CHAPTER THREE Developmental Systems Theory: What Does It Explain, and How Does It Explain It? Paul E. Griffiths*,1, James Tabery† *Department of Philosophy and Charles Perkins Centre, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia †Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA 1Corresponding author: E-mail:
[email protected] Contents 1. Origins of Developmental Systems Theory 66 1.1. Waddington and the “Developmental System” 66 1.2. Gottlieb and Probabilistic Epigenesis 68 1.3. Oyama and the Ontogeny of Information 71 1.4. Ford, Lerner, and a “DST” 72 2. What Developmental Systems Theory Is Not 73 2.1. Quantitative Behavioral Genetics and Its Developmental Critics 73 2.2. Nativist Cognitive Psychology and Its Developmental Critics 76 3. Core Concepts 78 3.1. Epigenesis 78 3.2. Developmental Dynamics 82 4. Mechanisms—A Philosophy for Developmental Systems Theory 84 4.1. The Philosophy of Mechanism 84 4.2. Bidirectionality 85 4.3. Dynamic Interactionism 86 4.4. Truly Developmental Explanations 88 5. Conclusions 89 References 90 We are indebted to Susan Oyama for reading and providing very useful feedback on an earlier version of this article. Griffiths’ work on this paper was supported as part of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project DP0878650. Advances in Child Development and Behavior, Volume 44 © 2013 Elsevier Inc. ISSN 0065-2407, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-397947-6.00003-9 All rights reserved. 65 66 Paul E. Griffiths and James Tabery Abstract We examine developmental systems theory (DST) with two questions in mind: What does DST explain? How does DST explain it? To answer these questions, we start by reviewing major contributions to the origins of DST: the introduction of the idea of a “developmental system”, the idea of probabilistic epigenesis, the attention to the role of information in the developmental system, and finally the explicit identification of a DST.