Libya Humanitarian Response Monitoring

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Libya Humanitarian Response Monitoring HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME CYCLE 2021 HUMANITARIAN ISSUED MAY 2021 RESPONSE MONITORING RESPONSE GAP ANALYSIS (JAN-MAR 2021) LIBYA LIBYA © OCHA, LIBYA Creation date: 27 April 2021 SOURCES: FTS: fts.unocha.org, 27 April 2021; Sectors reporting to 4W, January-March 2021 FEEDBACK: [email protected] 1 HUMANITARIAN GAP ANALYSIS DASHBOARD (JAN-MAR 2021) NEEDS 1.3M 0.45K 33 189M PEOPLE IN NEED PEOPLE TARGETED # OF 2021 HRP PARTNERS REQUIREMENTS (US$) Humanitarian Response by Targeted Groups Target by Location POPULATION GROUP PEOPLE IN PEOPLE IN NEED NEED TARGETED TARGET A JAA AJFAA TP Mediterranean A AA I 173 8 WAA Sea AMAJ TUNISIA AMA A AAWA MSATA A T R 228 61 ST AT A JAA A A JAA N- 502 143 ALGERIA WA ASSAT AJFA SA A EGYPT AT Migrants 304 105 M AFA R 44 44 umber of people: 0,000 10,000 NIGER 100 CHAD SUDAN 150 KM Target by Sector SECTOR/MULTI-SECTOR FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS (US$) OPERATIONAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN PEOPLE IN NEED PARTNERS PROJECTS NEED TARGETED TARGETED Education 0M 8 8 2 12 TS 0M 1 2 121 1 S 20M 3 8 699k 10 H 10M 1 2 11 1 P M 10 11 0 11 P 0M 4 4 21 65k GB M 5 6 1 54k M A 10M 7 7 0 1 SNI 12M 6 7 374k 111 ASH 10M 9 9 438k 2 MPA 12M 6 7 11 34k S 1M 11 1 - - Abbreviations: HRP: Humanitarian Response Plan; FS: Food Security; WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene; NFI: Non-food Items; MPCA: Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance; CSS: Common Services Sector (Logistics, and Coordination) 2 FUNDING REQUIREMENTS* FUNDING REQUIREMENTS* 189M 53.5M** 36.1M* 80.9% FUNDING REQUIREMENT OVERALL FUNDING HRP FUNDING RECEIVED FUNDING GAP RECEIVED FUNDING REQUIREMENT BY ORGANISATION TYPE OVERALL FUNDING RECEIVED ORGANIATION TYPE REQUIREMENTS NOPARTNERS NOPROJECTS INGO 1M 1 45 67.% 2.% NGO M 6 6 P PA F TS P PA F RR 0M 1 1 UN 1M 9 49 HRP FUNDING RECEIVED FUNDING GAP BY SECTOR (US$) Sector Covered itin HRP Reuired Gap 19.1% 0.9% eceived ap Protection .M 70.7% P F P F AP Food Security 2.0M .9% MPA 1.2M 7.% HRP PROJECTS FUNDING VS REPORTING ealth 41.0M 9.% CS 14.4M .% ShelterF 1.1M .4% P projects 101 WAS 1.M 9.7% Protection - Mine 10.6M 100.0% Projects with reported progress 29 Action Protection - .4M 100.0% 12 Education .0M 100.0% All funded Projects Protection - P .0M 100.0% Projects funded and reported 8 TS 0.M 100.0% progress ot specified 12.7M OVERALL FUNDING RECEIVED BY SECTOR (US$) TOP TEN DONORS Education uropean ommission 19.4M ETS Japan 7.9M Food Security anada 2.5M ealth 1.8M MPA Sweden Protection United ingdom 1.2M Shelter/NFI Switerland 1.2M Water Sanitation Hygiene taly 1.0M CCS ermany 0.6M Not specified enmark 0.3M 0 $5 10 1 20 2 0 Millions P F OA F SA 0.3M *Funding reported on FTS as of 27 April 2021 ** Overall humanitarian funding received for Libya 3 HUMANITARIAN GAP ANALYSIS DASHBOARD (JAN-MAR 2021) HRP HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND GAPS TOTAL PEOPLE REACHED THROUGH HRP ACTIVITIES PEOPLE REACHED THROUGH HRP HRP FUNDING RECEIVED (US$) FUNDING GAP HRP REPORTING PARTNERS 195K $36.1M 81% 18 TOTAL PEOPLE REACHED THROUGH HRP ACTIVITIES TOTAL PEOPLE REACHED BY POPULATION GROUPS ACHED AP 4% Ps 22% eturnees 7% 1K on-displaced 47% Migrants 6% 7% ACHED AP efugees 64% TOTAL PEOPLE REACHED VS ACCESS CONSTRAINTS OVERALL RESPONSE BY MANTIKA Azzawya Tripoli Al Jabal Al Akhdar Azzawya Almarj Tripoli Al Jabal Al Akhdar Zwara Almargeb Almarj Zwara Almargeb Misrata Derna Misrata Aljfara Benghazi Aljfara Derna Benghazi Nalut Al Jabal Sirt Tobruk Al Jabal Sirt Al Gharbi Nalut Tobruk Al Gharbi Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Sebha Ubari Sebha Ghat Ubari Ghat Murzuq Murzuq Target Reached Alkufra Total Target 90,000 Alkufra 90K 11,000 26K GAP 1400 REACHED Response 1K Access Constraints GAP Total Reached 3 45 REACHED 322 58,826 Strategic Objective 1: Prevent disease, reduce risks to physical and mental wellbeing, and strengthen the protection of civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law, human rights law and other international legal frameworks. Strategic Objective 2: Facilitate safe, equitable and dignified access to critical services and livelihoods to enhance people’s resilience and ensure they meet their basic needs. 4 HRP HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND GAPS TOTAL PEOPLE REACHED BY GENDER AND AGE HRP RESPONSE BY GENDER Boys 7% 2% irls 7% Men 70% 4% Women 1% ACHED AP FMA MA TOTAL PEOPLE REACHED BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TOTAL PEOPLE REACHED BY REGION S1 64% AST 79% ST 6% S2 6% WST 1% ACHED AP ACHED AP OVERALL RESPONSE BY SECTOR OVERALL IDP RESPONSE BY MANTIKA* P AT F STY GBV M ACT MPA PTT SF WAS OA P HRP RESPONSE BY SECTOR P AT F STY GBV M ACT MPA PTT SF WAS TAT ACHED * 70% and above: major gap 41%-69%: gap 0-40%: on track 5 HUMANITARIAN GAP ANALYSIS DASHBOARD (JAN-MAR 2021) OVERALL RETURNEES RESPONSE BY MANTIKA OVERALL NON-DISPLACED RESPONSE BY MANTIKA OVERALL MIGRANTS RESPONSE BY MANTIKA OVERALL REFUGEES RESPONSE BY MANTIKA 6 HRP HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND GAPS RESPONSE BY GENDER - MALES* RESPONSE BY GENDER - FEMALES* Azzawya Al Jabal Al Akhdar Tripoli Almarj Azzawya Al Jabal Al Akhdar Tripoli Almarj Zwara Almargeb Zwara Almargeb Misrata Aljfara Derna Misrata Benghazi Aljfara Derna Benghazi Al Jabal Sirt Sirt Nalut Tobruk Al Jabal Al Gharbi Nalut Tobruk Al Gharbi Ejdabia Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Sebha Sebha Ubari Ubari Ghat Ghat Murzuq Murzuq Male Target Alkufra Alkufra Female Target 53K 37K 10K GAP 10K GAP 1K REACHED 1K REACHED Total Reached Total Reached 322 58,826 322 58,826 CHILD PROTECTION RESPONSE EDUCATION RESPONSE Azzawya Tripoli Al Jabal Al Akhdar Azzawya Almarj Tripoli Al Jabal Al Akhdar Zwara Almarj Almargeb Almargeb Zwara Aljfara Misrata Derna Aljfara Derna Misrata Benghazi Benghazi Tobruk Sirt Nalut Tobruk Nalut Al Jabal Al Jabal Sirt Al Gharbi Al Gharbi Ejdabia Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Sebha Sebha Ubari Ubari Ghat Ghat Murzuq Murzuq Alkufra Alkufra EDU Target CP Target 35K 26K 8K GAP REACHED 4K GAP 1K 1K REACHED FOOD SECURITY RESPONSE GENDER-BASE VIOLENCE RESPONSE Azzawya Azzawya Tripoli Al Jabal Al Akhdar Tripoli Al Jabal Al Akhdar Almarj Almarj Zwara Zwara Almargeb Almargeb Benghazi Derna Aljfara Benghazi Derna Aljfara Misrata Misrata Tobruk Nalut Al Jabal Sirt Al Jabal Sirt Nalut Tobruk Al Gharbi Al Gharbi Ejdabia Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Aljufra Sebha Ubari Ubari Sebha Ghat Ghat Murzuq Murzuq Alkufra Alkufra Target Reached Target Reached 32K 21K 9K GAP 2K 5K GAP REACHED 1K REACHED * The data in the heat map represents the overall people reached, while the pie charts represent the gap vs response by the theme. 7 HUMANITARIAN GAP ANALYSIS DASHBOARD (JAN-MAR 2021) MINE ACTION RESPONSE MULTI-PURPOSE CASH ASSISTANCE RESPONSE Azzawya Al Jabal Al Akhdar Tripoli Almarj Zwara Almargeb Azzawya Al Jabal Al Akhdar Tripoli Almarj Aljfara Misrata Derna Zwara Almargeb Benghazi Misrata Aljfara Derna Benghazi Al Jabal Sirt Nalut Tobruk Al Gharbi Al Jabal Sirt Nalut Tobruk Al Gharbi Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Sebha Ubari Sebha Ubari Ghat Ghat Murzuq Murzuq Alkufra MA Target Alkufra 90K MPCA Target 26K 19K GAP 8K GAP 1K 1K REACHED REACHED GENERAL PROTECTION RESPONSE SHELTER/NON-FOOD ITEMS RESPONSE Azzawya Al Jabal Al Akhdar Azzawya Tripoli Almarj Al Jabal Al Akhdar Tripoli Almarj Zwara Almargeb Zwara Almargeb Misrata Aljfara Derna Misrata Aljfara Derna Benghazi Benghazi Nalut Al Jabal Sirt Al Jabal Sirt Tobruk Nalut Tobruk Al Gharbi Al Gharbi Ejdabia Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Sebha Sebha Ubari Ubari Ghat Ghat Murzuq Murzuq Alkufra Alkufra PROTECTION Target SNFI Target 60K 36K GAP 9K GAP 8K REACHED 1K REACHED 1K WASH RESPONSE Azzawya Al Jabal Al Akhdar Tripoli Almarj Zwara Almargeb Misrata Aljfara Derna Benghazi Al Jabal Sirt Nalut Tobruk Al Gharbi Ejdabia Wadi Ashshati Aljufra Sebha Ubari Ghat Murzuq Alkufra WASH Target 48K 15K GAP 1K REACHED 8.
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