Towards a Scientific Conception of Free Will
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Towards a Scientific Conception of Free W ill Mathew Walter Martin Iredale Ph.D. University College London ProQuest Number: 10045699 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10045699 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Abstract Can we reach a satisfactory conception of free will that is consistent with the current scientific world view? This important problem is the subject of this thesis. It is argued that certain areas of science raise profound problems for libertarian conceptions of free will and moral responsibility. Specifically, it is unclear how libertarian free will can arise from the neuronal processes of the brain; it is unclear how, or why, it has evolved; and it is inconsistent with the physicist's conception of time as it is understood through Einstein's Theory of Relativity. These are problems which do not arise for compatibilist conceptions of free will. Furthermore, there are a number of more philosophical objections which can be raised against libertarianism - including Harry Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternate possibilities and Galen Strawson's recent objection to ultimate responsibility - which strongly indicate that we do not have free will or moral responsibility in any libertarian sense. As a consequence of this various compatibilist conceptions of free will are considered in order to see if a satisfactory compatibilist account of free will can be reached. It is concluded that an epistemic account of free will based upon Richard Double's autonomy variable account of free will is the most satisfactory. Several libertarian objections to compatibilism are discussed and rejected. Finally, some general objections to free will and moral responsibility that have recently been raised by Ted Honderich, Richard Double, and Bruce Waller are discussed. It is argued that they provide no reason to doubt that we have free will. It is therefore concluded that we can reach a satisfactory conception of free will that is consistent with the current scientific world view. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 4 2. The Nature of Free Will 18 2.1 Personal Experience and Free Will 19 2.11 Libertarianism and Compatibilism 31 3. The U-Condition 43 3.1 The U-Condition of Free Will 43 3 . Ü The U-Condition of Moral Responsibility 71 4. The C-Condition 78 4.1 A Problem for the C-Condition 78 4.11 Objections to Frankfurt's Argument 90 4.111 The Theory of Relativity and the C-Condition 103 5. The Evolution of Libertarian Free Will 114 6. Compatibilist Free Will 130 7. Compatibilist Moral Responsibility 151 7.1 Objections to Compatibilist Moral Responsibility 154 7.11 Moral Responsibility and Reactive Attitudes 158 8. The Evolution of Compatibilist Free Will 168 9. Objections and Replies 177 9.1 Ted Honderich*s Objections 177 9.11 Richard Double's Objections 186 9.111 Bruce Waller's Objections 213 10. Conclusions 221 Chapter 1 Introduction I wish to begin this thesis by raising a question: why has the problem of free will lasted so long? In fact, not only has the problem lasted an age, and shown little sign of abating, but if anything it is becoming more complicated. Until quite recently the problem of free will appeared to be quite clear cut, in that nearly everyone agreed that the majority of people have free will: it was just a matter of determining exactly what sort of freedom we had. It makes better copy, perhaps, to highlight the differences between traditional compatibilism and traditional incompatibilism than to highlight their similarities, but there clearly were broad areas of agreement. It was agreed that we had free will, of some sort, and that this enabled us to be morally responsible. And there was almost agreement about which factors remove our freedom; coercion, force, mental illness, and, more recently, hypnotism and brainwashing. There was of course disagreement about why these factors rob us of our freedom, as there still is, but that they did was not in dispute. Occasionally someone would come along, such as Holbach, who would upset this comparatively simple state of affairs by claiming that we were not free, and that both parties - compatibilists and libertarians - had got it wrong. But such people were few and far between and for the most part no one doubted that we had free will. Now, however, this is not the case. Now there is a veritable barrage of criticism against the view that we have free will (Strawson, 1986; Honderich, 1988b, 1993; Breer, 1989; Double, 1991; and Waller, 1989a, 1989b, 1993 to mention recent critics.) And, just as those who defend free will cannot agree on what sort of free will we have, so those who deny it cannot agree on why we do not have it. But that they deny that we are free cannot be doubted, and their numbers appear to be increasing. Thus not only does the problem of free will look set to continue, it appears to be getting more complex. So we return again to the question. Why has the free will problem continued for so long, and why, rather than becoming clearer, has it become more complicated? I agree with Honderich (1989b, p.117; 1993, p.105) that to put the lack of progress down to confusion, or unreflectiveness, or word-play, on the part of the protagonists, is quite inadequate. On the other hand, I do not think that his own explanation is fully satisfactory either. He states; What would explain the persistence of the problem is there not being a single settled idea of freedom, but two ideas, involved in different attitudes. What would go further in explaining the persistence of the problem is each of us having the two ideas, and moving back and forth between them. (1993, p.105) Whilst I agree that we can have two different sorts of attitudes towards our freedom, I do not believe that we ordinarily do have these two sorts of attitudes. It seems to me that people's ordinary, or common sense, or prephilosophical attitudes are clearly only libertarian, and that compatibilist attitudes are regarded with either horror or ridicule (for a similar view see Thorp, 1980, pp.34-35.) Speaking personally, my own prephilosophical, or common sense, views were definitely libertarian (although at the time, of course, I would not have described them as such), and it has been my experience that the initial reaction of nearly every non-philosopher I have met has been to dismiss the idea that free will could be compatible with determinism. This viewpoint, that people are intuitively libertarian, is given support by the fact that the major monotheistic faiths support a libertarian notion of free will, as, I believe, do the majority of legal systems in the world, although not necessarily explicitly. If our intuitive attitudes were not purely libertarian, then I think that it is very unlikely that these two areas would have arisen supporting such a consistently libertarian view of free will. Contrary to Hobbes, Hume, and others, therefore, I do not think that people ordinarily have a shared view of freedom that is in accordance with compatibilism. There may be aspects of their beliefs which are not inconsistent with compatibilism - that our freedom is threatened if we are forced or coerced - but there are also clearly further aspects which are not in accordance with compatibilism - that we have the ability when we make a decision to decide one thing or another there and then, and that our future is therefore physically open in a way that is quite incompatible with determinism. Rather, people have a shared view of freedom that is in accordance with libertarianism. This is not to say that they cannot have compatibilist attitudes towards freedom, but rather that, ordinarily, they do not. Why, then, has the free will problem persisted for so long? My own view is that the free will problem has persisted because our ordinary view of freedom is at odds with the evidence. To be more specific: we intuitively interpret our experiences of freedom in a libertarian way, and this acts as a natural barrier to our acceptance of the view that we do not have libertarian free will. However, when we look more deeply into the subject, it does not appear as if the conditions necessary for libertarian free will can be fulfilled. This then leads us towards a compatibilist or hard determinist solution, which, to come full circle, appears to be at odds with our experiences of freedom. It does not appear as if the conditions necessary for libertarian free will can be fulfilled because of a number of problems which are associated with those conditions. For example, it seems to be impossible to provide a satisfactory, that is, detailed and coherent, analysis of the conditions of libertarian free will - as a number of libertarians have admitted (Wiggins, 1973; Thorp, 1980; van Inwagen, 1983). Furthermore, in as much as they can be clarified, the conditions of libertarian free will consistently appear to be at odds with the prevailing scientific world view (whether they actually are or not is another matter, but they consistently appear to be.) They are inconsistent with the deterministic world of classical physics, and appear to gain no great advantage from the indeterministic world of quantum physics.