Logic in Hegel’s Logic Jacob McNulty Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2019 © 2019 Jacob McNulty All rights reserved ABSTRACT Logic in Hegel’s Logic Jacob McNulty My dissertation concerns Hegel’s mature theoretical philosophy. I focus on the role of logic, meant here in a much more conventional sense of the term than is usually thought relevant to Hegel’s thought. I argue that Hegel’s main achievement in logic is to attempt a noncircular derivation of its laws and materials. Central to my interpretation is a sympathetic treatment of Hegel’s claim that Kant did not have a comparably rigorous justification for logic. In Hegel’s view, the critical philosophy’s pervasive reliance on logic precludes it from evaluating the latter in a non-question-begging way. As a result, Kant is forced to ground logic psychologically (though not “psychologistically” in Frege’s sense). For Hegel, Kant’s critical philosophy is insufficiently self-critical with respect to its own logical foundations. It is therefore vulnerable to criticism on logical grounds — especially from a Hegelian direction. As I also hope to show, Hegel rejects Kant’s critique of metaphysics, arguing that its logical presuppositions are unfounded. Once those presuppositions are overhauled, the true source of the metaphysical tradition’s impasses becomes apparent, and a non-Kantian-idealist, metaphysical solution is at hand. The lesson is that metaphysics is an enduring possibility, provided it is based on secure logical foundations. Table of Contents Abbreviations iv Acknowledgments vii Introduction. Philosophy of Logic in Kant, German Idealism (and after) 1 i. Logic in Hegel’s Logic ii. What justifies a law of logic? A dilemma iii. Jäsche’s observation iv. Marburg Neo-Kantianism v. German Idealism v. Heidegger and Hegel: logic and the “question of Being” vi. Overview of the argument vii. “Logic and metaphysics coincide” (Pippin) I. Hegel and the Logic of the Aristotelian tradition 42 i. Presuppositionless knowing: natural science, mathematics, formal logic and religion ii. Hegel and the logic of the Aristotelian tradition iii. Two forms of finitude iv. “Irrational cognition of the rational”: Hegel’s critique of Aristotelian logic v. From formal to speculative logic vi. Conclusion: Kant as minor post-Aristotelian? II. Hegel and Transcendental Logic 72 i. Kant’s Analytic: Marburg Neo-Kantian v. German Idealist readings ii. Hegel’s swimming objection reconsidered: defending a logical interpretation iii. Surmounting the swimming objection 1: Reinhold, Fichte !i iv. Surmounting the swimming objection 2: Hegel v. Conclusion: The ontological argument as “the true critique of the categories and reason” III. Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics 122 i. Introduction: Hegel and Kant on the problem of dogmatism ii. The role of formal logic in pre-critical metaphysics a) Predicative judgment b) Syllogistic Inference iii. The role of religion (Christianity) iv. Truth in formal and speculative logic v. Overcoming dogmatism: the dialectic vi. A pre-predicative Absolute? vii. Conclusion: Bowman’s Hegel IV. Hegel’s Response to Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics 147 i. Finite and infinite categories ii. Responding to Kant’s critique of Rational Psychology: Paralogisms iii. Responding to Kant’s critique of Rational Cosmology: Antinomies iv. Responding to Kant’s critique of Rational Theology: the Ideal v. Conclusion: Post-Kantian Idealism as Spinozism/monism V. Hegel on the Laws of Logic 185 i. Longuenesse’s Hegel ii. Two methods of justifying the laws of logic iii. Hegel on the laws of logic in the Leibniz/Wolff tradition !ii a) The law of identity b) Identity of indiscernibles (PII) c) Non-contradiction (PNC) d) Excluded middle e) Sufficient reason (PSR) iv. Conclusion: Dialetheism, Hylomorphism and Modality VI. Hegel on Concept, Judgment and Syllogism 234 i. What is Hegel’s argument for conceptual realism? The Kreines Stern debate ii. The Doctrine of Being: regress problems iii. The Doctrine of Essence: circularity problems iv. The Doctrine of the Concept v. Judgment and syllogism vi. Conclusion: was Hegel a Brandomian inferentialist? Conclusion. Analysis, Synthesis, Dialectic 278 i. The Self-Comprehension of Hegel’s Science of Logic ii. From the Concept to the Idea: (Finite) Knowledge iii. From (Finite) Knowledge to Absolute Knowledge: Aristotle Again Epilogue. Absolute Idealism for the 21st Century 290 i. Is Absolute Idealism “the science without contrary”? A Spinozist rejoinder to Rödl ii. “Logic and metaphysics coincide” (again) Works Cited 302 !iii Abbreviations Throughout this work, both in the body and in the footnotes, I provide references to the German and English versions of primary texts by Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The following are the abbreviations that I use; Hegel There are two editions of Hegel’s complete works in German, Suhrkamp and Meiner. My references refer to the Meiner edition, (1968- Gesammelte Werke, Deutsche Forschungsgemainschaft. Hamburg: Meiner) except where otherwise indicated. References to the English translations refer to titles from the series, “Cambridge Hegel Translations” edited by Michael Bauer. I have occasionally referred to other translations of works by Hegel not yet available in this series. The Science of Logic is cited by volume and page number for the German, and just page number for the English. The Encyclopedia is cited by section number (§) followed, where relevant, by an A for the Anmerkungen (remarks) and/or a Z for the Zusätze (additions). The 1831 lectures on logic are cited by the corresponding section number in the Encyclopedia, and the page number in the English translation. The Lectures in the History of Philosophy are cited only by the English section name and sub-section name, e.g., “Aristotle: Logic.” !iv EL = Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse Teil 1: Logik. Werke vol. 13/Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline: Part 1, Science of Logic. 2010. Edited and translated by Brinkmann, Klaus and Dahlstrom, Daniel O. New York: Cambridge University Press. VL/LL =Vorlesungen über die Logik, Berlin 1831. 2001. Transcribed by K. Hegel. Edited by U. Rameil and H. C. Lucas. Hamburg: Meiner/Lectures on Logic, Berlin, 1831. 2008. Trans. by C. Butler. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. VGP/LHoP = Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophy. Werke vol. 30/Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 1995. 3 vols. Translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. WdL/SoL = Wissenschaft der Logik. Werke vols. 21, 11, 12/Hegel’s Science of Logic. 2010. Translated by di Giovanni, George. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant References to the German are all to the Akademie Ausgabe (Immanuel Kant: Gesamelte Schriften. 1902-. 29 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter). I use the English translations from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, except where otherwise noted. For the first critique, I use the standard A/B page references to refer to the first (1781) and second (1787). editions of the work. !v A/B = Kant, I. Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Ak vol. 3-4/Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. and Trans. by Guyer P. and Wood A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. P = Kant, I. Ak. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik Ak. vol. 4/Kant, I. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Edited and Translated by Hatfield, G. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. JL = Kant, I. “Jäsche Logik” Ak. vol. 9/Kant., I. “Jäsche Logic” In: Kant’s Lectures on Logic, ed. and trans. J. Michael Young, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fichte German references are to the version of Fichte’s complete works edited by his son, I.H. Fichte. Fichtes Werke. 1971. ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co. This is not the favored edition, but I refer to it because many of the English translations have references to it in the Margins. English references are to what were, at the time of this writing, the most recent English translation. References to the first Wissenschaftslehre are by volume and page number (German), or just page number (English). WL/SoK - Fichte, J.G. Wissenschaftslehre (1794-5). Werke vol. 1/Fichte, J.G. Science of Knowledge. Ed. and Trans. Heath, J. Lachs, P. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. !vi Acknowledgments It would not have been possible for me to complete this dissertation without the support of a great many people, some of whom I would like to acknowledge here. A number of these people provided comments on this dissertation which led me to make important changes. Still, I take full responsibility for any errors it may contain. I would like to begin with my committee, whose guidance at every stage of the process was invaluable. My advisor, Fred Neuhouser, provided detailed written feedback on numerous drafts of the chapters which appear in this dissertation. Before the dissertation phase, attending Fred’s courses was a formative experience. It not only laid the foundation for all of my subsequent work on German philosophy but also decisively shaped my conception of the practice of philosophy itself. All throughout graduate school, I looked to Fred’s writings as a model of how to bring clarity and rigor to scholarly discussions of difficult authors like Hegel and Fichte. Yet I am perhaps most grateful of all to Fred for his broader approach to advising which I believe is unique. Fred left space for me to become the best version of myself rather than a duplicate of him. What is more, he seemed excited by the prospect. Beyond his role as my advisor, Fred has been an example for me to emulate in my own life. His intellectual humility, conscientiousness, and humaneness are often on my mind. A true eclectic, Wolfgang-Rainer Mann is the intellectual kindred spirit of this dissertation.