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The Radical Traditionalisin of the Nahdlatul Ulaina in Indonesia: a Personal Account of the 26Th National Congress, June 1979, Seinarang

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The Radical Traditionalisin of the Nahdlatul Ulaina in Indonesia: a Personal Account of the 26Th National Congress, June 1979, Seinarang Southeast As£an Studies, Vol. 19, No.2, September 1981 Notes The Radical TraditionalisIn of the Nahdlatul UlaIna in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, SeInarang Mitsuo NAKAMURA* I Introduction : An Apparent Paradox of the N ahdlatul Ulallla The Nahdlatul Ulama (literally, 'The Awakening ofIslamic Scholars') is one of the oldest Islamic religious organizations in Indonesia. It was established in 1926 as an association of ulama, i.e., Islamic scholars and teachers, as well as of ordinary Mus­ A plenary session ofthe 26th Congress ofthe Nahdlatul lims who followed strictly the Sunni Ularna in Sport Hall, Semarang,June 9, 1979. Photo­ orthodoxy of Islam.!) After a half­ graphed by Mitsuo Nakamura. century's history, the Nahdlatul Ulama, or the NU as it is commonly ab­ governmental organizations In Indonesia breviated, is reported to have grown to be today in terms of membership and organi­ the largest of all Islamic religious organi­ zational strength.2 ) zations or, for that matter, of all non- I had the opportunity of attending the * ¢ttJ'C5!3. Department of Anthropology, 26th National Congress of the Nahdlatul Research School of Pacific Studies, The Ulama held in the city of Semarang, the Australian National University, P.O.Box 4, provincial capital of Central Java, for Canberra, ACT2600, Australia 1) The spelling ofthe name ofNahdLatul Ulama seven days from the 5th to the 11 th of in this paper follows the one employed by June, 1979. My experience with the NU the organization itself. Also in this paper, prior to this occasion was not only meager a distinction made in the Arabic original between 'alim (singular) and 'ulamii' but somewhat biased. I first came into (plural)--meaning 'man of knowledge' contact with some NU members while --has been ignored, following the Indo­ nesian convention. In other words, ulama I was doing anthropological field work is used both for singular and plural. in the Central Javanese town ofKotagede 187 from 1970 to 1972.3 ) The NU in the flicts between the N ahdlatul Ulama and town was, however, rather insignificant the Muhammadiyah colored part of the in its size and influence, for it was over­ pre-War history of the town, as they did shadowed by the Muhammadiyah, the elsewhere. But these conflicts were so-called reformist rival of the NU, which already things of the past and the NU dominated the religious sphere of the itself was regarded largely irrelevant by town. Doctrinal and organizational con- most of the Muhammadiyah members, who made up a large portion of the 2) The NU was established in 1926 as jam'iyah informants for my study. In this situation, diniyah Islam~yah, or 'Islamic religious associ­ ation,' and its fundamental character has I did not feel any disagreement with not changed since. However, from the a characterization ofthe N ahdlatul Ulama viewpoint ofits relationship with government and politics, the history of the NU can be widespread among Western students of divided into five periods as follows: (a) Indonesia that it was the organization of 1926-1942, when the NU maintained a old and old-fashioned ulama in the strict non-political and non-cooperative stance vis-a.-vis the Dutch colonial govern­ countryside of Java who were religiously ment; (b) 1942-1945, when it was forced to traditional, intellectually unsophisticated, cooperate with the Japanese occupation authorities; (c) 1945-1952, when it partici­ politically opportunistic, and culturally pated in the newly established republican syncretic.4) In other words, I did not government through the Masjumi party, think much of the NU as a subject of in which it held the status of a special mem­ ber; (d) 1952-1973, when it participated in study. government and politics directly and inde­ Yet several developments during the pendently in its own name, i.e., the NU as a political party; and (e) 1973-present, when 1970s have since aroused my curiousity it relinquished its political activities to the about the Nahdlatul Ulama. Politically, newly formed Development Unity Party, the NU has emerged as the boldest and or Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), and re-confirmed its fundamental character most defiant critic of the New Order as jam'iyah diniyah, religious association. government.5) The NU has not only The most recent change has been described withstood the merciless onslaught of the by one ofthe NU leaders as the act of'releas­ ing' (melepaskan) and 'bestowing abundantly' government upon the existence of any (melimpahkan, limpah denotes overflowing social forces independent of it but has of some liquid from a container) the 'practi­ even developed broad criticism of the cal political activities' (aktivitas politik praktis) of the NU to the PPP [Achmad Siddiq development strategy of the current 1979: 7]. These expressions seem to illus­ regime.6 ) There are emerging from trate aptly the change as viewed by the NU leadership. 4) This picture of the NU, first presented and 3) Nakamura [1972] gives an overview of the developed by Harry Benda and Clifford scope of this field work. For a history of Geertz in the 1950s [Benda 1958; Geertz social and religious developments in the 1960a; 1960b], was unchallenged for the town from the turn of the century up to the next two decades and even elaborated into early 1970s, with a particular focus on the a particular type in the political constellation growth of the Muhammadiyah, see Naka­ of modern Indonesia by Feith and Castles mura [1976; 1977]. [1970]. 188 M. NAKAMURA: The Radical Traditionalism of the Nahdlatul Dlama in Indonesia among the NU circles a number of young development models inspired by Islamic intellectuals who are seeking alternative social ethics. 7) Young, well educated ulama 'and 'lay-activists' are growing as 5) The earliest documentation ofthis phenome­ a new leadership of the NU at all levels non seems to have been made by Ken Ward when he observed the 1971 general elections of its organization. The stereotype of in East Java [Ward 1974]. On the basis the NU as 'a gerontocratic organization of Ward's report and also of his own earlier of opportunistic and unsophisticated work [Anderson 1970] in which the pondok­ pesantren, the traditional rural Islamic board­ rustic ulama' seems to have become less ing school, was viewed as the generator of appropriate in VIew of the reality of the revolutionary youths for the Indonesian inde­ NU today, if, indeed, it ever was justi­ pendence struggle of 1945-1949, Ben Ander­ fiable. son warns of prejudice often found in the conventional secular view of the Nahdlatul 7) The most articulate spokesmen for this Ulama as 'politically opportunist' [Anderson category of young activists include Abdur­ 1977: 23-24]. For descriptions ofthe strug­ rahman Wahid and Mahbub Djunaidi. gles of the NU and the PPP in and around The former was elected to the position of the 1971 and 1977 elections, see Liddle vice-secretary ofthe Central Religious Coun­ [1978], May [1978], and McDonald [1980]. cil, Syuriyah, and the latter, to that ofsecond 6) Various parts of the "Basic Program for the chairman of the Central Executive Council, Development of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Tanfidziyah, of the Nahdlatul Ulama 1979-1983" adopted by this NU Congress through the Semarang Congress. Both are in Semarang attest to this [Nahdlatul Ulama popular and frequent contributors to a 1979b]. A more politically explicit criticism number of newspapers and magazines, of the government can be found in the state­ including the most widely circulated, ment of the Development Unity Party KOMPAS and TEMPO. Their recent presented to the MPR (Majelis Permusya­ writings are now conveniently complied into waratan Rakyat, or People's Consultative booklets, Abdurrahman Wahid [1979] Assembly) on March 15, 1978, by one of its and Mahbub Djunaidi [1978] respectively. leaders, H.A. Chaild Mawardi, who is also WAWASAN, a journal for intellectual dis­ a member of the current Central Executive cussion in search of alternative development Council of the Nahdlatul Ulama. Criticiz­ strategies (published by the Lembaga Studi ing the presidential speech on the govern­ Pembangunan CLSPJ, Institute of Develop­ ment's performance, 1973-1977, Chalid ment Studies, Jakarta), should be given Mawardi advocated the following six points: particular attention for the fact that its (1) change the economic structure from one initial chiefeditor was Abdurrahman Wahid. which is colonial and dependent on inter­ Ofcourse, search for alternative development national markets into one that is more models is not confined to the NU circles. independent and based on self-reliance; A number of young intellectuals and social (2) change dependence of economy on im­ activists are emerging and cooperating with ported capital, technology, and management each other regardless of their diverse to reliance on domestic human resources; ideological backgrounds and formal organi­ (3) first priorities should be given to the zational affiliations. LSP is only one example basic needs of food, clothing, housing, edu­ of such cooperation. The popular social cation, and health; (4) the bottom 40% of science journal PRISMA also provides a the population must receive special attention; common forum for these people. For earlier (5) a nation-wide full employment policy attempts by a group of young Islamic intel­ is needed; and (6) inequalities in the distri­ lectuals at re-evaluating the pesantren for its bution ofproperty ownership, trade facilities, potentiality in rural community develop­ and the availability of education must be ment, see Dawam Rahardjo [1974a; 1974b; reduced (See McDonald [1980: 247-249]). 1975] and Sudjoko Prasodjo et at. [1974]. 189 Religiously, however, the NU's tra­ The experience I gained at the NU ditionalism seems to have remained intact. Congress met these expectations. Most I t proudly calls itself ahlus sunnah wal importantly, I realized that there was jama'ah, 'the people of the Sunna (the only an apparent paradox in the con­ tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) junction of political radicalism and reli­ and of the community,' and its members gious traditionalism within the NU.
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