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Home , Afghanistan, Rollback, Yunus Qanuni

AFGHANISTAN’S UNENDING WARS

MARVIN G. WEINBAUM AND AHMAD KHALID MAJIDYAR

FEBRUARY 2019

POLICY PAPER 2019-3 CONTENTS

* SUMMARY

* 1 INTRODUCTION

* 3 HISTORICAL CONTEXT

* 5 PRESENT DAY CONFLICT

* 6 DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT

* 9 EFFORTS FOR PEACE

* 12 ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

* 14 CONCLUSION SUMMARY

The conflict in , the latest in a series of civil wars over the past 40 years, is strategically stalemated. With the and other militant groups gradually gaining a grip on large areas of the countryside, the government and its international allies have recently redoubled their efforts to seek a negotiated peace agreement with insurgents to end the protracted conflict. While the Taliban are willing to negotiate with the U.S. about the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, they continue to reject direct talks with the government for a political settlement. Even with inclusive peace talks, there is reason to question whether the Taliban’s vision of a future Afghan state and society can be reconciled with a liberal, democratic constitutional order.

An alternative political pathway to a peaceful outcome is through executing better security and governance reforms. With continued support of the international community, the Afghan government may be able to provide the incentives needed to reintegrate insurgent commanders and combatants back into the sociopolitical system. All other scenarios for Afghanistan are dark, especially the prospect of a disintegration of the existing political system that could trigger a wider, more bloody civil war. © The Institute

The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 a proposal by Kabul and Washington for INTRODUCTION a comprehensive ceasefire to jumpstart a peace process. The war in Afghanistan is locked in a protracted stalemate, with the Furthermore, divisions between warring Afghan government largely controlling sides also complicate the prospects population centers and urban areas for arriving at and sustaining a peace and the Taliban and other militant and agreement. Afghan politicians are criminal networks dominating or exerting increasingly at odds over how to influence over large swathes of the rural pursue peace talks with the Taliban. regions. As the international community’s The upcoming presidential elections, engagement in Afghanistan is gradually scheduled for July 2019, may further diminishing, the Afghan security forces fracture the Afghan polity, as some are struggling to contain the Taliban’s politicians have already called for momentum on the battlefield and are the establishment of an interim suffering casualties at an unsustainable administration to lead the peace talks rate. In addition, corruption and with the Taliban. Without a national mismanagement in the government consensus and unity, the Afghan continue to underpin the and government will be in a weaker position undermine governance and stabilization to negotiate a settlement with the efforts. Moreover, foreign support for Taliban. the Taliban, particularly sanctuaries Regional tensions are another obstacle. in neighboring , remains a While a stable Afghanistan benefits significant impediment to defeating or regional security and economic weakening the group militarily. connectivity, a divergence of interests Although the latest talks between the between Afghanistan’s neighbors, as and the Taliban in as geopolitical rivalries between have raised hopes for the start of a key international players, hinders a peace process in Afghanistan, there are collective effort to stabilize the country. major stumbling blocks to reaching a And most importantly, it is far from clear final agreement. The Taliban have made that the broader insurgent movement it clear that their primary objective to fighting in Afghanistan would adhere to negotiate with the United States is to any agreement signed by the Taliban end “foreign occupation” in Afghanistan, negotiators in Qatar. Although the and they still refuse to negotiate directly Taliban remains the most formidable with the Afghan government for a antigovernment force throughout the political settlement to end the conflict. country, the emergence of an ISIS So far, the insurgents have also rejected offshoot and a proliferation of regional

 1 TIMELINE

April 1978: Communist coup; start of Islamist guerrilla campaign to bring down the Kabul government

December 1979: Red Army launches an of Afghanistan

February 1989: Red Army completes its withdrawal

April 1992: Fall of the Kabul government and start of another period of civil conflict

September 1996: Taliban seizes Kabul and proclaims Islamic of Afghanistan

October 2001: US launches Operation Enduring Freedom, invades Afghanistan

December 2001: selected as leader of Interim Administration at Conference

Winter 2002: Taliban establishes in Pakistan to reorganize and mount insurgency

October 2006: NATO assumes responsibility for security across all of Afghanistan

September 2010: Karzai sets up High Peace Council for talks with Taliban

January 2012: Taliban agree to open office in Qatar for talks

September 2014: Afghan leaders sign a power-sharing agreement after disputed elections results

December 2014: NATO ends its combat mission, hands responsibility to Afghan forces

January 2015: NATO-led “Resolute Support” mission set up to advise and assist the Afghan forces

January 2015: Islamic State- established

July 2015: Taliban admits its leader Omar died a few years ago

September 2018: U.S. appoints special adviser to pursue talks with Taliban

January 2019: U.S. and Taliban agree in principle to a peace negotiation framework

2  militant groups in certain areas have further Many Afghan religious fundamentalists settled worsened security and complicated conflict- in Pakistan, where they received a warm resolution efforts. welcome and extensive support. As part of the , the United States, , and HISTORICAL CONTEXT their allies provided financial and weapons to the mujahedeen. These fundamentalist The historical context of the war provides leaders, who harbored strong anti-communist valuable lessons to analyze the present-day and anti-capitalist sentiments, created situation in Afghanistan, explore potential seven parties – collectively known as “the solutions to ending the war, and avoid mujahedeen” – to wage war against the Kabul mistakes that have exacerbated the conflict government and its Soviet allies. They also throughout different periods of civil strife in established close ties with transnational Sunni the past. In fact, almost all underlying causes extremist groups, including future leaders of of the current conflict predate the 2001 U.S. -Qaeda. Indeed, most of the Taliban leaders, intervention. including Mullah Mohammad Omar, were The 1978 coup was the beginning of state formerly members of the mujahedeen. failure and civil strife in Afghanistan. The Much like the current conflict, the Soviet war regime in Kabul and its Soviet supporters also culminated in a deadlock, with the carried out a brutal purge of religious leaders, Soviet and Afghan government forces civil society, intelligentsia, tribal leaders, and holding the urban regions and insurgents all domestic opposition. The new government commanding much of the rural areas. also introduced radical political, economic, When came to power cultural, and social reforms that were largely in 1985, he questioned the possibility of a antithetical to Afghanistan’s predominantly military victory in Afghanistan. In line with religious and traditional society – triggering his “new thinking” foreign policy doctrine, a nationwide antigovernment and anti-Soviet he decided to gradually end the occupation rebellion. of Afghanistan, which he had described 2 To suppress the uprising and rescue its as “the bleeding wound.” The new Soviet struggling Afghan , the Red leader instructed the Kabul government to Army resorted to dreadful tactics, including negotiate peace with the opposition and indiscriminate aerial strikes and depopulation form a power-sharing government. While strategies, sparking major internal troop drawdown did not begin until February displacement and forcing five million 1988, ’s announcement unnerved the to take refuge in neighboring countries, Kabul government, whose survival depended predominantly in Pakistan and . This period on Soviet military and financial assistance. of the conflict led to the killing of about 15,000 Therefore, in December 1986, Afghan Soviet military personnel and more than one President announced million Afghans over .1 a reconciliation program designed to broaden the government’s support base and

 3 seek peace with the insurgents. He offered government, while Pakistan continued to aid unilateral concessions, including a six- the Afghan mujahedeen seeking to depose ceasefire, a new constitution recognizing the Kabul government.5 Islam as the state , the promise of One important lesson from the Soviet general elections, a reversal of some of the experience in Afghanistan and its aftermath is socialist economic reforms, amnesty for that the announced and/or actual withdrawal opposition leaders, release of 16,000 political of the Red Army did not encourage the prisoners, and half of the posts in a national insurgents to make peace with the Kabul unity government for insurgent leaders.3 government. Quite the opposite, and Emboldened by the Soviet decision to instructive for the present day, the mujahedeen withdraw, however, mujahedeen leaders intensified military operations to seize Kabul. rejected Najibullah’s peace offer and doubled Facing internal divisions and financial hardship down on efforts to topple the government after the 1991 collapse of the , militarily. “The counter-revolution is aware of the Kabul government fell to the mujahedeen the strategic decision of the Soviet leadership in April 1992. There followed a devastating to withdraw the Soviet troops from the DRA civil war between competing armed groups [Democratic ],” a Soviet that paved the way for the emergence of the official noted. “The counter-revolution will not Taliban in 1994 in southern Afghanistan and be satisfied with partial power today, knowing the seizure of Kabul in 1996. that tomorrow it can have it all.”4 Another important lesson from this historical In addition to a lack of interest and political will experience for today is that a precipitous by the international community to bring peace U.S. withdrawal now could have similar, if not to Afghanistan, the lack of sincerity about a more disastrous, ramifications for Afghanistan negotiated settlement by all external parties and international security. The U.S. exit could to the conflict also contributed to the failure. bolster the Taliban’s confidence about a On , 1988, for example, Afghanistan, military victory and diminish the prospects for Pakistan, the United States, and the Soviet peace. It might also deepen internal divisions Union signed the , which had within Afghanistan, as happened with the been under on-and-off negotiations since Kabul government after the Soviet withdrawal, 1983 and were concluded only when the and most likely lead to the disintegration interlocutors agreed to a “negative symmetry” of the post-Taliban political system and the that called on Moscow to cut its military aid Afghan security forces. As in the time of the to the Kabul regime and and its post-Soviet withdrawal, the fall of the Kabul allies to stop interfering in Afghan affairs. As government would most likely culminate in required, the Soviets had entirely withdrawn a nationwide civil war, rather than an abrupt their troops by the following February. takeover of power by the Taliban. Moreover, However, in what became “positive symmetry,” regional countries may also be expected to Moscow maintained support to the communist increase support for their proxies to secure their

4  interests in the wake of an American than Bosnia ($1,390) and Kosovo pullout and disengagement from ($814) did during similar periods in the region. their reconstruction.8 PRESENT DAY Second, the United States and its allies initially had a small footprint in CONFLICT Afghanistan and they largely relied on local warlords and power brokers The 2001 U.S.-led military intervention to provide security and governance, swiftly toppled the Taliban regime fueling corruption and lawlessness and helped install a new government and leaving a security vacuum that in Kabul. However, peace and stability could be filled by the insurgents. in post-Taliban Afghanistan proved Furthermore, the 2003 invasion of to be short-lived as within a few distracted Washington from years the militants regrouped and state-building and stabilization mounted a full-fledged insurgency efforts in the war-ravaged country. against the Afghan government and The Central Intelligence Agency and 6 its international supporters. the United States Central Command considered the Taliban a “spent Three key factors prepared the force” and diverted key military and ground for the Taliban resurgence. intelligence assets to Iraq, limiting First, three decades of war had the military mission in Afghanistan to fragmented Afghan society and counterterrorism operations against crippled the country’s civilian and the remnants of al-Qaeda.9 military institutions.7 As a result, the new Afghan government, led by Third, the Taliban leadership, President Hamid Karzai, struggled to including the group’s leader, Mullah govern effectively and expand its writ Omar, relocated to Pakistan, where across the country. President George it received support from state and W. Bush’s pledge of a “” non-state entities to reestablish the for Afghanistan did not materialize; Taliban as an insurgent movement. the country received only $52 per Two recent books – Directorate S capita in foreign assistance for by renowned journalist and author the first two years of post-conflict Steve Coll and The Wrong Enemy reconstruction, substantially less by New York Times correspondent – provide a chilling account of how Pakistani military

 5 and intelligence officials’ support for the insurgents has prolonged the war and undercut the prospects of finding a negotiated settlement to end the Afghan conflict. In recent years, other regional countries, such as Iran and , have established ties with the Taliban, effectively playing both sides as part of a calculated hedging strategy to secure their perceived interests. DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT

The ongoing war in Afghanistan is most visibly a contest for political control of the state that involves elements of ethnic resentment and local grievances, as well as tribal and personal animosities. More essentially, it concerns an ideological struggle between two competing visions of the state. One promises a democratically elected, pluralistically tolerant, constitutionally governed Afghanistan that gives ample recognition to religious and . The other offers a theocratic state modeled on an idealized Islamic emirate, headed by a caliph or Amir-ul-Muminin (Leader of the Faithful), whose piety rather than popular election legitimizes his rule.

Arrayed against the Kabul government and its supporters are a wide cast of armed groups. Spearheading the insurgency is the Fighters of a splinter Taliban group take part in a gathering in Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) composed of , south Afghanistan on Aug. 14, 2016. (Xinhua/ Manan Arghand via Getty Images)

6  Afghan Taliban commanders, established in the winter of 2002 in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province, which borders southern Afghanistan.10 Somewhat loosely organized, these Taliban are closely aligned with the more cohesive , perhaps the insurgency’s most effective terrorist force. QST carries out attacks against coalition and Afghan security forces, mainly in the form of suicide attacks undertaken in cooperation with Pakistani militant groups.11 Also of importance as a party to the conflict is the Islamic State- Khorasan Province (ISKP), established in January 2015 in eastern Afghanistan.12 This movement emerged mainly from among dissident elements of both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, joined by foreign terrorist groups, most notably the Islamic Movement of (IMU).13 Unlike in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan has not been along sectarian lines, but ISKP appears determined to change that by selectively targeting the Shiite Hazara minority. The cast of anti-state players also encompasses the remnants of al-Qaeda and supporting militant groups in Pakistan, notably the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), that have also been engaged in terrorist attacks against .14 All seek the downfall of the Kabul government and the ouster of foreign forces from Afghanistan. They have had their own agendas, however, and in some cases are

A US soldier stands guard at Air Base in Afghanistan on January 23, 2018. ( MARAI/AFP/Getty Images)

 7 in direct competition, none more an outright Taliban victory could so than the QST and the Haqqani expand Islamic insurgency beyond Network pitted against ISIS. the country’s borders and that it would be preferable, if possible, On the government side are to have an Afghanistan that is Afghanistan’s security forces, stable, peaceful, and prospering. composed of the Afghan National The regional meetings dedicated Army (ANA), the Afghan National in recent years to promoting the Police (ANP), and the local armed country’s development attest to units supported by the U.S. Special the widespread perception of its Operation Forces known as the centrality to regional economic (ALP).15 While connectivity and stability. the Afghan security forces have made significant progress in terms Still, there is much that divides the of their size and capabilities, they various regional parties in their remain highly reliant on the U.S.-led motives and degrees of involvement. coalition for auxiliary roles such as Virtually all would favor seeing a air support, intelligence, logistics, negotiated political resolution of reconnaissance, and funding. the Afghan conflict so long as their core interests are secured. They, The primary foreign party to the therefore, may differ sharply on conflict since 2001 has been the the terms of any peace settlement. United States. But over the course Moreover, geopolitical competition of this UN-sanctioned mission, its between regional actors on one NATO allies have also contributed hand, and some regional countries’ to the Afghan mission by providing growing tensions with the United troops and financial assistance. States on the other, also make it Although not direct parties in the difficult to foster effective regional war, Pakistan, Iran, and India have felt cooperation to stabilize Afghanistan. they have a significant stake in the At the same time, there is a lingering outcome of the conflict, as have to absence of confidence among a lesser degree many other regional neighboring or near-neighboring countries including Russia, Saudi states in the eventual outcome, and Arabia, the United Arab , most have their hedging strategies Qatar, and several Central Asian for Afghanistan in the event of regime states. There is a general concern failure. A US soldier stands guard at Kandahar Air Base in Afghanistan among Afghanistan’s neighbors that on January 23, 2018. (SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images)

8  For the Taliban and other insurgent groups, played an important role in explaining the establishing their own versions of an Islamic Taliban’s military gains.18 Few, if any, Afghans government in Afghanistan motivates them expect the Taliban to strengthen the economy to wage war against the government and its or provide better services outside of perhaps international allies. There is a range of opinion a fairer system of justice. No settlement with among the Taliban leadership about how this the insurgency seems conceivable without might be achieved. The ascendant view has addressing some of these issues. long been that there is no reason to discuss compromising on their principal aims when EFFORTS FOR PEACE military success remains achievable. Others in the higher leadership seem prepared, The Afghan conflict has reached new heights however, to explore political negotiations both in terms of the extent of the Taliban’s as an alternative means of realizing the contestation nationwide and the numbers of organization’s objectives.16 Despite occasional combatants and civilians who have been killed conciliatory signs to the contrary, there is little or injured. According to a UN report, more than reason to believe that the Taliban would be 10,000 civilians lost their lives or were injured in any more willing to yield on its core beliefs. 2017,19 and the number of casualties reached a record in the first half of 2018.20 According to a The typical Taliban field commander and report released by the Global Index insurgent combatant are less motivated by in December 2018, Afghanistan surpassed Islamic ideology than by patriotic appeals Iraq to become the ’s deadliest country calling for an Afghanistan free of foreign for terrorism last year.21 By some estimates, at occupation and cultural influences. Many least 40 percent of the country’s nearly 400 are also driven by the profits of extortion, are either under effective Taliban kidnapping, smuggling, drugs, and other control or actively contested. But while the 17 criminal activities. For many fighters Taliban has succeeded in gaining a grip on alienation from the state can be traced to a much of the countryside, it remains incapable sense of injustice born from contact with of overrunning and holding provincial capitals government agencies, including, above and larger population centers. Although at all, judicial institutions rife with corruption. present the conflict has elements of a “hurting In the absence of alternative employment stalemate,” so long as both sides believe opportunities, the relatively generous salary that by continuing to fight they can acquire paid to foot soldiers is also a motivating factor. a position of sufficient leverage to shape the Nevertheless, much of the public sees the outcome of the conflict, the conditions that Taliban as probably less corrupt than predatory would force a compromise are absent. warlords and government representatives. In general, although all Afghans want a stronger While the progress in current talks between economy and many hold the government U.S. and Taliban officials in Qatar has been the responsible for not bettering their lives, anger most significant to date, it is not the first time over socio-economic conditions has not that Washington or Kabul has reached out to the

 9 Taliban for peace talks. In 2003, former Afghan first resisting, the U.S. indicated that it was President Karzai tried unsuccessfully to co- prepared to accede to Taliban demands that opt Taliban leaders in southern Afghanistan. five high-profile prisoners held in Guantanamo Two years later, he set up a reconciliation be released.23 In 2013, the Taliban and commission, which managed to reintegrate U.S. representatives met in the Qatari capital more than 7,000 former combatants over the of , where the Taliban had opened a next four years and assisted the release of political office. From the outset, the Taliban hundreds of Taliban members from prison. made it clear that they had no interest in After winning a second term in office in 2009, talking with anyone aside from the Americans. Karzai placed reconciliation at the top of his Always fearing that the U.S. might strike a agenda and created the High Peace Council deal behind his back, President Karzai had to expedite reconciliation efforts. objected to formal negotiations without his government’s participation. Although the U.S. On June 6, 2010, Karzai convened Afghanistan’s had pledged that the peace process had to be National Consultative Peace Council to pursue Afghan-led,24 it persisted and President Karzai a negotiated agreement with the Taliban core finally gave way under the condition that the leadership.22 Initially, the United States, in its Kabul government would soon be included in desire to see fugitive Taliban head Mullah negotiations and the Taliban’s political office Omar prosecuted, had little enthusiasm for a would not be used by the Taliban to assert political option. But as it became increasingly itself as a legitimate alternative to the Kabul clear that the American-led military surge government.25 But the fragile negotiation was unlikely to bring decisive gains, interest process came to an abrupt end when grew among American officials in finding a President Karzai disavowed the talks after the solution to what seemed an unwinnable war. Taliban office publicly declared itself as an An interagency cell was created to explore a arm of the revived Islamic emirate and vowed negotiated agreement, and the Office of the to continue fighting.26 Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the U.S. State Department began Prospects for initiating a negotiating process to actively search to establish a dialogue with revived when the QST’s purported second in credible Taliban actors. Both the Americans command, , apparently under and Afghans foresaw negotiations that would heavy pressure from his handlers with the Inter- create a power-sharing arrangement in which Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence the Taliban would renounce violence, cut its service, agreed to attend a June 2015 meeting ties to al-Qaeda, and be willing to accept the to create a “road map” to an Afghan peace. Afghan constitution. Hosted by the Pakistani government, the session was notable for the participation of not After more than two years of behind-the- only Afghan government representatives but scenes discussions, individuals believed to also ones from and the United States. be acting on behalf of the Taliban leadership While little of substance emerged from the conveyed that they were willing under certain meeting, the parties agreed to continue the conditions to enter direct talks. While at

10  dialogue. But this incipient process promptly expanded use of air power to blunt the Taliban’s fell apart when it was revealed that Mullah momentum, which had been building for Mansour, purportedly speaking on behalf several years. Above all, rather than a serious of Mullah Omar, had hidden the fact that peace overture, the letter seemed to be a Omar had actually died two years earlier.27 It finely tuned reading of American disquiet over was suspected that the Afghan intelligence the Afghan war and designed to undermine service, determined to scuttle negotiations, support among the public and in Congress. In had deliberately exposed Omar’s death. the letter and subsequent statements,32 the Mansour’s deception and his claim to Omar’s Taliban reiterated its position that talks could leadership mantle produced immediate only be between Taliban representatives and divisions over the issue of succession, and American ones, excluding a Kabul government with several of his challengers already cool regarded as merely a puppet of the U.S. to negotiations, Mansour backed off, firmly The full weight of regional and international rejecting the idea of continuing the talks. pressure on the Taliban was felt with President Efforts to coax the Taliban into entering talks ’s February 2018 proposals at the did not end there, however. There followed in Kabul Process, a conference in the Afghan Shanghai, Moscow, Kabul, and a series capital in which representatives from 30 of regional conferences convened to indicate countries and international organizations regional support for the Kabul government participated to discuss reconciliation in and a determination to draw the Taliban Afghanistan. He offered a set of unilateral into peace discussions. Earlier conferences, concessions the government was prepared beginning in Istanbul in November 2011,28 had to make, including a ceasefire, release of emphasized the importance of stabilizing Taliban prisoners, new elections with Taliban Afghanistan as a way of unlocking the region’s participation, and possible amendments economic interconnectivity and growth. to the country’s constitution.33 The Afghan Importantly, although invited to attend government also indicated that the phased several conferences, the Taliban repeatedly withdrawal of foreign troops might also be refused. on the table. Some of these concessions had been offered years earlier and others were Then on Feb. 14, 2018,29 in a letter addressed new. Unlike in the past, the Ghani government to the American public and U.S. Congress, laid down no specific preconditions for the Taliban offered to reach a political negotiations, such as an immediate ceasefire. agreement. The overture appeared timed The overture was widely hailed as extremely for the Kabul Process for Peace and Security generous – though some Afghan critics of conference, held on Feb. 28, 2018,30 and was the government thought the president might probably influenced by an intensified U.S. have given up all his bargaining chips. Rather military campaign under a new strategic plan than accepting or rejecting, the Taliban failed announced on Aug. 21, 2017.31 The plan had to respond to Ghani’s proposals, suggesting provided for the introduction of new, looser possible discord within its senior leadership. rules of engagement on the ground and the

 11 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani shakes hands with a foreign delegate at the second Kabul Process conference at the Presidential in Kabul on February 28, 2018. (SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images)

Other messages from the Taliban seem to viewed as potential negotiating partners make clear, however, that it has not budged and there is every expectation that these from its demand for the departure of foreign insurgents would act to undermine a peace troops as a precondition for serious talks. settlement, were one reached. While unstated, President Ghani’s offers meanwhile carried the assumption that the ALTERNATIVE Taliban were prepared to join the prevailing SCENARIOS political system.

By 2015, the quest for a political formula to There are several alternative scenarios, end the war had become more complex as some more plausible than others, to ISIS and foreign terrorist movements had describe where the war may be headed wrested areas of influence, if not control, over the next several years. In a “ inside Afghanistan. Although the Taliban scenario,” improved Afghan security forces has always left the impression that its aims are seen as able in time to reverse the gains are limited to capturing power within the of the insurgents. Aided by embedded country, the openly stated objective of advisors, special operations forces, and ISIS and the other groups is the overthrow heavy tactical air support, a more confident of the Kabul regime as a stepping-stone and better-equipped Afghan army and toward extending their military power well police enabled by local militias is able to beyond Afghanistan’s borders. None are degrade the Taliban’s capacity to carry out

12  coordinated attacks. The inflicting of heavy could be expected to remain irreconcilable, casualties among insurgents succeeds in they would likely become a marginal, discouraging Taliban recruitment, thinning manageable security threat. their ranks and undermining their confidence. In a second “stasis scenario,” the conflict Pakistan also makes it more difficult for the remains roughly where it is today, with the resident insurgent leadership to operate. Kabul government and its allies, as well as the The Taliban’s setbacks together with the insurgents, able to inflict damage, but neither encouragement of Pakistan and neighboring side capable of making decisive military gains. countries then leads it to compromise in a Taliban forces and, to a lesser extent, ISIS hold negotiated settlement. sway over large portions of the countryside In a variant of the rollback scenario, the but continue to be denied control of provincial government’s military successes against capitals and the larger cities. This scenario the Taliban do not lead to a comprehensive assumes the continued flow of international agreement or grand bargain involving power assistance to the Kabul government, as well sharing. Rather this scenario envisions the as the long-term deployment of foreign gradual erosion of the insurgency’s strength troops as advisors, trainers, and through the disaffection of the core Taliban in a more or less open-ended commitment. leadership of field commanders and armed That decision might be made independently followers, and their reintegration into the of stabilizing Afghanistan were an indefinite economic, political, and social fabric of the American military presence justified as both country. While many in the higher leadership

Afghanistan’s former vice president/former speaker of the House of the People, (C), and special representatives gather after the peace talks in Moscow, Russia on February 6, 2019. (Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency/ Getty Images)

 13 vital to preventing global terrorist networks A fourth “collapse scenario” envisions the from taking root and furthering U.S. disintegration of the Kabul government, interests in a strategically important region. whether militarily or politically, and its replacement not as in the by a Taliban A third “fallback scenario” finds the military able to consolidate control over government’s writ over the country sharply the country. Instead, the collapse scenario reduced to only a few major cities whose foresees a broadened conflict for power defense is heavily dependent on the that pits elements of the insurgency as well remaining foreign troops. The Taliban as contending ethnic militias against one along with ISIS and others challenging the another, resulting in a prolonged, chaotic, Kabul government would have succeeded and bloody civil war. It would be as well a in consolidating their hold over most of in which Pakistan, Iran, Russia, the countryside. Under these conditions, and India pursue their separate national however, it is problematic whether the interests through client groups. commitment of penned-in American forces could be long sustained or whether there would be the political will in the U.S. to keep CONCLUSION them deployed. Nor would there be much Even with negotiations, there appears no interest in donor countries in continuing clear pathway toward resolution of the with their financial assistance. Afghan conflict. It is difficult to see either This third scenario could also take a a military victory by the government and different course. It is conceivable that the its allies or by the forces of the insurgency Taliban leadership, feeling itself in a strong any time soon. Although many conclude position militarily, would at this stage that this logically means that the conflict offer to conclude a political agreement. must inevitably end with some kind of It would, however, be on terms clearly compromise political settlement, the distinguishable from those sought by scenarios above suggest other possible the Kabul government and international outcomes. In fact, agreements that end supporters. Rather than agreeing to be civil wars are more likely to enshrine one absorbed into the prevailing political side’s military victory.34 For Afghanistan, it order, the Taliban would instead promise remains doubtful that a political solution to accommodate their Afghan adversaries to the conflict will ultimately be reached in an Islamic emirate likely portrayed as in a Geneva-style conference with a grand more tolerant and inclusive. But an emirate bargain struck among all the principal would likely have no place for elections, adversaries. Other conflicts also instruct parliaments, and Western-oriented political us that even after the parties agree to figures such as President Ghani and current negotiate seriously, no early end to the Chief Executive . fighting can be expected; this is even more likely in Afghanistan with its many diverse domestic and external stakeholders. Talks

14  may well extend over years. It is a separate more representative governance. Others issue entirely whether any deal could be argue for a strong devolution of powers of enforced, especially after the exit of foreign the central government as more fitting for forces. a decentralized society and Afghanistan’s history and customs. At present, the Taliban as the principal insurgent group is unwilling to engage Federalism is sometimes advocated – in direct high-level talks with the Afghan though mainly by outsiders – as a means to government. Even were the senior allow fuller expression of ethnic interests leadership of the Taliban to agree to join the and convince the Taliban to accept a political government in peace talks, a successful solution to the conflict. In a federated state, outcome requires that the principal the insurgents would in effect be ceded interlocutors have the authority to negotiate control of several provinces in the country’s and the capacity to keep and enforce their southeast. The proposal would concede part of an agreement. It remains to be seen the insurgency’s already strong influence in whether the government or the Taliban are those provinces and give it a political base able to speak with one voice and give an for competing for political power nationally. assurance that the terms of a settlement But critics have questioned its feasibility in can be sold to a diverse leadership and light of the overlap of ethnically identified rank and file. Without its once unified groups geographically. Many Afghans are leadership under Mullah Omar the Taliban also resistant to federalism, seeing it either may have no one who can rally the several as conceding defeat to the Taliban or a power centers within the organization. On recipe for intensifying ethnic conflict and the government side, while most political inevitably breaking up the country. factions are in principle willing to negotiate, In view of the uncertain prospects for judging from their usual inability to agree a comprehensive settlement with the among themselves, it could be difficult to Taliban, a political outcome may rest on the reach a consensus on the details of a peace aforementioned process of reintegration. pact with the Taliban. It envisions a strategy of eroding the Naturally, the door should always remain insurgency’s strength through formal or open to a sincere offer to negotiate from informal deals with individual commanders the Taliban and other insurgent groups. and their fighters. Through a gradual, likely Willingness should also be shown to loosely coordinated process involving explore new political and constitutional numerous local-level deals, insurgents are formulations that might serve as the effectively bought off and integrated back basis for mitigating differences between into communities and local economies. A the adversaries and among Afghans reintegration process that succeeds would more generally. There is wide support marginalize the hardcore Taliban leaders for electoral law changes and the full and steadily degrade their insurgency. legalization of political parties to create

 15 Reintegration is not a and either to an Islamic or a more does not preclude reaching a broader anarchic civil war, millions of Afghans are settlement. But so far, attempts to arrange destined once again to become . piecemeal agreements – which have taken Much of the enormous human and social a back seat in the search for a broad-based capital created since 2001, and gains in reconciliation – have made little progress. basic human rights and especially women’s For large-scale reintegration to begin, the rights, are almost certainly to be lost. Kabul government must regain the public’s Also at risk in a failed Afghanistan are the confidence by creating the incentives for security and economic aspirations of other commanders and fighters to put down countries in the region. The ungoverned their weapons. In addition to assuring more space created by a radical Islamic regime or basic security, there needs to be progress a chaotic civil war, as in the past, is likely to creating jobs, reforming the government see the export of violence and insurgency (especially in reducing corruption), and outside of Afghanistan’s borders. Without improving the justice system. A thus- a more stable and secure Afghanistan far-elusive reconciliation among Afghan serving as the crossroad for trade and political leadership may also be necessary energy transfers, the region cannot to achieve these gains. realize the connectivity so necessary for its economic growth. The outcome of Reintegration depends on conveying the Afghanistan’s ongoing conflict also carries idea that time is on the side of the state and global stakes. The country’s stability bears not the insurgents. But it requires a continued most directly on international concerns military and economic commitment by about the spread of terrorism and drug the U.S. and coalition forces, as well as trafficking. Important strategic interests the international community, to buy time involving the competition for influence for the Afghan government to create the and prospective power projections of the conditions for reintegration in the absence United States, Russia, and China also come of a comprehensive negotiated agreement. into play with the endgame in Afghanistan’s While the current odds for successful latest civil war. reintegration are long, the increasing possibility of a premature departure of U.S. and allied troops may make the prospects for reintegration even more remote.

The outcome of this most recent of Afghanistan’s civil wars is certain to be broadly consequential. However achieved, a united, peaceful, and prospering Afghanistan is critical to the future wellbeing of an Afghan people desperate for peace. Should the current Afghan state succumb

16  Afghanistan: Organization, Operations, and ENDNOTES Shadow Governance,” Institute for the Study of War, December 21, 2009. 1. Mail Foreign Service, “Russian soldier missing in Afghanistan for 33 years is found 11. Ibid. living as nomadic sheikh in remote Afghan province,” Daily Mail, March 5, 2013. 12. Borhan Osman, “The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How it began and where it 2. Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, stands now in Nangarhar,” Afghanistan “Afghanistan and the Soviet Withdrawal Analysts Network, , 2016. 1989,” National Security Archive, , 2009. 13. Ibid.

3. Ibid. 14. “Mapping Militant Organizations: Lashkar- e-Taiba,” Stanford University, January 30, 4. Ryan Evans, “The war before the war: Soviet 2016. precedent in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, April 3, 2013. 15. Ayesha Tanzeem, “Afghan Local Police: The Controversial Force That Fills a Security 5. David B. Ottaway, “Agreement on Gap,” , , 2017. Afghanistan Signed in Geneva,” The Washington Post, April 15, 1988. 16. Robert D. Lamb et al. “Afghanistan’s National Consultative Peace ,” Center 6. , Descent into Chaos: The for Strategic and International Studies, May United States and the Failure of Nation 27, 2010. Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central (London: Penguin Books, 2008). 17. Gabriel Dominguez, “How the Taliban get

their money,” Deutsche Welle, January 21, , The Wars of Afghanistan: 2016. Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 18. Agence France-Presse, “Afghans angry at government after Kabul ,” The National, April 23, 2018. 7. , The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, 2nd ed. (New 19. “Afghanistan: 10,000 civilian casualties in Haven: Yale University Press,, 2002). 2017 - UN report suicide attacks and IEDS caused high number of deaths and injuries,” UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 8. Dobbins et al., “Afghanistan” America’s Role February 15, 2018. in Nation Building from to Iraq (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003). 20. James Mackenzie, “Civilian deaths in Afghanistan at record high, UN says,” 9. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a Reuters, July 15, 2018. ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007. 21. Alistair Jamieson, “Afghanistan becomes world’s deadliest country for terrorism, 10. Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg, overtaking Iraq,” NBC News, December 5, “The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern 2018.

 17 22. “Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion 33. Hamid Shalizi and James Mackenzie, of the National Consultative Peace Jirga” “Afghanistan’s Ghani offers talks with Afghanistan Permanent Mission to the United Taliban ‘without preconditions,’” Reuters, Nations, June 6, 2010. February 28, 2018,

23. Karen DeYoung, “U.S. to launch peace talks 34. Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: with Taliban,” The Washington Post, June 18, Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic 2013. State (Oxford: , 2016). 24. Barnett Rubin, “An Open Letter to the Taliban,” The New Yorker, February 27, 2018. Cover Photo: An Afghan soldier aims his gun as he guards the surrounding 25. “Afghan President Karzai backs Taliban the Intercontinental Hotel during a military Qatar office plan,” BBC News, December 28, operation against Taliban militants on June 29, 2011. 2011. (PEDRO UGARTE/AFP/Getty Images) Photo 2: Afghan Taliban militants take to the 26. M. Latifi, “Taliban’s Qatar office stokes street to celebrate the ceasefire on the second Karzai’s ire,” Al Jazeera, June 21, 2013. day of Eid in the outskirts of on June 16, 2018. (NOORULLAH SHIRZADA/AFP/Getty 27. Adam Withnall, “Taliban appoints Mullah Images) Omar’s deputy Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as its new leader” The Independent, July 30, 2015,

28. “ on Regional Security and Cooperation for A Secure and Stable Afghanistan,” Republic of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2, 2011.

29. Harriet Alexander, “Taliban publishes open letter to Americans,” The Telegraph, , 2018.

30. “The Kabul Process for Peace & Security Cooperation Declaration,” Embassy of Republic of Afghanistan in Canberra, , January 3, 2018.

31. David Nakamura and Abby Phillip, “Trump announces new strategy for Afghanistan that calls for troop increase,” The Washington Post, August 21, 2017.

32. “Statement by Political Office of Islamic Emirate Concerning Latest Comments by U.S. Department of State,” Al-Emarah, February 26, 2018.

18  ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

The Middle East Institute is a center of knowledge dedicated to narrowing divides between the peoples of the Middle East and the United States. With over 70 years’ experience, MEI has established itself as a credible, non-partisan source of insight and policy analysis on all matters concerning the Middle East. MEI is distinguished by its holistic approach to the region and its deep understanding of the Middle East’s political, economic, and cultural contexts. Through the collaborative work of its three centers — Policy & Research, Arts & Culture and — MEI provides current and future leaders with the resources necessary to build a future of mutual understanding.

 19 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Marvin G. Weinbaum is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and served as an analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003. He is currently the director of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Program at MEI.

At Illinois, Dr. Weinbaum served for 15 years as the director of the Program in South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. He is the author or editor of six books and has written more than 100 journal articles and book chapters.

He was awarded Fulbright Research Fellowships for in 1981–82 and Afghanistan in 1989–90, and was a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 1996–97. He has been the recipient of research awards from the Social Science Research Council, the Ford Foundation, the American Political Science Association, and other granting agencies.

Ahmad Khalid Majidyar is a senior fellow and the director of the IranObserved Project at MEI. He has worked as a senior research associate at the American Enterprise Institute, where he co- authored two monographs on Iran and published a number of research papers on Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

He has provided training as an instructor at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Leadership Development and Education for Sustained Peace program (2008-2016), and briefings to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, the National Defense University, the State Department, and Congress.

Majidyar’s articles have been published in Foreign Policy, The New York Times, Fareed Zakaria’s GPS, News, U.S. News & World Report, The Daily Telegraph, and Forbes, among others. He has also been a guest on the BBC, CNN, , Sky News, CBC Canada, Bloomberg News, and Voice of America’s , Farsi, , and English services.

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