DOCSLIB.ORG

WALTER HALLSTEIN: the USA, the ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP and the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY * Corrado MALANDRINO

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
WALTER HALLSTEIN: the USA, the ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP and the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY * Corrado MALANDRINO WALTER HALLSTEIN: THE USA, THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY * Corrado MALANDRINO Para citar este artículo puede utilizarse el siguiente formato: Corrado Malandrino (2015): «Walter Hallstein: the USA, the Atlantic Partnership and the European Community», en Revista europea de historia de las ideas políticas y de las instituciones públicas, nº 9 (diciembre 2015). Puede leerse este artículo en línea: http://www.eumed.net/rev/rehipip/09/hallstein.html. RESUMEN: Estudio sobre Walter Hallstein, uno de los políticos que en los años setenta y ochenta del siglo XX contribuyó a la construcción de la Unión Europea. Fue el fundador de la maquinaria burocrática de la Unión Europea. Previamente formó parte de la Iglesia Confesante que se opuso al nazismo, pero fue militarizado en la segunda guerra mundial, y fue hecho prisionero por los norteamericanos. Sería profesor en diversas Universidades alemanas. Hombre clave en las relaciones entre Europa y los Estados Unidos de América. PALABRAS CLAVE: Walter Hallstein, Edward Heath, Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl, Heinrich von Brentano, Paul van Zeeland. RESUM: Estudi sobre Walter Hallstein, un dels polítics que en els anys setanta i vuitanta del segle XX va contribuir a la construcció de la Unió Europea. Va ser el fundador de la maquinària burocràtica de la mateixa Unió Europea. Prèviament va formar part de l'Església Confesante que es va oposar al nazisme, però va ser militaritzat en la segona guerra mundial, i va ser fet presoner pels nord-americans. Seria professor en diverses Universitats alemanyes. Home clau en les relacions entre Europa i els Estats Units d'Amèrica. PARAULES CLAU: Walter Hallstein, Edward Heath, Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl, Heinrich von Brentano, Paul van Zeeland. 1. Hallstein: who was he? In the opinion of the main European political men, who actually helped to prepare in the 1970s and 1980s the construction of the European Union ‒ like Edward Heath, Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl ‒ Walter Hallstein ―was a great European‖, not only because he was the first President of the Commission of the EEC and the founder of the European Community's bureaucratic machinery1. But Hallstein is today, as a matter of fact, ―a forgotten European‖ for a very important part of the European public intellectuals and the public opinion. Hardly anybody remembers he was at the end of 1950 the head of the German delegation who was negotiating with the French Foreign Minister * Ordinario di storia delle dottrine politiche. Università degli studi del Piemonte Orientale. 1 See W. Loth, W. Wallace and W. Wessels (ed. by), Walter Hallstein the forgotten European?, foreword by J. Delors, E. Heath and H. Kohl, St. Martin Press, New York, and Macmillan Press, London, 1998, p. xiii. 71 Revista Europea de Historia de las Ideas Políticas y de las Instituciones Públicas Robert Schuman and his counsellor Jean Monnet the Treaty of Paris (1951), that instituted the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and was signing 1957 for Germany ‒ with Konrad Adenauer ‒ the Treaties of Rome that established the EEC and the Euratom. So it is not inappropriate to ask himself today: who was actually Hallstein?2 And to give some basic informations about his life before he was appointed in January 1958 the President of the European Commission. Walter Hallstein was born on 17 November 1901, the son of a Protestant family. His father was the head of the planning department and building control officer in Mainz (Rhine Palatinate). He studied jurisprudence and political science in Bonn, Munich and Berlin. Having graduated he quickly went into the university and became 1925 assistant professor of Civil Law. In 1930 he was appointed a professor in the University of Rostock and in 1941 received a chair at Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe University in Frankfurt, where he worked as the director of the Institute for Comparative Law and as the director of the Institute for Commercial Law. There is to note that in the meantime he was close to antinazi Evangelical ―Confessant‖ Church of Martin Niemôller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and took no part in political nazism. His brilliant jurist career was interrupted by his conscription to military service in the second world war. He was an officer of the mounted artillery in occupied northern France when the Allies invaded in June 1944. He became an American prisoner-of-war and was taken to Camp Como in the US state of Missisipi. There he organized a camp prisoner university, demonstrating his ability to manage operations on a larger scale. He entered also for the first time in touch with the American way of life and made friends with American authorities, contacts wich were consolidated in postwar period when he became in 1946 professor and Chancellor of Frankfurt University and returned in 1948 in USA as a visiting professor in the Georgetown University. Hallstein played a part in the reorganization of the higher education system in the Western-occupied German zone as a Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Southern German Higher Education Congress. He met first Adenauer in 1948 in the German Delegation to the Congress of the European Movement in The Hague. This time Hallstein had a reputation as one of the German personalities whom the Allies wanted to promote in consolidating their democratization programme. He supported in 1949 the founding of a German UNESCO Commission whose became 1950 the first president. After the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, the Chancellor Adenauer appointed Hallstein in June 1950 to conduct the German delegation in Paris for the government negotiations on the Schuman Plan. Since 1951 he became Adenauer‘s State Secretary for the ―Office for Foreign Affairs‖ in the federal Chancellery too. The German ambassador Joachim Jaenicke, 1956-9 spokesman for the Foreign Office, wrote that since 1951 untill 1955 «Hallstein was the minister responsible for laying the foundations of foreign policy and for the day-to-day running of the Foreign Office»3. When the ―Office for Foreign 2 For the European biography of Hallstein see C. Malandrino, “Tut etwas Tapferes”: compi un atto di coraggio. L‟Europa federale di W. Hallstein (1948-1982), Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005. 3 Compare J. Jaenicke, Remembering Walter Hallstein, in W. Loth, W. Wallace and W. Wessels (ed. by), Walter Hallstein the forgotten European?, p. 35. 72 Revista Europea de Historia de las Ideas Políticas y de las Instituciones Públicas Affairs‖ moved out of the federal Chancellery and Adenauer retained the position of Foreign Minister, Hallstein was the actual head of a federal ministry. As a State Secretary to the Foreign federal ministry (also with the new minister Heinrich von Brentano since 1955) he conducted the European and German policies. He became famous particularly for the so named ―Hallstein- Doctrine‖, that supported the Federal Republic‘s claim to be the sole representative of German interests against any similar pretension of the communist Eastern Democratic Republic. This ―Doctrine‖ was actually an elaborated strategy of the Minister von Brentano and of the director of Foreign Office Wilhelm Grewe. As a State Secretary, Hallstein stated it 1956 to the public opinion. When this ―Doctrine‖ caused an acute crisis in the autumn of 1957 with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and GDR, Hallstein had no part in it for he was outgoing from federal government and engaged above all in European policy. But he remained labeled this way as a strong anticommunist political man for the rest of his political life that, on the contrary, was devoted only to European activities. 2. Hallstein‟s American relationship: the Atlantic inspiration and the influence of the American federalism There can be no doubt that Hallstein‘s reflections during his stays in the USA in 1940s made him more and more aware of the necessity to anchor the destiny of Germany – and of Europe as well – to Atlantic and American strong relationships. In the conference at the Georgetown University held on 12 March 19524 he remembered his prisony years 1944-5 and the visiting professor period in 1948-9. They were in his opinion the richest years of his life, not only for his culture, but for assimilating a new way of life. A way so far from the heavy German Weltanschauung during the period between the two world wars, fed with revanscist and racist feelings and militarist aggressive policies. On the contrary he saw the American way inspired to freedom and vitality ideals, to a sense of greatness and large horizons, desires of realism and transformation, but also to a concept of fairness. ―The Americans are the best Europeans‖ he sentenced, and he meant that the best European values continued to live in the American political culture. Moreover he intended also that the USA performed successfully a role of ―federator‖ of the European states. In fact, Hallstein was persuaded that the American federalist tradition, beginning with the original experience of his transition from the Confederation Articles of 1778 until the federalist constitution by the ideologic struggle of Hamilton and Madison's Federalist, could represent mutatis mutandis a good example for the European states too. Axel Herbst, German ambassador, diplomatic attaché in Washington 1953- 57 and from 1960 untill 1968 deputy Secretary-General of the EEC Commission with Hallstein, wrote that «living through the war and living in the postwar period, combined with experience at Konrad Adenauer's side, convinced Hallstein that the goodwill and support of the USA was imperative for the 4 See W. Hallstein, Schumanplan und europäische Integration, typescript of 19 pages, in "Nachlass Walter Hallstein" NWH, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, N 1266 N. 1964. 73 Revista Europea de Historia de las Ideas Políticas y de las Instituciones Públicas security of the Western world and for the rebirth of Europe»5.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy-Making at the European Commission, from the Rome Treaties to the Hague Summit
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Maes, Ivo Working Paper Macroeconomic and monetary policy-making at the European Commission, from the Rome Treaties to the Hague Summit NBB Working Paper, No. 58 Provided in Cooperation with: National Bank of Belgium, Brussels Suggested Citation: Maes, Ivo (2004) : Macroeconomic and monetary policy-making at the European Commission, from the Rome Treaties to the Hague Summit, NBB Working Paper, No. 58, National Bank of Belgium, Brussels This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144272 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM WORKING PAPERS - RESEARCH SERIES MACROECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FROM THE ROME TREATIES TO THE HAGUE SUMMIT _______________________________ Ivo Maes (*) The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium.
    [Show full text]
  • José Manuel Barroso's Leadership of the European Commission
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kassim, Hussein Working Paper A new model presidency: José Manuel Barroso's leadership of the European Commission WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP IV 2013-502 Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Kassim, Hussein (2013) : A new model presidency: José Manuel Barroso's leadership of the European Commission, WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP IV 2013-502, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103427 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence
    [Show full text]
  • The Legal Constitution of the European Union2
    European Scientific Journal August 2018 /SPECIAL/ edition ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 2 The Legal Constitution of the European Union Academic Director Dr. iur. Dr. phil. Franz-Rudolf Herber Frederic-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany Doi: 10.19044/esj.2018.c4p9 URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2018.c4p9 Abstract World War II (1939 – 1945) was a catastrophe for the whole world and for Europe in particular. It is one of the great miracles of the 20th century that the West European war parties did draw a line and founded an economic alliance for coal and steel production. This economical alliance is based on common values and on the rule of law. A main problem of the European Union is to give a democratic legitimation to the European institutions. It is good that e.g. the European Parliament is elected directly, it is bad that e.g. the President of the European Commission is not elected directly. In some Member States of the European Union common values and common interests are only partim shared. The people of Great Britain did decide in 2016 to leave the European Union; according to the legal constitution of the European Union a leave is allowed. The main achievement of the European Union is the abolition of inter-European taxes and thus the promotion of economical relationships between the Member States of the European Union. The Euro that is the currency of (only) some Member States has become a global player. Keywords: European Union, Member States of the European Union, Treaties of the European Union, common values, common market, separation of powers, European Commission, European Parliament, President of the European Council, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Central Bank Introduction One should be aware of the fact what kind of brutal military violence the greatest war criminal of human history – Adolf Hitler (1883 – 1945) and his crazy followers – had brought to the former Czechoslovakia (CSSR)3.
    [Show full text]
  • Éva Bóka Europe in Search of Unity in Diversity
    Éva Bóka Europe in Search of Unity in Diversity Can Personalist Federalism and Multilevelism Manage Diversity? (A historical essay) Abstract This essay investigates how European (Western and Central European) federalist political thinkers, believing in the idea of a peaceful world federation, developed personalism, multilevelism, and subsidiarity as means of protecting diversity in Europe during the 19th and 20th century, in opposition to anti-federalist conservative power policies and classical liberal capitalist market economy expansion. It emphasises the role of József Eötvös who rethought the ideas of Tocqueville and Proudhon, and can be regarded as the first “manager of diversity” in Europe. The lecture also presents how the Pan-European Movement elaborated the federalist ideas on personalist federalism and multilevelism. It also deals with European integration as manager of diversity: more precisely it investigates how the EU, as an intergovernmental and supranational new regional union of states based on multilevelism and subsidiarity, protects diversity (“unity in diversity”), and how this can influence new regionalism in the world. Conclusion: personalism, subsidiarity and multilevelism can protect diversity world-wide. - 1 Content 1. Introduction: the idea of peaceful world federation 2. European federalism in opposition to wars and power policy 2.1. Federalists in opposition to anti-federalists in a modernising Europe 2.2. Eötvös as the first manager of diversity in Europe 2.3. Linguistic-cultural federalist visions 2.4. The Pan-European Movement in defense of European civilization 2.5. Renewing the international and European state organization after the Second World War 3. European integration and managing diversity 3.1. Federalist élan in Europe 3.2.
    [Show full text]
  • Chronicle of an Election Foretold: the Longer-Term Trends Leading to the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ Procedure and the Election of Jean-Claude Juncker As European
    LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series Chronicle of an Election Foretold: The Longer-Term Trends leading to the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ procedure and the Election of Jean-Claude Juncker as European Commission President Martin Westlake LEQS Paper No. 102/2016 January 2016 LEQS is generously supported by the LSE Annual Fund Editorial Board Dr Joan Costa-i-Font Dr Vassilis Monastiriotis Dr Jonathan White Dr Katjana Gattermann Dr Sonja Avlijas All views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the LSE. © Martin Westlake Chronicle of an Election Foretold: The Longer-Term Trends leading to the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ procedure and the Election of Jean-Claude Juncker as European Commission President Martin Westlake* Abstract By focusing on the near-term campaign in the 2014 European elections analysts have tended to over-look a series of longer-term trends that were jointly and inexorably leading to the Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidate) process and to some at least of the subsequent structural reforms to the Commission. The paper argues that those longer-term trends continue and that the (s)election of Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission and the structural reforms he subsequently introduced are better understood as steps in ongoing processes rather than fresh departures. Thus, what will happen in 2019 will have been conditioned not only by 2014, but also by previous elections and previous developments, as considered in this paper. Keywords: European Commission Presidency, Jean-Claude Juncker, Spitzenkandidaten, European Parliament, Longer-Term Trends * Visiting Professor, College of Europe, Bruges Senior Visiting Fellow, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE Email: [email protected] The Longer-Term Trends leading to the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ procedure Table of Contents 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents
    SECTION 5: Non-Communist Europe and Israel Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents access agency, the exchange of mutual non-aggression declara- d. Note: Much like the other NATO allies of the United tions and the establishment of FRG-GDR technical commissions. States, West Germany was not involved in either the ori- Somehow the proposals leaked to the German press, leading gins or the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.1 Secretary of State Dean Rusk to protest the serious breach of confi- EBut, of course, nowhere in Europe was the immediate impact of dence. Hurt by the accusation, Adenauer withdrew his longstand- Khrushchev’s nuclear missile gamble felt more acutely than in ing confidante and ambassador to Washington, Wilhelm Grewe. Berlin. Ever since the Soviet premier’s November 1958 ultima- Relations went from cool to icy when the chancellor publicly dis- tum, designed to dislodge Western allied forces from the western tanced himself from Washington’s negotiation package at a press sectors of the former German Reich’s capital, Berlin had been the conference in May. By time the missile crisis erupted in October, focus of heightened East-West tensions. Following the building Adenauer’s trust in the United States had been severely shaken.4 of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the October stand-off The missile crisis spurred a momentary warming in the between Soviet and American tanks at the Checkpoint Charlie uneasy Adenauer-Kennedy relationship. Unlike other European crossing, a deceptive lull had settled over the city.2 allies, Adenauer backed Kennedy’s staunch attitude during the cri- Yet the Berlin question (centering around Western rights sis wholeheartedly, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Washington.
    [Show full text]
  • The European Council As a Crisis Driven 'Gouvernement Économique׳
    The European Council as a crisis driven ‘gouvernement économique’ by Wolfgang Wessels Jean Monnet Chair University of Cologne [email protected] Paper for the 14th EUSA Conference, Boston Friday 18 March 2015, 1:45-3:15 p.m. Please do not quote without the author’s permission Based on a preliminary version of the chapter “Economic Governance: Towards a ‘gouvernement économique’?” In: Wessels, W. (forthcoming 2015): The European Council Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillian. Prepared within the framework of the project: „EU-GLOBAL: Transatlantic Perspectives in a Changing Global Context: Multilateralism Through Regionalism” The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. Content Economic Governance: Crisis driven and institutional .............................................................. 3 The European Council as constitutional architect ............................................................................... 5 Managing the Economic and Financial Crisis: A Reinforced Leadership Role ..................................... 8 At the Institutional Centre of the Multi-Pillar Architecture: Treaty Rules and Actual Practices ....... 12 Conclusion: Towards a Crisis-Driven ‘Gouvernement Économique’ .................................................. 15 2 Economic Governance: Crisis driven and institutional High on the agenda of the European Council as the key institution within the EU’s architecture are issues of economic governance. The various policies that form part of economic governance – monetary, fiscal, and other economic and social policies – are usually regarded as the most important or at least the most often discussed areas of the European Council’s policy-making (see for example Van Rompuy 2010).
    [Show full text]
  • Senior Scholars European Union Spring 2017 Week 7 March 28
    3/30/17 The European Union The European Union: • Three important EU-related events in the past week History, Structure, Future – Announcement that UK will notify EU tomorrow, March 29, of its intent to withdraw from the EU – to invoke Article 50 TEU Senior Scholars Spring 2017 – Declaration of Rome, Saturday, March 25, 2017 – Proceedings against Poland under Article 7 TEU Prof. Kenneth F. Ledford [email protected] 368-4144 DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY The European Union The European Union • Brexit • Article 50 TEU – 1) Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. – 2) A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. – 3) The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
    [Show full text]
  • The Founding Fathers of the EU the European Union Explained
    THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED The founding fathers of the EU THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED This publication is a part of a series that explains what the EU does in different policy areas, why the EU is involved and what the results are. You can see online which ones are available and download them at: http://europa.eu/pol/index_en.htm How the EU works Europe 2020: Europe’s growth strategy The founding fathers of the EU Agriculture Borders and security Budget Climate action Competition Consumers Culture and audiovisual The European Union explained: Customs The founding fathers of the EU Development and cooperation Digital agenda European Commission Economic and monetary union and the euro Directorate-General for Communication Education, training, youth and sport Publications Employment and social affairs 1049 Brussels Energy BELGIUM Enlargement Enterprise Manuscript completed in May 2012 Environment Fight against fraud Photos on cover and page 2: © EU 2013- Corbis Fisheries and maritime affairs Food safety 2013 — pp. 28 — 21 x 29.7 cm Foreign affairs and and security policy ISBN 978-92-79-28695-7 Humanitarian aid doi:10.2775/98747 Internal market Justice, citizenship, fundamental rights Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, Migration and asylum 2013 Public health Regional policy © European Union, 2013 Research and innovation Reproduction is authorised. For any use or reproduction Taxation of individual photos, permission must be sought directly Trade from the copyright holders. Transport THE founding fathers OF THE EU The founding fathers of the EU Over half a century ago a number of visionary fathers were a diverse group of people who held leaders inspired the creation of the European the same ideals: a peaceful, united and Union we live in today.
    [Show full text]
  • The European Council After Lisbon: a Review Article by Giacomo Delledonne
    ISSN: 2036-5438 The European Council after Lisbon: A review article by Giacomo Delledonne Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 6, issue 3, 2014 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -126 Abstract This contribution deals with the role of the European Council in the institutional framework of the European Union, as it has been laid down by the Lisbon Treaty. It focuses on its rising influence, even beyond the wording of the Treaty, and the increasing criticism stimulated by this evolution. In reviewing the main relevant issues and critical viewpoints related to the European Council, some aspects are considered in depth: the increasing institutionalisation of the European Council and its critical position with regard to the management of the economic and financial crisis and to the ongoing process of “politicisation” of the Union. The discussion also considers comparative constitutional data and organic proposal of reform of the institutional architecture of the EU. Key-words European Council, President of the European Council, intergovernmentalism, politicisation of the European Union, comparative federalism Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -127 1. Introduction This contribution deals with the role of the European Council in the institutional framework of the European Union, as it has been laid down by the Lisbon Treaty. It will consider its rising influence, even beyond the wording of the Treaty, and the increasing criticism stimulated by this evolution. In reviewing the main relevant issues and critical viewpoints related to the European Council, some aspects will be considered in depth: the increasing institutionalisation of the European Council and its critical position with regard to the management of the economic and financial crisis and to the ongoing process of “politicisation” of the Union.
    [Show full text]
  • Setting Europe's Agenda: the Commission Presidents And
    POLICY BRIEF Setting Europe’s Agenda: The Commission Presidents and Political Leadership Henriette Müller Active political leadership by Commission presidents means strategically transferring political ambitions of a Pan-European scope into consensual agendas (agenda-setting leadership) that can be effectively mediated through the intra- and inter-institutional arenas of decision-making at a European level (mediative-institutional leadership) and gain support among European public spheres (public leadership). In fact, since the European Commission is vested with the right of initiative, shaping and influencing Europe’s agenda through strategic agenda-setting is the president’s primary political opportunity to exhibit political leadership. This policy brief thus focuses on the strategic timing and substance of presidential agendas. In doing so, it evaluates the agenda-setting strategies of three former incumbents Walter Hallstein, Jacques Delors and José Barroso, who presided over the Commission at least for two terms. The brief reveals two main results. First, the distribution of speeches during each presidency showed that supranational agenda-setting is more successful when there is a strong push and outreach strategy towards delivering the main topics of an agenda at the beginning of each term. For example, Walter Hallstein gave most of his speeches in the first phase of his presidency. Jacques Delors’ agenda-setting entailed greater fluctuations; nonetheless, he was particularly keen to address his agenda both as directly and frequently as possible at the beginning of each of his three terms. Barroso instead followed a cyclical development of speeches in which he delayed his strong outreach until the middle of each term, which was, as a result, much less efficient in successfully setting the main goals of his incumbency.
    [Show full text]
  • The Potsdam Agreement
    1 Bill Bowring The legal significance of Potsdam: Quincy Wright versus Wilhelm Grewe in the pages of the American Journal of International Law in Christoph Koch (ed) Das Potsdamer Abkommen 1945-2015. Rechtliche Bedeutung und historische Auswirkungen (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2017) pp. 115-132 Introduction The Potsdam Agreement was contained in the Protocol of the Proceedings, dat- ed 1 August 1945, published following the conference which took place from 17 July to 2 August 19451. I have chosen, as my contribution to this collection, to focus on a scholarly exchange which took place in 1961–1962, that is, more than 15 years after the Agreement, in the context of one of the most dangerous crises of the Cold War, one of the precise moments at which nuclear Armaged- don could have been unleashed. The protagonists, in the pages of the American Journal of International Law were, at first sight, two distinguished jurists, both of whom had risen high in their country’s service: the international relations scholar Quincy Wright, who lived from 1890 to 1970, and was 70 years old at the time, and the lawyer and diplomat Wilhelm Grewe, who lived from 1911 to 2000, 20 years Wright’s junior, and 51 years old at the time of his reply to Wright. It is immediately apparent that the Potsdam Agreement was very much the central matter of contention between them, Wright inclined to accept politi- cal realities but prepared to argue, against himself, for a “return to Potsdam”, and for that reason denounced by Grewe. I start with some brief remarks on the Cold War and the events of 1961– 62, before setting out the elements of Wright’s comments and Grewe’s heated response.
    [Show full text]