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《禪與人類文明研究》第一期(2016) International Journal for the Study of Chan Buddhism and Human Civilization Issue 1 (2016), 83–112 Gushan Zhiyuan: Interpreting the Buddha- Nature of Insentient Beings through the Notions of Mind-Inclusion and Mind-Contemplation Shuman Chen Abstract Using textual analysis, this paper examines Gushan Zhiyuan’s interpretation of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings. In the Jin’gangpi xianxing lu, a commentary on Zhanran’s Jin’gangpi, Zhiyuan deems the concepts of inclusion and contemplation, closely associated with the mind, as prerequisites for justifying the Buddha-nature of insentient beings. The mind, as an agent, possesses and includes all the three thousand dharmas; the mind, as a thinking being, can contemplate its own three thousand dharmas of/in/as one moment of thought. Because all dharmas are included in the all-pervasive minds of sentient beings who have Buddha-nature, it is valid to suggest that insentient beings also have Buddha-nature. Zhiyuan, however, underscores that insentient beings per se cannot engage in spiritual practice or attain Buddhahood because they have no minds. This view of Zhiyuan’s, I argue, contradicts Zhanran’s philosophy, for Zhanran does imply in the Jin’gangpi that insentient beings can attain Buddhahood. I suggest that, by considering the Buddha-nature of insentient beings completely contingent on the mind, Zhiyuan, to some extent, denies their Buddha-nature. This paper Shuman Chen is the Abbess of Pukai Meditation Center, Taichung Branch of Chung Tai Chan Monastery, Taiwan. 84 Shuman Chen challenges Zhiyuan’s implication that sentient beings’ Buddha-nature possesses insentient beings, which differs from Zhanran’s assertion that insentient beings themselves really possess Buddha-nature. Keywords: Buddha-nature, mind-inclusion, matter-inclusion, mind-contemplation, three thousand Gushan Zhiyuan: Interpreting the Buddha-Nature of Insentient Beings 85 Introduction In the Song dynasty, a series of intense debates occurred between the thinkers of the Shanjia 山家 (home-mountain) and Shanwai 山外 (off-mountain) traditions within the Tiantai School.1 Scholars tend to regard these debates as a sectarian event.2 Indeed, their sectarian element 1 The Shanjia-Shanwai debates occurred in the late 10th century and continued into the early 11th Century. The term “Shanjia,” originally representing the Tiantai School, was later used by Zhili’s descendants to clothe themselves in Tiantai orthodoxy. The term Shanwai is not a designation that “Shanwai” thinkers used to label themselves, and instead was coined by Shanjia thinkers to stigmatize their “heterodox” opponents. Such schism recalls the contrast between Mahayana and “Hinayana” Buddhism. 2 Scholars have suggested that the Shanjia-Shanwai debates were also a sectarian competition with other schools. Examining the internal debate in the broader historical context of the Song dynasty, Wu Zhongwei proposes that the intense literary debates are a result of a Tiantai response to other contemporaneous traditions. Both Shanjia and Shanwai thinkers were aware of an urgent need to revitalize the Tiantai Perfect Teaching; they, however, responded with different approaches. Shanjia attempted to reveal for example, the evils in the Expedient, while Shanwai limits Tiantai Buddhism to a teaching of the mind. Wu concludes that Shanjia attempted a genealogical association by means of extremely evil-inclusive (cunmei 存魅) repentance practices, whereas Shanwai adopted the study of the mind with evil-exclusive (qumei 袪魅) approaches associated with good. Wu Zhongwei 吳忠偉, Yuanjiao de weiji yu puxi de zaisheng 圓教的危機與普系的再生:宋代天台宗山家山外之爭研究 (The Crisis of the Perfect Teaching and the Rebirth of Lineages: A Study of the Dispute between Shanjia and Shanwai in Song Tiantai Buddhism) (Changchun: Jilin renmin, 2007), 4–12. Wu seems to disprove Zhili’s “extreme” approach. However, Wu ignores the Tiantai position by identifying the extreme and the middle (jibian er zhong 即邊而中), and the Expedient and the Real (jiquan er shi 即權而實). Zhiyi states that, in the Perfect Teaching, the extreme is identical to the middle and everything is a Buddha Dharma. T33.n1716.697a. If one takes into account the Tiantai principle of identity, Zhili’s use of a seemingly extreme approach is understandable. Note: T refers to Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經 [A standard collection of the East Asian Buddhist canon], edited by Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次朗 and Watanabe Kaigyoku 渡 邊海旭, et al., 100 vols. Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankō kai, 1924–1932. CBETA 86 Shuman Chen cannot be rejected, for both sides of the Tiantai thinkers who participated in the debates claimed to be faithful to the authentic Tiantai teachings. Although the debates might seem heated, if one only views them through a sectarian lens, the signifi cance of a doctrinal clarifi cation would be missed.3 As contemporary Tiantai thinker Shi Huiyue comments, the debates helped the Tiantai teaching reach its apex in the Song dynasty.4 Indeed, the debates do entail signifi cant, doctrinal values. In the doctrinal context of the Shanjia-Shanwai debates, most scholars allude to the contradictions between mind-inclusion (xinju 心具) and matter-inclusion (seju 色具) and between the pure mind (zhenxin 真 心) and the deluded mind (wangxin 妄心).5 Gushan Zhiyuan 孤山智圓 (Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection Cross-platform Version), 2011 edition. Cited by volume (T) followed by text number (n), page, and register. 3 It is not always easy to pin down the real intentions of the participants in any Dharma debate, since the debate might be about politics or a fi ght for true teachings. The late Buddhist scholar and monk, Yinshun, for example, in his critique of the confl icts between the “Southern” and the “Northern” sects in the 8th century Chan School suggested that Shenhui’s 神會 (668–760) eagerness in recognizing Huineng 慧能 (638–713) as the 6th patriarch showed his passion for the Dharma, and his efforts to defend the teachings of the Southern sect should not be seen as a purely sectarian fi ght. Yinshun印順, Zhongguo Chanzong shi中國禪宗史 (History of the Chan School of China) (Jiayi, Taiwan: Yinshun, 1975), 295. In like fashion, Shanjia and Shanwai thinkers took the real essence of Tiantai teachings very seriously and felt a need to clarify them. Thus, it would be more appropriate to view their debates from a doctrinal perspective, rather than merely from a political one, for the main concern was correct interpretation of Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597) and Jingxi Zhanran. I argue that, by identifying the key points Shanjia and Shanwai thinkers emphasize and deemphasize, their seemingly contradictory arguments may reveal their main interests and thus, the spirits of their persistence can be reevaluated and appreciated. 4 Shi Huiyue 釋慧嶽, Tiantai jiaoxue shi天台教學史 (The History of Tiantai Teaching) (Taipei: Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 1993), 253. 5 Scholars tend to label Shanwai as the sect embracing the contemplation of the pure mind (zhenxin guan 真心觀), and Shanjia as the sect embracing the contemplation of the deluded mind (wangxin guan 妄心觀). This classifi cation, however, is only partially correct. Shanjia thinkers, such as Wu’en 晤恩 (912–986) and Yuanqing 源清 Gushan Zhiyuan: Interpreting the Buddha-Nature of Insentient Beings 87 (976–1022), the representative of the Shanwai tradition, privileges the mind, arguing that the entirety of the universe is passively included in the mind. In contrast, Siming Zhili 四明知禮 (960–1028), representing the Shanjia tradition, contends that matter also actively includes the mind and all other elements. In terms of the quality of the mind, observed in the practice of mind-contemplation, Zhiyuan argues that the objectifi ed mind is true, in the sense of the unity of truth and falsehood/ delusion (zhenwang hehe 真妄和合). Zhili, although acknowledging the oneness of truth and delusion, singles out the deluded quality of the mind as the object of meditation. In this article, I attempt to extend this scholarship to expound upon the Shanjia-Shanwai disagreement, in terms of how to justify Jingxi Zhanran’s 荊溪湛然 (711–782) theory of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings. The notion that all sentient beings (alone) possess Buddha-nature is widely accepted in Mahayana Buddhism. Zhanran, in contrast, enthusiastically contends that insentient beings also have Buddha-nature. His last work, the Jin’gangpi 金剛錍 (the Diamond Scalpel), is dedicated to defending and articulating the logic of his unconventional thought. A careful reading of the text suggests that the scope of insentience ranges widely, from the natural to the man-made, and to the (d. c. 1000), do highlight the pure mind or pure nature. In contrast, Zhiyuan fi nds a middle ground between the pure mind and the defi led mind. Shi Huiyue was correct in pointing out that Zhiyuan views both types of contemplative practices as extreme. Shi Huiyue 釋慧岳, Zhili 知禮 (Taipei: Dongda, 1995), 39. Indeed, in the Xianxing lu, Zhiyuan emphasizes the identity between truth and delusion, stating that the true and the deluded cannot be separated, that the ignorant mind is identical to the three truths, and that the conscious, defi led, and diseased mind becomes the inconceivable object in the practice of mind-observation as it is taught in the Mohe zhiguan 摩訶止觀. X56. n935.532c. Note: X refers to Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzōkyō 卍新纂大日本續藏經 (卍 新纂續藏) [The continued East Asian Buddhist canon], edited by Maeda Eun 前田慧 雲 and Nakano Tatsue 中野達慧, 88 vols. Tokyo: Kokusho kankō kai, 1980–1989. CBETA, 2011 edition. Cited by volume (X) followed by text number (n), page, and register. 88 Shuman Chen intangible, invisible, and formless element. As Zhanran has explained, all types of existence, including walls, rocks, fl ora, dust, fi bers, colors and scents have Buddha-nature. Zhanran’s rationale for articulating the Buddha-nature of insentient beings may be summarized in the following points. Because all- pervasiveness (bian 遍) is Buddha-nature’s primary quality, Buddha-nature includes all types of beings without exception.