ELECTRUM * Vol. 11 Kraków 2006

Tomasz Grabowski

The Ptolemaic Policy towards Rome and Pontus during the

The Romans, completing the conquest of the Mediterranean world, found a worthy ene­ my even as late as the first half of the first century. Their reign over Minor was threat­ ened by Mithridates VI, the king of Pontus. Having acquired territories in the north-eastern region of Asia Minor and on the northern coasts of the Black Sea, Mithridates turned to­ wards lands situated at the Hellespont. The Senate, busy with internal and external feuds, initially did not react to the king’s progress. However, the clash was inevitable and the war finally broke out in the winter of 89/88 B.C. At first Mithridates enjoyed great military success, especially since a number of Asian Minor cities, fed up with the ruthlessness and arbitrariness of the Roman administration, were decisively sympathetic towards his plans. Although some of the cities (e.g. Rhodes, Abydos, and Lampsakos) did not join the Pontus king, the majority of Greeks there saw him as a liberator from the Roman rule. Adopting this role, the king of Pontus conquered the Roman dominion in Asia Minor and, by the end of 88 B.C., moved the military operations to the Balkan Peninsula.1 As Mithridates’s campaign unfolded, the Ptolemaic monarchy, divided into two parts at the time ( and ) saw some notable events. In 88 B.C., Ptolemy X Alexander was exiled from and his brother Ptolemy IX Soter II came back from Cyprus to take the Egyptian throne.2 3Starting his fight with Rome, Mithridates took very active dip­ lomatic steps. First of all, acquiring Athens was a significant propaganda success on his part? The Pontic diplomacy also extended to Syria and Egypt. At that time the country on the Nile was still ruled by Alexander and it was to him that Pontus’s offer was addressed.4

1 For Mithridates’s wars with Rome, see Sherwin-White 1980 and 1984: 108-195; Sullivan 1990: 25- 28. 2 For Ptolemy IX’s restoration see Maehler 1983: 2; Fraser 1972: I, 123; Holbl 2001: 211; Huss 2001: 656-659. 3 Cf. Badian 1976 on Mithridates’s relations with Athens. 4 App., Mithr. 13, 44. The Romans were told about Mithridates’s attempts to enlist the support of the kings of Syria and Egypt by some messengers from Bythnia. This followed the king of Bythnia’s Roman- inspired attack on Pontus. According to Livius (per. LXX1V) we may date this fact at the beginning of 90 B.C., cf. Badian 1976: 507-508. The first record of Ptolemy IX’s rule over Egypt is dated at April 21, 88 192 Tomasz Grabowski

In the so-called “Mithridates’s letter” to Arsaces, the king of the Parthians, supposedly sent in 69/68 B.C., Mithridates renews the contacts with Egypt in 90 or 89 B.C. By asking Arsa­ ces to join him in the fight against Rome, Mithridates put the blame for the earlier failures on those who had remained neutral. The king of Pontus also named an undefined Ptolemy, who tried to delay the outbreak of war by means of money. He meant Ptolemy XII (who bought the decision that pronounced him the king of Egypt in Rome in 59 B.C.; his earlier gifts to the Romans are also likely), but he aimed the accusation at his predecessors.5 What this indicates is that Ptolemy Alexander refused to join the war against Rome. This is also confirmed by the events that followed, i.e. Mithridates capturing a part of the Ptolemaic treasure, left on Kos by III in 102 B.C. Apart from the treasure, the Egyptian queen also left her grandsons on the island. It was the three boys that might have turned out to be even more valuable for the Pontic king. The young Ptolemies were Alexander (Ptolemy X’s son) and two sons of Ptolemy IX. Mithridates received them with due ho­ nours and later engaged them to his daughters.6 And so the co-operation between Egypt and Pontus never came to fruition during the reign of , and his successor continued the policy of neutrality. Al­ though (Mithr. 16, 55) writes that Pontic messengers warned the Romans against attacking their king and claimed that Egypt was among the allies of Pontus, it was only a political game aimed at creating an image of Mithridates’s power. It was no coincidence that after Athens joined Mithridates, the philosophers of the Athenian pro-Roman Acade­ mia found shelter also in Alexandria.7 The Ptolemies had their own problems as it was. Alexander, with the support of Roman financiers, started preparations for the attempt to recapture the Egyptian throne. Probably in the spring of 87 B.C. there was a sea battle off the coast of Cyprus, which ended in Alexander’s defeat and death. In this way Ptolemy IX Soter II strengthened his position as king in Alexandria and confirmed the reunification of Egypt and Cyprus.8

B.C. and the last trace of Alexander’s reign at October 4, 88 B.C. Cf. v’ant Dack et al. 1989: 143-150; Huss 2001: 659. 5 Sall., hist. Frg. IV 69. “Mithridates’s letter” was probably composed by Sallustius (Bickerman 1985: 289-309.) Cf. also Forte 1972: 131-132; Nicolet 1978: 905-906. 6 Mithridates capturing the treasure and the young Ptolemies: App., Mithr. 23, 92-93; bell .civ. 1, 102; Jos. Fl., Ant. Jud. 13, 349; 14, 112. These records do not state clearly that this was also the fate of Ptolemy IX’s sons, but - since we know that Cleopatra III put more than one of her grandsons on Kos (Jos. Fl., Ant. Jud. 13, 349), and according to Appian (Mithr. 11) Mithridates engaged his daughters to the kings of Egypt and Cyprus - it certainly refers to the sons of Ptolemy Xll. The engagement of the Ptolemies to the daugh­ ters of the king of Pontus: App., Mithr. Ill, 536. Will (1982: 480) draws attention to these events, also seeing them as proof that Mithridates failed to enlist the support of Egypt in 90/89. The engagements are usually dated after 84. Cf. Seibert 1967: 120-121, 134; Will 1982: 480. 7 Fraser 1972: 1, 485, II, 703 n. 61. Lampela (1998: 225) analyses the hypothesis that Ptolemy Alexan­ der might have intended to help Mithridates. According to the author, this might explain why the soldiers in Alexandria refused to obey the king. They might have rebelled because they were afraid he would send them against the Romans. The researcher also notices that after a defeat in a sea battle while trying to re­ capture the Egyptian throne, Alexander fled to the city of Myra in (FGrH Porph. 260, F2, 2). The Pontic army was besieging the nearby city of Patrea at that time (App., Mithr. 20, 21; 24, 27; cf. Badian 1976: 506.). As he observes himself, however, we do not know which side Myra took. As for the reasons for the soldiers’ mutiny, they are only speculations. Cf. Huss 2001: 656-657. 8 Battle off the coast of Cyprus and Alexander’s death: lust. XXXIX 5; Paus. I, 9, 3. For information on the date of this event see Will 1982: 443. On the subject of financial support likely given to Alexander I by The Ptolemaic Policy towards Rome and Pontus during the First Mithridatic War 193

During the heavy fights between the Romans and the Pontians Mithridates was not the only one to contact the Ptolemies. The Roman side, specifically Lucius Cornelius who led the military operations, also showed some interest in Egypt. In the winter of 87/86 B.C., Sulla besieged Athens but his army was blocked in Attica by the Pontic fleet. Mithri­ dates, backed up by pirates, controlled this body of water. The Roman general needed ships and he could not obtain them from Rhodes at that time. In this situation he sent his pro­ quaestor, Lucius Licinius to Egypt and Syria in order to find warships. It is possi­ ble that Lucullus was to invoke the provisions of lex de piratis presequendis of 101-100 B.C.,9 since Mithridates’s sea power was based primarily on his co-operation with pirates. Some researchers believe it is impossible and claim that Lucullus as an optimate would not have invoked a law dating back to the times of the radical popularis Satuminus and that at that time lex de piratis presequendis was no longer in force. However, these arguments are not conclusive. It is true that the period of Satuminus’s tribunate was successful for the Populares; e.g. he introduced a special tribunal for dealing with cases of injury to the maje­ sty of the Roman people (e.g. high treason or sedition). The selling price of grain was low­ ered; land allotments in were given to some veterans of the leading popularis Mar­ ius. Ultimately the steps taken by the radical Populares proved destructive for them. Satur- ninus and his followers, defeated by Marius, were lynched by the mob. It remains unsettled, however, whether all laws passed during Satuminus’s tribunate were annulled. Moreover, as negotiations with Ptolemy IX dragged out, Lucullus might have used such an argument regardless of his political affinity.10 Avoiding the enemy fleet, Lucullus had to zigzag across the Mediterranean and first came to Crete, whose citizens were known for piracy. Although prior to the breakout of the Roman-Pontic war the Cretans had established con­ tacts with Mithridates, it is possible that Lucullus obtained some ships on this island, which he then took to Cyrenae. Probably threatened by the operations of the Pontic fleet, he stayed there a little longer, waiting out the operations of enemy ships. This was not an idle stay, since - at the request of the local population, tired by the internal turmoil - he under­ took the task of putting the local law in order.11 From Crete he set out for Alexandria. How­ ever, he failed to deceive the pirates and he lost most of the fleet gathered in Crete and Cyrenae on his way to Africa.12 Ptolemy IX received him splendidly but took his time granting his request. Negotiations dragged out so that ultimately Sulla began to build his own fleet (in 86 B.C.), without waiting for the result of Lucullus’s mission. Finally the latter received only a modest escort of ships that were to accompany him on his way to Cyprus. Ptolemy did not want to put Lucullus at the risk of death by pirates near the Egyptian coast so as not to further worsen the relations with the Republic. Despite this, according to Appian (Mithr. 36, 222), Lucul- the Roman merchants see Badian 1967: 184-185; Huss 2001: 659 contra Braund 1983: 27 n. 44; Lampela 1998: 225 n. 133. 9 For the dale of this law see Hassall, Crawford, Reynolds 1974, 195-220; Pohl 1993:220-221. 10 The hypothesis that Lucullus used this law was put forward by Olshausen 1963: 18-19. Bulin (1983: 24-25) presented a critique. 11 Cyrenae was bequeathed to Rome by Ptolemy Apion, who passed away in 96 B.C. The decision on including this territory in the Republic was only made in 75 B.C. 12 Lucullus’s mission: App., Mithr. 33, 92; Plut., Luc. 2, 2; Veil. Pat. 2, 23; Jos. Fl., Ant. Jud. 14, 115. Loss of fleet: Plut., Luc. 2, 4-6. Mithridates and pirates: App., Mithr. 92. For Lucullus’s visit in Egypt see Bouché-Leclerq 1903-1907: II, 112-113; Manni 1950: 255-256; Olshausen 1963: 12-21; Will 1982: 518; Lampela 1998: 225-227. 194 Tomasz Grabowski lus with a small fleet from Cyprus, Rhodes, Phoenicia and allegedly harried the coasts controlled by Mithridates and engaged in skirmishes with the Pontic fleet. This might suggest that the Egyptian ships stayed with Lucullus after all and participated in these fights or at the very least that the Roman general received the support of Cyprian ships. However, this is likely a mistake on Appian’s part. Plutarch (Luc. 2-3), whose ac­ count is more detailed and seems more reliable, only reports that Lucullus stopped on Cy­ prus and prepared to spend the winter there. When the wind became favourable he left the island immediately. It is also improbable that Cyprus, ruled by Ptolemy IX, disobeyed the king’s orders. Therefore the king of Egypt was ultimately successful in his play for time and managed to resist Lucullus’s demands. This decision by Ptolemy IX was probably influenced by two reasons. Firstly, he did not want to fall foul of Mithridates, who kept three Ptolemies and could put forward a new claimant to the Egyptian throne. His cautious­ ness was all the more justified since Mithridates was at that time undefeated by the Ro­ mans. Secondly, Ptolemy IX was aware that Sulla’s position in Rome was not very strong at the time. After the completion of the Social War in 88 B.C., there was a riot in Rome led by the tribune Sulpicius Ruphus. Sulla, who was one of the consuls at the time, gained the support of legions stationed in Campania and marched on Rome. He quickly took over the city. However, his expedition to war with the king of Pontus made it possible for his ene­ mies to recapture power. Marius and Cinna controlled the situation in Rome, declared the laws passed on Sulla’s initiative as invalid, and officially exiled him.13 Ptolemy IX had no obligations to Sulla. Plutarch’s opinion (Luc. 3, 1) is unfounded when he says that Ptolemy revoked a friendship pact between the two states.14 Plutarch’s mistake probably resulted from using sources friendly to Sulla, e.g. his or Lucullus’s memoirs.15 In the eyes of these two generals the actions of the Egyptian king might have meant breaking off the relations, since Lucullus saw himself as a representative of the Republic. For Ptolemy, however, he was only a messenger of Sulla, who did not represent the at the time. This was the first time when Egyptian kings had to make a choice between quarrelling Roman generals. Ptolemy IX acted reasonably, especially since granting Lucullus’s request might have led to complications from Mithridates. The king of Pontus might have treated it as an invitation to introduce a “rightful ruler” to the Egyptian throne. Alexandria must have been deeply worried by the news of Sulla’s victory in the civil war and appointment to dictator (82 B.C.). Fortunately, the stem dictator, who did not hesitate to execute revenge and showed no internal struggle when brutally eliminating opposition in Italy, did not retaliate. When Ptolemy IX died in 80 B.C., he left the throne to his daughter, Cleopatra III. Her independent rule as queen of Egypt lasted about six months. However, there were intensifying voices saying that a woman reigning independently is not in accordance with the Ptolemaic customs, even more so as there were male representatives of the dynasty, the

13 For the situation in Rome at the time see Seager 1994: 197-207. 14 Plutarch uses the term ovggaxia, which does not necessarily refer to a formal alliance but may refer to the long history of friendly relations between the two states (similarly to e.g. Polyb. XXXII 20, 3; SEG IX, 7). Long-existing amicitia between the Ptolemies and Rome is a sufficient explanation why the Romans expected to get Egyptian help. 15 Olshausen 1963: 18-19 n. 24. The Ptolemaic Policy towards Rome and Pontus during the First Mithridatic War 195 sons of Ptolemy IX and Ptolemy X Alexander I.16 Finally, Ptolemy XI Alexander II, the son of Alexander I, came to the throne as Berenice’s husband. Alexander taking the throne was a sign of changes occurring in the Roman client sys­ . As far as is known, the king was the first Ptolemy in the who had a leading Roman politician for a patron. As has been mentioned, Alexander was one of the three young Ptolemies who had been left on Kos by Cleopatra III and captured by Mithridates. In 84 B.C., during the Roman-Pontic peace negotiations in Dardanos, Alexander managed to escape to Sulla’s camp; the latter took him to Rome with him.17 Thus the events of the Mithridatic War might have had an influence on the Egyptian history after all. The patron-client relation which was then created between Sulla and the young Ptolemy gave the former an opportunity to influence the Egyptian affairs and to intervene in the case of changes on the throne. He took this opportunity in 80 B.C., although it was probably on the initiative of the Alexandrians themselves. They sent, probably in consultation with Berenice, messengers to Rome to invite Alexander to the Egyptian throne. Sulla, the dicta­ tor in Rome, naturally agreed, and the Senate that he controlled approved Alexander’s rule in Egypt. Apparently there is a fundamental difference between the accounts of Appian {bell. civ. 1, 102) and Porfirius {FGrH26Q, F 2, 11). Appian writes that it was Sulla who put Alexander on the Egyptian throne, while Porfirius’s account indicates that he was sent for by the people pf Alexandria. It seems, however, that both accounts could be complemen­ tary, since we may assume that Appian’s words {bell. civ. I, 102, 476): tcov yvvaiKÈv àvôpoç gvyyevoùç Seopévœv {the women of the royal house wanted a man of the same lineage) should be understood to mean that they were looking for a candidate for a husband in Alexandria. Some researchers put more emphasis on Sulla’s role in these events.18 Ac­ cording to them, it was him that imposed his protégé as the king of Egypt. Although it is more than likely that Sulla would have decided to take such a step, it seems that he did not need to, since it was the Alexandrians themselves that put forward such a proposal. The appointment of Alexander to the throne of Egypt by the people need not be surprising. Out of the male descendants of the only the sons of Ptolemy IX were alive. Although one of them, who later became Ptolemy XII, was older than Alexander, his le­ gitimacy was questionable.19 Moreover, Alexander’s name could be found in state docu­ ments in 101/100 B.C. next to his father’s name. This could also have been a factor behind the Alexandrians’ choice. Finally, they must have taken into consideration that Sulla, con­ trolling the claimant to the Egyptian throne, would want to impose him, especially since Ptolemy IX’s affront towards Lucullus and Sulla in 87/86 B.C. was not forgotten. Thus the co-regency of Berenice and Alexander II was established. Due to his role of the Egyptian king’s patron, Sulla gained influence on Egypt and its resources, which was not insignifi­

16 Cf. Whitehome 1994: 160-161; Hôlbl 2001: 213; Huss 2001: 669. Contra Hazzard 2000: 144. Ber­ enice’s independent rule lasted from March to September 80 B.C. (Skeat 1954; Samuel 1962: 153-154). 17 App., bell. civ. I, 102; FGrHlfti Porph. F 2, 10-11. Bouché-Leclerq (1903-1907: II, 118) put for­ ward a convincing hypothesis that Alexander’s escape took place during the negotiations in Dardanos. The majority of researchers agrees with this thesis (cf. e.g. Hôlbl 2001: 213; Huss 2001: 669). Contra Hazzard 2000: 144. According to her Alexander stayed at Mithridates’s court until 80 B.C. 18 E.g. Thopmson 1994: 118; Hazzard 2000: 144. 19 It is possible that both his and his brother’s mother was also Cleopatra Selene, and the rumours of their illegitimacy were spread on purpose. However, it is more likely that their mother was an Egyptian noblewoman. In any event, from the Greek point of view they were not legitimate heirs (Paus. I, 9, 3; Cic., legagr. II, 42); cf. also Sullivan 1990: 92-93; Bennet 1997; Hôlbl 2001: 222; Huss 2001: 672. 196 Tomasz Grabowski cant in the context of the ongoing political fight in the Roman Republic. We must remem­ ber how rich the country on the Nile was and how many opportunities its control presented to an ambitious Roman general. The Senate’s place in the Roman-Ptolemaic relations was taken over by one person. The king of Egypt was Sulla’s client, and Sulla acted as the rep­ resentative of the Roman Republic in its relations with Egypt. Although Sulla’s actions during his dictatorship were aimed at rebuilding the Senate’s authority, he set an example for future ambitious individuals. He showed how to act against the will of the Senate. He dared to make war without the Senate’s authorisation and even marched his legions on Rome. He showed how the mechanism of a military coup d’etat worked in practice, setting an example that proved more lasting than the measures he took to prevent the recurrence of lawlessness.20 Sulla also started a new direction in the devel­ opment of the Roman Republic’s relations with its clients. Of course, even earlier the cases of private foreign clients of individual noblemen were not uncommon. It was always very significant for the Roman politicians who wanted to make a public career to have foreign clients. Regardless of very tangible benefits, it also enhanced the politician’s reputation. Having influence in Rome was connected with increasing prestige, which in tum depended, among others, on having clients. Through their foreign contacts noblemen had a good op­ portunity to increase their leverage. This was all the more important since in Rome they were under the Senate’s watchful eye. Dignitas, leading to tangible benefits, was one of the most important elements of the noblemen controlling their foreign clients.21 Now, however, in the light of a changing model of the Roman state, such relations took on a new meaning. The clients were changing from state to private clients. This process continued in the years that followed. Sulla had high hopes for Alexander Il’s rule in Egypt - not only political, but also fi­ nancial ones.22 Egyptian reaches were far-famed and Sulla probably remembered the not- so-remote event when Mithridates grew significantly richer by capturing only a part of the Ptolemaic treasure. However, Alexander Il’s reign was brief. He probably expected that, as Sulla’s protégé, he would actually rule the country. It turned out, however, that he was only a coregent, dominated by the older and more experienced Cleopatra Berenice III. He relied too much on the support of the and acted too boldly, while his dependence on Sulla certainly did not earn him the love of his subjects. Very quickly he made an unfor­ givable error, which cost him his life. After eighteen or nineteen days he murdered Bere­ nice, which incurred the wrath of the citizens of Alexandria who lynched him.23

20 For Sulla’s actions and laws during the dictatorship see Sherwin-White 1994: 197-207. 21 As Badian (1958: 159) observed, even earlier every kind of contact between a Roman politician and a ruler of another state could lead to the patron-client relation (e.g. military victories, administrative con­ tacts, taking such an initiative by the other party). For the noblemen’s foreign clients see Cobban 1935: 60- 63; Badian 1958: 154-167; Gelzer 1962: 99-101; Rawson 1973; Braund 1988: 83-84 and 1989. It was sometimes the case that rulers were connected to several Roman politicians. Deiotarus (the king of Gala­ tians) was connected to , Caesar, and Pompey, i.e. the key individuals in the later Republic. Caesar then accused Deiotarus of siding with Pompey, not him, in the civil war: bell. Alex 67-68. 22 App., bell. civ. I, 102. 23 Berenice’s position is evidenced by the fact that her name is written before Alexander’s name in the only document remaining from their co-regency (P. dem. Cair 30752), cf. Pestman 1967: 76-77; Hazzard 2000: 144. The end of Alexander’s rule: App., bell. civ. I, 102; FGrH 260 Porph. F 2, 11; P. Oxy XIX, 2222. Some researchers suggest other reasons why Berenice was murdered by Alexander II, e g. the queen The Ptolemaic Policy towards Rome and Pontus during the First Mithridatic War 197

The Egyptian throne was then taken by Ptolemy XII, invited by the citizens of Alexan­ dria, while his brother received the independent kingdom of Cyprus.24 By giving the island to the younger Ptolemy the Alexandrians sanctioned the legal (for the first time) division of the Ptolemaic monarchy. This was probably aimed at decreasing the threat posed by Rome that, having had no influence on these decisions, might have failed to accept the new king. Rome (i.e. Sulla) did not react to the death of its protégé but that did not mean that the Ptolemies’ position in Rome improved. For a long time Ptolemy XII could not confirm his position in Rome. After Sulla’s death in 78 B.C., the Egyptian issue came up in a whole new form. While Sulla did not want to conquest Egypt, now there was no lack of candidates for generals ready to enter Egypt. However, as a result of long-lasting balance of powers and the Senate’s decisive resistance to the annexation or interference in the country on the Nile, ultimately no such action was taken.

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