of races,

arguing that Mexican Americans had distinct needs and interests than others (Marquez

2001).

Despite a previous history of more moderate, middle-class activism, by the 1960s, cultural nationalism also dominated Puerto Rican politics in the United States. The “New

Awakening,” or el Nuevo Despertar of Puerto Rican Nationalism, represented a shift in both philosophy and strategy, with activists advocating self-determination and liberation of Puerto Ricans both in the U.S. and on the island. As such, the theme of Puerto Rican independence featured prominently. As with the Chicano movement, the Puerto Rican nationalist movement emphasized ethnic pride and identity, highlighting various aspects of cultural heritage and difference from Anglos through both activism and the arts. Like the Chicano movement, the Puerto Rican nationalist movement also had a distinct socialist message, protesting the exploitation of people and culture by American

“colonizers.”

While the broader Puerto Rican movement included a number of groups, by far the most widely known and active of these organizations was the Young Lords Party, which used the Black Power movement as a model (Beltrán 2010). Founded in Chicago, the organization had active groups in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and the island of Puerto Rico, as well as ties to Massachusetts, Ohio and Michigan. The

New York chapter in particular expanded its reach with a media presence, through both a bilingual newspaper and a radio show. Nationally, the Young Lords Party provided a range of social services for the Puerto Rican community. The group also taught Spanish and Puerto Rican culture classes, designed to help participants embrace their distinct

Puerto Rican identity (Melendez 2003).

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the message of national pride for Mexicans and

Puerto Ricans was highlighted in social movement activities and emphasized in a variety of formats, including conferences, the literary arts, and the media. While the Chicano and Puerto Rican Nationalist movements certainly did not encompass all of the views within these communities4, the emphasis on cultural difference marks a distinct shift away from the assimilation discourse that dominated the first half of the twentieth century.

Focusing on Mexican-American social movements, Marquez (2001) argues that the identity claims advanced by these organizations situate these groups toward society at large, with both ideological and strategic motivations underlying such claims.

Specifically, he suggests that organizations adopted positions and associated identities with the goal of recruiting and motivating members. I argue that even as identity claims may be developed in order to attract members, these claims are also likely to influence the self-perception of individuals. Moreover, if these messages are disseminated in the media, identity claims will also reach non-group members, such that even those who are not active members of a social movement may be affected by their message. Further, as is seen in 2006, identity claims may be motivated not just by the desire to recruit members, but also with the goal of advancing a political message; thus, it is not only potential members’ views that matter, but also the views and responses of society at large. These themes will be developed further throughout the dissertation.

4 See Beltrán 2010 for a discussion of divisiveness and efforts to construct unity among a diverse population. 43

1980s-1990s: National Reform, Proposition 187 and Calls for Latino Unity

In the wake of the 1965 Immigration Act, both documented and undocumented immigration increased significantly (Smith 2011). In 1986, after five years of trying,

Congress finally passed legislation for comprehensive immigration reform, the

Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, PL 99-603). The legislation was also known as the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, after Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) and

Representative Romani Mazzoli (D-KY), who chaired the immigration subcommittees in the Senate and the House. This legislation initiated a sanctions program under which employers who hired undocumented workers could be fined anywhere from $250 to

$10,000. To balance these sanctions, the law also developed procedures through which undocumented residents living continuously in the U.S. since 1982 could apply to receive legal documents (“amnesty”), and created a new visa category (H-2A) for temporary agriculture workers, allowing undocumented aliens employed in agriculture for at least ninety days the opportunity to apply for permanent residence after two years as

“temporary residents” (Zolberg 2006). In sum, an estimated 2.7 million individuals attained legal status as a result of these provisions (McCabe and Meissner 2010).

Additionally, in order to alleviate any potential burden on social services, the legislation provided four years of funding assistance to states.

As with many previous immigration debates, congressional support for the proposal was divided, and did not fall along traditional ideological or party lines.5 Then-

5 In the Senate, the vote on final passage was 63-24, with 34 Democrats and 29 Republicans voting for the bill, and 16 Republicans and 8 Democrats in opposition. The final passage vote in the House was 238-173, with 161 Democrats and 77 Republicans voting in support, and 80 Democrats and 93 Republicans opposing the legislation (Pear 1986b). 44

Representative Charles Schumer (D-NY), who described the final legislation as “a left- center bill,” was widely credited with saving the legislation by negotiating a compromise on agricultural workers that would meet the needs of Western industry while also protecting workers’ rights (Pear 1986c). In both the House and the Senate, opponents included liberals, who feared discrimination, as well as conservatives, who opposed the amnesty and guest worker provisions (Zolberg 2006).

By and large, Latinos were divided in response to the 1986 reforms. While many supported the law because of the amnesty provision, others argued that the employer sanctions provision invited discrimination against all Hispanics regardless of their immigration status6 (Pear 1986c). This quandary is illustrated by the response of one

Latino advocacy organization, the National Council on La Raza. While the group declined to support the bill, a spokesman acknowledged it was, ''probably the best immigration legislation possible under current political conditions” (Pear 1986c). While members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus had firmly opposed previous iterations of the bill, this time around Members were divided, with five of eleven members supporting the proposal (Chavez 1986).

Nationally, there was little public mobilization of Latinos surrounding the congressional debate. As Smith (2011, p 550) describes, by this time, with the “rise of modern multiculturalism,” Mexican Americans (and undoubtedly other Latinos) began to develop a renewed sense of “dual cultural citizenships” (see also Meeks 2007; García

6 In an attempt to alleviate these concerns, the legislation included civil rights protections and the creation of a new office within the Justice Department to investigate allegations of discrimination. 45

Bedolla 2009), moving away from some of the nationalist rhetoric of the previous two decades

The 1980s also saw rise of the sanctuary movement, in which religious organizations and social activists united to provide safe communities for refugees from

Central America seeking political asylum (Coutin 2000). As Bloemraad and her colleagues (2011) describe, activists of this era engaged in civil disobedience against

Ronald Reagan’s policies in the region, building transnational ties and developing a strategy of cooperation with the religious community later revisited in the 2006 protests.

At this point, however, the focus was on advocating for refugees rather than the broader

Latino population.

The 1986 legislation, and congressional modifications in 1990, increased the number of legal immigrants from less-represented countries but failed to reduce the number of undocumented immigrants, still mostly Mexicans. In the 1990s, as immigration-receiving states became increasingly frustrated with the burden of the immigrant population, a number of states began to promulgate anti-immigrant legislation.

The first and most renowned of these early state-level policy initiatives was California’s

Proposition 187. Approved by the state’s voters on November 8, 1994, Proposition 187 sought to ban a range of social services, including public education and healthcare, for undocumented immigrants.7 The legislation also called for service providers to verify the legal status of applicants, and to report suspected illegal immigrants to the California

Attorney General’s office and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

7 While California voters approved Proposition 187, it was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the courts. 46

The debate over the legislation was highly politicized, involving both California politicians and national figures. Even President Clinton got involved in the debate, empathizing with the frustration felt by California voters but encouraging them to allow the federal government to continue to address the immigration issue. Then-Governor

Pete Wilson, a Republican, was a vocal proponent of Proposition 187, which became a key issue in his 1994 re-election campaign. While previously the national debate over immigration had been bipartisan, characterized by atypical political alliances, in

California, most Democrats opposed Proposition 187 while the Republicans were somewhat split in their support for the proposal (Martin 1995).

In the final months before the vote on the initiative, Latino students spearheaded much of the activity against Proposition 187, organizing petition drives, operating phone banks, and leading highly visible protests. Newspaper accounts estimate that more than ten thousand students, wielding the Mexican flag, actively demonstrated against the initiative (García Bedolla 2005). In a study of the student protests and its effects on

Latino community members, García Bedolla (2005) conducts extensive qualitative interviews of student participants and adults residing in Los Angeles and Montebello,

California, during the Proposition 187 debate. Echoing the position of some LULAC members from nearly a century before, she finds that in a political context in which

Latinos are stigmatized, many established, U.S.-born Latinos opted to distance themselves from newer arrivals and the contentious political debate. Likewise, even many opponents of Proposition 187 argued that the students protests were counterproductive, contending that the imagery of the Mexican flag pushed undecided citizens to support the Proposition (Martin 1995). This critique would later be 47

underscored during the 2006 protests, helping to push organizers toward a pro-American message.

In the years immediately following the Proposition 187 debate, Californians also voted on two more statewide ballot initiatives relating to the Latino community:

Proposition 209, which sought to end affirmative action at public universities, and

Proposition 227, which sought to terminate bilingual education programs in public schools. Existing political science literature suggests that, in response to this series of initiatives, Latinos increasingly engaged in a wide range of civic participation, from mass protests to increased naturalizations rates and even higher voter turnout in some elections

(Pantoja et al. 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Ramakrishnan 2005).

At the national level, by 1996, the immigration debate became more polarized along traditional party lines, with politicians publicly contesting what it meant to be

American. For instance, the Republican-led Congress debated English-only legislation, and the party’s platform that year included language seeking to strip the citizenship rights of children born to parents living illegally in the U.S. (Pear 1996). Moreover, a

Republican provision in that year’s welfare reform bill (the Personal Responsibility and

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, PL 104-193) drew on themes from California’s

Proposition 187 by imposing restrictions on benefits for illegal immigrants as well as non-naturalized legal immigrants.

After months of heated congressional debate, in September of that year, President

Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

(IIRAIRA, PL 104-208). The law included further restrictions on immigrant admissibility and asylum law, created new categories of “aliens unlawfully present,” 48

doubled border patrol over five years, tightened penalties on smugglers, and called for construction of a fence in the most heavily trafficked border areas. The final version of the bill did not include earlier, more controversial Republican provisions, including one that would have denied access to public education to the children of illegal immigrants, and another that sought to deport legal immigrants who utilized any type of public assistance for more than 12 months over a seven year period. Nevertheless, Republican advocacy of such provisions sparked the ire of the Latino community.

In response to the 1996 reforms and the hostile tone of the congressional debate, in October of that year, thousands of Hispanics joined in the Latino and Immigrants’

Rights March on Washington, DC. The protests were organized by the National

Coordinating Committee for Citizenship and Participation, also known as Coordinadora

96, which was a national network of organizations that initially emerged in response to

California’s Proposition 187. In addition to ending discrimination, the organization also sought protections for agricultural and domestic workers. The 1996 protest marked the first Latino march on Washington, and the largest grass-roots event of its kind (Milloy

1996). While the protest emerged in response to the recent legislative action, in line with the broader goals of Coordinadora ’96, participants advocated for a number of specific reforms including a minimum wage increase, maintenance of affirmative action programs, and an amnesty program for undocumented immigrants arriving in the US prior to 1992.

The event began with a march from Malcolm X Park down to the Ellipse, with marchers chanting in Spanish, “We are here; we’re not going away” (Constable 1996)

and “United, we will never be defeated” (Eisenstadt 1996). Protesters arrived from around the country, with crowd estimates ranging from 25,000 to 100,000 (Gonzalez

1996). Protesters carried a bright collection of flags, including Mexican, Salvadoran,

Cuban and American, and the rally began with a choir singing “the Star-Spangled

Banner” in Spanish. Participants ranged from long-time legal residents in the U.S. carrying American flags to more radical students carrying Mexican flags and even banners of the Mexican Zapatista rebel army (Constable 1996).

Many participants vocalized opposition to California Governor Pete Wilson and

House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) for their attacks on immigrant rights. Overall, however, protesters and speakers emphasized that Latinos must end intra-ethnic division and promote pan-ethnic unity (Holmes 1996). For instance, Congresswoman Nydia

Velazquez (D-NY) thanked Newt Gingrich and other conservatives in Congress for bringing Latinos together. Congressman Ed Pastor (D-AZ), President of the

Congressional Hispanic Caucus, highlighted the diversity of the crowd, listing off a long number of national origin groups present. Echoing that the vitriolic Congressional debate had united Latinos, Pastor emphasized that Latinos were one family, regardless of national origin, and invoked César Chávez with calls of “Sí Se Puede” (Yes, we can).

Talk show host Geraldo Rivera also delivered an emphatic speech. Alternating between

Spanish and English, Rivera told the crowd, “We have a choice, all of us, now: we can be part of 30 different minority groups, or we can be the largest minority group in the U.S. in the twenty-first century. What do you want? What do you want? Show our power.

Let them hear our voice” (CSPAN 1996; translation by the author).

The 1996 protests were notable for being the first major national Latino movement in Washington, D.C., the seat of the federal government. In social science terms, however, their emphasis followed a classic, predictable pattern. In the face of adversity, different national origin groups united and advocated for pan-ethnic strength.

Messages emphasized both unity and Latinos’ minority status. More recent Latino activism, however, demonstrates a shift away from this traditional story, moving from a message of difference back toward one of inclusion and similarity. This change in rhetoric culminated in the theme of the spring 2006 protests.

2000-Present: Failed Attempts at National Reform, “We are American”

When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, he emphasized the need to improve the U.S. relationship with Mexico; notably, his first international visit while in office was to see Mexican President Vicente Fox. However, any inertia behind the issue of immigration reform at the start of Bush’s term was stymied as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (McCabe and Meissner 2010). In response to these attacks, the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for immigration issues was transformed.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service, which had overseen immigration law and enforcement under the auspices of the Department of Justice since 1941, was dissolved, and authority for immigration issues was transferred to the newly-formed Department of

Homeland Security (DHS). On the legislative front, laws were passed in an attempt to fight terrorism, but often affected the foreign-born in the U.S. as well. For instance, the controversial Patriot Act, signed into law a month after the attacks, includes provisions that allow for the search, monitoring, detention and deportation of suspected terrorists,

and gives the government the right to detain foreign nationals for up to seven days while deciding whether to file charges against them (McCabe and Meissner 2010).8 That Act and subsequent legislation also tightened control at international borders.

On January 7, 2004, President Bush returned to the issue of comprehensive immigration reform in a major speech in which he asked Congress to create a temporary program for foreign guest workers and an estimated eight million unauthorized immigrants (Jachimowicz 2004). The proposal was designed to fix widely perceived gaps stemming from the 1986 reforms. In response to the President’s proposal, later that month, Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and then-Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D –

S.D.) introduced S. 2010, the Immigration Reform Act of 2004: Strengthening America’s

National Security, Economy and Families. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary

Committee, but did not advance beyond committee consideration.

In May 2005, the late Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and Senator John

McCain (R-AZ) introduced legislation for a comprehensive reform bill that, among other provisions, would allow for temporary visas for unskilled workers and proposed a “path to legalization,” through which undocumented workers could ultimately apply for legal status after paying a substantial fine (Patterson 2005). On December 6, 2005, the Border

Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (H.R. 4437) was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr.,

(R-WI), then Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. This legislation had a number of key provisions, including increased penalties for illegal immigration; expanded

8 For additional discussion of the Patriot Act, controversy over the legislation, and the law’s impact on U.S. immigration policy, see Zolberg (2006). 52

construction of a nearly 700-mile fence along the US-Mexico border; increased cooperation between the Homeland Security Department and local law enforcement officials; and classification of unauthorized immigrants and anyone helping them enter or stay in the United States as felons. This final provision was particularly far-reaching, threatening anyone who aided undocumented immigrants in any way with criminal penalties and up to five years in prison.9 The broad scope of the legislation, and the wide range of people who would have been subject to punishment under its provisions, incited deep opposition across the Latino community.

In the House of Representatives, members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus,

Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus united to oppose the bill. 10 Members emphasized the need for comprehensive immigration reform, including border security and economic protections, as well as honoring the contributions of immigrants to our society. They argued that the pending legislation was not the right course of action, nor would it address the country’s most urgent problems. While Latino identity was not addressed per se, several Members of the

Hispanic Caucus invoked ideas about American values, and the far-reaching implications of the legislation’s punitive measures in defining America as a nation during the floor debate. For instance, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) argued, “Our great nation serves as a model for democracy, fairness, and the rule of law. Unfortunately, this

9 While not included in the final version of the bill, Republicans in the House of Representatives, led by Tom Tancredo (R-CO), also sought to include a provision that would have ended the right of “birthright citizenship” to the children of undocumented immigrants, which is currently guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 10 The Congressional Hispanic Caucus was founded in the 1970s as a bipartisan organization, but currently represents only Latino Democrats. Following a dispute over Cuba policy, Republican members left the Caucus in the late 1990s. The Congressional Hispanic Conference was founded as a Republican counterpoint to the Caucus in 2003. 53

bill takes us away from these ideals upon which our nation was founded” (Roybal-Allard

2006). No Members of the Hispanic Conference spoke about the bill during the floor debate.

The Sensenbrenner bill passed on December 16, 2005, just ten days after it was introduced, by a vote of 239-182. The final vote was not strictly on party lines with 36

Democrats crossing over to support the legislation and 17 Republicans voting in opposition. Nearly all Members of the Hispanic Caucus opposed the bill, while the

Hispanic Conference was more divided.11

As the time approached for Senate consideration of immigration reform, hundreds of Latino leaders and activists convened in Riverside, California in February 2006 to coordinate action against the legislation (Bloemraad et al. 2011). By the time the Senate moved to consider its version of immigration legislation in the spring of 2006, a prolonged series of protests was underway, quickly catapulting across the United States.12

In all, somewhere between 3.5 and 5.1 million people, many of Latino descent, took to the streets to protest the harsh provisions enshrined in H.R. 4437 (Bloemraad and Trost

2008; Barreto et al. 2009).

The protest movement began on the east coast, with three early demonstrations in

February of 2006 (for a chronology of the protests, including location, date, crowd estimates, and location, see Appendix A, Table 2). By March, the movement started to

11 The exception in the Hispanic Caucus was Rep. Napolitano (D-CA), who did not vote on the legislation. In the Hispanic Conference, Cuban Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) and Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL) opposed the legislation, while Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL) did not vote and Henry Banilla (R-TX) supported H.R. 4437. 12 In contrast to the House bill, the Senate considered bipartisan reform legislation, S.2611, the Comprehensive Immigration and Reform Act. The legislation was advanced by Senator John McCain (R- AZ) and the late Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), and passed by a vote of 62-36. 54

grow in earnest; according to a database of protests compiled by Bada et al. (2006 ) from newspaper accounts, nearly 70 protests took place that month alone. One early, well- attended gathering in Chicago had an estimated 100,000-300,000 participants, while attendance estimates at a Los Angeles protest on March 25 ranged from 200,000 to one million (Félix et al. 2008).

Across the U.S., a National Day of Action was planned for Monday, April 10, coinciding with the Congressional recess so that Members of Congress would observe their constituents’ rallies. Beginning on Sunday, April 9, and continuing through the next day, rallies occurred in an estimated 120-140 cities (Pineda and Sowards 2007). These events marked an “unprecedented” mobilization of immigrants (Cordero-Guzman et al.

2008, p 601; Pantoja et al. 2008). The final large day of coordinated action occurred on

May 1, where an estimated 70 protests spanned across the U.S., from Anchorage, Alaska to Boston, Massachusetts. As part of the “Day Without Immigrants” demonstrations, participants skipped work and school and vowed not to make any purchases for 24 hours.

The selection of “May Day,” or International Workers’ Day, was designed to draw attention to both immigrant rights and workers’ rights issues (Heiskanen 2009).

Figure 2.1, below, maps the development of the protests in March, April, and

May, by the percentage of Latinos residing in a given county. As the maps reflect, in

March, demonstrations were generally concentrated in areas with high Latino populations. By April, the protests spread across the U.S., and reached even areas where the proportion of Latinos was quite low. Indeed, the extensive reach of the demonstrations were illustrative of the growing geographic diversity of Latino

immigrants, with migrants increasingly locating in new “host” communities across the

U.S. (Massey 2008; Bloemraad et al. 2011). As Benjamin-Alvarado et al. (2009) point out, involvement in the Spring 2006 immigration protests spread far beyond traditional immigration centers, with Latinos residing in new immigrant destinations equally as likely to participate as those in more established communities. By May, the protests began to taper off, with the distribution of events resembling March more than April.

Figure 2.1

Note: Size estimates are calculated using the average number from newspaper accounts. In cases where multiple protests occurred in the same month, size estimates are based on the first protest in each city.

As the protests evolved, so did their message. While many March protests featured Mexican flags, or a combination of Mexican and American flags, by April organizers increasingly emphasized the theme of Latinos being American, urging participants to demonstrate their American-ness. The advancement of this theme, and the role of the media both in driving the protests and their discourse, will be discussed further below.

Media, Message, and the 2006 Protests

By all accounts, the collaboration between community-based organizations, the

Catholic church, and ethnic media is credited with the unexpectedly large turnout at the

2006 protests (Pineda and Sowards 2007; Félix et al. 2008; Barreto et al. 2009). In particular, media reports and academic literature alike identify two distinct roles for media sources in driving the events. On the one hand, ethnic media – and particularly,

Spanish language radio – actively recruited individuals to participate in the protests, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of listeners into the streets. On the other hand, mainstream media provided widespread information and coverage about the events themselves, often after the fact (Félix et al. 2008; Barreto et al. 2009; Rim 2009).

Likewise, a number of mainstream media accounts and critical editorials helped recast the theme of the protests, emphasizing American symbols and themes rather than Latino unity or cultural nationalism.

In general, Latinos listen to radio more than any other news source, and in recent years, Spanish radio stations have become increasingly pervasive, with nearly 700 stations across the country, more than double the amount from 15 years ago (Félix et al.

2008). By comparison, nationwide, there are three major Spanish-language networks, over 160 local Spanish television stations, and 60 cable stations. Additionally, there are over 700 daily and weekly newspapers in Spanish (Ayón 2006). Across the U.S., Spanish radio personalities played a key role in building popular support for the protests. In

Chicago, for instance, deejay Rafael Pulido (el Pistolero, or the Gunman), actively promoted the March 10 protest. Likewise, weeks before the Los Angeles protests, popular radio hosts such as Renán Almendárez Coello (El Cucuy) and Eduardo Sotelo (El

Piolín) enthusiastically promoted the events on air. In Los Angeles, Sotelo also spearheaded the formation of the March 25 Coalition, an organization of over a dozen rival deejays collaborating to mobilize Latinos for the March 25, 2006 protest in LA.

The coalition was credited with driving the unexpectedly large crowds at this event

(Watanabe and Becerra 2006), as well as subsequent protests across the country (Starr

2006).13

Social movement literature on framing argues that activists work to interpret and provide meaning to particular events, mobilizing others around ideas and prescribed actions (Snow and Benford 1988; Gamson 2004). Likewise, research on communications emphasizes the importance of framing, or the way that a message or reality is presented, in influencing ideas and attitudes, making some aspects more salient than others

(Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991; Entman 1993;

Popkin 1994). After the first weeks of the spring 2006 events, organizers undertook a

13 Even after the protests, key figures in Spanish radio continued to promote the goal of immigrant incorporation in the U.S. For instance, Coello initiated a Votos por America (Votes for America) campaign, which purports to have registered over one million Latinos to vote. Sotelo, working with the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) and other Spanish-language media outlets, declared his intention to become a U.S. citizen and encouraged others to naturalize as well (Félix et al. 2008). 58

conscious effort to reframe the message of the protests, emphasizing that Latinos were not some Hispanic “other,” but rather, another face of “America.”

From the beginning, the deejays in LA encouraged protesters to follow three rules: be peaceful, clean up after themselves, and bring American flags (Navarro 2006).

In an interview with the Los Angeles Times at the end of March, Sotelo explained, "We wanted them to show that we love this country. Bringing the U.S. flag, that was important. There are so many people who say, 'I'm glad my parents came here and sacrificed like they did for us’” (Watanabe and Becerra 2006). Despite this purported emphasis, however, the early protests were strongly criticized for their vast display of

Mexican flags (see, for instance, Epstein and Sterngold 2006; Hendricks and Garofoli

2006). Indeed, following the March 25 protest in Los Angeles, an OpEd in the San

Francisco Chronicle called on demonstrators to “Forget the Mexican Flags” (Navarrette

2006); a similar message was echoed in the editorial pages of the New York Times, the

Omaha World-Herald, and beyond ("The Power of Symbols" 2006; Chavez 2006; Pineda and Sowards 2007). Likewise, at a March 25 demonstration in Denver, Colorado, protesters brought both Mexican and American flags, carrying signs in both languages.

Following the protest, opponents portrayed marchers as “anti-American.” After these early protests, both locally and nationally, organizers realized they needed to retool their message for subsequent events (Martinez 2011).

In April, by the time the wave of mass protests began in earnest, organizers had refined their framing. In language that paralleled the efforts of LULAC a century before, marchers were now instructed to emphasize being American, underscoring their loyalty

to the United States. Two mantras, repeated at events across the U.S., highlighted this new theme: “We Are America” and “Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote.” As hundreds of thousands of protesters assembled throughout the country, organizers distributed American flags to participants, asking them to leave their Mexican flags at home. In Washington, D.C., for instance, during a rally that lasted over three hours, protesters were guided in the pronunciation of the “Pledge of Allegiance” and repeatedly chanted, “U.S.A., U.S.A” (Epstein and Sterngold 2006).

This message continued at the May 1 “Day Without Immigrants” events, referred to by many deejays as the “Great American Boycott” (Félix et al. 2008). At one rally in

Los Angeles, for instance, Cardinal Roger Mahony asked those carrying flags from other countries to roll them up, so that only American flags were visible (Chander 2007).

Indeed, as Bloemraad and colleagues assert, the most successful frames of the marches emphasized core American values, family and work, while appeals emphasizing pride in one’s country-of-origin or even human rights issues were widely perceived to be too

“foreign” (2011, p 31). As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate, this reframing had unexpected impacts on certain segments of the Latino population. Indeed, for some community members, the messages and images from the protests were internalized, transforming their views on what it means to be American and whether or not they themselves fall into that category.

Unfortunately, aside from crowd estimates at specific events, no reliable data exists on the percentage of the Latino population that attended the 2006 events or the demography of attendees. One rough estimate is derived from data from two Latino

Policy Coalition (LPC) surveys fielded in April and June 2006, which was limited to U.S. citizens. Drawing on these surveys, Barreto et al. report that an estimated 10% of those interviewed say they participated in the protests, while an additional 16% indicated family members or close friends participated (Barreto et al. 2009). Barreto et al. argue that this expanded categorization is important because many individuals may have supported the goals of the protests without actually attending the events; for instance, particularly when protests took place on a workday, a household may have decided that one person would attend and not another. Clearly, however, the reach of the protests and their message resonated far beyond the number of actual participants.

In helping to mobilize millions of Latinos into the streets against H.R. 4437, ethnic media sources – and particularly Spanish-language deejays – acted in an influential capacity far beyond the traditional role described in existing political science research.

Yet, existing literature helps to begin to understand the larger role of the media, as well as the interactive relationship between the media, public policy, and activists. Early research on political communication emphasizes the importance of pre-existing attitudes and experiences as a lens for interpreting new information. For instance, Berelson et al.

(1956) find that rather than providing voters with new knowledge, campaign advertisements instead activate individuals’ previous beliefs or opinions. Zaller (1992) argues that individuals assimilate new information and align their attitudes based on longstanding predispositions. Other research points to the importance of agenda-setting, priming, and framing effects, which draw on an individual’s existing predispositions to shape attitudes (Iyengar 1991; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Kinder and Sanders

1990). Importantly, this literature emphasizes pre-existing dispositions, which suggests

that individuals with different backgrounds will interpret media messages differently, within the context of their own experience.

Moreover, existing scholarship contends that highly salient events can result in attitude crystallization (Valentino and Sears 1998). Further, research suggests that attitude transformation may involve a combination of mass media and communication with others. For instance, the interactional model of socialization contends that the news media provides raw political information, which subsequently drives interpersonal discussion, resulting in the formation of attitudes (Atkin 1972; Kuo 1985). As this literature suggests, while the protests demonstrated the ability of the Spanish-language media to mobilize Latinos in the streets, the power of the “We are American” message may extend far beyond participation in a protest.

Chapter 1 outlined arguments regarding immigrant socialization and the different legal experiences of Latino subgroups. Likewise, I posit that the framing efforts of 2006 had a distinct impact on those subgroups of the Latino population most affected by the immigration debate. Collectively, the literature on media and framing discussed above suggests that strategic framing undertaken by leaders of a social movement may have more far-reaching effects on participants, and that effects may not be limited to a movement’s membership alone. Rather, a combination of strategic messaging by protest organizers and the dissemination of that message by both the ethnic and the mainstream media has the power to shape broader ideas and attitudes.

As I argue in subsequent chapters, the interaction between public policy, social movements, and the media coincided in some cases to shape an individual’s sense of self, as well as perceptions of what it means to be American. Existing literature also finds that

group-based appeals should be most effective among less incorporated segments of the

Latino population (Holmes 1996; García Bedolla 2005; Espino et al. 2007; Abrajano

2010). Chapters 3 and 4 support this claim, finding that for certain segments of the

Latino population, the protests altered individuals’ very sense of what it means to be

American, as well as their own self-identification.

Conclusion

As this chapter illustrates, Latino activism and framing has travelled a circuitous, and ultimately circular, path. In the early twentieth century, activists fought discrimination by emphasizing similarity with other Americans. This movement, however, was limited in both scope and demography, representing primarily middle class

Mexicans who were themselves highly incorporated into life in the U.S. and often sought to distance themselves from newer arrivals.

Over time, and in response to the politics of the day, by the 1960s, the message shifted to one of cultural difference, spearheaded by the Chicano and Puerto Rican

Nationalist movements. By the 1990s, in response to a contentious immigration debate, movement organizers embraced a pan-ethnic identity with calls for Latino Unity. This approach fulfilled the traditional expectations of political science literature, which suggests that a pan-ethnic identity will develop in circumstances where it is politically advantageous.

However, the events of spring 2006 defy this expectation. Indeed, when millions of people took to the streets to protest immigration reform, the framing returned once again to incorporation. Latino activists and Spanish language radio personalities

emphasized that Latinos are among the many faces of America, and highlighted core

“American” values of family and hard work. In contrast to previous Latino social movements, the demands of the protesters in 2006 had also expanded. This time, activists were fighting for the rights of undocumented immigrants rather than established citizens. The effects of this new framing will be the subject of future chapters.

CHAPTER 3

Defining American: Latino Identification, Political Socialization, and Protest Politics

As the previous chapter demonstrates, over time, Latino movements and their leadership have framed the community’s identity in different ways. Early activists emphasized an assimilationist approach, while later movements worked to portray

Latinos as a distinct “other.” More recently, in an attempt to avert an anti-immigrant backlash, elites deliberately sought to frame the 2006 immigration protests by highlighting that Latinos are also American.

But what does being American actually mean for the Latino community? Do

Latinos define “American” in the same way as Whites and African Americans? Is this definition consistent across Latino subgroups? And, did the strategic framing of the 2006 protests change the way Latinos understand what it means to be American? This chapter will address these questions in turn, focusing on an ascriptive definition of American.

Defining American

Identity scholars frequently study the “content,” or meaning, of a collective identity. Emphasizing that this meaning is not fixed, this scholarship also highlights the ongoing process of social contestation through which an identity’s content can shift.

Such contestation may include, for instance, whether the boundaries of a category are determined by innate characteristics, as well as how exclusive an identity may be

(Abdelal et al. 2009).

Throughout history, both scholarship and public discourse have emphasized two competing myths about what it means to be American. These myths highlight distinct identity contents, one ideological, and the other ascriptive. First, from the Founding

Fathers to the present day, an American identity has been contested on ideological grounds emphasizing equality of opportunities. One early observer of life in the United

States, Alexis de Tocqueville, famously observed that, “Americans were born equal without having to become so” (Tocqueville [1848] 1969 ). Discussions of liberalism

(Hartz 1950), the American dream (Hochschild 1995), individualism (Morone 1990), and the American creed (Huntington 1981) all emphasize the centrality of ideological pursuits to the character of America. This body of scholarship defines American in terms of ideas and ideals to which all can aspire.

Yet, over time, contestation over ascriptive definitions of American have also persisted. As Citrin et al. (1990) point out, particularly during periods of demographic and other change, “nativists” frequently seek to redefine what it means to be American based on religious, racial, and other restrictive grounds (see also Higham 1988).

Referring to such descriptors as ethnocultural Americanism, Smith (1988) argues that throughout time, these factors have been even more decisive in shaping U.S. immigration policy than liberal ideas. In a provocative article and subsequent book, Samuel

Huntington (2004a; 2004b) exemplifies this trend. Huntington asserts that early settlers initially defined America with their own ascriptive characteristics: primarily white,

English-speaking, and Christian. He argues that the modern-day influx of Latino immigrants threatens these key aspects of American culture, through the persistence of

Spanish rather than English and the potential departure from an “Anglo” society. 66

A substantial body of research exists on the ways that the Anglo majority defines

American. This research shows that perceptions of American as an open or closed group are closely connected to positions on public policy (Citrin et al. 1990; Citrin et al. 2001;

Schildkraut 2005a) as well as political knowledge and participation (Huddy and Khatib

2007). Drawing on this research, we can infer that for immigrant groups, how individuals define American is likely to relate to political learning and socialization; the acquisition of new identities in a host society; and importantly, the extent to which newcomers feel able to integrate into U.S. society. For instance, an ideological definition of American, such as the pursuit of equal opportunities, may be open to everyone who shares these beliefs. In contrast, the very nature of ascriptive categories, such as being born in the U.S. or being white, suggest that they may be closed to many newcomers.

Despite these implications, however, extant literature contains few studies that explore the views of immigrant groups regarding what it means to be American. In large part, this gap in the literature may be a consequence of limited data; the General Social

Survey, for instance, did not begin to target large numbers of Spanish-speakers until

2006. One notable exception, by Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001), uses data from the 1994 and 1995 Los Angeles County Social Surveys to study the perceptions of Asians and

Latinos in the LA metropolitan area. But, a widespread perspective on the perceived content of an American identity within immigrant communities is lacking.

Fortunately, the large sample size of the Latino National Survey (2006) and the diversity of respondents in the survey facilitates a broader examination of what it means to be American for different subsets of the Latino population. Specifically, questions in

the survey regarding the importance of ascriptive characteristics enable an assessment of

Latino perceptions regarding the boundaries of American society.

Focusing on Latinos, in this chapter I study four distinct ascriptive features commonly associated with being American: race, religion, language, and birthplace. In comparison to ideological definitions of American, beliefs surrounding ascriptive categories are more likely to be consequential in terms of individual self-identification.

For instance, if a Spanish-speaking immigrant born outside the U.S. believes that an

American must be born on U.S. soil and speak fluent English, he may be less likely to aspire to an American identity or think that he is able to incorporate fully in the U.S.

This limited focus is also a practical matter; while an analysis using both ascriptive and ideological definitions of American would have been ideal, unfortunately, existing data do not lend themselves to the study of American as an ideological category. Nevertheless, this limited analysis is useful in further developing our understanding of the process of identity formation.

Much of the existing political science literature on identity draws on psychology’s social identity theory, which emphasizes the process by which individuals distinguish their own in-group from a larger out-group (see, for instance, Tajfel 1970; Brewer 2003).

According to this theory, in cases where groups are assigned or group membership is assumed, individuals tend to favor their own in-group. This postulate holds true even under minimal conditions of similarity, such as when respondents are assigned into specific groups for role-playing exercises (see, for instance, Zimbardo et al. 2000).

Social identity theory provides tremendous insight in cases where identities may be “primordial,” assigned, or otherwise clearly established, but is far less successful in explaining the acquisition of new identities (Huddy 2001). I argue that a better understanding of the process by which individuals assume new identities is essential for improving our understanding of immigrant integration into host societies. Specifically, through multivariate analysis, I examine the role of political socialization, political events, and gender in this process, underscoring the diversity within the Latino population.

As McClain et al. (2009) explain, group membership can refer both to how one describes oneself as well as to ascriptive characteristics that shape the way others might categorize people. Scholars of self-categorization emphasize the importance of a

“prototype” group member, real or imagined, who exhibits a range of attributes or characteristics common to the group. Perceived proximity to this prototypical person helps to determine whether or not one self-categorizes as a member of that group (Lakoff

1987; Turner et al. 1987). This theory suggests that the more minorities perceive

American to be defined as a closed group, characterized by certain ascriptive features, the less likely they are to feel that they may be included in this category. In other words, the perceived strength of group boundaries can play an important role in determining one’s own self-identification and sense of belonging. Indeed, Golash-Boza (2006) argues that foreignness associated with Latinos can prevent them from developing an identity as

American. Similarly, in a study of East German residents, Kessler, Klink and Mielke

(1999) find stronger East German identities among respondents who believe it is more

difficult to pass as West German. Conversely, they find stronger German identities among those who think the categorical boundaries are less restrictive.

Yet, these connections do not explain the underlying mechanisms that help to determine varied perceptions regarding the content and boundaries of group membership.

In this chapter, I seek to contribute to this knowledge with a focus on the heterogeneous

Latino population in the United States. Drawing on literature regarding political socialization and political learning, I hypothesize that country-of-origin/ ancestry and gender help to shape whether certain Latinos perceive American to be an open category that they are able to join, or a closed one from which they are excluded.

Some self-categorization researchers also suggest that categories themselves may change across social settings, resulting in the formation of temporary prototypes (Huddy

2001). Given the strategic framing of the 2006 protests described in Chapter 2, I further hypothesize that these highly polarized political events may shift Latinos’ perceived boundaries of what it means to be American. I also introduce a quasi-experimental research design to examine the role of events in shaping one’s perceptions of group boundaries. Accordingly, I evaluate whether Latino perspectives on what it means to be

American change before and after the 2006 immigration marches. Chapter 4 will further elaborate on this research design.

General Perspectives on Defining American: GSS Baseline

I begin by situating Latino perspectives on what it means to be American within the broader context of the general population. To do so, I utilize data from the General

Social Survey (GSS, 2004). A long-standing national survey, the GSS interviews two national samples of an estimated 1500 people on a biannual basis. Because the 2006

version of this study did not include the relevant questions regarding ascriptive definitions of American, I use data from the 2004 GSS, which included questions regarding the importance of birthplace, religion and language to being American.

Specifically, respondents were asked, “Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is…..?” Respondents were then given a number of characteristics, including: to be a Christian; to have been born in America; and to be able to speak English. Race was not included among the list of ascriptive characteristics on the GSS.14 This data allows for comparison between a large population of whites and a smaller sample of African Americans and English-speaking Latinos.15

Given the limited Latino sample in the GSS, I also include data from the Latino

National Survey (LNS , 2006) in order to compare with a broader sample of Latinos The

LNS, a major national survey of the U.S. Latino population, is a dataset that is used extensively throughout this dissertation. The LNS was conducted in two parts. The first phase of data collection ranged from November 2005 through August 2006, including a total of 8,634 respondents across fifteen states and the Washington, DC metropolitan area, while the subsequent round contained 1,200 respondents from Connecticut,

Massachusetts and Rhode Island interviewed the following summer.16 Surveying for the

14 Race and ethnicity were treated as separate categories in the GSS. Consequently, respondents could identify as both white/black/other, and Latino. Reported race of Latino respondents in the survey is as follows: 61% white, 4% black, 35% other. While LNS respondents did not report race, they were asked questions about both ethnicity and skin color. In contrast to the LNS, where respondents were given 3 response categories, GSS responses options were: 1 (very important); 2 (fairly important); 3 (not very important); and 4 (not important at all). To facilitate comparability between the datasets, categories 3 and 4 are combined here into one “not important” category. 15 Unfortunately, the question was not repeated on the 2006 GSS, which, for the first time, specifically targeted the Spanish-speaking population. 16 Principal investigators for Phase One of the survey include Luis Fraga, John Garcia, Rodney Hero, Michael Jones-Correa, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Gary Segura. Principal investigators for Phase Two 71

LNS was conducted by phone through Geoscape, a private marketing company. The survey was conducted using spatial stratified random sampling, and contains approximately 165 distinct questions on a range of demographic, political, and social issues.

LNS respondents were asked, “When you think of what it means to be fully

American in the eyes of most Americans, do you think it is very important, somewhat important, or not important to: Have been born in the United States? To speak English well? To be White? To be Christian?” The language of the LNS question is less straightforward than the GSS, encompassing both individual opinions and perceptions of others. Yet, as McClain and her colleagues (2009) suggest, a combination of these factors is likely to be important in shaping perceptions of identity boundaries. This question captures both of these aspects.

The following table presents a comparison of responses from the GSS (2004) and the LNS (2006). As the table illustrates, using raw data from both surveys, Latino respondents in both surveys place even more importance on speaking English than

Whites. These numbers seem to defy Huntington’s (2004a; 2004b) fears that Latinos in the U.S. do not wish to learn English. With respect to being a Christian, Latinos are less likely to think this attribute is “very important” than other groups. However, across both surveys, a similar minority of White and Latino respondents think Christianity is not important for being defined as American. Perhaps most striking in this category is the very high percentage of African Americans emphasizing the importance of Christianity.

include Evelyn Hu-Dehart, Matthew Garcia, Cynthia Garcia Coll, Jose Itzigsohn, Marion Orr, Tony Affigne, and Jorge Elorza. The fifteen states included in Phase One of the survey are: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, California, Colorado, the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, Washington state. 72

Table 3.1. GSS and LNS Responses, Ascriptive Characteristics of Being American

Ascriptive GSS, Whites GSS, Blacks GSS, Latinos LNS Characteristic

Speak English N=971 N=164 N=112 N=9834

Very Important 82.2% 90.2% 90.2% 85.0%

Somewhat/ Fairly 14.5% 7.9% 8.0% 11.0% Important

Not Important 3.3% 1.8% 1.8% 4.0%

Christian N=948 N=159 N=104 N=9834

Very Important 47.3% 75.5% 35.6% 42.2%

Somewhat/ Fairly 17.2% 6.9% 26.0% 21.9% Important

Not Important 35.6% 17.6% 38.5% 35.9%

Born in U.S. N=961 N=157 N=107 N=9834

Very Important 55.9% 70.1% 60.8% 44.84%

Somewhat/ Fairly 22.0% 12.7% 24.3% 25.16% Important

Not Important 22.1% 17.2% 14.9% 30.0%

White N=9834

Very Important 19.1%

Somewhat/ Fairly 18.9% Important

Not Important 62.0%

Note: In the GSS, respondents were given 4 options (very important, fairly important, not very important, not important at all) while in the LNS, respondents were given 3 choices (very important, somewhat important, and not very important). In the table above, the GSS categories “not very important” and “not important at all” have been combined to facilitate comparability between the datasets.

Finally, with respect to birthplace, looking only at the GSS data, African

American respondents are most likely to emphasize the importance of being born in the

U.S., followed by Latinos and then Whites. Comparing Latino respondents across the

surveys, respondents in the LNS place far less emphasis on birthplace. This difference

may, in part, stem from the large number of respondents in the LNS who were born outside the U.S (64.6%), compared to the GSS (30.5%); in reality, the Latino population falls somewhere in between these numbers, with 53% of all Hispanic adults born outside the U.S. (Lopez and Taylor 2010). 17 With the exception of the birthplace question in the

LNS, however, Latino and white respondents overall demonstrate similar perspectives on what it means to be American. Indeed, in most cases, Latino and white perceptions of the boundaries of American tend to be closer to each other than to the views of African

Americans.

Divergent Pasts, Convergent Presents?

Returning to a major theme of this dissertation, the first two hypotheses tested in this chapter underscore the diversity of experience embodied within the Latino community. As described in Chapter 1, depending on one’s ancestral origin group, a given Latino immigrant is likely to have had vastly different historical experiences prior to arrival in the U.S. Further, some subgroups have since developed distinct legal and political relationships with the U.S. government, guided largely by federal immigration policy.

Traditional literature on political socialization emphasizes the ways in which citizenship, party membership, and political participation develop in the United States, with many scholars arguing that children acquire political ideas at a young age from their parents (see Sapiro 2004 for a full review of this literature). For immigrant populations, scholarship increasingly incorporates behavior in one’s home country as an independent

17 The GSS question on birthplace is dichotomous, asking respondents whether or not they were born in this country, while the LNS includes Puerto Rico as a separate, third category. Because those born in Puerto Rico also have birthright citizenship, the above statistic includes those born in Puerto Rico as born in the U.S. 74

variable, focusing on transnational activities and, to the extent possible, political behavior prior to arrival in the U.S. (Jones-Correa 1998a; Ramakrishnan 2005). Moreover, looking specifically at variation among immigrants from Mexico, Jones-Correa and

Andalon (2008) suggest that contextual variables in one’s sending country may be relevant in explaining an immigrant’s current political behavior and attitudes toward government in the U.S.

Likewise, scholarship on political learning argues that an individual’s experience with the government shapes his or her perspective on both governance and citizenship.

From welfare recipients in the United States (Soss 1999) to peasants in India (Corbridge et al. 2005) to the incarceration of young African American men (Weaver and Lerman

2010), researchers in this tradition emphasize that one’s interaction with state institutions contribute to an individual’s most fundamental sense of what citizenship means.

Drawing on these traditions, I suggest that an immigrant’s country-of-origin may help to shape not only his political behavior in the United States, but his very attitudes and ideas about what it means to be American. Theiss-Morse (2009) finds that among the general population, those who most strongly identify as American have the most restrictive views about what being American means. I suggest that for immigrant communities, the construction of an American identity may work in the opposite direction, with those who are least likely to feel American, including members of subgroups that have had less welcoming experiences in the U.S., placing the most importance on ascriptive categories.

Specifically, the political socialization hypothesis anticipates that variance in

U.S. policy toward different Latino subgroups as well as varied Latino experiences are 75

likely to result in distinct perceptions of what it means to be American. As described in

Chapter 1, due to their special circumstances, I hypothesize that both Puerto Ricans and

Cubans will have more open attitudes about what it means to be American. At the other end of the spectrum, Salvadoran immigrants have had a particularly negative experience with the U.S., shaped in part by U.S. involvement in that nation’s bloody civil war.

Wood (2003) argues that the shift in political identities caused by this brutal conflict are likely to persist over time and space; an extension of this theory suggests that

Salvadorans are likely to have a more negative collective view of the U.S. than their

Latino counterparts. I hypothesize that this view will translate into a more restrictive perception of what it means to be American.

In addition to disaggregating by country of origin or ancestry, literature on intersectionality emphasizes the compounding effects that multiple disadvantages, such as race/ ethnicity and gender, may have on individuals’ experiences (Crenshaw 1989;

Hancock 2007a). Similarly, existing research on immigrant incorporation and politics emphasizes the different experiences of Latino men and women (Hardy-Fanta 1993;

Jones-Correa 1998b; Jaramillo 2010), and indicates that Latinas are far less likely than

Latinos to self-identify as American (Golash-Boza 2006; Silber Mohamed 2010).

Building on this research, the intersectionality hypothesis anticipates that Latino men and women will have differing perceptions of what it means to be American, with women more likely to define American in ascriptive terms.

Political Events and Identity: A Quasi-Experiment

In addition to the hypotheses outlined above, in order to examine the effects of the

2006 protests on respondents’ understanding of what it means to be American, I build on

a tradition of research in psychology and economics by employing a quasi-experimental research design (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Cook and Campbell 1986; Meyer 1995;

Shadish et al. 2001). This approach takes advantage of the coincidence between data collection for Phase One of the LNS, which occurred between November 2005 and

August 2006, and the wave of immigration protests traversing the country between

March and May 2006. To do so, I use a simple pre-post research design, treating the protests as quasi-experimental stimuli (Campbell and Stanley 1963).

As outlined in Chapter 2, event organizers and Latino elites made a concerted effort to frame these protests around the theme of Latinos as American. Given this emphasis, I test the political events hypothesis, which predicts that respondents’ perceptions of what it means to be American are likely to become more inclusive after the massive protests of that spring. In other words, I expect that respondents interviewed following the protests are less likely to emphasize ascriptive categories.

Data and Methods

Previous research suggests that the use of a pan-ethnic Latino/ Hispanic identifier was slow to catch on across the Latino population. Drawing on data from the 1989-90

Latino National Political Survey, for example, Stokes (2003) reports that only one in four

Latinos prefer pan-ethnic identifiers, and a majority prefer references to their specific nationality. However, more recent surveys indicate that across subgroups, identification with both a national origin subgroup and a pan-ethnic identifier are now quite high. For instance, in responses to a range of questions regarding self-identification in the Latino

National Survey (2006), an estimated 87% of respondents “strongly” or “very strongly” identify with their country-of-origin, compared to 90% with a Latino/ Hispanic identifier.

Significant variation exists, however, in the extent to which members of different ancestral origin groups self-describe as American (see Figure 3.1). I suggest that despite the high levels of self-identification as Latino, this variation in identification underscores divisions among the broader Hispanic community regarding their standing in the U.S.

Figure 3.1 American Self-Identification (Percentages) by Country-of-Origin

Source: Latino National Survey (LNS, 2006)

As the figure reflects, and the political socialization hypothesis might anticipate, Cubans and Puerto Ricans are most likely to identify as American, while Salvadorans are the least likely to identify as such.

To explore the hypotheses outlined above, using data from the LNS, this chapter focuses on the five largest Latino-origin subgroups in the United States: Cubans,

Dominicans, Salvadorans, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. 18 Overall, these groups

18 Following initial data collection, each respondent was assigned three weights: national, state, and urban/ rural. These weights were subsequently revised in March, 2010. Bivariate analyses below use raw data, while the multivariate analysis employs the revised, nationally-weighted figures, which attempt to make the survey more representative of the Latino population in all 50 states. Because the New England data is not 78

represent more than 80% of the Latino population currently living in the United States

(US Census 2010). Within the LNS, each group has a minimum of 400 respondents, allowing for a close study of variation within these subgroups. The first two hypotheses are tested below using data from both phases of the LNS. Given the coincidence between

Phase One of the LNS and the spring 2006 protests, for the models related specifically to the protests, the sample is limited only to those included in the first phase of data collection. As such, the political events hypothesis will be discussed separately.

To address Latino views about the ascriptive side of American identity, I examine responses to a series of questions that gauge where individuals think the boundaries of

American group membership may lie. The analysis focuses specifically on 4 ascriptive characteristics: being born in the U.S.; speaking English; being white; and being

Christian. Responses range from 1 (not important) to 3 (very important).

As mentioned above, given the ambiguous phrasing of the survey question, respondents may be referring to their own definition of American as well as to perceptions of discrimination or attitudes of others. Nevertheless, identity is thought to include both self-perception and the perceptions of others, both of which are captured by this question (McClain et al. 2009). Additionally, these four characteristics represent classic ascriptive views on who is included in the category of American (see Theiss-

Morse 2009). For instance, as Theiss-Morse (2009) explains, from John Jay to Joseph

McCarthy to John McCain, political leaders throughout American history have repeated assertions that the U.S. is a Christian nation. Likewise, over time, many have argued that

included in the weights, the majority of analyses above use the original, unweighted data. Because the models focusing specifically on the 2006 immigration marches are limited to data from Phase One of the survey, the revised weights are utilized in this section. 79

America is defined by the English language; for instance, much of Huntington’s (2004a;

2004b) discussion of the “Hispanic Challenge” revolves around the fear that Latinos seek to make Spanish the second official language of the United States. With respect to race, as Itzigsohn (2009) describes, the interaction between race and ethnicity on migrants to the United States can be complex, as the traditional racial categories of newcomers often do not align with their experiences in U.S. society (see also Rodriguez 2000; Itzigsohn et al. 2005). LNS responses provide a unique opportunity to more accurately understand

Latino perspectives on these topics.

Independent Variables. To test the political socialization hypotheses, dummy variables are used for subnational groups, with Mexicans as the reference category because they are by far the largest subgroup represented both in the survey and the overall Latino population in the U.S. Given the large and historic Mexican immigrant population in the United States, research on Latino politics in the discipline frequently focuses on Mexicans. Using this group as the reference category allows us to test whether the broader Latino population has a comparable perception of what it means to be American. To test the intersectionality hypothesis, a dummy variable is included for women.

In addition to the hypotheses outlined above, I expect a number of other variables will contribute to whether or not respondents think the boundaries of American society are permeable. As García Bedolla (2005) and Lavariega Monforti and Sanchez (2010) report, later generations of immigrants, those who speak English, and those who have lived in the United States for a significant period of time are more likely to distance themselves from other Latinos and integrate into broader U.S. society. Accordingly, I

anticipate that immigrants who are more incorporated in the United States will have a more open perception of how American is defined. In contrast, I anticipate that respondents who are less integrated into American society, and more likely to see their fate as closely linked to that of other Latinos, will have a more restricted definition of

American.

Latinos are the youngest minority population in the U.S., with a median age of 27, compared to 41 for the white population (Pew Hispanic Center 2009). Existing research in Latino politics finds that older respondents are more likely to self-identify as

American, suggesting a positive relationship between age and incorporation into

American society (Schildkraut 2005b). However, a recent report on Latino youth in the

U.S. (ages 16-25) finds that self-identification within this population is strongly related to an individual’s parental socialization experience, including whether parents encourage their child to speak Spanish at home (Pew Hispanic Center 2009). While conventional wisdom might suggest that a younger respondent would be more open-minded about the boundaries of identity categories, this research suggests that the age variable may also be contingent on other factors.

To measure immigrant generation, respondents are divided into three categories of dummy variables: the non-native population, defined here as those born outside of the

50 U.S. states and Puerto Rico; first generation, who were born in the U.S., but both parents were born elsewhere; and second generation and above, who have at least one parent born in the U.S. In general, I anticipate that respondents who are more integrated into American society are more likely to see American as a permeable category.

The models below also include other variables that may be indicative of immigrant incorporation. For instance, two measures of socioeconomic status are included: a continuous measure of years of education as well as a continuous measure of income, which is separated into three categories: below $25,000, $25-45,000, and above

$45,000.19 Additionally, dummy variables are included for a respondent’s language preference, based on the language of the interview, as well as for new arrivals, referring to those who have been in the U.S. for less than 5 years. Finally, drawing on literature from African American politics, I employ the concept of “linked fate,” a phenomena whereby individuals perceive their interests to be connected to other members of the same in-group (Dawson 1994). I anticipate that respondents who have a high sense of linked fate with other Latinos will have a more restricted definition of American. To measure how much respondents believe their fate is linked to other Latinos, a variable is included from the LNS, scaled from 1 (nothing) to 4 (a lot).

I also anticipate that one’s own characteristics are likely to affect responses, particularly on the questions relating to religion and race. Thus, control variables are used for skin color (measured 1-5, with 1 being very dark and 5 being very light) and religiosity, measured by attendance at religious services (from 1-5, with 1 being more than once a week and 5 being never). Both of these measures are self-reported.

Additionally, a continuous variable is used for age, measured by decade (1 = respondents

19 Because of the large number of respondents who did not answer the income question, following Michelson and Lavariega Monforti, I use an imputation of income for respondents with missing data. For a full discussion of this imputation, see Michelson and Lavariega Monforti (2009). 82

19 and under; 2 = respondents 20-29, etc), with the expectation that younger respondents will have the most open perspective on what it means to be American.20

Existing scholarship also emphasizes the importance of geography on political behavior (Huckfeldt 1996; Tam Cho et al. 2006). Different historical patterns, as well as more recent migration patterns by Latinos, have resulted in distinct incorporation experiences based in part on where one settles and the characteristics of the receiving community (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). Traditionally, Mexicans have settled in the

Southwestern United States, while Cubans have settled in Florida, and Puerto Ricans and

Dominicans in the Northeast. Using a range of demographic, economic and structural indicators, Lieske (1993) advances the idea of regional subcultures. More recently,

Kaufman and Rodriguez (2009) examine the effect of immigrant destinations on political attitudes, finding that Latino immigrants in new destinations are more likely to be less political than those in historical immigrant destinations. Regional differences upon arrival in the United States are also likely to yield divergent experiences for some

Latinos. Moreover, since the 1990s, an increasing number of states and communities have initiated their own immigration-related provisions (see, for instance, Newton and

Adams 2009). Thus, different subnational political contexts may also contribute to the ways in which Latinos conceptualize group membership and whether or not they fit under the American category. Drawing on this literature, I anticipate that characteristics specific to area of residence may also result in varying perspectives on the meaning of American.

To control for geographic context, respondents are divided according to their state of residence, using U.S. Census categories. Accordingly, the South is defined as

20 All independent variables that are not dummy variables are scaled to range from 0-1. 83

Arkansas, Georgia, North Carolina, Texas and Florida; the West includes Arizona,

California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada and Washington; the Midwest includes

Illinois, notable for a history of “immigrant-friendly” policies, and Iowa; the Mid-

Atlantic includes New York, New Jersey, and the Washington, DC metropolitan area; and New England includes Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Given the disproportionate amount of Latino politics literature that focuses on the Western U.S., the

West is the excluded category in the following analysis.

Table 3.2, below, presents the results of a multivariate analysis. Because the dependent variables are categorical (measured from 1-3, with 3 being most important), ordered logistic regression is employed. Tables 3.3 through 3.6 present predicted probabilities, calculated with continuous independent variables moving from their minimum to maximum values, holding all other continuous independent variables constant at their means. For dummy variables, a prototypical respondent is used with the following characteristics: male, Mexican, from the Southwest, non-native but arrived in the U.S. more than 5 years ago, with survey responses in English. The 95% Confidence

Intervals are presented in brackets.

Table 3.2. Ascriptive Characteristics of Being American (Ordered Logit)

Born in US Christianity English White Female 0.00 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Skin Color -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.07*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.06** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Subnational Groups Cuban 0.07 0.19 0.14 0.48*** (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.14) Dominican 0.02 0.37** 0.35 -0.16 (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.15) Puerto Rican -0.20* 0.47*** 0.08 0.25* (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) Salvadoran 0.35** 0.56*** 0.67** 0.11 (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) Region Midwest -0.21** -0.18* -0.05 0.08 (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) Northeast 0.05 0.17 0.07 -0.04 (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10) South 0.03 0.33*** -0.02 -0.02 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) Incorporation Income -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.06 -0.08* (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) Years of Education -0.03*** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) New Arrival 0.04 0.00 0.32** -0.14 (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) First Generation 0.81*** 0.09 -0.11 -0.07 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) Second Generation 0.72*** 0.13 -0.06 -0.22** (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) Prefer Spanish 0.24*** 0.19** 0.71*** -0.10 (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) Linked Fate 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.10*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) Religiosity -0.02 -0.32*** -0.02 -0.02 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) N 6401 6401 6401 6401 Pseudo R2 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.01

Two-tailed tests, significance levels: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p <0.001

NOTES: The unit of observation in an individual respondent. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is done using ordered logistic regression, using raw data from Phases I and II of the Latino National Survey. Analysis is limited to Cubans, Dominicans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Salvadorans. 85

Table 3.3 Importance of Being Born in the United States

Somewhat Not Impt. Impt. Very Impt. Age -0.1 -0.00 0.1 [-0.2, -0.04] [-0.01, 0.00] [0.04, 0.16] Puerto Rican 0.04 -0.00 -0.04 [0.00, 0.09] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.08, -0.00] Salvadoran -0.08 -0.01 0.09 [-0.12, -0.03] [-0.02, 0.00] [0.03, 0.14] Midwest 0.04 -0.00 -0.04 [0.01, 0.08] [-0.01., 0.00] [-0.07, -0.01] Income 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 [0.05, 0.11] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.11, -0.05] Years of Education 0.17 0.01 -0.18 [0.11, 0.23] [-0.01, 0.02] [-0.25, -0.12] First Generation -0.15 -0.03 0.18 [-0.18, -0.12] [-0.04, -0.02] [0.14, 0.22] Second Generation -0.15 -0.03 0.18 [-0.18, -0.12] [-0.04, -0.02] [0.14, 0.22] Prefer Spanish -0.18 -0.05 0.23 [-0.23. -0.14] [-0.07, -0.03] [0.18, 0.29] Linked Fate -0.08 0.00 0.09 [-0.12, -0.06] [0.00, 0.01] [0.06, 0.11]

Table 3.4 Importance of Being Christian

Somewhat Not Impt. Impt. Very Impt. Age -0.41 -0.01 0.42 [-0.45, -0.36] [-0.04, 0.01] [0.36, 0.48] Cuban -0.06 0.00 0.05 [-0.11, -0.01] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00, 0.11] Puerto Rican -0.09 0.00 0.09 [-0.13, -0.05] [0.00, 0.01] [0.04, 0.13] Salvadoran -0.15 -0.00 0.15 [-020, -0.10] [-0.02, 0.01] [0.10, 0.21] Mid -Atlantic -0.04 0.00 0.04 [-0.08, 0.00] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00. 0.08] New England -0.07 0.00 0.07 [-0.13, -0.02] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.12] South -0.06 0.00 0.04 [-0.09, -0.03] [0.00, 0.01] [0.03. 0.08] Income 0.07 -0.01 -0.06 [0.04, 0.10] [-0.02, 0.00] [-0.09,- 0.03] Education 0.28 -0.02 -0.26 [0.21, 0.34] [-0.03, 0.00] [-0.33, -0.19] Second Generation -0.11 0.00 0.11 [-0.16, -0.06] [0.00, 0.01] [0.06, 0.15] Prefer Spanish -0.04 0.00 0.03 [-0.07, -0.01] [0.0, 0.01] [0.00, 0.06] Linked Fate -0.13 0.02 0.11 [-0.16, -0.10] [0.01, 0.03] [0.08, 0.14] Church Attendance 0.31 -0.05 -0.26 [0.27, 0.24] [-0.07, -0.03] [-0.29, -0.22]

Table 3.5 Importance of Speaking English

Somewhat Not Impt. Impt. Very Impt. Age -0.04 -0.12 0.16 [-0.06, -0.03] [-0.15, -0.08] [0.11, 0.21] Dominican -0.02 -0.04 0.06 [-0.03, -0.00] [-0.08, -0.01] [0.01, 0.11] Salvadoran -0.02 -0.07 0.09 [-0.03, -0.01] [-0.10, -0.03] [0.04, 0.13] Prefer Spanish -0.02 -0.07 0.09 [-0.03, -0.02] [-0.09, -0.05] [0.06, 0.12]

Table 3.6 Importance of Being White

Somewhat Not Impt. Impt. Very Impt. Age -0.15 0.05 0.10 [-0.21, -0.08] [0.03, 0.06] [0.06, 0.15] Cuban -0.08 0.03 0.06 [-0.14, -0.03] [0.01, 0.04] [0.02, 0.10] Linked Fate -0.07 0.02 0.04 [-0.10, -0.03] [0.01, 0.04] [0.02, 0.06]

The analysis above finds mixed support for the political socialization hypothesis, which anticipated that distinct political learning and socialization experiences of different subnational groups would impact the perceptions of identity categories by subgroup members. Based on previous experiences, history, and immigration/ citizenship status, this hypothesis predicted that Cubans and Puerto Ricans would have the most open views of what it means to be American, while Salvadorans immigrants, who have had the most difficult experience with the United States government, would demonstrate the most restrictive perspective. The Salvadoran case represents the strongest support for this hypothesis; Salvadorans have the most restrictive perspective on what it means to be

American in three out of the four categories. With high degrees of statistical 88

significance, Salvadorans are 9% more likely to think it’s very important to be born in the

United States and to speak English than the prototypical respondent, and are 15% more likely to report that it’s very important to be Christian.

Despite expectations that Cubans would have a more open perception of what it means to be American, however, no statistically significant difference is evident across most categories. The only exception is skin color, which moves against the predicted direction; Cuban exiles, who are historically more likely to have lighter phenotypes, also place the most importance on being white; compared to Mexicans, Cubans are 6% more likely to indicate that skin color is very important to being American.

Interestingly, Puerto Ricans, who are born U.S. citizens, are 4% less likely to think that birthplace is very important to being American, suggesting that being

American means more than just birthright for this population. Surprisingly, though, compared to Mexicans, Puerto Ricans are 9% more likely to emphasize Christianity as very important to being American, which again defies the expectation that this group would have a more inclusive perspective of the American category.

As for the intersectionalty hypothesis, using the raw LNS data, women are far less likely to “very strongly” self-identify as American (37%) than their male counterparts (44%). Despite this disparity, however, there is no difference in the way that American is defined, ascriptively, across genders, demonstrating no support for the intersectionality hypothesis. Thus, even as women and men perceive the boundaries of

American-ness to be similarly permeable, Latinas remain less likely to place themselves in this category than Latino men. This finding suggests that something beyond the perception of group boundaries is driving the difference in self-identification between 89

these subpopulations. These topics will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and

As for the control variables, as anticipated, respondents with higher levels of income and education are generally likely to have less restrictive definitions of what it means to be American. For instance, compared to respondents in the lowest income category, those in the highest category are 8% less likely to emphasize being born in the

U.S., and 6% less likely to emphasize Christianity. Similarly, when compared to the least educated respondents, those with a graduate or professional degree are 18% less likely to say birthplace is very important and 26% less likely to say Christianity is very important.

Surprisingly, however, holding everything else constant, length of time in the U.S. has a relatively weak effect, with the variable for those being in the US for less than five years failing to reach statistical significance across the models. Similarly, immigrant generation also has a relatively weak effect. Birthplace is the only question for which first and second generation respondents are significantly different from their immigrant counterparts, and in both cases the relationship moves opposite the predicted direction: both first and second generation respondents are 18% more likely to emphasize birthplace as very important for being American, reflecting a less permeable view of

American-ness than non-natives. Second generation respondents are also more likely to emphasize the importance of Christianity.

As expected, the measures for preferring Spanish and feeling that one’s fate is strongly linked with other Latinos are both associated with more restrictive views of what it means to be American across three out of four ascriptive categories. For instance, respondents who report having the highest feelings of linked fate are 9% more likely to

emphasize the importance of birthplace; 11% more likely to emphasize Christianity; and

4% more likely to indicate that light skin color is very important to being American.

Similarly, Spanish-speaking respondents are 23% more likely to emphasize birthplace,

3% more likely to emphasize religion, and 9% more likely to say English skills are very important than their English-speaking counterparts. These results underscore that those respondents who are less integrated into life in the United States are more likely to feel that American is a closed category from which they are excluded.

In terms of geography, few differences are evident across the regional categories.

Respondents from the mid-west, including Latinos in Iowa and immigrant-friendly

Illinois, are 4% less likely to say that being born in the U.S. is very important to being

American. The largest regional differences are evident with respect to opinions on the role of Christianity. The added importance of religion for respondents from the traditional Bible Belt states is relatively unsurprising, with Latinos in the South being 4% more likely to indicate that Christianity is very important. Less clear, however, is the reason for the increased importance of religion for Latinos from the Mid-Atlantic and

New England – these respondents are 4% and 7% more likely, respectively, to emphasize the importance of Christianity. Moreover, despite extant literature regarding differing race relations in the South (see, for instance, Sanchez and Barreto 2009), no regional differences are evident with respect to the importance of skin color to any degree of statistical or substantive significance.

Similarly, respondents’ self-reported skin color had no significant effect across the categories. However, this result may be attributed, at least in part, to lack of diversity

among respondents, with just 10% of respondents placing themselves in the two darkest categories in the self-reported question regarding one’s own phenotype.

In contrast, the age variable is significant across all four categories, with younger respondents having a far more open interpretation of what it means to be American. As age increases, respondents are more likely to emphasize the importance of each of the various ascriptive categories, with the oldest respondents demonstrating the most closed view definition of American. Specifically, the oldest respondents are 10% more likely to say birthplace is very important, 42% more likely to emphasize Christianity, 16% more likely to emphasize English skills, and 10% more likely to say skin color is very important than their younger counterparts. The strong relationship between this variable and perceptions of what it means to be American suggest that the role of age is not simply contingent on parental socialization experiences. Less clear, however, is whether perceptions of what it means to be American will change as individual respondents age, or whether the younger generation of Latinos may maintain a more open view of what it means to be American over time.

Finally, the measure of religiosity is statistically significant in the predictable direction with respect to Christianity: respondents who are more likely to attend religious services are also 26% more likely see religion as a very important part of being

American, and vice versa. However, given the important role played by the church in mobilizing and incorporating new immigrants (Wong 2006), the lack of significance of the religiosity variable in other categories is unexpected.

Identity Contestation and the Power of Political Events

As mentioned above, Phase One of the LNS data collection occurred concurrently with the massive immigration protests of the spring of 2006, with nearly half of the respondents in the survey interviewed before the height of the protests and the remainder interviewed after. I take advantage of this coincidence by utilizing a quasi-experimental research design to test the political events hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that in light of the massive Spring 2006 immigration protests, and the emphasis these events placed on Latinos being American, respondents interviewed after the protests are more likely to see American as an open category than comparable respondents interviewed earlier.

This hypothesis draws on constructivist literature, which argues that political events, leaders, and institutions are able to “activate” or transform individual self- identification (see, for instance, Bates 1981; Chandra 2004; Posner 2004; Eifert et al.

2010). Likewise, a tradition of literature in sociology highlights the ability of protests, and the framing of these events, to alter the identity of participants (Gould 1995; Snow and McAdam 2000; Stryker et al. 2000).

While some early protests occurred in late March, as Chapter 2 documents, overall, event organizers did not begin their emphasis on Latinos being American, encouraging the widespread use of American flags and other patriotic symbols, until the

April events. Because most of the subsequent protests occurred on or after April 10,

2006, in the analysis that follows, April 10 is used as a cutoff date. Accordingly, respondents are divided into two categories: those interviewed before April 10, 2006, when the vast majority of the protests took place (the “pre-protest” group), and those

interviewed on and after that date (the “post-protest” group). Table 3.7, below, indicates the distribution of respondents in these two groups.

Table 3.7. LNS “Quasi-Experiment” Breakdown

Before April 10, 2006 After April 10, 2006

N 3,845 4,788

Percentage 44.54% 55.46%

Source: LNS 2006 (Author’s calculations)

To test the political events hypothesis, I conduct ordered logistic regression using weighted data from Phase One of the LNS. The model below does not distinguish between Latino subgroup or region-of-residence. Table 3.8 presents the results of the model, demonstrating strong support for this hypothesis. For the predicted probabilities, the prototypical respondent is male, interviewed prior to the protests, and an immigrant to the U.S. living here more than 5 years, with all continuous independent variables held constant at their means.

As illustrated below, the post-protest variable is statistically significant in the predicted direction for three out of four categories. Respondents interviewed after the spring 2006 protests are 3% less likely to say that being born in the U.S., speaking

English, and being white are very important aspects of being American than those interviewed before these events to a high degree of statistical significance. By comparison, on the question regarding birthplace, for instance, the effect of being interviewed after the protests is almost half the amount of language preference, in the opposite direction: Spanish speakers are 7% more likely to say being born in the U.S. is very important.

Table 3.8. 2006 Immigration Protests and Defining American (Ordered Logit)

Born in US Christianity English White Post-Protests -0.11* -0.07 -0.18** -0.19*** (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Female 0.00 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) Skin Color -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) Age 0.06*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.07*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Region Midwest -0.23** -0.17* -0.06 0.11 (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) North East 0.02 0.44*** 0.22 0.06 (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) South 0.02 0.38*** 0.01 0.03 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)

Incorporation Income -0.18*** -0.12** -0.05 -0.06 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) Years of Education -0.03*** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) New Arrival 0.05 -0.01 0.31** -0.16* (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) First Generation 0.80*** 0.10 -0.11 -0.08 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) Second Generation 0.71*** 0.08 -0.10 -0.26** (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) Prefer Spanish 0.24*** 0.15* 0.67*** -0.17* (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) Linked Fate 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.10*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) Attend Church -0.02 -0.32*** -0.02 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) N 6401 6401 6401 6401 Pseudo R2 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.01 Two-tailed tests, significance levels: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p <0.001. The unit of observation in an individual respondent. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is done using ordered logistic regression, using the revised national-level weights provided in the data set. Analysis is limited to Cubans, Dominicans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Salvadorans.

Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals are presented in Tables 3.9 –

3.12, below.

Table 3.9. Importance of Being Born in the U.S.

Not Impt. Somewhat Impt. Very Impt. Post -Protests 0.03 0.00 -0.03 [0.00, 0.05] [0.00, 0.00] [0.05, 0.00] Age -0.09 0.00 0.09 [-0.14, -0.03] [-0.01, 0.00] [0.03, 0.15] Income 0.08 0.00 -0.08 [0.05, 0.11] [0.00, 0.01] [-0.11, -0.05] Years of Education 0.15 0.01 -0.16 [0.09, 0.21] [0.00, 0.02] [-0.23, -0.09] First Generation -0.15 -0.04 0.19 [-0.18, -0.12] [-0.05, -0.02] [0.15, 0.22] Second Generation -0.13 -0.03 0.16 [-0.16, -0.11] [-0.04, -0.02] [0.13, 0.20] Prefer Spanish -0.06 -0.01 0.07 [-0.09. -0.03] [-0.01, 0.00] [0.04, 0.10]

Table 3.10. Importance of Being Christian

Not Impt. Somewhat Impt. Very Impt. Age -0.42 -0.05 0.47 [-0.46, -0.38] [-0.08,- 0.03] [0.42, 0.52] Income 0.06 0.00 -0.06 [0.03, 0.09] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.09, -0.03] Years of Education 0.25 0.01 -0.26 [0.19, 0.31] [-0.01, 0.03] [-0.33, -0.19] Prefer Spanish -0.06 0.00 0.06 [-0.09, -0.03] [0.00, 0.00] [0.03, 0.09] Church Attendance 0.30 -0.03 -0.27 [0.26, 0.33] [-0.04, -0.01] [-0.30, -0.24]

Table 3.11. Importance of Speaking English

Not Impt. Somewhat Impt. Very Impt. Post -Protests 0.01 0.02 -0.03 [0.00, 0.02] [0.01, 0.04] [-0.05, -0.01] Age -0.04 -0.11 0.15 [-0.06, -0.03] [-0.14, -0.09] [0.11, 0.19] New Arrival -0.01 -0.03 0.04 [-0.02, 0.00] [-0.05, -0.01] [0.01, 0.07] Prefer Spanish -0.02 -0.07 0.09 [-0.03, -0.02] [-0.08, -0.05] [0.06, 0.11]

Table 3.12 Importance of Being White

Not Impt. Somewhat Impt. Very Impt. Post -Protests 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 [0.02, 0.07] [-0.02, -0.01] [-0.05, -0.01] Age -0.13 0.03 0.09 [-0.19, -0.06] [0.02, 0.05] [0.04, 0.14] New Arrival 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 [0.00, 0.07] [-0.02, 0.00] [-0.05, 0.00] Second Generation 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 [0.03, 0.11] [-0.04, -0.02] [-0.07, -0.02]

The above model reflects the potential role political events can play in the process of identity contestation. In Chapter 4, I further develop the quasi-experimental research design. Likewise, I demonstrate that for certain subgroups of the Latino population, the

2006 protests alter not only perceptions of what it means to be American, but have the power to change an individual’s very own self-identification.

Conclusion

Throughout this dissertation, I seek to better understand the acquisition of identities in cases where they are not clearly defined. As a first step in this process, in this chapter, I address variation in the content, or meaning, of American for the

heterogeneous Latino population. I focus in particular on the myth of an American identity based on ascriptive characteristics: being white, being Christian, being born in the U.S., and speaking English.

Comparing data from the GSS and LNS, I find that Latino perceptions of what it means to be American are, overall, quite similar to those of the Anglo majority.

Underscoring the diversity within the Latino community, I test three distinct hypotheses.

The first, the political socialization hypothesis, anticipates that an individual’s national origin or ancestry is likely to be indicative of a particular type of experience with the U.S. government. I expect that these interactions, in turn, would result in distinct perceptions of what it means to be American. Specifically, I hypothesize that Cubans and Puerto

Ricans, both of whom have had a more positive relationship with the U.S. government, would have a more inclusive perception of what it means to be American. In contrast, I hypothesize that Salvadorans, who have had the most challenging relationship with the

U.S. government, would be more likely to define American in ascriptive terms. In multivariate analysis, I confirm that Salvadorans have the most closed perception of what it means to be American across three out of four categories. The results regarding

Cubans and Puerto Ricans, however, are less decisive, indicating mixed support for this hypothesis.

Based on literature from political science, sociology and women’s studies that calls for a gendered perspective on political incorporation, I also develop the intersectionality hypothesis, which predicts that men and women would have distinct understandings of what it means to be American. Despite differences in the ways in which Latino men and women self-identify, however, I find no support for this

hypothesis. The theme of gendered differences will be discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5.

In the political events hypothesis, I anticipate that comparable respondents interviewed following the spring 2006 protests will have a more open perception of what it means to be American than those interviewed before. To test this hypothesis, I introduce a quasi-experimental research design, dividing respondents into one group interviewed before the 2006 protests and another group interviewed after. My analysis finds support for this hypothesis, with respondents interviewed after the protests indicating a more open perception of what it means to be American across three out of four categories. The quasi-experimental research design introduced here will be further developed in Chapter 4, along with a more extensive discussion of the power of political events to shape identity.

Finally, I suggest that in contrast to existing research on the general population, which finds that individuals who identify most strongly as American are more likely to define it in restrictive terms (Theiss-Morse 2009), the opposite pattern may be the case for Latinos. The control variables used throughout the chapter seem to confirm this contrast. In particular, immigrants who are less incorporated into American society, socioeconomically and linguistically, hold more closed views about the boundaries of

American identity. Moreover, the strong relationship between some variables related to immigrant incorporation and perceptions of what it means to be American suggest that within the Latino population, the meaning of American is not static. Rather, how an individual defines American is likely to be changed by process and experience in the

United States.

These findings represent an initial attempt to better understand the ways in which different Latino groups perceive the boundaries of American society, as well as factors that may help to impact one’s broader sense of belonging and citizenship. The mixed results outlined above, however, illustrate the need for future research that will enable scholars to better understand the way that political learning, socialization, and context help to shape perceptions regarding the permeability of the American category by different immigrant groups. The next chapter returns to some of these points and further elaborates on the role of political events, as well as the relationship between events and identification.

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CHAPTER 4

Can Protests Make Latinos “American”? Identity, Immigration Politics and the 2006 Marches

In the previous chapter, I examine what an American identity means for different subsets of the Latino population. I find mixed support for the idea that Latinos from different national origin subgroups understand “American” differently. The clearest evidence for this varied understanding occurs with the Salvadoran population, who are most likely to define American in closed, ascriptive terms. I suggest that this view may be the product of a distinct political socialization grounded in the experience of the violent Salvadoran civil war and related actions by the U.S. government. With respect to gender, multivariate analysis suggests no difference in the way that Latino men and

Latinas define American. Finally, I introduce a quasi-experimental research design, treating as stimuli the spring 2006 protests, which emphasized that Latinos are also

American. I find that across most categories, respondents interviewed after the protests had a more open view of what it means to be American than comparable respondents interviewed before these events.

This chapter builds on these findings to look specifically at the ways in which the contentious debate over immigration policy impact self-identification among Latino subgroups in the United States. Specifically, I do so in two ways. First, I elaborate on the quasi-experimental research design by analyzing the ways in which the protests affect self-identification across the Latino population. Just as respondents interviewed after the 101

protests perceived American to be a more open category than those interviewed before, holding all else equal, I find that respondents interviewed after the protests are more likely to say that they feel American. Next, building on the tentative findings about political socialization, I subdivide the data to examine effects among different subgroups.

Chapter 1 demonstrates the varied salience of the immigration issue to different subsets of the Latino community; here, I find that the effects of the protests on individual self- identification are concentrated among those respondents for whom the question of immigration reform is likely to be most salient. For instance, Spanish speakers are more likely to identify as American after the 2006 protests than comparable respondents interviewed before, but no change is evident among English speakers. Looking specifically by ancestral subgroup, the results hold only for respondents of Mexican and

Dominican origin or ancestry; no change appears for respondents of Cuban, Puerto Rican, or Salvadoran descent. Additionally, to ensure the validity of these findings as well as the quasi-experimental research design more generally, I employ a range of robustness checks throughout the chapter.

Contentious Politics and Latino Self-Identification: From Pan-Ethnic to American

Much research has established that group identities can be powerful predictors of political attitudes and behavior. More debate surrounds the formation and strengthening of these identities in the first place. Existing theories dispute the causal antecedents of strong ethnic identities, and the role that particular political events and leaders can play in shaping self-identification. Literature on the politicization of identities assumes that in times of political turmoil, leaders are likely to “play the ethnic card,” attaching increased political salience to racial and ethnic identities (Eifert et al. 2010; see also Chandra 2009;

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Lee 2008). A growing body of scholarship on minorities in the U.S. also emphasizes the importance of elite mobilization, political context, and group characteristics on minority participation and political engagement (see, for instance, Leighley 2001; Ramakrishnan

2005; Segura and Rodrigues 2006).

Among immigrants, pan-ethnic identities such as Asian or Latino/ Hispanic are thought to develop in response to situations of exclusion, particularly under circumstances where subgroup unity is politically advantageous (Padilla 1986; Espiritu

1992; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000). In the late twentieth century, Latino elites strategically defined their communities in pan-ethnic terms in an attempt to secure resources and favorable policies (Beltrán 2010). For instance, Chapter 2 describes the message of pan-ethnic unity advanced during the 1996 Latino protest on Washington.

During times of contentious debate over immigration issues, scholars of Latino politics frequently assume a stronger sense of pan-ethnic identity will emerge within this population (Barreto et al. 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado et al. 2009). Likewise, research on minorities within the U.S. indicates that the experience of group-level discrimination is likely to decrease a respondent’s self-identification as American (see, for instance,

Schildkraut 2005b).

In a highly politicized context, then, why might we see minorities instead identify increasingly with the majority? Further, why might variation exist between subgroups that employ a broader pan-ethnic identifier?

Using the spring 2006 immigration protests in the United States as a case study, I seek to answer these questions by examining changes in self-identification among Latino respondents. In examining variation in self-identification during a time of heightened

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political contestation, my research informs the debate on identity and ethnicity by studying the impact of exogenous events on minority groups, emphasizing elite efforts to frame these events in a particular way. Focusing on Spanish-speakers, I test whether existing theories about the “activation” of identities (Chandra 2009) may hold even in cases where a large proportion of the population do not have legal citizenship. Drawing on the lessons of intersectionality literature, I emphasize the need to disaggregate beyond the broad Latino label. Accordingly, I suggest that the experience of multiple marginalizations may leave some subsets of the Latino population less likely to perceive themselves as American than others. Moreover, I go one step further by exploring the extent to which individuals might internalize a broader message about identity to the point that it could ultimately alter their own self-perception. I find that while some identities may remain stable, other aspects may be subject to politicization in a seemingly counterintuitive way. Specifically, as the public eye shifts to the immigration debate, self-identification as American increases among certain subsectors of the Latino population, while pan-ethnic and sub-national identification remains constant.

The Politics-to-Identity Link?

As Lee (2008, p 458) explains, existing literature largely assumes an “identity-to- politics” link, implying that “individuals who share a demographic label— e.g., African

American, Latino, Asian American, Arab American—will also share common political goals and interests and act in concert to pursue them,” rather than specifying when or how this link evolves. Indeed, much existing political science literature suggests unidirectional causality, in which identity may shape an individual’s politics, but not the reverse.

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A growing body of literature in sociology and political science attempts to invert this causal arrow. For instance, research on social movements finds that protest, the collective identity of a movement, and instrumental appeals may shape self-identification among movement participants (see, for instance, Gould 1995; Snow and McAdam 2000;

Stryker et al. 2000). Looking beyond social movements, Eifert et al. (2010) study the relationship between identity and elections in ten African countries. They find that the importance placed on attachment to one’s ethnic or tribal group increases during the time period immediately surrounding a national election, particularly when that election is highly competitive. However, the survey question used in this analysis prevents respondents from identifying in national terms, so the researchers are unable to gauge whether national identity may also shift. In addition, the question asks respondents to select the group to which they identify “first and foremost,” a choice with which individuals are rarely faced in real-world scenarios. Here, I build on this burgeoning literature by further examining the possibility of a politics-to-identity link. Specifically, I ask whether, under certain conditions, a major political event coupled with strategic elite messages can shape individual self-identification in a seemingly counterintuitive way.

As the United States becomes increasingly diverse, improving our understanding of the complicated relationship between politics and identity is more important than ever.

Existing literature suggests that among minorities, the choice of an American identity may have both normative and practical implications. For instance, from a normative perspective, in a “melting pot” society, it is arguably problematic to have large segments of the population who perceive themselves as separate and distinct from the national group. Since de Tocqueville ([1848] 1969 ) first famously observed the U.S. in the early

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1800s, scholars have viewed political participation as an essential part of the American experience. Focusing on the 2006 immigration protests in the US, Beltrán (2010, p 155) argues that in contesting the countervailing discourse surrounding undocumented immigrants, marchers “challenge(d) established narratives of membership and consent,” questioning the very boundaries of citizenship. By entering into the political sphere,

Beltrán argues that protesters deepened the scope of our democracy. She warns, however, against the potential effects of imposing a panethnic identity on a diverse population; likewise, even as Latinos, broadly speaking, may embrace an American identity, it is important to remain mindful of the heterogeneity within this community.

As outlined in Chapter 1, a broad body of literature addresses the practical implications of self-identification at the individual level. For instance, Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse (2003) highlight psychology research which finds that, under some circumstances, positively identifying with a national group can result in higher self- esteem. Other research points to competing effects of self-identification, ranging from increased voting and other political engagement to feelings of alienation, as well as the role that one’s identity and sense of community can play in developing attitudes on a range of public policy issues (Schildkraut 2005a; 2005b; Wong 2010). Thus, self- identification can have widespread consequences for individuals, communities, and democracy more broadly. Here, however, I argue that the relationship between politics and identity is iterative, and can work both ways: while an individual’s self-identification may shape their politics, political debate and framing may also shape one’s identity.

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The Many Faces of America

This study builds on the existing research described above to examine the ways in which individual self-identification of Latinos changes during the spring 2006 immigration marches. As Chapter 2 explains, between March and May 2006, these protests unfolded across some 39 states and more than 140 cities. An estimated 3.5 million to 5 million people, mostly of Latino descent, took to the streets in an unprecedented mobilization of immigrants (Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Cordero-Guzman et al. 2008; Pantoja et al. 2008). The events occurred in response to debate over the

Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (H.R. 4437), which passed the House of Representatives in December 2005, and which was viewed as highly punitive by much of the Latino community.

This chapter examines the effects of those protests on the self-identification of

Latino respondents, focusing on variation between the five largest Latino national-origin subgroups currently in the US: Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Mexican, and Puerto

Rican. In the absence of comprehensive reform, and with the passage of Arizona’s

S.B.1070 – designed to identify, prosecute, and deport illegal immigrants – as well as copycat legislation in other states, immigration issues remain at the forefront of the political arena. Although I focus here on the 2006 protests, this framework may also be extended to look at future responses to this ongoing debate.

As Chapter 2 explains, the emphasis on respecting and embracing American symbols distinguish the 2006 marches from other recent immigration-related protests.

Indeed, since the mid 1950s, Latino activism has highlighted differences with the Anglo majority and, more recently, emphasized Latino unity. In 2006, however, the message

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shifted to one of inclusion with the majority rather than difference. The second chapter highlights, in particular, the efforts of Spanish-language media personalities in mobilizing the Latino community for “a demonstration of Latino pride and power,” while simultaneously encouraging participants to bring American flags to events (Janiot 2006;

Oz 2006; Félix et al. 2008). For instance, during an interview with Univision (2006),

Eduardo 'Piolín' Sotelo, host of the popular radio show El Piolín por la Manaña (Piolín in the Morning), explained, “It is important to carry the American flag so that people see we respect this patriotic symbol” (translation by the author).

Given the elite emphasis and framing around on American symbols, I develop the first hypothesis:

 Hypothesis 1: The spring 2006 immigration events will lead to greater self-

identification as American among Latino respondents.

Traditionally, Latinos in the United States have identified primarily based on ties to their home country or ancestral origin rather than with a broad, unifying “pan-ethnic” identity such as Hispanic or Latino (García 2003; Fraga et al. 2006). In fact, some scholars suggest that immigration policy has underscored intracommunal divisions among Latino populations. For instance, García Bedolla (2005) argues immigration issues are less likely to be of interest to Latinos of later immigrant generations or those who have been in the United States for a substantial period of time, and may cause long- time residents to distance themselves from negative stereotypes surrounding new arrivals

(see also de la Garza et al. 1993; Branton 2007). Likewise, existing research on acculturation and immigration policy finds a relationship between language competence and policy preferences, with English speakers more likely to hold restrictive views on

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immigration policy (Binder et al. 1997; Hood et al. 1997; Branton 2007). This literature suggests that the politics of immigration reform may be of greater interest to the Spanish- speaking population.

Moreover, as outlined in Chapter 1, due to U.S. policy differences toward countries that broadly constitute the “Latino” population, the immigration issue has varied salience to members of different ancestral origin subgroups. For instance, those with no special legal protections vis-à-vis U.S. immigration policy, such as Mexicans and Dominicans, may be more engaged in the immigration debate. In contrast, such reforms are of far less importance to Puerto Ricans, who are born U.S. citizens, and Cuban exiles, whose preferential immigration status allows those who reach the United States to remain here legally.

Organizers of the 2006 protests framed their outreach carefully to emphasize the rallies were not just a Mexican issue; for instance, one leader interviewed by Barreto et al. (2009) cited the importance of ensuring that event flyers were not printed in the colors of the Mexican flag so as not to exclude other Latino groups. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the complex legal situation described in Chapter 1, it is easy to imagine that when immigration issues move to the forefront of the political arena, the debate has a differential impact within the Latino population. Given this varying salience of immigration issues to different Latino subgroups, I develop the following sub-hypothesis:

o Hypothesis 1a: Change in self-identification will occur only among those

populations most affected by the immigration debate, with the impact

strongest among Spanish-speaking Latinos as well as Mexicans,

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Dominicans, and Salvadorans. Effects are likely to be limited or

nonexistent for respondents from Puerto Rico and Cuba.

¡Somos Latinos!

Existing literature highlights the ways in which perceptions of discrimination can impact group identification, participation, and civic engagement (Schildkraut 2007; Fraga et al. 2010). Similarly, the racialized tone of the immigration debate in recent years has led scholars to focus renewed attention on the relationship between immigration and ethnicity. As Hero and Preuhs (2007) explain, “Because immigration to the United States over the last generation is so heavily from Latin America, and Mexico in particular, policies regarding ‘immigrants’ may be viewed effectively as policies regarding

‘Latinos’” (p 499; see also Hajnal et al. 2002; Newton 2008).

Despite intracommunal divisions regarding immigration policy, some speculated that anti-immigrant sentiment surrounding the 2006 events would likewise unify the

Hispanic community. Anti-Latino rhetoric and “racial profiling” were thought to paradoxically mobilize all Latinos, including Puerto Ricans and Cuban Americans as well as those residing in the U.S. for many generations. Indeed, in the Pew Hispanic Center’s

2006 National Survey of Latinos, conducted shortly after the protests, a majority of respondents reported an increase in discrimination as a result of the policy debate (Suro and Escobar 2006). The LNS contains a series of questions about individual experiences with discrimination by employers, police, landlords, and in a restaurant. Following the protests, reports of discrimination increased up to 5% in each category; for instance,

15.5% of respondents interviewed before the protests reported discrimination while at a restaurant, compared to 20.3% of those interviewed after. 110

Scholarship on pan-ethnicity argues that these identities arise under circumstances in which ethnicity can be employed as a vehicle for making political claims (Padilla

1984; 1986). This strategy was evident in 1996, for instance, when Latinos first marched on Washington to protest immigration reform. In that case, the main message was one of

Latino unity. Moreover, using data from 2002, Schildkraut (2005b) finds that perceptions of group-level discrimination make individuals more likely to identify as

Latino than American.

As Chapter 2 describes, organizers of the 2006 protests took a different approach, framing the response to H.R. 4437 around the theme of being American. Despite this difference in strategy, however, many political science accounts of the protests incorporate this assumption without new empirical study. For instance, both Barreto et al. (2009) and Benjamin-Alvarado et al. (2009) highlight this seeming connection, with the latter authors arguing, “the rise in national, anti-immigrant, anti-Latino rhetoric and legislative proposals served to reinforce a sense of pan-ethnic identity” (723). To examine this perspective more closely, I test the second hypothesis:

 Hypothesis 2: Given the increased sense of discrimination against Latinos, the

spring 2006 protests will lead to a greater sense of pan-ethnicity among all

respondents.

Finally, recent scholarship has focused on the question of whether identity choices are a tradeoff, with an increase in self-identification with one group resulting in a decrease in self-identification with another (Sidanius et al. 1997). Reporting on findings from focus group research, Fraga et al. (2010, p 52) point out that Latinos do not appear

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to view the choices to identify as American, Latino, or with a national origin group as zero-sum. While demonstrators in the 2006 protests were encouraged to bring American flags, many also carried flags from their home country, displaying the two side by side.

Similarly, I develop the third hypothesis:

 Hypothesis 3: While American sentiment may increase after the protests, no

significant difference will exist in levels of identification with country of origin

or ancestry.

This hypothesis further suggests that for those who feel a strong connection to their ancestral identity, this identity may be more stable or less subject to politicization than feeling American.

Data and Methods

Questions about the varying salience of identities abound, but rarely is it possible to develop a methodological design that isolates an event’s effects on individual self- identification. In this study, I use data from Phase One of the Latino National Survey

(LNS, 2006), which was conducted in the months before, during and after the Spring

2006 immigration protests, to test whether the protests affected responses to questions about self-identification. Phase One of the LNS includes 8,634 respondents across fifteen states and the Washington, DC metropolitan area.

As Chapter 3 describes, the present research design takes advantage of a quasi- experiment that occurred during data collection for the LNS, which is divided here into two groups: control (pre-protest) and treatment (post-protest). This approach builds on a tradition of research in which major social events are used as a treatment condition to gauge variation in pre- and post- attitudes (see, for instance, Riley and Pettigrew 1976;

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Bobo et al. 1994). Because the survey asks respondents about the extent to which they self-identify as American, with a pan-ethnic identifier, and with their country of origin/ ancestry, I am able to test the hypotheses outlined above and compare whether shifts occur in any or all of these categories.

While a number of large immigration-related demonstrations took place in isolated states over several months in the spring of 2006, nationally, coordinated protests occurred between two key dates: April 10 and May 1. Moreover, as Chapter 2 discusses, while some large events occurred in late March, many of these were later criticized by Latino leaders for their preponderance of Mexican flags. Indeed, by March 31, an OpEd in the

San Francisco Chronicle extolled demonstrators to “Forget the Mexican Flags”

(Navarrette 2006). Likewise, in a New York Times OpEd , Linda Chavez (2006), Chair of the Center for Equal Opportunity, argued that thousands of protesters carrying Mexican flags in the streets in 1994 in California “scared Americans” into supporting that state’s restrictive Proposition 187. To prevent this from recurring, Chavez encouraged Latinos to instead demonstrate how similar they were to other Americans. By April 1, Latino elites were clearly articulating the theme of being American. Throughout the month, this message disseminated nationally, with leaders distributing American flags to participants at large-scale events (Epstein and Steingold 2006). In an attempt to capture even the early effects of this rhetorical shift, in this chapter, I use April 1, 2006 as a cutoff date to divide the LNS into “control” (pre-protest) and “treatment” (post-protest) groups.1

1 Given that the protests, and the strategic emphasis on being American, both developed over the course of April, if anything, this cutoff date is likely to underestimate the treatment effect in the full model. Compared to most other months of surveying, a relatively small number of respondents were interviewed in April; within this month, 45% (N=197) of respondents were interviewed before the major wave of April 10 protests, while 55% were interviewed after. 113

Accordingly, the pre-protest group yields 3,646 interviews (42.22%), while the post- protest group includes 4,988 respondents (57.77%). 2

Because the timing of the protests was exogenous to the survey itself, one limitation to the existing study is that no information is available regarding whether or not respondents actually participated in these events. Thus, I am unable to test whether the demonstrated effects occur as a result of framing, collective action, or some combination of mechanisms. Given the dramatic increase in immigration-related media coverage between April and June 2006 (Dunaway et al. 2010), however, I argue that the contentious political atmosphere is a sufficient condition for treatment in that even if respondents did not actually attend the protests, they were very likely exposed to their message.3 Indeed, as Chapter 2 describes, existing research on the media and politics demonstrates the power of the press to activate individual’s previous ideas or predispositions (Berelson et al. 1956; Zaller 1992), as well as the ways in which framing may shape individual attitudes (Iyengar 1991; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1990). The emphasis that this research places on pre-existing attitudes is consistent with the arguments I make regarding political socialization and issue salience, suggesting that individuals with different backgrounds will interpret media messages differently, within the context of their own experience.

2 Following initial data collection, each respondent was assigned three weights - national, state, and urban/ rural – which were revised in March 2010. This analysis employs the revised national weights, which attempt to make the survey more representative of all 50 states. A subsequent phase of LNS data collection occurred the following year in three New England states. However, because this data is not included in the national weighting system, occurred long after the 2006 protests, and specific interview dates are not available, the present analysis is limited to Phase One of data collection. 3 Specifically, Dunaway et al. (2010) find that on average, newspapers published nearly 60 immigration- related articles in April 2006, compared to less than 20 in most other months that year. 114

As described in Chapter 3, self-categorization scholars contend that identification is formed in part through the process of comparing oneself and one’s attributes with those of a prototype group member. Some scholars in this tradition argue that temporary prototypes may also be formed, and these prototypes can be transformed across social settings (Huddy 2001). I argue that the emphasis placed on Latinos being American in the spring 2006 protests developed a new prototype for the category of American, resulting in a shift in self-identification among some segments of the Latino population.

I seek to test whether a “politics-to-identity” link occurs by examining the extent to which an identity that is highly and publicly politicized may also be internalized and self- reported among survey respondents. To estimate the effect of the spring 2006 marches on respondents’ self-reported identity, I run three separate ordered logistic regression models. For the main dependent variables, I focus on a series of questions regarding self- identification. Specifically, respondents were asked, “In general, how strongly or not do you think of yourself as ______?” The questions were asked in random order, with

American, Latino/ Hispanic, and a national origin descriptor used separately.

Respondents were given four options ranging from not very strongly to very strongly. I also test two additional dependent variables regarding the extent to which an individual thinks it is important for Latinos to change in order to blend in the US and to maintain a distinct culture, respectively. These variables are used as potential proxies for gauging feelings of similarity and difference. Both are measured on a 3-point scale, from not at all important to very important.

The main independent variable of interest is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent is a member of the post-protest treatment group or the pre-protest control

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group. I also include control variables for gender; self-reported skin color; language preference; years of education; household income; age; and a series of dummy variables reflecting immigrant generation (for a full description of variables and coding, see

Appendix C).

Just as Latinos of distinct ancestral origin subgroups are likely to have different experiences in the U.S., significant variation can also exist depending on one’s host community. In the models presented below, state-level fixed effects are used in order to control for unobserved characteristics such as local political and legal context as well as history, all of which may vary across states.4 Moreover, states experienced differing levels of political activity during the 2006 events, and surveying occurred at different rates across the states; while respondents in the majority of states are split somewhat evenly between the treatment and control groups, in several states, considerable variation exists in the proportion of respondents who were “treated” (see Appendix C, Table 4.1).

The use of state-level fixed effects also helps to further control for these discrepancies.5

In a true experiment, respondents would randomly be placed into control and treatment groups. In contrast, this study is a quasi-experiment, so the extent to which randomization occurred is simply a consequence of the order in which respondents were called; the survey’s design did not include any deliberate attempts to sort respondents

4 Fixed effects are calculated in Stata, using dummy variables for each state, with Florida as the omitted state. 5 As an additional robustness check, the models were also conducted without state-level fixed effects (see Appendix C, Table 4.3). The main findings with respect to pre- and post- protest groups retain statistical significance across models. In two cases, control variables that fail to obtain statistical significance when fixed effects are included become statistically significant when fixed effects are omitted. In no case does a variable that has obtained significance in the fixed effects models lose significance in the models without these effects. 116

into distinct, randomized groups, making the inclusion of control variables especially important in subsequent analyses.

As Sekhon and Titiunik (Forthcoming) argue, in addition to randomization caused by the result of some exogenous event, in a natural experiment, comparability between the control and treatment groups must be assumed. As is evident in Table 4.1, in comparing the LNS control and treatment groups, however, differences exist on a number of key characteristics. For instance, English speakers, as well as people with low income

Table 4.1 Mean Characteristics of Respondents in Treatment and Control Groups, Full Sample Control Treatment P-Value P-Value with State-Level Fixed Effects Female 0.52 0.53 0.37 0.54 Skin color 0.63 0.62 0.01 0.00 Survey in Spanish 0.74 0.49 0.00 0.00 Years of Education 0.59 0.63 0.00 0.01 Income 0.29 0.37 0.00 0.00 Age 0.20 0.20 0.59 0.05

Immigrant Generation+ Newcomer (in US < 5 years) 0.20 0.14 0.00 0.00 First Generation 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.00 Second Generation and above 0.13 0.23 0.00 0.00

Country of Origin/ Ancestry Cuban 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.09 Dominican 0.04 0.04 0.33 0.26 Mexican 0.80 0.77 0.02 0.74 Puerto Rican 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 Salvadoran 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.00

Bolded entries are significant at the p<.05 level. All continuous independent variables scaled from 0 to 1. Analysis uses the revised national weights and is limited to respondents of Cuban, Dominican, Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Salvadoran origin or ancestry.

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and lower levels of education, appear to be underrepresented in the control group. 6 In an attempt to mitigate these differences, I divide the full sample into multiple control- treatment pairs and re-run the regression models within each subsample. As Table 4.2 demonstrates, most demographic differences disappear when the subsample is limited to

Spanish speakers.

Table 4.2 Mean Characteristics of Treatment and Control Group Respondents, Spanish Speakers Control Treatment P-Value P-Value with State-Level Fixed Effects Female 0.53 0.55 0.15 0.24 Skin color 0.64 0.62 0.02 0.00 Years of Education 0.55 0.57 0.00 0.49 Income 0.21 0.23 0.07 0.78 Age 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.98

Immigrant Generation Newcomer (in US < 5 years) 0.26 0.25 0.44 0.70 First Generation 0.05 0.06 0.50 0.69 Second Generation and above 0.02 0.03 0.75 0.88

Country of Origin/ Ancestry

Cuban 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.29 Dominican 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.56 Mexican 0.82 0.75 0.00 0.55 Puerto Rican 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 Salvadoran 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00

Bolded entries are significant at the p<.05 level. All continuous independent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. Analysis uses the revised national weights and is limited to respondents of Cuban, Dominican, Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Salvadoran origin or ancestry.

6 Nothing in the methodological descriptions provided by Geoscape, or in follow-up communications, account for these differences. However, to bias the analysis, the variables would need to be related to the outcome variable, meaning that they would need to pick up the effects of the “post-protest” variable. As an additional robustness check, I ran separate regressions including the treatment variable (“post-protest”) and then excluding that variable. With the variable excluded, both the coefficients and statistical significance of the other variables remained virtually identical, indicating that the control variables are capturing a separate phenomenon than the main variable of interest. 118

Likewise, I run separate tests for each national origin subgroup. When limited to

Dominicans, Cubans, or Puerto Ricans, no statistically significant demographic differences persist between the treatment and control groups; among Salvadorans,

Spanish speakers are over-represented in the treatment group but no other differences appear. Confining the analysis to specific subgroups thus serves the dual purpose of refining the proposed theory and operating as an additional robustness check of the results.

Additionally, while a month-by-month analysis would have been ideal, over the course of data collection, significant variation exists in both the number of people surveyed each month and the characteristics of these respondents, posing further problems for the quasi-experimental research design. As a further robustness check, however, I also run the models using dummy variables for each month (See Appendix C,

Table 4.2). These models generally confirm the results presented below.

Results I: Feeling American - Full Sample

Beginning with the main variable of interest, the “post-protest” treatment variable,

Figure 4.1 presents a simple histogram using the weighted LNS data. The graph indicates preliminary support for H1, which hypothesized that respondents surveyed during and after the spring 2006 immigration activities were more likely to self-identify as American than those in the pre-protest control group. Specifically, in the time period following the protests, the number of respondents indicating they did “not at all” feel American declined substantially, while a corresponding increase appears in the number indicating they “very strongly” feel American.

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Figure 4.1 Pre- and Post- Protest Level of Identification as American

How strongly (or not) do you feel American? 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% Pre-Protest ("Control") 20% Post-Protest ("Treatment") 15% 10% 5% 0% Not at All Not Very Somewhat Very Strongly Strongly Strongly

Given the quasi-experimental research design, however, and particularly in light of potential issues regarding randomization, multivariate models are essential to test these differences. The results presented in Table 4.1 test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 using data from the full LNS sample, incorporating a range of control variables from literature on immigrant incorporation and assimilation.7

The model in column one indicates support for the first hypothesis: holding all else equal, respondents interviewed in the post-protest treatment group are more likely to feel

American than those interviewed earlier. In terms of predicted probabilities, women are

3% more likely and men are 4% more likely to identify as “very strongly” American following the protests.8

7All models use robust standard errors, and all continuous variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. 8 Predicted probabilities are calculated with all continuous variables held at their mean, and dummy variables held at their modal value (post-protest=1, female=1, Spanish speaker = 1, respondent is born outside the US but arriving more than five years ago.) All predicted probabilities reported above use the same prototype respondent; full list available upon request. 120

Table 4.3 Effects of Spring 2006 Protests on Respondent Self-Identification, Full Sample

American Pan-Ethnic Country- "Blend" Maintain Unique Identity Identity of-Origin in the US Culture (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Post-Protests 0.19 0.03 -0.06 0.29 -0.14 (0.07) (0.66) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) Female -0.40 0.21 0.15 -0.24 0.33 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) Skin color 0.19 -0.07 -0.20 0.32 0.07 (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) Survey in Spanish -0.94 0.37 -0.01 0.85 0.50 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) Age 1.86 -0.57 -0.48 1.70 -0.17 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) Years of Education 0.98 0.23 0.48 -1.07 -0.21 (0.23) (0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.32) Household Income 0.43 0.23 0.01 0.02 -0.21 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) Immigrant Generation Newcomer -0.12 - 0.24 0.08 0.22 - 0.19 (in US < 5 years) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) First Generation 0.74 0.30 -0.22 -0.13 0.20 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) Second Generation 1.64 -0.29 -1.07 -0.46 -0.08 and Above (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) Pseudo R-Squared 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.02 N 5470 5489 5491 5403 5480

Ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors. The first three dependent variables are the degree to which a respondent self-identifies as American, with a pan-ethnic identity, and with their country of ancestral origin, on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly). The fourth and fifth dependent variables, opinions about whether Latinos/ Hispanics should change to blend in the United States and maintain a distinct culture, are measured on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 3 (very important). All continuous variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Bolded entries are significant at the p<.05 level. State-level fixed effects are used, with respondents from DC, Maryland and Virginia combined as one category representing the DC Metropolitan area.

As illustrated in column (2), no support can be found for H2, which hypothesized that heightened racial profiling and discrimination would increase the likelihood that

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respondents in the treatment group self-identify with a Hispanic/ Latino pan-ethnic identifier. Indeed, the percentage of respondents who self-identify with a pan-ethnic identifier and with one’s ancestral country-of-origin remains consistently high across both the treatment and control groups, which may preclude any significant shift from occurring.9 Nevertheless, this finding goes against much of the existing literature, which posits that the spring 2006 events would result in greater pan-ethnic sentiment for all

Latinos. Previous scholarship emphasizes the construction of a pan-ethnic identity as a vehicle for political mobilization. However, the 2006 immigration events emphasized an

American – rather than pan-ethnic – identity, and changes in self-identification follow the same pattern.

The results of the third column support H3, which hypothesized that no change would be seen in the extent to which respondents self-identify with their country-of- origin. I find that empirically, no tradeoff occurs between identities. Rather, self- identification with a particular group can be “activated” without impacting the level of identification with another group. These findings, coupled with the high numbers of respondents across all categories employing pan-ethnic and country-of-origin identifiers, suggest a high level of stability with respect to these identities across the Latino population. In contrast, for certain subgroups of Latinos, an American identity may be more fluid.

Turning to the two additional dependent variables regarding the maintenance of a distinct Latino culture and whether Latinos should change to blend into greater American society, the Principal Investigators of the survey point out that, as with the questions on

9 Among the respondents included here, an estimated 91% “very strongly” or “somewhat strongly” identified with a pan-ethnic identifier, and an estimated 88% do so with a national origin identifier. 122

self-identification, respondents did not view these choices as zero-sum; rather, a positive relationship exists between the two variables (Fraga et al. 2010, p 52). When used as proxies for feeling “American” and “Latino,” the results in columns four and five essentially mirror the findings in columns one and two regarding the effects of the protest, with respondents in the treatment group more likely to support the idea that

Latinos should change to blend into larger American society, while no difference is evident as to whether Latinos should maintain a unique culture.10

In the previous chapter, I find that Latino men and Latinas define American similarly. Here, however, the coefficient on female is significant in the first two models.

In terms of predicted probabilities, women are 8% less likely than men to indicate that they “very strongly” self-identify as American. Likewise, they are more likely than men to identify in pan-ethnic terms. These findings are reiterated in models (4) and (5), with women less likely to express a desire to blend into U.S. culture and more likely to support a distinct Latino culture. Existing literature calls for a gendered perspective on political incorporation and socialization (see, for instance, Montoya et al. 2000; García Bedolla et al. 2007). However, the findings here run counter to scholarship emphasizing men’s preference for continuity with their home country, with women incorporating more easily in the U.S. through government and education programs (Jones-Correa 1998). These findings will be discussed at length in the following chapter.

Traditional sociological literature assumed that assimilation in the United States would follow a “linear” pattern in which successive generations become increasingly integrated into society (see, for instance, Warner and Strole 1945; Alba and Nee 1997).

10 In particular, the question about maintaining a distinct culture is informative, as responses to this question exhibit relatively more variation than the pan-ethnic identity question. 123

This approach has been challenged in recent years on a number of fronts. For instance, other scholars argue that for contemporary immigrant groups, “segmented assimilation” is more likely to occur (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997), with the interaction of certain characteristics, including English language skills, racial status, and socioeconomic background, resulting in varied outcomes for later immigrant generations.

With respect to language, literature on language politics (Schmidt 2002) as well as ethnicity (Horowitz 1985) underscore the importance of shared language in defining one’s identity. At the start of each interview, the respondent was given the option to complete the survey in either English or Spanish. This choice is employed as a proxy for the preferred language of the respondent. The high statistical significance of the language variable aligns with conventional wisdom and generally moves in the expected direction, with those who prefer Spanish far less likely to self-identify as American, more inclined toward pan-ethnic or national identities, and more likely to want to maintain a unique culture. In a discussion of focus group research conducted in conjunction with the

LNS, Fraga et al. (2010, p 127) emphasize that many Spanish-language participants also indicated an attachment to the U.S. and an American identity. This phenomenon is reflected in the finding that Spanish- speaking respondents are actually more likely to indicate Latinos should change to blend into American society.

In terms of skin color, beginning with Glazer (1993), scholars have emphasized the importance of race as a limitation to classic assimilation theory. Recent literature highlights the ways in which race can alter the opportunities available to immigrants

(Waters 1999; Itzigsohn 2009). Interestingly, the self-reported skin color variable is

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insignificant in almost all models; the one exception is that respondents who report having lighter skin are more likely to indicate a desire to blend in the US.11

The importance of economic status on ethnic self-identification is well-documented in existing literature (see, for instance, Chong and Kim 2006; Itzigsohn 2009). In the models presented above, however, income is significant only in the first column.

Holding all else equal, moving from the lowest to the highest income category increases the probability a respondent will identify very strongly as American by 8%; the effect of the “post-protest” variable is nearly half this amount, demonstrating the importance of including some measure of political context in studies of self-identification.

Interestingly, the income variable is not significant in any of the other models.

Drawing on segmented assimilation theory, we can hypothesize that the relationship between length of time in the U.S. and an American identity may not be linear. For simplicity, respondents are divided here into four categories: newcomers (respondents born outside the U.S. arriving less than five years ago); respondents born outside the U.S. arriving more than five years ago; first generation immigrants (respondents born in the

U.S. with parents born elsewhere); and second generation immigrants and above

(respondents born in the U.S. with least one parent born in the U.S.).12 Interestingly, the newcomer variable is insignificant across all models. Compared to respondents born elsewhere, those born in the U.S. are far more likely to self-identify as American, with

11 The true effects of the skin color variable may be limited by the fact that the assessments were self- reported and only a small number of respondents (14.7%) placed themselves in the two darkest categories. In an attempt to mitigate these issues, I also used a truncated version of the skin color variable, combining the 2 highest and 2 lowest categories to create a 3-point scale. Using this scale, skin color actually lost significance in the Blend model, and remained insignificant in all other models. 12 With respect to the post-protest variable, all findings presented remain robust when separate variables are also included for citizenship status. 125

predicted probabilities of 15% for first generation respondents and 38% for second generation and above.

Using data from the 1999 Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard National Survey on

Latinos in America, Masuoka (2006) finds that Latinos born in the U.S. are more likely to demonstrate a sense of group consciousness than immigrants, highlighting the fact that pan-ethnic identities are also constructions of life in the U.S. However, she divides the data into just two categories, immigrants and native-born respondents. In the present study, first generation respondents are more likely to think of themselves in pan-ethnic terms than those born elsewhere. Later generation immigrants, however, are less likely to employ pan-ethnic or national origin identifiers. The results about later-generation immigrants are consistent with the work of Garcia Bedolla (2005), who finds that given the stigma surrounding new arrivals, many established Latinos opt to distance themselves from their co-ethnics when the issue of immigration becomes politicized. Interestingly, respondents born in the U.S. are also less likely to share the belief that Hispanics should blend with larger American society, holding all else equal, compared to those born abroad. Moreover, immigrant generation has no statistically significant effect on whether respondents support maintenance of a distinct culture.

Results II: Identity, Language, and Ancestral Sub-Groups

Literature on intersectionality emphasizes the importance of looking beyond broad labels to understand the varied experiences of individuals who are multiply marginalized.

In the sociology literature on protests, the extent to which an individual identifies with a particular social movement represents a critical link underlying the transformation of identities. Despite widespread generalizations about the 2006 protests and increased

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feelings of discrimination across the Latino community, I hypothesize that these events had differential effects on the broader Latino population, given the varied salience of the immigration issue. Accordingly, the following section tests hypothesis 1(a), which suggests that the impact of the protests may vary for Spanish versus English speakers, as well as for respondents from different ancestral origin subgroups.

García Bedolla (2003) examines how language proficiency can contribute to identification among Latinos, and the ways in which language and identity may interact to shape attitudes toward immigration-related policy. Likewise, in a study of Spanish- language advertising, Abrajano (2010) finds that Spanish-speaking Latinos are more influenced by ethnic-based appeals than their English-speaking counterparts.

Specifically, she argues that receptivity to identity-based messages is conditioned on an individual’s level of political incorporation, with language preference used as a proxy for incorporation. Consistent with these ideas, I find that the impact of the 2006 protests on self-identification is not universal. Rather, the increasing level of American sentiment after the protests is concentrated among respondents who prefer Spanish. Table 4.4, below, highlights the differences between English- and Spanish- speakers.

As the table reflects, limiting the analysis to English speakers, the protests have no effect on the extent to which a respondent self-identifies as American. In contrast,

Spanish speakers in the treatment group are 6% more likely to indicate that they very strongly self-identify as American than those in the pre-protest group. As mentioned above, this finding is also an important robustness check, because most demographic differences between the treatment and control groups disappear when the sample is limited to Spanish speakers.

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Table 4.4 Effects of Spring 2006 Protests on English- and Spanish- Speakers

English Change in Spanish Speakers Change in Speakers Predicted (Standard Error) Predicted (Standard Probability Probability Error) (95% CI) (95% CI)

Post-Protests -0.06 -0.01 0.33 0.06 (0.14) [-0.08, 0.05] (0.08) [0.03, 0.09] Female -0.35 -0.09 -0.41 -0.08 (0.12) [-0.15, -0.03] (0.08) [-0.11, -0.04] Skin color -0.02 -0.00 0.33 0.07 (0.23) [-0.12, 0.11] (0.16) [0.00, 0.13] Age 2.50 0.50 1.58 0.35 (0.32) [0.40, 0.60] (0.23) [0.25, 0.45] Years of Education 1.68 0.40 0.65 0.13 (0.48) [0.20, 0.59] (0.26) [0.02, 0.23] Household Income 0.37 0.09 0.46 0.10 (0.21) [-0.01, 0.19] (0.16) [0.03, 0.17] Immigrant Generation Newcomer - 0.37 -0.09 - 0.15 - 0.03 (in US < 5 years) (0.31) [-0.24, 0.06] (0.11) [-0.07, 0.01] First Generation 0.66 0.15 1.02 0.24 (0.15) [0.09, 0.22] (0.21) [0.14, 0.34] Second Generation 1.71 0.32 1.03 0.24 and Above (0.16) [0.26, 0.37] (0.23) [0.13, 0.35] Pseudo R-Squared 0.11 0.04 N 2352 3118

Ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors and state-level fixed effects. The dependent variable in both models is the extent to which a respondent self-identifies as American. All continuous variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Bolded entries are significant at the p<.05 level. The change in predicted probabilities reflects the increase or decrease in identifying “very strongly” as American, with independent variables moving from their lowest to highest value. To calculate changes in predicted probabilities, all continuous variables are set at their mean, with dummy variables set as follows: male respondents interviewed after the protests, born outside the US, living here more than 5 years. P-value for all models = 0.00.

Interestingly, comparing the two models, there is a relationship between higher level of education and strong self-identification as American among both populations.

However, the income variable is significant only for Spanish speakers, suggesting that for 128

this population, a combination of socioeconomic factors may be more important contributors to self-identification choices.

In addition to linguistic ties, existing literature highlights variation in self- identification among Latinos when disaggregated by country-of-origin (see, eg, García

2003; Segura and Bowler 2005), and Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 demonstrates this variation within the LNS sample with respect to an American identity. Given the distinct legal status of different ancestral origin subgroups, the issue of immigration also has varied salience for these subpopulations, reflected in distinct attitudes on immigration issues.

For instance, LNS respondents were asked about their preferred policy choice for dealing with undocumented or illegal immigrants in the United States. The most liberal of these options, “immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants,” received support from just 25% of Puerto Ricans and 39% of Cubans, compared to 49% of Mexicans and over 50% of Dominicans and Salvadorans. These differences persist in multivariate models with a range of control variables.

Drawing on these propositions, I hypothesize that the impact of the spring 2006 protests will differ based on a respondent’s country-of-origin, with the strongest effect seen among Mexicans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans. I anticipate little or no effect on

Puerto Ricans, who are U.S. citizens, and Cubans, who receive special legal protections.

The results of this analysis are included in Table 4.5.

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Table 4.5 Effects of Spring 2006 Protests on American Self-Identification, by Ancestral Subgroup Cuban Dominican Mexican Puerto Rican Salvadoran (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Post-Protests 0.26 0.61 0.21 -0.21 -0.21 (0.36) (0.21) (0.06) (0.19) (0.24) Female 0.17 0.14 -0.47 -0.40 -0.52 (0.23) (0.30) (0.07) (0.16) (0.37) Skin color 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.28 (0.35) (0.28) (0.14) (0.33) (0.51) Survey in Spanish -0.96 -0.99 -0.88 -0.50 -0.80 (0.20) (0.34) (0.10) (0.02) (0.18) Age 1.99 0.39 1.6 1.95 0.85 (0.35) (0.10) (0.22) (0.41) (0.90) Years of Education -0.96 0.04 0.95 1.83 1.21 (0.20) (0.49) (0.23) (0.42) (0.75) Household Income 1.36 0.30 0.48 -0.08 -0.19 (0.21) (0.55) (0.08) (0.27) (0.37) Immigrant Generation Newcomer -0.11 - 1.15 - 0.05 - 0.81 - 0.38 (in US < 5 years) (0.26) (0.27) (0.14) (0.27) (0.36) First Generation 0.12 -0.15 0.79 0.90 0.91 (0.53) (0.45) (0.11) (0.15) (0.45) Second Generation 0.18 -1.69 1.89 0.86 1.18 and Above (0.64) (0.64) (0.12) (0.27) (1.07) Pseudo R-Squared 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.06 N 298 234 4050 620 268

Ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, clustered by state. The dependent variable in both models is the extent to which a respondent self-identifies as American. All continuous variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Bolded entries are significant at the p<.05 level.

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In Figure 4.2, below, the bullet represents the change in predicted probability that a respondent from a given subgroup will very strongly self-identify as American if interviewed in the post-protest treatment group, compared to a similar respondent from the control group. The line on either side of the bullet represents the 95% confidence interval.13

Figure 4.2 Change in Predicted Probabilities for Identifying as “Very Strongly” American, Pre- and Post- 2006 protests (by National Origin Subgroup)

0.23

0.21

0.13

0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02

-0.04 (Very Strongly American) Strongly (Very

-0.05 Change in Predicted Probabilities Predictedin Change -0.1 -0.13 -0.14

Cuban Dominican Mexican Puerto Rican Salvadoran Ancestral Origin Subgroup

13 Separate models are run for each subgroup. Because of the reduced sample size for some groups, the model uses state-level clustered standard errors rather than state-level fixed effects. 131

As anticipated, respondents of Dominican and Mexican origin or ancestry are more likely to indicate feeling very strongly American following the spring 2006 protests, with predicted probabilities of 13% and 5%, respectively. With respect to Dominicans, this finding is particularly important given the potential concerns regarding an imbalance in demographic characteristics between the control and treatment groups in the full sample.

Limiting the analysis solely to the Dominican population, no statistically significant differences persist on any demographic indicators, yet the shift in self-identification persists.

On the other hand, the confidence intervals for Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and

Salvadorans all cross 0, indicating a lack of statistical significance associated with these results. Because immigration issues are less salient for Cubans and Puerto Ricans, respondents from these subgroups are less likely to identify with the protest movement, and consequently, less likely to experience shifts in identification. At first glance, the

Salvadoran case appears more puzzling. However, the extent to which respondents perceive American to be an accessible category and the political socialization hypothesis of the previous chapter may help to explain this unexpected result. Indeed, in Chapter 3,

I find that Salvadorans are more likely than respondents from other subgroups to define

American in terms of ascriptive characteristics such as birthplace, language skills, and religion. Consequently, respondents of Salvadoran origin or ancestry may perceive

American to be a group that they are less able to enter.

Collectively, these findings demonstrate support for H1a, which posits that the effects of the spring 2006 immigration events on a respondent’s self-identification would be differential, and concentrated among groups most affected by the immigration debate. 132

More broadly, they illustrate the vast diversity of the Latino community, the varying salience of the immigration debate, and the importance of developing a more fine-grained understanding of differences based on linguistic, national origin, and other characteristics.

Discussion

This chapter extends the quasi-experimental research design introduced in Chapter

3 to investigate the “politics-to-identity” link, studying the effects of the 2006 protests on self-identification within the heterogeneous Latino population. In drawing inferences from the results, however, it is important to be mindful of potential drawbacks common to this type of research design. Sekhon and Titiunik (Forthcoming) highlight two primary issues: lack of randomization between the treatment and control groups, and faulty assumptions that result in the selection of incomparable groups. With respect to the first issue, I attempt to mitigate these concerns by testing the models across a number of different sub-samples that more closely approximate randomization between the treatment and control groups. Specifically, when I limit the analysis to the Spanish- speaking population, within which most demographic differences are diminished, and the

Dominican population, within which all demographic differences between the treatment and control groups disappear, the main finding that an American identity increases following the protest remains robust. To address the question of potentially incomparable groups, I also undertake a month-by-month analysis of the data (see

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Appendix C, Table 4.4). Again, the main finding remains robust, with the increase in

American self-identification concentrated between May and July 2006.14

While I suggest that the strategic message of the protests drove this shift in self- identification, a further limitation to this type of analysis is, of course, that a quasi- experiment can only approximate causality, and I am unable to isolate the causal mechanism with certainty. Rather, the shift in self-identification may be the result of media effects, increased discrimination, or some combination of variables related both directly and indirectly to the protests. Real experiments would be required to better understand what drives the politics-to-identity link observed here.

Nevertheless, in finding that the political events of spring 2006 change the way in which certain Latino respondents self-identify, my analysis provides increased insight as to the relationship between politics and self-identification. Instrumentalist literature from comparative politics and sociology research on social movements argue that political leaders, the press, and events can change the political salience of identities. I extend these findings to examine whether a period of public protest surrounding what is perceived to be an ethnically-targeted public policy measure may transform one’s self- identification, at least on a temporary basis. In line with this literature, I find that this shift is concentrated among those groups for which the issue of immigration may be most salient.

In a defining work on ethnicity and identity, Anderson (1983) posits that ethnic identities are uniquely modern, with the spread of mass media bringing people together and leading them to create “imagined communities.” Looking specifically at the Latino

14 Interestingly, all findings are robust in the month-by-month analysis except for one: the increased desire to blend into the U.S. evident above loses significance in the month-by-month analysis. 134

population, Rodriguez (1999) points to the efforts of Spanish-language media to construct a unified pan-ethnic identity among viewers. In contrast to more recent movements, however, the Spanish language press and political leaders emphasized a different message in 2006: that Latinos represent the many faces of America. While this message echoed the rhetoric of Latino advocates in the early twentieth century, those early movements generally represented a small segment of the Mexican-American community: middle-class citizens. In contrast, in 2006, a far more diverse group of activists embraced this message.

As Chapter 2 describes, popular Spanish language deejays underscored the emphasis that Latinos are American as they encouraged their widespread base of listeners to participate in the protests, while event organizers distributed American flags and instructed participants to leave their Mexican flags at home. I argue that this framing shaped self-identification among certain segments of the Latino population in a seemingly counterintuitive way. Moreover, given the widespread press coverage of the events, and the documented role of Latino deejays in building support for the protests as well as the message that Latinos are American, I contend that actual participation at events was not a prerequisite for treatment. In contrast to the assumptions of existing literature, which assumes that Latinos would experience an increase in pan-ethnic sentiment, I find that many individuals internalized the messages of the 2006 protests.

Consequently, they became more likely to identify as American. This shift suggests the power of leaders and events to transform identities in a complex fashion.

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Conclusion

While a number of scholars argue that political leaders, the news media, and events can have at least a short-term effect on one’s own self-identification, much of this literature is grounded in the notion of ethnic divisions, highlighting differences that can result in conflict between groups. Here, however, I examine a different strategy. As

Chapter 2 describes, during the 2006 protests, elites frame an American identity in an inclusive way that makes minorities increasingly feel as though they are part of a larger society. Chapter 3 demonstrates that this framing can effect perceptions of what it means to be American. The findings in this chapter illustrate the ability of events and messages to shape one’s very own self-identification. These findings have significant implications for the process of immigrant incorporation, citizenship, and more broadly, participatory democracy, as well as our understanding of the malleability of identity.

In sum, I examine the spring 2006 immigration protests across the United States, in which Latinos took to the streets in an organized fashion, emphasizing that they, too, are

Americans. Employing evidence from a quasi-experiment that occurred during data collection for the Latino National Survey (2006), I find strong statistically significant support for the hypothesis that Latinos are more likely to self-identify as American in the time period after these events. Highlighting the diversity of the Latino population, I suggest that these events have differential effects across the Latino community, based largely on the salience of the immigration issue for different subgroups. Looking by language preference, I find that the shift is concentrated among Spanish-speaking respondents. When disaggregating by ancestral origin, increased American sentiment is

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evident among Mexicans and Dominicans, for whom immigration is more pressing, and nonexistent among Cubans and Puerto Ricans, for whom it is not.

With regard to identification with a pan-ethnic (Latino/ Hispanic) identifier, and with one’s ancestral subgroup, I find no evidence of any treatment effect. This finding runs counter to the expectation of much existing literature, which assumes that contentious immigration debates result in greater feelings of pan-ethnicity across the

Latino population. Looking at the full sample, response to questions about whether

Latinos should change to blend with larger American society and whether they should maintain a distinct culture are used as proxy variables for the questions regarding

American and pan-ethnic identities. Mirroring the previous results, respondents in the treatment group are more likely to want to blend, while there is no change with respect to maintaining a distinct culture, holding all else equal.

Despite the findings in Chapter 2 that suggest Latino men and women share a similar perception of what it means to be American, however, I find here that, holding all else equal, women are more likely to self-identify as Latino and less likely to self-identify as American than men. In the next chapter, I turn to these results.

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CHAPTER 5

The Latin@ Gender Identification Gap: Male-Female Differences in Immigrant Self-Identification

This chapter shifts focus away from the 2006 protests to concentrate, instead, on another Latino subgroup: women. Chapter 3 finds that Latino men and women share a similar understanding of what it means to be American, while Chapter 4 suggests that women are less likely to self-identify as a member of this category. Drawing on scholarship that emphasizes the intersection between race and gender, as well as gendered differences in immigrant socialization, this chapter develops the latter finding.

Anthropological literature from across the globe highlights women’s roles in preserving traditional cultures and transmitting identities to future generations

(LaFromboise et al. 1990; Afshar 2003). Yet, literature from African American politics find that Black men are likely to have stronger feelings of group solidarity (Bledsoe et al.

1995) and stronger “nationalist” feelings than Black women (Gurin et al. 1989).

Focusing on Asian Americans, Masuoka (2006) finds no difference in self-identification between men and women. Within this broader context, where do Latino men and women fit?

Much of the existing literature on Latino men and women examines variation in political participation, public policy views, and approaches to leadership. This chapter examines a more fundamental question, focusing on the distinct ways in which Latino 138

men and women living in the U.S. perceive themselves. Accordingly, I test the extent to which intersectionality theories apply to questions of self-identification. In contrast to other chapters of the dissertation, here I examine identification with both an American and a pan-ethnic identity. I also study the extent to which individuals think it is important to blend in the U.S. and to maintain a distinct Latino culture. These latter variables build on the efforts of Chapter 3 to better understand what it means to be

American for different segments of the Latino population.

Recent scholarship suggests that perceptions of race and ethnicity are socially constructed, and are shaped by one’s experiences with a broader society (Anderson 1983;

Brubaker 2004; Chandra 2009). Indeed, in American politics, a significant body of research focuses on the development of a pan-ethnic identity, such as Asian or Latino, emphasizing that politics shapes identity choices, and likewise, identity motivates political action and behavior. However, more recent literature on ethnicity, identity politics, and intersectionality highlights the need to disaggregate identities, emphasizing that groups are not always as cohesive as might be assumed (Horowitz 1985; Brubaker

2004; Simien 2007; Hancock 2007b). This important theme is echoed throughout my dissertation. Earlier parts of the project focus on the varied experiences of Latinos from different national origin subgroups, and the relationship between identity, framing, and political events. Here, the focus shifts to another subgroup, examining the difference in self-identification between Latino men and women.

Traditional literature on immigrant populations assumed that assimilation in the

United States would follow a “linear” pattern in which successive generations become

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increasingly integrated into society (see, for instance, Warner and Strole 1945; Alba and

Nee 1997). Under the classic assimilation model, differences in American identity among immigrant populations would be relatively small, and proportionate to an individual’s time in the U.S. This approach has been challenged in recent years, with other scholars arguing that a “segmented assimilation” is more likely to occur (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). This theory suggests increased incorporation and participation is not a given among later generation immigrants. Rather, different characteristics can lead to varied outcomes among the second generation, causing them to assimilate into different segments of American society. Recent literature in Latino politics reiterates that the process of assimilation in the U.S. for Latinos can be highly varied and complex (de la Garza et al. 1996; García Bedolla 2005; Fraga et al. 2006).

The segmented assimilation approach points to the interaction between a number of individual and contextual variables including education, citizenship, English language skills, racial status, socioeconomic background and place of residence, as well as immigrant culture and group characteristics. In this chapter, I focus on another variable that remains relatively less developed in the segmented assimilation literature: gender.

Intersectionality research emphasizes the compounding effects that multiple disadvantages, such as race/ ethnicity and gender, may have on individuals (Crenshaw

1989; Hancock 2007a). Yet, while a tradition of research on immigrant incorporation emphasizes the different experiences of Latino men and women (Jones-Correa 1998b;

Jaramillo 2010), large-scale quantitative research examining the relationship between gender and self-identification within this population is lacking. I attempt to address this

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hole in the literature by examining whether a “gender identification gap” occurs in the ways that men and women self-identify. Specifically, I will address the following research questions: under what conditions do Latino men and women develop pan-ethnic and American identities? Do distinctly gendered patterns exist? Using data from the

Latino National Survey (2006), I will test these hypotheses by examining the extent to which comparable men and women self-identify as American and with a pan-ethnic

(Latino/ Hispanic) identifier.

Theoretically, this project is grounded in literature on intersectionality, which highlights the varying ways in which “categories of difference” such as race/ ethnicity and gender interact. For an immigrant population, pan-ethnic and American identities are both constructions developed while living in the United States. Consequently, these categories are particularly useful case studies for examining the differences in identity acquisition between men and women.

While self-identification is, by nature, an individual level phenomenon, it is also determined largely by relational comparisons with other groups and other possible identities (García Bedolla 2007; Abdelal et al. 2009). Thus, evidence of a gender identification gap suggests a distinction in the ways that Latino men and Latinas relate to society at large, including different relationships with politics and political incorporation.

By focusing on gendered differences in self-identification, I seek to develop a more basic understanding of the factors underlying identity formation and the fluid nature of identities within the heterogeneous Latino population, as well as the ways multiple disadvantages may contribute to self-perception. Given the role that identity plays in

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shaping an individual’s view on politics, policy, and political participation, a better appreciation of the process of identity formation among individuals with multiple disadvantages also has deeper implications for politics more generally (Jaramillo 2010).

As mentioned in previous chapters, traditionally, the Latino population in the U.S. has self-identified based on ties to their home country or ancestral origin rather than a broad, unifying identity (García 2003; Fraga et al. 2006). Drawing on data from the

1989-90 Latino National Political Survey, for example, Stokes (2003) reports that only one in four Latinos prefer pan-ethnic identifiers, and a majority prefer references to their specific nationality. As discussed in Chapter 4, pan-ethnic identities such as Latino/

Hispanic are thought to develop in response to situations of exclusion, particularly under circumstances where subgroup unity is politically advantageous (Padilla 1984; 1986;

Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000). Cohen (1999, p. 40) argues that marginal groupings are not voluntary; rather, these groups and identities rely on some shared characteristic.

Thus, we might perceive the development of a pan-ethnic identity in somewhat defensive terms, where individuals differentiate themselves from a broader society; in contrast, the development of an American identity is a process of seeking (and perceiving) inclusion with the majority.

Intersectionality and Identification

A growing body of literature emphasizes the importance of intersectionality in understanding the distinct experiences of different subsets of disadvantaged groups. For instance, feminist theorist bell hooks (1984) challenges early feminist thinking for privileging only the experience of white women. Legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw

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(1989) elaborates on this point, arguing that the multidimensional experience of black women is more than simply the combined effects of racism and sexism; rather, there is something unique about being a black woman that is not captured simply by aggregating the effects of gender and race. As Carter et al. (2002, p. 111) echo, the concept of intersectionality emphasizes that categories such as race/ ethnicity, gender, and class, are

“not separate and additive but rather interactive and multiplicative,” such that multiple disadvantages may shape and reinforce each other.

Crenshaw calls attention to those who are “intersectionally marginalized,” arguing that the common practice of focusing solely on the more privileged members of a disadvantaged group -- for instance, black men representing all blacks or white women representing all women -- places those with “multiple burdens” at an even greater disadvantage. This process minimizes the effects of racism, sexism, or social class, with profound legal and policy consequences. Focusing on Chicano and Puerto Rican movements in the U.S. in the 1970s, Beltrán (2010) demonstrates vividly the ways in which women did not fit neatly within the rhetoric of either group, nor with the feminist movement of the day. Scholars such as Cohen (1999) and Strolovitch (2006; 2007) further underscore the policy consequences of this homogenization of interests for intersectionally marginalized populations.

Intersectionality literature is commonly critiqued for remaining at the theoretical level, rather than being fully incorporated into empirical political science (García Bedolla

2007; Hancock 2007b). Beyond theory, however, three streams of empirical research have advanced significantly in recent years. First, a growing body of scholarship focuses on differences between men and women at the elite level. For instance, Clawson and 143

Clark (2003) demonstrate that black female political activists have distinct policy attitudes, while Hawkesworth (2003) examines marginalization of women of color in

Congress. Likewise, in a study of community leaders and activists, Hardy-Fanta (1993) highlights the different perceptions of Latino men versus Latinas with respect to political mobilization and participation (see also Hardy-Fanta 2006). Among her interviewees, she finds that “politics” has a different meaning to men and women: for Latino men, politics is narrowly defined in terms of voting, while for Latinas, politics is more inclusive, extending to social relationships and networking. Latina activists and legislators are more likely to view their roles communally, seek consensus, and use their connections to develop coalitions (see also Fraga et al. 2006). Because identity is a relational phenomenon, the different ways in which Latino men and Latinas perceive relationships in the public sphere suggests a different approach to self-identification may also develop.

A second stream of literature emphasizes the social construction of gendered stereotypes. Looking at U.S. society at large, Lawless and Fox (2005) find that stereotypes and gender socialization affect a women’s decision to enter into the public sphere. Research on populations with multiple disadvantages highlight the role of politicians and the news media in creating images of intersectionally disadvantaged segments of the population, such as “welfare queens” or “crack moms” (see, for instance,

Jordan-Zachery 2003; Hancock 2007a). For Latinas, these stereotypes tend to fall into two categories: Latinas are alternately perceived as “hot” and sexually promiscuous, or as obedient wives and mothers (Chavez 2008). As Chavez describes, Latinas are frequently portrayed as overly fertile, birthing large numbers of children that threaten to displace the 144

white population and potentially serve as “anchor babies” in a parent’s quest for U.S. citizenship. These messages undoubtedly send a distinct signal to Latinas that impacts their sense of belonging in U.S. society, potentially affecting both self-identification and incorporation.

A third, growing body of research focuses on differences in political attitudes, with a number of recent articles highlighting varying social and political views between

Latino men and Latinas (see, for instance, Montoya et al. 2000; García Bedolla et al.

2007; Rouse et al. 2010). These scholars examine different perspectives on social issues ranging from the use of force to immigration to gender roles. For instance, Rouse et al.

(2010) find that men are significantly more likely to perceive undocumented immigrants as helping the economy. Drawing on the lessons of this research, I argue that one’s sense of belonging in a host society has potential implications not only for political views, but for patriotism, participation and representation, all of which are characteristics integral to a democracy.

Research in psychology demonstrates the different ways in which women and men in the broader population develop identities (Gilligan 1982). Existing research on intersectionality suggests that Latino men and Latinas may have a different way of relating to the state and society, with Latinas more likely to emphasize relationships and build social networks, while Latino men take a more individualistic approach. Likewise, negative messages and stereotypes about populations with multiple disadvantages may change the extent to which Latino men and women see themselves as able to permeate different identity categories.

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To my knowledge, only two existing large-N studies address the potential gender identification gap among the Latino population, with both employing gender as a control variable. Analyzing data from the 1989 Latino National Political Survey, Golash-Boza

(2006) finds that women are less likely to take on any new identifiers in the United

States, and are most likely to continue to identify in national origin terms. In contrast to

Golash-Boza, using the 1999 Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard National Survey on

Latinos in America, Masuoka (2006) finds that Latinas have a stronger sense of group consciousness than Latino men.

In Chapter 3, I find no difference in the ways in which Latino men and women perceive the boundaries of the American category. Yet Chapter 4 suggests that the extent to which men and women actually include themselves in these categories may vary.

Indeed, as Hawkesworth (2003, p 531) writes, “The identities of women of color are constituted through an amalgam of practices that construct them as “other” (to white men, men of color, and white women), challenging their individuality and their status as fully human.” Based on this research, and drawing on existing political science theory, I develop the following hypotheses, which collectively suggest a Gender Identification

Gap between Latino men and women:

 H1: Given the emphasis Latinas place on connections to other Latinos

and minority groups, Latinas are more likely to self-identify in pan-ethnic

terms than Latino men.

 H2: Similarly, Latinas will be more likely to view themselves in national

origin terms than Latino men.

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 H3: Because Latinas face multiple disadvantages, they will be less likely

than men to see themselves as American.

Extant literature also calls for a gendered perspective on political incorporation and socialization (see, for instance, Montoya et al. 2000; García Bedolla et al. 2007).

For instance, Grasmuck and Pessar (1991) interview Dominican immigrants, who report that since arriving in the U.S., women are more likely to contribute to household income, while men are more likely to participate in some aspect of housework and child care.

Building on this line of research, Jones-Correa (1998aa; 1998b) interviews new Latino immigrants in Queens. He finds that men are more likely to prefer continuity, preserving, for instance, the status associated with their profession in their home country. In contrast, women are more likely to prefer change, as a result of experiences with their children’s education and other social programs and their new status in the U.S., with many contributing financially and having a greater say over the household budget.

This line of research leads to a fourth, competing hypothesis:

 H4: Given their greater status in the U.S compared to their home country,

Latinas are more likely to identify as American than men. Likewise,

Latino men are more likely to identify in national origin or pan-ethnic

terms.

Finally, the importance of social networks, such as friends, family, and colleagues, in shaping political attitudes and ideas is well-documented in existing research. (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Zuckerman et al. 2007). Feminist and psychological theory emphasize the importance of relationships in women’s development, and much of the research on Latina politics likewise highlights the role of 147

social networks in women’s political socialization and activism (see, for instance, Pardo

1997). Moreover, a tradition of research on the gender gap in political participation finds that a combination of childhood socialization, including variables such as parents’ income or educational status; adult socialization, such as employment status and other social network variables; and structural factors such as education and income all work to mitigate the participation differences between men and women (Andersen 1975; Welch

1977; Schlozman et al. 1999; Burns et al. 2001; Burns 2007). Drawing on these streams of research, and on literature regarding group consciousness (Dawson 1994), I anticipate that some relationship exists between one’s community and their identity:

 H5: Respondents with more diverse social networks, including those who

work outside the home and have children in school, are more likely to self-

identify as American. Those with more homogeneous networks

comprised solely of Latinos are more likely to identify in pan-ethnic or

national origin terms.

Data and Methods

In this study, I use data from Phase One of the Latino National Survey (LNS,

2006), to test whether a gender self-identification gap exists among Latinos, as well as to examine the role of social networks in self-identification. For the main dependent variables in this study, I focus on a series of questions regarding self-identification.

Specifically, respondents were asked, “In general, how strongly or not do you think of yourself as ______?” The questions were asked in random order, with American,

Latino/ Hispanic, and a national origin descriptor used separately. Respondents were

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given four options ranging from not very strongly to very strongly. I analyze three models based on these questions.

I also test two additional dependent variables regarding the extent to which an individual thinks it is important for Hispanics to change in order to blend in the US and to maintain a distinct culture, respectively. These variables are used as potential proxies for gauging feelings of similarity and difference, and also help to capture what it means for individuals to be “American”.15 Both variables are measured on a 3-point scale, from not at all important to very important. Notably, these phenomenon are not mutually exclusive; rather, in multiple surveys across time, Latinos tend to express positive support for both measures (Fraga et al. 2006; Fraga et al. 2010). Because the dependent variable is categorical and the responses are ordered from least to most (measured from 1-4 in the first three models and 1-3 in the last two models), ordered logistic regression is employed.16 State -level fixed effects are also used to control for state-context variables.

Results I: Gender and Self-Identification

As Table 1 reflects, the raw data of the LNS provides preliminary support for hypotheses 1 and 3, and no support for hypothesis 4. With respect to pan-ethnic self- identification, 66.43% of Latinas identify very strongly as Latina/ Hispanic, compared to

62.9% of Latino men. The disparity is greater in terms of an American identity, with

37.97% of Latinas identifying very strongly as American, compared to 45.51% of Latino men, a difference of nearly 8%. These differences are echoed when looking at the proxy questions: 81.84% of women believe it is very important to maintain a distinct Latino/

15 Given the relatively small amount of variation in the percentage of respondents identifying pan-ethnically (with 90.9% of respondents indicating that they strongly or very strongly identify as Latino/ Hispanic), the variable regarding the importance of maintaining a distinct culture is especially useful. 16 All models use robust standard errors, and all continuous variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. 149

Hispanic culture, compared to 76.13% of men. Likewise, 57.96% of women expressed support for blending into the United States, compared to 61.35% of men. Using only basic correlations, very slight support is found for the second hypothesis – 64.83% of women strongly self-identify in terms of their ancestral origin, compared to 63.76% of

Latino men. While some of these differences may appear minor, their consistency in direction points to a pattern of gendered differences in identification that suggest the need for further study.

Table 5.1 Self-Identification of Latinos versus Latinas -- "In general, how strongly or not do you think of yourself as….?" Latino/ Hispanic National Origin American Women Men Women Men Women Men Not at all 3.00% 4.61% 4.86% 5.09% 17.24% 12.17% Not very strongly 5.42% 7.28% 7.98% 8.87% 17.57% 17.16% Somewhat strongly 25.15% 25.21% 22.33% 22.28% 27.21% 25.17% Very strongly 66.43% 62.90% 64.83% 63.76% 37.97% 45.51% N 4573 3792 4586 3789 4535 3771

As Chapter 1 describes, across national origin subgroups, large differences exist in experiences prior to arriving in the United States as well as the incorporation experience of immigrants upon arrival (see also García Bedolla 2009). For later generation immigrants, these experiences may also be passed down by parents and grandparents. Nevertheless, the gender identification gap persists across almost all national origin subgroups. As Figure 5.1 reflects, for Dominicans, Mexicans, Puerto

Ricans, and Salvadorans, women are less likely to self-identify very strongly as American than men to a high degree of statistical significance.

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Figure 5.1 Percent of Respondents Feeling Very Strongly American, by Subgroup

70%

60%

50%

40% Female Male 30%

20%

10%

0% Cuban Dominican Mexican Puerto Rican Salvadoran

Interestingly, for Cubans, the pattern switches, with women feeling more

American than men. Pedraza (1991) highlights a number of reasons why different outcomes may be expected for Cuban-American women. For instance, in contrast to many Latino subgroups, because of the nature of the political crisis in Cuba, women and children dominated the early arrivals in the U.S. Likewise, Cuban women who emigrated to the U.S. were more likely to work than those from other Latino groups, in many cases seeking to maintain the middle-class status their family held prior to moving (Sullivan

1984; Pedraza 1991). Moreover, the different socioeconomic backgrounds of many earlier Cuban immigrants led to a disparity with other Latino groups. Consequently, even when Cuban women worked in the same industry as other Latinas, their employment

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often had a different meaning for themselves and their households (Fernandez-Kelly and

Garcia 1992).

To truly test the hypotheses outlined above, however, multivariate analysis is required. The results presented in Table 2 test the hypotheses using data from the LNS, incorporating a range of control variables from literature on immigrant incorporation and assimilation, as well as socialization and social networks (for a full description of the questions and coding for all independent variables, see Appendix D). This section will focus on the first four hypotheses, discussing the different demographic variables. The subsequent section will address the fifth hypothesis, and develop other potential mechanisms behind the Gender Identification Gap.

Table 5.2, below, confirms the idea of a Gender Identification Gap, with gender one of the only variables to retain statistical significance across all but one model. The models indicate support for H1 and H3, and no support for H2 and H4. Specifically, controlling for a range of demographic and socioeconomic variables, women are more likely to self-identify in pan-ethnic terms and less likely to identify as American than men, though women are equally likely to self-identify in terms of their country of origin or ancestry.17 Women are also more likely to express a desire to maintain a distinct culture, and less likely to want to blend into the United States. As we will see below, however, these latter dependent variables are not exact proxies for self-identifying in pan-

17 The change in predicted probabilities reflects the increase or decrease in identifying “very strongly” as American, with independent variables moving from their lowest to highest value. To calculate changes in predicted probabilities, all continuous variables are set at their mean, with dummy variables set at their modal values, with the exception of gender, as follows: respondent is male, Mexican, prefers Spanish, is born outside the US, lives in California, is a US citizen, has mixed friends and primarily Latino co-workers, has no kids in school, and works outside the home. 152

Table 5.2 Relationship between Gender and Respondent Self-Identification Maintain Pan-Ethnic Country-of- American Distinct Blend in the Identity Origin Identity Culture US (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Female 0.28*** 0.13 -0.39*** 0.33*** -0.22** [0.12, 0.43] [-0.03, 0.28] [-0.54, -0.25] [0.15, 0.51] [-0.38, -0.07] Skin color -0.01 -0.20 0.09 0.09 0.31* [-0.31, 0.28] [-0.50, 0.08] [-0.17, 0.36] [-0.25, 0.43] [0.03, 0.61] Survey in Spanish 0.39** 0.04 -0.78*** 0.50*** 0.74*** [0.17, 0.60] [-0.17, 0.25] [-0.98, -0.58] [0.25, 0.74] [0.54, 0.94] Age -0.69** -0.79*** 1.36*** -0.21 1.67*** [-1.10, -0.28] [-1.19 -0.39] [0.96, 1.75] [-0.69, 0.27] [1.25, 2.08] Years of Education 0.39 0.64* 0.58* -0.04 -0.84** [-0.13, 0.90] [0.10, 1.17] [0.10, 1.05] [-0.71, 0.62] [-1.37, -0.30] Household Income 0.27 0.10 0.28* -0.16 0.01 [-0.01, 0.55] [-0.18, 0.38] [0.01, 0.54] [-0.47, 0.14] [-0.26, 0.27] US Citizen 0.22* 0.01 0.59*** 0.28* -0.09 [0.01, 0.44] [-0.21, 0.23] [0.40, 0.77] [0.01, 0.56] [-0.30, 0.12] First Generation 0.22 -0.24 0.47*** 0.06 -0.09 [-0.05 0.50] [-0.51, 0.02] [0.23, 0.72] [-0.25, 0.37] [-0.34, 0.15] Second Generation -0.29* -0.98*** 1.40*** -0.13 -0.40** and Above [-0.55, -0.03] [-1.22, -0.73] [1.12, 1.69] [-0.41, 0.16] [-0.64, -0.16] Cuban -0.05 0.36 0.44* -0.15 -0.03 [-0.48, 0.38] [-0.10, 0.81] [0.03, 0.85] [-0.64, 0.33] [-0.43, 0.37] Dominican 0.28 0.08 0.20 -0.03 -0.15 [-0.22, 0.73] [-0.38, 0.54] [-0.17, 0.57] [-0.60, 0.53] [-0.58, 0.27] Puerto Rican 0.36* 0.68*** 0.36* 0.32 -0.28 [0.04, 0.68] [0.35, 1.01] [0.03, 0.68] [-0.0, 0.73] [-0.57, 0.01] Salvadoran 0.48* 0.02 0.13 0.39 0.34 [0.08, 0.87] [-0.34, 0.38] [-0.21, 0.46] [-0.12, 0.84] [-0.05, 0.73] Parental Education -0.35* -0.63*** 0.09 -0.23 -0.15 [-0.65, -0.05] [-0.92, -0.34] [-0.20, 0.38] [-0.55, 0.09] [-0.45, 0.14] Latino Friends 0.53** 0.71*** -0.70*** 0.70*** -0.17 [0.22, 0.83] [0.43, 0.99] [-1.04, -0.36] [0.38, 1.03] [-0.46, 0.12] Mixed Friends 0.43** 0.61*** -0.36*** 0.61*** -0.05 [0.15, 0.73] [0.35, 0.86] [-0.69, -0.03] [0.32, 0.90] [-0.31, 0.20] Latino Co-Workers 0.14 0.07 -0.09 0.22 0.26** [-0.08, 0.36] [-0.15, 0.29] [-0.30, 0.11] [-0.03, 0.48] [0.05, 0.48] Mixed Co-Workers -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.15 0.05 [-0.20, 0.17] [-0.19, 0.18] [-0.10, 0.18] [-0.06, 0.36] [-0.12, 0.22] Kids in School 0.10 -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.30*** [-0.05, 0.25] [-0.21, 0.08] [-0.09, 0.18] [-0.11, 0.23] [0.16, 0.44] No Job Outside the Home -0.50*** -0.02 -0.24 0.09 0.18 [-0.78, -0.22] [-0.33, 0.30] [-0.52, 0.04] [-0.30, 0.48] [-0.11, 0.48] Pseudo R-Squared 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.08 N 5182 5184 5168 5175 5403 *** = p<0.00, **= p<0.01 * = p<0.05 Ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors and state-level fixed effects, with California as the excluded state and Mexicans as the excluded national origin group. All continuous variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Brackets indicate the 95% Confidence Interval. P-value for all models = 0.00. 153

ethnic and American terms. Indeed, in several cases, an independent variable associated with increased strength of an American identity is also associated with a decreased desire to blend in the U.S. or an increased desire to maintain a distinct culture. Identity scholars examine the process of contestation through which the meaning of identity can shift

(Abdelal el at. 2006). The fact that these outcomes move in the same direction in the case of gender, but in the opposite direction with several of the control variables, suggests an interesting relationship between gender and contestation of identities.

Existing literature highlights the ways in which race can alter the opportunities available to immigrants (Waters 1999; Itzigsohn 2009). Nevertheless, as found in other chapters, the self-reported skin color variable is insignificant in almost all models; the one exception is that respondents who report having lighter skin are more likely to indicate a desire to blend in the US.

At the start of each interview, the respondent was given the option to complete the survey in either English or Spanish. This choice is again employed as a proxy for the preferred language of the respondent. As is seen in the previous chapter, language moves in the anticipated directions, with Spanish speakers more likely to prefer a pan- ethnic identity and less likely to chose an American one. Interestingly, however, respondents who completed the survey in Spanish were more likely to indicate a desire to maintain a distinct Latino culture and more likely to express a desire to blend in the U.S.

This finding reflects that for many respondents, feeling American does not equate to changing one’s culture. Rather, for many Latinos, “becoming” American may include preserving some aspects of one’s culture while adding or changing others. 154

With respect to age, moving from youngest to oldest, individuals are less likely to opt for a pan-ethnic or national origin identity. Older respondents are more likely to prefer an American identity, and to express a desire to blend in the U.S. The socioeconomic variables in the models are relatively weak, with neither education nor income impacting the extent to which an individual self-identifies as Latino to any degree of statistical or substantive significance. As segmented assimilation theory might predict, individuals with higher levels of education and income are more likely to self-identify as

American.

One counterintuitive finding is that respondents with a higher level of education are also more likely to self-identify with their country of origin. Interestingly, however, in specifications of the model that do not contain a variable for parental education, the education variable does not obtain statistical significance. This distinction suggests a possible inverse relationship between an individual’s own education and that of their parents. Individuals with higher levels of education are also less likely to express a desire to blend in the U.S. These findings suggest that more educated individuals may feel more comfortable being different.

Notably, U.S. citizens are more likely than non-citizens to self-identify as Latino or Hispanic, reiterating that pan-ethnic identities are also a construction of life in the

United States. While citizens are more likely to identify as American, once again, a counterintuitive finding emerges: U.S. citizens are also more likely to want to maintain a distinct Latino culture. This disparity further suggests differences in contestation over what it means to be American, and whether or not becoming American involves sacrificing one’s culture or background.

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Individuals who are second generation and beyond are less likely to identify in either pan-ethnic or country-of-origin terms. The results about later-generation immigrants are consistent with the findings in previous chapters, as well as with existing research which finds that given the stigma surrounding new arrivals, many established

Latinos opt to distance themselves from their co-ethnics when the issue of immigration becomes politicized (García Bedolla 2005).

Once again, however, the same counterintuitive pattern obtains, with later immigrant generations more likely to feel American and less likely to want to blend in the U.S. This repeated pattern of inverse findings indicates, for some segments of the

Latino population, a more multi-cultural understanding of what it means to be American: an individual can feel American without thinking they must sacrifice their latinidad, their

Latino traditions and culture.

Turning to the national origin subgroups, as in other chapters, Mexicans are used as the reference group. While Figure 5.1 indicates that Puerto Ricans are the most likely group to self-identify as American, with a range of control variables included in the model, that distinction is not statistically significant. In fact, in the multivariate model,

Cubans are the most likely to self-identify as American. Interestingly, both Puerto

Ricans and Salvadorans are more likely to prefer a pan-ethnic identifier than members of other subgroups. Puerto Ricans are also the most likely to self-identify in national origin terms, to a high degree of statistical significance. In contrast to other subgroups, Puerto

Ricans are born U.S. citizens; this dual identity from birth may change the identity calculus for Puerto Ricans compared to other Latino respondents. Indeed, as we saw in

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Chapter 3, Puerto Ricans are also less likely to emphasize the importance of birthplace for being American.

The change in predicted probabilities is illustrated in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.

Figure 5.2 Predicted Probabilities, Pan-Ethnic Identity

0.45

0.41 0.4

0.35 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.23

0.18 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03

American) -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19

-0.25 -0.24 -0.24 Change in Predicted Probabilities (Very Strongly Strongly (Very Probabilities Predicted in Change

-0.35 Female Survey in Age Education US Citizen 1st 2nd Latino Mixed Spanish Generation Generation Friends Friends Independent Variables Figure 5.2 demonstrates that women are 6% more likely than men to self-identify in pan-ethnic terms. In the Latino/ Hispanic model, the effect of gender is nearly the same strength as language, a well-documented variable in identity research (Schmidt

2002; García Bedolla 2003), with Spanish speakers 9% more likely to choose a Latino/

Hispanic identifier.

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Figure 5.3 Predicted Probabilities, American Identity

0.45

0.41 0.4

0.35 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.23

0.18 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03

American) -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19

-0.25 -0.24 -0.24 Change in Predicted Probabilities (Very Strongly Strongly (Very Probabilities Predicted in Change

-0.35 Female Survey in Age Education US Citizen 1st 2nd Latino Mixed Spanish Generation Generation Friends Friends Independent Variables The effects of gender are strongest when looking at the extent to which respondents identify as American, with women 8% less likely to say they identify very strongly as American than men, given the prototype respondent outlined above. By comparison, Spanish speakers are 19% less likely to very strongly identify as American.

Among the control variables, the strongest relationships exist between age (32%, moving from the lowest to the highest value) and second generation (34%) and very strongly self- identifying as American.

In sum, these models illustrate strong support for a Gender Identification Gap between men and women, confirming the first and third hypotheses and rejecting the second and fourth ones. Drawing on literature from intersectionality, the gender gap in political participation, and social networks, the following section will explore potential mechanisms for this disparity. 158

Socialization and Structure

The fifth hypothesis suggested that respondents with more diverse socialization experiences are more likely to very strongly self-identify as American, while those with more homogeneous experiences are more likely to opt for pan-ethnic or national origin identifiers. This hypothesis draws on intersectionality theory and literature on social networks. In addition, a tradition of literature on the gender gap in political participation in the general population suggests that a combination of socialization and structural causes account for much of the disparity between male and female participation rates.

For instance, Welch (1977) finds that differences in male and female participation are mitigated when structural and situational variables are examined. Sapiro (1983) argues that adult socialization, through family and work roles, plays an important part in explaining differences in male and female participation rates (see also Andersen 1975;

Clark and Clark 1986). Burns et al. (2001) confirm previous findings about socioeconomic resources, arguing that lower levels of income, occupational status, and especially education account for much of the participation gap between men and women in the general population. They also confirm findings about the role of institutions such as the workforce and other social networks, which serve as an important arena in which men and women can develop the types of skills that significantly decrease the participation gap.

The models in Table 5.2 include seven independent variables that attempt to address various aspects of socialization. Following the political participation literature, a continuous variable is included for parental level of education, to serve as a proxy for early childhood socialization. Two pairs of dummy variables are included to gauge

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diversity in social networks, looking at friendships and colleagues. In both cases, responses are divided into three categories: mostly Latino/ Hispanic; a mix of

Latino/Hispanic and either white, black, or Asian; and mostly white, black or Asian, with the latter category excluded as a comparison group. To capture an individual’s situational status, variables are included for whether an individual has children in school and whether the respondent works outside the home.18

Turning to childhood socialization, as the first two columns indicate, individuals whose parents are more highly educated are far less likely to self-identify in pan-ethnic or national origin terms. These findings again speak to the literature on segmented assimilation, as individuals who are born into a higher socioeconomic position are less likely to prefer “ethnic” identity options.

One of the strongest findings in the models relate to friendship networks.

Individuals who report having friendship networks that are primarily Latino/ Hispanic, and those whose friendships are primarily mixed (a combination of Latino/ Hispanic and white, black or Asian), are far more likely to strongly self-identify in pan-ethnic and national origin terms, and less likely to indicate that they feel American. Likewise, these individuals – even those with primarily mixed friendships – are more likely to indicate a desire to maintain a distinct Latino/ Hispanic culture. These results suggest that friendship networks play a strong role in individual identity choices, and demonstrate strong support for one component of Hypothesis 5.

In contrast, the other social network variables did not fare as well in the analysis.

Respondents whose co-workers are primarily Latino express a greater desire to blend in

18 In separate specifications, a variable was included for marital status, but that variable did not reach significance across any model. 160

the U.S., but this variable did not obtain statistical significance across any other categories. Similarly, and despite suggestions to the contrary from existing literature on gender and political incorporation, having children in school does not affect identity choice. However, respondents with children in school are more likely to express a desire to blend in the U.S. Finally, in contrast to expectations that individuals who do not work outside the home are less likely to identify as American, in fact these individuals are 12% less likely to report feeling Latino. Again, this finding underscores the fact that pan- ethnic identities are also acquired in the United States.

Existing research on intersectionality as well as scholarship on the gender gap in political participation suggest that variables related to social processes may operate differently for Latinas and Latino men. For instance, in a review of research on Latino/a political behavior, Montoya et al. (2000, p 556) find that in addition to one’s level of political interest, involvement in churches, organizations and children’s schools most consistently predict political turnout solely among Latinas, “suggesting that political socialization and institutions have a stronger mobilizing effect on women than on men.”

Likewise, Jaramillo (2010) and Pardo (1990) emphasize the importance of mothers’ social networks in driving political participation and activism in the U.S. (1990; 2010).

Moreover, literature on social movements from across the globe demonstrates the special role that networks of women can play in mobilizaiton; for instance, organizations such as

Argentina’s Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, a protest movement of mothers fighting for information about their children, who were “disappeared” by that country’s military regime during the 1970s, is but one example of the role played by networks of mothers in political organizing (Bouvard 2002). In an attempt to capture this variation, following

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Welch (1977) and Burns et al. (2001), the analyses below present separate models for men and women. As Burns et al. explain (2001, p. 50), utilizing a split sample “allows us to search for the sources of gender differences and to locate the context within which gender differences are constructed.”

For the two main variables of interest – pan-ethnic and American identity – I first ran each model without the gender variable, and then ran separate models for men versus women to see whether the significance of the social network variables changed. With gender excluded from the models, the biggest shift occurs with respect to working outside the home. This variable is not significant in the model with the female dummy variable.

However, when gender is not included as an independent variable, being a homemaker significantly decreases the likelihood of identifying as American, as is evident in Table

5.3, below. This distinction suggests that to some extent, the gender variable may be capturing the effects of homemakers who are not exposed to others through work.

However, only 15% of the women included in the LNS do not work outside the home, and gender remains highly significant in separate tests when homemakers are excluded from the models, indicating that employment status is clearly not the only factor driving the gender identification gap.

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Table 5.3 Respondent Self-Identification without Gender (Ordered Logit) Pan-Ethnic Identity American Identity (1) (2) Skin color 0.02 0.04 [-0.27, 0.32] [-0.21, 0.30] Survey in Spanish 0.39*** -0.73*** [0.17, 0.60] [-0.93, -0.5] Age -0.70** 1.35*** [-1.10, -0.29] [0.98, 1.72] Years of Education 0.40 0.43 [-0.12, 0.92] [-0.02, 0.89] Household Income 0.21 0.31* [-0.07, 0.49] [0.07, 0.56] US Citizen 0.24* 0.54*** [0.02, 0.46] [0.36, 0.72] First Generation 0.22 0.43*** [-0.05, 0.50] [0.19, 0.67] Second Generation -0.26* 1.22*** and Above [-0.52, -0.01] [0.97, 1.48] Cuban -0.04 0.39* [-0.47, 0.38] [0.01, 0.77] Dominican 0.33 0.14 [-0.16, 0.82] [-0.21, 0.49] Puerto Rican 0.38* 0.30 [0.05, 0.70] [0.00, 0.60] Salvadoran 0.47* 0.18 [0.08, 0.87] [-0.15, 0.52] Parental Education -0.04* 0.01 [-0.07, -0.01] [-0.02, 0.04] Latino Friends 0.57*** -0.73*** [0.27, 0.88] [-1.06, -0.41] Mixed Friends 0.48** -0.40** [0.20, 0.76] [-0.70, -0.10] Latino Co-Workers 0.10 -0.05 [-0.11, 0.32] [-0.25, 0.14] Mixed Co-Workers -0.04 0.09 [-0.22, 0.14] [-0.08, 0.26] Kids in School 0.13 0.01 [-0.02, 0.27] [-0.12, 0.14] No Job Outside the Home -0.38** -0.39** [-0.66, -0.11] [-0.66, -0.11] Pseudo R-Squared 0.02 0.13 N 5182 5182

*** = p<0.00, **= p<0.01 * = p<0.05 Ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors and state-level fixed effects, with California as the excluded state and Mexicans as the excluded national origin group. All continuous variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Brackets indicate the 95% Confidence Interval. P-value for all models = 0.00.

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Additionally, I ran gender-specific models, presented in Table 5.4, to test whether the social network variables have differential importance for women and men.

Table 5.4 Split Sample: Latinas, Latino Men and Self-Identification Pan-Ethnic Identity American Identity Women Men Women Men (1) (2) (3) (4) Skin color -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 0.22 [-0.42, 0.39] [-0.50, 0.36] [-0.35, 0.33] [-0.12, 0.64] Survey in Spanish 0.32* 0.49* -0.84*** -0.71*** [0.01, 0.62] [0.18, 0.79] [-1.10, -0.58] [-1.02, -0.40] Age -0.83* -0.63* 1.13*** 1.63*** [-1.41, -0.24] [-1.21, -0.05] [0.59, 1.67] [1.04, 2.21] Years of Education 0.62 0.18 0.72* 0.49 [-0.08, 1.31] [-0.60, 1.00] [0.76, 1.37] [-0.18, 1.16] Household Income 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.31 [-0.15, 0.66] [-0.11, 0.68] [-0.11, 0.61] [-0.08, 0.69] US Citizen -0.37* 0.10 0.63*** 0.51*** [0.07, 0.68] [-0.22, 0.42] [0.37, 0.89] [0.24, 0.78] First Generation 0.19 0.23 0.53* 0.43* [-0.22, 0.60] [-0.14, 0.60] [0.20, 0.85] [0.05, 0.82] Second Generation -0.34 -0.24 1.38*** 1.44*** and Above [-0.69, 0.01] [-0.62, 0.14] [1.03, 1.74] [0.96, 1.91] Cuban -0.5 0.02 0.76* 0.19 [-0.63, 0.52] [0.60, 0.63] [0.16, 1.35] [-0.38, 0.76] Dominican 0.39 -0.15 0.26 -0.06 [-0.18, 0.96] [-0.78, 1.08] [-0.21, 0.73] [-0.65, 0.52] Puerto Rican 0.29 0.51 0.25 0.46 [-0.16, 0.75] [0.05, 0.10] [-0.18, 0.69] [-0.03, 0.96] Salvadoran 0.67* 0.31 0.03 0.20 [0.12, 1.23] [-0.27, 0.89] [-0.44, 0.50] [-0.28, 0.26] Parental Education -0.62* -0.08 0.06 0.14 [-1.02, -0.22] [-0.53, 0.36] [-0.35, 0.46] [-0.28, 0.56] Latino Friends 0.27 0.59* -0.69** -0.75** [-0.20, 0.74] [0.18, 1.0] [-1.11, -0.26] [-1.28, -0.23] Mixed Friends 0.1 0.59* -0.27 -0.50* [-0.24, 0.26] [0.22, 0.96] [-0.68, 0.14] [-1.00, -0.01] Latino Co-Workers 0.01 0.25 -0.13 -0.04 [-0.28, 0.29] [-0.09, 0.59] [-0.38, 0.13] [-0.37, 0.29] Mixed Co-Workers 0.01 -0.08 0.3 0.16 [-0.24, 0.26] [-0.39, 0.20] [-0.20, 0.25] [-0.14, 0.45] Kids in School 0.01 0.22 -0.03 0.18 [-0.19, 0.21] [-0.01, 0.46] [-0.21, 0.14] [-0.03, 0.39] No Job Outside the Home -0.51** 0.26 -0.17 -0.62 [-0.81, -0.21] [-0.71, 1.23] [-0.47, 0.12] [-2.05, 0.81] Pseudo R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.14 N 2756 2426 2755 2413 *** = p<0.00, **= p<0.01 * = p<0.05 Ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors and state-level fixed effects, with California as the excluded state and Mexicans as the excluded national origin group. All continuous variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Brackets indicate the 95% Confidence Interval.

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As the first two columns of the table indicate, there is significant variation in the extent to which many independent variables impact male and female pan-ethnic identity choices. For Latinas, individuals who are U.S. citizens, have high levels of parental education, and do not work outside the home are all less likely to self-identify in pan- ethnic terms, while none of these variables reach statistical significance for men. In contrast, friendship networks do not obtain significance in the female model, but are the main social network variables that help to predict whether Latino men strongly identify in pan-ethnic terms. While women are more likely than men to prefer a pan-ethnic identifier, there also appears to be a divergent path to this choice.

For the acquisition of an American identity, much more similarity is evident among the independent variables. Still, however, friendship networks appear to play a stronger role for men than women, with “mixed friends” statistically significant in the male model only. Given the emphasis that existing literature places on the communal, relationship-driven aspect of Latina participation, the increased importance of friendship networks in shaping the self-identification of Latino men, versus Latinas, is somewhat counterintuitive.

In terms of the socioeconomic variables, in the split samples, neither variable is significant for men. The only statistically significant predictor of whether or not Latinas self-identify as American is years of education. This distinction suggests that in addition to the divergent role of social networks, structural factors may also underlie the Gender

Identification Gap. To further test this theory, I ran additional models splitting the sample across socioeconomic lines rather than gender. Using level of education, the gender variable loses statistical significance for an American identity when the sample is 165

limited to those with college education and beyond. However, the results for pan-ethnic identity were inconsistent depending on the cutoff point, with gender failing to reach statistical significance when the more educated sample includes those with some college, but again obtaining statistical significance when limited to those with a college degree and beyond. Looking at household income, the Gender Identification Gap disappears for both American and pan-ethnic identities when the sample is limited to those in the highest income category (respondents earning $65,000 and higher). While the present analysis does not support Hypothesis 4, which suggested that women are more likely to feel American because of their increased status in U.S. society, the findings regarding structural differences suggest that once a certain socioeconomic status is reached, at a minimum the gender gap is likely to diminish.

Conclusions

Drawing on literature from intersectionality, in this chapter, I test whether a

Gender Identification Gap exists between Latino men and women. Specifically, I hypothesize that because identity is a relational phenomenon, given their experience of multiple disadvantages, Latina women would be more likely to self-identify in pan-ethnic and national origin terms than men, and less likely to identify as American. Using data from the Latino National Survey (2006), I find support for the hypotheses that women are more likely to see themselves as Latino/ Hispanic and less likely to self-identify as

American. I did not find support for an alternative hypothesis which suggested that, given changing household dynamics in the U.S., women would feel more American and men more Latino.

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Moreover, I find that women are more likely to want to preserve a distinct Latino/

Hispanic culture, and less likely to want to change to blend in the U.S. In contrast, I find a counterintuitive result with respect to several other independent variables, which are associated with both a stronger American identity and either a stronger desire to maintain a distinct culture or a weaker desire to change to blend in the U.S. This inconsistency suggests that for many respondents, being American does not necessarily mean giving up distinct traditions, and suggests the need for further study regarding the contestation, or meaning, of an American identity for different segments of the Latino population.

With respect to the final hypothesis regarding the importance of socialization and social networks, I find more mixed support. Friendship networks appear to have a clear relationship with self-identification, consistently moving in the predicted directions.

Individuals who have primarily Latino or primarily mixed Latino and white/black/Asian friendship networks are more likely to self-identify very-strongly in pan-ethnic and national origin terms, less likely to self-identify as American, and more likely to want to maintain a distinct culture. The role of other social network variables, however, is less conclusive, suggesting that different aspects of social networks may influence an individual’s identity more than others. Moreover, particularly in the case of pan-ethnic identities, many of these variables operate differently for women and men. Finally, I find that once a certain socioeconomic status is reached, the gender identification gap diminishes. Collectively, these findings build on the broader arguments advanced throughout this dissertation about the need to disaggregate beyond the Latino label to better understand self-identification, and the larger immigrant incorporation process, for

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this heterogeneous community. Likewise, they reiterate the need for an intersectional understanding of self-identification that includes ethnicity, gender, and social class.

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

Over the last twenty years, the Latino population in the United States has grown and changed significantly (Junn and Haynie 2008; Fraga et al. 2010), extending to new destinations (Marrow 2005), and recently overcoming African Americans as the largest minority in most U.S. cities (Yen 2011). Given this population’s rapid increase and geographic expansion, Latinos stand poised to play a decisive role in the 2012 presidential election and beyond; indeed, a recent cover story by Time magazine proclaimed, “Yo Decido. Why Latinos Will Pick the Next President.” The feature article argues that support from large Latino populations in Colorado, Nevada, Florida and

Arizona could help to propel President Obama to victory even if he loses other seemingly critical states in the Midwest (Scherer and Dias 2012).

These developments demonstrate the need for an updated understanding of this increasingly diverse population, including the varying ways in which the immigration policy debate affects Latinos and the factors that influence self-identification, an important element of the broader incorporation process. My dissertation attempts to answer these questions by studying the varying ways in which political and social context

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affect the process of “feeling American” within different subgroups of the Latino population.

Throughout the dissertation, I emphasize two main themes. First, I explore the growing heterogeneity within the Latino community, highlighting the diverse experiences embodied within this population as well as the varied salience and effects of the immigration policy debate. This diversity also extends to an examination of gendered differences within the Latino population. Second, I explore the role of political events and framing in shaping identity, complimented by a study of the shift in identity-based messages by Latino movements over time.

Much of my project focuses on the Latino response to H.R. 4437, a far-reaching immigration reform bill approved by the U.S. House of Representatives in December

2005, and the massive protests against this legislation that unfolded across the U.S. in the spring of 2006. After a few early events featuring Mexican flags and a subsequent backlash, Chapter 2 illustrates that Latino political leaders and media personalities consciously worked to reframe the 2006 protests around the theme of Latinos being

American. I use data from the Latino National Survey (LNS, 2006), which was conducted before, during and after the 2006 immigration protests, to evaluate the effects of these efforts. Specifically, I demonstrate that in comparison to similar respondents interviewed before the protests, holding all else equal, individuals interviewed after these events are less likely to define American in closed, ascriptive terms (Chapter 3), and are more likely to self-identify as American (Chapter 4). These findings suggest the existence of a “politics-to-identity link,” demonstrating the ability of framing and

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political events to transform one’s understanding of identity categories as well as an individual’s very self-identification. Underscoring the interaction between public policy, protests, and the press, I suggest that given the extensive media coverage of the events, and the role of Spanish-language radio personalities in building support for the protests, actual participation may not have been necessary for individuals to be affected by the message that Latinos are American.

Specifically, Chapter 2 develops the core theoretical argument regarding political events and identity, focusing on the evolving rhetoric of Latino activists over time. I begin with a historical look at the early twentieth century efforts by the League of United

Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and similar groups. These organizations primarily represented middle-class Latino citizens, emphasizing assimilation and American-ness.

In contrast to these organizations, in the latter half of the twentieth century, Latino advocacy groups focused first on messages of cultural nationalism, particularly in the

Mexican and Puerto Rican communities in the 1960s and 1970s, and subsequently, on

Latino unity in the 1990s.

The 2006 protests marked a return to the earlier message of LULAC and other organizations, highlighting that Latinos are American. However, this contemporary emphasis on being American develops within a distinct demographic and political context. Indeed, Latino organizations no longer represent a small, elite group of U.S. citizens. Rather, in 2006, the “We Are American/ Somos Americanos” message served as a rallying point to unite a diverse community of individuals of varying socioeconomic background, national origin, legal status, and language proficiency. Additionally, while

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the early LULAC members sought to Americanize by demonstrating their high levels of assimilation (for example, by only speaking English), the more recent emphasis on being

American suggests a broader understanding of what this category may mean within the

Hispanic population. For instance, as I suggest in later chapters, many Latinos maintain that even as one becomes “American,” it may still be possible to maintain cultural distinctions.

In Chapter 3, I turn to the question of what it means to be American in ascriptive terms. Comparing Latino definitions of American with the perspectives of Whites and

African Americans, I find that Latinos and Whites hold relatively similar views about the importance of these characteristics. I also examine how individuals from varying Latino national origin groups define American, finding mixed evidence for political socialization effects. Specifically, respondents of Salvadoran origin or ancestry hold the most restricted view of what it means to be American, but fewer differences exist than anticipated among other subgroups. I suggest that El Salvador’s experience of U.S. involvement in that nation’s particularly bloody civil war may help to account for this community’s distinct definition of American. Finally, using LNS data, I introduce a quasi-experimental research design to test for changes in opinion among comparable respondents interviewed before and after the 2006 protests. I find that respondents interviewed after these events are less likely to associated being American with ascriptive characteristics across three out of four categories: being born in the U.S., speaking

English, and being white. This finding suggests the power of the 2006 protests to change an individual’s understanding of what it means to be American, shifting the very boundaries of this identity category. 172

Chapter 4 extends the quasi-experimental research design to test whether individual self-identification is affected by the protests and their strategic message of

Latinos as American. Existing literature assumes that this polarizing policy debate would result in an increased pan-ethnic sentiment among the Latino population. In contrast, I find that holding all else equal, respondents interviewed after the protests are more likely to feel American than comparable respondents surveyed before, with no change in pan- ethnic feelings between the two groups. Additionally, I demonstrate that this change is concentrated among subgroups for whom the immigration policy issue is most salient, including Spanish-speakers, and Mexicans and Dominicans. No statistically significant shift in self-identification occurs among English-speaking Latinos, nor among Puerto

Rican, Cuban, or Salvadoran respondents.

Finally, drawing on the literature of intersectionality, Chapter 5 focuses on gendered differences in immigrant self-identification, and highlights the importance of understanding the varied experience of multiple marginalizations. In Chapter 3, I find no difference in the ways that Latino men and women define American. Here, however, I find that women are more likely to self-identify as Latino and less likely to see themselves as American than Latino men. Likewise, Latinas are more likely to want to maintain a distinct culture and less likely to want to blend into the U.S. than Latino men.

These findings contrast with existing literature on gender and immigrant incorporation, which suggests that men tend to prefer continuity with their home country while women prefer change. This gender gap in self-identification further reiterates the need to better understand the diversity within the heterogeneous Latino population.

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In addition to these theoretical contributions, my research also presents a methodological contribution with respect to the use of surveys to conduct identity-related research. As Taeku Lee (2009) explains, traditionally static survey research methods are limited in their ability to measure a fluid concept like identity. Using a simple pre-post research design, I demonstrate one way in which surveys can be employed to capture a dynamic phenomenon by incorporating a shifting political context. Further, my research demonstrates that political context can have a substantial impact on self-identification.

These findings have important implications both for our understanding of ethnicity as a dynamic construct that can be activated or politicized by exogenous events, as well as the methodological approaches undertaken to study this topic. For instance, the increased likelihood that some subset of respondents self-identify as American following the 2006 protests illustrates the potential for incorporating events that may take place during data collection to further our understanding of questions related to ethnicity and identity.

Yet, this contribution also points to drawbacks of the existing research design.

As Lee further suggests, the depth of information that survey questions can provide on identity and self-identification are limited. In this project, I work to address these limitations by studying the strategic framing employed by Latino organizers during the

2006 protests, which highlighted that Latinos are among the many faces of America. To truly understand the mechanisms underlying the shifts outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, however, an actual experiment would be required. Moreover, qualitative research or focus group analysis would allow us to better understand what it means for Latinos to be

American, as well as the gender differences in self-identification found in Chapter 5.

These methods are two areas in which the current research project could be extended.

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Immigration Post-2006: Failed National Reform, State Initiatives, and Legal

Challenges

In the preceding chapters, much of the analysis focuses on the national-level debate over immigration reform during the spring of 2006. But, how has immigration policy developed since that time? In the short term, the immediate goal of the 2006 protests was attained, in that the Sensenbrenner Bill (H.R. 4437) failed to advance in

Congress. In contrast to the draconian legislation passed in the House, on May 26, 2006, the Senate passed S.2611, the Comprehensive Immigration and Reform Act, by a vote of

62-36. This bipartisan legislation, which developed out of a proposal advanced by

Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and the late Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), would have created an alternative path to legalization for undocumented immigrants. Vast differences existed between H.R.4437 and the Senate’s more moderate proposal, and neither bill advanced beyond an initial vote in their respective chambers (U.S. Senate.

109th Congress 2006).

In 2007, a bipartisan group of Senators again sought to advance a comprehensive reform initiative. Once more, efforts were led by Kennedy and McCain, in collaboration with Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), and Senators John Kyl (R-AZ) and

Lindsay Graham (R-SC). As a product of these bipartisan efforts, and through negotiations with President George W. Bush, Senator Reid introduced S. 1348, the

Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007. While numerous amendments to the legislation were considered on the Senate floor, ultimately, by a vote of 45-50, the Senate failed to invoke cloture, which would have been necessary to end debate and proceed

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with a vote on the legislation (U.S. Senate. 110th Congress 2007). The cloture vote, on

June 7, 2007, effectively ended any hope for the passage of a comprehensive immigration reform bill prior to the 2008 election. Moreover, Senator McCain’s continued advocacy for comprehensive immigration reform was widely seen as a weakness in his candidacy for that year’s Republican presidential nomination (Shear 2007). This perception may help to explain the strong anti-immigrant stance taken by all candidates in the current

Republican primary campaign. Indeed, all contenders have distanced themselves from the more moderate, bipartisan efforts espoused by previous Republican leaders over the last few decades, including President Ronald Reagan and both Presidents Bush

("Immigration and the Campaign" 2012).

In 2008, President Barack Obama’s campaign platform included national-level immigration reform, which he promised to implement during his first year in office.

Once elected, however, comprehensive reform fell behind other Administration priorities, and no legislative changes have been enacted to date (Scherer and Dias 2012). In March

2010, tens of thousands of immigrants rallied in Washington, D.C. to demonstrate their support for a bipartisan initiative drafted by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and

Charles Schumer (D-NY) (Preston 2010). Ultimately, however, Senator Graham backed away from these reform efforts, arguing no bipartisan progress could be made until 2012

(Dinan 2010).

Outside of the legislative process, President Obama has implemented a variety of changes related to immigration, sometimes moving in conflicting directions. For instance, during Obama’s first three years in office, deportations skyrocketed to 1.2

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million, far more than any other president in history (Ramos 2012). More recently, however, the Obama Administration enacted two policies more friendly to immigrants, emphasizing the goal of keeping families together. The first allows undocumented spouses of citizens to apply for citizenship without requiring them to leave the U.S. The second reprioritizes deportations, targeting criminals first, and providing prosecutors with discretion to waive deportation in cases where undocumented immigrants are charged only with civil violations and have strong ties to the U.S. (Scherer and Dias 2012). Based on an early review of pilot projects in Denver and Baltimore, estimates indicate that up to

39,000 immigrants may have their deportation cases closed as a result of this latter change (Preston 2012).

Looking beyond federal policy, in recent years, and in the absence of comprehensive immigration reform, the number of state-level proposals related to immigration has increased at unprecedented rates. According to the National Conference on State Legislators, in 2005, 300 immigration-related initiatives were introduced in state legislatures across the country, 39 of which were enacted. By 2007, the number jumped to 1,562 introduced, with 240 enacted. Those numbers have varied only slightly in the subsequent years, with 1,607 bills introduced and 197 enacted in 2011 (National

Conference of State Legislators 2011).1 Notably, these figures reflect a combination of both immigrant-friendly and punitive measures, though the vast majority of these proposals are punitive.

In general, the restrictive measures fall under three primary substantive areas. The first of these is enforcement, either by sending undocumented immigrants to Homeland

1 For 2011, these figures include all legislation introduced or enacted prior to December 7, 2011. 177

Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents or through enactment of

287(g) agreements whereby local law enforcement is empowered to cooperate with ICE on enforcement issues. The second category includes restrictions on employment, including mandatory use of the e-Verify system, a program administered by the

Department of Homeland Security that allows employers to check the legal status of employees, or criminalizing employers for hiring undocumented workers. Finally, a range of provisions seeks to make immigrants’ lives more difficult, including initiatives regarding drivers’ licenses, obtaining employment, or renting housing (or, in the case of

Alabama, nullifying enforcement of contracts with undocumented immigrants), as well as a range of English-only laws (Varsanyi 2010). These types of policies seek to drive immigrants to leave their state of residence through what Republican Presidential candidate Mitt Romney terms “self-deportation” ("Immigration and the Campaign"

2012).

More recently, anti-immigrant advocates have sought comprehensive “omnibus” packages calling for a combination of the reforms outlined above. The first of these laws,

Arizona’s Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070, the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe

Neighborhoods Act, was signed into law on April 23, 2010.2 Among other provisions, that legislation makes it a misdemeanor offense if immigrants do not have their documentation with them at all times; allows police to question anyone they believe may be in the U.S. illegally; allows individuals to sue local government or agencies if they suspect immigration law is not being enforced; punishes anyone believed to be harboring or transporting illegal immigrants; and includes employer sanctions (National Conference

2 A week after passage, the legislation was modified by Arizona House Bill 2162 (HB 2162) in an attempt to address some of the concerns regarding racial profiling. 178

of State Legislators 2012). Once signed, the law was immediately subject to legal challenge. Currently, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments on the legislation at the end of April, with a decision anticipated in June or July 2012.

Figure 6.1 Map of Omnibus Immigration Legislation

Source: The New York Times (Downes 2012)

In 2011, Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, Indiana and Utah all enacted omnibus immigration provisions modeled after Arizona’s law.3 In all cases, legal

3 Notably, however, the Utah law is more balanced than the other pieces of omnibus legislation. Under what is known as the “Utah Compact,” the state would balance tough enforcement provisions with the creation of special “guest worker” permits allowing undocumented immigrants to remain in the U.S. The 179

challenges have been filed, and either some or all of the laws have been enjoined.

Nevertheless, in the absence of a clear judicial ruling, by early March of 2012, five more states had introduced omnibus enforcement bills: Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi,

Tennessee, and West Virginia (National Conference of State Legislators 2012).4 A map of these state-level initiatives can be found in Figure 6.1, above.

Effects of State-Level Initiatives

As state-level initiatives increase across the country, their effects on the Latino community are far less clear. As Junn (2011, p 636) writes, “Policies at the federal level have operated in conjunction with state and local practices to shape the context within which immigrants experience and participate in politics.” Drawing on the lessons from my dissertation, I suggest that the impact of these proposals on Latino identification will be conditional on the local demographics and political context. Specifically, I speculate that the individual-level effects of these laws would depend on the national origin and degree of incorporation of the Latino community, as well as infrastructure within the local community, including leadership, messaging, population base, and Spanish- language media.

Indeed, in the aftermath of divisive state-level initiatives, the political repercussions have been mixed. Following California’s polarizing 1994 election, and the fiercely partisan debate over the Proposition 187 ballot initiative that sought to prevent undocumented immigrants from accessing social services, scholars found a short-term

Compact, which emphasizes keeping families together and supporting businesses, was backed by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, a strong political force in Utah (Goodstein 2012). 4 At the time of this writing, Mississippi’s legislation had passed the House of Representatives but stalled in the Senate, where it seemed poised to die in the Judiciary B Committee. Consideration of Tennessee’s bill has been delayed. 180

increase in Latino political participation in California, measured by indicators such as voting and naturalization levels (see, for instance, Jones-Correa 2001; Hajnal et al. 2002;

Ramakrishnan 2005). Latino identification with political parties has also shifted dramatically: the odds that a Latino living in California would identify as a Republican decreased from 34% to 12%, with a corresponding increase, from 38% to 63%, in the odds of identifying as a Democrat (Scherer and Dias 2012). In other states, however, the effects on civic participation are generally too soon to measure. Moreover, as Leighley

(2001) argues, the observed increases in political participation are likely the byproduct of not just the contentious policy debate, but also mobilization efforts and the work of

“political entrepreneurs” present in California.

In Arizona, as S.B. 1070 passed the state’s legislature and advanced to Governor

Jan Brewer (R) for signature in April 2010, protesters began to assemble around the state

Capitol in Phoenix. Small groups of protesters held prayer vigils and camped outside the

Capitol for over 100 days, until a July 28, 2010 court-ordered injunction prevented some of the most controversial parts of the law from being enacted (Nevarez 2010). Crowds generally ranged from a few hundred up to 2,500 (Coddington 2010), while a Memorial

Day weekend protest drew an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 activists (Price 2010; Wyloge

2010).5 Smaller protests also occurred intermittently throughout the state. For instance, in Tucson, thousands of protesters rallied against the law on May 1, with many wearing t- shirts and buttons with the slogan “no papers.” ("Thousands turn out for May Day rally in

5 This estimate is roughly half of the 100,000 people estimated to have marched on the Arizona state Capitol in 2006 (Bunk 2010). 181

Tucson" 2010). While counter-protests occurred in cities such as Tempe and Phoenix, their attendance numbers were considerably smaller (Wyloge 2010).

Soon after S.B. 1070 became law, Arizona’s Latino leaders called for a federal lawsuit against the legislation. Representative Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ), a Congressman of

Mexican descent, also advocated an economic boycott of the state (Davenport 2010).

Ultimately, numerous conventions were cancelled, and cities across the country sought to end business with the state to protest S.B. 1070.6 The entertainment industry also responded, with major performing acts including Hall & Oates and Los Lobos cancelling performances, protests surrounding a scheduled Major League Baseball game in Phoenix, and the Phoenix Suns dawning Los Suns jerseys in a May 5, 2010 championship basketball game to demonstrate their support for the state’s Latino community (Paulson

2010).

In the aftermath of S.B. 1070, Arizona’s Latino community also appears to have experienced an increase in civic participation similar to that of California. For instance,

Latino attendance at workshops designed to help individuals navigate the naturalization process increased fivefold (Scherer and Dias 2012). Moreover, results from a July 2010

AP/ Univision Poll in the field before and after the passage of SB1070 indicate that 39 percent of English-speaking Latinos interviewed prior to this vote said it is important to blend into society, compared to 54 percent interviewed after (Fram and Armario 2010).

This simple comparison, without multivariate controls, demonstrates that so long as

6 One estimate, conducted by Arizona-based economists for the liberal-leaning Center for American Progress, suggests that in the year following passage of S.B. 1070, Arizona lost at least $141 million in cancelled trips and conferences, as well as an associated $253 million in economic output and $9.5 million in tax revenues (Wolgin and Kelley 2011). 182

immigration remains hotly contested in the public domain, there may be repercussions for

Latino identity and incorporation, sometimes in unexpected ways.

Latino communities in Arizona and California are well-established, however, and the presence of these populations dates back many decades. In contrast, the response in

New Immigrant Destinations, where Hispanics are far less established, may be distinct.

As Table 6.1 demonstrates, like California and Arizona, the Latino communities in

Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina are all predominately Mexican (Pew Hispanic

Center 2012).

Table 6.1 Demographics of Latino Population in Select States

Latino Percent Foreign-Born Latinos as Population Mexican Hispanics Percent of Total (2010) (Percent) State Population Alabama 182,000 67% 51% 4% Arizona 1,909,000 90% 30% 30% California 14,092,000 84% 38% 38% Georgia 856,000 63% 50% 9% South 232,000 58% 47% 5% Carolina Source: Pew Hispanic Center (2012)

However, the migration of Latinos to the South is a much more recent phenomenon. In contrast to California and Arizona, where Latinos comprise roughly one third of each state’s total population, in the Southern states Latinos constitute less than

10% of the states’ residents, and roughly half the Hispanic population in these states is born outside of the U.S. (Pew Hispanic Center 2012). Moreover, the Latino population in the South is growing faster than any other region, with South Carolina (148%) and

Alabama (145%) experiencing the most significant growth of all states between 2000 and

2010, and Georgia’s Latino population nearly doubling during this time period (Passel et

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al. 2011). These demographic distinctions, coupled with the unique legacy of racial relations dating back to the Civil Rights Movement, yield a different dynamic in the fight over immigrant rights, further highlighting the importance of contextual effects.

In Georgia and Alabama, protests against the pending immigration laws are strongly colored by memories of the Civil Rights movement. For instance, in March

2011, as members of Georgia’s House and Senate worked to reconcile omnibus immigration legislation already approved by their respective chambers (H.B. 87 and S.B.

40), thousands of people gathered around the state capitol in protest. U.S. Representative

John Lewis (D-GA), a renowned activist from the Civil Rights era, called to mind that fight, proclaiming “We are all brothers and sisters. It doesn't matter whether we are black, white, Latino, Asian-American, Native American. We are one people. We are one family. We all live in the same house. If any one of us is illegal, then we all are illegal.

There are no illegal human beings" (Redmon 2011). As H.B. 87 advanced to the

Governor’s desk for signature, an estimated 1,000 protesters again gathered at the Capitol on May Day, chanting in English and Spanish, with some Latino protesters telling reporters of their tentative plans to leave Georgia (Brumback 2011).

In early July, as some provisions of Georgia’s law went into effect, the Georgia

Latino Alliance for Human Rights evoked the national “Day Without Immigrants” of

2006 by asking local businesses in the state to close and encouraging people not to shop.

Between 8,000 and 14,000 people marched to the Georgia Capitol in protest, with many carrying signs proclaiming “Immigration Reform Now!” While the crowd was primarily

Latino, a number of allies from the civil rights movement were also present (Haines

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2011). The following week, the Reverend Al Sharpton led another rally of several hundred people at the state Capitol (Diamond 2011).

Likewise, at a series of rallies unfolding across Alabama since last spring, thousands of Latino activists have been joined by members of the African American community and labor unions in protesting the state’s far-reaching omnibus legislation,

House Bill 56 (H.B. 56), considered to be the strictest in the country (Roberston 2011).

While most legislation modeled after Arizona’s S.B. 1070 includes a combination of provisions that allow law enforcement officials to check a person’s legal statues; enable residents to sue state and local agencies for noncompliance with immigration laws; require employment verification; and require immigrants to carry legal documentation at all times, Alabama’s law goes a step further by requiring schools to verify the immigration status of their students (National Conference of State Legislators 2012).

In March 2011, as the legislation advanced in Alabama’s House of

Representatives, an estimated 150 people protested outside the Alabama State House.

Drawing on the state’s historic legacy of civil rights struggle, State Representative

Merika Coleman (D-Birmingham) explained, "I think that it is pretty ironic that we are in the city of Montgomery, and I am from the city of Birmingham, where people fought to be treated like human beings, and now they are trying to take that away. I say 'no' to that" (Sell 2011). Protesters held signs with phrases such as “Stop Juan Crow” (Ellington

2011a). In August 2011, days before the immigration law was to go into effect, another rally at the state Capitol drew hundreds of protesters. Invoking the words of the late

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Reverend Martin Luther King, organizers emphasized a message of solidarity (Griffin

2011).

On October 13, 2011, organizers in Alabama also called for a “Day Without

Immigrants,” in which many local businesses closed across the state. One organizer estimated that nearly 300,000 people in Alabama did not make any purchases as a result of their efforts, though these figures were not independently verified (Fleischauer 2011).7

On the day of the boycott, thousands of Hispanic students protested across the state, with

5,143 reported absent from school (Ellington 2011b). Throughout the week, smaller protests also took place across Alabama. For instance, in Athens, Alabama, an estimated

300 people gathered, carrying a combination of Mexican, Guatemalan, and American flags (Burkett 2011). In December 2011, immigrant and civil rights leaders from

Alabama rallied in opposition to H.B. 56, alongside members of the NAACP, the

National Council of La Raza (NCLR), and the Service Employees International Union from over twenty states. Organizers estimate that 2,500 people assembled on the steps of the state Capitol, with many carrying signs reading, “One Family, One Alabama”

(Okarmus 2011).

In early 2012, the wave of protests continued. The Alabama Coalition for

Immigrant Justice organized a lobbying day in February during which activists asked for the repeal of H.B. 56. Afterward, hundreds of Latinos, civil rights activists, members of the religious community, and union members joined in protest, chanting slogans including, "Una familia, una Alabama" (One Family, One Alabama) and "Sí se puede"

7 Indeed, given that Alabama’s total Latino population is estimated at 182,000 (Pew Hispanic Center 2012), this figure may be unrealistically high. 186

(Yes we can) (Lyman 2011). La Jefa Radio, the largest Spanish-language radio station in Alabama, and radio personality Orlando Rosa have helped to spearhead the state’s more recent events, including a reenactment of the historic March 1965 Selma-to-

Montgomery March. The March 2012 event, which protested both the immigration bill and a new voter identification law, featured key civil rights leaders such as the Reverend

Al Sharpton, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, and Congressman John Lewis (D-GA), as well as Martin Luther King III (National Public Radio 2012). The 50-mile march lasted nearly a week, and at its conclusion, an estimated 2,000 people rallied at the state Capitol, calling for the repeal of H.B. 56 (VacLav 2012). Protesters sang traditional African

American songs such as “Lift Every Voice and Sing” and “We Shall Overcome,” and carried signs proclaiming, “We are all immigrants," and "United for voting rights and immigrant rights. Repeal H.B. 56” (White 2012). In contrast to the Arizona survey that indicated Latinos increasingly wanted to blend in the U.S., Latino communities in

Alabama and Georgia are embracing a broader civil rights struggle that emphasizes diversity as part of the American experience.

Contrary to the increase in naturalization and voting rates seen in Arizona and

California, however, large numbers of Latinos living in Alabama and Georgia, legal and illegal alike, have fled their communities in the wake of the states’ omnibus legislation.

While estimates are difficult to attain, anecdotes of families packing up and leaving abound (Robertson 2011). After Alabama’s legislation went into effect, and a judicial ruling upheld the provision allowing schools to check the immigration status of newly enrolled students, many Latinos left the state or withdrew their children from school; on the Friday following the court’s ruling, across the state, 1,988 Latino students, an 187

estimated 5% of the Latino school population, were reportedly absent (Robertson 2011).

Given the particular harshness of Alabama’s law, reports indicate that large numbers of

Alabama’s Latinos who have opted to remain in the state are still living in fear, in many cases too scared to appear at protests or give their full name to reporters (National Public

Radio 2012).

The core argument of this dissertation is that political events can shape an individual’s idea of what it means to be American, and whether or not he or she is included in that category. While the bulk of this project focuses on the 2006 protests, and the experience of “becoming” American, the fleeing of Latino residents from Alabama and Georgia represents the opposite extreme, demonstrating the ways in which contentious debate and legislation can make even some Latinos residing legally in the

U.S. feel like an unwelcome “other.” Indeed, the exodus of numerous Latinos from

Georgia and Alabama demonstrates that the “politics-to-identity link” can yield multiple outcomes.

In 2008, South Carolina enacted the South Carolina Illegal Immigration Reform

Act (H. 4400), which required employers to verify the legal status of all eligible employees. At the time the law was signed, it was considered one of the toughest in the country (Wenger 2008). When South Carolina revisited the issue of immigration in 2011, it strengthened and expanded this earlier legislation. In June 2011, Senate Bill 20 (S.B.

20) was signed into law. This legislation makes it a misdemeanor for aliens to leave the house without legal documentation; requires police in the state to notify federal authorities if an individual is suspected of being in the country illegally; makes it a felony

188

to create false identification for undocumented immigrants, and creates a new police force to enforce this provision; prohibits undocumented immigrants from receiving most state or local public benefits; and makes it illegal to transport, protect or harbor an undocumented immigrant (National Conference on State Legislators 2012).

As the legislature moved toward consideration of the bill, in April 2011, protest prayer vigils were organized in opposition to the legislation ("Learn more about immigration issues" 2011). Yet searches conducted on LexisNexis and Google yielded no reports of widespread protests anywhere near the size or scope of those witnessed in

Alabama or Georgia. While South Carolina’s Latino community is slightly larger than

Alabama’s, I speculate that the smaller number of protests may potentially be the result of a variety of factors, including weaker local infrastructure and/ or alliances with the

African American community; more national attention on the Alabama legislation, given the harshness of the law’s provisions; the pre-existence of stringent immigration-related legislation in South Carolina; and Alabama’s distinct historical legacy of civil rights protest. This distinction illustrates that it is not just the debate surrounding a harsh public policy, but the interaction between policy, social movements, and the media that help to drive the “politics-to-identity link.”

While some civil rights undertones existed, to the extent that protests took place in South Carolina, these events were couched primarily in religious terms and led by the faith communities. In December 2011, a South Carolina District Court heard arguments over the state’s law. Prior to the hearing, members of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities united to hold another round of prayer vigils in Columbia, Charleston,

189

Greenville, Spartanburg and Hilton Head Island. The events were organized by the newly established South Carolina Immigrants Rights Coalition ("Groups to protest SC immigration law with prayer" 2011). On December 19, when a South Carolina District

Court heard arguments over the law, between 100-200 protesters marched from the courthouse to a downtown park for the “S.B. 20 Peace and Unity Rally,” with four bishops from different denominations leading prayers against the law (Brown 2011;

Phillips 2011). As the case of South Carolina demonstrates, contentious immigration legislation and a fast-growing Latino population are, on their own, not necessary preconditions for widespread protests. The response in South Carolina further underscores the diversity of experiences that Latinos may have in the United States.

Defining American at the State Level

Immediately following the enactment of Alabama’s immigration law, a New York

Times editorial implored, “President Obama needs to show stronger leadership in defending core American values in the face of the hostility that has overtaken Alabama and so many other states” ("Alabama's Shame" 2011). Indeed, it is clear that the immigration policy debate remains central to defining American values and who is included in that category. More broadly, the spread of omnibus legislation signals a renewed dispute, at the state level, over what it means to be American and who we are as a nation. While these topics were previously thought to be decided at the federal level, as the recent events in Georgia and Alabama remind us, many of the most important civil rights battles of the past were fought on the ground at the state and local level.

190

Within the Latino population, the debate also points to a deeper question over the contestation of an American identity. As my dissertation demonstrates, the immigration debate can change perceptions of what it means, ascriptively, to be American, as well as opinions about whether Latinos are American, and whether they should change to blend into the United States. As Barvosa (2011, p 560) describes, ”For many mainstream

Americans, the belief that immigrants and their descendants must become like them – white, monolingual English speakers, identified only with mainstream American ethnic culture – is a component of their identity as Americans.” For Latinos, however, is blending into broader society an essential part of becoming American? If so, is it necessary to give up a distinct culture in this process? And, if not, will Latinos ever be accepted or considered “American” by others?

My dissertation demonstrates the ways in which national political context can alter views about self-identification. However, the increasing variation in state and local policy, and the distinctive community responses, suggests the ongoing policy debate may affect the Latino population in myriad ways depending not only on one’s country of origin or ancestry and level of assimilation, but also on one’s local political context.

Even as the Supreme Court moves to address Arizona’s immigration law, the patchwork of state and local immigration politics expands, suggesting that these answers may be continually re-defined in the months and years to come. Indeed, in the wake of these policy developments, my project suggests the need for future research to better understand the effect of state and local provisions, as well as the importance of organizational infrastructure and alliances with other community groups at the local level.

With Latinos comprising far more of the population growth in the U.S. than any other

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demographic group, the answer to these questions could shape the very face, and character, of America moving forward.

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216

APPENDIX A

Supplemental Information for Chapter 2.

Table 2.1. Major Legal Milestones in Immigration Law, 1870-Present

1790 Establishment of Naturalization Rule

1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo annexes significant amount of Mexican territory, adding an estimated 75,000 new citizens.

1870s Supreme Court ended state control over immigration policy, asserted federal supremacy.

1880s Immigration quotas/ preferences first imposed in wake of national economic recession.

1892 Ellis Island opens. By 1953, more than 12 million immigrants will be processed there.

1917 Literacy test introduced for all immigrants 16 or older. Virtually all Asian immigrants banned from entering US.

1921 Quota Act. Annual immigration ceiling set at 350,000. New nationality quota instituted, limiting admissions to 3% of each nationality group’s representation in 1910 US Census (designed to restrict flow of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe).

1924 Congress passed Immigration Act of 1924, limiting the number of people who could enter the country to 2% of the number of people from that country in the 1890 census, and the ceiling is lowered to 165,000.

1927 Immigration ceiling further reduced to 150,000, with quotas revised to 2% of each nationality based on the 1920 census. This system essentially lasted until1965.

1929 National Origins Act. Annual immigration ceiling of 150,000 is made permanent, with 70% of admissions slated for those from northern and Western Europe, while the other 30% reserved for Southern and Eastern Europeans.

217

1930s Mexican Repatriation, during which time hundreds of thousands of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans were forced to return to Mexico.

1940s Start of Mexican bracero program, providing temporary US work permits to Mexican nationals, primarily in agriculture and construction.

1952 Truman administration first took note of “wetbacks” (illegal Mexican immigrants) and proposed sanctions to impose upon those harboring them.

1964 LBJ allows bracero program to expire; many employers turned to hiring illegal workers.

1965 1965 Immigration Act repeals national origin quotas, emphasizes family reunification and employment skills needed in US. Effective in 1968, the law contains 170,000 annual cap on Eastern Hemisphere immigration, with 20,000 per country subcap, and 120,000 cap on Western Hemisphere immigration without per-country subcap (p 60). These changes, which were enacted with strong bipartisan consensus, lead to increases in Hispanic, Asian immigrant populations; vast majority of immigrant visas granted on basis of family preference categories.

1980 Refugee Act. New system developed to handle refugees as a class separate from other immigrants. President and Congress can establish annual ceiling on refugees, though President is allowed to admit any group of refugees in an emergency.

1980s Sanctuary Movement in U.S. fights to protect Central American refugees.

1981 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (headed by Father Theodore Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University) releases recommendations centering around 4 themes: employer sanctions; enhanced border enforcement; humane solution for illegal immigrants already in US; stopping illegal immigration as a means to legal immigration. These recommendations form foundation of Simpson- Mazzoli legislation (1986).

1981-1985 Congress repeatedly tries to pass immigration reform, without success.

1982 Plyer v. Doe (457 U.S. 202) – Supreme Court rules states do not have the right to deny illegal aliens the benefit of a free public education since Congress had not passed a law granting them this power.

1984 Congress considered immigration legislation similar to 1986 final bills. Legislation passed HR and Senate but died in conference committee 3 weeks before presidential election. 218

1986 Simpson (R-WY) and Mazzoli (D-KY) are finally pass the Immigration Reform and Control Act (PL 99-603), granting amnesty and permanent legal status to more than two million illegal residents living in the US (2). Core of legislation: employer sanctions + legalization (Final passage: 63- 24 Senate, 238-173 House). • Authorizes amnesty for undocumented workers in US since January 1, 1982. The legislation authorizes $1 billion per year to states to cover any related costs. • Also puts in place sanctions and penalties against employers who knowingly hired illegal immigrants • In contrast to 1984, where the vote cut across party lines, in 1986 these were largely divided along party lines, with some Hispanic members supporting the bill because they wanted legalization, while others such as Roybal (D-CA) and many Republicans opposed it because of the employer sanctions. Unlike 1984, black members and those from districts with high unemployment also supported the legislation. • Legislation had the most sweeping impact on immigration policy since repeal of national origins quotas in 1965

1990 Immigration Act of 1990 (PL 101-649). Provisions include: substantial increase to the nation’s annual immigration quotas (700,000 for 1992, 1993 and 1994; thereafter down to 675,000); Attorney General authorized to grant temporary protected status (TPS) to undocumented alien nationals of designated countries with armed conflict/ natural disaster. Revises/ establishes new nonimmigrant admissions categories and creates new temporary worker categories, including the Diversity Visa Lottery Program. Transfers exclusive jurisdiction of naturalization from federal/state courts to the Attorney General.

1994 California’s Proposition 187 seeks to prohibit illegal immigrants from accessing public services, including healthcare and education. The referenda was approved by voters in November 1994 but ultimately ruled unconstitutional in 1997.

1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of August 22, 1996 (110 Statutes-at-Large 2105) establishes restrictions on eligibility of legal immigrants for means-tested public assistance (food stamps, SSI), barring most from receiving such assistance for 5 years; broadens restrictions on public benefits for illegal aliens and non- immigrants. Illegal immigrants become ineligible for virtually all areas of federal, state benefits except emergency medical care, immunization programs, and disaster relief)

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Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of September 30, 1996 (110 Statutes-at-Large 3009). Increases border- control measures, workplace enforcement, and removal of criminal aliens. Also adds additional restrictions on benefits for aliens (eg, pilot program limiting issuance of driver’s licenses.)

2002 USA Patriot Act amended Immigration and Nationality Act to broaden the scope of aliens not eligible for admission or deportable, due to affiliation with terrorist activities, groups, or organizations.

2005 H.R. 4437 (the Sensenbrenner Bill) passes the U.S. House of Representatives.

2006 Massive protests occur across the U.S. in opposition to the Sensenbrenner Bill.

2006-Present In the absence of comprehensive policy reform, explosion of state and local immigration initiatives occurs across the U.S.

Sources: Gimpel and Edwards (1999); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security (2009); PBS (2012).

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Table 2.2 Database of Immigrants’ Rights Protests

City State Date of event Estimate of participants Georgetown DE 2/14/06 1500 Philadelphia PA 2/14/06 5000 Fort Myers FL 2/22/06 1000 Portland OR 3/4/06 2000 Washington DC 3/6/06 30000 Chicago IL 3/10/06 100,000-300,000 Monterey CA 3/15/06 100 Santa Cruz CA 3/17/06 500 Knoxville TN 3/18/06 600 Milwaukee WI 3/23/06 10,000-30,000 Phoenix AZ 3/24/06 20,000-25,000 Los Angeles CA 3/24/06 2700 Atlanta GA 3/24/06 80000 Kansas City KS 3/24/06 2000 Los Angeles CA 3/25/06 200,000-500,000 Sacramento CA 3/25/06 4000 Watsonville CA 3/25/06 2000 Denver CO 3/25/06 50000 Charlotte NC 3/25/06 3,000-7,000 New York City NY 3/25/06 200 Cleveland OH 3/25/06 1800 Dallas TX 3/25/06 1500 Houston TX 3/25/06 6000 Los Angeles CA 3/26/06 3500 San Francisco CA 3/26/06 5000 New York City NY 3/26/06 1000 Columbus OH 3/26/06 3000 Dallas TX 3/26/06 1500 Phoenix AZ 3/27/06 400 Los Angeles CA 3/27/06 8,500-36,500 Riverside CA 3/27/06 1000 San Diego CA 3/27/06 1,500-2,000 Watsonville CA 3/27/06 1000 Washington DC 3/27/06 1000 Wilmington DE 3/27/06 12 Boston MA 3/27/06 2500 Detroit MI 3/27/06 50000 Grand Rapids MI 3/27/06 7000 Dallas TX 3/27/06 1,500-4,000 El Paso TX 3/27/06 6000 Houston TX 3/27/06 1000 Phoenix AZ 3/28/06 2000 Farmersville CA 3/28/06 200

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City State Date of event Estimate of participants Los Angeles CA 3/28/06 6000 San Diego CA 3/28/06 1,500-2,000 Watsonville CA 3/28/06 350 Dallas TX 3/28/06 3,000-4,000 Tucson AZ 3/29/06 1300 Bakersfield CA 3/29/06 1800 Kern County CA 3/29/06 3000 San Diego CA 3/29/06 1,500-2,000 Watsonville CA 3/29/06 150 Nashville TN 3/29/06 9,000-15,000 Birdville TX 3/29/06 100 El Paso TX 3/29/06 700 Tucson AZ 3/30/06 1500 San Diego CA 3/30/06 1,500-2,000 Kensington MD 3/30/06 300 Trenton NJ 3/30/06 200-1,200 El Paso TX 3/30/06 2000 Northern Virginia (Arlington) VA 3/30/06 1500 Kennewick and Pasco WA 3/30/06 300 Tucson AZ 3/31/06 1000 Bakersfield CA 3/31/06 1000 Fresno CA 3/31/06 50 Los Angeles CA 3/31/06 100 San Diego CA 3/31/06 1,500-2,000 Las Vegas NV 3/31/06 4000 El Paso TX 3/31/06 6000 Walla Walla WA 3/31/06 400 Costa Mesa CA 4/1/06 1500 Las Vegas NV 4/1/06 150 New York City NY 4/1/06 4,000-10,000 Arlington TX 4/1/06 100 Haltom City TX 4/1/06 150 Fort Wayne IN 4/2/06 1000 Yakima WA 4/2/06 2000 Louisville KY 4/4/06 450 Fresno CA 4/5/06 150 Los Angeles CA 4/6/06 100-900 Aurora IL 4/6/06 1000 Costa Mesa CA 4/8/06 100 Goshen IN 4/8/06 1,700-2,000 Birmingham AL 4/9/06 4000 San Diego CA 4/9/06 50000 Miami FL 4/9/06 7000 Orlando FL 4/9/06 2000

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City State Date of event Estimate of participants Pensacola FL 4/9/06 1000 Des Moines IA 4/9/06 5,000-6,000 Boise ID 4/9/06 4000 Portland ME 4/9/06 150 Detroit MI 4/9/06 100 St. Paul MN 4/9/06 30,000-40,000 St. Louis MO 4/9/06 5000 Lenoir/Hickory NC 4/9/06 200 Wilmington NC 4/9/06 100 Albuquerque NM 4/9/06 1000 Santa Fe NM 4/9/06 2000 Salem OR 4/9/06 5,000-10,000 Dallas TX 4/9/06 350,000-500,000 Fort Worth TX 4/9/06 7000 Salt Lake City UT 4/9/06 20000 Anchorage AK 4/10/06 24 Albertville AL 4/10/06 5000 Birmingham AL 4/10/06 3000 Little Rock AR 4/10/06 3000 Phoenix AZ 4/10/06 100,000-300,000 Tucson AZ 4/10/06 15000 Bakersfield CA 4/10/06 10000 Berkeley CA 4/10/06 200 Concord CA 4/10/06 400 Farmersville CA 4/10/06 100 Fresno CA 4/10/06 12000 Los Angeles CA 4/10/06 10000 Madera CA 4/10/06 150 Oakland CA 4/10/06 5000 Richmond CA 4/10/06 250-300 Sacramento CA 4/10/06 1,000-10,000 San Jose CA 4/10/06 25000 Boulder CO 4/10/06 150 Colorado Springs CO 4/10/06 1000 Denver CO 4/10/06 7,000-10,000 Grand Junction CO 4/10/06 3,500-4,000 Hartford CT 4/10/06 1000 New Haven CT 4/10/06 1,000-2,500 Washington DC 4/10/06 180000 Belle Glade FL 4/10/06 500-800 Fort Lauderdale FL 4/10/06 150 Fort Myers FL 4/10/06 75000 Lake Worth FL 4/10/06 4500 Miami FL 4/10/06 3,000-5,000 Plant City FL 4/10/06 200

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City State Date of event Estimate of participants Sarasota FL 4/10/06 100 Tampa FL 4/10/06 3000 West Palm Beach FL 4/10/06 5000 Atlanta GA 4/10/06 40,000-50,000 Chicago IL 4/10/06 1000 Urbana-Champaign IL 4/10/06 1000 Indianapolis IN 4/10/06 10000 South Bend IN 4/10/06 3000 Garden City KS 4/10/06 3000 Kansas City KS 4/10/06 2000 Wichita KS 4/10/06 4000 Lexington KY 4/10/06 7000 Boston MA 4/10/06 10000 Salisbury MD 4/10/06 200 Detroit MI 4/10/06 20000 Jackson MS 4/10/06 400-500 Chapel Hill NC 4/10/06 100 Columbia NC 4/10/06 3000 Durham NC 4/10/06 50 Raleigh NC 4/10/06 200 Siler City NC 4/10/06 4000 Smithfield NC 4/10/06 200 Wilmington NC 4/10/06 100 Winston-Salem NC 4/10/06 1500 Lincoln NE 4/10/06 4000 Norfolk NE 4/10/06 1000 Omaha NE 4/10/06 8,000-10,000 South Sioux City NE 4/10/06 5000 Santa Fe NM 4/10/06 2000 Las Vegas NV 4/10/06 3500 New York NY 4/10/06 100000 Rochester NY 4/10/06 250 Toledo OH 4/10/06 300 Eugene OR 4/10/06 300 Salem OR 4/10/06 10000 Harrisburg PA 4/10/06 200 Philadelphia PA 4/10/06 7000 Pittsburgh PA 4/10/06 100 Providence RI 4/10/06 2000 Charleston SC 4/10/06 4000 Columbia SC 4/10/06 3,000-5,000 Greenville SC 4/10/06 2500 Sioux Falls SD 4/10/06 300 Chattanooga TN 4/10/06 200 Jonesborough TN 4/10/06 300 Knoxville TN 4/10/06 2500 224

City State Date of event Estimate of participants Memphis TN 4/10/06 10000 Austin TX 4/10/06 10000 El Paso TX 4/10/06 300 Harlington TX 4/10/06 100 Houston TX 4/10/06 50000 San Antonio TX 4/10/06 18000 Tyler TX 4/10/06 2000 Blacksburg VA 4/10/06 25 Richmond VA 4/10/06 4000 Seattle WA 4/10/06 25000 Madison WI 4/10/06 10000 Los Fresnos TX 4/12/06 80 Huntersville NC 4/13/06 50 Charlotte NC 4/18/06 50 Denver CO 4/19/06 1000 San Francisco CA 4/23/06 2000 Anchorage AK 5/1/06 1000 Phoenix AZ 5/1/06 2400 Tucson AZ 5/1/06 700 Bakersfield CA 5/1/06 3000 Concord CA 5/1/06 1,000-2,500 Fresno CA 5/1/06 15000 Hemet CA 5/1/06 300 Huntington Park CA 5/1/06 8000 Los Angeles CA 5/1/06 650,000-700,000 Moreno Valley CA 5/1/06 500 Oakland CA 5/1/06 15,000-17,000 Pajaro CA 5/1/06 6,000-10,000 Palm Springs CA 5/1/06 2000 Petaluma CA 5/1/06 200 Riverside CA 5/1/06 3000 Sacramento CA 5/1/06 15,000-18,000 Salinas CA 5/1/06 13000 San Bernardino CA 5/1/06 1200 San Diego region CA 5/1/06 2500 San Francisco CA 5/1/06 30000 San Jose CA 5/1/06 100000 San Ysidro CA 5/1/06 1,000-1,100 Santa Ana CA 5/1/06 5,000-10,000 Santa Barbara CA 5/1/06 15000 Santa Cruz CA 5/1/06 3000 Santa Rosa CA 5/1/06 5,000-7,500 Stockton CA 5/1/06 6000 Tracy CA 5/1/06 75 Union City CA 5/1/06 400-1,000 Denver CO 5/1/06 50,000-75,000

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City State Date of event Estimate of participants Hartford CT 5/1/06 1000 New Haven CT 5/1/06 2,000-4,000 Stamford CT 5/1/06 3000 Fort Lauderdale FL 5/1/06 500 Homestead FL 5/1/06 1,200-5,000 Miami FL 5/1/06 5000 Orlando FL 5/1/06 20000 Atlanta GA 5/1/06 4500 Storm Lake IA 5/1/06 400-500 Aurora IL 5/1/06 9000 Chicago IL 5/1/06 400,000-750,000 Cicero IL 5/1/06 200 DeKalb IL 5/1/06 500 Elgin IL 5/1/06 1000 Joliet IL 5/1/06 600 Louisville KY 5/1/06 550 Morehead KY 5/1/06 60 New Orleans LA 5/1/06 3000 Boston MA 5/1/06 5,000-8,000 Fitchburg MA 5/1/06 500 Detroit MI 5/1/06 1000 Burlington NC 5/1/06 1000 Chapel Hill- Carrboro NC 5/1/06 40 Lumberton NC 5/1/06 5000 Trenton NJ 5/1/06 1500 Albuquerque NM 5/1/06 1500 Las Vegas NV 5/1/06 1500 New York City NY 5/1/06 3000 Tulsa OK 5/1/06 2,000-4,000 Eugene OR 5/1/06 400 Hood River OR 5/1/06 1300 Medford/Rogue Valley OR 5/1/06 500 Portland OR 5/1/06 8,000-10,000 Salem OR 5/1/06 8000 Allentown PA 5/1/06 500 Philadelphia PA 5/1/06 1000 Chattanooga TN 5/1/06 700 Houston TX 5/1/06 10,000-15,000 San Antonio TX 5/1/06 18000 Seattle WA 5/1/06 20,000-65,000 Yakima WA 5/1/06 5,000-8,000 Madison WI 5/1/06 3000 Milwaukee WI 5/1/06 10,000-70,000

Source: Xóchitl Bada, Jonathan Fox, Elvia Zazueta, and Ingrid García Protest Database, 2006 226

APPENDIX B

Supplemental Tables and Figures for Chapter 3

Question Wording and Variable Coding

Dependent Variables

“When you think of what it means to be fully American in the eyes of most Americans, do you think it is very important, somewhat important, or not important to: Have been born in the United States? To speak English well? To be White? To be Christian?” 1 = Not important; 2 = Somewhat important; 3 = Very important

Independent Variables

FEMALE: 1 = Yes; 0 = No

SKIN COLOR: (Latinos/ Hispanics) can be described based on skin tone or complexion shades. Using a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents very dark and 5 represents being very light, where would you place yourself on that scale?

AGE: “What year were you born?” Responses are coded continuously by decade: 1 = less than 20 years old; 2 = 20-29; 3 = 30-39; 4 = 40-49; 5 = 50-59; 6 = 60-60; 7=70-79; 8=80-89; 9 = 90-97

SUBNATIONAL GROUPS: “Families of Latino/ Hispanic origin or background in the United States come from many different countries. From which country do you trace your Latino heritage?” IF MORE THAN ONE RESPONSE GIVEN READ: “Which country does most of your family come from?” Dummy variables are assigned for each subnational group such that 1 = yes and 0 = no. Analysis is limited to 5 main demographic groups: Mexicans, Cubans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and Salvadorans.

REGION: South = Arkansas, Georgia, North Carolina, Texas and Florida; West = Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada and Washington; Midwest = Illinois and Iowa; Northeast = respondents from New England (Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) and the Mid-Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, and the Washington, DC area).

227

INCOME: “Which of the following best describes the total income earned by all members of your household during 2004?” 1 = Under $25,000; 2 = $25,000-44,999; 3 = $45,000 and above

YEARS OF EDUCATION: “What is your highest level of formal education completed?” Coded continuously such that 0=None; 8= Eighth grade or below; 10 = Some high school/ GED; 12 = High school graduate; 14 = Some college; 16 = 4-year college degree; 19 = Graduate or professional degree

NEW ARRIVAL: “When did you first arrive to live in the US [mainland]?” 1 = 2000 and above; 0 = prior to 2000

NON-NATIVE: 1= Respondents born elsewhere; 0 = respondents born in mainland US/ Puerto Rico

FIRST GENERATION: 1 = Respondents born in the U.S. with both parents born outside the U.S.; 0 = all others

SECOND GENERATION: 1 = Respondents born in the U.S. with at least 1 parent born in the U.S.; 0 = all others

PREFER SPANISH: Language of interview. 1 = Spanish; 0 = English

LINKED FATE: “How much does your “doing well” depend on other Latinos/Hispanics also doing well? A lot, some, a little, or not at all?” 1 = Nothing; 2 = A little; 3 = Some; 4 = A lot

RELIGIOSITY: “How often do you attend religious services? Do you attend…?” 1 = More than once a week; 2 Once a week; 3 Once a month; 4 Only major religious holidays; 5 Never

POST-PROTESTS: 0= Respondents interviewed prior to April 10, 2006; 1 = Respondents interviewed on or after April 10, 2006

228

Table 3.1 External Validity of Latino National Survey, by Subgroup

Percent Bachelor's Median Foreign US Degree & Household Population Born*++ Citizens++ Above** Income Cubans 1,631,000 60.1% 74.9% 25.1% $43,587

LNS – Cubans 522 84.1% 66.5% 30.3% $35,000-44,999 Dominicans 1,334,000 57.3% 69.9% 15.6% $35,644 LNS – Dominicans 413 87.7% 54.2% 20.8% $25,000-34,999 Mexicans 30,746,000 37.0% 71.1% 9.1% $40,736 LNS – Mexicans 5,903 68.8% 50.7% 13.3% $35,000-44,999 Puerto Ricans 4,151,000 1.1% 99.4% 16.0% $40,736 LNS - Puerto Ricans 848 11.0%* 90.1% 26.3% $45,000-54,999 Salvadorans 1,560,000 64.7% 54.2% 8.4% $43,791 LNS – Salvadorans 477 92.7% 37.3% 9.9% $25,000-34,999

* Foreign Born = Born outside 50 U.S. states and Puerto Rico. ** Because education figures in the Census include only those 25+, LNS education figures are also limited to this age group. ++For Census data, percent foreign born and citizenship status refer to the general Latino population.

Sources: Pew Hispanic Center/ American Community Survey Data (2008),

Latino National Survey (2006) Raw Data

229

Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

Table 3.2 Importance of Being Born in the U.S. on Being Perceived as American, by Subgroup

Very Important Somewhat Important Not Very Important N

Total Survey 44.58% 25.64% 29.78% 8634

Cuban 44.31% 20.82% 34.87% 420

Dominican 48.05% 24.62% 27.33% 335

Salvadoran 56.58% 21.84% 21.59% 407

Mexican 44.05% 26.75% 29.19% 5704

Puerto Rican 38.8% 23.54% 35.86% 822

Table 3.3 Importance of Being Christian on Being Perceived American, by Subgroup

Very Important Somewhat Important Not Very Important N

Total Survey 41.38% 22.03% 26.59% 8634

Cuban 45.28% 18.64% 36.08% 420

Dominican 50.45% 20.72% 28.82% 335

Salvadoran 57.57% 17.87% 24.57% 407

Mexican 37.73% 23.19% 39.07% 5704

Puerto Rican 48.1% 21.18% 30.72% 822

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Table 3.4 Importance of Speaking English on Being Perceived as American, by Subgroup

Very Important Somewhat Important Not Very Important N

Total Survey 85.11% 11.07% 3.82% 8634

Cuban 86.2% 8.23% 5.57% 420

Dominican 88.59% 8.41% 3% 335

Salvadoran 92.8% 5.46% 1.74% 407

Mexican 83.9% 12.05% 4.05% 5704

Puerto Rican 82.74% 14.08% 3.18% 822

Table 3.5 Importance of Being White on Being Perceived as American, by Subgroup

Very Important Somewhat Important Not Very Important N

Total Survey 18.5% 18.84% 62.66% 8634

Cuban 26.63% 19.37% 54.0% 420

Dominican 21.02% 15.92% 63.06% 335

Salvadoran 23.57% 18.61% 57.82% 407

Mexican 17.14% 18.38% 64.48% 5704

Puerto Rican 19.46% 21.54% 59% 822

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APPENDIX C

Supplemental Tables and Figures for Chapter 4

Question Wording and Variable Coding Dependent Variables “In general, how strongly or not do you think of yourself as ______?” (American; Hispanic/Latino; Cuban/ Dominican/ Mexican/ Puerto Rican/ Salvadoran). 1= Not at all; 2 = Not very strongly; 3 = Somewhat strongly; 4 = Very strongly

How important is it for (Hispanics/ Latinos) to ... change so that they blend into the larger American society? Is this very important, somewhat important or not at all important? 1 = Not at all important; 2 = Somewhat important; 3 = Very important

How important is it for (Hispanics/ Latinos) to ... maintain their distinct cultures? Is this very important, somewhat important or not at all important? 1 = Not at all important; 2 = Somewhat important; 3 = Very important

Independent Variables POST-PROTESTS: 1 =Respondent interviewed on or after April 1, 2006; 0= Respondent interviewed prior to April 1, 2006

FEMALE: 1 = Yes; 0 = No

SURVEY IN SPANISH: Language of interview. 1 = Spanish; 2 = English

AGE: “What year were you born?” Responses coded continuously from 18 to 97 .

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INCOME: “Which of the following best describes the total income earned by all members of your household during 2004?” Coded continuously such that 12 = below $15,000; 20 = $15,000-24,999; 30 = $35,000 – 44,999; 40 = $45,000 – 54,999; 50 = $55,000 – 64,999; 80 = Above $65,000.

NEW ARRIVAL: “When did you first arrive to live in the US [mainland]?” 1 = 2000 and above; 0 = prior to 2000

NON-NATIVE: 1= Respondents born elsewhere; 0 = respondents born in mainland US/ Puerto Rico

FIRST GENERATION: 1 = Respondents born in the U.S. with both parents born outside the U.S.; 0 = all others

SECOND GENERATION: 1 = Respondents and at least 1 parent born in the US; 0 = all others

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Table 4.1 Distribution of Respondents by State, before and after April 1, 2006 State Pre-Protest N Post-Protest N Total N Arkansas 208 193 401 Arizona 108 292 400 California 599 605 1204 Colorado 121 283 404 DC Area 205 199 404 Florida 301 499 800 Georgia 219 181 400 Iowa 209 191 400 Illinois 175 425 600 North Carolina 203 198 401 New Jersey 173 230 403 Nevada 205 198 403 New York 288 512 800 Texas 312 499 811 Washington 218 185 403

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Table 4.2 Effects of Spring 2006 Protests on Self-Identification, Month-by-Month Analysis "Blend American Pan-Ethnic Country-of- " in Maintain Identity Identity Origin the US Unique Culture November 2005 0.04 0.38 -0.51 -0.02 0.30 (0.28) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.37) December 2005 0.14 -0.05 0.04 0.10 0.04 (0.23) (0.26) (0.29) (026) (0.33) January 2006 -0.19 -0.07 -0.40 -0.20 -0.12 (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24) February 2006 0.25 0.04 -0.14 -0.21 0.06 (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) March 2006 0.18 0.20 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 (0.32) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) May 2006 0.40 0.02 -0.33 0.23 -0.16 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) June 2006 0.35 0.18 -0.15 0.19 -0.02 (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) July 2006 0.36 0.22 -0.28 0.05 -0.11 (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) August 2006 0.13 0.26 0.24 -0.46 -0.18 (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.32) (0.40) Female -0.40 0.21 0.16 -0.24 0.34 (0.07) (0.07) (0.72) (0.07) (0.09) Skin Color 0.21 -0.04 -0.17 0.32 0.10 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (014) (0.16) Survey in Spanish -0.93 0.39 0.05 0.81 0.49 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) Years of Education 1.08 0.22 0.55 -1.12 -0.12 (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.31) Income 0.47 0.22 0.05 0.05 -0.23 (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) Age 1.99 -0.52 -0.42 1.75 -0.10 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) Newcomer (in US < 5 years) -0.11 .05 0.05 0.20 -0.18 (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) First Generation 0.75 0.33 -0.22 -1.33 0.22 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) Second Generation & above 1.61 -0.26 -1.15 -0.47 -0.09 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) Pseudo -R Squared 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.02 N 5470 5489 5491 5403 5480

Ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors. Month of interview is included as a series of dummy 235

variables, with April excluded. The dependent variable in both models is the extent to which a respondent self- identifies as American. All continuous variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. Bolded entries are significant at the p<.05 level.

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Table 4.3 Effect of Spring 2006 Protests on Respondent Self-Identification, Without State Fixed Effects American Pan-Ethnic Country-of- "Blend" in Maintain Unique Identity Identity Origin the US Culture (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Post-Protests 0.21 0.08 -0.04 0.26 -0.10 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) Female -0.4 0.22 0.16 -0.24 0.34 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) Skin color 0.21 -0.04 -0.17 0.30 0.10 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) Survey in Spanish -0.89 0.39 0.03 0.85 0.51 (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) Age 1.98 -0.50 -0.41 1.74 -0.11 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.31) Years of Education 1.1 0.27 0.55 -1.11 -0.09 (0.22) (0.23) (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) Household Income 0.45 0.22 0.06 0.04 -0.23 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12 (0.15) Immigrant Generation Newcomer -0.11 - 0.25 0.05 0.21 - 0.19 (in US < 5 years) (0.26) (0.12) (0.13) 0.12 (0.15) First Generation 0.74 0.32 -0.21 -0.14 0.22 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 0.12 (0.14) Second Generation 1.60 -0.26 -1.15 -0.47 -0.09 and Above (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) Pseudo R-Squared 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.02 N 5470 5489 5491 5403 5480

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APPENDIX D

Supplemental Information for Chapter 5

Independent Variables FEMALE: 1 = Yes; 0 = No

SURVEY IN SPANISH: Language of interview. 1 = Spanish; 2 = English

AGE: “What year were you born?” Responses coded continuously from 18 to 97 .

US CITIZEN: 1 = Citizen; 0 = Non-citizen 238

NON-NATIVE: 1= Respondents born elsewhere; 0 = respondents born in mainland US/ Puerto Rico

FIRST GENERATION: 1 = Respondents born in the U.S. with both parents born outside the U.S.; 0 = all others

SECOND GENERATION: 1 = Respondents and at least 1 parent born in the US; 0 = all others

PARENTAL EDUCATION: “Which of the following best describes your parents’ educational attainment? Did…” Coded continuously such that 9 = neither of them finish high school; 12 = at least one of them finish high school; 14 = at least one of them go to college; 16 = at least one of them got a college degree; 19 = at least one or both of them receive an advance degree

LATINO FRIENDS: How would you describe your friends? 1 = Mostly Latino/ Hispanic; 0 = all others

MIXED FRIENDS: How would you describe your friends? 1= Mostly Latino/ Hispanic and white; Mostly Latino/ Hispanic and black; Mostly Latino/ Hispanic and Asian; 0 = all others

LATINO CO-WORKERS: How would you describe your co-workers? Stop me when I get to your answer. Are they: 1 = Mostly Latino/ Hispanic; 0 = Mostly white; Mixed Latino/ Hispanic and white; Mostly black; Mostly Latino/ Hispanic and black

KIDS IN SCHOOL: Did you have children enrolled in elementary or secondary/high school last year? 1= Yes; 0 = No

NO JOB OUTSIDE THE HOME: What is your employment status? Stop me when I describe your situation. Are you: 1 = Not working outside the home; 0 = all other categories (employed full-time; working more than one job; employed part-time; engaged in occasional or day labor; currently unemployed; full time student; retired or permanently disabled.)

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Table 5.1 Gender Differences in Political Engagement

Political Engagement Measures Women Men

Media Watch News Daily 60.73%*** 55.68% Read Newspaper Daily 15.33% 20.81%***

Political Interest Very Interested in politics 16.91% 21.88%*** Contacted government officials 29.99% 29.65% Believe very strongly that men are better political leaders 12.53% 15.89%***

Voting (US Citizens Only) Registered to Vote 76.95% 74.45% Voted in 2004 59.15% 56.96%

Political Knowledge Republicans are More Conservative 33.81% 39.04%*** Republicans Controlled House in 2006 (pre-11/06) 34.49% 43.38%***

Trust in Government (Strongly Agree with Statements) Government is Run by Big Interests 40.84% 39.84% People Like Me Don't Have Say in Government 31.96% 32.39% Parties are too Complicated to Understand 37.38%*** 32.50% People Should Avoid Contact with the Government 14.12% 18.46%*** Always Trust the Government to Do What's Right 11.59% 12.43%

Asked only to those with kids in school: Attended a PTA Meeting 77.19%*** 69.77%

Asked only to Spanish-Speakers: Very Important to Keep Spanish (for family members) 87.95%*** 81.59% Very Important to Learn English (for everyone in US) 91.81% 90.81%

Significance: *<0.05, ***<0.01

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