Merging Challenges of Free Trade Zones to the Export Control Regime
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Chapter 2 New Challenges to the Export Oriented Growth Model
Chapter 2 New Challenges to the Export Oriented Growth Model Song Hong Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) December 2012 This chapter should be cited as Song, H. (2012), ‘New Challenges to the Export Oriented Growth Model’, in Zhang, Y., F. Kimura and S. Oum (eds.), Moving Toward a New Development Model for East Asia- The Role of Domestic Policy and Regional Cooperation . ERIA Research Project Report 2011-10, Jakarta: ERIA. pp.27-54. CHAPTER 2 New Challenges to the Export Oriented Growth Model SONG HONG Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) The export-oriented strategy played a crucial role for the successful development of East Asian economies after the World War II. They first exported low-technology manufactured goods, then gradually upgraded and transformed their export goods packages and finally caught up with the developed countries. Export oriented strategy in East Asia has been based on a series of internal and external conditions. Those conditions includes an open international environment, the existence of a certain size of external market, a stable supply of raw materials, as well as good and convenient navigation, and some internal conditions. Global financial crisis badly changed some of these conditions. For example, the external market was very unstable and was growing very slow; after the financial crisis, international raw material and energy prices experienced sharp volatility, which caused great challenges to the countries and enterprises seeking to implement an export oriented strategy. However, after the financial crisis the changes in international and domestic environments did not change the nature and trends of globalization, only temporarily slowed the pace of this process. -
United States Code: the Tariff Commission, 19 USC §§ 91-107
TITLE 19.-CUSTOM, 1 DUTIES § 123a station to another for duty may be allowed, within tihe discre- 96. Invcstigatios as to customs.-- Supersedecd.l tion and under written orders of the Secretary of the Treasury, This section mast5uperseded by I 1332 (a) of this title. the expenses incurred for packing, crating, freight, and dray- 97. Information to President and Congress.--[ SUplerseded.I age in the transfer of their household effects and other per- This section was superseded sonal property. (Mar. 4, 1923, c. 251, § 5, -12 Stat. 145; June by J 1332 (g) of this tillO. 17, 1930, c. 497, Title IV, § G-15(b), 46 Stat. 701.) 98. Investigating tnmiff relations with foreign countries.-- This section was in part repealed by 1 015 (b) of Act June 17, [Sulerseded. 1 1930, cited thereto, which read its follows: "So much of the Act This section was superseded by 1 1132 (b) of lihs titl. entitied 'An Act to provide the necessary organization of the Customs Service for an udequate administration and enforcement 100. Documents and copies for investigations; teltimony; of the Tariff Act of 1922 and all other customs revenue laws,' ip. compelling production of books or papers; freedom of wit- proved M[arch 4, 1923, as anitided, as limits the amount of house. nesses from prosecution.-[SUlitrsededI. hold effects and other personal property of customs officers nl employees for which expenses may be allowed upon transfer from This section wits suprsedeld hy 111313(a) itn (e) of this tlil, one oflehil station to another, is hereby retlied." and the auendatory set of Selpt. -
Jesus on Tithing 17
www.Tithing.com 1 CHAPTER INDEX PREFACE 3 INTRODUCTION 5 FIRST FRUITS 8 ABRAHAM & JACOB 11 JESUS ON TITHING 17 ETERNAL PRINCIPLE 21 THE MINIMUM STANDARD 29 THE LOCAL STOREHOUSE 33 THE BURDEN OF TITHING 38 GREATER GIVING 43 CLOSING THOUGHTS 51 www.Tithing.com 2 PREFACE The preface may be the most important portion to read in this whole book. This will define some terms and clear up some preconceived notions before we proceed to more controversial issues. If you do not believe the tithe is commanded, and are giving through freewill, Spirit-led giving, this resource is written in support of your view of giving; but if you read this only gaining support for the tithing debate, then you will have missed greater intentions that the Spirit of God has. If you support tithing (a minimum requirement of 10%), this resource is not written in total support of your view, but if you feel that this resource will make attempts to excuse selfishness, greed, and disobedience, then you will have missed the greater intentions of giving written here. The challenge for all is to gain knowledge and experience of the greater call and higher guilt led by the Holy Spirit. Whether you give beyond the tithe with limitless offerings, or you give freely, you already exercise the tool used to define "Spirit-led giving". This book will challenge you to give sacrificially. First, let’s explain and compare two types of givers. 1. Cheerful tither - They follow the examples in scripture about tithing, while cheerfully and willingly committing themselves to give a 10% minimum. -
(Output) Import Tariff Reduction Increase Home Exports? Evidence from Korean Manufacturing Plant–Product Data
ERIA-DP-2019-29 ERIA Discussion Paper Series No. 315 Does Home (Output) Import Tariff Reduction Increase Home Exports? Evidence from Korean Manufacturing Plant–Product Data Chin Hee HAHN Gachon University, Republic of Korea Ju Hyun PYUN§ Korea University Business School, Republic of Korea February 2020 Abstract: This study examines the effects of domestic output import tariff reduction on domestic plant export dynamics and clarifies the underlying mechanism, using rich plant–product data from the Republic of Korea for 1991–2002. We find that home import liberalisation increases domestic plants’ export market participation (extensive margins), particularly for industry where markup growth is more negative during tariff reductions. However, we do not find evidence that cutting import tariffs significantly affects incumbent home exporters’ export volume (intensive margins). This study unveils a new mechanism – ‘escape competition’ to foreign markets – by showing that reducing import tariffs leads domestic firms under heightened industry competition to look for an opportunity in foreign markets via export inauguration. Keywords: Plant-product level data; output tariff; Lerner symmetry; extensive margin; intensive margin; product scope JEL Classification: F15; F23 Corresponding author: Ju Hyun Pyun, Business School, Korea University, 145 Anam-Ro, Seongbuk- Gu, Seoul 02841, Republic of Korea, Tel: 82-2-3290-2610, E-mail: [email protected] § This research was conducted as part of the 2018 Microdata project of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). The authors are deeply indebted to the members of this project for their invaluable suggestions. The opinions expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reflect the views of ERIA. -
New Experimental Electricity Tariff Systems for Household End Use
Panel 2 - ID 54 - p1 Wols i n k New experimental electricity tariff systems for household end Use Ma a r ten Wol s i n k De p a r tment of Environmental Science, University of Amster da m Abstract A significant tool in Demand Side Management is the structure of tariffs. Price incentives can be directed at dif- ferent parts of the efficiency-concept: efficiency in capacity planning, efficiency in total electricity consumption, efficiency in total fossil fuel use, efficiency in total energy demand. The tariff system, which is currently used in the Netherlands, does not give proper price incentives for end-user efficiency. In particular total electricity demand is rather stimulated, which is somewhat dampened by the introduction of the eco-tax. In the Netherlands field experiments with tariff systems directed at influencing household electricity demand were carried out by five utilities. In the experiments differentiated tariff-variants were introduced, replacing the old tariff-system. The experiments included voluntary price differentiation, which introduced a free-rider prob- lem in combination with the chosen price levels. Furthermore remote-monitoring, feedback, special peak-pricing etc. were implemented in the experiments. Some interesting options, in particular those influencing total demand, were not implemented by utilities. The reasons for it should be categorized as ‘strategic’ and part of the utilities’ policy. 1. Reasons for tariff experimentation In 1989 the electricity sector in the Netherlands was reorganized. Part of it was the separation by law of produc- tion companies and distribution utilities. A series of changes in purchase-rates from producers in which flexibility and capacity-cost became more important urged utilities to pay more attention to load patterns. -
What Is Really in the Economic Partnership Agreements for the Southern African Region? a Perspective from Botswana's Beef Expo
Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008) Mbatha & Charalambides What is really in the economic partnership agreements for the Southern African region? A perspective from Botswana’s beef export markets CN Mbatha1 & N Charalambides2 Abstract The signing of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) nations dominated the multilateral trade agenda in late 2007 and early 2008. While the Caribbean nations signed the full EPAs, some of the African countries only singed interim agreements with the EU and a number of West African countries chose not to sign any EPA. Using the case of Botswana’s export markets, especially in agriculture, it is argued that the interim Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA, which was signed by Botswana and her neighbours, with the exception of South Africa, may have been economically sensible in protecting Botswana’s rural poor, at least in the short run. By tracing trade flows from the border to specifically poor sectors of the country, the importance of the beef exports sector to the poor and rural communities was found. The potential effects on the most significant exports of tariff bands associated with preferential agreements with the EU were found to be most beneficial in comparison to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and the South Africa-EU Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) tariff bands. But it is also argued that the EPA will most likely have far reaching long run costs on regional economic development and institutional integration, within the SADC and Southern African Customs Union (SACU). -
How Do Exports and Imports Affect the Use of Free Trade Agreements? Firm-Level Survey Evidence from Southeast Asia
ERIA-DP-2016-01 ERIA Discussion Paper Series How Do Exports and Imports Affect the Use of Free Trade Agreements? Firm-level Survey Evidence from Southeast Asia Lili Yan ING* Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) and University of Indonesia Shujiro URATA ERIA and Waseda University Yoshifumi FUKUNAGA Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) January 2016 Abstract: Based on profit estimations, findings from a firm-level survey of 630 manufacturing firms across Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries conducted in 2013 showed that a 1 percent increase in the share of exports in total sales will increase the probability of use of free trade agreements (FTAs) by 0.2 percent, whereas a 1 percent increase in the share of imports in total inputs will reduce the probability of use of FTAs by 0.4 percent. Results from locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOESS) show that the use of FTAs is tilde-shaped and negative-shaped as a function of exports and imports, respectively. Keywords: Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN, Regional integration, FTA Utilisation JEL: F14, F15, F16, F23, F6 * The authors thank national teams for their work on leading surveys in Southeast Asia – MOFAT for Brunei Darussalam, CICP for Cambodia, LPEM–FEUI for Indonesia, NERI for Lao PDR, MIER Malaysia, YIE for Myanmar, PIDS for the Philippines, SIIA for Singapore, University of Chulalongkorn for Thailand, and CIEM for Viet Nam. The authors thank Ikumo Isono and Archanun Koophaiboon, and participants at the 14th East Asian Economic Association Conference for their comments on an earlier draft, and Robert Herdiyanto for his assistance in data cleaning at an early stage of the survey, and Rully Prassetya and Muhammad Rizqy for checking the use of GSP. -
EC Commission V. Ireland (Case 288/83)
Re Imports of Cyprus Potatoes: E.C. Commission v. Ireland (Case 288/83) Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities ECJ (Presiding, Lord Mackenzie Stuart C.J.; Bosco, Due and Kakouris PP.C.; Pescatore, Koopmans, Everling, Bahlmann and Galmot JJ.) M. Marco Darmon Advocate General. 11 June 1985 Application under Article 169 EEC. Imports. Quantitative restrictions. Article 30 EEC prohibits, in trade between member-States, all public bans on imports and all other restrictive measures in the form of import licences or other similar procedures. [20] Constitutional law. Community law and national law. The E.C. Commission cannot, even by approving expressly or by implication a measure adopted unilaterally by a member-State and whether or not there has been prior consultation, confer on such State the right to maintain in force provisions which are objectively contrary to Community law. [22] Agriculture. Common organisation of markets. Inter-State trade. Agricultural products (in casu potatoes) in respect of which a common organisation of the market has not been established are subject to the general rules of the Common Market with regard to import, export and movement within the Community. A member-State may not, therefore, rely on the special rules of Article 39 et seq. to derogate from those rules in respect of such a product. [23] Imports. Free circulation. Articles 9, 10 and 30 EECapply without distinction to products originating in the member-States and to those coming from non-member countries and put into 'free circulation' within the Community. Once the latter have been duly imported into the Community they are definitively and wholly assimilated to products originating in member-States. -
Energy Pricing Policy in Iran Politika Određivanja Cijena
Davood Manzoor Ministry of Energy Teheran, Iran HR9600065 ENERGY PRICING POLICY IN IRAN Abstract: Low energy prices in Iran do not reflect economic costs. Further distortions exist in the tariff structures of most energy sources and in their relative prices. Price reform is a key policy element for achieving increased energy conservation and economic substitution. Subsidies should be made transparent and explained by the Government, and, when eliminated, they could be compensated by target measures or direct subsidies for low income households. Price reforms are under way, with some caution though, because of possible political and inflationary consequences. In order to better understand the need for price reforms a brief analysis of the current energy pricing policy is provided here. POLITIKA ODREĐIVANJA CIJENA ENERGENATA U IRANU Sažetak: Niske cijene energije u Iranu ne odražavaju stvarne njene troškove. Nadalje, postoje deformacije u tarifnoj strukturi za većinu energetskih izvora, kao i u njihovim relativnim cijenama. Reforma cijena je ključni element politike usmjeren na postizanje boljeg čuvanja energije i gospodarske zamjene. Vlada treba u potpunosti predstaviti i objasniti subvencije, a nakon što ih ukine treba ih nadomjestiti ciljanim mjerama ili izravnim subvencijama za kućanstva s niskim prihodima. Reforme cijena su u tijeku, premda uz veliki oprez zbog mogućih političkih i posljedica inflacije. Da bi se bolje razumjela potreba za reformom cijena, ovdje se daje kratka analiza sadašnje politike njihovog određivanja. 1. The price Fixing Procedures in Iran Proposals for tariff increases are submitted to the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) by the Ministry of Energy (MOE) for electricity and by the Ministry of Petroleum for oil products and natural gas. -
Trade Facilitation and the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements
Journal of Economic Integration 23(3), September 2008; 518-546 Trade Facilitation and the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements Maria Persson Lund University Abstract This paper assesses the potential effects from trade facilitation in terms of increased trade flows both on average and specifically for the six regional groups of ACP countries negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU. Data from the World Bank’s Doing Business Database on the time required to export or import are used as indicators of cross-border transaction costs, and a gravity model on two-way bilateral trade between 22 EU countries and 100 developing countries is estimated using a sample selection approach. The results suggest that time delays on the part of the exporter and the importer generally significantly decrease trade flows, but also that this effect is not constant, in the sense that the elasticity of trade with respect to border delays declines at higher levels of time requirements. On average, lowering border delays in the exporting country by one day from the sample mean would yield an export-increasing effect of about 1 percent, while the same reduction in the importing country would increase imports by about 0.5 percent. Significant negative effects are also found of both export and import transaction costs for most EPA groups, and the effects tend to be at least as large as the average or larger. The results are generally robust for a number of alternative estimation methods such as Poisson estimation, IV estimation taking sample selection into account and the sample selection approach suggested by Helpman et al. -
Research Paper 57 GLOBALIZATION, EXPORT-LED GROWTH and INEQUALITY: the EAST ASIAN STORY
Research Paper 57 November 2014 GLOBALIZATION, EXPORT-LED GROWTH AND INEQUALITY: THE EAST ASIAN STORY Mah-Hui Lim RESEARCH PAPERS 57 GLOBALIZATION, EXPORT-LED GROWTH AND INEQUALITY: THE EAST ASIAN STORY Mah-Hui Lim* SOUTH CENTRE NOVEMBER 2014 * The author gratefully acknowledges valuable inputs and comments from the following persons: Yılmaz Akyüz, Jayati Ghosh, Michael Heng, Hoe-Ee Khor, Kang-Kook Lee, Soo-Aun Lee, Manuel Montes, Pasuk Phongpaichit, Raj Kumar, Rajamoorthy, Ikmal Said and most of all the able research assistance of Xuan Zhang. The usual disclaimer prevails. THE SOUTH CENTRE In August 1995 the South Centre was established as a permanent inter- governmental organization of developing countries. In pursuing its objectives of promoting South solidarity, South-South cooperation, and coordinated participation by developing countries in international forums, the South Centre has full intellectual independence. It prepares, publishes and distributes information, strategic analyses and recommendations on international economic, social and political matters of concern to the South. The South Centre enjoys support and cooperation from the governments of the countries of the South and is in regular working contact with the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 and China. The Centre’s studies and position papers are prepared by drawing on the technical and intellectual capacities existing within South governments and institutions and among individuals of the South. Through working group sessions and wide consultations, which involve experts from different parts of the South, and sometimes from the North, common problems of the South are studied and experience and knowledge are shared. NOTE Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce the contents of this Research Paper for their own use, but are requested to grant due acknowledgement to the South Centre and to send a copy of the publication in which such quote or reproduction appears to the South Centre. -
The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy∗
The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy∗ Joseph S. Shapiro UC Berkeley and NBER [email protected] May 2019 Abstract This paper documents a new fact, then analyzes its causes and consequences: in most countries, import tariffs and non-tariff barriers are substantially lower on dirty than on clean industries, where an industry's \dirtiness" is defined as its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per dollar of output. This difference in trade policy creates a global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions in internationally traded goods and so contributes to climate change. This global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions totals several hundred billion dollars annually. The greater protection of downstream industries, which are relatively clean, substantially accounts for this pattern. The downstream pattern can be explained by theories where industries lobby for low tariffs on their inputs but final consumers are poorly organized. A quantitative general equilibrium model suggests that if countries applied similar trade policies to clean and dirty goods, global CO2 emissions would decrease by several percent annually, and global real income would not change. JEL: Q50, Q56, F6, F13, F18, H23 ∗I thank Costas Arkolakis, Tim Armstrong, Kyle Bagwell, Brian Copeland, Arnaud Costinot, Thibault Fally, Penny Goldberg, Edgar Hertwich, Sam Kortum, Arik Levinson, Giovanni Maggi, Guillermo Noguera, Bill Nordhaus, Michael Peters, Steve Puller, Andr´esRodr´ıguez-Clare,Nick Ryan, Bob Staiger, Reed Walker, Marty Weitzman, and seminar participants at AEA, Columbia, Dartmouth, the Environmental Defense Fund, Georgetown, Harvard Kennedy School, IDB, NTA, Stanford, UBC, UC Berkeley, UC Santa Barbara, U Mass Amherst, and Yale for useful discussions, Matt Fiedler and Ralph Ossa for sharing code, Elyse Adamic, Kenneth Lai, Eva Lyubich, Daisy Chen Sun, and Katherine Wagner for excellent research assistance, and the Alfred P.