Confronting Syrian-Backed Terrorism

Daniel Byman Confronting Syrian-Backed Terrorism U.S. policymakers rightly blast Damascus for backing Palestinian, Lebanese, and other terrorist groups, but they often fail to grasp the Syrian regime’s ambivalent relationship with several of its clients and the nuanced way it manages them. Over the years, Syria has aided a daunting array of terrorist groups, but it seldom has been an ardent supporter. Damascus has both bolstered and weakened the Palestinian cause, encouraged and con- strained Hizballah in Lebanon, abetted and arrested Iraqi insurgents, and otherwise demonstrated considerable care and variance in how it uses terrorist groups. Syria also tries to portray itself as part of the solution to terrorism, demonstrating not only its efforts to halt Al Qaeda but also its ability, for the right price, to shut down the very groups it sponsors. As Middle East expert Michael Doran contends, “Ever since the 1980s, Syria has played this game of being both the arsonist and the fire department.”1 Syria’s Deadly Relationship with Palestinian Militants Damascus has long staunchly supported various Palestinian movements and, for just as long, sought to control, limit, manipulate, and thwart them when they threatened Syria’s interests. This ambivalence has led Damascus to champion the Palestinian cause and provide various violent Palestinian movements with a wide array of support even as it dealt bloody blows against these same elements at other times. Today, Syria remains an impor- Daniel Byman is an assistant professor in the Security Studies Program of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. This article is based in part on a chapter in his book Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (forthcoming July 2005). © 2005 by Daniel Byman The Washington Quarterly • 28:3 pp. 99–113. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SUMMER 2005 99 l Daniel Byman tant supporter of several Palestinian terrorist movements but does not control the cause as a whole. ORIGINS UNDER HAFIZ AL-ASSAD Syria’s ambivalent relationship with the Palestinian cause took shape during the reign of Hafiz al-Assad, who ruled Syria from 1970 until his death in 2000. As Patrick Seale contends, “In theory [Hafiz al-Assad] was with it heart and soul, in practice it was a constant source of trouble.”2 Hafiz held a genuine ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause, but he also sought to use the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Pales- tinian factions as a weapon against Israel. He aimed to regain the Golan Heights, which Syria had lost to Israel in the Six-Day War in 1967, and more generally to demonstrate Syria’s continued opposition to Israel. Hafiz al-Assad turned to terrorism in part because Syria’s armies had failed him. Israel’s rout of Syria in 1967 and its lesser but still decisive victo- ries in 1973 and 1982 demonstrated that Damascus had no conventional military options against Israel. For Hafiz to achieve any of his strategic goals, he needed a means of inflicting pain on Israel. Only then, in his eyes, could Damascus force the Jewish state to make concessions on the Golan Heights or otherwise accommodate Syria. In addition to using the Palestinians against Israel, Syria also used Pales- tinian factions in its rivalry with its Arab neighbors. Syria supported the Pal- estinians in their struggle against Jordan’s King Hussein in 1970. As the Syrian-Jordanian rivalry continued in the 1980s, Hafiz employed the Abu Nidal Organization, a radical and exceptionally murderous Palestinian splin- ter group, to intimidate King Hussein by attacking Jordanian officials in Eu- rope. The Syrian intimidation campaign contributed to Jordan’s decision to back away from initial efforts to work with Israel and the PLO to reach a deal on the West Bank.3 Despite its utility in the struggle against Israel and for regional leader- ship, the Palestinian cause was a double-edged sword. Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel could escalate into an all-out war that Syria would lose. In addition, enthusiasm for the Palestinian struggle could inflame the passions of the Arab world, leading to pressure on Arab regimes to act and even to popular revolts against the existing leaders. Because these options would be disastrous for Syria, the regime had to control as well as exploit the Palestinian cause. Control was particularly important after Hafiz con- solidated power and Syria gave an impressive showing in the 1973 war with Israel, becoming far more of a status quo power.4 From the PLO’s point of view, Syria’s attempts to dominate the movement and control its actions were a grave threat. The Palestinians were con- 100 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SUMMER 2005 Confronting Syrian-Backed Terrorism l cerned both about Damascus’s desire to dominate Lebanon, the PLO’s main base from 1970 until 1982, and about its eventual opposition to the PLO’s claim to be “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”5 Palestinian leaders tried to resist Syrian dominance, which in turn led to violent clashes. Most devastatingly, in Lebanon in 1976, Syria militarily in- tervened against the Palestinians and their allies to prevent their victory over Christian forces in the civil war. After the Israeli invasion in 1982 and the subse- quent expulsion of much of the PLO leader- The Syrian regime has ship from Lebanon, Syria also worked with had an ambivalent the Palestinian rivals of PLO leader Yasser Arafat to foster an all-out struggle for power relationship with within the Palestinian movement, a struggle several of its terrorist that left Arafat in power but gravely weak- clients. ened, particularly in Lebanon. The Syrian regime also leaned heavily on the Palestinian cause to bolster Damascus’s weak legitimacy. Hafiz al-Assad had taken power in a military coup and never institutionalized his rule, despite repeated attempts. Syria lacked strong political parties, an efficient bureaucracy, respected courts, and other basic institutions. In essence, Hafiz ruled through the military, the security services, the Alawi community (followers of the Alawi sect of Islam, repre- senting only 11 percent of Syria’s population), economic cooptation, and family ties, all of which undermined efforts to build strong institutions. The sectarian nature of the regime was a particular problem. Many Sunni Muslims, who make up more than half of Syria’s population, consider the Alawis to be heretics. When the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood challenged the government from 1976 until 1982, it was opposing what it declared to be an apostate Alawi regime. Although the regime brutally crushed the uprising, its sectarian nature remains a problem. Foreign rivals of Hafiz’s regime, such as the Ba’athist regime in Iraq and at times King Hussein’s regime in Jordan, played on this theme of illegitimate Alawi domination in their criticism of the Syrian government.6 As expert Raymond Hinnebusch notes, “Resent- ment of Alawi dominance remains the main source of the regime’s legitimacy deficit.”7 Hafiz was thus forced to embrace the Palestinian cause as the sina qua non of Arab unity. Until 1986, Syria was also quite active in using its own agents for operations. These agents attacked Syrian dissidents, Palestinians who sided with Yasser Arafat, Iraqi officials, and moderate Arab state officials, as well as Is- raeli and Jewish targets. After outside pressure grew in response to several terrorist outrages, in 1986 Syria refrained from using its own operatives to THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SUMMER 2005 101 l Daniel Byman mount clandestine attacks and tried generally to minimize its direct hand in any violence. To allow itself deniability, it decided to use terrorist groups ex- clusively instead of its own agents. Pressure from the United States and several European countries made Damascus fearful that using its own operatives would greatly increase that pressure and perhaps even lead to military strikes. Outsourcing terrorism reduced these risks. As the U.S. Department of State report noted at the time, “Damascus utilizes these groups to attack or intimidate enemies Weaker domestically, and opponents and to exert its influence in Bashar appears more the region. Yet at the same time, it can dis- avow knowledge of their operations.”8 This dependent on deniability served a useful purpose, enabling terrorist groups for Syria to distance itself when necessary from legitimacy. the actions of its proxies. After the Cold War ended and the peace process gained momentum, Syria supported an array of violent anti-Israeli movements that rejected the peace process. In 1991, after the Madrid peace conference that brought Israel, Palestinian leaders, and various Arab states together, Hamas and other militant Palestinians, mostly secular and Marxist, estab- lished the “Ten Front” in Syria to oppose negotiations.9 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Libera- tion of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine– General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, and Hizballah all attacked Israel, the latter three being particularly active before as well as after the second intifada broke out in September 2000. Some of these groups used terrorism, while others, particularly Hizballah, also use guerrilla warfare. Syrian leaders supported and strengthened these groups, even though they seldom shared the specifics of the groups’ agendas. Syria, of course, rejected the Islamist groups’ visions of governance. Even more importantly, Damascus often seriously engaged in peace negotiations with Israel, which had a heavy U.S. role to boot, using its backing of terrorism to extract concessions from Israel on the particulars of the border or to ensure that Syria itself was not excluded from any settlement.

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