BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IN ISRAELI PRISONS
PALESTINIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE ICRC’S ACTION FOR PRISONERS
Figure 1. Minister Qaraqa in front of posters critiquing the ICRC during a demonstration before the ICRC office in Ramallah on 6 March 2012 [Sarnau, 2012] Translation: The failure of ICRC’s protection of prisoners is unacceptable : تقصير الصليب في حماية االسرى غير مقبول غير االسرى حماية ?The ICRC: Whose interests do you serve : الصليب االحمر لصالح من تقبلون In English: “The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation…” Yves Daccord
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
VALENTINE SARNAU
Under the supervision of Lecturer Dr. MAYA ROSENFELD & Senior Lecturer Dr. NIMROD HURVITZ
NOVEMBER 2012
Abstract
The efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to protect victims of war and to develop International Humanitarian Law (IHL) have been unanimously applauded. Indeed, few independent studies have challenged the ICRC’s immaculate image of a bastion of humanity in the cruelty of war. Commitment to neutrality, one of the central principles with which the ICRC is identified, is the key tool which gives the organisation access to places which are otherwise closed. At the same time, adherence to neutrality often gives rise to compromising practices which may be at odds with the ICRC's role as guardian of humanitarian law. This duality in the mode of operation of the ICRC loomed large in my research on the role of the ICRC in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Since the 1967 War and the ensuing enforcement of the Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the ICRC has been engaged in several major humanitarian projects in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The organization's action on behalf of Palestinian prisoners is perhaps the largest in scope and the most salient in significance among its projects. Through special agreements with Israel the ICRC was given a privileged access to the detainees and to the detention facilities. It was also authorized to facilitate prison visits by members of prisoners' families. The importance of this role cannot be overestimated given the centrality of the Palestinian prisoners’ issue for Palestinian society and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in general.
Despite its evident importance, until now the action of the ICRC in Israel and the Palestinian territories has not been reviewed. One possible reason for the absence of research stems from the difficulty in conducting it objectively given the fact that the greater part of the ICRC's reports are confidential and hence not accessible to the researcher. This hindrance compelled me to redirect my study from considering the ICRC's overall operations, to focusing on the evaluation of the ICRC's operations by the beneficiaries, in my case, Palestinian prisoners, their families, and institutions that work on behalf of prisoners. The research integrates the results of small scale fieldwork which included a series of brief interviews with prisoners' relatives, several interviews with Palestinian officials and lawyers, and a number of in-depth interviews with ICRC officers.
I
The investigation showed that the Palestinians are generally satisfied with the ICRC’s routine work. The ICRC was found to be particularly successful in helping families to maintain contact with prisoners and in providing prisoners with material help. However, the majority of the Palestinian interviewees were highly critical of the fact that the organisation failed to raise its voice or to take any measures in response to the ongoing and occasionally escalating violations of IHL by Israel. Several interviewees claimed that the organisation only acts within the limits of Israel’s discretion.
Since the second Intifada, a combination of factors and circumstances has led to a serious deterioration in the conditions of imprisonment that Palestinian prisoners face in Israeli prisons, detention centres and interrogation facilities. However, contrary to expectations, rather than intensifying, the ICRC’s interventions have tended to diminish in scope. Two features of the ICRC’s policy assist us in explaining this failure:
1) The organisation has a “standardized” bureaucratic mode of action: the ICRC has been applying the same procedure to conflict related imprisonment throughout the world for decades. Neutrality also contributes to rigidity by restraining the organisation from taking a stronger stance. 2) In order to be able to operate in Israel, the ICRC has had to find a modus vivendi with the occupying force, a constraint which regularly compels the organization to refrain from harsh reaction to incidents of human rights violations on the part of the Israeli authorities. Hence open condemnations and the application of sanctions are very rare, even at times when violations have become more frequent and/or more severe. This apparent tension between the restraints that derive from the ICRC's dependence on the goodwill of the Israeli authorities and between its role as a guardian of IHL emerged strongly in my research.
II
Table of contents Introduction 4 Chapter 1: Presentation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 1. Literature review 8 2. The ICRC’s mode of action: neutrality & persuasion 11 3. The ICRC in Israel and the Palestinian territories 13 a. The ICRC in Israeli prisons 17 i. 1967-1993: the establishment of ICRC routine activities 17 ii. 1994-2000: the Oslo years & massive release of 22 Palestinian prisoners iii. 2000-today: Decrease of the ICRC’s involvement and 26 retraction of prisoners’ rights iv. Assessment of the importance of Palestinian prisoners’ 30 issues in the action of the ICRC 4. How I came to the substance of this thesis 32
Chapter 2: Opinions of some Palestinians 1. Methodology 36 2. Analysis of the interviews 41 a. In-depth interviews 41 i. Qaddura Fares, chairman of the Prisoners’ Club 41 ii. Samia Zaid, lawyer at the Prisoners’ Club 47 iii. Issa Qaraqa, Minister of Prisoners and Former Prisoners 49 Affairs iv. Murad Jadallah, researcher at Addameer 51 v. Mahmud Hassan, lawyer at Addameer 53 b. Short interviews 55 3. Summary of criticism and praise of results of the ICRC 59 4. Additional anecdotes and experiences in the field 67
1 Chapter 3: The ICRC’s response 69 1. Interviews with the ICRC 69 a. Sarah Avrillaud, head of the protection department 69 b. Joana Gamuel, delegate 74 c. Conclusion of the interviews with both ICRC employees 82 Conclusion 84 Bibliography 90
Tables and Illustrations Figure 1. Minister Qaraqa in front of posters critiquing the ICRC during a demonstration before the ICRC office in Ramallah on 6 March 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
Figure 2. Almost no women, but they are in the foreground. Demonstration before the ICRC office, Ramallah, 6 March 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
Figure 3. Reporters interviewing a woman during a demonstration in Ramallah on 20 March 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
Figure 4. Palestinians demonstrating before the ICRC office in Tulkarem on 17 April 2012 [Sarnau 2012]
Figure 5. A Palestinian man throws eggs at an ICRC office in Gaza on 23 June 2011 in protest to an ICRC call for Hamas to show signs that Gilad Shalit was still alive. [AFP Mohammed Abed, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=399392 - last accessed: 12-11- 2012]
Figure 6. A Palestinian woman entering the ICRC office in Ramallah during a demonstration in support for the prisoners on 10 April 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
Figure 7. A poster in support of Hana Shalabi on an ICRC car in a demonstration in Ramallah on 20 March 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
2 Glossary
GSS General Security Service of Israel ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IHL International Humanitarian Law IPS Israeli Prison Services OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories PNA Palestinian National Authority PRCS Palestinian Red Crescent Society PCATI Public Committee against Torture in Israel
3 Introduction
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an “independent, neutral organisation ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence. It takes action in response to emergencies and at the same time promotes respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and its implementation in national law”1. Since the 1967 war, the ICRC has established a permanent office in Israel and the Palestinian territories where it has been playing an important role in different humanitarian projects: it has developed the Palestinian health services in cooperation with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), it has provided assistance to families whose homes had been demolished as a result of the conflict, it has complained to the relevant authorities in cases of violation of international law, it has spread the knowledge of IHL, it has helped to reunify and to create contact between families separated by the conflict and it has built up several programmes for Palestinian prisoners.
The ICRC has special agreements with Israel which afford privileged access to Palestinian prisoners. Consequently its action is very important and it was even more important before the Oslo accords when it was the only body that took care of prisoners and their families. The ICRC is an important link between prisoners and their families. It helps the families to obtain permits to visit their relatives and transfers both written and oral messages (salamaat). This role was crucial in the case of Gazan prisoners who had no family visits from June 2007 to July 20122.
The question of Palestinian prisoners is one of the central issues in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict for two main reasons. Firstly, it concerns a large number of Palestinians: the Palestinian Ministry of Prisoners and Former Prisoners Affairs estimates that about 750 000 Palestinians have been detained by Israel from 1967 to 20083. Secondly, it is part of the “myth symbol complex” of both groups4. For the
1 ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-mandate-mission.htm - last accessed: 12-11-2012 2 From 6 June 2007 to 16 July 2012, ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-footage/palestine-israel-tvnews-2011-06-23.htm; http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/israel-palestine-news-2012-07- 16.htm - last accessed: 12-11-2012 3 Ministry of Prisoners’ website: http://www.freedom.ps/showRep.php?tbl=english_rep&id=3 - last accessed: 12-11-2012
4 Palestinians, individuals who are in prison for security reasons are political prisoners; they are a kind of hero, freedom fighters that dare to challenge the occupation. For the Israelis, they are terrorists that threaten the life of the Israeli citizen. Consequently, a stable peace will depend among other things on finding a solution to this problem.
Nowadays, different organisations focus exclusively on Palestinian prisoners; for instance Addameer (Conscience), Nadi al-Aseer (the Prisoners’ Club) and Mandela. A special Ministry was established in 1998 which supports the prisoners and their relatives financially5. Other organisations such as B’tselem, al-Haqq, and the Public Committee against Torture in Israel (PCATI) tackle the issue of prisoners among other things. However none of these has the same conditions of access as the ICRC.
First, I assumed that the organisation should have an impact on Palestinian society, taking into account the high level of imprisonment among the Palestinian people and the intensity of ICRC activities. I was particularly interested by the ICRC, because it is a Swiss organisation that follows a particular value which is central to Swiss policy: neutrality. Despite the centrality of the prisoners issue in Palestinian society and the fact that it has been the chief sphere of ICRC activities in Israel and the Palestinian territories for decades, this subject has not been systematically researched.
While researching the ICRC’s action in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, I came across a less idealistic problem: its particular mode of action based on neutrality often prevents the protection of the rights of prisoners. From a theoretical point of view, neutrality means that the organisation does not take sides in a conflict in order to stay on good terms with all parties. It uses persuasion as a means to induce the parties to comply with international law. Practically, it means that the ICRC is present in Israeli prisons, detention and interrogation compounds five days a week, but it almost always refrains from denouncing Israel’s violations of prisoners’ rights in the name of the principle of “neutrality”. In summary, the organisation keeps all
Note that this number is an estimate and does not differentiate between hour-long arrests and long- term imprisonment. 4 For the concept of symbolic myths of ethnic groups, see Kaufman, S. J., Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 2001, p. 17-38 5 Ministry of Prisoners’ website: http://www.freedom.ps/showRep.php?tbl=aboutus&id=1- last accessed: 12-11-2012
5 its reports confidential and rarely openly denounces violations of international law. This state of affairs creates an internal tension, if a not contradiction, between its role as guardian of human rights and its commitment to neutrality.
For a long time, these violations have been revealed by Israeli, Palestinian and international human rights organisations, such as the ones mentioned previously. The concept of neutrality has already been questioned: after the holocaust, a huge debate emerged because the ICRC ignored the destiny of the Jews in the interest of neutrality6. During the Biafra war (1967-1970), several ICRC doctors disagreed with the ICRC’s mode of operation because it was helping the violators of human rights. They consequently created a parallel organisation “Doctors without Borders”7. Nowadays, there is clear differentiation between human rights organisations which denounce violations even if it threatens their activities, and humanitarian organisations which remain secretive in order to maintain access to victims8.
Neutrality has another consequence: all the reports on the situation in Israeli prisons are kept confidential in the Geneva archives for at least 40 years. I first thought that I would be allowed to access the years 1967 to 1971, but the archives for the region are open only for 1948. So the ICRC provides no sources and it is almost impossible to write about it unless you are an ICRC worker. As a result, there has been no independent assessment of its achievements in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In spite of these obstacles and contradictions, I decided not to change my topic. I thought it should be possible to assess some successes and failures of the
6 Mathur, R., The Ethical Witness: the International Committee of the Red Cross, YCISS Working Paper Number 47, York University, February 2008 7 Delvaux, D. , The Politics of Humanitarian Organizations: Neutrality and Solidarity, the case of the ICRC and MSF during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Master of Arts of Rhodes University, 2005, p. 8 8 There is an extensive literature about this issue. The question of neutrality is tackled in the following articles: Delvaux, D. , The Politics of Humanitarian Organizations: Neutrality and Solidarity, the case of the ICRC and MSF during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Master of Arts of Rhodes University, 2005; Harrof-Tavel, M., “Does it still make sense to be neutral?”, Humanitarian exchanges 25: 2-4, 2003; Haug, H., “La neutralité comme Principe fondamental de la Croix-Rouge”, Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge 822, 1996; Kennedy, D., Humanitarian NGOs and the Norm of Neutrality: A community Approach, University of Minnesota, 2008; Mattli, K. & Gasser, J., “Neutralité, impartialité et indépendance: la clé de l’acceptation du CICR en Irak”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 90: 153-168, 2007; Minear, L., “The theory and practice of neutrality: some thoughts on the tensions”, International Review of the Red Cross 833, 1999; Nickolls, J., “Limits to neutrality in Iraq”, Humanitarian exchanges 25: 7-9, 2003; Plattner, D., “ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance”, International Review of the Red Cross 311, 1996
6 organisation through the opinions of people who benefit from ICRC services. I conducted three types of interviews: in-depth interviews with members of Palestinian institutions for prisoners, short interviews with people demonstrating in front of the ICRC offices and in-depth interviews with ICRC staff members. While interviewing, I tried to keep the above contradiction in mind hoping that it would emerge in one way or another. Ultimately, I wanted to test the assumption that neutrality facilitates or hampers mediation.
The structure of the thesis is the following; the first chapter presents the ICRC’s mode of action and its activities in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The second chapter presents the opinion of Palestinians related to the prisoners’ issue. The last chapter consists of the IRC’s answer to Palestinian criticisms and an evaluation of the organisation’s achievements and failures.
7 Chapter 1: Presentation of the International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Committee of the Red Cross was established in 1863 as an impartial, neutral and independent organisation. It was the idea of Henri Dunant, a Swiss citizen, who happened to witness the aftermath of the battle of Solferino. He was shocked that nobody took care of the dead and the wounded and he consequently decided to create an organisation that would accomplish this task9. With time, the ICRC extended its field of protection to other victims of war such as prisoners and civilians. The organisation’s mandate is based on treaties between states which agree to give the organisation access to the victims of conflicts. The states have a dual interest in signing such treaties: the ICRC relieves them of one of the burdens of war and they hope that the other states will reciprocate10.
The ICRC is active in conflict areas worldwide and its scope of activities covers a large number of issues: it provides primary assistance such as food, drinking water, clothing, essential housing items, basic infrastructure and medical services. In some cases it even supports micro-economic projects. Since the Second World War, the ICRC has developed a unique system to trace people who have disappeared during hostilities. It also restores ties between families separated by conflicts, and visits war/political prisoners. Finally, it develops International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in cooperation with the different states and advocates for its respect and implementation.
1. Literature review
After the Second World War, literature relating to the ICRC emerged. It first developed in the field of IHL11 because one of the main tasks of the ICRC is the “development and promotion of international humanitarian law and of humanitarian principles”12. At that time, the first reports of its activities were published. Some articles tackled the origin and the history of the ICRC, usually in a highly idealized
9 ICRC, the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, ICRC Publications, Geneva, 1999, p. 3 10 Hutchinson, John, F., Champions of Charity, War and the Rise of the Red Cross, Westview Press, United States, 1996 11 The International Humanitarian legislation before the Second World War did not tackle the problem of civilians in conflicts. After the Second World War, a war that involved a lot of civilians, it was decided that IHL should be modified consequently. The ICRC participated in the drafting of Conventions and in diplomatic conferences for the improvement of IHL in 1949. 12 CICR, Le CICR, Sa mission et son action, Geneva, March 2009, p. 6
8 way13 while the history of the organisation has usually been presented as a sort of myth which has rarely been challenged14. In the 1960s, some ICRC delegates gave the first testimonies of their work15. In the 1970s, research in international relations began to include new non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations as a point of focus. Studies were developed concerning the relationship between the ICRC and international politics16.
The neutrality and confidentiality of humanitarian organisations was taken for granted until the Biafran war of independence (1967-1970). During this conflict, the different parties involved profited from the confidentiality of the ICRC to perpetrate atrocities. This caused some ICRC doctors to leave the organisation, arguing that neutrality helped the perpetrators rather than the victims17. They created a similar organisation, called “Doctors without Borders”, which provides medical help like the ICRC, but does not hesitate to denounce violations of human rights or humanitarian law. Thenceforth, the debate of neutrality versus morality has materialized. This debate includes the question of whether non-governmental organisations should or should not be involved in politics18. Some authors insist on the fact that humanitarian organisations should remain totally neutral19 while others claim that the modes of operation, neutrality and denunciation, are complementary20. Recently, it has been
13 Bossy, S., “The International Red Cross”, International Journal 7 (3): 204-212, Canadian International Council, Summer 1952 14 For a challenge of origin and the development of the organisation: Hutchinson, J. F., Champions of Charity, War and the Rise of the Red Cross, Westview Press, US 1996 15 For instance: Jacquinet, L., “The Civil War in Jordan: An Episode in the Life of an ICRC Delegate”, International Review of the Red Cross 10: 632-633, 1970 16 Forsythe, D. P., “The Red Cross as Transnational Movement: Conserving and Changing the Nation- State System”, International Organization 30: 607-630, 1976 17 Delvaux, D. , The Politics of Humanitarian Organizations: Neutrality and Solidarity, the case of the ICRC and MSF during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Master of Arts of Rhodes University, 2005, p. 8 18 Brauman, R., Humanitaire le dilemme, Les éditions Textuel, Paris, 2002 19 The issue of neutrality is addressed in the following articles: Delvaux, D., The Politics of Humanitarian Organizations: Neutrality and Solidarity, the case of the ICRC and MSF during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Master of Arts of Rhodes University, 2005; Harrof-Tavel, M., “Does it still make sense to be neutral?”, Humanitarian exchanges 25: 2-4, 2003; Haug, H., “La neutralité comme Principe fondamental de la Croix-Rouge”, Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge 822, 1996; Kennedy, D., Humanitarian NGOs and the Norm of Neutrality: A community Approach, University of Minnesota, 2008; Mattli, K. & Gasser, J., “Neutralité, impartialité et indépendance: la clé de l’acceptation du CICR en Irak”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 90: 153-168, 2007; Minear, L., “The theory and practice of neutrality: some thoughts on the tensions”, International Review of the Red Cross 833, 1999; Nickolls, J., “Limits to neutrality in Iraq”, Humanitarian exchanges 25: 7-9, 2003; Plattner, D., “ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance”, International Review of the Red Cross 311, 1996 20 Bonard, P., Modes of Action used by humanitarian players, International Committee of the Red Cross, Switzerland, 1999
9 argued that the ICRC, by indiscriminately relieving the parties in the conflict, might contribute to the continuation of war21.
David P. Forsythe wrote about the general functioning of the organisation and its history from the 19th century until today22. Some articles concerning the activities of the ICRC on behalf of prisoners were published23, but most of the people who have written about the ICRC are former delegates or are still members of the organisation. None of the articles about the work of the ICRC in prisons takes a critical approach; most of them are testimonies or descriptions of the ICRC visits’ procedures.
In relation to the creation of the state of Israel, two issues have been tackled: the silence of the ICRC during the Holocaust and its activities for the Palestinian refugees after the 1948 war24. Currently, there is some research on international law and the occupation of Palestinian territories25. However, no academic work has been written concerning the action of the ICRC towards Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons.
In summary, the positive impact of the ICRC’s activities has rarely been challenged. There is no public survey about what the recipients of the services of the ICRC think of the organisation, nor is it possible to assess the work of the ICRC on the basis of its reports, since they are confidential.
On the other hand, there is extended academic research on Palestinian prisoners by academics and NGOs. One of the first issues to arise concerns the conditions of
21 Polman, L. & Terry, F., “Two authors, two views: does aid fuel conflict?”, The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 1, 2011 22 Forsythe, D. P., THE HUMANITARIANS, The International Committee of the Red Cross, Cambridge University Press, UK and US, 2005; Forsythe, D. P & Rieffer-Flanagan, B. A. J., The international Committee of the Red Cross, a neutral humanitarian actor, Routledge, US and Canada, 2007 23 For instance: Aeschlimann, A. , “La protection des détenus: l’action du CICR derrière les barreaux”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 87: 33-75, sélection française 2005 ; Aeschlimann, A. & Roggo, N., “Visits to persons deprived of their freedom : the experience of the ICRC”, 2007 ; Amstrong, J. D., “The International Committee of the Red Cross and Political Prisoners”, International Organization 39: 615-642, 1985; Daudin, P. & Reyes, H., “How visits by the ICRC can help prisoners cope with the effects of traumatic stress”, 1996; Staiff, M., “Visits to detained torture victims by the ICRC”, Torture 10: 4-7, 2000 24 Rey-Schyrr, C., “Le CICR et l’assistance aux réfugiés arabes palestiniens (1948-1950)”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 83, pp. 739-761, 2001; Favez, Jean-Claude, The Red Cross and the Holocaust, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1999 25 Weill, S., “The Judicial arm of the occupation: the Israeli military courts in the occupied territories”, International Review of the Red-Cross 89, selected articles of humanitarian law, pp. 395-419, 2007
10 imprisonment. Originally, they were reported in Palestinian newspapers26 and later on by academic articles27. Nowadays, there is a proliferation of reports and articles by NGOs, academics and newspapers. Different organisations have focused on torture during interrogation28 and the legality of administrative detention29. There has been some research concerning imprisonment of women and of children30, and the legality of political imprisonment31. Finally, a last field of study has been the importance of the prison-experience in the development of the Palestinian political struggle32.
2. The ICRC’s mode of action: neutrality & persuasion33
The ICRC’s mode of action is persuasion. It is based on trust relationships and the willingness/ability of the authorities to take action. It is usually a long term process that requires an understanding of the mentality and of the social values of the country in which the ICRC’s action takes place. It has been argued that principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence usually favour relationships of trust34.
26 See for instance: “Prison conditions”, Journal of Palestine Studies 3: 169-197,1974; “Strike of Arab prisoners in Israel”, Journal of Palestine Studies 7: 169-171, 1977; “The closed world of a Palestinian prisoner”, reviewed by Amnon Kapeliouk, Journal of Palestine Studies 10: 155-157, 1980 27 See for instance: Punamäki, R-L., “Experiences of Torture, Means of Coping, and Level of Symptoms among Palestinian Political Prisoners”, Journal of Palestine Studies 4: 81-96, 1988 28 For instance: B’tselem http://www.btselem.org/topic/torture, PCATI http://www.stoptorture.org.il/en/skira90-99, Addameer http://www.addameer.org/etemplate.php?id=294 29 http://www.btselem.org/topic/administrative_detention 30 Tzemel, L. & Grossfield, E., “Detention of Palestinian Youths in East Jerusalem”, Journal of Palestine Studies 6: 206-211, 1977; Hanieh, A. & Kay A. & Cook C., “Paying the Price of Injustice: Palestinian Child Prisoners and the UN Human Rights System”, Middle East Report 229: 26-31, 2003; Abdo, N., “Palestinian Women Political Prisoners and the Israeli State”, Threat, Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel, Baker, A. & Matar, A. Eds., PlutoPress, London, 2011 31 For instance: Weill, S., “Reframing the Legality of the Israeli Military Courts in the West Bank: Military Occupation or Apartheid?”, Threat, Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel, Baker, A. & Matar, A. Eds., PlutoPress, London, 2011; “Who Is a Security Prisoner and Why? An Examination of the Legality of Prison Regulations Governing Security Prisoners”, Threat, Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel, Baker, A. & Matar, A. Eds., PlutoPress, London, 2011 32 Rosenfeld, M., “The centrality of the Prisoners’ Movement to the Palestinian Struggle against the Israeli Occupation: A Historical Perspective”, Threat, Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel, Baker, A. & Matar, A. Eds., PlutoPress, London, 2011; Rosenfeld, M., Confronting Occupation, Work, Education and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in Refugee Camp, Standford University Press, California, 2004, Chapter 10 33 In order to get a full explanation of the three different modes of action, see Bonard, P., Modes of Action used by humanitarian players, International Committee of the Red Cross, Switzerland, 1999 34 Bonard, P., Modes of Action used by humanitarian players, International Committee of the Red Cross, Switzerland, 1999, p. 19
11 Neutrality means that the ICRC should avoid taking “sides in hostilities”. In addition, it also may not “engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature”35.
Impartiality means “no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions”; relief should be provided first to “the most urgent case of distress”. Impartiality is directed towards the ones who need to be helped, while neutrality relates to the relationship with the actors involved in a conflict.
Independence means that the organisation “must always maintain its autonomy so that it may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement”36. The organisation should be independent from the state in which it is active and from its own nation of origin. Finally, all neutral organisations should be independent, but not all independent organisations are neutral.
The advantages of this mode of action is that it allows “access to the territory under the control of the authority”, “access to the authorities”, “access to the victims” and “access to information”37. The disadvantage is that trust relationships require the silence of the organisation38. It might be amoral and in some cases lead to cooperation with violators of humanitarian/human rights. Sometimes neutral humanitarian actors are even used as political instruments, for instance as pawns in a state propaganda programme39. Moreover, states “would never have assigned the ICRC the powers it enjoys without guarantees for their own military and political security”40.
As mentioned before, the benefits of the neutral-persuasion mode of operation have been questioned since the Biafran war of independence (1967-1970)41 when some doctors of the ICRC thought that the principle of neutrality prevented the world from knowing and from responding to an atrocious reality. From that moment on, it
35 ICRC, the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, ICRC Publications, Geneva, 1999, p. 2 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., p. 18 38 Ibid., p. 19 39 Brauman, R., Humanitaire le dilemme, Les éditions Textuel, Paris, 2002, p. 63 40 Plattner, D., “ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance”, International Review of the Red Cross 1996 41 Delvaux, D., The Politics of Humanitarian Organizations: Neutrality and Solidarity, the case of the ICRC and MSF during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Master of Arts of Rhodes University 2005, p. 8
12 became clear that sometimes aid workers, despite their best intentions, “become logisticians in the war efforts of warlords, fundamentalists, gangsters, and ethnic cleansers”42. So from a moral point of view, neutrality is sometimes close to collaboration with thugs. In summary, neutrality allows relief and trust which might be a useful tool of mediation, but is often gained at the expense of justice.
3. The ICRC in Israel and the Palestinian territories
The British decided to withdraw from Palestine in Mai 1948 and the situation of tension in the regions drove the ICRC to prepare itself for a conflict43. It was mostly concerned with medical matters such as hospitals, ambulances and medical provisions44. In Mai 1948, it established in Jerusalem three neutral zones which should welcome non-combatants. This action was a failure; the combatants did not respect the zones and the ICRC had to withdraw. In spite of the failure, this event is presented as a near success in the ICRC annual report: “the ICRC had to take its flag down and abandon definitively this zone. The experience, even if it was limited in time, proves that with the good will of the belligerent authorities, we can get results”45.
With the development of the conflict, the ICRC acknowledged the importance of the refugee problem and started to extend its activities to this population. At the end of 1948, the UN invited three organisations to participate in the relief of the Palestinian refugees: the Quakers (AFSC), the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS), and the ICRC46. The General Assembly of the UN adopted resolution 212 which provided them with a budget of $32,000,000. The ICRC was responsible for the relief to refugees in the Israeli-controlled areas; the LRCS was assigned the Arab states and the AFSC Gaza47. According to the research of Nancy Gallagher, the ICRC’s work in favour of the refugees was important, but it was not the most successful. Firstly, the AFSC was much closer to the population than the ICRC delegates: “the fifty AFSC volunteers had lived as close to the refugees as possible while the Red Cross
42 Rieff, D., Humanitarian Illusion, The New Republic, March 16 1998, p. 30 43 Rapport annuel du CICR, juillet 1947 au 31 décembre 1948, p. 110 44 Ibid., p. 111 45 Ibid., p. 118, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 46 Gallagher, N., Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the Dilemmas of NGO humanitarian Activism, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 2007, p. 51 47 Ibid., p. 54
13 personnel who distributed relief had lived separately from the Palestinian refugees in guarded houses. In addition, the Red Cross personnel paid refugees to distribute supplies for them, while the AFSC volunteers were out working in the camps themselves and were always present at the distribution of rations”48. Secondly, the ICRC seems to be quite a rigid and bureaucratic organisation: “the AFSC volunteers were inventive and did not follow any sort of rigid protocol. Generally they were out in the camps and took a more ‘hands on’ approach to their tasks, more so than the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies. This enabled the AFSC to make a census quickly and efficiently without the extra time, staff, and funds required by the other relief agencies”49.
In 1951, the delegation in Israel was closed50. In the 1950s, the ICRC was temporarily present in Israel or the Palestinian territories. It was mostly preoccupied with the victims of the different wars in 1948 and 1956, border incidents and the fate of war prisoners. In 1960, the activities of the ICRC further slowed down: “M. David de Traz, who had been holding the position of general delegate of the ICRC in the Near-East since 1956, had to go back to Geneva for a long medical treatment (…) the ICRC reached the conclusion that it was not indispensable to maintain a permanent delegation in the Near-East anymore. Consequently, the position of general delegate was deleted”51. The ICRC was almost inactive in the region until 1967.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war pushed the Israeli-Palestinian question to the forefront and became one of the ICRC’s priorities. The ICRC undertook several urgency actions to relieve injured people, prisoners and refugees52. It participated in a really short term agreement that allowed some refugees of the Six-Day War to return to the West Bank53. Consequent to the situation of war and occupation, the ICRC decided to establish a permanent presence in the region. It was thus able to respond to a larger range of issues generally related to occupation and the respect of the fourth Geneva Convention54. However, at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the 1970s, the
48 Gallagher, N., Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the Dilemmas of NGO humanitarian Activism, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 2007, p. 113 49 Ibid., p. 161 50 Rapport annuel du CICR 1951, p. 67 51 Ibid., p. 21, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 52 Ibid., p. 5-9 53 Ibid., p. 11 54 Rapport annuel du CICR 1968, p. 33
14 action of the ICRC still focused almost exclusively on problems which directly resulted from wars: repatriation and exchange of war prisoners, refugees and reunification of families.
In the annual report of 1968, the ICRC observed that Israel “let open for the time being the question of applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories”55. The ICRC extended its activities in the “limits of practical facilities granted by the government of Israel”56. For instance, Israel granted the ICRC the right to visit Arab prisoners except for the ones coming from East Jerusalem57. This period marks a change in the balance of power, in which Israel gained the upper hand and seemed to be less concerned by the Geneva Conventions. It is possible to identify some expressions of limited criticism by the ICRC. It expresses for instance its “deep concern”58 or “objected to the Israeli authorities”59 or it is “preoccupied”60. However, the criticism does not go further than this.
In the annual reports, there is usually no feed-back of ICRC intercessions or criticism to the Israeli authorities. The lack of feedback raises concerns of ICRC actual successes. It is likely that if the results were positive, they would be publicized since it would benefit both Israel and the ICRC: the organisation’s action leads to results & Israel respects international law. Another problem of the ICRC’s annual reports is that they are not systematic. It means that information appears and disappears according to the year. For instance, the ICRC complains about the overpopulation of prisons in 1971, 1975, 1976 and 1982; for the years in between it is impossible to know if the situation improved or stagnated.
The reports are generally very complaisant towards Israel, but it can be sensed when the situation worsens: “Of particular concern to the ICRC were detainees under interrogation: an average of nearly 300 people a month were notified to the ICRC after they had spent more than 12 days in interrogation sections, and about half of these spent more than 28 days under interrogation. ICRC delegates who regularly visited these detainees did not note any improvement in their treatment. Under
55 Rapport annuel du CICR 1968, p. 34, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 56 Ibid., [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 57 Ibid., p. 38 58 Ibid., p. 37, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 59 Ibid., p. 36, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 60 Rapport annuel du CICR 1971, p. 58, [translation: Valentine Sarnau]
15 Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, physical or moral coercion against protected persons is prohibited”61, or slightly improves: “from their side, the Israeli authorities generally have favourably received the recommendations of the ICRC”62.
Later in the 1970s the ICRC developed new programmes to support underprivileged Palestinian families or invalid people. It acted in cases of population transfer, expropriation or demolition of properties by the occupying power and checked the medical and sanitary situation of the occupied territories…63
In summary, the activities of the ICRC since 1967 can be summarized with the following tree:
1. Protection a. Civilians i. Transfer of messages between residents, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) ii. Reunification of families iii. Tracing missing people iv. Issuing travel documents b. Prisoners i. Visits ii. Restoring family links 2. Assistance a. Civilians: food, household items, water, agriculture, etc. b. Prisoners: household and medical items c. Wounded and sick: hospital support, water and habitat, physical rehabilitation 3. Prevention a. Dialogue with the bearers of weapons to familiarize them with IHL b. Conferences, workshops, seminars 4. Cooperation with National Societies: financial, material and technical support.
61 Rapport annuel du CICR 1994, p. 224 62 Rapport annuel du CICR 1974, p. 24 [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 63 Rapports annuel du CICR 1970-1980
16 In cases of conflicts or violent episodes, the ICRC usually increases its international staff, intensifies and broadens the scope of its action.
a. The ICRC in Israeli prisons
i. 1967-1993: the establishment of ICRC routine activities
The Six-Day war (June 1967) entailed a new wave of Palestinian refugees, occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by Israel, a massive deployment of Israeli military forces and strong repression of any kind of Palestinian organisation64. The war put an end to the Pan-Arab movement and galvanized the Palestinian people, “a whole nation humiliated by the collapse of the Arab armies”65. Israel implemented military rule, controlled natural resources, seized lands, flooded the Palestinian market with Israeli products and refrained from developing public services and infrastructures66. Small-scale resistance was organised, but was harshly repressed by Israel and had no possibility of leading to the creation of armed groups. The first Palestinians to be arrested were usually very young people who had participated in demonstrations, distributed political leaflets, thrown stones or were members of political organisations67: “The majority of the groups were apprehended in their infancy, and their members were handed especially heavy sentences, so that there were many whose connection to a group was counted in weeks, while their sentences numbered years”68. As a result, “the activist became a prisoner before experiencing political activity”69. The young activist got the opportunity to develop political consciousness and knowledge in the prisons, enrolled in a system of education set-up by the prisoners themselves70.
The activities of the ICRC for the Palestinian prisoners, our focus of study, started as early as December 1967 when the ICRC began to “visit in the occupied territories of the West Bank, Kuneitra and Gaza the persons arrested and detained for resistance
64 Rosenfeld, M., Confronting the Occupation, Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2004, pp. 218-219 65 Sayigh, R. (1979), The Palestinians, London & New York, Zed Books 2007, p. 148 66 Rosenfeld, M., “Power Structure, agency, and family in a Palestinian refugee camp”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 524 67 Ibid., p. 218 68 Ibid., p. 224 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid, 2004, p. 238
17 activities”71. Delegates’ visits and the family programme became regular in 196972. Since 1967, the ICRC has focused on the following activities:
- Visits to prisoners
- Supply of materials, such as clothing for the winter, school books, pens, sports items…
- Medical support, supply of spectacles, prostheses, dentures…
- Legal review and advice in military courts
- Family programme: support to very indigent families, buses for prison visits, transmission of written messages
As previously stated, prison became a fruitful environment for political education. There was a strict discipline of study: “There was a very rigorous regime over things like cleanliness and maintaining silence during study time, with everyone having to submit a monthly report on his progress and to sum up what he read during the month. If he didn’t know how to write for this summing up, others would help him. At the start of every day a different person would sit and guide me”73.
The ICRC could have played a crucial role by providing the prisoners with books and study materials. However, it failed: initially, the organisation did not even manage to supply pens or notebooks and all the literature it provided was subject to the Israeli Prison Services (IPS) censorship: “all written material that reached the prison, through the Red Cross or through relatives, was censored”74; “books, notebooks and pens were forbidden and the only newspaper we received was al- Anba [an official Arabic-language organ of the Israeli government]. They didn’t even allow the Red Cross to bring us games like backgammon or chess”75. So no book related to Palestinian nationalism was allowed76. Books were very important in the prisoners’ life: Mr. Qaddura Fares testified that “each book gave me a push”77.
71 Rapport annuel du CICR 1967, p. 13, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 72 Rapport annuel du CICR 1969, p. 50 73 Rosenfeld, M., Confronting the Occupation, Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2004, p. 248 74 Ibid., p. 246 75 Ibid., Testimony of Noah Salameh, p. 244 76 Ibid., p. 246 77 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 5 February 2012, question 11
18 Prof. Rosenfeld observed: “many interviewees noted that their attitude to the concept of time completely changed in prison, to the extent that they began to measure their sentences in terms of reading material that they sought to finish before their release”78.
At the end of the 1970s, the ICRC tried very hard to make an agreement with Israel in order to be rapidly informed of every arrest and to access the detainee as soon as possible79. In 1977, the ICRC was able to reduce the period it was not allowed to visit a new detainee from 18 to 14 days80. In 1978, the ICRC reduced this number further to 12 days81, but it quickly returned to 14 days in 198182. This agreement is still valid today and is more or less respected by Israel. In 1986 the ICRC extended this agreement to Jerusalemite detainees, who have always had a special status in 198683.
In December 1987, the first Intifada broke out and Israel used massive imprisonment as a means of repression84, they arrested up to 175,000 persons from 1987 to 1994 according to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights85. The ICRC said that Israel’s answer to unrest brought to the fore the question of the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention. In 1987, Israel accepted to apply the Convention de facto, but they kept a leeway, considering the West Bank and Gaza sui generis, a special case which does not fit in any category of International Law. In response to the Intifada, the ICRC increased its staff on the ground86 as well as in detention centres and reminded the Israeli authorities of their obligations towards the civilian population87. The director of the operational activities and the general delegate for the Middle East travelled to Israel three times88.
78 Rosenfeld, M., Confronting the Occupation, Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2004, p. 248 79 Rapport annuel du CICR 1976, p. 12; 1977, p. 9 80 Rapport annuel du CICR 1977, p. 9 81 Rapport annuel du CICR 1978, p. 54 82 Rapport annuel du CICR 1981, p. 50 83 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1988, p. 72 84 Rosenfeld, M., Confronting the Occupation, Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2004, p. 235 85 Note that there is no precision about the nature of the detention, it probably also includes detentions of several hours, http://www.pchrgaza.org/arrests_torture_stat.html - last accessed: 12-11-2012 86 The number of delegates passed from 18 to 37 and the local employees from 46 to 77, Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1988, p. 81 87 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1988, p. 80 88 Ibid., p. 81
19 The ICRC mentioned that the “population in prison increased considerably”89; according to its census, it reached 6,333 Palestinian detainees at the end of 198890. The sudden growth of the prison population induced the Israeli authorities to extend existing centres of detention and to open new ones. The ICRC observed that Israel delayed in notifying the organisation of the names of detainees: “this sudden increase of detainees entailed certain problems, even more than in the previous years; the notifications were incomplete and delayed regarding both arrest and transfer from one place of detention to another”91. In the report, the ICRC nuanced this negative point by assuring that it improved later in the year and that the ICRC delegates rapidly got access to the new detention centres92. This way of presenting Israel’s failure to fulfil its obligations repeats itself in other reports93.
The ICRC noted, as in previous years94, that there were a high percentage of people who stayed under interrogation longer than four weeks which is the limit deadline except in imperative cases of security95. It also observed a drastic increase in administrative detention, 1,356 administrative detainees at the end of 1988 for 50 in 198796, mostly detained in the camp Qziot, out of the occupied territories, in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention. The location of this detention camp hampered the smooth development of the family visit programme97. Finally, in response to massive imprisonment, the ICRC appointed a special staff to register and identify newly arrested people98.
The same year, an inquiry body, the Landau commission, was set up to investigate the General Security Service’s (GSS, Shin Bet or Shabak99) procedure in the bus 300 affair, in which the GSS killed two captured Palestinian hijackers. At first military censorship blacked out the affair, but the story came out in the foreign press and was
89 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1988, p. 80, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 90 Ibid., p. 81, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 91 Ibid. [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 92 Rapport annuel du CICR 1988, p. 81 93 For instance: “the system [of notification of arrest] worked unsatisfactorily during the first semester, it improved considerably during the second part of the year” Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1984, p. 70 [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 94 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1986, p. 72; 1987, p. 84 95 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1988, p. 80, [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 96 Ibid., p. 81 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., p. 82 99 http://www.shabak.gov.il/english/Pages/default.aspx - last accessed: 12-11-2012
20 eventually covered by the Israeli media, causing public uproar. The commission investigated the GSS’s methods of interrogation and concluded that “moderate measure of physical pressure is allowed”, a conclusion questioned by various human rights organisations100.
In 1990, the ICRC reported that the number of detainees passed from 4,000 in 1987 to 16,000 in 1990. The annual report begins in these terms: “At the end of 1987, serious unrest occurred in the territories occupied by Israel. In 1990, the civil population of these territories suffered a lot: the number of injured, dead, arrest and detainees increased considerably and many homes were destroyed by the armed force.” In response to the situation of crisis, the ICRC improved its service to trace missing people, tried to access all the detainees under interrogation and to pursue the family visit programme101.
In 1991, the ICRC’s report described the situation of conflict between Israel and Iraq and the consequences for the population of the OPT. It stated it intensified the pressure on Israeli authorities concerning questions of “massive arrest, interrogation, administrative detention, destruction of houses, expulsions and certain means of repression”102.
In 1992, the ICRC complained that “the selective and pragmatic way of implementing the convention tend increasingly to limit the scope of the ICRC’s activities”103. The same year, the ICRC eventually denounced publicly Israel’s means of interrogation; it called the Israeli government, in a press release on 21 May 1992,
100 B’tselem in 1991, http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/199103_torture - last accessed: 12-11-2012; by the UN in 1994, UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Second periodic reports of States parties due in 1996: Israel 18/02/1997, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/653f6da51dc104d68025646400568ed6?Opendocument - last accessed: 12-11-2012; In 1999 the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the Centre for the Defense of the Individual brought the issue to the High Court of Justice, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Public_Committee_Against_Torture.pdf - last accessed: 12- 11-2012 101 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1990, p. 23 102 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1991, p. 113 [translation: Valentine Sarnau] 103 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1992, p. 148
21 to end ill-treatment during the interrogation of detainees from the occupied territories104.
In 1993, the ICRC’s annual report mentioned that the Palestinians and Israel have started a peace process and that “during the five-year transitional period laid down in the Declaration, it [the ICRC] would extend its role as an independent humanitarian organisation whose mandate was defined by the Geneva Conventions and the Statutes of the Movement. It would keep a close watch on the humanitarian implications of the new accord’s implementation, and would remain at the disposal of all parties concerned in order to act as a neutral intermediary”105.
In conclusion, during this period, the ICRC’s main successes were the following: it regulated the timing for Israel to provide information on new detainees; it ran the family visit programme and provided prisoners with some material help. The response to crisis like the Intifada consisted in increasing and intensifying existing services (staff and visits). In a certain way, it succeeded in implementing an inflexible bureaucratic machine which relieved Israel from some of its duties toward the Palestinian prisoners106.
ii. 1994-2000: the Oslo years & massive release of Palestinian prisoners
The Oslo accords entailed series of release of prisoners. At that time there were about 12,000 prisoners in Israeli custody107.
Declaration of Principles (1993): Israel agreed to release the prisoners arrested before 13 September 1993108.
At the beginning of the year 1994, Israel released 1071 prisoners109
104 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1992, p. 148 105 ICRC annual report 1994, p. 207 106 Anat Barsella, Barred from Contact, Violation of the Right to Visit Palestinians Held in Israeli Prisons, B’tselem, September 2006, p. 2 107 Addameer, Reaching the ‘No-Peace’ Agreement: The Role of Palestinian Prisoner Releases in Permanent Status Negotiations, December 2009, p. 8 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid., p. 33
22 Gaza Jericho Agreement & Protocol of Paris (1994): it was decided that Israel would release 5000 prisoners110.
In the annual report, the ICRC first observed that violence continued in spite of the “normalization of the relations between Israel and the Palestinian people”111.That year, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established. The ICRC signed an agreement with the OLP in order to extend its activities to the Palestinian autonomous territories112 and it started to visit the new Palestinian detentions centres as early as July 1994113.
Israel released 4,950 detainees among whom 550 were transferred to Palestinian custody114. The ICRC noted the diminution of detainees from 10,375 in 1993 to 6,191 in December 1994, but it added that on average, 576 individuals were arrested monthly in the West Bank and 205 in Gaza115. Moreover, Israel delayed in informing the ICRC of the interrogation of 300 detainees and there was no improvement in the conditions of interrogation116.
Oslo II agreement (1995): in this agreement, it was decided to release certain categories of prisoners.
The ICRC in the 1995 annual report explained that this agreement stipulated the release of Palestinian detainees and the redeployment of the Israeli forces from six main cities. In October, 882 prisoners were released117. According to the report, in December, there were 4,929 Palestinian detainees in Israeli custody. That year, a prisoner died in prison as a result of ill-treatment. The ICRC coldly “issued a communication to the press following the death of a Palestinian detainee under interrogation and calling for such detainees to be treated in accordance with the
110 Addameer, Reaching the ‘No-Peace’ Agreement: The Role of Palestinian Prisoner Releases in Permanent Status Negotiations, December 2009, p. 8 111 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1994, p. 222 112 Ibid. 113 ICRC annual report 1994, p. 225 114 Addameer, Reaching the ‘No-Peace’ Agreement: The Role of Palestinian Prisoner Releases in Permanent Status Negotiations, December 2009, p. 9 115 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1994, p. 224 116 Ibid. 117 Addameer, Reaching the ‘No-Peace’ Agreement: The Role of Palestinian Prisoner Releases in Permanent Status Negotiations, December 2009, p. 10
23 Fourth Geneva Convention”118. The ICRC complained that the temporary closure of the West Bank and Gaza hampered the family visit programme119.
On January 1996, Israel released 800 prisoners and transferred 230 to Palestinian custody120. Israel started to transfer Palestinian political prisoners to prisons inside Israel in violation of the 76th article of the Fourth Geneva Convention that stipulates that occupied population should be detained inside the occupied territory121.
In the annual report, the ICRC noted that various violent episodes led to the closure of the West Bank and Gaza and hampered the family visit programme122. It also mentioned the release of 1,200 prisoners, but added that arrests continued at a rate of about 300 each month.
In 1997, the ICRC commented that “despite years of approaches to the Israeli authorities and the latter’s response, the ICRC did not succeed in obtaining full respect for IHL. In 1997 it reported scores of violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the authorities, a significant increase over the preceding period.123”
Wye River (1998): It was decided that Israel would release 750 prisoners124.
In November 1998, 250 prisoners were released. As stated in the ICRC’s annual report, the Palestinian people protested in various violent demonstrations because they were dissatisfied with the number and the categories of prisoners released125.
Sharm el-sheikh (1999): Israel announced the release of 350 prisoners126.
In 1999, Israel released 332 prisoners in three stages. The ICRC noted in its report that there was a decrease in the number of civilians held for security reasons127. It mentioned without further comment the conclusions of the Supreme Court of Israel
118 ICRC annual report 1995, p. 232 119 Ibid. 120 Addameer, Reaching the ‘No-Peace’ Agreement: The Role of Palestinian Prisoner Releases in Permanent Status Negotiations, December 2009, p. 11 121 ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/380?OpenDocument - last accessed: 12-11-2012 122 ICRC annual report 1999, p. 235 123 ICRC annual report 1997, p. 247 124 Addameer, Reaching the ‘No-Peace’ Agreement: The Role of Palestinian Prisoner Releases in Permanent Status Negotiations, December 2009, p. 12 125 ICRC annual report 1998, p. 264 126 Stein, K. W., ”The Arab-Israeli peace process”, Middle East Contemporary Survey, Ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Volume 23;Volume 1999, Tel Aviv 1999, p. 61 127 ICRC annual report 1999, p. 298
24 ruling on torture, aftermath of the Landau commission, which made certain methods of GSS interrogation illegal128 and ended years of non-regulation or limitation of GSS powers in interrogation processes129.
In total, Israel released about 8,000130 prisoners as a result of the Oslo interim agreements and transferred 780 to Palestinian detention centres. Note that arrests continued during this period at a rate of hundreds of people every month. In the year 2000, approximately 1,650 Palestinian political prisoners remained in Israeli jails131.
The 1990s were characterized by unrest, violence and harsh military responses. In general, the ICRC’s main concerns during these years were:
- Non compliance with international law such as detention of the occupied population in the occupier’s territory. This concern was also raised although to a lesser extent in the 1980s annual reports132.
- The family visit programme was hampered because of restriction of movement on the inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank133.
- The ICRC was also more critical about the conditions of interrogation than in previous years. It was probably freer to speak after the bus 300 affair and the conclusions of the Landau commission134.
- The ICRC also protests against Israel’s practice of keeping so many prisoners in “administrative”135 detention136.
128 It decided that “the GSS does not have the authority to “shake” a man, hold him in the “Shabach” position (…) force him into a “frog crouch” position and deprive him of sleep in a manner other than that which is inherently required by the interrogation”, The Supreme Court of Israel ruling on torture, the PCATI vs. Israel, 1999, pp. 27-28, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Public_Committee_Against_Torture.pdf - last accessed: 12- 11-2012 129 ICRC annual report 1999, p. 297 130 Addameer, Reaching the ‘No-Peace’ Agreement: The Role of Palestinian Prisoner Releases in Permanent Status Negotiations, December 2009, p. 33-36 131 Ibid., p. 37 132 Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1986, p. 72; 1987, p. 85; 1988, p. 80 133 ICRC annual report 1994, p. 225; 1995, p. 232; 1996, p. 235; 1997, p. 248; no commentary in 1993, 1998 & 1999 134 Rapport annuel du CICR 1992, p. 151; ICRC annual report 1993, p. 209; 1994, p. 224; 1995, p. 232; no mention in 1996; 1997, p. 248; 1998, p. 266; 1999, p. 214 135 “Administrative detention is detention without charge or trial that is authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree”, http://www.btselem.org/topic/administrative_detention - last accessed: 12-11-2012
25 iii. 2000-today: Decrease of the ICRC’s involvement and retraction of prisoners’ rights
In 2000, the second Intifada broke out, mainly due to the stagnation of the economic and political situation. The success of the Oslo accords was limited and the Camp David negotiations (2000) failed. Israel responded to the unrest with mass imprisonment: Addameer estimates that between March and October 2002, about 15,000 Palestinians were arrested and many were placed in administrative detention137. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Prisoners, about 45,000 Palestinians were arrested during the second Intifada138.
The ICRC’s answer to the second Intifada was the following: “it strengthened its presence in the area by increasing the number of expatriates and basing some of them permanently in Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron, in order to respond to the humanitarian needs arising from the events and to make regular representations to the relevant authorities regarding respect for the rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention”139. As to the detainees, the ICRC “pursued its traditional activities” 140. It also publicly called all the parties to restrain violence and respect IHL141. In the 2000s the ICRC became particularly preoccupied with the “widespread use of administrative detention by Israel”142.
In 2001, the ICRC doubled the budget and the staff in Israel and the OPT. In the annual report, the ICRC stated that it had increased the level of its activities, but “it had no intention of becoming a substitute for the occupying power, which had the main responsibility of ensuring that the living conditions of the Palestinian population were as normal as possible”143.
136 Rapport annuel du CICR 1988, p. 82; ICRC annual report 1997, the ICRC simply notes a decrease in their number for the year 1999, p. 248; no mention for 1993-1996 137 Addameer, Reaching the ‘No-Peace’ Agreement: The Role of Palestinian Prisoner Releases in Permanent Status Negotiations, December 2009, p. 14 138 Note that there is no precision about the nature of the detention, it probably also includes detentions of several hours, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/e- Prisoners_Day2007.pdf - last accessed: 12-11-2012 139 ICRC annual report 2000, p. 184 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 ICRC annual report 2003, p. 272; 2004, p. 286; 2005, p. 313; no mention for 2006; 2007, p. 343; 2008; in 2009 the ICRC notes a decrease in the number of administrative detainees; 2010, p. 437 143 ICRC annual report 2001, p. 328
26 As usual in times of unrest, the number of people arrested increased and the family visit program was disrupted because of the restriction on movements in the Palestinian territories by Israel for security reasons. The ICRC’s response to the situation consisted of an increase in visits by delegates and of material help.
Since 1988, Israel’s policy on movement has seriously slowed down the ICRC’s family visit programme. During the first Intifada, Israel restricted the general exit orders which allowed the residents of the occupied territories “to leave freely, enter Israel and East Jerusalem, and pass between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank”, and obliged the inhabitants of the Strip to possess magnetic cards to identify themselves at the border144. In 1991, Israel revoked the general exit orders and made permits obligatory for residents of the Occupied Territories to enter its territory. At the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000), Israel “almost completely prohibited Palestinians from entering Israel and from travelling between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”145.
This policy hampered the ICRC family visits since most of the prisoners had been detained inside Israel. Most of the families were from the OPT and needed security clearances to enter Israel and the prison. The different checkpoints at the border and inside the Occupied Territories had made the trip to prisons longer and harder146.
This situation was reported by the ICRC: in 2000, the programme was suspended “as a consequence of the upsurge in violence which began in September”147, in 2001 families were prevented from visiting prisoners for seven months148, in 2002, no family visits took place149, in October 2003150 and in 2004 “visits were occasionally disrupted by Israeli closures in parts of Gaza and the West Bank. In September 2004 Israel lifted a ban on visiting rights for residents of Nablus in force since the beginning of the Intifada. It also announced the implementation of a new travel permit system which should enable numerous West Bank families to visit detained
144 B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/closure - last accessed: 12-11-2012 145 Ibid. 146B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/topic/freedom_of_movement - last accessed: 12-11-2012 147 ICRC annual report 2000, p. 184 148 ICRC annual report 2001, p. 327 149 ICRC annual report 2002, p. 305 150 ICRC annual report 2003, p. 272
27 relatives for the first time”151. At the end of the second Intifada, over 60% of Palestinians detainees received monthly family visits152.
According to the Minister Issa Qaraqa, since the second Intifada prisoners have lost many of the advantages they gained during their struggles in the 1980s & 1990s and the Israeli authorities have recently significantly restricted prisoners’ rights153.
In 2006, Hamas won the legislative elections. In June 2007, the military wing of the organisation took the control of the Gaza Strip and Israel decided to define the Strip as a hostile territory154. The ICRC family visit programme was stopped for between 753-787 Gazan individuals who were prisoners at that time155. According to Mr. Goldstein, the ICRC’s spokesman in Tel Aviv, about 800 families were affected and have been demonstrating weekly in front of the ICRC Gaza office since then. The ICRC decided to increase the visits of ICRC delegates for Gazan prisoners156.
Gilad Shalit’s capture is another illustration of the ICRC’s helplessness in front of violators of international law. Gilad Shalit is an Israeli soldier who was captured by Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip in June 2006157. According to the ICRC Director-General Yves Daccord, "Hamas has an obligation under IHL to protect Mr. Shalit's life, to treat him humanely and to let him have contact with his family"158. However, the ICRC never managed to visit him and it was difficult to obtain proof that he was alive in spite of reiterated demands on its part159.
For Israel, Shalit afforded an opportunity to influence both Israeli and maybe international public opinion, to justify the interruption of the family visit programme and to place further restrictions on Gazan prisoners. For Hamas, Gilad was a good bargaining chip to be used in exchange for prisoners. Gilad was eventually freed in
151 ICRC annual report 2004, p. 286 152 ICRC annual report 2005, p. 314 153 Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, question 5 154 B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/20120515_prison_visits - last accessed: 12-11-2012 155 According to the IPS figures provided by Sarit Michaeli, B’stelem 156 ICRC annual report 2008, p. 349 157 Le Monde, http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/07/12/enlevement-de-gilad-shalit- deux-juges-designes-en-france-pour-enqueter_1548058_3218.html - last accessed: 12-11-2012 158 ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2011/israel-palestine- news-2011-06-23.htm - last accessed: 12-11-2012 159 See for instance: Gaza: ICRC demands proof that Gilad Shalit is alive, 23-06-2011 News Release 11/139 http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2011/israel-palestine-news-2011- 06-23.htm - last accessed: 12-11-2012
28 October 2011 in return for the release of about 1000 Gazan prisoners. The ICRC played no role in the negotiation process and a minor role in the release: “the ICRC helped ensure that the release operation ran smoothly. ICRC delegates interviewed each detainee in private prior to his or her release to verify that they accepted their release. The ICRC also facilitated the transportation of the detainees in the West 160 Bank and from the Kerem Shalom crossing into the Gaza Strip” .
The case of the Gazan prisoners as well as that of Gilad Shalit shows that the ICRC is unable to compel either of the parties to respect international law. It has also very limited powers in terms of negotiation.
In summary, in spite of radical changes in the circumstances and demands on the ground during the last 12 years, it has not been possible to identify any significant change in the nature of the ICRC’s action. Some services appeared and disappeared according to certain needs: when there was a hunger strike, the ICRC sent one of its doctors or the delegates’ visits were more frequent161; when prisoners did not have family visits, they got material help from the ICRC. However, it often seems that some paragraphs of the annual reports are simply copied year after year162. Two of the Palestinians interviewed, Mr. Qaddura Fares163 and Mr. Issa Qaraqa164, observed that the ICRC’s action decreased in the last decade. This means that the organisation lacks flexibility and maybe fails to recognize new issues.
Several reasons explain the decrease in the action of the ICRC in Israel and the OPT: In times of tension such as Intifada, the power of the ICRC usually decreases as it can only act within the limits of Israel’s discretion and Israel takes a harsher line. The budget of the ICRC is dependent on what is happening elsewhere in the world and depending on the situation it may have to change priorities165. Finally, the PNA successfully replaced the role of the ICRC in certain domains, for instance by providing prisoners and their families with material help.
160 ICRC welcomes release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and Palestinian detainees, 18-10-2011 News Release 11/212, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2011/israel-palestine- news-2011-10-18.htm - last accessed: 12-11-2012 161 Rapport annuel du CICR 1987, p. 84; Informe de Actividad, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja 1992, p. 149 ; 1995, p. 232; ICRC annual report 1999, p. 299; 2004, p. 286 162 See for instance the introductory paragraph between the year 2002-2010, or the paragraph about the ICRC’s action is very similar from 2002 to 2009 163 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 20 164 Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, question 12 165 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 21
29 iv. Assessment of the importance of Palestinian prisoners’ issues in the action of the ICRC
The relative importance that the ICRC accords to the various activities it conducts and to the issues it deals with is not always clear from the annual reports and from the organisation's website. Since the issues pertained to in the reports are not organised in alphabetical order, one would assume that the order of appearance of a specific theme reflects its relative importance. However, it remains difficult to draw detailed conclusions. When I started my research on the ICRC, Israel and the Palestinian territories had the second rank after Iraq on the ICRC’s website. Now it is ranked third because of events in Syria166. Unfortunately, this cannot be systematically checked since there is no acknowledgement on the part of the ICRC that confirms or denies their priority scale.
In their annual reports, we see that the wars in 1967 and 1973 propelled Israel and the OPT to the fore. The Middle East was the first region that appeared in the annual report. In general, between 1967 and 1974, Israel and the OPT were first among other Middle-Eastern countries, then they are replaced by the Lebanese Civil War. During the following years, Israel always came after Lebanon, Iran or Iraq. In 1979, the year of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, Israel again emerged as first among the Middle-Eastern issues. During the Oslo years, from 1993 to 2000, Israel and the OPT were first again. So it seems that wars and peace treaties push the Israeli-Palestinian issues to the forefront.
As for the issue of Palestinian political prisoners, I have not yet found a satisfactory explanation for the shifts in the ranking of this problem. In general, when there is a war, the ICRC directs most of its efforts to the provision of medical support for civilian victims. Nonetheless, prisoners always remain important; they usually come in first or second place. During the first Intifada, prisoners received primary concern, but this was not the case during the second Intifada. In general, activities on behalf of prisoners received major publicity in the 1970s and the 1980s and less so in the decades that followed.
166 ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/middle-east/index.jsp - last accessed: 12- 11-2012
30 I asked the head of the protection department, Ms. Sarah Avrillaud, if visits to prisons are one of the most important activities of the ICRC. She answered the following: “Well, it’s difficult to compare because all the activities we are doing in a certain country are related to the needs of the people. All our activities are justified by the need. I cannot say that the work of visiting detainees is more important than providing water to the Bedouins. We’re all equal in that respect. What we say in general is that the core of the activity of the ICRC is related to protection because this is the core of our mandate if you want. But assistance, to protect and assist the victims of conflict, assistance is also an important component of our work in all the places we work in. So everything is equally important. I don’t know if the answer fits”167. So in general, the issue is not more important but the ICRC has a special mandate that makes its mode of operation unique in this domain.
I added that I had the feeling that ICRC plays a crucial role in visiting prisons because it is the only organisation that has such relations with the authorities and consequently flexibility of access. She said: “Yeah, in that regards, if you compare it to what other organisations are doing then, yes, the ICRC is very important in that activity because as you pointed out, not many organisations have access or at least not the same kind of regular access, conventional access, I mean…”168 Because of its special mandate, the ICRC has the “right to visit Palestinian detainees and protected persons. Whereas if the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights want to visit, they have to ask a special request and it’s not necessarily that they’ll get an agreement like we have. So we have an added value because we are regularly visiting, and we can do it as long as there would be prisoners. It’s not just for one shot visit”169. Mr. Goldstein added that because of the special mandate that the ICRC has from the international community, it focuses more publicly on detention than on other activities170. In summary, the issue of Palestinian political prisoners is important in ICRC eyes, but it is not always their main concern. It depends on the context and the need of the beneficiaries. The mandate that gives the ICRC the right to enter prisons makes this intervention special in comparison with other organisations and is used as a tool for advertisement for the public.
167 Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 11 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid.
31 4. How I came to the substance of this thesis
I am from Switzerland and I have been studying the Middle East, focusing on issues related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, so I wanted to research a subject which would in some way link Switzerland and Israel. I first considered the relations between Switzerland and the Hamas, but it soon became evident that this subject cannot be researched because it is masked in secrecy and there are no sources.
Then I thought of the ICRC because it was founded in Switzerland, it is governed by Swiss law and it is neutral like Switzerland171. The ICRC’s neutrality was inspired by Swiss neutrality, but they have not the same goal: through neutrality, Switzerland seeks the preservation of its territorial integrity while the ICRC aims at relieving the victims of armed conflicts172. Moreover, they are not based on the same sources of IHL.
My thesis supervisor, Prof. Maya Rosenfeld, suggested I focus on the intervention of the ICRC in Israeli prisons. It was a very good proposal since the ICRC’s action is unique in this sphere: neutrality and special agreements with Israel give the organisation extended access to detentions facilities and contacts with the detainees. It can enter parts of prisons that no other organisation can visit such as the cells, the interrogation centres, the shower facilities, etc. It regularly meets the detainees, sometimes even when they are still under interrogation173. It plays a particular role in the contacts between the prisoner and his family facilitating the family visits and transmitting messages between the prisoner and his relatives. Written and oral communication between the prisoners and their families has been particularly important in the case of the Gazan prisoners who have been prohibited from family visits since 2007174.
171 ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/overview-who-we-are.htm - last accessed: 12- 11-2012 172 For a more detailed differentiation between the Swiss and the ICRC’s neutrality, see: Bugnion, François, La neutralité suisse dans l'optique du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, Declaration 26.05.2004, link: http://www.icrc.org/fre/resources/documents/misc/5zla49.htm - last accessed: 12- 11-2012 173 In Israel, the ICRC is allowed to meet with prisoners under interrogation after 14 days. 174 From 6 June 2007 to 16 July 2012, ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-footage/palestine-israel-tvnews-2011-06-23.htm; http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/israel-palestine-news-2012-07- 16.htm - last accessed: 12-11-2012
32 I first looked for sources from the organisation itself, but I rapidly discovered that it is quite restricted. As the organisation wishes to maintain its neutrality, it does not publish any reports about its activities in the prisons. I was surprised that confidentiality applied even for domains such as budget or the possibility to join the family visits programme since these issues have nothing to do with neutrality175. The extent of the ICRC’s confidentiality was difficult to gauge at the beginning since the ICRC employees always answered my queries diplomatically: “we’ll check this issue and come back to you”, “we cannot answer your question now because the person responsible is on holidays”, “we’ll contact you in a week”, and so on. The head of the family visit section told me that “The ICRC has no interest in academic research being undertaken concerning its activities”. Secrecy tickled my curiosity even more. How is it possible that there is almost no critical material about the organisation? Why have so few academics have researched this topic?176
When I understood that virtually no cooperation was forthcoming from the ICRC, I turned to the side of the beneficiaries. I decided to go into the field and ask people what they thought about the organisation. I tried to collect a wide range of opinions, from a minister to the mother of a detainee.
I was lucky because I conducted my research in a period of renewed struggle by the prisoners and the Palestinian public at large. At the presidential conference in Jerusalem on 23 June 2011, Netanyahu declared: “I have decided to change Israel's treatment of terrorists sitting in prison. We will give them all that they deserve according to international law but nothing beyond that”177. He added that there would be “no more master’s degrees in murder or doctors of terrorism”178. According to Addameer, the Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, Netanyahu’s punitive measures affected “everything from prisoners’ access to education, books
175 See chapter 2.4, p. 67-68 176 In my knowledge, only John Hutchinson undertook the difficult task to critically review the history of the foundation of the ICRC in Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross. He did not get access to the ICRC’s archives because he refused to submit his manuscript to the ICRC before publication. http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnd4.htm - last accessed: 12-11- 2012 177 Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-israel-to-toughen- conditions-of-palestinian-prisoners-1.369269 - last accessed: 12-11-2012 178 Ma’an news agency: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=399599 - last accessed: 12-11-2012
33 and family visits, to the IPS’s use of isolation and fines as punishment”179. Summer 2011 was relatively calm in terms of the struggle180, while media and the Palestinian people were mostly focused on Abbas’ decision to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state at the UN general assembly in September 2011181. The bid did not have any impact.
On 27 September 2012, the Palestinian prisoners started a disobedience campaign “in response to an escalating series of punitive measures by the Israeli prison authorities182”. Disobedience spread to every prison, but was expressed in different ways: from hunger strikes and/or disobedience to any prison order183. At first sight, the movement seemed unified: the prisoners decided to undertake a hunger strike on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays and to disobey prison orders, refusing for instance to wear a uniform or to participate in the daily roll call. Then, a group of prisoners affiliated to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine party undertook an open hunger strike (which ended on 18 October 2011) to demand the end of isolation for their leader Ahmed Saadat. Finally, a group of prisoners from the Ramon prison started a hunger strike to end the abusive use of isolation, restrictions on family visits, fines, night raids, humiliating searches and shackling while being transported for lawyers visits184.
In October 2011, Hamas signed an exchange deal for the captured Israeli Gilad Shalit, which consisted of the release of 1027 Hamas prisoners in two stages185. However, important Palestinian political figures such as Marwan Barghouti or Ahmed Saadat were not included in the deal186 and several prisoners were rearrested soon after their liberation187. So for the Palestinians, the deal was only a half victory.
179 Addameer: http://addameer.info/?p=2244 - last accessed: 12-11-2012 180 Based on what was reported by Ma’an news agency 181 The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/sep/23/alestinian-statehood-un-general- assembly-live - last accessed: 12-11-2012 182 Ma’an news agency: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=424063 - last accessed: 12-11-2012 183 Ibid. 184 Addameer: http://www.addameer.org/etemplate.php?id=358 - last accessed: 12-11-2012 185 Yehidot Aharonot: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4134315,00.html - last accessed: 12-11-2012 186 Jersualem Post: http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=241597 - last accessed: 12-11- 2012 187 For instance, Hana Shalabi & Sameer al-Issawi were rearrested few months after the swap, Al Arabiya News: http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/24/196750.html & Ma’an news agency: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=531962 - last accessed: 12-11-2012
34 From December 2011, several prisoners started to hold individual hunger strikes. These strikes were supported by the prisoners’ relatives who organised weekly sit-ins before the ICRC offices188. Most of the individual strikers have a religious background and are members of the Islamic Jihad party189. From 17 April to 14 May 2012, the prisoners led a massive hunger strike in which about 2000 detainees took part. The strike ended with the agreement of Israel to end the isolation of 19 prisoners, to stop the renewal of the sentences of administrative detainees without valid reasons and to reopen family visits for Gaza prisoners190.
It was a real chance for me because I was able to live the development of the struggle on the spot: I went to several demonstrations in Ramallah and Tulkarem, I met with families, former prisoners and officials. I had also the chance to flesh out my questions with the ongoing events and to check the ICRC’s capacity of adaptation to a turbulent situation.
188 Al Arabiya News: http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/10/07/170636.html - last accessed: 12- 11-2012, there has been sit-ins in before the Beit Hanoun ICRC office every Monday since 1995 http://www.info-palestine.net/article.php3?id_article=11334 - last accessed: 12-11-2012. The sit-ins were particularly intense from February to June 2012, it can be observed in Addameer’s calendar: http://www.addameer.org/eevents.php?date=1330293600 - last accessed: 12-11-2012 189 Khader Adnan, hunger strike from 18 December 2011 to 21 February 2012; Hana Shalabi, from 16 February to 29 March 2012; Bilal Nabil Saeed Diab & Thaer Halahla, from 29 February to 17 May 2012; Mahmoud al-Sarsak, from 19 March to 14 June 2012; Akram Rikhawi, from 12 April to 23 July 2012; Ayman Sharawna, from 1 July 2012, at the time of writing (31 October 2012) he was still on hunger strike; Hassan Safadi, from 21 June to 21 September 2012; Samir al-Barq, from 15 to 24 October 2012; Sameer al-Issawi, from 1 August, at the time of writing (31 October 2012) he was still on hunger strike. Some of the prisoners such as Ayman Sharawna and Samir al-Barq held several successive strikes. 190 Amnesty International: http://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/moyen-orient-afrique-du-nord/israel-et- territoires-occupes/docs/2012/accord-encourageant - last accessed: 12-11-2012
35 Chapter 2: Opinions of some Palestinians
1. Methodology
My fieldwork included five in-depth interviews, twenty-three short interviews and additional field experiences. The in-depth interviews were relatively long and were undertaken in the offices of different organisations. The short interviews were conducted during demonstrations before the ICRC offices. The interviewees were related to the prisoners’ issue in different ways; they were officials, lawyers, former prisoners and relatives of prisoners. Most of the people were interviewed in Ramallah, but they came from different places (Jerusalem, Tulkarem, nearby villages, etc). They were interviewed either in English, Hebrew, Arabic or French.
For in-depth interviews, I prepared a set of questions for the following groups: officials, former prisoners, and families. In some cases, the three sets of questions were addressed to the same person, for instance in the case of Mr. Qaddura Fares, who spent 14 years in prison, has relatives in prison and currently heads the Palestinian Prisoners’ Club1 (Nadi al-Aseer). The questions were divided into two parts. The first category consisted of general questions about the Palestinian prisoners, their families and the help they get from different organisations. These questions were used to gauge the importance of the ICRC relative to other organisations. I usually started with questions which did not mention the ICRC in order to avoid influencing the interviewees any way and when I presented myself, I tried not to specify that I was writing about the ICRC. The second category consisted of specific questions about the work of the ICRC in Israeli prisons.
In preparation for these questions, I looked for the ICRC’s most crucial activities vis- à-vis the Palestinian prisoners which could be used to gauge its successes and failures. The points I ended up focusing on were:
1) The ICRC is the only organisation that has such extensive rights of visits; it can even visit prisoners held under interrogation or in isolation2. I was therefore interested to learn whether this field is the one in which the ICRC
1 Website of Nadi al-Aseer: http://www.ppsmo.ps/portal/ - last accessed: 12-11-2012 2 Rosenfeld, Maya, When the exception becomes the rule, Incommunicado detention of Palestinian security detainees, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel & Nadi al-Aseer - Palestinian Prisoners’ society 2010, p. 43
36
has the most impact and to what extent the visits of ICRC delegates make a difference. 2) The ICRC created an original programme that facilitates family visits. It helps the families to obtain permits and provides a service of buses3. I wondered if the families of the prisoners concerned were satisfied with the programme. 3) The ICRC is contradictory: on the one hand, it is a guardian of humanitarian law while on the other hand it does not publicly denounce violations. So I wanted to find out what officials and lawyers thought about this situation.
The in-depth interviews were conducted in Hebrew, English or Arabic with simultaneous translation. I spontaneously added questions when I felt it was necessary. The interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed into a written format.
The short interviews were conducted in the noisy crowded environment of demonstrations which is not optimal for long questions and answers. Most of the interviews were carried out in Arabic because most of the interviewees were from Palestinian villages and did not speak any English. I understood about 50% of the answers and I tried to add spontaneous questions when I felt it was necessary. As for the in-depth interviews these interviews were recorded and translated later. One of the interviewees spoke perfect French because he had studied in Paris. I mostly interviewed women because I thought they played an important role in publicizing the prisoners’ cause. In the demonstrations, women are mostly a numeric minority, but when the press shows up, they are placed in the front line with the elderly men4.
3 As seen earlier in chapter 1.3.a.i p. 20, most of the Palestinians are detained outside the occupied territories in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention; consequently, families from the West Bank need a special permit to enter Israel. Prisoners from Gaza were forbidden from family visits until July 2012. 4 This assumption was not confirmed by Mr. Murad Jadallah, researcher at the organisation Addameer; he does not see any special role for the women in the demonstrations; Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 21 & 22
37
Figure 2. Almost no women, but they are in the foreground. Demonstration before the ICRC office, Ramallah, 6 March 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
I noticed that journalists usually interview women to get testimonies and men for official statements. But this could also be explained by the fact that there are very few women performing a high function in the Palestinian administration. Katy Parry, who studied the depiction of the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006, wrote that newspapers retain the “values and beliefs of the target audience” and “reinforce prevailing news narratives”5. In our case, the prevailing narrative is the crying mother, longing for reunion with her son or husband. The prisoners are the heroes fighting for freedom and the mothers are the victims of the conflict.
Figure 3. Reporters interviewing a woman during a demonstration in Ramallah on 20 March 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
5 Parry, K., “A visual framing analysis of British press photography during the 2006 Israel–Lebanon conflict”, Media, War & Conflict, 3 (1): 67-85, 2010, pp. 68-69
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Another reason why I first approached women is that as a Western woman in a conservative world I felt more comfortable speaking with persons of the same sex. I interviewed 17 women, 5 men and 1 group of people.
The questions in my interviews evolved with time and were adjusted to the context. I noticed that some questions worked better than others, for instance, instead of asking the family directly about the visit / the journey to the prison, I asked them to speak about their most difficult experiences. It opened up the question and indicated whether the ICRC is helping in issues which are crucial for the families. Finally, in all the interviews I reformulated the question or gave some examples when I had the feeling that a question was not well understood.
Main flaws of the methodology
Language barrier: The interviews were conducted in languages which were usually not the mother tongue of either the interviewees or the interviewer. It implied a greater effort from both parties to understand each other. Many words were employed to express something that a native would summarize in a few. Sometimes expressions were used in an improper way and questions had to be spontaneously reformulated which possibly changed their sense somewhat. There was always a risk of misunderstanding of the questions as well as the answers.
Short interviews were held in Arabic and translated subsequently with the help of Echlas al-Azzeh6 who is not a professional interpreter. The short interviews give a good idea of people’s feelings and allow one to sound out the atmosphere, but cannot be considered as field research as such.
In order to counter the language flaws, I used common sense and tried to make sure that my interlocutors understood me and that I grasped what they wanted to say.
Interpretation: I am an outsider to the conflict, with a personal background and knowledge which of course influences my interpretation of the interviews. This problem is not specific to my case. It pops up each time that someone interprets some else’s ideas7.
6 Echlas al-Azzeh is from the refugee camp of al-Azzeh in Bethlehem. 7 I am ready to make the recording of the interviews available for further interpretation.
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Context: the short interviews took place in a noisy and relatively tense environment in which it was not comfortable to speak. It could have prevented the interviewees from telling me things they wanted to, and it surely made me forget some questions. Moreover, most of the demonstrations took place before the ICRC offices which probably entailed either a limitation of criticism or an overemphasis on the organisation.
Flexibility of the questions: in interviews, it is very important to gain the confidence of the interviewee and to catch her or his interest. So it can be counterproductive to remain rigid and always ask the same questions. If too many non-relevant questions are asked, the interlocutor becomes tired. However, it is often difficult to evaluate when a question is relevant or not. In my opinion, the best way to counter this flaw is to keep in mind that the art of interviewing is not empirical.
Choice of the interviewees: for the short interviews, I spoke only to people who go to demonstrations. It means that I did not get the chance to get the opinion of people who do not and there is always a chance that the latter holds other opinions about the issues at stake. Moreover, I chose people randomly, I usually tried to find someone who was on the sidelines and seemed available for an interview. Only a small number of people were interviewed and no sample was made beforehand.
Political and personal interest of the interviewees: the interviewees also have personal and political interests that influence their answers. People often spoke to me because they wanted me to bring their stories before international organisations in Geneva. All the interviewees are emotionally involved in the conflict.
Analysis of the interviews: I could not make a rhetorical analysis of the interviews because of the language barrier. I tried to remain conscious of the body language of the interviewees, but because my final analysis was based on recorded interviews, I can hardly take this into account.
First interviewing experience: I have a background in international relations, a field in which is based on other methodological tools than anthropology or sociology. So I have had no practice in conducting interviews.
40
2. Analysis of the interviews
a. In-depth interviews
i. Qaddura Fares, chairman of the Prisoners’ Club
Mr. Qaddura Fares is the chairman of Nadi al-Aseer, literally “the Prisoners’ Club”. He was imprisoned from 1980 to 1994. He was a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council from 1996 to 2006 and Minister from 2003 to 2005, he participated in the establishment of the Ministry of Prisoners and he was also one of the leaders of Fatah’s “Young guard” during the elections in 2005. Mr. Fares is one of the founders of Nadi al-Aseer which was established on 27 September 1993 on the initiative of Palestinian political prisoners who were determined to struggle for their rights8.
This was one of the first interviews I conducted, so I was a neophyte. I had far too many questions and Mr. Fares loves speaking. The result was an interview of two and a half hours and I was able to ask only slightly more than half of my questions. As already mentioned the first part of the interview included general questions on the prisoners’ issue and did not make explicit reference to the ICRC. The interview was conducted in Hebrew, a language that Qaddura Fares learnt in prison. In the first part of the interview, Mr. Fares explained the prisoners’ organisation inside the detention centres and their relative successes in the 1980s9.
Mr. Fares first spoke about the Club’s activities which were limited at the beginning to some demonstrations and to collecting items for the prisoners. When the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established in 1994, Nadi al-Aseer was the only Palestinian organisations with expertise in the prisoners’ issue. At that time, the newly born Palestinian government institution partially funded Nadi al-Aseer and used its expertise to finance the prisoners’ canteen and the salaries of prisoners’ families. This responsibility was subsequently taken over by the PNA10.
8 Website of Nadi al-Aseer http://www.ppsmo.ps/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=131& Itemid=571 - last accessed 27.04.2012 9 For a more detailed study of the prisoners’ struggle and their method of study inside the jail, see Rosenfeld, M., Confronting the Occupation, Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2004, chapter 10 10 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 5 February 2012, question 1
41
Note that the first services provided by Nadi al-Aseer such as supplying the prisoners with clothes, fruit and items of primary necessity were also the task of the ICRC. So why did the Palestinians feel the need to create a new institution?
1) The major explanation is maybe that many prisoners were released in the wake of the signing of the Oslo Accords and many of them entered politics. As politicians, they wanted to provide those remaining in prison with the best social services; they remained highly committed to prisoner’s issues and founded different public and governmental organisations for prisoners11. 2) The Palestinians wanted to be autonomous, to become self reliant and to take charge of their future. 3) The ICRC employs a considerable number of expatriates (it depends from year to year but in the past few years about one third of its staff12). So the creation of a Palestinian institution opened the door to foreign financing and job opportunities at the time when demand for Palestinian labour in Arab countries and in Israel decreased13. 4) The ICRC services were not satisfactory or sufficient.
Nowadays, the organisation also provides legal support through a legal unit composed of 30 lawyers. About 10 lawyers regularly visit the prisons to check that human rights are being respected. Nadi al-Aseer campaigns internationally for the Palestinian prisoners’ cause in bodies like the UN or the Arab League. In order to become a member of the Club, it is necessary to have been detained for political reasons for at least six months14.
In reply to the question “which organisations work for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons” Fares made mention only of Palestinian ones15. The focus on Palestinian self-determination was indeed a general line in Fares’ interview. It is true that only Palestinian organisations, such as Addameer or Nadi al-Aseer, tackle exclusively the prisoners’ issue. No similar organisation exists in the Israeli or in the
11 This suggestion was brought by my supervisor Prof. Maya Rosenfeld. 12 ICRC annual reports 2001-2010 (numbers are not available in the rest of the reports). In 2001, the ICRC employed about 60% of expatriate. In 2002-2003 the expatriate represented about a third of the staff and from 2004 until today about a fourth of the staff. 13 Rosenfeld, M., Confronting the Occupation, Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2004, pp. 41-42 14 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 5 February 2012, question 1 15 Ibid., question 5
42 international sphere. However, since Qaddura mentioned al-Haqq and Mandela, which are not specific to detention, he could also have mentioned the ICRC16.
The question of health in prison is an important concern of the ICRC. The organisation has its own doctor and if the health services are not fitting, it usually raises the issue with the prison’s administration. The prisoners can also complain directly to the ICRC. Concerning the prisoners’ health, Mr. Fares focused on the struggle of the prisoners inside the prison. When asked if an organisation provided help, he said that sometimes they contacted B’tselem, Amnesty or Doctors for Human Rights, but he omitted the ICRC17.
The ICRC has authority to intervene in cases ill-treatment. The following question was asked: “In case of ill-treatment, what can the prisoner do?” Qaddura referred only to the administrative procedure of the prison: an ill-treated detainee may complain to a judge, but the chance that anything will be done is very low18.
The contact with the family is very central to the ICRC’s work in Israel. So I asked how prisoners proceed when they want to speak with their family19. Qaddura Fares first said that the prisoners do not get the opportunity to be in contact with their families. Finally he said that some West Bank prisoners have family visits. He mentioned the ICRC but only indirectly; he said that isolated prisoners do not see anybody except for “the guard, the ICRC and their lawyer”20. He added that some elderly mothers are not allowed to visit their sons “in spite of the fact that they go with the ICRC bus” (implying that they are under control)21.
The visits of the ICRC delegates are intensive and extensive. As seen at the beginning of this chapter22, they are important because they are the first people external to the prison to see the detainees. Usually, they are allowed to see the detainees quite rapidly, after 14 days, even though the General Security Service (GSS or Shabak) often violates this agreement23. It was therefore assumed that if the
16 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 5 February 2012, question 12 17 Ibid., question 15 18 Ibid., question 16 19 Ibid., question 17 20 Ibid. 21 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 17 22 Chapter 2.1, p. 36 23 As previously mentioned in Chapter 1.3.a.i., p. 19
43 organisation has some impact, it should be highlighted in this activity. It was expected that Mr. Fares would speak of the ICRC, at least among other things, when asked if an organisation visited him during his detention. He started by saying that nobody visited him. Then he referred to lawyers and to delegates of associations; the ICRC was totally absent in his answer24.
Eventually Fares admitted that when he was in prison he was visited by “the commission of the lawyers, the Arab committee of lawyers, and the Red Cross”25 . He added that the ICRC helped, but it played a more active role in the past because it had a bigger budget26: “We saw them; they were always coming, every month and sometimes even twice a month. Nowadays, sometimes you don’t see them for four- five months. They come only if the family complains”27. According to him, nowadays the ICRC visits each prison about every three months28. Qaddura focused almost exclusively on the ICRC’s material help “They brought books, a ping-pong table, chess, notebooks, colours, etc. (...) Yes, yes, in specific things, they helped”29. It is more visible and quantifiable and the ICRC was probably less successful in improving conditions in cases of isolation, administrative detention and ill-treatment.
The second set of questions addressed the ICRC directly and requested an evaluation of its performance. Fares was quick to declare that he was not very “satisfied” with the ICRC and to explain why he thought the ICRC was biased and mainly supported the Israeli side30.
He believes that that the ICRC does not probe enough to understand what really happens in the prisons, it just acts within the limits of Israel’s discretion: “They work with what the occupation gives them”31. According to Fares this is the result of an agreement signed between Israel and the ICRC that limited the ICRC’s mandate. The ICRC does not contest when Israel says “no, it’s not possible, you cannot visit this part of the territory or this prison for security reasons”, he explained. The ICRC
24 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 5 February 2012, question 14 25 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 18 26 Ibid., question 19 27 Ibid., question 20 28 Ibid., question 22 29 Ibid., question 19 30 Ibid., question 29 31 Ibid.
44 obeys; it does not insist and does not complain publicly to the press for instance32. Qaddura used two small anecdotes to illustrate these claims, a case in which the ICRC did not immediately check the situation in a prison after an attack by the guards and another about settlers’ violence33.
Qaddura is convinced that it is impossible for ICRC delegates to remain perfectly neutral. The environment makes them lean automatically towards one side or the other. He personally involved me in his example: “you learn things, you personally, Valentine, you are not asked to balance between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but there are specific moments when you start doing it; you start dealing with politics without intending to do it. You don’t mean at the outset to love the Arabs or to hate the Jews, to love the Jews and hate the Arabs. You don’t mean it, but when you come here, you are influenced by the circumstances. Do you understand? There are delegates of the Red Cross who understand the Palestinians better and our relations become much friendlier and there is the opposite”34.
In general, Fares thinks that the ICRC is pro Israeli because “They are the stronger side”35. According to him one of the main reasons for this bias is cultural: “I think that the Israelis are more intelligent managing relationships, in the way they communicate with organisations that come from outside. The culture and the mentality of a person that lives in Tel Aviv are more similar to your mentality, you who live in Switzerland. Imagine that you’re one of the delegates of the Red Cross; it might be that I invite you to a restaurant for supper or a drink. We speak, joke, we create a human relationship and you start to understand me better than the other side. Now we are Arabs, we’re somewhat conservative so maybe I won’t invite you. The Jews have a more Western mentality than we do that is why they know how to communicate. They are more convincing; they know how to forge the truth, and to paint reality in a shiny beautiful colour. They are able to transform something awful and disgusting into something good”36. Here again he directly involved me in his example in order to make it real and touch my sensibility.
32 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 29 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., question 31
45
Three main interactions between Nadi al-Aseer and the ICRC stood out from Qaddura’s interview37:
1) Dialogue between the ICRC ↔ Nadi al-Aseer: sharing of ideas on how to improve or tackle certain problems 2) Information from the ICRC → Nadi al-Aseer: about the action of the ICRC (e.g.: an ICRC representative spoke with Israel about such and such an issue, the ICRC stopped this programme), a change in the regulations of Israeli Prison Services (IPS) (e.g.: prohibition of visits). 3) Complains from Nadi al-Aseer → ICRC about IPS practices
Nadi al-Aseer also plays the role of intermediary between the ICRC and prisoners’ families. According to Qaddura, the families of prisoners have the tendency to think that the ICRC cooperates with Israel38 and associate it with the occupier because it is a Western organisation39. Sometimes there is a misunderstanding from the public about the different mandates of the organisations that defend human rights and the ones that are humanitarian. It is then the task of Nadi al-Aseer to explain the difference to the people.40
As expected, the ICRC is not a source of information and does not want to be a source of information for reasons of neutrality. Qaddura accepts this mode of action as long as it also applies to Israel and the ICRC does not provide Israel with information. However, Mr. Fares does not understand why the ICRC does not provide him with non-sensitive information, such as how many prisoners are in prison: “I cannot ask them to give me documents that tell me how long the prisoners were detained or how many prisoners are in prison, in spite of the fact that I have friendly relationships with some of them”41.
The last questions concerned the general impact of the ICRC: “does the ICRC have an impact on the conflict?” “Does it encourage the parties to use dialogue as a means of conflict resolution?” “Do the different programmes such as the family visits help?” Qaddura thinks that the ICRC cannot have an impact on peace because it is
37 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 30 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., question 32 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., question 30
46 not a political organisation42. The ICRC’s dialogue method does have influence but in a limited way43. The family visits programme helps but the ICRC was more helpful in the past. Qaddura Fares thinks that the ICRC’s main contribution is that it reminds the director of the prison of the existence of the law. It makes him feel he is being monitored and he cannot continuously lie to the ICRC delegates44.
In conclusion, the fact that Qaddura Fares did not mention the ICRC spontaneously can have various explanations. Firstly, Qaddura Fares is a public figure; politics are his passion and the element that helped him cope with his experience in prison. The ICRC usually avoids political matters in order to remain neutral, so that it is a possible reason why this organisation did not come to his mind. Secondly, Mr. Fares thinks that the ICRC’s work in prison is important but not as crucial as the Palestinian struggle.
According to Fares, the ICRC is sometimes biased; it is a problem of mandate and of cultural inclination. The ICRC and the delegates are manipulated by Israel and this is one of the main reasons why they are not as helpful as they could be. The visits of ICRC delegates seem not to have had an impact on Qaddura’s detention. The family programme helps but the families remain suspicious of the ICRC’s intentions. Finally, Qaddura thinks that even though the ICRC’s presence does not prevent violations, it helps in restraining the IPS.
ii. Samia Zaid, lawyer at the Prisoners’ Club
Samia Zaid studied law in Jordan and is now responsible for the prisoners’ health file at Nadi al-Aseer. She has been working for the Club since May 2011. She previously worked for the Palestinian Finance Ministry. She is not a former prisoner45. Her interview was much shorter than Qaddura’s because she has less experience; it consequently reduced the number of relevant questions.
Unlike Qaddura Fares, Samia Zaid mentioned the ICRC at the beginning of the interview when I asked her to speak about her job at Nadi al-Aseer. She told me that
42 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 35 43 Ibid., question 36 44 Ibid., question 37 45 Interview with Samia Zaid on 5 February 2012, question 1
47 she works in collaboration with the organisation. She forwards the questions of the prisoners and the ICRC is able to answer certain among them46.
Ms. Zaid explained that the ICRC is by no means the only organisation that enters prisons. Other Palestinian organisations such as Nadi al-Aseer, Mandela, and Addameer regularly send lawyers to visit the prisoners47. However, they do not have the same conditions as the ICRC; they do not have freedom of movement and cannot visit the detention facilities. Moreover, the time between an arrest and the contact with a lawyer is usually longer than 14 days.
Ms. Zaid told me that the Club has close relationships with the ICRC and that it helps a lot: the ICRC regularly answers her queries and those of the prisoners and schedules extra visits when requested48. Nonetheless, she explained that while the ICRC always answers questions, the content of the answers is often limited (I myself became aware of the tendency of ICRC to provide superficial answers at a later stage of my fieldwork). She values the fact that the ICRC always answers her requests. She understands perfectly that the ICRC cannot be a part of any political issue and that is the reason that it does not provide any kind of report49.
The information that the ICRC provides to Nadi al-Aseer is partial and restricted. Ms. Zaid does not know the reason behind the ICRC’s strict confidentiality on issues such as the health files, which is her field of work. The doctor of the ICRC merely informs Nadi al-Aseer that he visited such or such prisoner and that he is in a good health or that he is under treatment, nothing more50. She thinks that some information sharing could significantly help the prisoners. Nevertheless she acknowledged the ICRC’s attempts to help51.
When I raised the contradiction between the ICRC as a guardian of humanitarian law and its inability to protect it because of neutrality, Samia Zaid agreed that it is not logical, but she was more preoccupied by the fact that the ICRC provides
46 Interview with Samia Zaid on 5 February 2012, question 1 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., question 4 49 Ibid., question 7, 9 & 10 50 Ibid., question 5 51 Ibid., question 6 & 7
48
Palestinian prisoners with the services of one doctor only52. She said that it is really important for prisoners be given a neutral external medical opinion and that the Palestinian organisations did not manage to get permits for Palestinian doctors to enter the prisoners.
Ms. Zaid appreciates the ICRC’s help especially from the material point of view: “They help but they don’t change anything. They help with family visits. They bring some clothes, ball games, etc.”53 She concluded that she does not think that neutrality, agreement with the prison administration and confidentiality are the only way to enter the prisons54. Ms. Samia Zaid and Qaddura Fares reached a similar conclusion55. Why does the ICRC not share more information in fields which are not crucial to its neutrality and could improve the prisoners’ conditions?56
iii. Issa Qaraqa, Minister of Prisoners and Former Prisoners Affairs
Issa Qaraqa has been the Minister of Prisoners’ Affairs since May 2009. He is a member of the political party Fatah, he was at the head of Nadi al-Aseer between 1993 and 2005 and he was imprisoned in the 1980s like Qaddura Fares.
The Minister was late because he had to deal with a sudden urgent issue. I waited with the Minister’s public relations person who also played the role of interpreter later on in the interview. Two minutes after I entered his office, he told me that the ICRC’s secrecy is a problem because the Palestinians do not get to know what the ICRC heard from the Israeli prison authorities and cannot counterbalance it. He refused to give me a proper interview arguing that I would discuss these issues with the Minister in any case, but he did not mind if I took notes of what he said. In short, this officer thought that the ICRC conveys a misleading image. In reality, the ICRC does much less than its mandate; it does not protest when the IPS introduces unjust rules and confines its work only to what Israel allows it to do. He too complained about the fact that there is only one doctor for about 5000 prisoners and that the budget is tight.
52 Interview with Samia Zaid on 5 February 2012, question 7 53 Ibid., question 14 54 Ibid., question 16 55 For Qaddura’s opinion, see the previous subsection 56 Interview with Samia Zaid on 5 February 2012, question 15
49
When I finally met the Minister I first asked for his response on what was then an urgent current issue, namely, Khader Adnan’s hunger strike. He gave me a short summary of Adnan’s state of health and of his demands: “Khader is on his 57th day of hunger strike and he is in a critical health situation. His lawyer visited him on Friday; he said he is in a critical state and has lost 42 kilos. Both his legs and one of his hands are cuffed. He only drinks water. He will continue his hunger strike until he gets his basic demand: he wants to be released from administrative detention.57” The Minister said that he met the ICRC and “they said that they are following the situation. They have visited him five times and basically they are monitoring his state of health. They made it clear that they won’t interfere in any legal or political aspect58”.
Addressing my question about the relationship between the Ministry and the ICRC, Qaraqa noted that cooperation existed and that the parties met on a regular basis. The meeting usually focuses on cases of sick prisoners. The ICRC is particularly helpful in providing material aid like wheelchairs, spectacles, and so on59.
The Minister said that the conditions in Israeli prisons for Palestinian prisoners have worsened over recent years: family visits have been prohibited for prisoners from Gaza for five years now60, special expenses at the canteen have increased, certain prisoners have been in solitary confinement for years, there is an increase of night raids by the IPS, medical interventions are often delayed, prisoners are denied access to the Open University, and finally, women are strip-searched at checkpoints when they visit their imprisoned relatives. These are the current most critical issues and the Minister has approached the ICRC with the view to their solution without any convincing results61.
The Minister thinks that the ICRC tends to bend under Israeli pressure and does not defend its position very well. He is not very convinced by the ICRC’s policy of writing reports and sending them to Geneva without giving the Palestinians any
57 Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, question 1 58 Ibid., question 2 59 Ibid., question 4 60 From 6 June 2007 to 16 July 2012, ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-footage/palestine-israel-tvnews-2011-06-23.htm; http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/israel-palestine-news-2012-07- 16.htm - last accessed: 12-11-2012 61 Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, questions 5 & 6
50 information. However he thinks the ICRC’s presence is important from a legal and humanitarian perspective62. He added that everybody, the Palestinian government and the families feel that the ICRC is losing its strength63.
Mr. Qaraqa commented that the ICRC fell short of fulfilling its mandate because it failed to check whether international law is respected by the occupier and to react when it was not. From an international legal point of view, the prisoners from Gaza should get family visits, but the ICRC has failed to make Israel comply with this rule. Then from a health point of view, it is Israel who should pay for the medical care of the prisoners and this is often not the case64. He concluded that the ICRC should play a greater role in the conflict than it currently does65.
iv. Murad Jadallah, researcher at Addameer
Murad Jadallah studied Humanitarian Law in Geneva66 and is currently working as a researcher at Addameer. He was detained during the first Intifada and he wanted to be interviewed as a former prisoner67. In 1989, when he was only twelve years old, he was put under interrogation for six to seven days. He was detained again when he was fourteen for two periods of six months68. He was arrested the last time when he was sixteen for a period of six months69. He is member of a group of young people that asks the ICRC to either do something or leave the country70.
I first asked what his worse experience was in order to check if it was in a field in which the ICRC usually intervenes. His main problem was that he was very young and that the prisons were not adapted to accommodate children. So he was incarcerated in a mix of adults and regular criminals71. This is not a sphere on which the ICRC particularly focuses, at least not officially. He said that he learnt to deal
62 Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, question 7 & 8 63 Ibid., question 9 64 Ibid., question 10 65 Ibid., question 11 66 Interview with Mr. Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 7 67 The interview is the result of Mr. Murad Jadallah’s opinion and does not represent Addameer’s general line, interview with Mr. Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 23 68 I thought that Mr. Jadallah was an administrative detainee because he was detained for short period, but he told me otherwise, question 4 69 Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 1 70 They have a facebook page and regularly organise demonstration, for more information about this movement, see http://www.facebook.com/Herak.Shababi, last accessed – 12-11-2012 71 Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 2
51 with the difficulties by himself while being alone during the interrogation 72. He could not remember clearly if he had been visited by an ICRC delegate during the interrogation period73. He explained that the ICRC is usually allowed to see the detainee 14 days after his arrest, but during the first Intifada, it was difficult for the delegates to follow the pace because of the mass arrests74.
Murad thinks that the ICRC cannot be neutral in the case of Israel. It has the tendency to bend towards the Israeli side because it feels sorry for what it failed to do on behalf of the Jews during the Second World War: “Sometimes I think that the ICRC feels guilty for what they did and that they are willing to pay the price now by keeping silent about what Israel is doing”75. He added that “when it comes to Israel, the whole international community and all the international human rights organisations become weak and paralyzed”. However he believes that the organisation does a good job in other countries.
Mr. Jadallah is not happy with the way the ICRC operates. He wants the organisation to take stronger action against Israel after “64 years of violations”76. He gave the example of Myanmar where the ICRC left the country as a sign of protest against the non-cooperation of the military government. Like many Palestinians, he does not understand why the ICRC condemns Gilad Shalit being held incommunicado77 when some Palestinian prisoners have been in isolation for years such as Mahmud Issa who has been isolated since 200278.
Murad does not really want the organisation to leave the country, but he wants it to make strong statements and to comply with its mandate. He believes that some of the ICRC actions are hypocritical, for instance when after an alleged budget restriction it refused to keep on distributing local newspapers to the prisoners for free. Mr Jadallah cannot believe that the ICRC does not have enough money. When he visited the organisation's headquarters in Geneva he was under the impression that
72 Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 3 73 Ibid., question 5 74 Ibid., question 6 75 Ibid., question 7 76 Ibid., question 10. This is when you consider that the ICRC has been in the country since 1948. As described before, the ICRC established a permanent presence in Israel and the OPT in 1967. 77 Note that in isolation, contacts with the family are forbidden, but the prisoner usually receive the visit of a lawyer except in cases of solitary confinement and the ICRC delegates, which was not the case of Gilad. http://www.addameer.org/etemplate.php?id=298 - last accessed: 12-11-2012 78 Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 10
52 the ICRC is doing very well: “The ICRC is almost a business, a good Swiss business. It’s just like the banking system in Switzerland”79. He explained that in the past, the position of delegate was reserved to Swiss citizens, so the organisation created job opportunities for the Swiss people80. He added “we don’t see any development in our prisoners’ situation and we can’t see where they interact in a good way for the benefit of the Palestinian prisoners. So what most Palestinians think about the role of international organisations in Palestine is that they legitimate the state of Israel and the occupation81.”
With respect to the ICRC’s neutrality Murad commented that he has no problem with the principle as such. For him the main issue is that the ICRC does not denounce or tackle properly cases of torture. When I suggested that it was exactly because of neutrality that the organisation did not come out with these cases, Murad replied that the ICRC even if it is neutral is allowed to speak out when it feels confidential cooperation does not make any change. He wants the ICRC to speak out82 and do more than just write reports and send them to Geneva or use them as case studies for students of international law83.
Surprisingly in light of all the above, Murad ended by telling me that he was going to apply for a position with the ICRC. He explained that his criticism is directed specifically to the conduct of ICRC in Israel and the OPT: “its role in China or Algeria or in Libya is not the same as here. My problem with the ICRC is here. My problem with the UN is here” 84.
v. Mahmud Hassan, lawyer at Addameer
Mr. Mahmud Hassan has been lawyer at Addameer for 10 years. He studied in Kiev and completed a law degree in 199285. He represents Palestinian prisoners in Israeli civil and military courts. He told me straight away that his job is not easy because it is almost impossible to defend someone in a military court. He also helps families to get permits to visit their imprisoned relatives.
79 Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 11 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid, question 12 83 Ibid, question 13 84 Ibid., question 19 85 Interview with Mahmud Hassan on 21 March 2012, question 4
53
Mr. Hassan said Addameer works with Nadi al-Aseer, Mandela and DCI inside Palestine and “Doctors without Borders” and hamoked in Israel, but he did not speak about the ICRC at first86. He later added that they cooperate with the ICRC, but he himself has little contact with the organisation87.
Mr. Hassan understands that it is the ICRC’s policy not to share information in order to stay neutral: “We need a body like this that can help both sides without sharing the information88”. He thinks the ICRC plays an important role in the conflict and Addameer always tries to follow up the ICRC’s position in the field of humanitarian law89. Addameer regularly complains about specific issues to the ICRC, but never gets any feedback about the success or failure of the ICRC’s actions90.
Mr. Hassan did not see any improvements in the condition of detention of the Palestinian prisoners that would justify the fact that the ICRC remains silent. He stated rather that the situation has worsened in recent years. He raised some concerns about isolation, the difficult conditions of visits, the fact that prisoners are not allowed to have any physical contact with their relatives, the prohibition of family visits for the people of Gaza, the end of the possibility for the prisoners to study, the night raids, the prisons’ medical system and the fact that the families of the prisoners now have to pay for newspapers, a service that was earlier provided by the ICRC. Mr. Hassan added that “It’s a bad thing that there is no one inside Israel who is able to protect the Palestinians” 91. Mr. Hassan suggested the ICRC should take some measures: “I think that they should say that these conditions cannot be continued in the long term and I’m calling them to take action, to make the conditions better” 92.
According to Mahmud Hassan, people demonstrate before the ICRC offices “because we think that it’s a neutral side. They can help us with the Palestinian prisoners’ problem and they visit the prisoners, so they can influence the European
86 Interview with Mahmud Hassan on 21 March 2012, question 5 87 Ibid., question 6 88 Ibid., question 8 89 Ibid., question 9 90 Ibid., question 7 91 Ibid., question 11 92 Ibid., question 12
54 and Israeli authorities to improve conditions. You know it’s the only place where we can demonstrate and show the world that we are caring about our prisoners”93.
This was the most positive interview from all the in-depth interviews conducted.
b. Analysis of short interviews
In total 23 people were interviewed in 9 demonstrations, 7 in Ramallah and 2 in Tulkarem from February 2012 to May 2012. Out of 23 interviewees, 18 were women.
Analysis of the main questions
The first question was usually “what is your name?” or “what is the name of your relative who is in prison?” It gave the interviewees confidence and added a human element. During the interviews some questions which were not directly related to the ICRC were added in the hope that people would not guess the main focus of the research and give answers biased in this sense.
Figure 4. Palestinians demonstrating before the ICRC office in Tulkarem on 17 April 2012 [Sarnau 2012]
93 Interview with Mahmud Hassan on 21 March 2012, question 14
55
The hunger strikes
In response to the movement of protest and the wave of hunger strikes which started in October 2011, the ICRC doctor visited the strikers. The ICRC made a public statement in May 2012 and protested against the interruption of the family visit programme as a punishment for the strikes94. It requested Israel to transfer the strikers to hospital and to provide them with proper medical assistance95. Dr. Abu Rabi, the ICRC’s health in detention coordinator, came especially from Geneva to help tackle the crisis96.
Generally, the interviewees in demonstration did not refer to the ICRC’s response to the strikes, however, one of the interviewees whished delegates would have visited Hana Shalabi, one of the strikers, earlier: “During Shalit they made a lot of reports about human rights and they didn’t do a similar job for the 5000 prisoners. Before there was the prisoner Khader Adnan who was 66 days on a hunger strike and now there is Hana. The ICRC visited her very late. We want to demonstrate in front of the Saleeb to show the entire world what the occupation is. We demonstrate in front of the ICRC, it has to do something or to leave Palestine”97.
Why are you here today?
Out of 13 people, 4 wanted “to support the prisoners”, 2 wanted “to send a message to the international organisations and support the prisoners / Hana Shalabi”, 2 wanted “to support the prisoners and send a message to the Arab world”, 2 said “for Shalabi and the liberation of all the prisoners”, 1 wanted “to support Shalabi and protest against violations of international law”, 1 wanted “Israel to close the prisons and come back to the negotiation table” and 1 wanted “to liberate the prisoners”. So a majority of people came to support the prisoners, but some of them wanted to send a message to international organisations.
The ICRC is a symbol in front of which the cause of the prisoners is supported. Most of the Palestinian interviewees acknowledged the work of the organisation and even
94 ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2012/palestine-israel-feature- 2012-05-25.htm - last accessed: .12-11-2012 95 ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/israel-palestine- news-2012-05-08.htm -last accessed: 12-11-2012 96 Haaretz, 18.05.2012: http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1710856 - last accessed: 12-11-2012 97 Short interview 5, Ramallah 6 March 2012, question 3
56 if they wish the organisation would act more forcefully on behalf of the prisoners, they know the ICRC is not the cause of their sufferings.
The most difficult experience
Health and separation were the main points of concern for the families: out of 8 relatives, 4 related to separation, 3 to health issues, 1 to financial difficulties. Former prisoners related to the conditions in the prison, ill-treatment and the lack of freedom: out of 6 former prisoners, half complained about the conditions in prison, 2 about interrogation and ill-treatment and 1 about administrative detention. Health, relationships between relatives, conditions in prison and ill-treatment fall indeed under the ICRC’s concerns.
Who helps?
This question is an attempt to measure the ICRC’s importance relatively to other organisations. Most of the interviewees, 7 out of 18 asked, replied only “Allah”98, 5 said “nobody”, 4 spoke about organisations like Addameer, the Ministry of Prisoners and schools, 2 about their family and their neighbours. Nobody answered “the ICRC”. In general, most people do not feel supported by any organisation; they feel alone in their struggle for the prisoners. So the ICRC does not come to their mind.
Social background
It was assumed that educated people would be more inclined to accept the neutrality principle and hence be more willing to comply with the ICRC’s confidential mode of action. This assumption was not confirmed by the interviews. Usually interviewees with a higher educational background were the most critical of the ICRC’s silence99. The main explanation for this result is that they were aware of the existence of international regulations which protect their rights and of the ICRC’s role of a guardian of humanitarian law. They thought the ICRC does not fulfil its mandate to the fullest extent.
98 When people said nobody but “Allah” I counted it under the category Allah. 99 I refer to the short interviews 5, Ramallah 6 March 2012; short interviews 6, Ramallah 6 March 2012; short interviews 10, Ramallah 20 March 2012 and short interviews 14, Ramallah 3 April 2012
57
Are you happy with the ICRC?
This was one of the last questions of the short interviews. Out of 23 persons, 7 were unhappy with ICRC work, 2 relatively unhappy. The rest said that the ICRC tries to do its best. So a majority of people value ICRC actions positively.
ICRC visits in prisons
Since the ICRC is the only organisation which is able to meet with prisoners under interrogation, I assumed this activity to be crucial to the prisoners. However, the former prisoners interviewed mainly valued the ICRC’s material help. Note that very few interviews with former prisoners were conducted and most of them were detained during the first Intifada100.
Length of imprisonment
The assumption is that the relationship between families of prisoners with long sentences and the ICRC is longer and closer. This relation was not confirmed by the interviews. The fieldwork did not show either that people who can visit their relatives in prison are happier with the ICRC’s work than those who cannot: Out of 4 people who cannot visit the prisoners, 2 are happy with the ICRC’s work.
General observations
Many interviewees stated they do not feel supported by any organisation, but valued the ICRC’s work positively. This inconsistency can be explained the following ways:
1) People feel that they are in a constant struggle which is very tough. They do not see the ICRC or any other international organisation as partners in this struggle. This does not imply that they do not value the work of organisations which alleviates their situation. 2) From a rational point of view it is wise to highlight the gravity of the situation in order to get help, but it is also wise to value the help being received in order to give positive incentives to the benefactor and in hope of continuing to receive it: “Rather than to seek the explanation of issue opinions in some
100 Short interview 6, Ramallah 6 March 2012; short interview 8, Ramallah 13 March 2012; short interview 10, Ramallah 20 March 2012; short interview 12, Ramallah 27 March 2012; short interview 14, Ramallah 3 April 2012; short interview 15, Ramallah 10 April 2012
58
basic attitude pattern, it is as sensible to regard individual opinions on specific issues as the product of rationality, immediate self-interest, or other such factors”101.
3. Summary of criticism and praise of results of the ICRC
In short interviews as well as in in-depth interviews, the ICRC’s family visits programme and material help were particularly appreciated. The ICRC’s actions in the field of isolation, ill-treatment and administrative detention seem much less successful.
In spite of the length and the intensity of the ICRC’s action in Israel and the OPT, only Samia Zaid mentioned spontaneously the organisation as a source of help for the prisoners. It may appear odd that in demonstrations taking place in front of the ICRC, people referred to “Allah”, but omitted the ICRC. Note that a majority of people102 did not refer to any organisation at all. There are four possible explanations:
1) As stated before, the Palestinians wage a really tough struggle in which they do not consider any international organisation as partner. 2) The ICRC has been helping the prisoners and their families for such a long time that its help is taken for granted; it is evident that the ICRC helps. 3) The ICRC is a foreign organisation and the Palestinians want to prove their independence103. As stated previously, this was particularly evident in the interview with Qaddura Fares, the chairman of Nadi al-Aseer. He emphasized that all the main improvements in conditions of detention were achieved through the prisoners’ actions. 4) The impact of the ICRC is limited, that is why people do not think it is worth mentioning.
101 Key, V. O., Public Opinion in American Democracy, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1961, p. 172 102 Fourteen out of twenty-one person asked, seven said only “Allah”, five “nobody” and two “my family or neighbours” 103 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 5 & 7 February 2012
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Family visits
The prohibition of family visits is frequently used as a means of punishment by the IPS104. Where possible the ICRC helps families with the permit procedure and the buses. Under the best conditions, a close relative105 is allowed to visit a detainee every two weeks. The trip can be long and difficult106: depending on the distance to the prison, families have to reach the nearest ICRC office before dawn. They are carefully checked at checkpoints and at the entrance to the prison. The prisoners and their families meet in a special room in with a glass separation and they speak through phones. The visit lasts a maximum of 45 minutes. Veronika Hinz Gugliuzza, the head of the ICRC family visit programme, said that the difficulty encountered by the families during the bus trips is relative: if you balance the hours of trip against the distance, it is a lot, but if you compare it to a situation such as in Sudan where people have to walk hundreds of kilometres in the desert to visit prisoners, it is not so hard107. However, it would be more relevant to compare the current family visits with the visits during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s which were less complicated since the Palestinians did not need a permit to enter Israel.
Most of the interviewees in demonstrations seemed quite happy with the ICRC’s family visits programme108. It is probably the ICRC’s most helpful activity since without the ICRC the relatives could not visit the prisoners. One mother interviewed acknowledged that without the ICRC, she would not be able to visit her son109. Former prisoners also valued the fact that ICRC helped their family to visit them or to find out where they were detained110. The utility of the ICRC’s family visits’ programme was also acknowledged by Samia Zaid111 and Qadura Fares112.
104 Short interview 1, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 2, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 3, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 9, Ramallah 13 March 2012 105 Parents, young brothers & sister, grandparents, if they were never detained and fulfil the security conditions 106 Short interview 16, Tulkarem 17 April 2012 107 Discussion with Veronika Hinz Gugliuzza, 29 February 2012 108 Short interview 1, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 2, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 4, Ramallah 6 March 2012; short interview 7, Ramallah 13 March 2012; short interview 8, Ramallah 13 March 2012; short interview 9, Ramallah 13 March 2012; short interview 15, Ramallah 10 April 2012; short interview 19, Tulkarem 17 April 2012; short interview 20, Tulkarem 8 May 2012 109 Short interview 3, Ramallah 28 February 2012, question 5 110 Short nterview 8, Ramallah 13 March 2012; short interview 10, Ramallah 20 March 2012 111 Interview with Samia Zaid on 5 February 2012, question 14 112 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 37
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In spite of these plaudits, the interviewees rose some issues: the difficulty to obtain permits113, the fact that women are subjected to body searches114 and that the families have to speak with the prisoners through phones115.
The ICRC also failed to compel Israel to authorize family visits for the prisoners from Gaza, an issue raised by Mr. Fares116, Mr. Qaraqa117 and Mr. Hassan118. So the ICRC facilitates family visits only within the limits of Israel’s discretion, which is still quite a lot, given that the number of prisoners from Gaza is approximately one tenth of the total.
One of the interviewee in a demonstration in Ramallah stated: “if the role of the ICRC is limited to buses that go to the prisons, we don’t need it. We can organise visits for the prisoners ourselves. If The ICRC and the UN don’t take their responsibilities as human rights’ organisations that protect civilians and war prisoners, I, Mohamed Mustafa, I ask them to leave. There is no need to use us to make money. We don’t need them.119” In spite of this affirmation, it would not be possible for the Palestinians to organise the visits in the current state of affairs in which prisons are located in Israel proper and families come from the OPT.
Material help
Several interviewees said that the ICRC was important in helping the prisoners materially.
This point was raised by Ms. Zaid120, Mr. Qaraqa121 and Mr. Fares122. Qaddura Fares observed that the ICRC was even more helpful in the past: “The Red Cross usually helps. In the past, they had a bigger budget. They brought books, things to play with,
113 Short interview 1, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 2, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 7, Ramallah 13 March 2012 114 Short interview 1, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 2, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 3, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 4, Ramallah 6 March 2012; short interview 16, Tulkarem 17 April 2012; short interview 21, Tulkarem 8 May 2012; short interview 7, Ramallah 13 March 2012; Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, questions 5 & 6 115 Short interview 1, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 3, Ramallah 28 February 2012; short interview 4, Ramallah 6 March 2012; short interview 9, Ramallah 13 March 2012 116 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 17 117 Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, question 5 118 Interview with Mahmud Hassan on 21 March 2012, question 11 119 Short interview 10, Ramallah 20 March 2012 120 Interview with Samia Zaid on 5 February 2012, question 14 121 Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, question 4 122 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 19
61 ping-pong tables, chess, sport items, notebooks, colours. They helped us… They brought us spectacles, dentures, hearing aids”123.
In the demonstrations, the ICRC’s material help was acknowledged by Khadija Abu Akub, a former prisoner. She was grateful to the ICRC for bringing her shoes and clothes 124.
Murad Jaddallah and Qaddura Fares complained that the ICRC recently stopped providing the prisoners with local newspapers125. Note that it is in the interests of Palestinian officials that the ICRC keeps on supplying a maximum of material help since the PNA is responsible now for providing the greater bulk of prisoners' needs. The items that the ICRC is allowed to bring to the prisoners are dependent on Israel’s discretion.
Visits of the delegates of the ICRC
Mr. Fares said that in general, the visits of the ICRC delegates help “but in the limit of its [ICRC] mandate. It was more helpful in the past. It had more power”126. Mr. Hassan told me that the delegates of the ICRC “are visiting the prisoners inside the jails and can have an impact on the European and Israeli authorities to improve conditions”127. Khadija Abu Akub , a former prisoner interviewed in a demonstration said that she saw the ICRC quite often, but she put much more importance on the fact that the organisation brought her clothes and helped her family to visit her128.
Isolation & interrogation
No interviewee referred to the visits of the ICRC in cases of isolation. However, the scope of the fieldwork was limited and few former prisoners were interviewed, so nothing can be inferred from this absence of reference.
Murad Jadallah spoke of isolation in the context of Gilad Shalit. He asked “why is it so easy for the ICRC to make a statement to remind that Gilad Shalit must be treated
123 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 19 124 Short interview 8, Ramallah 13 March 2012, question 6 125 Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 11; Interview with Qaddura Fares, 7 February 2012, question 30 126 Interview with Qaddura Fares, 7 February 2012, question 37 127 Interview with Mahmud Hassan on 21 March 2012, question 4 128 Short interview 8, Ramallah 13 March 2012, question 5 & 6
62 as a war prisoner and has the right to communicate with his family when it never mentions Palestinian prisoners like Mahmud Issa who is in isolation since 2002 and has not received family visits for almost 10 years? 129” Qaddura Fares said he was held in isolation but did not mention the ICRC130. Mahmud Hassan stated Israel claims that the Palestinians are detained in five star hotels, but this is not the case, the conditions are harsh and some prisoners are isolated131. One interviewee in Tulkarem complained that some prisoners are isolated, with no reference to the ICRC132 and other interviewees also rarely referred to ICRC visits in cases of interrogation.
Murad Jadallah did not remember if and when the ICRC had visited him. Qaddura Fares spoke about his interrogation experience, but does not refer to the ICRC133. He also explained that in the past the ICRC had more leeway and usually visited the prisoners after 14 days. He added that nowadays, the GSS often asks the judge to prevent the prisoner from seeing anybody arguing it might damage the results of the interrogation134.
Two former prisoner interviewed during demonstrations in Ramallah underwent interrogation and isolation, but they did not refer to the ICRC135. However, they were arrested during the first Intifada, when the ICRC could not follow the pace of arrests and did not visit all interrogated detainees.
In testimony collected by the organisation B’tselem, a prisoner complained that the ICRC visited him only two months before he was released whereas he had been held incommunicado and ill-treated for several days136.
From the point of view of former prisoners that were interviewed, it seems that the visits of the ICRC during isolation and interrogation did not make a great impression on them. However, the visits of the delegates cannot be underestimated and if they
129 Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 10 130 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 5 February 2012, question 11 131 Interview with Mahmud Hassan on 21 March 2012, question 11 132 Short interview 21, Tulkarem 8 May 2012, question 7 & 10 133 Interview with Qaddura Fares, 5 February 2012, question 9 134 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 23 135 Short interview 10, Ramallah 20 March 2012, question 4 & 5; short interview 15, Ramallah 10 April 2012, question 7 136 Testimony gathered by B’Tselem, http://www.btselem.org/testimonies/20050925_isa_interrogators_il_treat_m.a - last accessed: 12-11- 2012
63 do not have an impact on the memories of some of the prisoners, they surely hinder Israel from making prisoners disappear or from treating them too badly.
Neutrality
In the in-depth interviews, it was asked if the interviewee understood the contradiction between the ICRC’s neutrality and its role as a guardian of humanitarian law.
Qaddura Fares said that Palestinian people are often upset by the fact that the ICRC rarely denounces violations of humanitarian law because they do not understand the difference between human rights and humanitarian organisations137. Mr. Fares does not blame the ICRC for being neutral and has been trying to mediate between the ICRC and the Palestinian people138. He commented: “I cannot blame the team or the representatives that work in Palestine, when I know that the organisation itself is based on such values.” In general he accepts that the organisation has values to which the delegates are bound. Paradoxically, Qaddura thinks the organisation is not totally neutral. It is more pro-Israeli because “Israelis are more intelligent in relationships” and the “culture and the mentality of a person that lives in Tel Aviv are more similar to western mentality” 139.
Mr. Hassan said that neutrality implied that the ICRC does not provide Addameer with any information or feedback. However, he thinks “they are doing their job well140”. He understands the ICRC’s silences and discretion141 and thinks that in a conflict there is a need of a body “that can help both sides without sharing information142.”
The Palestinian Minister of Prisoners commented: “There is always this secrecy about the work of the ICRC. It doesn’t give us any information. They deliver secret reports to Geneva, but it doesn’t give us any information (…) I’m not so much
137 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, question 31 138 Ibid., question 32 139 Ibid., question 31 140 Interview with Mahmud Hassan on 21 March 2012, question 7 141 Ibid., question 7 142 Ibid., question 8
64 convinced with this. I think the ICRC is not expressing its position very well. It tends to bend under Israeli pressure. Basically it is not fulfilling its mandate143”.
Ms. Zaid did not understand why the ICRC could not provide her with specific information related to her field of work. She assumed that it is because of an agreement between the ICRC and Israel. She added that it is not very logical; nonetheless she thinks the ICRC is doing a good job. 144
Mr. Jadallah understands the ICRC’s neutrality and thinks that neutrality might be a good mode of action, but he thinks there are limits. For him, if the organisation sees no improvement, as in the case of Israel, it should take stronger measures, start to speak out or leave the country: “The idea behind that is to keep an eye in the field and to try to make some small changes here and there, but when you don’t see any change, what is your role? Is it limited to reporting?145”
So all of them understand the value of neutrality and accept that it can be useful, especially in conflicts. Three out of five think the ICRC should take stronger action against Israel: speak out, leave the country, or threaten146. Two of them think that sometimes the ICRC’s silence goes too far147. In contrast to the initial assumption, neutrality would not give the ICRC any advantage if it were to play the role of a mediator. Instead of increasing the confidence of the Palestinians, its secretiveness has led the Palestinians to believe that the organisation is collaborating with Israel.
In conclusion, the interviewees acknowledge the need of the presence of a neutral body like the ICRC in a conflict, but they are dissatisfied with the ICRC for the following reasons:
1) The ICRC does not denounce the Israeli occupation and ill-treatment even though the situation has deteriorated in recent years. 2) It has failed in compelling Israel to respect humanitarian law. 3) It is biased towards Israel.
143 Interview with Issa Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, question 31 144 Interview with Samia Zaid on 5 February 2012, question 15 145 Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13 March 2012, question 12 & 13 146 Qaddura Fares, Issa Qaraqa & Murad Jadallah 147 Qaddura Fares & Samia Zaid
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Palestinians are particularly sensitive to the ICRC’s public statements. They were very upset about a press release stating that Shalit did not receive visits in June 2011148. Shamir and Shikaki stated: “the public seem to be highly sensitive to symbolic gestures and gains, such as acknowledgements of historical responsibility, repudiation of collective blame, gesture of identity recognition…”149 The ICRC’s statement did not change anything, but for the Palestinians it was as if the ICRC was denying the importance of their cause by defending Shalit’s rights. Shalit was an important pawn to be exchanged with Palestinian prisoners and was consequently symbolically significant.
In general, relatives of prisoners are relatively satisfied with the work of the ICRC. Officials, organisations such as the Movement of Young Palestinians, and lawyers are those who most harshly criticize the ICRC. They would like to see it actively request Israel to comply with international law. These people also noted that the activities and the power of the ICRC have decreased150. The fact that the organisation has reduced its activities while the conditions in prisons have worsened raises many questions. The third chapter presents the ICRC’s responses to these critiques.
Figure 5. A Palestinian man throws eggs at an ICRC office in Gaza on 23 June 2011 in protest to an ICRC call for Hamas to show signs that Gilad Shalit was still alive. [AFP Mohammed Abed, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=399392 - last accessed: 12-11-2012]
148Ma’an news agency: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=399392 – last accessed: 12-11-2012 149 Shamir, J. & Shikaki, K., Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press: 2012, p. 33 150 Interview with Mr. Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012, questions 19 & 20; Interview with Minister Qaraqa on 12 February 2012, Question 5 & 12
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4. Additional anecdotes and experiences in the field
To deal with the ICRC seems easy initially, but it is in fact quite difficult. As previously stated, the ICRC staff is usually very polite and helpful, but they provide you only with scanty information. I would like to illustrate this statement with two of my experiences.
As already mentioned, one of the ICRC’s main activities for Palestinian prisoners is to provide buses for their families. I therefore thought that it might be interesting to participate in one of these bus trips. I contacted the head of the public relations in Israel and the OPT, Mr. Marco Succi. He told me it would not be possible because of the Israeli security clearance requirements. However the ICRC could help me contact some of the families and he gave me the contact of the person responsible for the family visits programme, Ms. Veronika Hinz Gugliuzza151. Ms. Hinz Gugliuzza wanted to meet me in order to understand the scope of my research better.
At her office, Ms. Hinz Gugliuzza asked what kind of profile I was looking for. I said it would be good if I could have contact with people from different areas in the West Bank, the best would be English speaking families. She told me that this was going to give her a lot of work and she did not seem to know who does or does not speak English. I finally said I would be satisfied with whatever contact she could give me.
I used the opportunity to understand her relationship with the families and asked if she had good relationships with the families. She remained very vague, telling me that some families had just joined the programme and others had already been participating for years. I figured that she probably has almost no relations with the families.
I asked her if it is really impossible for me to join the families on the ICRC buses. I said that maybe I could join the visits of Palestinians from Jerusalem since they do not have to pass any checkpoints. I offered to obtain a security clearance from the prison myself. Ms. Hinz Gugliuzza said it was not possible because the buses were reserved for the beneficiaries and the ICRC staff. I would not have insisted so much if I had been told from the beginning that the ICRC does not want outsiders to go on its buses.
151 We met at her office in Jerusalem on 29 February 2012.
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The second anecdote concerns the ICRC’s budget. I thought I could get some details about the budget since it should not threaten neutrality and Mr. Ran Goldstein, the person responsible for public relations in Tel Aviv, told me that the ICRC is very transparent on this kind of issues. I sent him a first e-mail on the 22nd of February asking for a detailed budget. On the 23rd of February, he told me he would get the figures for me. Then there was no news until the 20th of April when I asked again if I could have the figures. On the 22nd he said: “I'll try to set up a meeting for you with Logistics/Human Resources - they are the ones who can clarify in detail any budget issues.” There was no further news until the 8th of May, when I sent another e-mail. At that point, Mr. Goldstein was not sure he would still be able to organise a meeting and asked me to send him the questions I would like to raise. I basically wanted more details about the amount of the budget spent on the delegates’ visits, the family visits programme, etc since the information on the budget in the annual report is very meagre and can be summarized in the following line: “Protection 17,159; Assistance 35,522; Prevention 4,358; Cooperation with National Societies 3,825; total 60,865 of which: Overheads 3,715 (in KCHF)”152. Mr. Goldstein finally told me: “Unfortunately, I have re-checked your request and we won’t be able to share with you more information than that which is already specified in the public annual report.”
Most of my requests to the ICRC were like this. I really had to insist to get some small scrap of information. I had the feeling that sometimes confidentiality outweighed the domain of neutrality. Note that the ICRC is probably not an exception and most international organisations are reluctant to share information with outsiders as they are afraid of inspections and criticism.
152 ICRC annual report 2010, p. 433
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Chapter 3: The ICRC’s response
1. Interviews with the ICRC
The ICRC annual reports which are open to the public provide so little information that it was necessary to interview ICRC officials for a better understanding of the organisation. After the fieldwork in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), the need for a response from the ICRC was clear.
A first interview with the head of the protection department, Ms. Sarah Avrillaud, was scheduled in Tel Aviv on the 28 of December 2011 with Mr. Goldstein, the ICRC's spokesperson in Tel Aviv, also attending to monitor the development of the discussion. The questions mainly focused on the ICRC’s activities in Israeli prisons and recording was allowed during this interview.
Following the fieldwork on the opinions of Palestinians, another interview was scheduled in order to give the ICRC the possibility of responding to criticism. The second interview with Joanna Gamuel, a delegate assigned to visit Israeli prisons, took place on the 22 of March 2012. Ms. Avrillaud was responsible for supervising the development of the interview.
In the following sections, the interviews are analysed separately. Issues which emerged in both interviews are discussed in the conclusion of the chapter.
a. Sarah Avrillaud, head of the protection department
Ms. Avrillaud has been working for the ICRC for 10 years1. She is from France and has studied human rights and humanitarian law2. She began her experience with the ICRC as an intern in the legal division and was later recruited as a delegate. As is usually the case for new ICRC delegates, she underwent basic training in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) with case studies, before leaving for her first mission and she has worked in several countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan and Kosovo3. After several missions as a delegate, ICRC Human Resources assigned her
1 Interview with Sara Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 2 2 Ibid., question 6 3 Ibid., question 12
69 to the protection department4. She has been working in Israel, where she previously worked as a delegate in 2008-2009, since March 2011 and extended her mission until summer 2012. Her main tasks consist of coordinating the ICRC’s action in Israeli prisons and of coaching delegates5. She explained her motivation to work for the ICRC in the following words: “I studied human rights and IHL and when you do IHL, you come across the ICRC. For me, it was the institution that was the most appropriate to work on IHL. And also I wanted to work for an international organisation that travels around the world and works for the people, the victims of conflicts and so on”6.
According to Sarah, delegates’ visits are pretty standard everywhere: they “assess the material conditions and monitor the treatment of detainees”7. In the case of Israel, she thinks the ICRC’s work is particularly important because: “we are regularly visiting and we have been here for many many years, so we have a working relation with them [the Israeli authorities]. The point is not to say this or that is bad or is wrong, but to work together and to see that where there is an issue we work with the authorities to see how things can be improved, so that’s why our work and the visits are important, to improve basically the conditions”8. The last sentence can be understood in two different ways: “the ICRC’s goal is basically to improve the conditions” or “its goal is to improve the basic conditions”. Sarah’s description reflects the ICRC’s traditional mode of action and its strategy based on ongoing dialogue and moderated criticism of the authorities in order to continue its access to detainees9. The ICRC’s long term action implies it maintains a long term presence in the region as an asset both in terms of experience and in building its relationship with the actors in the conflict.
4 Interview with Sara Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 7 5 Ibid., question 8 & 9 6 Ibid., question 6 7 Ibid., question 11 8 Ibid., question 11 9 Aeschlimann, A., “La protection des détenus: l’action du CICR derrière les barreaux", Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 87, sélection française 2005, p. 50; Aeschlimann, A. & Roggo, N., “Visits to persons deprived of their freedom: the experience of the ICRC”, 2007: “One of the specific features of the ICRC is that it is both a monitoring mechanism and an operational agency. This means on the one hand that the organization has a capacity for action which enables it to maintain regular presence at the local level in these operational arenas and to entertain ongoing dialogue with the authorities and all actors who can influence the course of events.” http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/detention-visits-article-300906.htm - last accessed: 12-11-2012
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In order to understand the ICRC’s work in Israel and the OPT, Ms. Avrillaud was asked to compare the situation with that in Ethiopia where she worked as a delegate. The ICRC acted on behalf of the prisoners in the conflict that confronted Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998-2000. Eritrea had gained independence from Ethiopia in the beginning of the 1990s and in 1998 war broke out as a result of a dispute over the borders of both respective countries10. In Ethiopia the ICRC visited prisoners of war and civilian internees11. Sarah Avrillaud explained that in general the work modalities are the same: “when you arrive you do the initial talks with the director of the prisons, then you do the tour of the premises, then you talk with the detainees in private, finally you go back to the director and you exchange your observations and report. This is something that we do everywhere when we do detention, that’s our modality”12. Sarah added that according to the needs of Ethiopia, a country with few resources, the ICRC set up a nutritional programme for prisoners13. Thus the ICRC’s procedure for visits seems quite rigid and standardized everywhere; however, some activities vary according to the specific needs of the detainees.
The ICRC’s presence in Israeli prisons is quite intensive: the delegates visit detentions facilities almost every day14. There is no fixed number of prisoners interviewed as it depends on the context, the ICRC’s strategy and the demand of the prisoners. Usually the delegates cannot interview each prisoner every time. They try to meet most of them during the interrogation period15. The length of personal interviews varies from 30 minutes to one hour16. Most of the delegates are fluent in Arabic, so the interviews are carried out in the prisoners’ mother tongue17. The visits of the ICRC delegates are very important to check the conditions of detention, to keep track of all registered prisoners (i.e. prevent the possibility of unreported
10 For more information about the causes of the conflict, Reid, R., “Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-state War”, Africa Journal of International African Institute 73 (3): 369-401, Cambridge University Press, 2003 11 ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jpee.htm - last accessed: 12- 11-2012 12 Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 12 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., question 15 & 26 15 The ICRC sees currently about 90% of detainees interrogation according to Ms. Avrillaud, Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, question 16 16 Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 27 17 Joanna Gamuel, the delegate I interviewed on 22 March 2012, is not fluent in Arabic.
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"disappearances"), to detect cases of ill-treatment, and to caution the authorities against violating IHL.
Sarah Avrillaud observed that it is in interrogation centres that the ICRC delegates are “able to develop a certain relationship”18 with the detainees because the delegates see some of them every week. However, the interrogation period usually remains limited and the ICRC does not necessarily visit all the detainees under interrogation every week. The delegates do not get the opportunity to develop very close relationships in prison neither because they do not necessarily visit the same prison each time. Ms. Avrillaud concluded: “even if we don’t have personal relationships with the detainees, they know the ICRC and they know that the delegates are coming and so they appreciate also our work for that, the fact that we are coming and spending some time with them”19. In cases of isolation, the delegate is the only person other than the prison staff that the prisoner is allowed to meet and is the unique link between the isolated prisoner and his family. However, delegates do not usually develop personal relationships with prisoners and personally follow- up their situation. This conclusion was confirmed by Ms. Gamuel in the second interview20.The main purpose of ICRC visits is to gather information on prisoners’ conditions and to check the behaviour of the IPS.
It was discussed whether the visits of the delegates may give rise to trauma or have a negative psychological impact on the prisoners. Ms. Avrillaud made it clear that ICRC delegates are not psychiatrists and are not trained in this sense, but they use their common sense to deal with the prisoners’ emotions: “Again, we do with the tools we have you know because we are not psychiatrists but there are few little things that we can do: to summarize and say “thank you for sharing with me” “now this is what I’m going to do” “I’m coming next week” and just to close the subject in a way and not leave him [the detainee] with all this open21”. She concluded: “it can be difficult for simple delegates on their first or second mission to deal with this emotionally”22. Ms. Avrillaud changed the focus from the detainees to the
18 Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 18 19 Ibid. 20 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, question 12 21 Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 23 22 Ibid.
72 delegates23, a change in emphasis which repeats itself later in the interview. Her preoccupation for the delegates can be explained by her responsibility as their coach.
The quality of the ICRC’s actions can be gauged by looking at its response in cases of violations of IHL such as ill-treatment. Ms. Avrillaud explained that in such cases, the delegate discusses with the prisoner, asks him the right to share the information and to refer to the responsible authority: “we first raise it orally with the authorities on the spot and then if needed we also address reports to the responsible authorities, or to different or other authorities where appropriate. And then we follow up on this, we try to discuss with the authorities, and heu…yep”24. So the ICRC brings the issue to the authorities, but if the authorities are indifferent then what happens remains unclear.
Sarah Avrillaud was asked what were the usual results of the ICRC’s complaints about ill-treatment. She said: “ah, it’s difficult (…) we want to have feedback from the authorities first of all, we want them to tell us their side of the story (…) this answer will be the basis for discussions afterwards. Hum if we see that hum… (…) if we want to go further on this issue, we really insist a little bit. Either we resend an updated report or we ask for a meeting with the... at the higher level for example”. It is difficult to understand whether the ICRC “really insists” or insists a “little bit”. The vocabulary used here suggests that the pressure on the Israeli authorities is weak. “We also write about the conditions [in the prisons], if the conditions are not good we try to understand better why there is a problem. A particular problem requires an explanation and then we discuss… what is important is that we have a dialogue, a working dialogue in which both parties are confident, and we try, you know. We need to work on some issue but there must be at least an interest for the authorities [to cooperate]… in some places it’s not even possible, you know, to discuss, so… but it takes time. This kind of dialogue is important but it takes time to get to the point”25. So the authority is able to maintain dialogue and to continue violations in parallel; the ICRC will take strong measures only if there is no cooperation. Note that for the ICRC a strong measure consists in publicly denouncing violations. The strongest measure it can take is to stop its actions and leave the country.
23 Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 15, 22 (but I asked if there is a psychological service for the delegates) & 23 24 Ibid., question 21 25 Ibid., question 29
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The ICRC’s activities are particularly important for the prisoners from Gaza who have not had family visits since June 2007. Ms. Avrillaud confirmed that the ICRC pays particular attention to these prisoners. The delegates visit them more often and transfer messages of family events (marriages, deaths, births …)26. Unfortunately, no interviews with families or prisoners from Gaza could be undertaken, so it is not possible to include their opinions in the research.
In anticipation of the interviews with Palestinians, Sarah Avrillaud was asked about the prisoners’ opinion of the ICRC. She gave me a very positive picture: “I think that after so many years, they know who we are, they expect us. They know the ICRC is coming and they know that we are the only ones, I mean external, to enter [the prisons], and so they do recognize and appreciate the work we are doing for them I think”27. The question was asked whether people were not upset that after so many years of activities the situation had not significantly improved. She said that people always complain, but they do not want the ICRC to leave the country28.
Finally, neither Ms. Avrillaud nor Mr. Goldstein has participated in a journey on the ICRC buses with the families29. They are not aware of any research on how the beneficiaries perceive the ICRC’s action in Israel or in other countries30.
b. Joanna Gamuel, delegate
Ms. Gamuel has been working for 11 months as a detention delegate for the ICRC and Israel and the OPT is her first mission. Prior to this she worked in another NGO in Israel and for refugees in her homeland, Poland. She will work for about two years in Israel and the OPT as she has extended her mission for a further year and currently she is responsible for the prisoners from Gaza31.
Ms. Gamuel first commented on her experience at the ICRC stating that even if the visits to prisons are very difficult and time consuming, she is happy to get positive feedbacks from the prisoners. She referred several times during the interview to the difficulty of her task. In general, Ms. Gamuel is very enthusiast about the work of the
26 Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 30 27 Ibid., question 19 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., question 32 30 Ibid., question 20 31 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, questions 1-4
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ICRC. She was not able to describe any bad experience: “everything goes smoothly and the team is great” 32. Note that her supervisor, Ms. Avrillaud, attended the interview and may have influenced her answers.
Concerning the relations between the ICRC and the Palestinian people, Ms. Gamuel stated: “You know, I didn’t study the presence of the ICRC in Israel and in the OPT, so I can’t really give you what you’re looking for, because you know, from my perspective, the perspective from which the detainees see the ICRC’s work, it didn’t change so much because we are still providing the same services as before. Maybe I don’t have enough experience, long enough, you know, to really give you the exact reply you’re looking for”33. The interviewee did not reply directly to the question but attempted to answer what she assumed the interviewer was looking for. She thought that her point of view was also the detainees’ point of view. She explained that to her knowledge, the ICRC had been providing the same services for a long time and they had not significantly changed34.
She said she met some former prisoners who were participating in a sit-in before the ICRC offices and it was interesting because the feedback from released prisoners was a “completely different experience”35. She stated that usually families participate in the sit-ins in Gaza and that: “for them [the Gazan families] it’s an opportunity to meet with the ICRC, just to get to know the dates for prison visits, to deliver salamaat (greetings), Red Cross Messages (RCM) or some oral salamaat”36.
In order to illustrate her good relations with the prisoners she recounted the following anecdote: “It happened to me when I was in a shop in Ramallah and one of the detainees recognized my voice and turned back and thanked the ICRC for its work because he had been released during the last exchange deal, in December 2011, and how these visits were very important during the hunger strike. So for me it was an amazing experience. I didn’t expect that someone recognizes you and expresses, you
32 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, questions 5 33 Ibid., questions 6 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.
75 know like gratitude, for our work and our visits. So you know this was a very positive feedback”37. She added that she never had any negative feedback.
Figure 6. A Palestinian woman entering the ICRC office in Ramallah during a demonstration in support for the prisoners on 10 April 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
When asked what she thought is the opinion of the Palestinians about the ICRC, she said that she could not answer for Palestinians as a whole because she only met with detainees: “You know I cannot tell you what the Palestinians think of the ICRC because you know my main interlocutors are Palestinians in detention. I don’t know, I can just repeat what the media say about the ICRC, I don’t think that it’s actually what you’re expecting from me: to repeat what you’ll find in the media”38. She added: “So you know, my perspective is more a perspective from the Palestinian detainees. So how much, you know, they are, you know, honest with me” 39. Ms. Gamuel understands that the opinion of Palestinians is not always objective since they have an interest in maintaining good relations with the ICRC. However this leads to an ambiguity: how can the relations between the ICRC and the detainees be so good if the prisoners are not honest? The mistrust reappears later in the interview: “some of the detainees I visited had been under interrogation, so for me it was very nice that when the detainee just found out that I’m in this section [of the prison], they approached to greet me, to ask me how I was, what’s going on and so on. It was really nice because you know they were out of the interrogation centre, so they were not interested anymore in ICRC visits, but still I think they just keep you know in
37 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, questions 6 38 Ibid., questions 8 39 Ibid.
76 their memories, some good impressions of our work, especially in interrogation, because I think interrogation can be considered as tough place in term of detention conditions”40.
Ms. Gamuel concluded by observing that her visits are particularly appreciated in the interrogation centres41. She also thinks that her work for the Gazans is very important because of the absence of family visits. The ICRC acts as an intermediary between the family and the detainees42.
Budget & decrease of services
Several Palestinians observed that the ICRC’s services had decreased because of budget restrictions43. Ms. Avrillaud confirmed that the ICRC’s budget for Israel and the OPT had decreased. When I commented that it was quite difficult to see this in the annual reports, she argued it is a question of exchange rate44. However, the budget is in Swiss Francs and it has tended to increase over recent years. This means that if the delegation in Israel received the same amount in 2010 and 2011, the value of its budget was effectively higher in 2011. The budget issue remains unsolved.
At the end of 2010, the ICRC had to cut the budget for some programmes; in the case of detention the ICRC decreased its “assistance programme”. Ms. Avrillaud said “we used to distribute some sports items. There were also the newspapers, we also chose to cut the newspapers, we had to choose between different things and we decided to cut this one. We also explained that it was because the detainees have TV and radio and so on. So it’s not as if they were cut off from news of the world. We thought that the newspapers would be less of an issue”45.
The ICRC is not mentioned as an organisation that helps in prisons
Sarah Avrillaud replied in the following way to the fact that none of the Palestinians interviewed spontaneously mentioned the ICRC as an organisation helping prisoners: “I think it’s partly due to the fact that we have been here for… for other
40 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, questions 12 41 Ibid., questions 8 42 Ibid., questions 9 43 Interview with Qaddura Fares on 7 February 2012; Issa Qaraqa’s pubic relation assistant; Interview with Murad Jadallah on 13March 2012, question 11 44 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, questions 7 45 Ibid.
77 organisations it’s also true, but I’m afraid that they also see us as part of a system. We are like… it’s like business as usual, the ICRC you know. And because we are not so vocal as well; this is also something that they also reproach to the ICRC that it’s not vocal enough, it doesn’t denounce the situation. They would like us to be much more on the public scene to say that their rights are violated and things like that. I don’t think that it’s due to the fact that they are dissatisfied with us because we have also recently asked a few of them, about the perception of the ICRC and so on. They still consider that our presence in the prison is necessary. And nobody else could do the work of the ICRC inside the prisons because nobody else enters like us and visits the sections and so on. Apart from the lawyers, but the lawyers meet in a special room. Still I think that they do expect a lot from us, much more than what we can do actually. So they hold us responsible for their conditions, even if it’s not up to us because we can’t change regulations from one day to the other, whatever. There are rules that we cannot change or at least if we want to change them, it will take many years. So it’s true, but I think it’s not only in prison, but in general, the ICRC would not maybe come first because we are maybe not so much on the public stage”46. From this explanation, four main reasons why people did not mention the ICRC stand out:
1) Palestinians are used to the ICRC because it has been in the country for so many years. People think it is part of the system, it is business as usual. “System” might refer to the occupation and the role of international organisations or to the general political context. 2) The ICRC is not visible and does not publicly denounce violations. “Confidentiality” is used throughout by the employees of the organisation to explain many criticisms and failures. 3) The Palestinians expect too much from the ICRC. 4) The ICRC’s strategy is based on long term actions and people want rapid results.
Also from this answer we learnt that the ICRC had recently made a survey to assess the Palestinian opinion. Unfortunately, this survey is not available to the public.
46 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, questions 7
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Ms. Avrillaud was confronted with the fact that several Palestinians were upset by the ICRC’s failure to pressure Israel into improving prisoners’ conditions47. She replied that current detainees do not necessarily look at the past and consequently do not see the improvements to which the ICRC has to a certain extent contributed. In order to support her argument, she added “sometimes when we talk with detainees that were detained in the 1980s, and so on, with the distance I mean, they really, after they are looking back, they say, the ICRC was very here, helping us. And your presence here was great and so on. I think that we did change a lot, or we participated in improving the conditions of the detainees from what was the situation in the 1980s and today, because it’s different what was in the 1970s, 1980s... the conditions and the conditions today (...) But we also have limits in what we can do because we have to intervene where we think also is a problem, you know. Not just on all the little things that for us are not an issue. There are certain things that are a problem for the detainees that are not a problem for us. And we tell them that “no, for that we will not work on that”48.
Crucial issues: Ill-treatment, interrogation, isolation
When confronted with the fact that several Palestinian interviewees complained that there were no significant changes in crucial issues such as isolation and interrogation, Ms. Avrillaud said: “Euh, yeah, well we are not going into details about interrogation but for isolation it’s true that the policy hasn’t change much. For the moment, it’s true. And we are trying to work on different levels to evolve”49. Concerning interrogation, she referred to the 1999 decision of the Court that made certain GSS methods of interrogation illegal50. Ms. Avrillaud commented that currently the ICRC delegates see 90% of detainees in interrogation. This only recently became possible because of the fall in the number of prisoners51. Concerning isolation, she said that the Palestinians do not see all of the diplomatic work that the ICRC undertakes backstage52. She concluded that the non-acknowledgement of the ICRC’s work is not
47 Interview with Sara Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 10 48 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, question 10 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., question 11 52 Ibid., question 10
79 exclusive to Israel and the OPT but that it is the case in many other countries, because most of the ICRC’s work cannot be seen53.
Should the ICRC take a stronger stance in response to ongoing violations?
Figure 7. A poster in support of Hana Shalabi on an ICRC car in a demonstration in Ramallah on 20 March 2012 [Sarnau, 2012]
The following proposal was presented to Ms. Avrillaud and Ms. Gamuel: “the ICRC has been in Israel and the OPT for more than 40 years and there is no significant change, so should the organisation take a stronger stance?54” Ms. Gamuel replied: “Ok, I cannot share some information I know, but I don’t agree with you, especially concerning conditions in some detention places or some aspects of detention”55.
Ms. Avrillaud added: “the ones who were in prison, they can tell you what they think about the conditions of detention, but how far they can be apolitical behind it and be honest. They cannot say, “oh we have great conditions in Israeli prisons”. No Palestinian would say that. We don’t say that it’s perfect either, but you see what I mean, it’s difficult for the Palestinians to say anything good about detention because it’s unacceptable for them”. I personally noted in some interviews the tendency to exaggerate in order to get my attention.
53 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, question 10 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., question 13
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Ms. Avrillaud said that the perception from outside the prisons may be biased, but the staff of the ICRC has the “privilege” to enter prisons and tries to assess the situation as objectively as possible56. She insisted on the fact that the situation has improved. She added: “I recently read the cartoon of Joe Sacco on Palestine, it’s very interesting. There is a big part on detention and it wasn’t so many years ago, it was still in the 1990s I think, end of the 1990s. And ex-detainees talk about interrogation, and so on. And for me it’s very interesting to see what was happening at that time. And we have a different situation today”57. She probably used the cartoon as a source of information because she is cannot discuss ICRC reports. Otherwise it would imply she does not have access to ICRC reports or that the reports are really superficial.
At first, Ms. Avrillaud was not sure that she had heard of the Movement of Young Palestinians (Al Herak al Shababyyie). This group, which includes former prisoners as members, would like the ICRC either to take a stronger stance or to leave the country. Then she remembered that some people had made a poster linking the ICRC and blood, but she did not know of their demands58. Ms. Gamuel added that it would be good first to discuss with the prisoners59. Ms. Avrillaud added that she thought it was a shame and that this sort of perception should be addressed. She added that it was her personal point of view and not a part of ICRC policy60.
Self-criticism
Ms. Gamuel was asked if she could critically review her work for the ICRC. She said that she could not share some information and that if you work in detention you have to believe in what you are doing; if you have doubts it is time to leave61.
Ms. Avrillaud commented that the ICRC reviews its work and that it remains in Israel and the OPT because there are still problems. In fact, the ICRC has a mandate in Israel and the OPT because there is a conflict. She replied: “It’s because of the conflict and because the conflict generates problems. We are not against the conflict
56 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, question 13 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., question 14 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., question 15
81 itself, we are not against the war, it’s just that a war or a conflict should be done according to the rules (…) Maybe the main problem of the ICRC is that we don’t go public with our findings and this can make people believe that we think that everything is fine”62. Here secretiveness again explains failures in public relations and the absence of visible results. If the ICRC were to publish its reports, people could actually see all the work it has accomplished63. She concluded that the Israeli authorities maintain the dialogue with the ICRC and that is why it stays64.
c. Conclusion of the interviews with both ICRC employees
I had difficulties in presenting clearly to the ICRC interviewees that some Palestinians interviewed deplored the fact that the Palestinian prisoners’ situation had deteriorated since the second Intifada and that the ICRC had failed to adapt to this new context. Instead of changing its strategy, it had in fact decreased its intervention in the region.
Many delegates are assigned to Israel and the OPT for their first mission65. Ms. Gamuel’s vision of the situation, of her work with the ICRC, and of the opinion of the people she helps is more idealistic than Ms. Avrillaud’s. Ms. Avrillaud has more experience and she had answers to all the contentious questions.
Some preliminary conclusions extracted from both interviews:
1) Both interviewees seemed generally satisfied with their work at the ICRC. 2) The delegates do not chose the destination of their missions and their missions are generally relatively short. a. The positive aspect is that they may remain more neutral as they do not have much time to get attached to one side or the other. b. The negative aspect is that they might be less involved and they have insufficient time to understand the full extent of the conflict. 3) Both interviewees pointed out that Palestinians cannot be objective because they have political interests.
62 Interview with Joanna Gamuel on 22 March 2012, question 15 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 12
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4) Both interviewees considered that the conditions in Israeli prisons had generally improved. 5) Neither interviewee was aware of the demands of the Movement of Young Palestinians which regularly demonstrates before their offices. 6) Both interviewees thought that the visits of delegates were particularly important during the interrogation period and for prisoners from Gaza. 7) Both interviewees explained the criticism of the ICRC’s actions as resulting from the principle of neutrality and the fact that the organisation remains secretive.
Even though the ICRC’s achievements have remained limited in the domains of interrogation, isolation and violations of IHL in recent years, it has not changed its strategy. The staff of the organisation has not remarked that its power of action has decreased of late and that the detention situation has worsened. In spite of the ICRC’s limited success in confronting Israel’s ongoing violations of IHL, the Palestinians still value the ICRC for what it is able to provide.
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Conclusion
The fieldwork of this thesis gives some impressions of the attitude of the people participating in demonstrations in support of prisoners. It cannot be considered as extensive field research since only a small number of people were interviewed, no sample was made beforehand, the interviews were not repeated over a period of time and the interviewees were chosen arbitrarily.
The in-depth interviews were conducted with senior officials of the PNA and NGOs who were either associated with the Palestinian authority, such as Nadi al-Aseer, or who were working for human rights. These interviews were used to try to understand the criticism of the ICRC related to prisoners’ issues that prevails among Palestinian professionals. Consequently, these interviews should not be used to gauge the ICRC’s impact in Israeli prisons, but they can help in understanding where the action of the ICRC is most appreciated and where, according to the main concerns of the interviewees, help is most needed.
The short interviews showed that the Palestinians are generally satisfied with the routine work of the ICRC. The action of the ICRC on behalf of prisoners is particularly appreciated where families are helped to maintain contact with prisoners. The importance of the family visits programme has increased in the context in which it has become very difficult for Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank to enter Israel and where most of the prisoners are detained inside Israel. The ICRC buses allow families to see their imprisoned relatives every two weeks in the best case. The organisation also significantly helps families going through the complicated procedure for obtaining necessary permits. The Palestinians also praised the ICRC for providing prisoners with material help, even though this area of action has decreased since the PNA has taken over part of the responsibility. The fact that people in demonstrations did not specifically mention the ICRC does not imply that they do not value its work, but shows their general feeling that they do not receive sufficient support from national and international agencies. As illustrated by the interviews, people rarely mentioned any organisation when asked “who helps?”
Officials and human rights professionals acknowledged that the presence of the ICRC in Israeli prisons and its role of monitoring the prison system were essential.
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According to the interviewees, there is an ongoing cooperation between their organisations (Nadi al-Aseer, Ministry of Prisoners and Addameer) and the ICRC. However, they deplored the fact that the organisation failed to raise its voice or perhaps take some measures in response to the ongoing and occasionally escalating violations of IHL by Israel. Several interviewees complained that the organisation only acts within the limits of Israel’s discretion. In general, neutrality was not appreciated as a value in its own right; rather the interviewees accepted neutrality as a useful mode of operation in a conflict, but they disapproved of the fact that the organisation used neutrality and confidentiality as a justification for its non-action in cases of repeated violations. Instead of providing an opportunity for mediation, as was assumed in the introduction, neutrality rather weakens the relationship with the Palestinians.
Interviewees of the in-depth interviews also mentioned that conditions have deteriorated in the following areas: the journey of the families to the prisons have become more difficult, family visits for prisoners from Gaza have been prohibited, expenses for prisoners have increased, certain prisoners have been in solitary confinement for years, night raids by the IPS have increased, medical intervention is often delayed, Israel does not pay for the medical care of the prisoners, and the prisoners are denied access to the Open University.
Qaddura Fares and Issa Qaraqa commented that the scope of the ICRC’s activities on behalf of the prisoners has recently decreased. Mr. Fares said that the ICRC used to provide more material help such as leisure and medical items, it used to visit the prisons more often and the organisation used to have more leeway. Mr. Qaraqa commented that the ICRC has failed to check whether international law is respected, he referred especially to the case of the prisoners from Gaza and to the fact that the prisoners have to pay for medical care. Ms. Avrillaud confirmed that the ICRC had to cut its assistance programme. In response to the criticism of the Palestinians, she answered that they often expect too much from the organisation and take the presence of the ICRC for granted. The ICRC’s strategy is based on long term intervention and people want rapid results. Most of the organisation’s results remain unknown because of its confidential mode of action.
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The evolution of the conditions in prisons has to be assessed from a historical perspective and different factors such as the political context and the intervention of different actors have to be taken into account66. In general, the conditions in prisons have always varied from one place to another and have also been dependent on internal factors such as the attitude of the director of the prison67 or the existence or not of a strong leadership among the prisoners68. Since 1967, the prisoners’ struggle inside the prisons69, the protests of the families outside the prisons and the intervention of local and international human rights’ organisations70 have generally contributed to the improvement of the conditions in Israeli detentions centres. The ICRC surely played a discreet role in this evolution. However, since the beginning of the second Intifada, various political circumstances have considerably altered conditions in prisons. It is most likely that the interviewees were referring to this recent development when they complained of the deterioration in the conditions of detainees.
In general, local and international interest in the prisoners’ cause has been highly dependent on external political events; unrest, war, acts of terrorism, the bid for unilateral recognition by the UN of a national Palestinian entity, etc. have tended to consign the issues of prisoners to the background71.
In general, situations of unrest have led to massive imprisonment and this was particularly true for the second Intifada. The Palestinian Ministry of Prisoners
66 For conditions in prisons in the 1970s, see Aruri, N. H., Resistance and Repression, Political Prisoners in Israeli Occupied Territories, Journal of Palestine Studies 7 (4): 48-66, University of California Press, Summer 1978; for some testimonies about the conditions in prisons in 1970s and 1980s, see Rosenfeld, M., Confronting Occupation, Work, Education and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in Refugee Camp, Standford University Press, California, 2004, Chapter 10, pp. 238-243 67 Rosenfeld, M., Confronting Occupation, Work, Education and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in Refugee Camp, Standford University Press, California, 2004, Chapter 10, p. 249 68 Ibid., p. 254 69 For a study of Palestinian struggle in prisons, see Rosenfeld, M., Confronting Occupation, Work, Education and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in Refugee Camp, Standford University Press, California, 2004, Chapter 10 70 For instance the action of Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the Centre for the Defense of the Individual that challenged Landau’s conclusion that moderated means of pressure were legal the High Court of Justice in1999, thanks to their action, certain means of pressure were made illegal http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Public_Committee_Against_Torture.pdf - last accessed: 12- 11-2012 71 During the 1973 war, the prisoners held a strike refusing to receive family visits for nine months, but the public’s interest in the struggle was negligible, Rosenfeld, M., Confronting Occupation, Work, Education and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in Refugee Camp, Standford University Press, California, 2004, Chapter 10, p. 245
86 estimates that about 45,000 Palestinians were arrested during the time of the second Intifada72. Consequently it was more difficult for human rights organisations and the ICRC to monitor the respect of prisoners’ rights by the IPS and the GSS. The second Intifada was ideologically different in the sense that it included an Islamic religious element. In comparison with the first Intifada, Palestinian arms changed from stones to “hot” weapons such as suicide bombing, or firearms73.
The outbreak of the second Intifada had additional related consequences, among which was the return of the Likud to power with the election of Ariel Sharon in February 2001. Israel’s reaction to the Intifada was severe and included airstrikes on targets in the West Bank. The Israeli government took further measures towards a separation between Israel and the Palestinian territories and in 2002, the Ministers’ Committee for National Security decided to erect a security fence, separating Israel from the Palestinian territories74. This policy has had tremendous consequences on the movement of Palestinians in Israel and the OPT. The separation of Israel and the OPT and the system of permits for Palestinians wishing to enter Israel began in the aftermath of the first Intifada and has intensified to a greater degree since the outbreak of the second Intifada. In general, the movement of Palestinians is highly restricted and depends significantly on the political situation 75.
As a result of the Oslo accords and the establishment of the PNA in 1994, most of the Palestinian prisoners were released and the prisons from the West Bank were evacuated. During the second Intifada, Israel started to detain most of the Palestinian prisoners outside the OPT (which in itself was a violation of the fourth Geneva Convention). Consequently it has become increasingly complicated for families who have to pass through various checkpoints to visit prisoners and has increased the hardship and the length of their journeys.
In 2004, Sharon’s government decided the unilateral disengagement from Gaza which took place in August 2005. In 2006, Hamas won the legislative elections and
72 Note that there is no precision about the nature of the detention, it probably also includes detentions of several hours, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/e-Prisoners_Day2007.pdf - last accessed: 28-09-2012 73 Morris B., Righteous Victims, A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, First Vintage Books Ed. New York, 2001, p. 661 74 Israel High Court of Justice ruling, Beit Surik case: Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, 2004, p. 3 75 B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/closure - last accessed: 12-11-2012
87 in June 2007, the military wing of the organisation took control of Gaza. Israel decided to define the Gaza Strip as a hostile territory and prohibited family visits for Gazan prisoners in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention76. The rise of Hamas to power further complicated the situation; it increased the polarisation of Palestinian politics77, divided the prisoners’ movement and weakened the PNA’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Israel.
In 2011, Prime Minister Netanyahu took a number of punitive measures, supposedly in response to Gilad Shalit being held incommunicado. He significantly decreased prisoners’ rights: the study programme at the Open University for prisoners was closed, access to books and family visits were restricted and the IPS used isolation and fines as punishment78.
This new political situation required the special attention of the ICRC and the condemnation of violations. However, contrary to expectations, the ICRC’s intervention tended to diminish in scope. Why did the organisation not intensify its activities when human rights in the OPT and the situation in detention centres deteriorated?
This recent failure of the ICRC to respond to the current political situation stands at the focus of my study. In the final analysis, I tend to attribute it to three features of the ICRC’s policy:
1) The organisation has a “standardized” bureaucratic mode of action: the ICRC has been using the same procedure in prisons of the world for years and addresses problems in prisons as if they were universal79. This creates a level of what may be described as bureaucratic rigidity and hampers the ability of the organisation to adapt in due time to changing circumstances and to the demands that arise on the ground.
76 B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/20120515_prison_visits - last accessed: 12-11-2012 77 Hilal, J., The Polarization of the Palestinian Political Field. Journal of Palestine Studies 39 (3): 24- 39, 2010 78 Addameer: http://addameer.info/?p=2244 last accessed: 12-11-2012 79 Abu Rabi, the ICRC’s health in detention coordinator who was sent in response to the hunger strikes, stated in an interview with Haaretz that the problems in prisons are universalhttp://www.haaretz.com/news/features/prison-doctors-have-conflicted-loyalties-everywhere- says-red-cross-health-in-detention-chief-1.431823 - last accessed 12-11-2012; Ms. Avrillaud observed too that the procedure in prison is standardized worldwide, Interview with Sarah Avrillaud on 28 December 2011, question 11
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The ICRC’s principle of neutrality contributes to the organisation’s rigidity as it is one of the main obstacles that prevents the organisation from taking stronger measures, from moving from the role of monitor to the role of protector by raising its voice. The ambiguity between the role of the organisation as a guardian of IHL and confidentiality, as a result of neutrality, undermines its capacity to adapt to a situation of ongoing or escalating violations and it limits its potential to protect IHL. 2) The ICRC’s modus operandi particularly suits Israel’s attitude towards international organisations: Israel has a diplomatic approach, stating that they are bound to IHL while regularly violating some of the rules. They continue cooperating with the ICRC and while the situation does not significantly worsen, but rather has a turbulent passage, the organisation has no strong reason for taking measures or questioning its activities in the region. This situation allows the ICRC to fulfil part of its mandate without threatening Israel’s interests. 3) In order to be able to operate in Israel and the OPT, the ICRC had to find a modus vivendi with the occupying force. The ICRC had to appease Israel by refraining from denouncing human rights violations in order to continue its routine work. This was the price to pay to maintain its action in Israel and the OPT and one of the reasons why the annual reports on the region provide so little information and rarely refer to violations. Moreover, the ICRC by providing some services, such as the family visit programme, relieves Israel from one of its responsibilities80. This apparent tension between the restraints that derive from the ICRC's dependence on the goodwill of the Israeli authorities and between its role as a guardian of IHL emerge strongly from my research.
80 Barsella, A., Barred from Contact, Violation of the Right to Visit Palestinians Held in Israeli Prisons, B’tselem, November 2006
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תקציר
מאמצם של הוועדה הבינלאומית של הצלב האדום (ICRC) להגן על קורבנות מלחמה ולפתח את המשפט הבינלאומי ההומניטארי (IHL) כבר קצר שבחים רבים. ואכן, רק מעט מחקרים עצמאיים קראו תיגר על התמונה ללא רבב של צלב האדום הבינלאומית כאי של אנושיות בתוך אכזריותה של מלחמה. המחויבות לניטראליות, הינו אחד מהעקרונות המרכזיים איתו הצלב האדום הבינלאומי מזוהה, והוא גם הכלי המרכזי שמקנה לארגון גישה למקומות הסגורים לאחרים. באותו הזמן, היצמדות לניטרליות לעתים קרובות גם מעורר פרקטיקות של פשרה אשר עשויים לעמוד בניגוד לתפקידיו של הצלב האדום הבינלאומי כאפוטרופוס של משפט ההומניטארי. הדואליות הזו, בפעולותיו של צלב אדום הבינלאומי, השתקפה רבות במחקר שלי על תפקידו בכל הנוגע לסכסוך הישראלי – פלסטיני.
מאז מלחמת 7691 והאכיפה הרציפה של הכיבוש הצבאי הישראלי בגדה המערבית וברצועת עזה, הצלב האדום כבר עסק בכמה פרויקטים הומניטריים גדולים בשטחים הפלשתינים הכבושים. פעילות הארגון בשם האסירים הפלשתינים היא אולי פעילותו הגדולה ביותר בהיקפה והבולטת ביותר במשמעותה, מבין הפרויקטים האחרים. באמצעותם של הסכמים מיוחדים עם ישראל, הצלב האדום קיבלו את הפריבילגיה לגשת לעצורים ולמתקני הכליאה. כמו כן, הוסמך לאפשר ביקורים של בני משפחת האסירים לבתי הכלא. לא ניתן להפריז בחשיבותו של תפקיד זה, בהתחשב במרכזיותה של סוגיית האסירים הפלשתינים, לחברה הפלסטינית ולסכסוך הישראלי – פלסטיני באופן כללי.
למרות החשיבות הברורה שלו, עד עתה, לא נערכה בדיקה של פעולות הצלב האדום בישראל ובשטחים הפלסטינים. אחת הסיבות האפשריות להעדרם של מחקרים נובעת מהקושי האובייקטיבי בביצועם לאור העובדה שהחלק הגדול מהדיווחים של הצלב האדום הם סודיים, ולכן אינו נגיש לחוקרים. מכשול זה אילץ אותי להפנות את המחקר שלי מלהתרכז בפעילותו של הצלב האדום הבינלאומי ככזה, לעבר התרכזות בהערכת פעילותו של הצלב האדום על ידי המוטבים, ובמקרה שלי, על ידי האסירים הפלסתינאים, משפחותיהם, והמוסדות הפועלים למען האסירים. המחקר משלב עבודת שטח קטנת היקף, שכללה סדרת ראיונות קצרים עם קרובי משפחה של אסירים; מספר ראיונות עם פקידים ועורכי דין פלסתינאים; ומספר ראיונות עומק עם קציני הצלב האדום.
החקירה הראתה שהפלסטינים מרוצים בדרך כלל מהעבודתו השגרתית של צלב האדום הבינלאומי. פעילותו שנמצאה מוצלחת במיוחד עסקה בעזרה למשפחות לשמור על קשר עם האסירים, ובמתן סיוע חומרי לאסירים. עם זאת, הרוב המכריע של המרואיינים הפלסתינאים היו גם ביקורתיים מאוד כלפי העובדה שהארגון נכשל בהרמת קולו, או אולי בנקיטה של פעולות מסוימות בתגובה לפגיעה המתמשכת ולעתים מתגברת במשפט הומניטרי הבינלאומי על ידי ישראל. כמה מרואיינים טענו כי הארגון פועל רק בגבולות שיקול דעתה של ישראל.
מאז האינתיפאדה השנייה, שילוב של גורמים ונסיבות הביאו להידרדרות חמורה בתנאי הכליאה איתם מתמודדים האסירים הפלשתינים בבתי כלא ישראלים, מרכזי המעצר ומתקני החקירה.
I
עם זאת, בניגוד לציפיות של חלק, במקום העמקת התערבותו של הצלב האדום הבינלאומי, חלה המעטה בהיקף פעולתו. שתי תכונות במדיניות של צלב האדום הבינלאומי מסעיים בהסברת כישלון זה:
1( הארגון בעל מצב פעולה "סטנדרטי" מבחינה בירוקרטית: הצלב האדום מיישם את אותו ההליך ביחס למאסרים הקשורים בסכסוכים ברחבי העולם, כבר במשך עשרות שנים. הניטרליות של הארגון גם תורמת לנוקשותו, בכך שמרסנת אותו מנקיטת עמדה חזקה יותר. 2( על מנת שיוכל לפעול בישראל, הצלב האדום היה צריך להגיע ל"מודוס ויוונדי" אל מול הכוח הכובש. אילוץ המחייב את הארגון באופן קבוע להימנע מתגובה חריפה במקרים של הפרות זכויות אדם מצד השלטונות הישראליים. לפיכך, גינויים פומביים והפעלת סנקציות הם נדירים מאוד, אפילו בזמנים שבהם ההפרות הפכו תכופות יותר או חמורות יותר. מתח זה שניכר מבין התחייבויותיו, מצד אחד מתלותו של הצלב האדום הבינלאומי ברצון הטוב של הרשויות הישראליות, ומצד שני בתפקידו כאפוטרופוס של המשפט הבינלאומי ההומניטרי, בא לידי ביטוי בצורה חזקה במחקר שלי.
II
אוניברסיטת בן - גוריון בנגב גוריון בנגב - הפקולטה למדעי הרוח והחברה המחלקה ללימודי המזרח התיכון
הצלב האדום בביתי הכלא הישראלים תפיסות של הפלסטינים בנוגע לפעילות צלב האדום
חיבור זה מהווה חלק מהדרישות לקבלת התואר "מוסמך למדעי הרוח והחברה" )M.A(
מאת: ולנטין סרנו ולנטין סרנו :בהנחיית מרצה רוזנפלד מאיה מרצה בכיר הורביץ נמרוד
מרחשון התשע"ג נובמבר 2102