Institutional Constraints and Leadership Discretion in China's
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Citizen Participation in Government
Autocracy, Oligarchy, & Democracy © 2014 Brain Wrinkles In each country, the people have different rights to participate in the government. •In some countries, any citizen can run for office or vote in elections. •In other countries, there are restrictions placed on who can run for office and who can vote. •There are also countries where NO citizen can vote and there are no elections. © 2014 Brain Wrinkles Types of Government are based on two key questions: 1. Who governs the country? 2. What is the citizen participation like? The way a country answers these questions determines its government type: Autocracy Oligarchy Democracy © 2014 Brain Wrinkles • Have a single ruler with unlimited power. • Citizens cannot participate in the selection of the ruler or vote on the country’s laws. • One benefit – decisions for the country can be made quickly. • However…the needs of the citizens may be ignored. • The leader may make poor or selfish decisions that hurt the citizens. © 2014 Brain Wrinkles Generally the power to rule the country is inherited (kings/queens) or is taken by military force. There are two main types of autocracies: Dictatorshi Absolute Monarchy • Thep leader uses force • The monarch has to control the citizens. absolute power (no • Example: Hitler constitution) over the citizens. © 2014 Brain Wrinkles © 2014 Brain Wrinkles • The country is ruled by a small group of people. •The group gets their power from either religion, military force, or wealth & resources. • The citizens do not select the members of this group or vote on the country’s laws. © 2014 Brain Wrinkles The citizens hold the power of the government. -
Guizhou Aims to Relocate Its Poor Residents
4 | Wednesday, January 30, 2019 CHINA DAILY CHINA Guizhou aims Bridging cultures Man waits 18 years to relocate its for trial, is acquitted poor residents By ZHANG YANGFEI [email protected] Zhang Yuxi, a resident of Xiayi county, Henan province, was Measure assists province in its fight to acquitted of a charge of inten- improve lives, provide better services tional injury by a local court on Tuesday after being released 18 years ago on bail pending trial. By YANG JUN in Guiyang and Zhang was involved in a dis- ZHENG JINRAN in Beijing 670,000 pute in 1992 with another resi- dent, Zhang Gongshe, which led Guizhou province plans to relo- people to violent scuffles between mem- cate 670,000 people from poverty- from poverty-stricken and bar- bers of the two families. Zhang stricken and barren regions this ren regions in Guizhou province Gongshe’s father, Zhang Chao- year, bringing the total of relocat- will be relocated this year. ming, was rendered unconscious ed people to 1.88 million in four during the fight and died. years, the most in the country, the Zhang Yuxi was later detained provincial government said. erty, the governor added. and prosecuted on a charge of This year, 1.68 million people “We will take multiple measures intentional injury in 1997. nationwide are scheduled to be to help relocated residents get According to the indictment by relocated under the 13th Five-Year jobs or start businesses, and make the local prosecutor, Zhang Yuxi Plan on Relocation for Poverty sure at least one member of the hit Zhang Chaoming’s forehead Alleviation (2016-20), and 40 per- family has a stable income,” she with an iron rake, causing the cent will be in Guizhou. -
The Two Faces of Populism: Between Authoritarian and Democratic Populism
German Law Journal (2019), 20, pp. 390–400 doi:10.1017/glj.2019.20 ARTICLE The two faces of populism: Between authoritarian and democratic populism Bojan Bugaric* (Received 18 February 2019; accepted 20 February 2019) Abstract Populism is Janus-faced; simultaneously facing different directions. There is not a single form of populism, but rather a variety of different forms, each with profoundly different political consequences. Despite the current hegemony of authoritarian populism, a much different sort of populism is also possible: Democratic and anti-establishment populism, which combines elements of liberal and democratic convic- tions. Without understanding the political economy of the populist revolt, it is difficult to understand the true roots of populism, and consequently, to devise an appropriate democratic alternative to populism. Keywords: authoritarian populism; democratic populism; Karl Polanyi; political economy of populism A. Introduction There is a tendency in current constitutional thinking to reduce populism to a single set of universal elements. These theories juxtapose populism with constitutionalism and argue that pop- ulism is by definition antithetical to constitutionalism.1 Populism, according to this view, under- mines the very substance of constitutional (liberal) democracy. By attacking the core elements of constitutional democracy, such as independent courts, free media, civil rights and fair electoral rules, populism by necessity degenerates into one or another form of non-democratic and authori- tarian order. In this article, I argue that such an approach is not only historically inaccurate but also norma- tively flawed. There are historical examples of different forms of populism, like the New Deal in the US, which did not degenerate into authoritarianism and which actually helped the American democracy to survive the Big Depression of the 1930s. -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy
MICHELS’S IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY Robert Michels ( 1876– 1936), was a young historian who had been unable to get a job in the German university system, despite the recommendation of Max Weber, because he was a member of the Social Democrats. Michels had participated extensively in party activities and had come to the conclusion that the Socialists did not live up to their own ideals. Although the party advocated democracy, it was not internally democratic itself. The revolutionary Marxism of the speeches at conventions and on the floor of the Reichstag was just a way of whipping up support among the workers, while the party leaders built a bureaucratic trade union and party machine to provide sinecures for themselves. Michels’s analysis appeared in 1911 in a book called Political Parties. The phenomenon of party oligarchy was quite general, stated Michels; if internal democracy could not be found in an organization that was avowedly democratic, it would certainly not exist in parties which did not claim to be democratic. This principle was called the Iron Law of Oligarchy, and it constitutes one of the great generalizations about the functioning of mass‐ membership organizations, as subsequent research has borne out. The Iron Law of Oligarchy works as follows: First of all, there is always a rather small number of persons in the organization who actually make decisions, even if the authority is formally vested in the body of the membership at large. The reason for this is purely functional and will be obvious to anyone who has attended a public meeting or even a large committee session. -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement May 2007 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC .......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 44 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 45 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 52 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 May 2007 The Main National Leadership of the PRC -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement October 2006 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries 44 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations 48 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR 49 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR 56 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan 60 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 October 2006 The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU Jen-Kai Abbreviations and Explanatory Notes CCP CC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CCa Central Committee, alternate member CCm Central Committee, member CCSm Central Committee Secretariat, member PBa Politburo, alternate member PBm Politburo, member Cdr. Commander Chp. Chairperson CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CYL Communist Youth League Dep. P.C. Deputy Political Commissar Dir. Director exec. executive f female Gen.Man. General Manager Gen.Sec. General Secretary Hon.Chp. Honorary Chairperson H.V.-Chp. Honorary Vice-Chairperson MPC Municipal People’s Congress NPC National People’s Congress PCC Political Consultative Conference PLA People’s Liberation Army Pol.Com. -
China to Keep Watch on TPP
Table for strangers Hainan helps visitors Memory protection Special police target tourism An app connects amateur chefs industry irregularities in Sanya with willing dining companions Database to be created on > CHINA, PAGE 4 > LIFE, PAGE 9 the Nanjing Massacre > p3 MONDAY, October 12, 2015 chinadailyusa.com $1 COMMERCE China to keep watch on TPP Such trade deals can disrupt non-signatories: offi cial By ZHONG NAN highly unlikely that the TPP would in Beijing lead to the creation of a trade bloc [email protected] that excludes China. “The economic development China will conduct comprehensive mode in China has already changed and systematic assessments of the from low-end product trade to ‘going fallout from the Trans-Pacifi c Part- global’ strategies like setting up or nership, a broad agreement between moving manufacturing facilities and 12 Pacifi c Rim countries, including to more direct investment in over- Japan and the United States, since it seas markets,” said Fan. believes that such deals have disrup- Besides the US, other signatories tive eff ects on non-signatory nations, to the TPP are Australia, Brunei, a top government offi cial said. Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mex- Commerce Minister Gao Hucheng ico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore said China is of the view that changes and Vietnam. in the global trade pattern should be China has to date signed bilateral decided by adjustments in the indus- and multilateral free trade agree- trial structure and through product ments with seven TPP members. competitiveness in global -
The Origins of Oligarchy: the Evolution of Communism and the System of Pressure Groups in the USSR
CONFRONTATION AND COOPERATION 1000 YEARS OF POLISH–GERMAN–RUSSIAN RELATIONS T h e J o u r n a l o f K o l e g i u m J a g i e l l o n s K i e T o r u n s K a s z K o l a W y z s z a V o l . i : 3 9 – 4 4 DOI: 10.2478/conc-2014-0006 Jaryna Boreńko The origins of oligarchy: the evolution of communism and the system of pressure groups in the USSR Key words: nomenklatura, Soviet Union, Ukraine, Russia 1. Introduction more than antidemocratic. Such structures, referred to as oligarchies, are not a novelty in the history of the The phenomenon of oligarchy in post-Soviet countries, development of group system in Soviet society. They mainly in Russia and Ukraine, has recently become result from the evolution of the communist system, the label for the functioning of the political system to especially specific activities of pressure groups. When distinguish the real participants of political processes. we pay more attention to the characteristics of political They, in fact, due to their un-established legal status activity and behaviour, and less to the institutional replace the formal structures of a state, such as political conditioning of the system, the evolution of the group parties or local authorities, in the process of decision system in Russian policy perceived as the phenomenon making. The characteristics of the oligarchs` activities, of the influence of informal subjects on decision their high position on the lists of the wealthiest people making, enables the comprehension of the character of of the world, as well as their participation in opposition the modern day oligarchy. -
Study of Military Oligarchy
University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 1969 Study of military oligarchy Richard Francis Murphy The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Murphy, Richard Francis, "Study of military oligarchy" (1969). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5232. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5232 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A STUDY OF A' IGLlflSf OlIO ARC .BY w Elctuurd T0 Mmphf S«3 »» Btighm Yeung Mtmmity, 1965 FreMMfeed la fartiai fulflllmnt «f the r«9«lr®»emts for the degree of Master of Arts w i f i s s i f f o f m m A M 1 9 6 9 Approved by: O ij& iniA | Baat'ci o f lxaaio.ora Goafe* aradtfatft' seheol ^ 4£4t£ UMI Number: EP40696 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. DiMNxtatkm PUNisNng UMI EP40696 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). -
The USSR: Oligarchy Or Dictatorship?
ROBERT G. WESSON The USSR: Oligarchy or Dictatorship? By the summer of 1971 Leonid Brezhnev had apparently become effective head of state of the Soviet Union and its spokesman. When Chancellor Brandt visited the Soviet Union in September he conferred with no one else, and Pravda reported (September 19) that "responsible members of the Secretariat of the General Secretary" participated in the conversations. One is reminded of the power obscurely exercised by Stalin's personal secretariat, especially the mysterious Poskrebyshev during the later years of his rule, and of the role of Hitler's secretariat, headed by Martin Bormann. Yet Brezhnev is certainly not the despot implied by these analogies. Officially, he has assumed no new powers. More important, no one has been ousted from the top circle since 1965, when the regime seemed to be truly a plural leadership in which no individual was clearly dominant. Yet it is practically the first task of a new tyrant to replace with his dependents those who were formerly his equals or at least potential rivals. This raises anew the question whether a plural-oligarchic or a single, more or less dictatorial leadership may be considered the more normal one in the Soviet system. History does not give a clear answer. About two-thirds of the fifty-four years since 1917 have seen individual, although not necessarily autocratic, rulership; but this proportion is distorted by the very long dictator ship of Stalin, which is unlikely to be repeated without systemic change. Stalin was forty-two when he became general secretary, but Brezhnev was fifty-eight on attaining the top party post, and the apparatus continues to age. -
Governance and Democracy
GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY Governance is the system of practices and processes that An oligarchy is a type of government where power rests a community or group uses to organize themselves and with a small number of people, generally individuals who make decisions. Governance models determine who has are rich and powerful, often due to family lines, wealth or authority or a voice in making decisions, how decisions prominent political or military connections (e.g., China, are made and who is accountable for them. There are Venezuela). People living under oligarchic rule usually several different governance or leadership styles, such as have some rights and freedoms. Similarly, an aristocracy autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire. is a form of governing where administration or power is in the hands of a special class of people. Aristocrats are Autocratic governance, also known as authoritarian connected to royal families through blood, whereas an leadership, is characterized by one person having complete oligarchy is not. control over all decisions with minimal input from other group members. Democratic governance involves A democracy is a type of government where a majority collective decision-making and the sharing of tasks and of the people are included in political decision-making responsibilities, and leadership changes regularly with and citizens elect political representatives to make participation from many group members. Laissez-faire decisions on their behalf (e.g., Canada, United States of is the absence of an organized leadership style; there is America). Citizens are also free to run for political office. no authority and group members are responsible for all In democratic countries, citizens have protected civil and community goals and decisions.