Logic in Hegel’s Logic
Jacob McNulty
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2019
© 2019
Jacob McNulty
All rights reserved ABSTRACT
Logic in Hegel’s Logic
Jacob McNulty
My dissertation concerns Hegel’s mature theoretical philosophy. I focus on the role of logic, meant here in a much more conventional sense of the term than is usually thought relevant to
Hegel’s thought. I argue that Hegel’s main achievement in logic is to attempt a noncircular derivation of its laws and materials. Central to my interpretation is a sympathetic treatment of
Hegel’s claim that Kant did not have a comparably rigorous justification for logic. In Hegel’s view, the critical philosophy’s pervasive reliance on logic precludes it from evaluating the latter in a non-question-begging way. As a result, Kant is forced to ground logic psychologically
(though not “psychologistically” in Frege’s sense). For Hegel, Kant’s critical philosophy is insufficiently self-critical with respect to its own logical foundations. It is therefore vulnerable to criticism on logical grounds — especially from a Hegelian direction. As I also hope to show,
Hegel rejects Kant’s critique of metaphysics, arguing that its logical presuppositions are unfounded. Once those presuppositions are overhauled, the true source of the metaphysical tradition’s impasses becomes apparent, and a non-Kantian-idealist, metaphysical solution is at hand. The lesson is that metaphysics is an enduring possibility, provided it is based on secure logical foundations. Table of Contents
Abbreviations iv
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction. Philosophy of Logic in Kant, German Idealism (and after) 1
i. Logic in Hegel’s Logic
ii. What justifies a law of logic? A dilemma
iii. Jäsche’s observation
iv. Marburg Neo-Kantianism v. German Idealism
v. Heidegger and Hegel: logic and the “question of Being”
vi. Overview of the argument
vii. “Logic and metaphysics coincide” (Pippin)
I. Hegel and the Logic of the Aristotelian tradition 42
i. Presuppositionless knowing: natural science, mathematics, formal logic and religion
ii. Hegel and the logic of the Aristotelian tradition
iii. Two forms of finitude
iv. “Irrational cognition of the rational”: Hegel’s critique of Aristotelian logic
v. From formal to speculative logic
vi. Conclusion: Kant as minor post-Aristotelian?
II. Hegel and Transcendental Logic 72
i. Kant’s Analytic: Marburg Neo-Kantian v. German Idealist readings
ii. Hegel’s swimming objection reconsidered: defending a logical interpretation
iii. Surmounting the swimming objection 1: Reinhold, Fichte