EVALUATION of FAO COOPERATION
in SIERRA LEONE
2001 – 2006
FINAL REPORT
VOL I: MAIN REPORT
ROME
APRIL 2007
List of Contents
Foreword...... i Acronyms and Abbreviations...... iii Executive Summary ...... vi Introduction ...... 1 1. Approach and Team Members...... 3 2. The National Context...... 5 2.1. Agricultural Sector and Food Security in Sierra Leone 5 2.2. Donor Assistance to Sierra Leone in Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry, and Food Security 13 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone...... 15 3.1. FAOR in the Evaluation Period 15 3.2. Technical Backstopping and Support from FAO Headquarters and Regional/Sub- regional Office 20 3.3. Cost-Effectiveness of Operations 21 3.4. Overall Conclusions 25 4. Summary of Activities and Results in Major Areas Supported by FAO in Sierra Leone...... 27 4.1. The FAO Portfolio in Sierra Leone 27 4.2. Emergency Rehabilitation Interventions 28 4.3. Development of Agricultural Policy and Agricultural Development Strategy (including Right to Food) 31 4.4. Operation Feed The Nation (OFTN) – Farmers’ Field Schools (FFS) 35 4.5. Seeds 39 4.6. Fair Trade 40 4.7. Telefood Projects 42 4.8. Other Areas 43 4.9. Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) 44 4.10. Cross-cutting Issues 46 5. Results by FAO Services ...... 49 5.1. Sharing and Applying Knowledge 49 5.2. Partnership Building 50 5.3. Capacity Building 51 5.4. Resource Mobilisation 52 6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations...... 55 6.1. Conclusions 55 6.2. General Recommendations 57 6.3. Sector-specific Recommendations 60
ii
Annex list
ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE
ANNEX 2: EVALUATION OF GCP/SIL/023/GER
ANNEX 3: EVALUATION OF GCP/SIL/022/GER
ANNEX 4: EVALUATION OF TELEFOOD PROJECTS IN SIERRA LEONE
ANNEX 5: REVIEW OF TCP PROJECTS IN SIERRA LEONE
ANNEX 6: SIERRA LEONE IMPACT STUDIES
ANNEX 7: PROJECTS REVIEWED BY THE EVALUATION
ANNEX 8: LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
iii Foreword
Foreword
Did FAO cooperation perform well in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2006? The question is not an easy one to answer, and yet the overall effectiveness of development cooperation is an issue of increasing concern. While individual projects and programmes generally have specific objectives that include indicators at the different levels, this is not the case with FAO cooperation in a particular country. All that has been formulated is the expectation that the Organisation will contribute to achieving the MDGs, i.e. that it must be judged with regard to relevance and effectiveness (development impact).
Furthermore, FAO is not a donor. Rather, the partner country concerned is a member of FAO and FAO is accountable to its members. And the partner country – in this case Sierra Leone – can (hopefully) declare itself satisfied with the services offered.
Is it possible to carry out an evaluation in such circumstances? The terms of reference are geared towards: cooperation strategy and relevance of the programme; developmental effectiveness; institutional arrangements, modalities and processes; functioning of the FAO Representation – although precise targets for achievement are not mentioned. Then there is an emphasis on specific programmes and projects – financed by FAO-TCP or from external sources – which were carried out by FAO during the evaluation period. Even if links do exist between the individual initiatives, one simply cannot speak of a programme in this context. In the early part of the evaluation period, international support to Sierra Leone – and with it that of FAO – was dominated by emergency aid. Subsequently, the focus was on restoring agriculture on a more normal basis. These were very different types of assistance.
We began by attempting to assess the various projects and programmes according to internationally recognised evaluation criteria:
Relevance: Is FAO doing the right things? Efficiency: Is FAO doing the right things in the right way, i.e. cost-effectively? Effectiveness: Do FAO activities help to achieve the objectives? Impact: Do FAO activities contribute to the achievement of overarching development goals (e.g. MDGs) and, if so, how? Sustainability: Are the results sustained beyond the period of FAO assistance?
The evaluation did not only look at the design, implementation and results of emergency and development projects; it also assessed the work carried out by the FAO country office in Sierra Leone and support to the country given by the FAO Regional Office in Accra and FAO headquarters.
Germany was the most important external financier of development projects during the evaluation period. Four projects in Sierra Leone were supported through the bilateral fund of the German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection (BMELV); these were in the areas of food security / agricultural advice; seed production; right to food; and fair trade. Germany cooperated closely with the evaluation and two team members were seconded by the German international cooperation agency GTZ.
i Foreword
The entire team was welcomed and treated in a friendly and obliging manner in Sierra Leone. The decision makers in the Sierra Leonean Government – especially the Minister for Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS) – showed a great deal of interest in the mission. They confirmed what they saw as the valuable support of the FAO Representation. Nonetheless, the staffing and institutional capacity of the ministries, as well as of the decentralised structures that were newly formed in 2005 (District Councils), are such that an efficient and effective cooperation remains dogged by many fundamental weaknesses. The answer given once in response to a question about priority setting summed up the situation: Priorities? We have so many priorities!
The final evaluation was preceded by an inception mission undertaken by the FAO Evaluation Service in July 2006, to gather information and consult with the Government, members of the UN system and other donors on the issues to be covered. The next step was the conduct of impact studies at field level on key programme areas (Farmers’ Field Schools and emergency interventions), carried out by a Sierra Leone team under supervision of the Evaluation Service.
The final evaluation was held in February 2007. The eight-member evaluation team (a staff member and a consultant from the FAO Evaluation Service, an FAO Internal Auditor, three international consultants and two national consultants) met all together for the first time in Freetown. Also present as a resource person was the former FAO Representative, Mohammed Farah. Although he retired in August 2006, the FAOR post was still vacant at the time of the evaluation. The allocation of tasks and roles in the team posed no problems whatsoever. The project visits, conducted in small groups, provided an extremely useful insight into the conditions surrounding development cooperation in the rural areas of Sierra Leone. The desire to live peacefully alongside one another was expressed convincingly everywhere, so that hope for corresponding progress in development was reinforced, despite the prevailing difficulties.
With the completing of this report – to which everyone made their expected contribution – I would like, as head of the evaluation team, to thank the members of the team for the successful and goal-oriented team work undertaken. The absorbing work proved to be no hindrance to a positive atmosphere – on the contrary! We wish FAO – and Sierra Leone – every success in implementing the recommendations we have proposed. In future, it may then be easier to answer the question: Did FAO cooperation perform well in Sierra Leone?
Klaus Pilgram
Team Leader of the Evaluation
ii Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABU Agricultural Business Units ADB African Development Bank AFSP FAO Procurement Service AOS Administrative and Operational Support ASR Agricultural Sector Review ASREP Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Project BADEA Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa BMELV German Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection (Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz) CAADP Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme COIN Country Office Information Network CORAD Consortium for Rehabilitation and Agricultural Development CRS Catholic Relief Services CTA Chief Technical Advisor DACO Sierra Leone Development Assistance Coordination Office DGB Director General’s Bullentin DFID Department for International Development DPAC Development Partnership Aid Coordination Committee DTIS Diagnostic Trade Integration Study DWH Data Warehouse (FAO) ECU Emergency Coordination Unit EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FAOR FAO Representative (or Representation) FAS Field Accounting System (FAO) FFS Farmers Field School FEC Forestry and Environmental Commission FPMIS FAO Field Programme Management Information System GCP FAO Government Cooperative Programme GDP Gross Domestic Product GoSL Government of Sierra Leone GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency HQ Headquarters HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (Bird flu) IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IVS Inland Valley Swamp KAE Kpeya Agricultural Enterprises, Kenema, Sierra Leone LDCs Least Developed Countries LOA Letter of Agreement MAFS Ministry for Agriculture and Food Security
iii Acronyms and Abbreviations
MAPCO Movement for Assistance and Promotion of Rural Communities Development MDG Millennium Development Goals MFMR Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources NMTIP National Medium-Term Investment Programme MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTI Ministry of Trade and Industries NAFSL National Association of Farmers of Sierra Leone NCDB National Cooperative Development Bank NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NPP Net Primary Productivity NRS National Recovery Strategy OCD Office for Coordination of Normative Operational and Decentralized Activities ODG FAO Office of the Director-General ODI Overseas Development Institute OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OFTN Operation Feed The Nation PEMSD Project Evaluation, Monitoring and Statistics Division (MAFS) PBE FAO Division of Programme, Budget and Evaluation PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSA Personnel Services Agreement RAF FAO Regional Office for Africa RCPRP Rehabilitation and Community Based Poverty Reduction Project RFCIP Rural Finance and Community Improvement Project RP FAO Regular Programme RR UNDP Resident Representative SiL/SIL Sierra Leone SFLP Sustainable Fisheries Livelihoods Development Programme SPFS Special Programme for Food Security SSF Small Scale Facility TCE FAO Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division TCI FAO Investment Centre Division TCO FAO Field Operations Division TCP FAO Technical Cooperation Programme TCPR Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review TFP FAO Telefood Programme UN United Nations UNDAF UN Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNCT United Nations Country Team UNEG United Nation Evaluation Group UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNHABITAT UN Human Settlements Programme
iv Acronyms and Abbreviations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development UNAIDS The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. WARDA West Africa Rice Development Agency WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organisation WTO World Trade Organisation
v Executive Summary
Executive Summary
i. The overall finding is that FAO’s cooperation in Sierra Leone during the evaluation period made a valuable contribution to the planning and initiation of agricultural rehabilitation following the period of civil conflict. FAO is considered a trusted partner of the Sierra Leone Government, due to its constant presence through most of the civil conflict period and its responsiveness to the President’s rights-based food security pledge of 2002. Strong support was given by FAO Headquarters to a response to the pledge and the FAO Representative, who was in post through almost all of the evaluation period. FAO is considered a valued member of the UN Country Team. ii. After the policy and strategy development assistance in planning agricultural sector rehabilitation in Sierra Leone, the focus then turned to implementation. Implementation of agricultural programmes in Sierra Leone is constrained by a number of factors that are discussed in the report. While many donors supported the emergency rehabilitation effort, almost all the post-emergency cooperation funding for FAO projects came from the Federal Republic of Germany. These projects have now ended, or will end by early 2008. Possibilities for programme development in country are limited by the relatively small number of donor interlocutors and, more significantly, by the absence of an FAO Representative since the former one retired in August 2006. iii. As Sierra Leone moves progressively into a more normal development mode, FAO will need to define what it can best do and how it can serve the needs of Sierra Leone. It will have to be proactive in asserting this, if it wishes to continue to be considered as a key partner in the country’s development.
Context iv. Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world with a ranking of 176 out of 177 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index for 2006. Three-quarters of the population lives in absolute poverty. Rural households headed by farmers have the highest incidence and intensity of poverty, even though the agriculture sector (including livestock and fisheries) currently employs 75% of the country’s labour force and accounts for about 45% of GDP. Subsistence bush-fallow cultivation is the predominant type of farming, accounting for about 60% of agricultural output and followed by two- thirds of the farming population. v. Domestic agricultural production has increased in recent years and now covers about 69% of the national rice requirement and over 100% for cassava and sweet potato. However, the country still faces a number of critical constraints to increased production including: • poor infrastructure • general low soil fertility • poor understanding of the economic background of production • policy unfavourable to local agriculture vi. Food security is one of the three pillars of the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The Agricultural Sector Review prepared by FAO, with
vi Executive Summary
assistance from UNDP, IFAD and the World Bank, was a key contribution to the PRSP. The Government continues to rely heavily on foreign assistance; some 60% of the national budget is supported by development partners, especially DFID, the EC and World Bank. The Government has embarked upon a decentralisation policy, encouraged by donors.
FAO Representation vii. The FAO Representation is a medium-sized office. As part of the current reform process in FAO, three administrative posts have been cancelled and a programme post downgraded. Particularly on the programme side, this is incompatible with the increased responsibilities given to FAORs through DGB 2007/04. It raises the likelihood of continued high staff turnover in this unit, the need for continuous staff training at entry level, and consequently a lower level of efficiency than is required to ensure growth in the field programme and its effective management. Savings from the restructuring may neither off-set the cost of constantly replacing trained staff nor repair the damage to the Organisation’s image caused by inadequate staffing capacity. viii. Only 3% of programme staff time was spent on programme/project identification. This is inadequate to grow the programme beyond its current level. Given the workload already in the programme unit and the increased demands, the evaluation concluded that the FAOR was not adequately resourced.
ix. During and just after the evaluation period, there were two long periods (10 months and 8 ½ months) when the FAOR post was vacant. These long gaps resulted in: weakened control of the office; overloading of local programme staff; weakened FAO’s presence in multi-stakeholder discussions (e.g. UNDAF, DACO); negatively impacted on resource mobilisation initiatives; and created delays in addressing pressing project implementation issues.
x. Priorities for the office were set as a result of Government requests. However, FAO in Sierra Leone does not have a plan or guide for establishing priorities. Such a tool is essential in a situation where there are many competing needs, scarce resources and donor reluctance to invest in certain areas such as capacity building of the Ministries.
xi. The FAOR was active with advocacy campaigns in various areas, including within the international community and the UN Country Team. There was less opportunity to work with donors, both because their numbers in Freetown are relatively low and some major donors either do not support agricultural projects or prefer to work through other sources. xii. Resource constraints were viewed to be a major problem. For example, funds were not available for project monitoring visits, meaning that the Representation had to rely on written reports. Decisions on budget allocations for the office were made in Rome. xiii. Budgetary controls in the office were weak. Systematic monitoring was constrained by the limitations of the Field Accounting System budget module and the limited capacity of the administrative unit to perform this task regularly.
vii Executive Summary
Activities and Results in Areas Supported by FAO xiv. FAO enjoys considerable credit for its constant involvement in emergency rehabilitation throughout most of the civil war period. FAO began operating emergency rehabilitation projects in the country as early as 1995, while the war was going on. The assistance programme grew after the signing of the Lomé Agreement in July 1999. During the evaluation period, some 18 emergency rehabilitation projects were implemented in Sierra Leone. Aside from the provision of rehabilitation supplies, FAO played a vital role in coordination of the large volume of emergency assistance to Sierra Leone. This assistance was widely acknowledged to have resulted in better targeting of beneficiaries and reducing duplication of efforts. Assessments of FAO emergency assistance in Sierra Leone showed that the quality of local rice seed distributed was often poor and seed was sometimes distributed late. The assistance was appreciated but in many cases the amount of assistance was found to be insufficient to feed the family through the season. Some later emergency rehabilitation activities were pilot initiatives aimed at vulnerable groups. Follow up to some of these has come through Operation Feed the Nation.
xv. FAO had a key role in agricultural policy and agricultural development strategy , because of a desire to respond to the President’s food security pledge at the same time that the scope of FAO’s Special Programme on Food Security was being broadened. A key output was the Agricultural Sector Review, which was praised for its quality and timeliness by many partners in the country. FAO also supported the establishment of a Right to Food Secretariat , although the prospective effectiveness of the Secretariat is in doubt after the cessation of donor funding. A major success, though, was the role played by the Secretariat in the inclusion of food security and agriculture in the PRSP.
xvi. A considerable success has been FAO’s involvement in the introduction and expansion of Farmers’ Field Schools through Operation Feed The Nation. FFS, with funding from various sources including a TCP project and a German Trust Fund, has trained over 36,000 farmers so far. FFS were positively assessed in an impact study carried out for this evaluation, in terms of increased production and incomes, introduction of improved agricultural practices and satisfaction of farmers with their participation. The study also pointed out areas needing to be addressed in future, such as storage and marketing. xvii. The largest single intervention funded by FAO in the evaluation period was a project for the development of a sustainable Seeds programme. The evaluation found that in less than two years, the project had made considerable progress in improving coordination in the seed sector and increasing capacity for seed production and dissemination. Although the project has been successful in a technical sense, it is not yet operating on a cost-recovery basis. The evaluation recommends putting the project on a sound business footing to ensure sustainability and address operational issues. If this is done, an extension of the project was recommended.
viii Executive Summary xviii. A German-funded regional project in which Sierra Leone participates promotes opportunities for organic and fair trade certification for agricultural products in West African countries; cocoa in the case of Sierra Leone. The main issues are whether the cooperative working with the project can purchase its own members’ crops against competition from cocoa traders and if its management can develop the skills and trust to service the members effectively. Assuming this happens, the project could serve as a model for other organisations in Sierra Leone also seeking fair trade and organic certification.
xix. An evaluation of Telefood projects was undertaken because of the large number of such projects (27 during the evaluation period) and to augment the evidence base with respect to the conclusions of the corporate evaluation of Telefood undertaken in 2005. This evaluation found some successful projects, but the sustainability of the projects was generally low and those with livestock components were particularly unsuccessful. Projects tended to operate in isolation and did not benefit from strategic linkages with other FAO programmes, other international development partners or with the government; thus they were not part of broader efforts for poverty eradication. The absence of technical support was one of the main causes of project failure. Due to absence of resources, project monitoring and follow-up were carried out neither by FAO nor by any other partner or agency. The evaluation validated the recommendation of the corporate evaluation that Telefood funds should support clearly identified components of wider FAO projects and programmes, where they can be better targeted and monitored. In the case of Sierra Leone, the evaluation recommended that Telefood projects be linked to FFS and FFS District Networks, in order to have better access to capacity building and advice.
xx. The evaluation examined eight Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) funded projects implemented over the review period. Overall performance of the TCP in Sierra Leone over the review period is judged to be above satisfactory, with a mixture of good projects, poor ones and some that could not be adequately assessed in the absence of key information. The use of TCP in the Agricultural Sector Review was particularly strategic, as without it, FAO would have been unable to play the leading role that it did in its implementation. Using TCP for “buy-in” to key national policy-making processes is extremely effective and the TCP Unit should be prepared to respond to such requests, if technically sound, in a rapid fashion. Efforts in the medium-term should be focused on developing sound technical proposals in close consultation with potential funders and thus a higher likelihood of follow-up.
xxi. In terms of cross-cutting issues , the evaluation found that FAO has a stronger role to play in terms of environmental protection in Sierra Leone and has identified this as a priority area for the future, because of the strong linkage to soil fertility and consequent agricultural production and food security. FFS should be the key mechanism for delivering messages at field level in this area. The evaluation identified a need for FAO to play a stronger role in terms of promoting gender equity. Utilising concepts developed by FAO Headquarters and with technical support from UNAIDS, the evaluation found scope for establishing a workplace policy for FAO staff, incorporating
ix Executive Summary
HIV/AIDS mainstreaming and for including modules on HIV/AIDS within FFS in particular.
Results by FAO Services xxii. Sharing and applying knowledge was assessed through FAO’s pilot activities and use of Regular Programme information and products. The pilot activities were few: the FFS were deemed successful as was an initiative to increase rice seed production through an emergency project while the Right-to-Food project was not considered successful. Little use is made of FAO information and products in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone does participate in meetings and seminars and these are useful for keeping abreast of latest technical developments. However, due to poor Internet connectivity and lack of knowledge in the FAO Representation about what is available, little use is made of information products. xxiii. FAO engages in partnership building with the Government, members of the UN family, donors, NGOs and civil society organisations. FAO is considered to be a trusted partner by the Government and the Representation has built linkages, including with the most senior decision-makers. FAO, thus, enjoys a high profile in the country, perhaps higher than in most countries. xxiv. Capacity building in Sierra Leone is particularly challenging. Within the UN system and among donors and NGOs, lack of capacity is universally cited as an obstacle to sustainable development interventions. While nearly all FAO interventions (except Telefood projects) have a capacity building component, they are invariably small, often of too short duration and thus have only limited impact. As FAO is not a funding agency, its possibilities for carrying out extensive capacity building will always be constrained. Accordingly, it may be able to make a greater impact through assessments of capacity building needs in particular areas and make this information available to Government and Development Partners. Such assessments should take into account capacities outside of government. xxv. In terms of resource mobilization , FAO was not notably successful. Despite the Presidential pledge, the Maputo Declaration, the goals of the PRSP and the agricultural and food security strategies developed, the amounts of national and international resources directed to agriculture have remained below expectations. Government resources for agriculture, although increased over the evaluation period, remain less than half the Maputo Declaration target. The major donors in the country have given emphasis to sectors other than agriculture and investment projects in agriculture, even when identified, have been very slow to come on line. There have not been any sector- wide programmes, so projects remain the form for international assistance. The relative lack of donors present in the country is also a difficulty.
Recommendations xxvi. The evaluation made 12 recommendations, eight of which are general, three relate to specific programme areas and one to Telefood. The general recommendations covered the following areas:
x Executive Summary
• Developing a framework for FAO support to Sierra Leone; • Continuing advocacy for food security issues; • Continuing assistance in agricultural policy and strategy formulation and linking this to resource mobilization; • Provision of agricultural policy and training support aimed at elucidating better understanding of the economic background of production and promoting agriculture as a profitable business; • Provision of policy support aimed at sustainable agriculture; • Ensuring adequate capacity in the FAO Representation; • Provision of continued technical support for the development of Farmers’ Field Schools; and • Specific consideration of cross-cutting issues (in particular environment, gender equity and HIV/AIDS) in future support.
xi Introduction
Introduction
1. At its May 2005 session, the FAO Programme Committee recommended that FAO should undertake “an evaluation drawing conclusions on the basis of evaluations of the totality of FAO’s work in individual countries”. Country evaluations respond to General Assembly Resolution 59/250 of 2004 on the Triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system (TCPR). The resolution stressed (a) that the operational activities for development of the United Nations system should be valued and assessed on the basis of their impact on the recipient countries as contributions to their capacity to pursue poverty eradication, sustained economic growth and sustainable development; and (b) that an important element of the TCPR is the overall assessment of the effectiveness of the operational activities for development of the United Nations system and its functioning at the country level.
2. FAO conducted its first country evaluation in 2005-06, in Mozambique. As that evaluation was being brought to completion, representatives of the FAO Evaluation Service were involved in discussions of country evaluation with the UN Evaluation Group, whose membership is drawn from evaluation departments of the UN and specialized agencies. UNEG had also decided to embark on country evaluations covering the entirety of UN support to individual countries. FAO’s criteria for its first round of country evaluation included that selected countries should be LDCs, given their importance to the ultimate realisation of the MDGs and MDG 1 in particular. UNEG had identified Sierra Leone as a country of interest for a UN-wide country evaluation, to be undertaken after an initial exercise in South Africa. Because of the high level of food insecurity and its recent emergence from a conflict situation, FAO decided to select Sierra Leone for its second country evaluation, with a view towards drawing lessons from this evaluation as a major contribution to the UN-wide exercise to follow. Sierra Leone was also deemed to be of particular interest because of the considerable involvement of FAO in high-level policy discussion and decision-making during the evaluation period.
3. The main purposes of the evaluation were: • to improve the relevance, design, implementation and results of FAO activities in Sierra Leone; • to learn lessons about the factors affecting the relevance and development impact of FAO cooperation at country level; • to provide accountability to FAO member countries and answer questions about FAO performance at country level; • to contribute to a UN system-wide evaluation in Sierra Leone; • to form a case study for a meta-evaluation of FAO country level effectiveness for completion in 2008; • to contribute to development of the methodology for carrying out evaluations at country level in the future.
1 Introduction
4. The evaluation was to be forward-looking, i.e. to identify areas for improvement and draw lessons in order to further FAO cooperation relevance and effectiveness in the future. It was also to assist the Government and partners in Sierra Leone in maximising the comparative advantage of FAO.
2 1. Approach and Team Members
1. Approach and Team Members
5. The evaluation took place in three phases, beginning with an inception mission by the FAO Evaluation Service in July 2006. The inception mission involved research into the activities that had been carried out in Sierra Leone over the preceding five years, interviews with FAO Headquarters staff that had been dealing with Sierra Leone matters and a one-week visit to the country by a Senior Evaluation Officer/Evaluation Manager and a consultant. During the visit, the team met with senior Government officials, donor representatives, NGOs and FAO staff, with a view toward gathering information about FAO’s cooperation activities and preparing subsequent stages of the evaluation.
6. The second phase of the evaluation revolved largely around the conduct of the impact studies on Farmers’ Field Schools and FAO emergency interventions, finalisation of terms of reference for the evaluation, putting together the evaluation team and assembling all relevant background information for the evaluation. The impact studies on Farmers’ Field Schools and emergency interventions with FAO support are found as Annex 6 to this report.
7. The third and final phase consisted of the three-week final evaluation mission, with a team composed of international and national team members. Some members of the team spent two days in Accra for briefing by the FAO Regional Office for Africa and the majority of the team was 15 days in Sierra Leone (February 6 to 23, 2007), including one week spent at sites in all Provinces of the country visiting field interventions.
8. The largest bilateral donor in the evaluation period to FAO was the Federal Republic of Germany. For this reason and due to their keen interest in this country evaluation, Germany kindly agreed to fund the Team Leader as well as the Human Rights Specialist.
9. The entire evaluation team was: Mr Klaus Pilgram (Germany) – Independent consultant/Team Leader and Policy Specialist Mr Robert Moore (USA) – FAO Evaluation Service, Rome, Evaluation Manager (TCP and emergency projects) Mr Peter Schröder (Germany) – Independent consultant/Agronomist Mr Sahr N. Fomba (Sierra Leone) – Agronomist/Agricultural research (nominated by Government of Sierra Leone) Ms Marjorie Smith-John (Jamaica) – Office of the FAO Inspector-General, RAF- Accra - Management Specialist Ms Monika Lüke (Germany) – Independent consultant/Human Rights Specialist Ms Luisa Belli (Italy) – FAO consultant/Telefood evaluator
3 1. Approach and Team Members
Mr S. Richard Senesie (Sierra Leone) – Independent consultant/Telefood evaluator
10. The Sierra Leonean team for the impact studies was : Ms Catherine Sandy-Margao – Supervisor Mr Daniel S. Fornah and Mr S. Richard Senesie – Lead Enumerators Ms Finda Jenkins, Ms Francess Nyuma, Mr Thomas Bangura, Ms Ima Lahai, Ms Bintu Moseray, Mr Mohamed Carankay - Enumerators
11. The evaluation main report (Vol. I) begins (Chapter 2) with a description of the agricultural sector in Sierra Leone, information about donor assistance to the country and a profile of FAO’s cooperation during the evaluation period. This is followed (Chapter 3) by a description and analysis of how FAO works in Sierra Leone, with emphasis on the FAO Representation. Chapter 4 examines the results of major areas supported by FAO over the evaluation period, while Chapter 5 looks at the performance of FAO services across sectors. The mission’s conclusions and recommendations are in Chapter 6.
12. Included in Vol. II: Annexes are, besides the Terms of Reference (1), evaluation reports of two specific projects (Seeds (2) and Right-to-Food (3) that were mandated in the evaluation TOR, along with reviews of TCP (4) and TeleFood projects (5) that were also requested. Annex 6 includes the impact studies that were undertaken on Farmers’ Field Schools and emergency interventions. Vol. II is completed by the List of Projects Reviewed (7) and the List of Persons Contacted (8).
4 2. The National Context
2. The National Context
2.1. Agricultural Sector and Food Security in Sierra Leone
13. Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world with a ranking of 176 out of 177 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index for 2006 and is classified as a low-income food deficit country. Annual per capita income is below US$ 175. Seventy- five percent of the population lives in absolute poverty. The 2000 Baseline Service Delivery Survey reported that between 78% and 90% of the rural population do not have access to potable drinking water and the percentage having adequate sanitation is as low as 5%. Sierra Leone’s social indicators are worse than those of other countries at a similar level of per capita income. Average life expectancy is 38 years, infant mortality is 147 per 1,000 and illiteracy rate is 81%. Daily calorie supply per capita is below 1,800, which is far below the requirement of 2,600 calories per day. On a more positive note, Sierra Leone is endowed with substantial mineral wealth (diamond, gold, bauxite, rutile, and iron ore), a varied agricultural resource base and rich fisheries.
14. After decades of poor governance and neglect of rural areas, an armed rebellion broke out in 1991 when regional actors sought to control the diamond fields in Sierra Leone and the rest of the Mano River Basin. The social and economic effects of the war were devastating with over 20,000 people killed, thousands injured or maimed and thousands more suffered from post-traumatic stress. Over two million people were displaced, 500,000 of whom fled to neighbouring countries. Infrastructure, businesses and much of the housing stock were ruined.
15. With the end of the civil war and beginning in 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone tackled the national recovery and reconstruction process in collaboration with its development partners through a two-pronged approach: (a) the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) and (b) the Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), beginning with an Interim PRSP in 2002-03. The objective of the NRS was to create the conditions that would consolidate peace and lay foundations for longer-term development. There were three principal elements to the recovery process: (i) the Government and its executive functions: a programme for good governance was developed, including enhanced financial management, institutional reform and reformed government procurement procedures, anti-corruption measures, decentralization and reactivation of local administration; (ii) civil society: building capacity of community groups and civil- society organisations; and (iii) the economy and related infrastructure: the restoration of agriculture and other economic activities in rural areas.
16. Rural Poverty: The national poverty profile of Sierra Leone reveals that rural households headed by farmers have the highest incidence (83%) and the highest intensity of poverty, even though the agriculture sector (including livestock and fisheries) currently employs 75% of the country’s labour force and presently accounts for about 45% of the GDP. Virtually all of Sierra Leone’s agriculture is in the hands of
5 2. The National Context
small scale farmers using minimal modern techniques, and they are amongst the poorest members of the population.
17. The total land area of Sierra Leone is estimated at 72,326 km 2 of which 5.36 million ha or 74% of the territory is cultivable land, divided into uplands of 60,650 km 2 (80% of the total), which is of relatively low fertility; and lowlands of 11,650 km 2 (20%). %). In the rainy season (May – October) precipitation ranges from 2000mm in the north to 4000mm in the south east. Surface water is abundant, supplied by nine major and three minor river basins. More than 95% of the original dense forest has been cleared, and much of the cleared area is now degraded to poor savannah woodland.
18. HIV/AIDS: The first HIV/AIDS case was reported in Sierra Leone in 1986. According to a 2005 survey, a national sero-prevalence rate of 1.53% was established and did not differ significantly between males and females. The highest prevalence among women occurred in the 20-24 year age group (2.0%) whereas males between 35-39 years had the highest prevalence (3.5%). Prevalence in urban areas was 2.1% as compared to 1.3% in rural areas except Koinadugu District (3.5%), a border district where mining is the dominating sector.
19. Gender Issues: Women account for about 51% of the total population, and contribute to providing most household food requirements. However, they are marginalized in society and lack access to productive assets, including land, credit, training, and technology. They, however, are entrepreneurial and practice food production, processing and petty trading to earn income. Illiteracy rates among women are higher (>80%), due to lower school enrolment rates, family labour requirements and teenage pregnancies. A significant proportion of household heads are women whose husbands were killed during the civil war. In agriculture, there are few women extension workers even though the bulk of farm labour is provided by women and children (>80%).
20. During the civil conflict, women and children suffered the most in respect of sexual assault, stress and the psychological strain unwanted pregnancies, and increased vulnerability to trauma and depression. The civil strife has left behind thousands of children in extremely difficult circumstances, as they were conscripted to swell the ranks of the various armed factions during that period.
2.1.1. Agriculture
21. About 600,000 ha of the land is cropped annually by about 400,000 farm families. The combination of customary and statutory land laws has permitted the coexistence of traditional farming with the establishment of large plantations, as well as the development of swamps and forests. Subsistence bush-fallow cultivation is the predominant type of farming, with smallholdings usually ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 ha under food crops. Up to 15 different crops are traditionally grown in mixed stands in one season, rainfed upland rice dominating. This type of farming accounts for about 60% of agricultural output and employs two-thirds of the farming population. Reduced fallow periods and increasingly frequent bushfires have caused widespread soil
6 2. The National Context
degradation and reduced yields. Sustainable production will require a switch from shifting to more productive and intensive settled agriculture, through swamp reclamation and development of small irrigation schemes. The uplands could be used for permanent tree crop plantations such as oil palm, cashew, citrus and mango in the northern region. Cocoa, coffee, rubber, kola nuts and oil palm are grown in the southeast of the country. The majority of farmers cultivate rice as the main crop, although tuber crops such as cassava and sweet potatoes, and cereals such as millet and maize, are gaining ground.
22. Agricultural production was adversely affected by unfavourable macroeconomic policies during the 1980s and by the civil war in the following decade, with rice production declining by 65%. Over 90% of the cattle were either killed or transferred to neighbouring countries.
23. Tree crops constitute the bulk of agricultural exports and the source of domestic palm oil for consumption. The main tree crops are coffee, cocoa, kola nuts and oil palm, followed by rubber and cashew. Present yields are low due to lack of maintenance and renewal, but this could also qualify them for organic products and fair trade consideration (see chapter 4.6).
24. Livestock is run mainly by semi-nomadic herders. In the wet season, the herds are grazed in the bush and other uncultivated uplands; and in the dry season on harvest residues, in swamps and bolilands (naturally grassy drainage depressions). Birth rates are low (45%), mortality is high and off-take is only 7%, due mainly to feed deficiencies and uncontrolled parasites and diseases. Poultry is the most numerous and widely owned form of livestock. However, a scare of avian flu has negatively affected this industry countrywide. Pigs are not widely owned, and generally found around urban centres.
25. Trade in Agricultural Produce has been going on since colonial times and was the one of the major sources of foreign exchange earnings prior to the civil war. Sierra Leone, being a member of WTO, benefits from the Integrated Framework for Trade Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries. Government has removed all barriers to trade and gives concessionary tariff for the importation of farm machinery and inputs (5% import duty). Phytosanitary and plant quarantine regulations exist in principle but need strengthening for proper functioning. Imported rice is freely available in the cities and big towns across the country to the detriment of local production.
26. Potential for Development: Given its generally favourable resource endowment, the country’s potential for agricultural development has yet to be realized. The vast water resources have yet to be tapped for irrigated agriculture, both large and small scale. The country’s favourable climate allows for cultivation of a wide range of annual food crops and tree crops for export. An average rainfall of about 3,000 mm, distributed over a six-month period, makes it possible to grow a second crop in many parts of the country, such as inland valley swamps with sufficient catchment areas.
7 2. The National Context
Constraints to Increased Agricultural Productivity: 27. Total domestic production of the main staple food crop, rice, has reached some 69% of the current requirement, while that of cassava and sweet potato have surpassed 100%. While it is hoped that production of all major crops will grow steadily as resettlement and rehabilitation efforts are completed, it is also recognized that increasing food production depends on removing significant constraints like: • poor infrastructure • general low soil fertility • poor understanding of the economic background of production • policy unfavourable to local agriculture
Infrastructure 28. Little investment is taking place in productive ventures in rural communities. The resources made available to these communities are largely used to satisfy basic consumption requirements. Feeder roads, transport, energy, water supply and markets need attention to make the rural areas more attractive and productive. Post-harvest losses are high (estimated currently at 15-40%). Poor infrastructure hinders transport from the villages to markets in the cities up-country and to Freetown. Any marketable surplus therefore is charged with extremely high cost of transport.
Low soil fertility 29. Sierra Leonean soils are mostly ferralite in origin and have developed under continuous high temperatures throughout the year, with constant leaching due to heavy rainfall, high rates of runoff and rapid infiltration of water to the lower horizons. Thus, they lack any mineral nutrient reserves, the only nutrients readily available being those held in the organic matter. Most soils are, therefore, of inherently low fertility.
30. Under natural forest, nutrients are lost when there is extraction of timber or removal of plant parts for food. Otherwise, nutrients are recycled continuously through the trees. Removal of bush and forest cover, e.g. for charcoal production which is the only cash- providing activity for many rural Sierra Leoneans, destroys this cycle and leads to rapid degradation of the soil. As a result, yields are very low. The average yields for rice in the upland is around 0.75 t/ha (range within the districts: 0.60 – 0.85) for low lands 1.45 t/ha (1.01 – 1.88) 1, for cassava around 5 t/ha, for maize about 1 t/ha, for groundnuts 1.5 t/ha.
31. Bush fallows also interrupt the cycle. When shrubs are burnt, all the accumulated nitrogen and much of the sulphur are lost to the atmosphere. Phosphorus, bases and some micronutrients are retained in the burnt ash but this is subject to wind and water erosion if preventive steps are not taken. Other nutrients are held in the soil and surface organic matter but most are used by the first flush of weeds and rapid mineralization on exposure of organic matter leads to further nutrient loss.
1 MAFS - PEMSD, 2004
8 2. The National Context
32. Soils of the inland valley swamps benefit to some extent from the nutrient losses from the upland areas. The traditional method of fallowing swamps results in losses of nutrients additional to those occurring naturally through leaching through the movement of the water downstream towards the sea. The long term potential for these areas is thus only marginally better than that of the upland areas.
33. Soil fertility together with the availability of water is the factor limiting the yield of crops. Soil fertility is better conserved in cocoa, coffee and oil palm plantations, mainly found in the east of the country, due to the permanent vegetative cover. With the exception of mangrove soils at the estuaries of the rivers where rice can be grown without a fallow period every year, all other ecologies, both upland and lowland, are endangered when they are continuously cropped as they are at present.
34. Tillage of the soils, especially with mechanised power tillers leads to a rapid depletion of soil nutrients due to high decomposition of the organic matter and to fast mineralization of clay, with the formerly stored plant nutrients. The fallow period of only a few years in the uplands is too short to restore soil fertility to its original level. A minimum fallow period, which is 10 – 20 years in the uplands, can hardly be observed any more. Shortened fallow periods are now also followed for the bolilands, the inland valley swamps and riverrain grassland, with negative consequences for productivity. The prospects for the lowlands are better only for the mangrove areas. However, there is presently low utilization of mangroves due to salinity, the absence of water control or a combination thereof.
35. The term of ‘arable’ or ‘cultivable’ land implies that reserves are available for further expansion. However, the high figure given is a fallacy in Sierra Leone, especially for the upland areas that constitute 80% of the cropped area. According to available data, some 6.5 % of the arable land of the upland area is cultivated. With the bush fallow system, this is already at the limit of what can be supported under current cropping regimes. There is a necessity to explore alternatives. Examples might include hedgerow farming with improved fallow using auxiliary plants like pigeon peas and other legumes, though it is a tedious and long-time investment.
36. Thus, the evaluation considers that any increase in yield performance will depend on the conservation and improvement of the production of biomass and its management, leading towards the improvement of soil fertility. Improved soil fertility will make the labour factor more efficient. Since the incremental labour demand is rather low the returns to labour increase as well.
37. Purchased farm inputs like certified seed will only become profitable if a higher yield level as compared to the present one can be achieved. This requires the application of improved management practices by farmers. The same holds for the use of fertiliser. Fertiliser use will only be profitable once the limiting factors causing low soil fertility have been addressed.
9 2. The National Context
Poor understanding of the economics of production 38. A key problem is that the economics of production and marketing are neither well known nor understood. Low institutional and human resource capacities and the restricted thinking in economic terms, partly influenced by relief aid/donations also work against the realisation of the country’s agricultural potential. The analysis of the productivity of various enterprises inside or outside farming is a precondition for any investment decision in order to have the maximum benefit and profit.
39. The agricultural sector is at present characterized by subsistence production. As shown above, possibilities of increasing the area cropped are very limited. For the individual farmer, labour is also a limiting factor. Mechanisation is often mentioned as part of the solution, but it is generally uneconomic given the present low yield levels both in the uplands and lowlands. Apart from the fact that the cost of fertiliser is increasing faster than farmgate prices, the use of chemical fertiliser will be profitable only when there is sufficient organic matter in the soil (see above). In Sierra Leone, fertiliser investments are presently only profitable for intensive production of vegetables.
40. For the majority of smallholders, potential for development depends on investing in the improvement of farm enterprises through an optimized factor allocation, in his cropping cycles as well as in animal production. By generally improving the quality of production and processing, storage and marketing facilities, farmers have the option of higher yields, higher proceeds, and increased profit.
41. The question is whether the farmer or the entrepreneur is able to use inputs profitably. The key to agricultural modernisation is the formulation – in response to farmers’ demand – of a menu of low-cost measures for agronomic and economic improvements that are within the management and husbandry capabilities of the farmers and do not place his family at a risk. The challenge is to develop these solutions, keeping in mind farmers’ economic possibilities. There is no other way; agriculture must be seen as a business.
Policy unfavourable to local agriculture 42. The goal of increased local production of staple food is at odds with another goal, to keep the price of staple food low, especially in Freetown and other cities where an increased percentage of the population has moved during the war. However, for farmers to intensify their labour and make investments in farm inputs, they need higher prices. Nearly all people in Freetown buy low-grade imported rice, because it is much cheaper than the locally produced. Locally produced rice could fetch a premium, because of its freshness, its better taste and because it is more nutritive (mainly not polished, therefore a higher protein content). However, the vast majority of customers purchase the lower-cost, imported rice. Under the present price relationship between domestic and imported rice, for the average rice farmer there is no price incentive to invest in more intensive rice production.
43. Another constraint is lack of access to rural financial services. Although there are six commercial banks in the country, they do not lend to the agricultural sector in general
10 2. The National Context
and small farmers in particular. Their lending operations are focused on larger corporations. The two existing development banks, the National Development Bank (NDB) and National Cooperative Development Bank (NCDB), previously provided loans in the rural areas but all their branches were closed during the war and they are yet to resume business. Numerous NGOs now operate their own credit programmes, practically in a policy void. The Government is working to redress this issue through World Bank support to the private sector and farmers and infrastructure.
2.1.2. Fisheries
44. Sierra Leone has an extensive coastline relative to its size and thus has access to vast fishing areas with considerable resources. Fisheries are therefore an important sector of the national economy and contribute significantly to protein intake. Marine fisheries represent more than 80% of the country’s total production of fish and fish products. The fishery sector accounts for 21% of the GDP with substantial foreign exchange earnings. About 20,000 people are directly involved in fishing and the harvesting of other marine food sources, and women particularly benefit from fisheries through their involvement in fish processing and marketing. Increasing the supply of fish to the domestic market and for export can be achieved through support to people engaged in artisanal fisheries and aquaculture with inputs and skills for processing.
45. Fisheries are predominantly artisanal and foreign fleets mainly engage in (uncontrolled) industrial fishing. Aquaculture is not significant, but more emphasis is now being placed on production from fish farming in the hinterlands. Prior to the civil war, the total annual catch was estimated at 65,000 mt, with artisanal fishing catches accounting for up to 70%.
2.1.3. Forestry and Environmental Issues
46. Forestry and environmental issues faced by Sierra Leone include land degradation caused particularly by agriculture and mining; cattle grazing; recurrent bush fires; population pressure; deforestation due to an increased demand for agricultural land and urban requirements for timber and fuelwood; loss of biodiversity; and pollution of fresh water resources due to mining and municipal waste. Moreover, the civil war had an adverse impact on the environment because of the destruction of water resources and uncontrolled mining. The Government enacted a National Environment Protection Act in 2004.
47. Fuelwood and charcoal production provide complementary income to most farmers but the need for replanting trees cannot be overemphasized. Logging is of little economic significance at national level but has a negative impact on the remaining forest reserves.
48. Due to the marginalisation of forestry and environmental issues in the past, the Government created an independent body, the Forestry and Environment Commission (FEC) in 2005. However, the necessary legislation is only now being prepared for
11 2. The National Context
submission to Parliament for enactment. The need to harmonize the legislation under various ministries such as Mining, Lands and Country Planning and Housing into the Commission’s portfolio is a key task. The responsibilities of the Commission cover 44 Protected Areas but due to limitations of funding only eight representative sites will be managed initially.
2.1.4. Food Security
49. In his inaugural address on the 19 th May 2002 for the second term of office as President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, HE Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah declared food security as his government’s main objective and pledged that by the end of 2007 when his term of office ended, no Sierra Leonean would go to bed hungry. Towards this end, MAFS has developed a policy intent document (see section 4.3). The “Interim Statement of Policy for the Agriculture Sector in Sierra Leone, October 2002” seeks to improve agricultural production and productivity in order to achieve food security, by providing the enabling environment for farmers and promoting appropriate research, extension, input delivery and market systems thereby improving rural incomes, reducing poverty and maintaining the natural environment.
50. As part of the preparation of the September 2004 Food Security Strategy for Sierra Leone, a survey was undertaken of 1700 households in 145 villages (in 13 administrative districts) to determine the level of food security in the country. It classified families by their level of food security into categories, ranging from chronically food insecure to food secure. The results were as follows: • Chronically food insecure: 28% • Households with varying degrees of food insecurity, largely seasonal: 64% • Food secure: 8%.
51. The highest levels of chronic food insecurity were found in Kambia, Koinadugu and Bonthe Districts (44-51%), while Port Loko, Bombali and Bo had the lowest incidences (15-16%). The survey classified the food security status of Sierra Leone as follows: • Good food availability, accessibility and utilisation: Rural Western Area and Port Loko District; • Relatively good food availability and accessibility but poor food utilisation (usually due to problems of health and hygiene): Moyamba and Bo Districts; • Borderline-poor food access and availability; chronic malnutrition due to poor utilisation: Bombali and Kenema Districts; • Poor food availability and accessibility, utilisation seasonally problematic: Kambia and Pujehun Districts; • Poor food availability and accessibility with below-standard utilisation: Kono and Kailahun Districts; • Very poor food availability and accessibility, poor utilisation: Koinadugu, Bonthe and Tonkolili Districts.
52. In Sierra Leone, many people equate food security with having rice. When referring to degree of fulfillment of the Presidential pledge, authorities usually take rice self-
12 2. The National Context
sufficiency as a proxy for food security. Food crop surveys conducted by MAFS, FAO, WFP, etc. indicated that domestic rice production met around 69% of the national requirement in 2006. Even though the President’s pledge will not come into fruition by the end of 2007, considerable progress will have been made towards that end.
2.2. Donor Assistance to Sierra Leone in Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry, and Food Security
53. Since the end of the civil war in 2002, Sierra Leone has been dependent on the goodwill of its international development partners such as DFID, the EC and World Bank which support over 60% of the national budget while the country is recuperating from the effects of the war.
54. The GoSL has sought assistance from several development partners, including FAO, to develop a coherent strategy for agricultural development and poverty alleviation. The current PRSP, which was presented and approved by a conference of donors, the Consultative Group (CG) Meeting in November 2005 in London, included agriculture and food security as Pillar II. The second PRSP is now in preparation, to be submitted to the development partners in 2008. The PRSP is the Government’s main strategy for the short to medium term programs towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.
55. The Agricultural Sector Review co-sponsored by the FAO, World Bank, UNDP and IFAD, was completed in 2003 and published in 2004 and formed the basis for the PRSP of 2005, which is now being implemented through various operational programmes or strategies such as Operation Feed the Nation. Several other donor– funded projects such as the Multinational NERICA Dissemination Project, IFAD and ADB projects covering seven districts are ongoing in the agriculture sector. The World Bank is about to embark on a large project to assist the private sector in Sierra Leone, including farmers and also to develop infrastructure, especially energy.
56. Like Rwanda, Sierra Leone is recipient of UN post-conflict assistance (UNIOSIL). The FAO, together with WFP, some donor agencies (USAID) and many international NGOs was a major player in these emergency activities.
57. The Government’s decentralisation policy, encouraged by donors, is also driving additional changes in the aid environment. DFID and World Bank are already making substantial input into local councils’ budgets. However, a great deal of capacity building is needed in order to effectively use the additional resources. The central Government is helping actively in this respect by devolving key staff to these local councils along with their budgetary support, starting with the Health and Sanitation, Agriculture and Food Security, Education, Science and Technology ministries, in the first instance. A national aid coordination body, DACO has already been established with the main task of designing, planning and monitoring the PRSP implementation. Since the beginning
13 2. The National Context
of 2007, DACO has fielded personnel to all district councils in the country to facilitate data gathering and dissemination and coordination on this issue.
58. The Sierra Leone Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS), prepared under the Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), is a multi-agency, multi-donor programme initiated by the WTO Trade Ministers in 1996 to promote integration of LDCs into the global economy, the objective being to make trade integration serve the LDCs’ poverty reduction and national development strategies. The Sierra Leone DTIS and its Action Matrix were validated at a workshop held in Freetown from 24-26 October 2006 and submitted to Cabinet in early November 2006. Both documents have been endorsed by cabinet paving the way for implementation of the Action Matrix.
14 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
59. The evaluation examined the capacity of the Representation (FAOR) to implement FAO’s mandate in Sierra Leone and assessed the quality of programme management. As the FAOR is the real face of the Organization in a country, it is important to assess the role it plays as part of an overall judgement of performance.
3.1. FAOR in the Evaluation Period
60. For purposes of this review, the operational field programme can be divided into two periods, the emergency rehabilitation phase from 2001-2003, and the reconstruction phase from 2003-2006.
61. During the emergency period, practically all projects were rehabilitation activities. TCE had budget holder responsibilities and project implementation was through the Emergency Coordination Unit (ECU), supervised by an Emergency Coordinator and the FAO Representative. The FAOR acted as paying agent as well as providing administrative support to the ECU activities. In return, it received financial support from the emergency programme since both offices were co-located from 2003 which greatly assisted in reducing operating costs. The major expenditures were for fuel and office rental.
62. In line with the decentralization of project responsibilities to FAORs in 2001, the FAOR/SiL assumed full operational responsibility for all non-emergency country projects from 2004 onwards. With the exception of the German-funded seed multiplication project that had an international CTA, all projects were managed by national coordinators under the supervision of the FAOR. This resulted in a significant shift in the nature and magnitude of the Representation’s workload from mainly liaison and administrative support for emergency interventions, to project operations, along with increased advocacy on food security issues and resource mobilization.
63. This new focus severely stretched the limited capacity in the Representation to adequately support these functions. The project operations capacity was partially augmented through increased use of national consultants and project coordinators in implementing projects and supporting visiting missions where necessary. However, some liaison type activities which are heavily time consuming could not be delegated, such as participation in UN thematic groups, donor/Government coordination meetings, and resource mobilization.
64. To enable the Representation to respond to requests from Government and to assist in fulfilling their mandate, the FAOR requested support from Headquarters and the Regional office to carry out sector/sub-sector assessments, project formulation and provide policy advice. While these activities fully reflected governments’ priorities, delays in response from Headquarters and the Regional offices hampered the
15 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
Representation’s timely participation in joint activities with Government and donor partners.
65. The Representation used approximately $86,000 of TCP and SSF 2 resources through eight interventions during the review period. This was found to be effective in facilitating a quick start-up for agreed activities, e.g. Tree Crop Assessment, as well as in underpinning its contributions to the UNCT thematic groups. However, the long process involved in accessing the TCP facility acts as a deterrent when the size of the funds is considered. With the increased allotment of $200,000 for the biennium, the evaluation believes that the procedures to access these funds should be reviewed to facilitate easier access.
66. The current field programme consists of four national projects (excluding Telefood) with a 2007 available budget of $510,807 3. The pipeline consists of six proposals, three of which have been listed for the last three years without attracting donor support.
FAO Office Profile 67. The Sierra Leone Representation is a medium 4 sized office consisting of nine Regular Programme funded posts. In addition to the Representative’s post, the programme unit is comprised of two posts and the administration unit has the remaining six posts. This is augmented with three temporary staff paid through the RP allocation for security and AOS, i.e one driver, a radio operator and an administrative clerk. The impact of the current reform is that three posts in the administration unit 5 have been cancelled and replaced by the Assistant FAOR (Administration) post, while the programme assistant’s post (G6) was downgraded to programme clerk (G4) with corresponding changes in the job description.
68. The evaluation found that staff turnover in the programme unit during the review period was relatively high. The disparity in grades and responsibilities between FAO and other UN Agencies meant that FAO was unable to attract or keep the better qualified candidates and therefore had to invest heavily in training, only to lose staff to other Institutions. Requests to OCD to up-grade the Assistant FAOR(Programme) to National Officer-B level were not successful and there is an attendant risk of losing the Officer to other Agencies/NGOs. The EC and UNDP commented on the rapid staff turnover in FAO and the negative impact this had on programme delivery and effective participation in UNCT thematic meetings and donor coordination fora.
69. DGB 2007/04 indicates that ‘…the responsibility for managing the project cycle for national projects, including liaison with local donor representatives and funding sources, lies with the FAORs.’. FAO Representatives therefore have greater lead
2 FAOR’s Small Scale Facility 3 FPMIS information as at 20/03/07 4 Classification used in the OCD’s November 2003 desk review ‘ An Assessment of the Functions and Resources of the FAO Representations ’. 5 Administrative Officer, Administrative Assistant and Receptionist
16 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
responsibility for managing the project cycle from project formulation, through implementation to closure.
70. The requirements of DGB 2007/04 6 imply the need to strengthen the programme unit to ensure adequate capacity for the Representative to fulfil the new obligations. However the new staffing profile does not provide the necessary support. The decision to downgrade the Programme Assistant’s post implies that the current level of field programme development is too low to warrant more senior staff. However, this approach does not recognize the level and volume of work undertaken by the programme unit. It raises the likelihood of continued high staff turnover in this unit, the need for continuous staff training at entry level, and consequently a lower level of efficiency than is required to ensure growth in the field programme and its effective management. In addition, savings from the restructuring may neither off-set the cost of constantly replacing trained staff nor repair the damage to the Organisation’s image caused by inadequate staffing capacity. OCD and the new Representative should review the staffing profile to ensure the programme unit is adequately resourced.
Workload Assessment 71. The 2006 PBE work measurement survey for Sierra Leone showed that an average of 70% of the year was spent on regular programme and technical support activities while 30% was spent on administration. The programme development and liaison activities focused mainly on budget holder responsibilities, liaison work through the UNCT and its thematic groups, and, coordination and information exchange. It was noted that an average of approximately 3% of the time was spent particularly on project/programme identification. The evaluation considers that this effort is inadequate to grow the programme beyond its current level in the existing country environment but that this is not addressed by the revised staffing profile. Given the workload already in the programme unit and the increased demands for FAO’s services described above, we conclude that the FAOR is not adequately resourced to ensure it can properly fulfil the new mandate.
Succession Planning for new FAO Representatives 72. The evaluation found that succession planning has been inadequate. Over the review period, there have been two significant gaps due to excessive delays in filling the FAO Representative’s post. In 2001/2002, there was a 10 months gap during which the WHO Representative acted as FAOR a.i. after the sudden and unexpected death of the incumbent. Again in 2006/07, there was a gap 7 during which the UNDP RR acted as FAOR a.i. In this case, the FAOR’s impending retirement in August 2006 was well known to OCD/ODG. To further complicate matters, the UNDP RR/FAOR a.i. is also
6 DGB 2007/04 also states that Representatives are expected to contribute 30% of their time as members of the multidisciplinary team of the Sub-Regional Offices, which seems entirely unrealistic in view of in-country requirements and the staffing situation in the Representation. 7 It was learned subsequent to the evaluation that a candidate has been identified and accepted as the new FAOR. He is expected to take up the post in mid-May 2007, meaning that there will have been an 8 ½ months gap.
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due to retire in March 2007 which means that the FAOR a.i. arrangements will be passed to yet another busy Head of Agency until the new FAOR is fielded.
73. Using other UN Agency Heads to act as FAORs a.i., while appropriate for short periods of say one to two weeks, has a negative impact if used over extended periods. The evaluation found that the long gap between Representatives has: weakened control of the office; resulted in overloading of the Assistant FAOR (Programme); weakened FAO’s presence in multi-stakeholder discussions (e.g. UNDAF, DACO); negatively impacted on resource mobilisation initiatives; and, created delays in addressing pressing project implementation issues. For example, there was urgent need to follow- up with Government on payments due to project GCP/SIL/024/GER for seeds procured during the 2006 planting season. However, follow-up with the MAFS and Ministry of Finance was only expedited during the recent visit of the previous FAOR as resource person for this evaluation. Programme development was also moribund during the hiatus, at a time when several projects were ending. This is unsatisfactory and damaging. Ideally, there should be a period of overlap between incumbents, or at minimum a substantive briefing from the previous incumbent, before a new FAOR takes up his post. In the case of new FAORs coming from outside the Organisation, the inability to benefit from previous FAORs (especially active and knowledgeable ones like the former FAOR in Sierra Leone) results in a much steeper learning curve, with all the attendant inefficiencies.
Recruitment of the Assistant FAOR (Administration) 74. The local selection process for the Assistant FAOR (Admin) was completed and the submission made to OCD in April 2005, to which the FAOR did not receive a response. At OCD’s request, the post was re-advertised in early 2006 and the submission made to OCD in July 2006, again without response. This is of concern as: a) this elaborate exercise was undertaken twice without any recruitment action; b) it is unlikely that the preferred candidate, who had previous UN experience, would still be available eight months later; c) the international Administrative Officer, who had been extended in post until June 2007 specifically to train the new Assistant FAOR(Admin), may not be available after this period; d) If both FAOR and Assistant FAOR (Admin) are new to the Organisation, then the efficiency of the Representation will be impaired until they gain the necessary experience. This situation contributes to reducing the efficiency of the administration which is responsible for supporting the Representation’s operations and should be speedily addressed.
Programme Development 75. Government requests received generally drove the planning process. These were reportedly based on needs assessments, the recommendations of the June 2002 report by the then-Director of TCO that launched several planning activities (see Chapter 4.3) and Government priorities evolving from MDGs 1 & 7 and the various strategic plans and sector development strategies developed, e.g. PRSP Pillar II and the Government’s medium term agricultural strategic plan 2003-2007. However, the FAOR/SIL does not have in place a plan to help prioritize or guide the selection process to ensure adequate synergies are created internally between FAO’s activities,
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and, externally with those of other actors. The evaluation considers this to be essential in a situation where there are many competing needs, scarce resources and donor reluctance to invest in certain areas such as capacity building of the Ministries.
76. The evaluation has noted the planning processes being developed in other countries on a pilot basis for creating a national priority framework. Such an approach should be used in Sierra Leone to develop a rolling framework, covering perhaps four years. Resource requirements could also be indicated. The priority framework should be reviewed periodically - every 1-2 years. It should specify intended outcomes, but not be tied down in the form of projects or programmes for implementation. This would ensure that FAO continues to play an active role in promoting food security and poverty reduction.
Advocacy 77. One of the main tasks of an FAO Representation is advocacy, aimed at promoting issues felt to be particularly important. The objective has been to raise the profile of these issues and to create support for addressing them, in partnership with Government and other actors (donors, NGOs) in the country.
78. The FAO Representative during the evaluation period was very active with advocacy. He attended many events (meetings, workshops, seminars, etc.) and was said by his in-country colleagues in other agencies to have been an active and effective spokesperson for FAO and for addressing the issues in FAO’s mandate.
79. One of the main advocacy areas was the inclusion of food security as a major theme in the PRSP and the UNDAF, building on the President’s food security pledge of 2002. This was achieved through direct advocacy by the FAOR as well as provision of backstopping to line Ministries that were involved in development planning processes, including the Right-to-Food Secretariat, which was particularly active with respect to the PRSP. The anniversary of the President’s pledge (19 May) is now commemorated and the FAO advocacy has played a role in this recognition. FAO has strongly advocated Government ownership and leadership of food security initiatives, although some donors have preferred in recent years to channel assistance through NGOs.
80. FAO has attended most of the meetings to review Pillar-II, organized by DACO. This was normally done by the Assistant FAOR (Programme) and this was an appropriate level of representation.
81. More recently, subsequent to an outbreak in Nigeria, the FAOR was instrumental in advocating the adoption of a plan for the prevention and control of avian influenza. This was the first activity of its type in Sierra Leone, and resulted in the formation of a National Avian Flu secretariat, including a technical and inter-ministerial committee.
82. Much of the successful advocacy work was connected to partnership efforts. Some of these are cited elsewhere in this evaluation, e.g. work with UNDP, CORAD and WFP on OFTN; crop survey and vulnerability assessment and school gardens with school
19 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
feeding (with WFP) and publicity of FAO activities on radio with the UN Communications Group. The FAOR has helped the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security to dialogue with partners, such as the National Association of Farmers of Sierra Leone (NAFSL). It also assisted in negotiations with IFAD, that led to a revival of the suspended North Central Development Project and formulation of new projects.
83. FAOR advocacy was particularly active within the UN Country Team and with the Government. Rather less was achieved with bilateral donors in the country, but there were factors that contributed to this. A major one was an absence of interlocutors that deal with agriculture. The largest bilateral donor in Sierra Leone, DFID, does not have an agricultural portfolio. USAID channels all its support through NGOs, but here the work on FFS did have considerable coordination with the CORAD group that is supported by USAID. The EU is another major donor, but the post of Rural Development Adviser was vacant for two years. Other donors present in Freetown have very small programmes.
3.2. Technical Backstopping and Support from FAO Headquarters and Regional/Sub-regional Office
84. FAO provides technical expertise through a variety of sources including FAO staff in Headquarters and the Regional Offices, consultants (national and international) as well as through the many regional and sub-regional technical committees and working groups of which Sierra Leone is a member.
85. During the period 2002-2006, the Representation hosted roughly 15 missions per annum. Approximately 40% of these were review and formulation missions, involving RAF and Headquarters technical divisions, and, policy assistance provided through RAF. Project backstopping, training, and evaluation/assessment missions accounted for 55% provided through international consultants, Headquarters technical divisions, and RAF 8. Of these only three missions in 2003 and four missions in 2006 were neither project related, requested by Government nor by the FAOR. They were concerned primarily with evaluations and sectoral studies e.g. the Fish Survey in the waters off the Liberian coast.
86. During 2006, FAO provided 1,700 person/days of technical expertise to the Government of Sierra Leone. Approximately 90% was delivered through project related activities, with national consultants accounting for 70%, international consultants for 23% and Headquarters missions for 7%. One long-term international consultant recruited in 2005 and five national professional project staff made up the bulk of the person/days worked. RAF did not undertake any missions to Sierra Leone during 2006.
87. The Representative has been very active in soliciting support from RAF and Headquarters Technical Divisions. His success, which was most evident in the period
8 The remaining 5% were visiting missions from other Agencies seeking information on sector issues
20 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
following the Presidential pledge, may be attributable to several favourable conditions that include the transitional status of the country, the FAO commitment to the food security agenda, the involvement of FAO technical and managerial expertise at high level in the sector review activities, and the FAOR’s collegial style of working. However, delays were noted in responses to requests. RAF support was constrained by the lack of human and financial resources. For example, in developing the SPFS/OFTN programme, the FAOR required RAF to assist in elaborating the document, either through staff time or providing a consultant, but this was not possible due to lack of funds. As a result, FAO’s inputs to the exercise were delayed.
88. The reform process is intended to bring FAO’s expertise closer to country level, but adequate financial resources to facilitate implementation must also be provided. Budgets of financial resources for the Regional offices set high income targets. Priority therefore is on those missions where income can be earned, typically project related technical backstopping. This reduces the possibility of FAO addressing problems or requests from FAORs in areas where there is no project against which the mission can be charged, and non-staff Regular Programme resources are very scarce in any case.
89. The evaluation has noted that FAO had virtually no non-project related activities in Sierra Leone (see section 5.1). An additional constraint is the lack of motivation in the concerned Ministries to provide data or information requested from Headquarters in support of these non-project activities, e.g. statistical surveys. The Assistant FAOR (Programme) therefore has to make a personal, special effort to obtain the required information.
90. Sierra Leone is part of the tri-nation Mano River Union, along with Liberia and Guinea. The UNCT regards close collaboration between the UN Agencies in the three countries as an essential tool to ensure mutually beneficial development, peace and stability between the three countries. Periodic meetings are held and although FAO has participated in the past, this has been despite great difficulty in obtaining timely approvals from Headquarters even where there is no cost implication for FAO. Furthermore, within the context of DGB2007/04, it is expected that the FAORs in the sub-region would have the opportunity to meet periodically with sub-regional technical officers, to share experiences and technical expertise. The evaluation believes that FAOR participation in these meetings is important for developing greater internal synergy. FAOR participation in these fora should therefore be actively supported by the Organization through providing timely travel clearances and resources to facilitate participation of the concerned FAORs.
3.3. Cost-Effectiveness of Operations
91. The evaluation examined the processes associated with procurement, recruitment, project operations, budget control and financial management of resources. The Representative had established procedures for project implementation and divided related tasks between the programme and administrative units. In general, the
21 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
arrangements were practical and supported project operations. However, there is need to ensure back-up support is provided in case of staff absences.
92. Unlike other countries, there were few complaints of delayed implementation due to existing rules and constraining delegated authorities from responsible staff. This was due in part to greater dependence on TCE to recruit and initiate procurement actions during the emergency period when the Representation was busiest. Subsequently, the relatively lower level of project activities as well as the measure of non-compliance with organisational rules were also contributory factors. The major issues noted are discussed below.
Procurement and Delivery 93. During the entire evaluation period, approximately US$1.5 million was spent on procurement of project inputs 9 locally while US$1.9 million was procured through Headquarters. Total procurement averaged $570,000 per year, which is quite small compared to other countries that have been through complex emergencies, e.g. Somalia and southern Sudan.
94. In 2004, a local procurement committee was established to review all purchases greater than $1,000. The evaluation found evidence of splitting of tenders to remain within the existing delegated authority of $25,000. Through DGB2006/19, FAORs were given the option of revising this ceiling upwards by applying to AFSP, through OCD. The past Representative did not request the increased delegation. His rationale was that at the time the offer came, there were no procurement actions that would have exceeded the ceiling. Furthermore, a new ceiling of $50,000 should have been made automatic for all Representatives and only those requiring levels above $50,000 should have been asked to make the request. The evaluation strongly supports this view.
Recruitment 95. The Representation recruited national consultants as project staff and also as temporary staff of the Representation. An average of 65 contracts were issued annually during the period 2004-2006 of which PSAs were about 48% and temporary or casual labour contracts the remainder. Multiple PSA and temporary contracts were given to national consultants and drivers. In a number of cases, issuance of PSA contracts not only exceeded the delegated authority, but were inappropriate for the nature of the work . FAORs have delegated authority for issuing PSA contracts for up to 11 months within a 12 month period. Subsequent appointments should be handled through the Management Support Unit in the Regional Office (RAFX). In addition subscribers are expected to be in the professional category and to work independently. In the instances noted, professional project staff were issued with contracts exceeding 11 months without going through RAFX, and several PSAs were given to support staff, e.g drivers. These contracts generated additional work in the Administrative Unit, as up to 10
9 This does not include fuel, vehicle spares or stationery
22 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
contracts per individual were prepared for the year. All of the ten 10 professional project staff (NPP) employed during 2004-2006 were given multiple contracts. Three of them worked continuously on short PSA contracts for 32.5 months, without the mandatory breaks.
96. MS375, re-issued in 2006, makes provision for recruiting national project personnel for a maximum of 12 months at a stretch for the duration of the project. However, the administrative unit was still issuing PSAs and temporary contracts to project staff in 2007. A constraint was that access to the FAO Intranet, where the up-dated manual sections are available, was not always possible and the international administrative officer was not up-to-date on these changes.
97. Posts or vacancies were not generally advertised, except for Representation RP staff where recruitment was finalized by OCD. The same individuals were recruited repeatedly, especially project coordinators and consultants, but there was no evidence that this was through a competitive process nor were there any performance reviews done. There was no guarantee therefore that the most qualified staff were recruited, or that the Representation had received services giving good value-for-money. This was reportedly due to FAO’s rates of compensation being non-competitive and therefore a major constraint to recruiting the best consultants. Furthermore, given the scarcity of jobs locally, it was not cost-effective to advertise vacancies in view of the likely large numbers of applications and the review time that would be required and which the Representation could not afford. Consultants who had worked for FAO before were therefore the preferred candidates and were transferred from project to project.
Operational Procedures / Project Implementation Tools 98. Project monitoring was constrained by inadequate human and financial resources in the FAOR RP budget to cover travel to project sites. The Representation therefore depended on the coordinators’ reports to obtain information on project status. This weakened the monitoring function, which may be the root cause of deficiencies noted in the procurement process and the poor success rate of the Telefood projects discussed further in this report.
99. LOAs/MOUs were not used extensively as an implementation tool. Instead, the Representation purchased inputs through local tenders for either direct distribution or distribution through cooperating partners, e.g. MAFS. In view of the small amounts involved, this appears to be a practical solution. However, the new Representative should review the procedures as the level of activity increases to ensure efficiency, cost-effectiveness and transparency.
100. Delays in project start-up and closures were noted and these appear linked to inadequate access to FPMIS, as well as inadequate application of operations procedures by the programme and administrative units. Start-up procedures i.e. initial
10 This information is based on recruitment records reviewed in the Representation since these NPPs were all recruited locally.
23 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
task force meetings, are not followed systematically neither are requests for financial closures timely. There is need to re-train staff of these units in project operations procedures and ensure reliable access to FPMIS.
Budget Control and Financial management 101. Access to the corporate systems has helped the Representation better track expenditures on projects and the Regular Programme. Systematic monitoring is, however, constrained by the limitations of the FAS budget module and the limited capacity of the administrative unit to perform this task regularly.
102. Headquarters does not enter the budgets in Oracle on a timely basis - therefore the information available in FAS usually is not current. The Administrative Officer is the only staff member familiar enough with FAS and DWH to prepare financial statements. He uses the information from the DWH as well as the FAS expenditures to prepare financial statements in spreadsheets, whenever needed for budget revisions. Monitoring of resource availability through generating regular financial statements for management review was therefore not undertaken. This aspect of the Representation’s budget control needs to be strengthened to support the decision making process.
103. The FAOR regular programme budget over the evaluation period has averaged approximately $530,000 per year of which the non-staff budget constitutes 30%. FAORs are not normally involved in the budgeting exercise as this is a purely OCD/HQ led exercise. The Representation had not received its 2007 allotment at the time of the evaluation mission, but a realistic budget for non-staff costs for 2007 is $176,000. This includes security charges, UN common services, and general operations of the Representation based on past expenditure. However, assuming the same funding level as in 2006 is allocated, there will be a shortfall of close to $40,000. AOS resources are included in the overall OCD budget estimates for general operating expenses and are therefore not available to support the programme unit, for example through hiring temporary assistance. The evaluation believes that FAORs should participate in the budgeting process and that resources earned through AOS should be allocated to support programme growth as much as is possible.
104. Table 1 below shows the FAOR budget compared to funds distributed through the office, by year during the evaluation period.
24 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
Table 1: FAO Representation Budget (US$)
Item / Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total FAOR Budget 311,150 11 522,104 595,844 665,770 598,611 501,332 12 Of which Non- staff component 169,883 172,901 154,381 187,373 139,662 137,753 Of which AOS component - - - - 24,000 82,000
Total annual FAS Disbursements 766,372 1,198,107 1,894,771 2,411,075 1,869,581 2,250,608
Information Technology 105. The Representation accesses COIN, FPMIS and DWH through the Internet as access to the Intranet is intermittent due to poor connectivity. The disadvantage is that they cannot access the manual sections on-line and so are not up-to-date with administrative changes.
106. In addition, with the departure of the FAOR, in August 2006, the password used to access ‘My FPMIS’ expired. Therefore, while the office can ‘see’ information in the system they cannot input information directly which makes programme monitoring more tedious as they then need to send the information to RAF for inputting. The evaluation believes that the Representation should request Headquarters to issue a new password.
3.4. Overall Conclusions
107. There is an overall positive judgement of the performance of the Representation. FAO enjoys a good reputation in the country, particularly among the Government and the rest of the UN system. Relations with bilateral donors and IFIs are also good. However, the office is very thinly staffed on the Programme side, and the long vacancy in the FAOR position has been a major weakness, as programme development in the country has largely ground to a halt. The evaluation has also noted issues to be addressed to improve administrative performance.
108. After the initial flurry of activity subsequent to the Presidential food security pledge, FAO did not have an agreed framework to guide its cooperation with Sierra Leone. Thus, the interventions were largely opportunistic and depended on requests received or the FAOR’s own initiatives. This does not provide a good basis for mobilizing resources, neither the scarce ones available within FAO nor from donors.
11 and 12 Actual expenditure used as budgeted amount not available from DWH
25 3. FAO Representation in Sierra Leone
109. While the FAOR was an effective advocate, he was not, nor could he be expected, to have a command of all technical areas. For reasons outlined above, there were numerous times when the FAOR requested support from other parts of the Organization, including notably the Regional Office, but these requests were not answered. Resource constraints have continued to plague the operation of the office in Sierra Leone, and these would have been even worse had there not been the German- funded projects during the evaluation period, which have now ended or will end soon. The evaluation feels that the resource situation deserves the urgent attention of FAO management.
26 4. Summary of Activities and Results
4. Summary of Activities and Results in Major Areas Supported by FAO in Sierra Leone
110. The following chapter includes a summary of the activities carried out by FAO in Sierra Leone during the evaluation period. From an initial emphasis on emergencies, and subsequent to the President’s food security pledge, FAO assistance moved into development of agricultural policies and strategies. After the policy guidelines were put in place, FAO assisted in its implementation, largely through three German-funded projects (on Operation Feed The Nation, rehabilitation of the seeds sector, and establishment of a Right-to-Food secretariat) and also with support from TCP. The chapter looks at these various intervention areas and some cross-cutting issues addressed by FAO during the evaluation period.
4.1. The FAO Portfolio in Sierra Leone 111. During the evaluation period, the FAO portfolio in Sierra Leone has changed considerably. The level in terms of funding has decreased, along with the number of donors, as immediate rehabilitation activities no longer feature in the portfolio. At present, the only donor funding projects through FAO in Sierra Leone is the Federal Republic of Germany. In 2006, Germany was funding three national projects in Sierra Leone, plus a regional project on fair trade and organic product certification in which Sierra Leone was actively participating. During the evaluation period, only one other non-emergency project was funded by a bilateral donor (Ireland).
112. The evaluation covered a total of 30 projects, of which 20 were classified as emergency rehabilitation activities and 10 were development. Among the emergency projects, thirteen were primarily for seeds and tools distribution and seven were others, largely aimed at rural rehabilitation. Eight of the projects were funded by TCP. The complete list of projects included in the evaluation is included in Annex 7.
113. The table below shows expenditure on national projects by type and source of funding for the years 2001-2006.
27 4. Summary of Activities and Results
Table 2: Project expenditure by type and source of funding 13
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Emergency rehabilitation projects Primarily 553,963 1,898,211 937,942 503,920 40,598 2,265 3,936,898 Seeds & Tools Others 0 373,105 416,695 1,159,914 127,194 8,660 2,085,568 Total 553,963 2,271,316 1,354,637 1,663,834 167,792 10,925 6,022,466 of which: TCP 44,703 534,476 236,932 200,778 1,819 0 1,018,708 Other donors 509,259 1,736,840 1,117,705 1,463,056 165,973 10,925 5,003,758 Development projects TCP 0 8,162 341,392 347,342 178,543 58,410 933,848 Other donors 0 0 0 152,238 1,746,557 1,612,564 3,511,359 Total 0 8,162 341,392 499,580 1,925,100 1,670,974 4,445,207 Total (emergency 553,963 2,279,478 1,696,028 2,163,413 2,092,892 1,681,899 10,467,673 + develop- ment)
114. The Table shows clearly the evolution of FAO-cooperation over the review period. Emergency rehabilitation projects were 100% of the total FAO project-based cooperation in 2001 and 99.6% in 2002, but fell as a percentage of expenditure in subsequent years, to 8% in 2005 and less than 1% in 2006, as the country situation returned to normal. Even within the emergency rehabilitation projects, seeds and tools distribution predominated until 2003 but there was an ever-increasing amount of expenditure on projects dealing with other forms of livelihood rehabilitation starting from 2002 and reaching a peak in 2004.
115. Expenditure on donor-funded projects in Sierra Leone has ranged from US$1.1 million - US$1.9 million since 2002, with the major shift from focus on emergency rehabilitation to development coming between the years 2004 and 2005. However, it is projected that there will be a dramatic decline in delivery in 2007 as the number of operational donor- funded projects declines.
4.2. Emergency Rehabilitation Interventions
13 Telefood and Regional projects excluded
28 4. Summary of Activities and Results
116. FAO enjoys considerable credit for its constant involvement in emergency rehabilitation throughout most of the civil war period. FAO began operating emergency rehabilitation projects in the country as early as 1995, while the war was going on. The assistance programme grew after the signing of the Lomé Agreement in July 1999, permitting the return of international personnel to the country. An FAO Emergency Coordinator was already fielded by August 1999 and an Emergency Coordination Unit (ECU) was established.
117. The emergency rehabilitation assistance programme increased further with the return of more peaceful conditions in 2001, which is the start of the period covered by this evaluation. Emergency rehabilitation assistance through FAO can be characterised as falling into two types, with some overlapping: • supply of agricultural inputs (mostly seeds and tools) and coordination of input supplies; • rehabilitation and training for most affected populations.
118. During the evaluation period, some 18 emergency rehabilitation projects were implemented in Sierra Leone. Sources of funding were bilateral donors (Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, USA), the EC, UNHCR and FAO TCP.
119. Projects for distribution of agricultural inputs targeted returning refugees, displaced persons and ex-combatants. Liberian refugees and their host families were targeted particularly in two interventions. Rice and groundnuts seeds were generally provided and vegetable seeds were included in some projects, to target women in particular. However, vegetable seeds were usually not accompanied by fertiliser and agro- chemicals, without which yields could not reach their potential. Seeds were generally procured on the local market, and one TCP project was specifically geared towards increasing the availability of certified seeds for distribution to needy farmers. Hand tools were procured from local blacksmiths when possible, including those trained under FAO projects. However, the volume required was such that imported tools also had to be purchased.
120. Aside from the provision of rehabilitation supplies, FAO played a vital role in coordination of the large volume of emergency assistance to Sierra Leone. This assistance was widely acknowledged to have resulted in better targeting of beneficiaries and reducing duplication of effort. It also permitted FAO TCP assistance, a more flexible source of funding, to fill gaps more effectively. Activities included chiefdom-level vulnerability assessments, crop surveys and mapping of vulnerability using the Dynamic Atlas, which enabled production of the Sierra Leone Food Security Atlas. With UNICEF and the Ministry of Health, the EU undertook a pilot Food Security and Nutrition Surveillance exercise, to identify early warning signs of seasonal food insecurity and acute malnutrition and to identify factors contributing to chronic food insecurity and malnutrition.
121. NGOs were effectively brought into the coordination process, thus reducing duplication in the provision of assistance. Food aid was integrated with seed supply, to ensure that
29 4. Summary of Activities and Results
seed was used as intended and not consumed during annual hungry periods. Despite relatively low funding levels, it was estimated that in the last major year of funding agricultural relief (2003), some 60% of needy families received assistance. Reports indicated that 90% of the inputs were appropriately used.
122. In 2002, FAO carried out an evaluation of its overall emergency activities at corporate level 14 . A mission to Sierra Leone in connection with that evaluation found that there were considerable delays in acquiring inputs, which meant that requirements of the agricultural calendar were too often not respected. Quality of local rice seed distributed was determined to be poor, due to the local gene pool having been depleted over the years and the absence of functioning institutions to look after the maintenance and multiplication of quality seeds, including foundation and certified seeds. Albeit on a small scale, this problem was directly addressed by one of the TCP projects implemented during the emergency rehabilitation period, TCP/SIL/0167 (see Annex 5). This was the only intervention aimed directly at improving seed quality. These problems were confirmed by the impact assessment study undertaken for this evaluation, where 46% of respondents mentioned quality problems with seeds received in emergency programmes. Thirty-one percent mentioned poor germination and 23% said that seeds were received too late for the season for which they were intended.
123. Efforts were made to monitor beneficiaries after the input distribution, but this was never done systematically. The impact study undertaken for this evaluation, carried out three years after FAO-provided assistance ended, found that 82% of the respondents felt that the emergency rehabilitation assistance they received was beneficial. While no benchmarks exist for whether this is a satisfactory result, the evaluation considers it to be minimally acceptable. A key problem was obviously that the packages provided were too small to provide inputs sufficient to feed a family through to the next season. The impact assessment survey noted, for example, that only 48% of the emergency assistance recipients retained seed for use in the next year. The size of the packages was constrained by funding and the quality of the materials provided has been noted above.
124. Some projects did not distribute seeds and tools, but rather focused on livelihood rehabilitation and skills development. Such projects started in early 2002, with the Netherlands-funded blacksmith project (OSRO/SIL/105/NET), followed in 2003 with a TCP for training of disabled people in blacksmithery and food processing (TCP/SIL/2903) and in 2004 by Irish-funded projects for processing facilities (particularly aimed at women beneficiaries) and village-level livestock rehabilitation (OSRO/SIL/303/IRE and OSRO/SIL/304/IRE) and a Swedish-funded project for addressing rural youth through cooperative fishing and crop production (OSRO/SIL/401/SWE).
14 Evaluation of Strategic Objective A3 - “Preparedness for an Effective and Sustainable Response to Food and Agricultural Emergencies”
30 4. Summary of Activities and Results
125. The evaluation viewed a sample of these activities, including two blacksmith workshops of the Netherlands project, a workshop and processing units provided under the TCP (see separate report on TCP/SIL/2903 in Annex 5) and a youth fishing group from the Swedish project. All the activities were continuing, although the blacksmiths and food processing activities were operating well below capacity. However, equipment provided was still functioning. While no examples of village livestock rehabilitation were seen, the evaluation notes on the positive side that this project wisely provided vaccine, which is not normally available in Sierra Leone rural areas and is important to the success of livestock rehabilitation 15 . Poultry rehabilitation was affected negatively by the precautionary moves taken by Sierra Leone subsequent to the outbreak of avian flu in early 2006 in Nigeria.
126. The FAO interventions towards rehabilitation were small pilot initiatives that highlighted the need to address particular vulnerable groups. For example, youth unemployment is stressed as an issue of concern in all analyses of Sierra Leone’s post-war development. One emergency project specially addressed this target group, but it did not inspire large-scale follow-up from donors 16 . FAO has followed up on some of these projects through its involvement in Operation Feed the Nation. Some FFS are engaged in animal production (usually poultry and small ruminants) and processing machines have started to be made available to established FFS through loans channelled through FFS District Networks.
4.3. Development of Agricultural Policy and Agricultural Development Strategy (including Right to Food)
127. The Presidential pledge on food security of May 2002 marked the beginning of a new orientation to FAO activities in Sierra Leone. The pledge came at the same time as changes were being made in the orientation of the FAO Special Programme on Food Security (SPFS), subsequent to an evaluation of that Programme. These changes were intended to broaden the scope of the SPFS and include wider dimensions of food security. The first step in Sierra Leone was a mission, headed by the then-Director of the Field Operations Division, to determine how FAO could best assist Sierra Leone in implementing the pledge. That mission assisted in the preparation of an Interim Statement of Policy Intent for the Agriculture Sector in Sierra Leone (October 2002). The Statement included that MAFS intended to formulate and implement policies and programmes for the development of the agricultural sector with the following objectives: Increase diversified domestic production of food, with a view to achieving food security in the medium to long term; Increase agricultural productivity, output, rural incomes and employment, while ensuring adequate protection of the environment;
15 The impact studies undertaken for the evaluation revealed that only 1% of the farmers interviewed vaccinate regularly. 16 However, UNDP has a Youth Engagement and Job Creation Programme that works with MAFS.
31 4. Summary of Activities and Results
Ensure balanced regional agricultural growth and equitable distribution of income; and Maximise foreign exchange earnings from the agricultural sector.
128. The Interim Statement of Policy Intent also defined the role envisaged for the state. The Statement was never formally adopted but served as a general guide for the MAFS at central level in its subsequent actions.
129. Mobilising more than 20 short-term consultants, all paired with local experts, FAO then initiated a major planning exercise, with financial support from the World Bank, IFAD and UNDP, to draft an Agricultural Sector Review and Agricultural Development Strategy (ASR). FAO support was funded largely through an TCP project (TCP/SIL/2904). While the main work was done in 2003, the Government officially adopted the review in June 2004. The main objective was to develop the substantial potential for agricultural sector growth by:
Implementing a Right to Food and Food Safety Net Programme; Improving rural/village infrastructure; Commercialisation of agriculture and export promotion; Efficient provision of agricultural services; Human resource development – empowering the people; Expansion and diversification of crop and livestock production to ensure food security; Sustainable natural resource management (Land, Forestry and Fisheries).
130. FAO was the lead agency for the elaboration of the ASR. Taking stock of the post- conflict situation in the country, the comprehensive document (main report plus 18 sector reports) provided the best data base for the agricultural sector at that point in time. A key problem to be addressed was seasonal food insecurity at the start of the rainy season (July-August) when labour and energy requirements were at their highest and food from the previous year had been depleted. The recommendations of the ASR advocated an orientation towards the private sector with the implication that agriculture had to be an economically viable business, along with human rights-based approaches to food security and development. In a period of conceptual uncertainty, FAO assisted MAFS (and MFMR) via the ASR in an optimal way – leaving it to the ministries mentioned to take over ownership and responsibility for the realisation of proposals to the sector’s development. The ASR was universally praised by interlocutors in Sierra Leone for its quality and timeliness.
131. However, it was felt that in some respects, the ASR was too technical in its approach and a wider food security strategy was needed. FAO subsequently participated in the preparation of a National Food Security Strategy with WFP and CORAD. The strategy included an assessment of food security in the country, a strategy and policies needed to address food security, an institutional framework for doing this and a monitoring and evaluation framework. The document was compiled with inputs from NGOs and civil society. It was finalised and adopted by the Government in September 2004. The
32 4. Summary of Activities and Results
document is very ambitious and includes significant expectations from the Right-to- Food Secretariat (see below). As part of other policy initiatives, FAO also worked with WFP on Vulnerability Assessment & Mapping (VAM-Report) and commented on the 2005 Food Aid Strategy, which was prepared largely by WFP.
132. In commemoration of the first anniversary of the President’s pledge (May 2003), a Right-to-Food seminar was held in Freetown. Because of the interest shown in the topic, the German Government agreed to finance a project (GCP/SIL/022/GER) to assist with the establishment of a Right-to-Food Secretariat. A full evaluation of the project is in Annex 3. A Right-to-Food Secretariat was established under the Vice- President at the national level. While the Secretariat could claim success for the inclusion of food security in the PRSP (see below), it did not play an effective inter- ministerial coordination role, nor did it develop the desired degree of cooperation with NGOs and outreach to the grassroots level. The project was too ambitious in scope to be implemented within the given two-year time frame. Whether the establishment of the Secretariat will lead to sustainable results depends on the interest and resources on the part of the Government to maintain the institutional and political structures that have been established. The continued vacancy of the Executive Secretary position and the absence of funding, now that the project is over, means that the Secretariat will be unable to address the shortcomings identified.
133. However, one of the clear successes of this project, due largely to the efforts of the then-Executive Secretary, was that food security found entrance into the first PRSP for the period 2005 -07 (Pillar II: promoting pro-poor growth for food security and job creation in a healthy macro-economic environment). This objective fully corresponds to MDG 1, eradicating poverty and hunger. The Executive Secretary was assisted in this by the FAOR, who participated regularly in the PRSP working groups. At the same time, the FAOR promoted agricultural/rural development and food security strategies at the conceptual discussions within the UNCT, when elaborating the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) (see Advocacy Campaigns under 3.1 above).
134. Once the policy and strategic planning task was largely accomplished, efforts turned towards implementation of the plans. The PRSP was used by the Government as a framework for seeking development assistance for food security initiatives. The FAOR played a role, and was effectively supported by technical units HQ and RAF, including missions fielded by the FAO Investment Centre (TCI). A key role in the monitoring of the PRSP should be played by the MAFS Project Monitoring, Evaluation and Statistics Division (PEMSD). A request for FAO TCP assistance to PEMSD has been pending for some time. However, longer term support may be more appropriate for the Division’s needs than can be offered from TCP.
135. The Investment Centre has been involved in the preparation of two projects each for the African Development Bank (ADB) also prepared the national medium-term investment programme and bankable projects under TCP/SIL/2905.
33 4. Summary of Activities and Results
136. The ADB projects are the Artisanal Fisheries Development (US$12.9 million) signed in January 2002 and the Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Project and Grant (ASREP) signed in April 2006 (US$17.76 million). The IFAD project already signed is the Rehabilitation and Community-Based Poverty Reduction Project (RCPRP) (US$8.51 million). The Rural Finance and Community Improvement Project (RFCIP) (US$13.9 million) identification was carried out by TCI; it was to be submitted for approval to the IFAD Board in April 2007.
137. The ASREP and RCPRP projects are complementary and aimed at increasing the quantity and quality of agricultural production, thus increasing food availability at household level and for sale. The ASREP project works in Kenema, Pujehun, Moyamba, Port Loko and Kambia Districts, while RCPRP is present in Kono and Kailahun. The projects have a common coordination unit in Freetown, autonomous from MAFS and when the RFCIP comes on line, it will also be handled by the same unit. The projects will make use of FFS for service delivery, with a target of reaching 21,000 beneficiaries. Besides agricultural production, the project will deal with storage and marketing and other issues such as group organisation, gender, HIV/AIDS, health and nutrition, literacy, community planning and conflict resolution.
138. The projects had a long gestation period, having been formulated in 2002 and appraised in 2004. The project started in July 2006 and the first ADB disbursement was in November 2006; by the time of the evaluation the first IFAD disbursement had not been made.
139. The project forms a key part of the scaling-up strategy for FFS in Sierra Leone and is thus an important effect of the work started by FAO in the immediate post-emergency period.
140. While there have been some successes, including those mentioned above, much of what was planned in Pillar II of the PRSP remains unimplemented and uncertain. There are several reasons for this:
• Major donors, in particular DFID and World Bank, through general budget support assistance, gave priority to social sectors (education, health) and infrastructure. Despite the Maputo Declaration recommendation, the Government only managed to lift agricultural sector’s budget share to some 4.5% in 2006 (the Maputo Declaration target is 10%). While some major agricultural support initiatives are being started, there is no sector-wide, programme-based approach. • Long delays in starting up investment projects. The ADB and IFAD agricultural development are cases in point. Funding for major scaling up of OFTN is still being sought. • The decentralisation process has not yet channeled much support to agriculture. After being absent for some 30 years, District Councils were reinstated from January 2005. Thus far, they have concentrated on the establishment of structures and new procedures.
34 4. Summary of Activities and Results
• Commercial agriculture hardly exists. There are very few large-scale farmers. Even large farmers tend to seek project or Government support for their endeavours. The private sector in agriculture is thus very weak, despite efforts being made now to promote it (e.g. by the World Bank). • Agricultural banks are not found in rural areas; hardly any credit programme is available to farmers and informal money lenders apply highly unfavourable terms. • Government institutional capacity is weak, salaries are very low, no qualification and incentive systems are in place and there is a lack of equipment, communication facilities, transport, etc. • Construction of rural roads continues to be inadequate for the development of agriculture.
141. All of the above have contributed to slower investment in agriculture than could have been expected at the time that the Agricultural Development Strategy was being prepared.
4.4. Operation Feed The Nation (OFTN) – Farmers’ Field Schools (FFS)
142. Operation Feed The Nation (OFTN) is the cornerstone of the Sierra Leone Government’s strategy for Pillar II on food security in the PRSP. Designed in cooperation with the FAO Special Programme on Food Security (SPFS), OFTN was conceived as developing in three stages:
143. Stage 1 – Preparatory Phase: This phase began with a study tour of existing FFS programmes in Uganda and Ghana by six Sierra Leoneans, including the Deputy Minister for Agriculture, a Paramount Chief, a female farmer and government representatives. A concept note for the Sierra Leone FFS Programme was drafted, followed by preparation of a curriculum suitable to Sierra Leone. This included group farming on FFS plots, with benefits from the plots accruing to group members. The next activity was a three-month training of trainers (May – August 2003) involving 31 staff (27 from MAFS and 4 from CRS). By December 2003, six FFS had been set up in each district and Western Area, making a total of 78. Training of FFS facilitators continued in 2004, and in March 2004 the ‘Operation Feed the Nation’ Steering Committee had its inaugural meeting. By May 2004, the first Schools had completed their 16-week curricula and participating farmers graduated. The first stage was supported by an allocation from FAO’s Regular Programme (SPFS).
144. Stage 2 – Consolidation Phase: The second stage was guided by a project proposal that had been developed by an FAO mission that took place in May 2004. The curricula were revised and fine-tuned over the course of a three-day workshop with District Coordinators and District Directors of Agriculture in July 2004. Training of trainers continued and 41 more FFS were established in each district in 2005. In August 2005, 140 farmer graduates from the FFS Programme were trained as Farmer Facilitators and each one subsequently established three Farmer-Facilitated FFS.
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145. District-level Networks of Schools began to be established, linking FFS that registered with the Network. Networks began to establish bank accounts, and some began to distribute processing units supplied by the FFS Programme - including threshers, winnowers and mills for rice; peelers, graters and chipping machines for cassava - and low-cost small irrigation systems. These were supplied on a cost recovery basis to FFS, with the funds for repayments being retained by the District Networks for more equipment purchases for other FFS. In addition, a school garden programme was established for 50 schools in Tonkolili, Kono and Kambia Districts. The school gardens are intended to improve the image of farming and produce vegetables to improve the nutritional value of food provided to the students. During Stage 2, the NGO Consortium for Rehabilitation and Agricultural Development (CORAD), funded by USAID, also began to support FFS, Funding for Stage 2 was provided by FAO TCP (project TCP/SIL/3001), UNDP and the Federal Republic of Germany (project GCP/SIL/024/GER).
146. By the time of the evaluation, it was reported that 1465 FFS had been established in Sierra Leone, of which 981 were through the Government (with TCP, UNDP and German financing) and 484 by NGOs. Assuming an average membership of 25, this would mean over 36,600 farmers have been or are being trained through FFS 17 . This is an impressive achievement in a relatively short time. Technical support to the Government programme is supplied by a National Coordinator and national consultants on school gardens, post-harvest and small-scale irrigation. At the time of the evaluation, the national team was awaiting the arrival of four experts and 14 technicians from China, to support the FFS at village-level under an FAO South-South Cooperation agreement. Also, a decision was taken to amalgamate mature Farmers’ Field Schools with the Agricultural Business Units, rural organizations for service provision supported by UNDP.
147. The Government is now attempting to arrange financing for Stage 3 – Rapid Up- scaling Phase . The goal of this Stage is to reach some 200,000 farmers through FFS. A proposal has been developed and expressions of interest received from the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and ADB. At the end of February 2007, a delegation headed by the Minister of Agriculture was expected to go to Khartoum, Tunis and Rome (IFAD) to seek support for the development of a bankable project, estimated at US$30 million. FFS will be used as the means of service delivery in the recently initiated RCPRP and ASREP projects (see chapter 5.7).
148. A FFS in Sierra Leone generally consists of 25 members. Both men and women can be members. Groups are formed when land is acquired for a group plot. In many countries, the group plot is small and basically used for teaching and demonstration. In Sierra Leone, group plots tend to be large, at least 5-10 acres, with examples of up to 100 acres. The production from these plots is shared (with a certain percentage to the land owner, who is often the FFS Chairman) and group work on the plot may, in some
17 There are an estimated 500,000 farm families in the country.
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cases, require a considerable proportion of the FFS member’s working week. In the case of particularly large FFS plots, local labour is hired to work in the fields. The group plot may thus be of considerable economic significance to the members.
149. The basic requirement to join the FFS is that potential members should have the capacity, time and willingness to participate. By definition, this can lead to exclusion of the most vulnerable, e.g. disabled, elderly, pregnant women, very young. Crops being developed in FFS are generally rice, cassava and vegetables. Some FFS engage in poultry and, in a few cases, other agricultural crops and aquaculture. The idea behind the FFS, in Sierra Leone as elsewhere, is that farmers learn from analysing agronomic situations and working together on a group plot. Their learning is facilitated by a skilled person who has both a sound knowledge base and facilitation ability. In poor developing countries like Sierra Leone, the national extension services can never reach all the farmers needing their services. In FFS, the concept is that eventually farmers themselves will act as facilitators, thus allowing a much greater spread of improved technologies.
150. The experience of FFS in Sierra Leone was evaluated in early 2006 by the UK Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Dunstan Spencer and Associates, in a study financed by FAO. It examined some 18 FFS and 18 control villages in three districts. The study, based largely on focus group discussions, concluded that FFS were highly appreciated by members, that there was some positive spin-off effects from the FFS to non-members and that there were higher yields in FFS groups than others.
151. Because FFS were a major focus of operation for FAO over recent years and recognizing that the ODI study had examined a very small percentage of FFS in the country, it was decided to carry out a larger impact assessment for this evaluation. The impact study covered 1380 individual farmer respondents in six districts (Kambia, Bombali, Bo, Pujehun, Kono, Kailahun). Farmers covered were members of FFS, non- members of FFS in FFS villages, and those in Control Villages without FFS 18 . The entire impact study appears as Annex 6 to this report.
152. The main question for the impact study was whether there was a difference in terms of livelihoods and food security as a result of participation in an FFS, as compared to those who did not participate. Another major question was whether there has been any “spill-over” effect in FFS villages among persons who are not members but who would have been exposed to the results of the FFS, as compared to Control Villages that did not participate at all in the FFS.
153. On the main question, the survey showed that rice production increased more rapidly since 2004 in FFS villages than in control villages. FFS farmers in the same village started from a higher average production than non-FFS farmers. Average rice production for both groups in FFS villages increased by about the same rate, thus
18 The impact study also covered emergency assistance distributed through FAO. Control Villages were those that had received emergency input assistance from FAO during the period covered by the evaluation.
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indicating a likely “spill-over” effect from the FFS. This was confirmed in the village- level questionnaire, where FFS villages showed a greater increase in food security over recent years than control villages. However, villagers do not themselves perceive a high degree of food security yet, when this is defined as one main meal per day throughout the year. Only 38% of village leaders in FFS villages stated that more than 75% of its inhabitants had reached that level, and 25% in Control Villages. This is considerably below the often-quoted figure of 65-70% based on the present level of rice self-sufficiency, and may be linked to the strong local preference for rice consumption in determining what constitutes a “main meal”. However, it is a question that deserves further analysis.
154. The impact assessment also found that FFS farmers in the same village started from a higher average production than non-FFS farmers. This is because FFS farmers usually have access to the best land and sometimes are selected especially for this reason.
155. All respondents cited improved agricultural practices as one the most important benefits of their participation. By comparison, relatively few chose social factors such as better communication skills, enhanced self-reliance, etc.. Among the most successful agricultural practices mentioned were line planting, appropriate spacing, bed preparation, timely planting, composting (manure) and crop protection techniques.
156. The survey showed farmers believe that increased agricultural production came as a benefit of their participation in the FFS. Some 91% reported that food production had increased on their own farms in the year(s) subsequent to their participation and 87% of these felt that the increase could at least partially be attributed to the FFS.
157. The survey also assessed whether farmers had actually adopted new farming practices and reasons for non-adoption. Nearly 90% of farmers claimed to have adopted new practices; the type of practice adopted was well distributed among many shown in FFS. FFS members were shown to be more innovative, with 60% of them having adopted new seed varieties within the past two years (compared to 44% of non-members) and 48% planting new crops (40% among non-members). Of the practices that were not adopted, the main one was fertiliser use, followed by row planting. Not surprisingly, the reasons for non-adoption were lack of cash, followed by lack of labour and non- availability of inputs locally.
158. Gender was found to be an important factor in attendance at FFS, with 9% of women attending less than 50% of the sessions, compared to 3% of men. More women than men also attended between 51-90% of the sessions, while men predominated among those attending over 90% of the meetings. Women were found to be slightly more likely than men to be involved in experiments relating to new varieties or fertiliser use, but participated significantly less in group savings schemes and were less likely to have received loans. Women were more frequent adopters of some agricultural practices such as crop rotations and use of new varieties.
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159. Main constraints to production were the same for all groups of farmers. In order, these were harvesting and/or storage; lack of fertiliser; lack of labour. Marketing was a particularly strong constraint for FFS farmers, probably because they market more of their production than do non-FFS farmers. This points to an important area that will have to be addressed by FFS in future.
160. The overall assessment of the FFS is that it is appropriate and promising for use in Sierra Leone. There is a tradition of group work and cooperation that makes the model of the large group plot effective. Farmers are enthusiastic about their participation; their agricultural production appears to be increasing. There is a demand from more farmers to be included, as they perceive the benefits to their neighbours. While the vast majority of subsistence farmers in rural areas live in poverty, there is some evidence that the most disadvantaged are less likely to belong to FFS, because they may be less able to work in the group plots. Inclusion of the poorest and least food-secure thus remains an issue. Also, storage and marketing remain key constraints that FFS have not yet addressed.
161. Because of the success so far, there will undoubtedly be pressures to increase the types of service delivery and numbers of people served through FFS. This would be a normal part of any eventual scaling-up. To be successful, this will have to be done judiciously, taking into account in particular the available human resources for facilitating the tasks being proposed.
4.5. Seeds
162. The largest single intervention in budgetary terms by FAO during the evaluation was project GCP/SIL/023/GER “Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone”. The three-year project, begun in February 2005 with a donor budget of US$2,396,027, aimed to revive the national seed multiplication capability that had been destroyed during the war. The pre-war effort was supported by Germany through a Seed Multiplication Project that had begun in 1974; Germany financed the new project for implementation by FAO. The project had been scheduled for a mid-term evaluation at the time of the present country evaluation; it was thus decided to include the project evaluation as part of the overall exercise.
163. The evaluation found that in less than two years the project had made considerable progress in improving coordination in the seed sector and increasing capacity for seed production and dissemination. Two seed centres have been rehabilitated instead of one as planned and, despite lack of vehicles and personnel, seed multiplication for rice and other crops is being revived. Cassava multiplication is also being carried out. An increasing number of farm families are getting benefits by using certified machine processed seed rice.
164. Although the project has been successful in a technical sense, it is not yet operating on a cost-recovery basis. Cassava multiplication is being done as a free service. In
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addition, payment is still outstanding for 400 mt of machine-processed seed rice that was released in June 2006 to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. This has lead to lack of liquidity of the Seed Multiplication Unit. Unless immediate payment is effected, no seed rice can be bought from the farmers and the Unit cannot produce further. The seed supply for the coming season cannot be produced and the continuation of the programme is in doubt unless immediate payment is made 19 . In addition, the regular, timely payment of salaries for counterpart staff has not yet been assumed by the Government. Given these operational difficulties, the future sustainability of the Seed Multiplication Unit is questionable at this point.
165. Operational difficulties should be addressed by establishing the Seed Multiplication Unit as a business enterprise with an independent management. It will also require further investment and additional commercial activities. In particular, more field staff has to be recruited, cost accounting has to be introduced, and capacity building in the farming community for intensive cultivation of crops has to be done to promote a steady increase in commercial demand for certified machine-processed rice seed. The latter would imply creation of a linkage to the Farmers Field School Programme.
166. If the project can be put on a sound operational footing, a second phase of four years (starting February 2008) is recommended, with suggestions to be followed in an extension phase of the seed multiplication project listed in Annex 2.
4.6. Fair Trade
167. Sierra Leone has participated with other countries in West and Central Africa in an effort to obtain fair trade and organic certification for certain export crops in which these countries have comparative advantages in production.
168. Under the project GCP/RAF/389/GER in 2004, in-depth analysis of demand for tropical fair trade and organic products was carried out in five European countries. The study concluded that although no organic or fair trade product is undersupplied, there is a good potential for imports of selected tropical products. The project also surveyed farmer groups and the potential to export organic and fair products in five West African countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. It has identified seven farmer groups which could export such products if adequate technical assistance and training could be provided. In Sierra Leone, the farmer group selected was Kpeya Agricultural Enterprises (KAE), based in Kenema, comprising some 700 members organised in 7 village groups and dealing pre-dominantly with cocoa.
169. In August 2005, GCP/RAF/404/GER (budget: US$ 1.822 million over three years) began to provide the operational assistance identified in the previous project . KAE is the largest group supported in any of the participating countries. Some 25 Farmers Field School programmes (ca. 25 members each) have been set up and at least 18 of
19 During the evaluation, steps were being taken to effect the payment.
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them apparently showed good results. Besides rehabilitation, training has concentrated on technical measures (e.g. pruning, shading, crop protection in accordance with criteria for organic production, drying, storing, etc.) for higher quantities and better quality cocoa. A manual on good practices is about to be issued.
170. Besides the technical assistance, the project supplements the salaries of KAE management until exports generate enough income and will finance the major part of inspection and certification costs in the first two years.
171. A problem for KAE is competition from cocoa traders who buy crops in advance during the ‘hunger period’ when cash is most needed, at very unfavourable terms for the farmer. This practise, which limits cocoa to be delivered to KAE after harvest, is against KAE regulations but has been tolerated by management so far. To discourage these practices, KAE should be in a position to offer farmers access to advance payments under fair conditions. This would also curb farmers’ requests for a full distribution of sales proceeds, allowing management to accumulate some basic savings for operational costs and necessary investments. But KAE does not yet have a business plan and farmers are apparently wary of leaving funds with the management. Many collapses of cooperative societies in the past were due to lack of transparency and accountability of management.
172. At present, there is actually a high demand for organic- and fair-trade-certified cocoa which is expected to continue. Because KAE-members have not used any chemical inputs for years, the fields could be certified organic with a shortened conversion period (normally 3 years). Similarly, because KAE is a farmer-owned organisation with a democratic decision-making structure, it qualifies for fair-trade certification but has to considerably enhance organisational structures required for tracing the origin of the product under fair trade conditions.
173. The first container with cocoa was shipped to Europe in mid-February 2007. KAE- management has experienced now for the first time all steps for an overseas shipment including purchasing, quality control, packaging, transporting, negotiating with exporter, getting clearance, regulations governing payment, etc.
174. The certification process, both for organic and fair-trade produce handling, has been initiated (clearance will last till 2008). Certification would give KAE access to a niche market with higher prices being paid. Furthermore, experience has shown that once one group is certified organic and/or fair-trade in a country, it functions as an example for other groups. Moreover, certification bodies and inspectors get to know the country; with more groups applying for certification inspection visits could be combined to reduce costs; and eventually certification bodies may start training local inspectors. The project has the potential for important catalytic effects in Sierra Leone.
175. It is unfortunate that the recent Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS, Nov. 2006) attached no priority to organic and fair trade. However, the study calls for more training in particular in post-harvest treatment of cocoa (fermentation and drying process) –
41 4. Summary of Activities and Results
which could be even more useful if complemented with the provision of materials on a cost-recovery basis – and suggests importing hybrid cocoa (and oil palm) seedlings.
176. With the emphasis on enhancing tree crop exports MAFS still has to establish a competent focal trade point, caring for organic and/or fair-trade produce at the same time. This unit has to closely link to the Ministry of Trade and Industries (MTI) playing the decisive role in the country’s import/export affairs.
177. It is too early to assess the eventual success of the project, but it seems promising if KAE can successfully compete for its own members’ crops against the cocoa traders and if its management can develop the skills and trust to service the members effectively. It could then serve as a model for other organisations in Sierra Leone also seeking fair trade and organic certification.
4.7. Telefood Projects
178. An evaluation of Telefood (TFD) projects was undertaken because of the large number of such projects (27 during the evaluation period) and to augment the evidence base with respect to the conclusions of the corporate evaluation of TFD undertaken in 2005. For this purpose eleven projects were visited by an international and a national evaluator. TFD projects in Sierra Leone have an average budget of US$ 6,000.
179. This evaluation found that only 20% of the projects had clearly positive impact and that the sustainability of the projects was generally low (the evaluation of Telefood projects is in Annex 4). Projects with livestock components were particularly unsuccessful, either because of management requirements or, in the case of poultry, because of concerns about avian flu. Projects tended to operate in isolation and did not benefit from strategic linkages with other FAO programmes, other international development partners or with the government; thus they were not part of broader efforts for poverty eradication. Only in one case was there evidence of linkages to the FFS.
180. The absence of technical support was one of the main causes of project failure. TFD implementation arrangements preclude the use of funds for capacity building, an area where FAO has a major comparative advantage.
181. No in-depth assessment was done for project appraisal and selection of beneficiaries was in some cases inappropriate. When projects failed, intended beneficiaries were sometimes left with nothing, if they did not have resources to re-start the enterprise. Quality and timeliness of input delivery was not always satisfactory, however this was not a major factor in determining project results. The evaluation found that a rather high percentage of project budgets was used for building materials. In the absence of funds for this, project monitoring and follow-up were not carried out.
182. The evaluation in Sierra Leone thus validates the recommendation of the TFD corporate evaluation that TFD funds should support clearly identified components of
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wider FAO projects and programmes, where they can be better targeted and monitored and fully meet the criteria of addressing the needs of the poor.
183. In the case of Sierra Leone, the evaluation recommended that TFD projects be linked to FFS and FFS District Networks, in order to have better access to capacity building and advice.
4.8. Other Areas 4.8.1. Fisheries
184. During the evaluation period, no national projects were implemented in Sierra Leone exclusively in fisheries. However, one project (OSRO/SIL/401/SWE) brought together three Ministries (Agriculture, Fisheries and Youth) and one component supported nine youth groups with a fishing boat, motor and gear. This component was considered to be successful. One group visited by the evaluation had continued its fishing operations. The boat and engine, serviced every three months, were in good repair and the group had purchased a fish smoker for adding value. However, the cost of assistance per beneficiary is much higher in fisheries rather than crop-based rehabilitation projects. In the case of the group visited, there were 35 members and the boat, engine and gear cost about US$22,000 in total.
185. The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFNR) would like to increase its cooperation with FAO, but so far this has been constrained by a lack of funding. During the evaluation period, FAO assisted with the preparation of an Interim Fisheries Policy of Sierra Leone, which was adopted by Cabinet in August 2003. The Fisheries Policy has four overall objectives: • To improve national nutrition and food security through responsible fishing and the reduction of spoilage and wastage • To increase employment opportunities • To raise the socioeconomic status of the people in the fisheries sector including women; and • To improve the skills of the fishing communities and increase export earnings.
186. The policy states that planning is to be based on sound ecological principles, maintenance and enhancement of marine and fresh water fishing resources, conservation of natural heritage, cooperation with international organisations, the establishment of training and research in fisheries matters and improvement of access to financial resources for stakeholders in the fisheries sector.
187. Sierra Leone would now like to develop an overall Master Plan for Fisheries and Aquaculture. Aquaculture has become more a priority as marine fishing productivity has dropped. A TCP proposal for assistance to aquaculture has recently been prepared. A project for youth in fisheries was also prepared in 2004, building on the Swedish-funded emergency project mentioned above that included a similar
43 4. Summary of Activities and Results
component. The proposal was submitted (on an informal basis) to Germany as a potential donor but not funded.
188. Sierra Leone participates through the Director of Fisheries in regional fisheries bodies meetings. It has also participated in meetings on the Code of Conduct and the Sustainable Fisheries Livelihoods Development Programme (SFLP), although no country-based activities were implemented under the Programme.
189. The main challenges facing the fisheries sector are protection of marine resources from illegal fishing, absence of infrastructure (harbours, roads, electricity) and development of opportunities for inland fisheries and aquaculture.
4.8.2. Forestry
190. Neither have there been any forestry project-related activities in Sierra Leone during the evaluation period. However, a few other initiatives, mainly in the area of policy, have been undertaken:
Forestry Policy Review in Sierra Leone 191. In October 2003, following a request by the Government, a draft Forest and Wildlife Policy was prepared by an FAO National Consultant. The draft was subsequently endorsed at a Stakeholder Workshop held in Freetown on 14 May 2004. This document, however, has not yet been transformed into a Policy Document, nor integrated into the Agricultural Policy of the country. It consists of summarized objectives and strategies and does not contain analysis of alternatives, nor justification for strategies recommended. As such, it is of limited utility.
Establishment of a National Commission on the Environment and Forestry 192. In October 2005, responding to a request by the Government, FAO, UNDP, UNEP and UNHABITAT fielded a joint mission to the country. The draft mission report has served in the preparation of a draft Strategic Action Plan for the National Commission on Environment and Forestry.
Diagnostic Trade Integrated Study (DTIS) in Sierra Leone 193. FAO participated in a World Bank initiative on Diagnostic Trade Integrated Study (DTIS) in the country. Upon request by the Bank, FAO prepared Terms of Reference for a national consultant to prepare a forestry component to the main DTIS in Sierra Leone. The consultant report assessed the actual and potential external trade in non- traditional forest products for the country.
194. Major expressed needs in forestry include wildlife and protected area management, bush fire control, mangrove protection and watershed management.
4.9. Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP)
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195. During the review period, eight TCP projects were implemented in Sierra Leone. Of these, three are considered to be emergency projects (one of which, for quality rice seed production, had a development aspect), two were the FAO contributions to joint efforts with other UN agencies or bilateral donors (for the Agricultural Sector Review and Operation Feed The Nation). One of the other projects (CAADP support) was identical in design and concept to those implemented in all other AU-member countries. The other projects were for training of disabled people and for preparation of a project 20 .
196. FAO’s Field Programme Management Information System (FPMIS) indicates that Sierra Leone is a participant in several regional TCPs. However, these projects are support to African regional or sub-regional organisations and there is no information about how Sierra Leone particularly benefits from these. They were thus not considered in this evaluation.
197. The most successful use of the TCP was for the Agricultural Sector Review and up- scaling of Operation Feed The Nation. As was noted earlier, the Agricultural Sector Review and Agricultural Development Strategy, co-funded with UNDP, the World Bank and IFAD, were important policy outputs in which FAO played a key and decisive role. The up-scaling of OFTN, with funding also by a GCP project with Germany and a UNDP project, seems to be on its way to establishing a new and more promising extension method to be applied in Sierra Leone. Financing for a much expanded programme of Farmers’ Field Schools is now being sought.
198. The emergency projects were considered to be an appropriate use of TCP funds. However, there is little information about the results of these projects. Production data for the final reports is based on assumptions rather than actual performance. Project TCP/SIL/0167 “Emergency Support to Quality Seed Production” was deemed valuable as it took place at a time when the national capability to produce certified seed was at its lowest ebb. This was the first step toward rebuilding quality seed production in the country, which is now continuing through GCP/SIL/023/GER.
199. The CAADP support project took place at an opportune time in Sierra Leone, having been approved just as the Agricultural Sector Review and Development Strategy was being brought to a conclusion. Thus, there was an opportunity to achieve synergy between investment plans and sector priorities. But the National Medium-Term Investment Programme never was officially endorsed as such and the bankable projects prepared under the TCP have not attracted donor interest, at least as yet.
200. The project for disabled people was not well conceived and although it addressed a large and highly vulnerable target beneficiary group, it ultimately did not produce many lasting benefits. This was despite a considerable amount of interest shown in the
20 Another project, TCP/SIL/3101 “Land Use Planning for Optimizing Agricultural Production”, was approved during the review period, but as the inception mission for this project was in May-June 2006, it was deemed too early in the implementation process to include it. Two other projects were approved just before the mission began.
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project, including by the lead technical division. The project did not lead to the development of a strategy for addressing these beneficiaries nor to any follow-up programmes or activities. The food processing activities were clearly not sustainable, as the disabled people operating on a very small scale could not profitably compete against bigger and better organized businesses. As a result, the involved organisations for disabled people continue to seek donor assistance for group support.
201. TCP funding was also used for a few small activities. TCP/SIL/2801 prepared an assessment of the functional status of veterinary labs in the country and requirements for their rehabilitation, including training needs. The output was a project proposal costed at US$3 million that was not funded. The TCP facility for FAORs (TCP/SIL/2802 and 3002) was used to carry out a technical assessment of the state of tree crop plantations (2802) and produce a Crop Production Manual (3002) containing guidelines for improved crop production and post harvest practices for technical extension staff. The tree crop assessment report and crop production guidelines were distributed to Government departments and NGOs in hard copy and CD-ROM. Plans were made to develop simplified extension pamphlets from the Crop Production Manual for Farmer Facilitators of FFS and farmers generally, but this had not yet been done.
202. Overall performance of the TCP in Sierra Leone over the review period is judged to be above satisfactory, with two of the non-emergency projects deemed clearly successful and two unsuccessful. In the absence of more information about the actual recipients of emergency rehabilitation assistance, it is not possible to make an informed judgement on the overall utility of these particular projects. However, the innovative nature of project TCP/SIL/0167 is to be commended and thus leads to an overall judgement of “above satisfactory” for the programme as a whole in the evaluation period. The use of TCP in the Agricultural Sector Review was particularly strategic, as without it, FAO would have been unable to play the leading role that it did in its implementation. Using TCP for “buy-in” to key national policy-making processes is extremely effective and the TCP Unit should be prepared to respond to such requests, if technically sound, in a rapid fashion.
203. Assuming that recommendations are accepted for the development of a national priority framework for Sierra Leone, efforts in the medium-term should be focused on developing sound technical proposals in close consultation with potential funders and thus a higher likelihood of follow-up. This will clearly require a greater level of technical support from the FAO Representation and others units, as need may be.
4.10. Cross-cutting Issues
204. The major cross-cutting issues (environment, gender, HIV/AIDS) were little addressed by FAO during the evaluation period, but neither were they ignored. None of the project activities had a strong emphasis in these areas, although there is scope for addressing them more comprehensively in the future.
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4.10.1. Environment
205. Section 2.1.3. mentions some of the most critical environmental problems facing Sierra Leone, none of which were extensively addressed by FAO during the evaluation period. As was mentioned above, FAO involvement in the forestry sector was very slight. Perhaps the main achievement was in the area of organic farming, which FAO was promoting through the German-funded regional project on fair trade and organic production.
206. The evaluation has suggested that FAO has a stronger role to play in terms of environmental protection in Sierra Leone and has identified this as a priority area for the future, because of the strong linkage to soil fertility and consequent agricultural production and food security. FFS should be the key mechanism for delivering messages at field level in this area. As FAO does not have its own financial resources, its role will necessarily be in terms of advocacy and awareness-raising of environmental problems and their linkage with food security and resource mobilization.
4.10.2. Gender Equity
207. Section 2.1 of the report includes some of the main gender issues in rural development, including the increased number of female-headed households, higher illiteracy level for women and restricted opportunities. Within FFS, there has been a noticeable effort in “affirmative action” to include women as members. This has been a positive development; however, the impact study of FFS found that women tended to be absent more frequently from FFS sessions than men, probably due to duties such as child and family care. Nonetheless, women seemed to be at least as innovative as men when it came to new agricultural practices. The mission is less sanguine about the prospects of introducing value-added activities for women and youth, due to general difficulties with accessing markets, but this would have to be assessed on a case-by- case basis. Gender issues, health and nutrition, and literacy are important focus areas of the RCPRP and ASREP projects and should continue to be covered in any large scaling-up of FFS. Again, FAO may need to play a key advocacy role, particularly in the strongly male-dominated MAFS.
4.10.3. HIV/AIDS
208. According to a population-based survey, conducted in June 2005 by UNAIDS, HIV- prevalence had increased to 1.53% from 0.9% in 2002, ranging from 2.1% in the urban areas to 1.3% in the rural areas. Widespread poverty and high unemployment rates, in particular with youths and young adults, and the breakdown of the extended family structure are contributing factors to increased infection risks. Misinformation, denial and stigmatisation are dominating rural life, making it hard for infected people to receive the necessary care. Particularly in rural areas, people are said to avoid speaking about this issue. At central Government level, all ministries are supposed to have HIV/AIDS focal points. MAFS has one that is not active due to lack of funds; MFMR does not. In general, a workplace policy programme in ministries does not exist.
47 4. Summary of Activities and Results
209. Within the ‘UN-family’ UNAIDS has pushed the HIV/AIDS issue in UNDAF and FAO support for this was acknowledged. However, HIV/AIDS-mainstreaming was not a theme in projects, including FFS. FAO did organise two workshops for agricultural extension facilitators/staff in 2004 as an ad hoc activity with financing by UNAIDS. On paper, FAOR has a workplace policy but there is no HIV/AIDS focal point in the office.
210. Utilising concepts developed by FAO Headquaters and with technical support from UNAIDS, there is definitely scope for HIV/AIDS-mainstreaming in general and for including modules on HIV/AIDS within FFS in particular. This has to be accompanied by advice how the taboo which dominates this area could be overcome. Agricultural development could be made instrumental in mitigation efforts, including introduction of labour-saving crops and technologies.
211. Here, also food security comes into play as a healthy body is the best way resisting both negative HIV/AIDS impacts and treatment effects, thus, probably leading to a prolonged life. A higher emphasis on nutritional advice offered to women and particularly to mothers caring for babies and children could yield beneficial results. The tragedy, however, lies in the fact that poor people fighting for daily survival usually have a poor health status.
48 5. Results by FAO Services
5. Results by FAO Services
212. The terms of reference for the evaluation call for an examination of whether FAO has a comparative advantage in Sierra Leone (from substantive, quality and cost points of view) for delivering the various types of services rendered by the Organisation. The main types of services rendered by FAO are analysed below.
5.1. Sharing and Applying Knowledge
213. FAO’s knowledge sharing work happens mostly through pilot activities of methods that may have been tried in other countries, to determine after appropriate adaptation, whether they are suitable for Sierra Leone; and through FAO’s global information services provided under the Regular Programme.
5.1.1. Pilot Activities 214. FAO did not engage in a wide variety of pilot activities. The outstanding example, and the one which is cited often in this evaluation, is the Farmers’ Field Schools. Although FFS are hardly new, they were introduced by FAO for the first time in Sierra Leone. FFS show considerable promise as an extension delivery method. The use of FFS plots for the economic benefit of participants was found to be a successful approach to improving agriculture among small-scale farmers in the Sierra Leone social context as it builds on the tradition of farmers working cooperatively. The early steps in the development of FFS in Sierra Leone, through the SPFS, involved sharing of experience from Ghana and Uganda. The FFS methodology has now been picked up by NGOs, other internationally-funded development projects (IFAD and ADB) and in the FAO/German regional project on organic and fair trade certification.
215. The use of TCP for initial rehabilitation of rice seed production was also innovative, although no data was collected from the beneficiaries to confirm the production assumptions made.
216. A less successful example was the attempt to create a Right-to-Food Secretariat. Originally set up with ambitious targets and poorly resourced, the future of the institution is in serious doubt without further external funding.
5.1.2. Use of FAO Regular Programme Products 217. Sierra Leone is one of the world’s least developed countries, with poor communications infrastructure. A consequence in the digital age is that there is very little familiarity with the global information services of FAO, unless they are directly related to projects being implemented in the country. Sierra Leone does participate in FAO meetings for which funding is provided. These are perceived as useful for maintaining international contacts and keeping abreast of current ideas. However, through its interviews the 5. Results by FAO Services
mission could find little evidence of use of FAO guidelines, methodologies and data bases in Sierra Leone, again unless it was connected with projects 21 .
218. While access to FAO materials are an issue, there is also a problem that the FAO Representation has little knowledge about the vast store of material being produced by FAO and thus its possible application for Sierra Leone and there is presently no satisfactory tool for increasing this knowledge. More significant is the capacity issue, in a country where problems are many and solutions (including funding for them) are often lacking. In such circumstances, most FAO Regular Programme outputs are not seen as relevant, without implementation assistance.
5.2. Partnership Building
219. FAO interacts with a broad range of partners in Sierra Leone, including Government, members of the UN family, donors, NGOs and civil society organisations. The work on partnership building was largely carried out during the evaluation period by the FAO Representative.
220. FAO is considered to be a trusted partner by the Government and the Representation has built linkages, including with the most senior decision-makers. FAO, thus, enjoys a high profile in the country, perhaps higher than in most countries. The Organization is often recognized in speeches by the President. The FAO Representative enjoyed considerable access to policy makers and was often consulted on policy matters. It is to be hoped that the quality of the Representation will be maintained in the future, so that this kind of relationship can be re-established.
221. FAO during the evaluation period was also a key and respected member of the UNCT. This was made unanimously clear by all members of the UN family consulted by the evaluation. The FAO Representative served as the UN Resident Coordinator, a.i. on a number of occasions. He regularly attended the weekly meetings of UN Agency Heads, the monthly meetings of the Donor Forum (chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator) and the quarterly meetings of the Development Partnership Aid Coordination Committee (DPAC), set up to monitor the flow of development assistance and implementation of agreed projects under the chairmanship of the Vice-President.
222. FAO partnered with various agencies particularly on the agricultural sector review and agricultural development strategy (with UNDP, World Bank and IFAD), OFTN/FFS (with UNDP) and on the food security strategy (with WFP and CORAD). It was instrumental in the inclusion of food security as Pillar II of the PRSP and as one of the priorities for the UNDAF. The fact of the President’s food security pledge in 2002 made for a
21 A positive example is the wide distribution of the ESC manual “Regulations, Standards and Certification for Agricultural Export” in connection with project GCP/RAF/404/GER “Increasing Incomes of Small Farmers through Exports of Organic and Fair Trade Tropical Products”.
50 5. Results by FAO Services
congruence of priorities between FAO and the Government, which was then taken up by the UN family as a whole.
223. Partnership with NGOs has largely been with CORAD 22 . CORAD was formed in 2003 and focuses its efforts on five particularly vulnerable districts: Kano, Kailahun, Bonte, Tonkolili and Koinadugu. Collaboration has taken place on FFS and on the Agricultural Sector Review and Development Strategy, the National Food Security Strategy and National Food Aid Strategy. CORAD also cooperates with FAO on the seed multiplication project, which CORAD itself sees as very successful. FAO also cooperated effectively with the Movement for Assistance and Promotion of Rural Communities (MAPCO) on training of disabled people in blacksmithing and food processing.
224. Civil society groups are not generally strong in Sierra Leone but one key group with which FAO had interaction was the National Association of Farmers of Sierra Leone (NAFSL), an advocacy group that is the leading non-state actor in the agricultural sector. FAO was given much of the credit for mediating between NAFSL and MAFS at various times in the evaluation period, and NAFSL was considered to be a key partner for carrying the message about the President’s pledge and with seed policy development.
225. Overall, FAO has been an important and active partner in the development community in Sierra Leone. It has been perhaps less in contact with the donor community, which is discussed more below.
5.3. Capacity Building
226. Building capacity in Sierra Leone is particularly challenging. Within the UN system and among donors and NGOs, lack of capacity is universally cited as an obstacle to sustainable development interventions. While nearly all FAO interventions (except Telefood projects) have a capacity building component, they are invariably small, often of too short duration and thus have only limited impact.
227. Of the interventions evaluated, the Right-to-Food project was the most deficient in balancing capacity building needs with appropriate strengthening activities. There was an unstated assumption to the project that institutional capacity existed for an operational secretariat and this proved not to be the case. None of the FAO interventions in the review period were long enough in relation to capacity building needs. It remains to be seen whether there will be another phase to the seed multiplication project, and if financing will be found for scaling up FFS in Operation Feed The Nation, where there are profound capacity building requirements.
22 Consortium for Rehabilitation and Development, a group consisting of international NGOs (i.e. Catholic Relief Services, CARE, World Vision, AFRICARE) largely funded by USAID in Sierra Leone.
51 5. Results by FAO Services
228. In an LDC emerging from civil war like Sierra Leone, capacity building efforts, particularly when directed at strengthening government institutions, are often compromised by the intense battle for a commodity in short supply - qualified staff - when the government is the least competitive from a remunerative point of view. Thus, trained and qualified staff often leave for employment in the private sector, with international organisations or with international NGOs. A related problem is that when projects end, staff who are able to do so seek other employment in the international sphere, with adverse consequences for the activity with which they were previously associated. In Sierra Leone, this is what happened in the Right-to-Food project.
229. As FAO is not a funding agency, its possibilities for carrying out extensive capacity building will always be constrained. Accordingly, it may be able to make a greater impact through assessments of capacity building needs in particular areas and make this information available to Government and Development Partners. Such assessments should take into account capacities outside of government. In Sierra Leone, this would usually mean NGOs and to a much more limited extent, the private sector. At the same time, FAOR should create awareness among Government, donors, NGOs and private sector about FAO training materials and facilitate their dissemination. Co-funding arrangements and public-private partnerships for capacity building activities should be sought.
5.4. Resource Mobilisation
230. Here resource mobilisation is intended in the broad sense, i.e. for the agriculture sector in general, not just for FAO. FAO was not notably successful in this area during the evaluation period. Despite the Presidential pledge, the Maputo Declaration, the goals of the PRSP and the agricultural and food security strategies developed, the amounts of national and international resources directed to agriculture remains below expectations. Government resources for agriculture, although increased over the evaluation period, remain less than half the Maputo Declaration target. The major donors in the country have given emphasis to sectors other than agriculture and investment projects in agriculture, even when identified, have been very slow to come on line. There have not been any sector-wide programmes, so projects remain the form for international assistance. Private sector investment in agriculture remains very weak.
231. The relative lack of donors present in the country has been identified by the evaluation as a difficulty for FAO. Many bilateral programmes now have decentralized responsibilities for decisions on assistance programmes. Perhaps because of its size and recent history, donors have been slow to return to the country. Many of the donors that are active in other African countries are simply not present in Sierra Leone.
232. One of the largest donors present in Sierra Leone is the EC, but the post to head the Rural Development section was vacant for some two years. Having been recently filled, the EC would likely now be seeking to revive its assistance in rural areas. However, in the continuing absence of an FAO Representative, there is no interlocutor.
52 5. Results by FAO Services
233. As was noted earlier, the FAO Investment Centre has prepared some projects that have been financed and others (through the NEPAD-CAADP TCP) that have not. FAO has also been highly supportive of Government efforts to secure funding for a major scaling-up of Operation Feed The Nation, but this has been going slowly and will likely take some time.
234. In terms of projects implemented through FAO, this will be a major challenge for the new FAOR. Only one national donor-funded project (Seeds) is currently operational (the Sierra Leone component of the regional organic/fair trade project is also still operating). Nearly all the previous bilateral support was from Germany through its Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection; their interest in future activities is uncertain.
53
6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations
6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations
6.1. Conclusions
235. The evaluation covered a time period of great change in Sierra Leone as the country was in an immediate post-conflict situation. Indeed, this was a key reason for choosing Sierra Leone for a country evaluation in the first place. As a result, the FAO assistance to the country changed considerably over the time frame, from emergency rehabilitation assistance to planning and post-conflict development.
236. The evaluation report has presented FAO’s work over the evaluation period and commented on many aspects of it. The evaluation now looks generally at the performance of FAO’s cooperation against evaluation criteria.
237. Relevance of interventions and coherence of strategy: During the evaluation period, there was no overall framework to provide a basis for FAO support to Sierra Leone. This is understandable for some of the period, as the country was emerging from civil war when “normal” development assistance was not possible. The first step was a proper one – to develop strategies for agriculture and rural development and FAO was instrumental in this. These initial interventions were highly relevant and brought considerable credit to FAO. Subsequently, in the period when strategy implementation began, FAO undertook activities for which donor funding (from Germany) was available. All these areas were identified as important, but so were many others. FAO should have more explicitly identified areas of its comparative advantage and sought partners for assisting in these areas. This was not done and is the subject of a key recommendation of this evaluation.
238. Efficiency: The mission has interpreted this as referring to the FAO office in the country. Ideally, FAO’s costs would have been benchmarked against those of other agencies operating in the country, but this would have required cooperation that was not sought and resources that were not available. However, the mission’s view is that FAO’s overall efficiency can be improved, but it would entail investment costs that FAO has been unwilling to make. The most noteworthy example is local salaries. By international standards, salaries in Sierra Leone are low. However, FAO pays at the lowest end of the international agencies. Thus, as was documented in section 3, it has a hard time retaining capable staff. In other words, FAO is “penny-wise and pound foolish”. Resources are undependable and Regular Budget allocations are insufficient to support the office, particularly the programme function. As a result, resources tend to be spent when available, a classic symptom of poverty that affects organizations as well. The mission’s overall assessment is that FAO needs to improve on efficiency, but it is operating in a very difficult environment.
239. Effectiveness: FAO has a relatively small number of cooperative activities in Sierra Leone and the picture with regard to their effectiveness is mixed. There is not enough information about all the emergency rehabilitation activities to make a firm overall judgement, particularly on the seeds and tools distribution interventions. Some of the
55 6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations
interventions were catalytic (seed production, youth employment). Quality of policy assistance was strongest in the agricultural sector, compared to forestry or fisheries. However, the expectations from support to the Right-to-Food Secretariat were unrealistic. On the other hand, very good work was done in terms of establishing Farmers’ Field Schools under Operation Feed The Nation, using a concept that was well-suited to Sierra Leonean conditions. Capacity building, while generally present in FAO activities, has been insufficient to create the necessary critical mass. More capacity building seems always to be required.
240. Impact: The impact studies carried out at field level have shown that FFS farmers have increased production and incomes more than non-FFS farmers, that their agricultural production methods and systems have been influenced and they are more aware. They also have more problems marketing, which leads to indications of need for future support. There seems to be clear support for further expansion of FFS and if funding is found, it is likely to have a considerable positive impact over time. Emergency assistance was shown in the impact studies to be generally appreciated and beneficial, but the levels of support were generally not enough to restore livelihoods fully to previous levels. Some FAO pilot activities have had positive impact on small groups of beneficiaries (fair trade cocoa, youth in fishing and agriculture) but follow-up investment has been limited, at least to the time of the evaluation.
241. Sustainability: In Sierra Leone, under the present economic circumstances, with 60% of the Government budget coming from foreign aid, continued external support is a pre- condition for sustainability of results of most programmes. FAO, which does not have its own funds, must seek continuing assistance for those activities deemed to be successful in a timely manner. It also needs to sensitize donors to the realities of institutional support in Sierra Leone. Grassroots efforts, if demonstrating benefits, are more likely to be sustainable in the current climate. For example, FFS groups that have been formed see benefits from their participation and the vast majority of members want to continue. However, even these activities require seed money to be launched.
56 6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations
6.2. General Recommendations
242. Within the context of these overall findings, the mission makes the following recommendations:
243. Framework for FAO support: As was mentioned above, the evaluation sees the need for more explicit priorities in terms of areas covered and services to be provided, assessing the possible contribution of other partners and identifying FAO’s comparative advantages. The process should be country-driven, but will require adequate support from and interaction with FAO. Establishment of a priority framework should be a first order of business in the work programme of a new FAO Representative.
Recommendation 1: A rolling FAO national priority framework should be developed with government and donors (as appropriate), supported as necessary by FAO technical and policy inputs. It may cover a period of four years. It should define flexibly the FAO priorities in support to national strategies, including revisions to the PRSP. The priority framework should be rolling and reviewed periodically - every 1-2 years. It should specify intended outcomes, but not be tied down in the form of projects or programmes for implementation.
244. Advocating food security: Within the process of preparing the priority framework, the evaluation endorses that the overarching importance of improving food security as the main priority for FAO in Sierra Leone. Food security usually is defined by three components: production/availability; access; and utilisation. The primary concern of agricultural development is production, taking into account the natural endowment of a country. However, rarely is self-sufficiency in staple foods the best option a country should follow; rather international comparative advantages should determine the macro-economic development pattern bringing in trade of agricultural produce as a crucial factor. When subsistence level is not assured – 74% of SiL’s population is rated poor to very poor – access to food is dependent on the purchasing power available. At household (micro-) level proper utilisation of food (including safe water) coupled with application of hygiene and sanitation standards are crucial factors for the health status.
Recommendation 2: With preparations for PRSP Phase II (2008-10) having started, FAO should advocate a continued orientation on food security in all its dimensions; participate in technical working (sub-)groups related to food security; and contribute to a better understanding of the multi-faceted character of food security by officials and the public.
245. Policy Advice: As noted previously, Sierra Leone has considerable capacity constraints for harmonising concrete actions with overall policy directives. Statistics, planning and monitoring and evaluation are key areas requiring improvement. There is
57 6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations
a need for sound advice, giving policy options with pros and cons, so that the implications of measures are better understood before they are implemented. Because of its neutrality and expertise, FAO enjoys a comparative advantage in supplying this. However, the FAO Representation does not, and will not in the foreseeable future, have the capacity to give this advice at the level and with the frequency required. The FAO Sub-regional and Regional Offices and Headquarters cannot be mobilized with the frequency and intensity of support needed.
Recommendation 3: A key priority for FAO in future should be assistance in agricultural policy and strategy development, linked to investment mobilization (see Recommendations 4 and 5). Coordination and donor liaison should be a key part of this. Support to monitoring and evaluation in MAFS is a key need. Because of limited numbers of qualified staff available to address key policy issues relating to agriculture and rural development in Sierra Leone, FAO should seek to place long-term experts in key advisory positions if appropriate funding mechanisms are available. Additional funding should be made available to draw on short-term technical expertise as required.
246. Policy support to agriculture as a business : It is Government policy that agriculture should be conducted as a business. At the level of the small producer, it implies that he/she has the information to judge whether or not an agricultural enterprise is sufficiently profitable. It also implies macro-level policies that allow Sierra Leonean farmers to compete on an equitable basis, without market distortions caused by policy decisions that hamper food security objectives or force farmers out of agriculture.
Recommendation 4 : FAO should provide support at policy level and appropriate training at national and district level aimed at elucidating better understanding of the economic background of production and promoting agriculture as a profitable business to agricultural producers in Sierra Leone, thus enhancing the appeal of agriculture as a means of livelihood. A key part would aim at creating an effective legal framework (e.g. market reforms, appropriate trade regulations; land tenure; micro-credits). This support should aim at ensuring that agricultural enterprises, when undertaken, represent an acceptable return on investment.
247. Policy support to sustainable agriculture and natural resource management: Among the problems facing Sierra Leone agriculture are poor soil fertility, environmental degradation caused by destruction of bush and forest cover and inadequate use of available water resources. Population increase and consequent food demand are placing greater stress on the traditional bush fallow system in the uplands. While these problems have been identified before, they seem poorly understood and relatively little has been done to address them.
58 6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations
Recommendation 5 : FAO should provide policy support aimed at the practice of sustainable agriculture, including measures to increase soil fertility, enhance environmental protection and use more effectively existing water resources.
248. Capacity in the FAOR: DGB 2007/04 has given FAO Representatives lead responsibility for managing the project cycle from project formulation, through implementation to closure. However the new staffing profile for FAO in Sierra Leone does not provide the necessary support. Recent staffing decisions do not recognize the level and volume of work undertaken by the programme unit. It raises the likelihood of continued high staff turnover in this unit, the need for continuous staff training at entry level, and consequently a lower level of efficiency than is required to ensure growth in the field programme and its effective management. Savings from the restructuring may neither offset the cost of constantly replacing trained staff nor repair the damage to the Organisation’s image caused by inadequate staffing capacity.
Recommendation 6: To enable the Representation fulfil its mandate and to implement the activities indicated, it must be given adequate resources to carry out the tasks. OCD and the new FAO Representative should review the staffing profile of the office to ensure the programme unit is adequately resourced.
249. SPFS and Farmers’ Field Schools: Farmers’ Field Schools have been introduced successfully in Sierra Leone since 2003. First introduced through the SPFS, they have grown in Sierra Leone through funding support by FAO TCP, UNDP, the German Government and now increasingly by NGOs. Farmers are enthusiastic about FFS and see good results from their participation thus far. There is demand from rural communities to further expand them. The Government hopes to attract major funding for scaling up the FFS in the near future.
Recommendation 7: FFS should continue to develop as a primary device in future for channelling services and information to Sierra Leone farmers and FAO should build on the success by continuing technical support for their development. However, scaling up should not proceed at a pace faster than can be supported by quality facilitation. Facilitator training, whether farmers, extensionists or others, will still require major investment.
250. Cross-cutting issues: While some work has been done on key cross-cutting issues like environment, gender and HIV/AIDS, these remain important priority areas in Sierra Leone that should be specifically considered in the preparation of a national priority framework (see recommendations 1 and 5). As has been done in the RCPRP and ASREP projects, HIV/AIDS-mitigation should be a consideration in the development of curricula for FFS.
59 6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations
Recommendation 8: Specific consideration should be given in the national priority framework to cross-cutting issues such as environment, gender equity and HIV/AIDS. Together with MAFS, the National Farmers Association, and civil society agriculture-led HIV/AIDS-mitigation strategies at community level should be developed in the context of expansion of FFS in Sierra Leone.
6.3. Sector-specific Recommendations
251. Seeds
Recommendation 9: If the present financial crisis for the seed multiplication-project (GCP/SIL/023/GER) is resolved immediately, a second phase of four years for the project should be approved. The expected outputs would be: - An entity, structured like a private enterprise, with annual business report that indicates a positive development of the profit and loss calculation. - Development programmes financed by special budgets in order to make use of the agricultural expertise of the Seed Multiplication Unit staff for training linkages to farmers field schools. - Policy guidelines aiming at the establishment of a market mechanism supporting a price stabilising system for locally produced rice. Detailed recommendations are included in Annex 2.
252. Right-to-Food
Recommendation 10: Although not within a project framework, FAO should continue technical assistance to the Sierra Leone Right-to-Food Secretariat, with a view toward building institutional linkages for creating awareness about the Right-to-Food at grassroots level, including with Operation Feed The Nation, and establishment of monitoring mechanisms to assess progress. Detailed recommendations are included in Annex 3.
253. Fair Trade
Recommendation 11: Within the Sierra Leone component of the existing regional project GCP/RAF/404/GER, the management of Kpeya Agricultural Enterprises should be assisted in elaborating business plans and cost-effectiveness measures, including a strategy for phasing out subsidies to management salaries; to further FFS-activities for members, including post-harvest treatment training with support from MAFS/MTI; to advise and enable KAE-management to follow-up on possible imports of improved cocoa seedlings; to assist MAFS in setting-up an international trade focal point and to develop links to MTI concerning exports of agricultural produce; and to assist Sierra Leone to gain better access to internationally available data and to technical discussion and reports in WTO.
60 6. Conclusions and Major Recommendations
254. Recommendations related to Telefood
Recommendation 12: Telefood funds should be used to support clearly identified components of wider FAO projects and programmes where they can be better targeted and monitored and fully meet the criteria of addressing the needs of the poor . In Sierra Leone, these projects should be linked to FFS. The presence of FFS in the area should be a necessary condition for the eligibility of requests and priority should be given to projects addressing fields where FFS can provide capacity building and advice. Telefood projects should therefore be used to expand FFS to other sectors such as livestock production and aquaculture, thus opening up the FFS to the entire community. These projects should be identified at community level and reviewed by the Telefood Committee in consultation with the National SPFS Coordinator. The linkage of Telefood-projects to the present FFS District Network structure would imply discontinuing the free provision of inputs, in favour a micro-credit model.
61 EVALUATION OF THE FAO-COOPERATION IN SIERRA LEONE 2001–2006, Final Report, VOL II, ANNEXES
EVALUATION of FAO COOPERATION
in SIERRA LEONE
2001 – 2006
FINAL REPORT
VOL II: ANNEXES
ROME
APRIL 2007
1 EVALUATION OF THE FAO-COOPERATION IN SIERRA LEONE 2001–2006, Final Report, VOL II, ANNEXES
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1 : TERMS OF REFERENCE...... 3
ANNEX 2: EVALUATION OF GCP/SIL/023/GER: ...... 25
ANNEX 3: EVALUATION OF GCP/SIL/022/GER: ...... 40
ANNEX 4: EVALUATION OF TELEFOOD PROJECTS IN SIERRA LEONE...... 61
ANNEX 5: REVIEW OF TCP PROJECTS IN SIERRA LEONE ...... 91
ANNEX 6: SIERRA LEONE IMPACT STUDIES...... 99
ANNEX 7: PROJECTS REVIEWED BY THE EVALUATION ...... 129
ANNEX 8: LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED...... 131
2 EVALUATION OF THE FAO-COOPERATION IN SIERRA LEONE 2001–2006, Final Report, VOL II, ANNEXES
Annex 1
Terms of Reference
Evaluation of FAO-Cooperation in Sierra Leone
Background
At its May 2005 session, the Programme Committee made recommendations for the work programme of the Evaluation Service for the period 2006-09. Following a suggestion made by the Committee at its September 2004 session (CL 127/12, paragraph 49), the PC recommended that FAO should undertake “an evaluation drawing conclusions on the basis of evaluations of the totality of FAO’s work in individual countries”. They will enable the Organization to undertake in-depth impact assessments of selected projects, including TCP, as discussed at the Programme Committee’s May 2005 Session. Such country evaluations also respond to General Assembly Resolution 59/250 of 2004 on the Triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system (TCPR). The resolution stressed (a) that the operational activities for development of the United Nations system should be valued and assessed on the basis of their impact on the recipient countries as contributions to their capacity to pursue poverty eradication, sustained economic growth and sustainable development; and (b) that an important element of the TCPR is the overall assessment of the effectiveness of the operational activities for development of the United Nations system and its functioning at the country level.
In response to the above-mentioned resolution, the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) decided to undertake country evaluations that embrace the work carried out by the whole of the UN system in individual countries. The first exercise, in South Africa, is scheduled to take place in early 2007. In considering its future programme of country evaluations, UNEG decided that one country should be emerging from a complex emergency situation, to assess how well the UN system responds to such cases. After a consultation among UNEG members, Sierra Leone was chosen for this evaluation.
FAO was also interested in carrying out a country evaluation in a post-complex emergency country and therefore decided to align its programme of country evaluations with the implementation of the UNEG evaluation in Sierra Leone. The FAO evaluation is expected to be an important input into the UNEG exercise and provide key lessons for its conduct in 2007.
3 EVALUATION OF THE FAO-COOPERATION IN SIERRA LEONE 2001–2006, Final Report, VOL II, ANNEXES
Purposes
The main purposes of the evaluation are:
• to improve the relevance, design, implementation and results of FAO activities in Sierra Leone; • to learn lessons about the factors affecting the relevance and development impact of FAO cooperation at country level; • to provide accountability to FAO member countries and answer questions about FAO performance at country level; • to contribute to the UN system-wide evaluation in Sierra Leone; • to contribute to development of the methodology for carrying out evaluations at country level in the future; • to improve the selection, design, implementation and results of TCP projects that are an important part of FAO’s interventions at country level.
The evaluation will be forward-looking, i.e. it will identify areas for improvement and draw lessons in order to further FAO cooperation relevance and effectiveness in the future. It will also assist the Government and partners in Sierra Leone in maximising the comparative advantage of FAO.
General questions
Key questions to be examined in the evaluation include:
Cooperation strategy and relevance of the programme: - Were FAO’s activities relevant to the country and FAO’s own priorities? - On which basis and through which processes does FAO select its areas of focus and decide on its activities in the country; and what are the roles of other key actors (Government, other development partners, ultimate beneficiaries in rural areas) in the process? - Are the services provided by FAO to the country in line with expectations of the government and development partners? - Did the activities of FAO reflect the Organization’s comparative advantage (as defined in the Strategic Framework)?; - Did FAO’s priorities in Sierra Leone take into account the activities and priorities of development partners (donors, other UN organizations, NGOs and national institutions)? - Have the emergency FAO activities in the country achieved their objectives and did they contribute to post-emergency rehabilitation and development efforts? - Are there synergies among the FAO activities in the country? - Are there links and synergy between FAO activities at national and regional/sub-regional levels? - How well do FAO activities address cross-cutting issues, such as gender and HIV/AIDS? - Does the strategy optimise on the potential benefits from partnerships?
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Developmental effectiveness - To what extent do FAO’s activities in Sierra Leone contribute to the implementation of the WFS, PRSP and MDGs in general, and MDG Goals 1 and 7 in particular and the right to food? - To what extent has FAO cooperation in Sierra Leone had an impact on the intended ultimate beneficiaries, particularly in rural areas? What have been the main constraining factors? - Do FAO projects in the country have a clear exit strategy aiming at the sustainability of their impact? - How do FAO partners (government and others) perceive the usefulness and quality of FAO outputs and services? - What is the role and impact of the TCP programme in the formulation, funding and implementation of development and emergency activities in Sierra Leone, whether by FAO, government or other sources? - Are there any particularly successful FAO activities that have had large-scale follow-up by donors? - Are the outputs of FAO’s Regular Programme useful to Sierra Leone?
Institutional arrangements, modalities and processes - Did FAO headquarters and the regional office provide enough technical, operational and other support to allow the FAOR to respond in a timely manner to agreed priorities? - Does FAO deliver services to Sierra Leone in an effective and cost-efficient manner? - Are sufficient resources available to the FAOR to carry out its mandate? - To what extent does FAO participate in the UN Country Team (UNCT) and does it contribute to implementation of UN reform at country level? - To what extent has FAO participation in the UNCT enhanced the impact of UN activities in the country and created opportunities for new partnerships? - What is the extent of FAO’s partnership with other development agencies in the country, what forms does it take? How does partnership affect FAO’s relevance and efficiency? - Is the project formulation process effective? What factors would require improvement to raise its quality?
Functioning of the FAO Representation - How does the FAO Representation establish its priority work areas? - How effective has advocacy by the FAO Representation been, both with the Government and with other development partners? - Is the staffing profile of the FAOR appropriate for the tasks expected from it? - What are the obstacles faced by the FAO Representation to improve its efficiency?
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Scope
The major focus of the evaluation is a determination of the impact of the totality of FAO cooperation in Sierra Leone. It encompasses all activities in direct support to the country irrespective of location (in the country, at HQs or the Regional or Sub-Regional Office), source of funding (Regular Programme or extra budgetary resources) or from where they are managed (Hqs, SRO, RO or the FAOR) during the period 2001-2006. The evaluation will consider all aspects of the work of the FAOR in its assessment.
The exercise will specifically include evaluations of projects GCP/SIL/023/GER “Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone” and GCP/SIL/022/GER “Support to Sierra Leone for the Establishment of a Right to Food Secretariat and Coordination Committee for Coordination of Efforts in the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food”, presented in the report as annexes, following the outline for FAO project evaluations. As the evaluation is intended to serve as a key accountability tool for TCP projects, brief individual project evaluations (including comments on relevance, design, implementation, results, impact and sustainability) will be prepared for the national TCP projects implemented during the evaluation period: 1. TCP/SIL/0166 Emergency Agricultural Rehabilitation Assitance to ex-Combatants and Host Comunities
2. TCP/SIL/0167 Emergency Support to Quality Seed Production
3. TCP/SIL/0168 Urgent Provision of Seeds and Tools to War-affected Farmers
4. TCP/SIL/2903 Emergency Assistance for the Reintegration of War-Handicapped and Other Disabled Persons
5. TCP/SIL/2804 + TCP/SIL/2904 Agricultural Sector Review and Formulation of Agricultural Development Strategy
6. TCP/SIL/3001 Post-emergency Accelerated Capacity Building for Upscaling Operation Feed the Nation
7. TCP/SIL/2905 Assistance in the Preparation of a Medium-term Investment Programme and Formulation of Bankable Projects in Support to the CAADP Implementation
Timing of the evaluation process
The evaluation is structured in three phases and should be completed by the end of March 2007.
First phase (July-September 2006): The first phase was to define the scope, issues and methodology of the evaluation and make arrangements for the next phases, including the finalization of detailed Terms of Reference for the whole evaluation exercise and a first assembly of basic information. Activities include preliminary discussions at headquarters and and an Inception Mission to Sierra Leone:
• to take stock of FAO activities in the country since 2001;
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• to identify issues of concern to FAO partners; and • to identify focus areas for in-depth evaluation, including impact assessment studies.
Second phase (October 2006-January 2007): The second phase aims at: • Completing preparatory work, including a desk study of FAO activities with for each project a description of outputs and identification of outcomes over the evaluation period, and assembling other relevant documentation and data; • Undertaking impact assessment studies relating to Farmers’ Field Schools and FAO emergency activities.
Third Phase(February - April 2007) : The third phase consists in carrying out an overall evaluation assessment by a mission and preparing the evaluation report.
Methodology of the evaluation
1. Overall approach
The evaluation will draw its conclusions and recommendations based on an assessment of the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of the programme, efficiency in its implementation and an assessment of the impact of FAO cooperation on each of its areas of focus in the agriculture and food security sectors and on key services provided by FAO, including capacity building, applying and sharing knowledge, partnership building and resource mobilization.
2. Impact evaluation
Impact studies will be carried out on FAO involvement with Farmers’ Field Schools (FFS) and emergency interventions, to collect quantitative data on their impact on beneficiaries, and comparing this to information about non-beneficiaries. The FFS impact study will include villages where FAO and UNDP-funded FFS were implemented through the Government and NGO-sponsored FFS. Non-participants in FFS will be drawn both from villages where FFS have been implemented and those where no FFS have been held. The emergency interventions to be studied are those where seeds, fertilizers and hand tools were distributed to at-risk beneficiaries (IDPs, returned combatants, women, youth, Liberian refugees)
The data from these studies will be analyzed and conclusions made available to the evaluation team for the main mission in January 2007.
3. Addressing programme issues
As with other countries, as FAO is dependent on voluntary funding for most of its work at field level, it does not have a country programme for Sierra Leone. Therefore, the task of the evaluation will be to determine whether the actions taken by FAO are consistent with the country needs and whether the areas of focus of the FAO cooperation strategically address these priorities. It will also examine whether activity would have been more effective if FAO had had a national priority framework as is now the Organization’s policy. During the
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evaluation period, FAO cooperation with Sierra Leone was primarily focused in the areas listed below. For each area, the Inception Mission identified specific issues on which the evaluation should focus, in addition to the general evaluation questions mentioned previously:
1. Assistance in development of agricultural policy and agricultural development strategies a. the relevance, appropriateness and realism of the Agricultural Development Strategy, which FAO played a key role in producing. b. prospects/progress towards making operational the PRSP, in particular Pillar Two on food security; c. influence of the Right to Food Secretariat on policies to date and feasibility of continued FAO involvement in specific right to food activities in Sierra Leone (see also Annex 2 on evaluation of project GCP/SIL/022/GER).
2. Farmers’ Field Schools a. the concept of FFS as it is being developed in Sierra Leone; b. prospects for sustainability and future development/expansion of FFS; c. effectiveness of coordination among FFS stakeholders (e.g. FAO, MAFS, NGOs); d. linkages with other related programmes (e.g. seeds); e. potential to include more/other subject matter in FFS; f. effectiveness of Operation Feed the Nation as a response to the President’s 2002 food security pledge to the country. 3. emergency intervention a. extent to which interventions built capacity in seed production among the farmers and to which emergency projects encourage the farmers to develop their own seed production strategy; b. effectiveness of FAO strategy to bridge the gap from emergency to rehabilitation; c. degree of involvement of donors funding emergency projects in the planning of rehabilitation/development;
4. seeds (see Annex 1 on evaluation of project GCP/SIL/023/GER).
5. fair trade a. progress on obtaining fair trade certification within project (GCP/RAF/404/GER); b. applicability of lessons learned to other projects.
6. Telefood a. coverage and relevance; b. sustainability of projects; c. linkages with FFS.
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Programme Process
The evaluation will also seek to establish:
• who actually initiates and promotes activity/project ideas (government, other national stakeholders, FAOR, donors, Hqs staff) and whether this differs, according to funding source; • the strategy and priority setting mechanisms (institutionalized or ad hoc dialogue with the government, dialogue with HQs and Regional/sub regional offices, links among FAO activities); • consultative mechanisms with intended beneficiaries; • through which mechanisms FAO cooperation is linked to the FAO Medium-Term Plan; • the processes linking FAO cooperation to UNDAF and national planning exercises; • the project pre-appraisal and appraisal mechanisms and the role of the FAOR within them.
Partnership The evaluation will seek to establish whether partnership building is strategic and efficient for creating complementarities and synergy among development assistance programmes, ensuring sustainability and coherence of the FAO cooperation and enhancing resource mobilisation. Positive examples and missed opportunities should be presented to illustrate the conclusions.
In particular, the evaluation will assess the extent to which FAO participation in the UN country team has resulted in any shifts in emphasis and concrete actions (UN joint or coordinated field activities at institutional level and/or district/community level, and adjustments, if any, in FAO policy, programming and operational approach). It will also examine relations with the wider donor community and influence on the their priorities and modalities of action.
FAO comparative advantage in delivering cooperation services The evaluation should determine whether FAO has a comparative advantage in Sierra Leone (from substantive, quality and cost points of view) for delivering the various types of services rendered by the Organization. The analysis should lead to an overall assessment of FAO as a provider of expertise, its role in agriculture information sharing, its capacity as a development partner and as a fund raiser.
Adequacy of the FAOR capacities to its mandate and appropriateness of that mandate Because the FAO Representation represents a significant proportion of FAO expenditure in Sierra Leone, it is important to assess the work done by the Representation and make recommendations for improvement as needed. The mission will express its views on the current arrangements and likely impact of the FAO Reform proposals. The coherence between the priorites and use of human resources by the FAO Representation, national needs and priorities and FAO comparative strengths will be assessed. The evaluation will determine (i) whether the Representation staffing profile (competencies and job profiles) is
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appropriate; (ii) the Representation’s workloads (technical, managerial, operational, administrative) and costs; (iii) whether the FAOR financial resources and operational mechanisms are adequate (including consideration of the project cycle effectiveness and FAOR role as budget holder); and (iv) whether within existing resources technical and operational support from HQ, Regional and Sub-Regional offices could be better targeted. This evaluation will be based on the assessments of past evaluations and reports, the Work Measurement Surveys data, the views of the FAOR and the perception of FAO partners in the country and the findings of the evaluation on FAO’s actual and potential role.
Feedback of the lessons learnt in the field, in particular from evaluations and review missions, into future FAO programmes and activites The extent to which evaluation and review mission recommendations have been effectively considered and then implemented will be assessed (the synopsis of such recommendations will be prepared during the evaluation phase 2).
Other issues During the course of the exercise, the evaluation team should feel free to identify other issues of importance that there is a need to address.
Work plan and deliverables
The evaluation will be conducted by a team of external consultants and staff members of the FAO Evaluation Service (PBEE). The Evaluation Service will collect information and documentation, and prepare initial notes for the evaluation team. The Service will collect and process basic information required for the evaluation.
The following deliverables will be produced prior to the start of the final evaluation mission:
Background information • A CD Rom of available background documents grouped, by topics and highlighting key documents completed by a list of information documents • Short historical overview of key social, political and economical events of the last 10 years that are relevant to UN, FAO, and donor cooperation over the evaluation period in order to highlight the major events which may have had a direct relevance to the cooperation strategy and decisions of the Organization and to recall the environment that prevailed during the period selected for the evaluation (2001-2006). This will include key economic and social data, focusing on poverty and food security, necessary to put the evaluation in the country context (tables) and a profile of agriculture and food security in Sierra Leone.
FAO Cooperation profile : This includes: • Tables showing projects by area of focus indicating basic information on their development and/or immediate objectives, starting and end dates, budget. These tables will be built from the FAO projects database (FPMIS)
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• For each area of focus, a chart showing project timelines and their relationship . This chart will be based on project documentation and checked by FAO technical divisions and the FAOR. • List of Regular Programme and FAOR activities. This information will be collected through questionnaires (one for HQs, one for Regional office and one for the FAOR).
Background documentation for focus area/service evaluations: • Tables providing, by area of focus, all known project, Regular Programme and FAOR outputs. These tables will be validated by the FAOR. • Once these are prepared, the Tables will be augmented by a description of outcomes, to the extent possible in phase two and to be completed in phase three. An initial identification of outcomes will be made by the Evaluation Service on the basis of available documentation (final reports, tripartite reviews etc.) and information collected in Sierra Leone from the FAOR, project staff and national authorities. In a second stage, these tables will be validated and discussed by the evaluation team in Sierra Leone (see below). • Tables providing for each focus area the other development partner’s programmes (programmes objectives and value). This information will be collected by the FAOR.
Background documentation for addressing selected issues: • A list of FAO’s partners outside the government (civil society entities, universities etc.) will be drawn by the FAOR indicating the object of the partnership and the frequency of meetings. • A compendium of previous evaluation and other relevant reports and their recommendations will be prepared by the FAO team. • Basic information on FAOR delivered services.
External evaluation team
Inception work
In July 2006, an external consultant and a member of the FAO Evaluation Service, took stock of FAO activities through interviews in HQs and in Sierra Leone and discussed with the FAO partners the scope of the evaluation. This report will be made available to the evaluation team members. The inception mission also selected the topics for the impact studies, established the approach of the present evaluation, and finalized the evaluation TORs.
As part of the mission to set up the impact studies in October 2006, there will be in-country consultation on the terms of reference.
The impact studies will be prepared by January 2007 so that they will be available for the evaluation team work in Sierra Leone.
The above documentation and information prepared by the FAO team will be sent in advance to the overall evaluation team.
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Mission in Sierra Leone
Meetings and checklists
• Meetings will be held with staff of the Regional Office for Africa in Accra who have been involved with support to FAO activities in Sierra Leone (projects and other); • Meetings will be held with national staff involved with FAO activities in each area of focus to discuss FAO cooperation impact based on the outcomes in their area. • A meeting with the same people as above will be held at the end of the mission to feedback evaluation results • Series of meetings with FAOR staff to address the country programme issues that have been selected for evaluation. • One meeting with the UNCT group dealing with food security and MDG issues to assess FAO partnership with the UNCT.
Final workshops
• Toward the end of the mission, a workshop will be held with partner representatives and key Government personnel to present the overall evaluation results and obtain their feedback. • Workshop with the FAOR and FAO project staff to feedback and discuss mission findings.
Evaluation Report
The draft evaluation report should be delivered for FAO comments by 30 March 2007.
The report will be as concise as possible, focusing on conclusions and recommendations and include an executive summary. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the report when considered essential for future reference.
The report will include:
• A profile of FAO cooperation with Sierra Leone; • An evaluation of impact on each area of focus; • An overall evaluation of FAO cooperation in Sierra Leone, which will include the analysis of the programme issues selected with development partners; • An overall assessment of the TCP programme role in the cooperation programme and its impact; • Lessons learned and recommendations; • Annexes with a separate evaluation of project GCP/SIL/023/GER “Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone” and project GCP/SIL/022/GER “Support to Sierra Leone for the Establishment of a Right to Food Secretariat and Coordination
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Committee for Coordination of Efforts in the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food”, as well as brief assessments of all the TCP projects listed above.
Composition and profile of the evaluation team and duration
The impact studies will be conducted from October-December 2006 by national consultants working under the overall supervision of the evaluation manager in the FAO Evaluation Service.
The final evaluation will include briefing of the international team members by appropriate Headquarters staff. The field portion of the final evaluation will take place from February 4- 23, 2007. In this period, the international team members will receive a briefing at the Regional Office for Africa (1 ½ days) and then go to Sierra Leone. The mission will spend 17 days in Sierra Leone, with at least the final five days for report writing and the in-country debriefing.
The final evaluation team will consist of 6 persons, as follows:
Full-time members 1. Mission Leader – development specialist with large experience in the rural sector and good knowledge of development policy issues (external – funded by German BMELV); 2. Agronomist, with strong experience in seed production and familiar with agricultural systems in West Africa and Sierra Leone in particular (external – to be funded by evaluation budget of GCP/SIL/023/GER); 3. Evaluation Manager from FAO Evaluation Service, with particular responsibility for issues relating to emergency interventions and TCP projects; 4. A representative of the Government of Sierra Leone.
Part-time members 5. An outposted Internal Auditor from the FAO Office of the Inspector General, with particular responsibility for issues related to the management and support of the FAO Representation; 6. A human rights expert, particularly for the evaluation of GCP/SIL/022/GER (external – funded by German BMELV).
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Annex 1, Appendix 1
Terms of Reference for Evaluation of GCP/SIL/023/GER
“Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone”
1. Background
The project started in February 2005 and is scheduled to end by January 2008. The donor budget of the project stands at US$ 2,396,027. The project is intended to strengthen the seed industry in the country, resulting in an improved capacity of Sierra Leone to produce and disseminate quality seed to farmers that should lead to improved seed security and food security. Main outputs of the project include the establishment of a National Seed Board and the development of a National Seed Policy, rehabilitation of seed farms, seed laboratories and processing equipment so that certified seeds produced by seed growers and community seed initiatives meet the needs of farmers, and training of seed industry personnel selected from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and participating NGOs with a view towards improving seed inspection and quality control of seed production and supply. These outcomes will be a significant step forward to help Sierra Leone recover from a tragic period of civil war.
Main activities carried out so far are as follows (corresponding to Immediate Objectives specified in the project document):
Immediate Objective 1 – Enhance the functioning and output of the seed industry through improvement of the coordination and oversight arrangements.
• A draft National Seed Policy has been formulated and submitted to MAFS for review and subsequent adoption to serve as the blueprint in guiding the development of the country’s seed industry; • A set of proposals have been formulated and submitted to MAFS for the reactivation of the National Seed Board (NSB) with new Terms of Reference, composition and operational modalities; • A National Seed Secretariat (NSS), comprising a Seed Industry Development Unit and a Seed Quality Control Unit, has been proposed to support the day-to-day activities of NSB as well as foster the seed industry privatization process including the separation and operation of the commercial functions of the seed sector from the public sector regulatory mandates.
Immediate Objective 2 - Increase the capacity of the national seed programme through the rehabilitation of farms, seed laboratories and processing equipment as well as training of relevant staff and partners.
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• A total of 46 damaged infrastructures (23 in Kobia Seed Centre, 17 in Makeni Seed Centre and 6 in Thakoblo Variety Maintenance Farm) have been rehabilitated; • 2 tractors, 2 disc ploughs and 2 disk harrows were procured. The utilization of these pieces of equipment has permitted the total area under rice seed production in Kobia Seed Centre during 2006 to reach 400 acres compared to 8 acres in 2005; • Procurement of three vehicles, 13 motorcycles and one mini-truck; these are in addition to three second-hand mini trucks and one tractor provided by the government; • Seed Processing plants in Kobia and Makeni Seed Centres have been repaired; • Laboratory buildings in Kobia and Makeni seed centres have been completed and over 118 pieces of seed testing equipments have been procured; • Proposals for the separation of seed quality control operations from the commercial seed production and marketing functions under the Seed Multiplication Unit (SMU) have been formulated and submitted to MAFS; • Approximately 360 stakeholders have been sensitized and trained in seed industry matters in 7 workshops and a National Seed Forum; • A field inspection refresher training workshop for about 20 field supervisors was carried out; • A Study tour of 4 senior staff from Kobia and Makeni Seed Centres was carried out in Ghana in September 2006 and another 4 staff at the management level will be going for a two-week study tour to Ghana in December 2006.
Immediate Objective 3 - Undertake widespread production and dissemination of seed and planting materials to meet the seed needs of the main food crops, in co-operation with participating partners.
• A 9 member Project Steering Committee (PSC) comprising a variety of institutions was formed at the beginning of project operations and 6 meetings have been held to review activities and guide the project; • A 2.5 months Seed Demand Survey has been carried out in 7 districts by a local consultant to determine the size and nature of the effective demand of the project’s seed outputs; • 13 varieties of rice, 4 of cassava, 2 of maize, 1 of groundnut and 2 of cowpea were identified for the seed production programme and foundation seed were obtained from IAR, RRS and project’s variety maintenance programme to initiate the seed multiplication chain; • A total of 627 MT of registered class of rice seed was produced during 2005/06. From this production, 550 MT (88%) – sufficient to plant 22,000 acres - was directed into the local market to support the 2006 rice production programme for national food security goals; • Over 3,000 acres are under rice seed production during the main 2006 crop season; • 17 MT of maize seed was produced during 2005/06 for the local market needs and for further multiplication;
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• 25 acres of cassava multiplication plots were raised during 2005/06 in 5 districts resulting in a total production of 2.5 million cuttings (sufficient for 630 acres) for distribution to farmers against the planned quantity of 1.5 million cuttings (for 375 acres); • Mechanisms for the establishment and management of a revolving fund were put in place whereby the proceeds from the sale of rice seed and other crops seed are being managed to support project activities.
1.5 Major problems identified by management
1. Inadequate number of field personnel provided by government to carry out scheduled project activities; 2. Delays in payment of salaries of project staff by government resulting in low staff morale; 3. Difficulties in recovery of all loans from seed contract growers; 4. Seed marketing problems, particularly the recovery of seed sale proceeds from government; 5. Shortage of funds to implement all the activities to produce all the set output targets at the required levels.
2. Purpose of the Evaluation
The evaluation, foreseen in the project document, is intended, to provide recommendations to the Government, FAO and the donor on the further steps necessary to consolidate progress and ensure achievement of objectives. If warranted, the evaluation will advise on any likely further need for external assistance, to permit timely consideration of the evaluation’s recommendations.
3. Scope of the Evaluation
The mission will assess the: a) Relevance of the project to development priorities and needs. b) Clarity and realism of the project's development and immediate objectives, including specification of targets and identification of beneficiaries and prospects for sustainability. c) Quality, clarity and adequacy of project design including: • clarity and logical consistency between, inputs, activities, outputs and progress towards achievement of objectives (quality, quantity and time-frame); • realism and clarity in the specification of prior obligations and prerequisites (assumptions and risks); • realism and clarity of external institutional relationships, and in the managerial and institutional framework for implementation and the work plan; • likely cost-effectiveness of the project design.
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d) Efficiency and adequacy of project implementation including: availability of funds as compared with budget for both the donor and national component; the quality and timeliness of input delivery by both FAO and the Government; managerial and work efficiency; implementation difficulties; adequacy of monitoring and reporting; the extent of national support and commitment and the quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO. e) Project results, including a full and systematic assessment of outputs produced to date (quantity and quality as compared with workplan and progress towards achieving the immediate objectives). The mission will especially review, the status and quality of work on: • Increasing capacity of the national seed programme with particular focus on rehabilitation of damaged seed infrastructures; • Improving the coordination and oversight arrangements of the national seed programme through seed policy reform; • Engagement in widespread seed production and dissemination activities of the target crops. f) The prospects for sustaining the project's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the project. The mission should examine in particular:
• The capacity and commitment of the government to proactively support and fund activities of SMU; • Financial and economic prospects of transformation of SMU into self-sustaining private seed enterprise (s) in a follow-up phase of the project; • The regulatory and legislative support tools and mechanisms needed to sustain the privatization process of the seed programme. g) The cost-effectiveness of the project.
Based on the above analysis the mission will draw specific conclusions and make proposals for any necessary further action by Government and/or FAO/donor to ensure sustainable development, including any need for additional assistance and activities of the project prior to its completion. The mission will draw attention to any lessons of general interest. Any proposal for further assistance should include precise specification of objectives and the major suggested outputs and inputs .
4. Report
The evaluation report will follow the standard format for an FAO project evaluation and correspond to the following outline:
I. Executive Summary (Main Findings and Recommendations)
II. Introduction
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III. Background and Context
IV. Assessment of Project Objectives and Design A. Justification B. Objectives C. Project Design
V. Assessment of Project Implementation, Efficiency and Management A. Project Budget and Expenditure B. Activities and Outputs C. Government Support D. Project Management E. Technical and Operational Backstopping
VI. Assessment of Results and Effectiveness A. Effects and Impact B. Sustainability and Environmental Impact of Results C. Gender Equity in Project Implementation and Results D. Cost-effectiveness E. Major Factors Affecting the Project Results
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations A. Conclusions B. Recommendations
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Annex 1, Appendix 2
Terms of Reference for Evaluation of GCP/SIL/022/GER “Support to Sierra Leone for the Establishment of a Right to Food Secretariat and Coordination Committee for Coordination of Efforts in the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food”
1. Background
When President Kabbah was sworn in for a second term on 19 May 2002, he announced that since peace had been consolidated, it was time to move on to the right to food. He pledged to do everything in his power so that by the end of his tenure (2007), no Sierra Leonean would go to bed hungry.
1.1. Origins of the project
FAO responded to the President’s pledge by fielding a mission to assess how the Organization could best help the Government of Sierra Leone to achieve its objectives. One of the mission members suggested to the Government to convene a national seminar to discuss the implications and operationalization of the right to food in Sierra Leone. During a session of the Intergovernmental Working Group to elaborate Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food in early 2003, the delegate of Sierra Leone approached FAO officials with a request for assistance. FAO convened a meeting with the Sierra Leone delegate of its staff and donor representatives. At this meeting, a representative of BMELV agreed to provide funding for the national seminar.
The seminar was held to coincide with the first anniversary of the President’s pledge, in May 2003. One of the recommendations of the seminar was to transfer the coordination body established by the Ministry of Agriculture to the Presidency, with a Secretariat that would serve that body and facilitate its work. This recommendation stemmed on the one hand from the observation made by FAO and others that the right to food and food security were cross sectoral and needed coordination that could not easily be provided by a Ministry. On the other hand, the donor representative gave signals to indicate that some funding could be made available for this purpose.
The project was subsequently drafted in FAO HQ with some inputs from the Government of Sierra Leone and the FAO Regional Office for Africa.
1.2. Project outcome
As the project title suggests, the main objective was to seek to strengthen cross-sectoral coordination through the establishment of a Right to Food Ministerial Policy Coordination Committee chaired by the Vice-President and served by a Right to Food Secretariat placed within the Office of the Vice-President. The Government of Sierra Leone would be squarely
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in the lead of deciding on specific priorities and the Executive Secretary of the Right to Food Secretariat was to report to the Vice-President as well as to FAO.
The detailed project objectives, with regard to coordination, advocacy and monitoring are set out in the project document.
The project was established for two years initially, which would allow assessment and refocusing as needed. The project was declared operational in March 2004 and some activities started in May 2004. The original Executive Secretary resigned and was replaced in February 2006. The project was extended to 31 May 2006 to allow spending of outstanding funds. Backstopping missions took place at the beginning, middle and end of the project.
1.3. Project follow-up
The donor had already made it clear that the project would not be extended as such. However, it was agreed that, as appropriate, funds from GCP/INT/970/GER could be used to provide continuing support to Sierra Leone.
During and following the last backstopping mission of the Lead Technical Unit (LTU), it was decided that the Right to Food Unit would continue to support the Right to Food Secretariat until the end of 2006. The need of sustainability of funding for the operations of the right to food secretariat was clear, through other donors or the funds of government itself. FAO indicated its willingness to provide continued technical assistance but as it is not a donor agency, it could not fund running costs.
After GCP/SIL/022/GER ended, FAO assisted with the formulation of a communication strategy that had been identified as one of his priorities during the LTU’s backstopping mission in May 2006.
1.4. Major problems identified during project implementation
• Inadequate funding for establishment and running of a new institution; • Inadequate capacity building; • Lack of information systems; • Lack of involvement of civil society in activities, possibly for lack of committed national NGOs present in the country; • Staffing problems.
2. Purpose of the Evaluation
The evaluation, which comes after the end of the project, is being undertaken for accountability purposes and to assess the prospects for continuing to work on the right to food in Sierra Leone.
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The evaluation should draw lessons from the experience of the project so that it may influence future country-level work by FAO and the donor. It should recommend whether and how continued engagement is justified, including what the possible cost implications would be for the Right to Food Unit, bearing in mind the available funds within GCP/INT/970/GER.
To the extent possible, the wider influence on the project on the activities of the government, donors and FAO itself should be assessed.
3. Scope of the Evaluation
The mission will assess the following: a) Relevance of the project to development priorities and needs. b) Quality, clarity and adequacy of project design including: • clarity and logical consistency between, inputs, activities, outputs and progress towards achievement of objectives (quality, quantity and time-frame); • realism of objectives and clarity about conceptual difference and similarities between the right to food and food security; • realism and clarity of external institutional relationships, and in the managerial and institutional framework for implementation and the work plan • extent to which project activities influenced other FAO projects. c) Efficiency and adequacy of project implementation including supervision by FAOR as budget holder and technical support from HQ and the adequacy of personnel to carry out the tasks at hand. d) Project results, including a full and systematic assessment of outputs produced to date (quantity and quality as compared with workplan and progress towards achieving the immediate objectives). The mission will especially review the status and quality of work on:
• Publications, reports and papers produced by the Right to Food Secretariat, including the terms of reference, supervision, selection and output of consultants; • Outreach activities to donors, government agencies, NGOs and local communities; e) The mandate and functions of the Right to Food Ministerial Policy Coordination Committee, including: • Composition and terms of reference compared with that of other institutions, from technical committees to the Cabinet itself; • Frequency and effectiveness of RTFMPCC meetings; • Links of right to food institutions with the Ministry of agriculture and food security.
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f) Assessment of progress on project and other priority activities recommended during backstopping missions.
Based on the above analysis the mission will draw specific conclusions and make proposals for any necessary further action by Government and/or FAO/donor to ensure continued efforts on the right to food (not just food security). Any proposal for further assistance should include precise specification of objectives and the major suggested outputs and inputs .
4. Report
The evaluation report will follow the standard format for an FAO project evaluation as in Annex 1 above.
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Annex 2
EVALUATION OF GCP/SIL/023/GER: “Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone”
I. Executive Summary (Main Findings and Recommendations)
A. Findings
Within the short period of less than two years, the project has largely achieved its aims (improved coordination in the seed sector; increased capacity for seed production; production and dissemination of seed). Although means available to the project are limited, two seed centres have been rehabilitated instead of one as planned and despite lack of vehicles and personnel, seed multiplication by contract growers and on government farms has been brought back into operation: two seed processing facilities are producing certified machine-processed seed rice, seed of other species as well as cassava cuttings were produced in sufficient quantities. The seed sector has been revitalized with the participation of all interested partners. An increasing number of farm families are getting benefits by using certified machine processed machine processed seed rice.
Although the project has been successful in a technical sense, it is not yet operating on a cost-recovery basis. The project document states that “any subsidization or humanitarian supplies should have a sponsor outside of the project” However, 400 mt of machine- processed seed rice were released in June 2006 to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security for free distribution without payment – sanctioned by the FAOR for political reasons. Payment is still outstanding. Similarly for the cassava multiplication so far no sponsor has been identified. This has lead to illiquidity of the Seed Multiplication Unit. Unless immediate payment is provided by the government, no seed rice can be bought from the farmers and the Seed Unit cannot process certified seed rice for the rapidly approaching planting season. The continuation of the programme is in doubt unless immediate payment is made.
The regular, timely payment of salaries for counterpart staff has also not been assumed by the Government. Given the lack of support for the Seed Multiplication Unit from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, its future sustainability is questionable at this point.
B. Recommendations
To avoid future problems of this nature, the management of the Seed Multiplication Unit should be guaranteed an independent status. It should be established as a business enterprise. Operational capacities need to be diversified and widened and additional commercial activities need to be added. Accompanying measures to improve the basic conditions for the seed programme should be as follows.
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The management structure has to be modified, more field staff has to be recruited, cost accounting (double entry system) has to be introduced, and capacity building undertaken to increase in commercial demand for certified machine-processed rice seed. A linkage to the Farmers Field School Programme has to be established in order to disseminate the practical knowledge on crop husbandry acquired by the seed multiplication project in the past decades.
Furthermore, a programme to improve soil fertility including organic farming both in the uplands as well as in the lowlands has to be established in order to practise and secure a long-term perspective for the development of the agricultural sector towards higher productivity and towards increasing engagement and employment of people in the rural areas. Market policies protecting the agricultural sector against dumping effects of cheap rice imports from the world market and enhancing the import of agricultural inputs have to be put in practise. Higher prices for farm produce will make agriculture as a business profitable, thus more attractive for the young people and for the refugees in Freetown who are willing to return to their villages.
As the overall objective to improve food security as well as rural employment and incomes remains unchanged, it is obligatory to secure the financial viability of the Seed Multiplication Unit and to furnish the programme with accompanying supportive elements.
In case the present financial crises can be solved immediately, a second phase of four years (starting Feb.2008) is recommended.
The following specific recommendations are made:
1.) The independence of management of the Seed Multiplication Unit to work in line with the project documents and its objective must be granted. Any future funding for the project should, at least, be controlled and managed jointly by the project and FAOR.
2.) For the remainder of the project and any successor phase, the CTA should head a management board for the project, members of which should be the national project co- ordinator, the seed centre managers, the production assistants, the head of the maintenance breeding and the chief accountant. The CTA should be responsible to the FAOR within the guidelines of the project document.
3.) In order to widen the economic base of the Seed Multiplication Unit and to increase its revenues, further commercial activities should be started: e. g. importation of vegetable seed, trade in fertilizer and consumption rice. Having operations in the rural areas, the Seed Multiplication Unit should act as a trading company buying rice at fair prices during the harvest season, process it to quality consumption rice and sell it again at market prices. Liquidity must be high enough to compensate for temporary losses.
4.) A double entry bookkeeping system should be established in order to prepare monthly trial balances and profit and loss calculations as a management tool. Likewise, a stock quantity monitoring system within the Unit and the price observation scheme on local
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retail markets for locally produced and imported rice should to be put in place to support decisions on buying and selling prices.
5.) In addition, a record keeping system for all agricultural enterprises, mainly at the maintenance breeding – site, should be introduced to enable gross margin calculations of the profitability of all different varieties, crops, and cropping patterns, which will be useful for eventual extension recommendations.
6.) The physical capacities of the seed centres to process seed should be enlarged: spare- parts for the old rehabilitated seed cleaning machines need to be procured and stocked. In addition, one new seed-processing machine needs to be installed in the Makeni seed centre for operation in the peak season and as a guarantee for continuous processing in case of an unforeseen breakdown of one of the older machines.
7.) To respond to an expected increase in demand for Nerica-varieties for dry season cultivation, which would be harvested when the rainy season is still going on, the dryer in Kobia seed centre should be repaired and a new one installed in the Makeni centre.
8.) In order to transfer the acquired knowledge on crop husbandry practises of the Seed Multiplication Unit personnel, linkages to the Farmers Field School Programme should be established. As an initial step, training and practical cropping work should be provided at the maintenance breeding site.
9.) At the maintenance site near Makeni, a programme for soil fertility improvement introducing auxiliary plants for hedgerows and improved fallow both for lowland and for upland should be started. This will also serve as practical training ground for the extension linkages.
10.) A market mechanism supporting price stability for the locally produced rice should be put in place. A development levy on imported rice in line with WTO-regulations will create revenues that should be used for measures towards an increase of productivity of agriculture.
II. Introduction
Project GCP/SIL/023/GER “Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone is the largest FAO-implemented national project in Sierra Leone and the only one with a full- time CTA. The project began implementation in February 2005 for three years, with a current NTE date of January 2008. The donor budget for the project is €1,898,144 (US$2,396,027).
The project document called for an evaluation during the project implementation period and budgetary provision was made for this. In July 2006, consultations were held between the Lead Technical Unit (AGPS) and the FAO Evaluation Service on the evaluation of FAO cooperation in Sierra Leone, which was scheduled to take place at about the same time that an evaluation of the project was being considered. For reasons of efficiency, and considering the possibilities for including the evaluation of this major project in a larger context, it was
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decided to combine the project evaluation with the country evaluation, using team members for both evaluations. Interviews with authorities in Freetown and field visits were undertaken as part of the overall country evaluation.
Primary responsibility for preparing the project evaluation was with the team agronomist, Dr Peter Schröder. He was assisted in preparing the report by the overall team leader, Mr Klaus Pilgram and by Mr Robert Moore of the FAO Evaluation Service. Valuable inputs were made by Dr S. Fomba, Government representative on the mission, and Mr M. Farah, former FAO Representative and resource person for the overall mission.
III. Background and Context
After the war Sierra Leone was in a precarious food security situation as a result of severe damages inflicted on the human and physical resources of its agriculture. Seed was scarce, and certified processed seed was not available at all. Before the war the former Seed Multiplication Project, funded by the German Government starting from 1974, was structured commercially like a private company, financially and technically fully separated from the Ministry of Agriculture. It had produced for the market demands and the demand from NGOs or other agencies that needed rice in Sierra Leone or in neighbouring countries. However losses occurred because cost covering prices for certified processed seed rice could not be realized, due to the extensive system of agriculture practiced in Sierra Leone as a consequence of extremely low soil fertility and the absence of market policies in favour for the agricultural sector. Other economic activities of the Seed Multiplication Project did not fully cover the losses. They were compensated by investments supplied by the German Government that was funding the project. The infrastructure of three seed centres, including the seed processing machines, were looted or destroyed during the war. Basic seed and foundation seed was not available because it was not produced or because it was consumed due to the prevailing emergency situation. After the war, overcoming the lack of seed became a key Government priority. The German Government, which supported seed multiplication in Sierra Leone since 1974, played a key role: - In 2003, part of Kobia Seed Centre was repaired: the store, which can accommodate 1000mt of rice was rehabilitated and the seed processing equipment including the generator was replaced. The funding (180,000 €) came from a regional seed project (GTZ). - In 2004, similar works were undertaken at the Makeni Seed Centre. The funding (190,000 €) was provided by the Project for Food Security, Reconstruction and Conflict Management in Kono and Kailahun (GTZ). - Implementation of project GCP/SIL/023/GER “Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone”. The project is intended to strengthen the seed industry in the country, resulting in an improved capacity of Sierra Leone to produce and disseminate quality seed to farmers that should lead to improved seed security and food security. Main outputs of the project include the establishment of a National Seed Board and the development of a National Seed Policy, rehabilitation of seed farms, and seed laboratories and processing equipment. Certified seeds produced by seed growers and community seed initiatives should meet the needs of farmers. Training of seed industry personnel selected from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and participating
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NGOs should improve seed inspection and quality control of seed production and supply.
IV. Assessment of Project Objectives and Design
A. Justification
A dramatic decline in domestic food production, the need for food imports and food aid, and widespread food insecurity and malnutrition were tragic consequences of the civil war in Sierra Leone. In the post conflict period the Sierra Leone government has made food production and food security a priority. The supply of seed of appropriate crop varieties was disrupted by the civil war and the reestablishment of a viable national seed system to improve the seed security of rural communities would contribute to food security.
After the war the return to farming was hindered by such constraints as the unavailability or lack of sufficient planting materials of improved, high yielding crop varieties that can increase production under low external-input conditions. Many development agencies had moved into farming communities with the objective of enhancing the farmers’ productive capacity through the provision of farm inputs. Farmers were invariably provided with seeds of local crop varieties that are long in duration, low yielding and susceptible to the numerous diseases and pests prevalent in the country. Consequently, crop productivity could be expected to be low and the prospects of achieving adequate production to feed the people rather dim. Under conditions of limited resources for crop production that prevails in Sierra Leone, the re-introduction of improved varieties, adapted and suitable for the growing conditions of various agro-ecologies, particularly the short duration and high yielding cultivars, was the best option towards yield enhancement and increased crop production. Thus, there was an urgent need to revitalize the seed sector with its core enterprise, the Seed Multiplication Project.
The question, whether from the cost / benefit aspect there would be a positive return, was not posed at the inception of the project – obviously due to the emergency situation. Yet, ‘sustainable’ means that a commercial enterprise like the Seed Multiplication Project is at least able to break even or - if not - to have a reliable sponsor who subsidises the enterprise. In the history of the Seed Multiplication project in Sierra Leone, dating back to 1974, cost covering prices for certified processed seed rice have never been realized. There was always a need for a subsidy though this was minimized through higher efficiency and due to other commercial activities like trade with imported vegetable seed, fertilizer and consumption rice, locally produced, mainly for the brewery.
The situation – no market possibilities to sell at cost covering prices – has not changed. Thus from the point of micro-economic point of view one has to ask, whether the counterpart funding (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security) is likely to be sufficient to compensate for the losses. From the macro-economic point of view it remains to be seen, whether under the present conditions there is a net benefit for Sierra Leone to invest in such an enterprise. The research conclusion before the war was that although the Seed Multiplication Project would have required subsidies, the production of certified machine-processed rice seed and its
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consequent re-use by the farmers for three years would have resulted in a net increase of rice production that would not have to be imported worth about US$2,000,000 annually,.
Thus in view of the large quantities of rice imported to Sierra Leone and taking into account the low level of intensification in staple food production the project is well justified.
B. Objectives
The development objective of the project was to improve food security and nutrition as well as rural employment and incomes in Sierra Leone through the rehabilitation of the national seed programme which will improve the availability of high quality seeds of adaptable varieties to farmers and provide the foundation for a sustainable seed industry. This objective mixes several levels of objectives, but the logic is that if the national seed programme is rehabilitated, high quality seeds will be available to farmers. If they use the seeds, food security and nutrition will improved and rural employment and incomes will rise.
The immediate project objectives are three, i.e. improved coordination in the seeds sector, increased capacity for seed production and production and widespread dissemination of seed. These all would contribute to the goal of a rehabilitated national seed sector. Although not well formulated, the evaluation agrees that the project objectives were relevant. However, the project document did not state any requirement that the project should be established on a sound commercial basis and the business aspects of running a sustainable seed multiplication programme were not sufficiently covered.
C. Project Design
Generally the project was well designed and the objectives took into consideration all necessary aspects as far as seed production and its organisational needs are concerned.
It was a mistake to start the abandoned farm of the Kobia Seed Centre again. A long time before the war, the former Seed Multiplication Project had withdrawn from the Robis Swamp in Kobia because the cost of mechanical soil cultivation could have never been recovered due to the low and decreasing yields. The project had shifted the production of foundation and certified seed to contract farmers with reliably higher yields. Mechanical soil cultivation for contact farmers in the bolilands around Makeni came to an end for the same reason: the farmers were not able to pay back loans as the yields were too low and the cost of mechanical soil cultivation too high.
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IV. Assessment of Project Implementation, Efficiency and Management
A. Project Budget and Expenditure
Table A. Project Budget €1 898 144
Oracle 9/04- Code Item 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total Cost € 12/04 2005 2006 1/07-8/07 Total 5300 Salaries Professional Chief Technical Adviser (Seed Technologist) 4 12 12 6 34 15,306 61,224 183,672 183,672 91,836 520.404 5570 International Consultant (Seed Development) 1 2 1 4 15,306 15,306 30,612 15,306 61,224 Subtotal International Experts 5 14 13 6 38 76,530 214,284 198,978 91,836 581,628 5500 General Service Staff General Service Staff (4) 16 48 48 32 144 408 6,528 19,584 19,584 13,056 58,752 Subtotal General Service Staff 16 48 48 32 144 6,528 19,584 19,584 13,056 58,752 5900 Official Travel Duty Travel 7,000 6,000 10,000 7,000 30,000 Review Mission Costs (see Table 3) 0 0 30,612 30,612 Subtotal Official Travel 7,000 6,000 10,000 37,612 60,612 6150 Technical Support Costs ATS AGPS 8,000 8,000 5570 National Consultants National Project Professional Personnel x 2 8 24 24 16 72 816 6,528 19,584 19,584 13,056 58,752 Subtotal Consultants 8 24 24 16 72 6,528 19,584 19,584 13,056 58,752 5650 Foundation seed production Land preparation Contracts 10,000 10,000 Procurement of breeder seed 5,000 5,000 5,000 15,000 Project’s own production 10,000 10,000 30,000 30,000 80,000 Production, processing, storage supplies 5,000 10,000 10,000 5,000 30,000 Foundation seed component total 20,000 35,000 45,000 35,000 135,000 Certified seed production Seed grower contracts 10,000 150,000 50,000 30,000 240,000 Processing and storage 30,000 5,000 5,000 40,000 Certified seed component total 10,000 180,000 55,000 35,000 280,000 5920 Training Conferences and meetings 5,000 10,000 10,000 5,000 30,000 Study Tours 60,000 60,000 In-service Training 5,000 5,000 10,000 5,000 25,000 Training component total 10,000 15,000 80,000 10,000 115,000 6000 Expendable Equip(Seed Laboratory Table 5) 30,030 30,030 6100 Non-expendable Equipment Repair and renovation of buildings 10,000 10,000 0 0 20,000 Seed processing plant rehabilitation 30,000 10,000 0 0 40,000 Farm equipment - Kobia (Table 3) 70,000 0 0 0 70,000 Vehicles (Table 4) 120,000 0 0 0 120,000 Seed laboratory rehabilitation 20,000 0 0 0 20,000 Equipment component total 250,000 20,000 270,000 6300 General Operating Expenses General Operating and maintenance 10,000 20,000 25,000 15,000 70,000 Reporting Cost 0 4,000 8,000 12,000 General operating Expenses Total 10,000 20,000 29,000 23,000 82,000 Total Budget excluding PSC 426,616 529,452 465,146 258,560 1,679,774 6130 Project Support Cost (13%) 218,370 Total Project Cost 1,898,144
Source: Project document
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The overall budget of the project was adequate for the envisaged activities. However, the budget level for training, study tours, international consultants, and for farm equipment at Kobia was high, given actual needs. The planed budget for national consultants should have been used to cover the employment of 3 national consultants including the coordinator. As means of transport to collect seed from the widespread out-growers is a bottleneck, the budget should have taken care of boat transport in the mangrove areas and of lorries, tractors and trailers instead of providing implements for soil cultivation.
An exception on the training was that no budgetary provisions were made to revitalize the account section of the Seed Multiplication Unit. As sustainable seed production implies a commercial business approach, the double entry system with monthly trial balances and profit and loss reports plus the stock taking and recording system are a must and training for this should have been provided for from the start of the project.
B. Activities and Outputs
Under the objective of improved coordination in the seed sector, the project was intended to help establish a strong and clearly mandated National Seed Board with membership fully representative of seed industry stakeholders in place and functioning and to assist in the formulation of a clear and concise national seed policy to serve as blueprint of the seed industry development.
The project concentrated considerable efforts to produce a blueprint of the seed industry development. Seven district workshops were held, the recommendations from which were used at a National Seed Forum (over 90 participants) held in June 2006. Subsequently, a National Seed Policy Document was drafted, reviewed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and approved in December 2006.
The project was intended to raise the capacity of the national seed programme, including overall capacity for seed multiplication, processing and handling and improvement of seed inspection and quality control.
In addition to the Kobia station mentioned in the project document, the more centrally located station in Makeni was also refurbished, as well as the adjacent maintenance breeding site in Thakoblo/Binkolo. The project also refurbished the Seed Unit office in Freetown. A seed-cleaning machine from a third station established by the previous Seed Multiplication project in Kenema has been dismantled in order to be used as source of spare parts. Seed testing has been established and criteria for national standards have been introduced. The reference samples are kept in polyethylene bags instead of paper bags. The seed testing laboratory in Freetown has not been revitalized yet. Appropriate proposals to separate the seed quality control operations have been prepared.
In terms of institutional strengthening, a total of 412 persons have been trained. Nine workshops have been held and two study tours to Ghana have been undertaken. As
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mentioned already the budget provision for training, in relation to the investment components of the budget, appears proportionally too high.
The project was to promote widespread distribution of seed and planting material. A study to forecast the seed demand was performed. It worked on plausible assumptions as far as the replacement of seed by certified machine-processed through farmers is concerned. However, what could not be assessed is whether this theoretical demand is backed by the ability and willingness of the farmers to pay cost covering prices in cash. Unless the usefulness of certified machine-processed seed rice is supplemented with an accompanying package on appropriate cropping techniques, its profitability will not be clear to farmers. Thus a linkage to Farmers Field Schools and other programmes still needs to be established.
Presently, due to the damages and losses during the war, there are no possibilities to test varieties, which are due for release according to international standards. A national variety field testing system does not exist as yet and statistical data as a base for control are not available either. Only NERICA varieties from WARDA are newly available. Theoretically, IAR and RRS in co-operation with the National Seed Board should operate such a variety field testing system – but lack of funds to do this is presently the bottleneck.
At the start of the programme, breeder seed was hardly available. Consequently the Seed Multiplication Unit went to the former contract farmers and recollected seed (panicle selection) of the formerly already released varieties and started the maintenance-breeding programme again.
The plan for re-cultivation of the Robis swamp at Kobia did not take into account the extremely low soil fertility in combination with high costs of mechanical cultivation. A better choice was made to re-cultivate the former maintenance breeding site at Takoblo/Binkolo near Makeni. Here presently the production of early generations of the various species and varieties is handled in a cost effective and appropriate manner. The Seed Multiplication Unit revitalized the former out - grower scheme successfully. Seed - mainly rice seed, but also maize, groundnuts and cowpea was produced and was ready for sale. Like before the war, the demand for seed other than rice was very limited.
A special programme was undertaken for the multiplication of four cassava varieties released by the Institute for Agricultural Research (IAR). In 140 villages on 740 acres, cassava was multiplied partly by ratooning with good results. More than 3000 immediate beneficiaries now have these improved varieties at their disposal and can sell the cassava cuttings to other interested farmers. Thus the project has made a significant contribution to the food security the rural areas in Sierra Leone. This programme was fully financed by the Seed Multiplication Unit, which receives no proceeds from it.
Whilst the activities cover fully the needs of establishing a technically functioning seed production industry with in-built quality control to guarantee the standards for certified seed, the commercial aspect was overlooked, which may be due to the relief and rehabilitation character of project operations in Sierra Leone shortly after the war. ‘Dissemination’ in the
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sense of a sustainable seed programme should always imply that costs are recovered by proceeds from sale directly to the customers.
C. Government Support
In the project document it is mentioned that: “The Government shall be responsible for the recruitment, salaries and social security measures of the national staff. The Government shall also provide the facilities and supplies... , as and when required for the project”. The project document specifies neither in quantity nor in quality the range or magnitude of the envisaged Government contributions. Viewing the staffing and financial needs of the programme at least some absolute figures and range of financial volumes should have been laid down.
D. Project Management
A Project Steering committee was established and six meetings have been held. The co- operation of the FAO – CTA with national experts is excellent. Generally the project was managed and implemented in an efficient way – input delivery by FAO was mostly in time, the implementation difficulties like shortage of transport were overcome. The budget and funds were managed adequately with support of the administrative officer in the FAOR. The reporting system and format are excellent – all activities were reported in detail. Emerging or envisaged bottlenecks were reported in time, including those requiring intervention by the FAOR.
E. Technical and Operational Backstopping
The technical backstopping was designed to come mostly from the HQ Rome. The technical backstopping officer, who had worked previously in Sierra Leone and thus has good familiarity with the country, not only visited the project in 2006 but communicates frequently with the CTA. The backstopping has been effective. However, as there was no component for it in the project, there was no backstopping related to the commercial operation of the Seed Multiplication.
The FAOR played a generally supportive role in project implementation, but enforced in 2006 that 400 t of seed should be collected from the Programme by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security without immediate payment. As the payment still was not effected when the buying season in January 2007 was at its peak, the lack of these monies led to illiquidity, i.e. the programme could not purchase the multiplied rice from its contract farmers.
V. Assessment of Results and Effectiveness
A. Effects and Impact
With the revitalizing of the seed sector and the re-establishment of the Seed Multiplication Unit, a functioning, reliable enterprise is now producing certified machine processed seed rice in the sub-region. As it was before the war, the Seed Multiplication Unit is able to supply
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projects, NGOs and other agencies. With the production and supply of certified seed to the farming community, especially in the war affected zones, families could start rice production again. Through the cassava multiplication programme, the new high yielding varieties are now widely available in the country. However, seed rice is provided to farmers through projects, NGOs and the government and not by direct purchase of seed by the small farmers.
Thus the seed multiplication programme has contributed considerably to bring normality back to the rice farming community. Apart from being an employer of about 300 people, it is a partner for hundreds of farmers who produce as seed rice as contractgrowers. These farmers are not subject to the low prices traders and moneylenders usually are in the position to enforce.
The operating capacity of the seed unit is now large enough to supply seed to neighbouring countries. The project has received an order for 2000 mt of certified processed seed rice to Liberia.
B. Sustainability and Environmental Impact of Results
The use of improved varieties of certified machine-processed seed rice, especially in the lowlands, where it can be cultivated in the dry season in Inland Valley Swamps as well, will reduce the production pressure on the uplands where environmental protection is most critical. Thus the programme can be expected to have principally a positive impact on the environment.
However the use of certified machine processed seed alone will not bring the considerable yield increase needed to encourage farmers to pay for a cost-covering price for seed rice. Certified seed must be accompanied by a package of appropriate and proven agronomic practices, which are common in other rice growing countries. In the maintenance farm of the seed multiplication project, these agronomic practices are used. Only a very few progressive farmers have followed this example so far. This package must include the know-how for soil fertility conservation and improvement.
So far no such programme is in place. The extension programme now focussing on the ‘farmers field school’ approach has not yet incorporated this into the curriculum.
C. Gender Equity in Project Implementation and Results
The consumers of the certified machine-processed rice seed are mostly male. However, with other crops (cassava, groundnut, maize, cowpeas), women are in the majority as producers. Women do the processing and marketing of cassava. Thus the cassava multiplication scheme was a boost for female income generating activities.
At project level, only in the account section of the seed multiplication unit are female personnel employed. In the seed centres, the laboratory and at the level of field staff only men are employed. This may not change in the foreseeable future, as female students who study agriculture in Sierra Leone are rare.
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D. Cost-effectiveness
Generally the programme operates cost-effectively but improvements in some aspects could be made.
It was already mentioned that the costs of mechanical soil cultivation cannot be covered by increased yields that can be realized as a result. Thus the mechanical soil cultivation for contract farmers should be phased out. Fertilizers and jute bags for contract farmers were purchased though middlemen from neighbouring Guinea. These procurements should be done through regular direct purchases from the factories.
In order to reduce losses, a concise stock control and audit system has to be re-introduced. Cost accounting is only at the beginning and a double entry system to bring the various project components together still needs to be initiated.
An increase in the number of field staff plus the provision of motorbikes and trucks for the transport of rice, rather than purchasing farm implements, would have been more beneficial for the production of certified machine processed seed rice.
E. Major Factors Affecting the Project Results
As already mentioned above, the project is not yet structured so that it can operate as a commercial enterprise. The targeted volume of 600 t of certified machine processed seed rice is not enough to result in a sufficiently low cost per unit that can be absorbed by the market with its present purchasing power. One potential strategy is to produce a higher volume of certified machine processed seed rice and sell it at cost covering prices for relief purposes (e.g. for Liberia), funded by external agencies. This would be a temporary solution. But from these relief actions a steady demand may develop, so that the capacities of the Seed Multiplication Unit can be utilized fully and can serve the sub-region, too. It could also start other commercial activities like production of machine processed consumption rice for the brewery or for sale to the public.
Financial liquidity must always be secured. Deferred payments of salaries through the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security are destructive to the morale of staff and consequently, to the project. Advance payment or cash down payments with full payment on invoice for goods and services supplied by the Seed Multiplication Unit must be followed for any consignment.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Conclusions
Within the short period of less than two years, the project has largely achieved its aims (improved coordination in the seed sector; increased capacity for seed production; production and dissemination of seed ). Although means available to the project are limited,
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two seed centres have been rehabilitated instead of one as planned and despite lack of vehicles and personnel, seed multiplication has been brought back into operation: certified machine-processed seed rice, seed of other species as well as cassava cuttings were produced in sufficient quantities. The seed sector has been revitalized with the participation of all interested partners. An increasing number of farm families are getting benefits by using certified machine processed seed rice.
However, this core of the project “Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone” - the Seed Multiplication Unit – can only be realised, if further investments will follow. The operational capacities need to be diversified and additional commercial activities need to be added. Therefore, the management structure has to be modified, cost accounting has to be introduced, and capacity building as far as the spreading of packages for intensive cultivation of crops is concerned has to be done in order to pave the way for a steady increase in commercial demand for certified machine-processed seed.
In addition a linkage to the Farmers Field School Programme as the modern approach of extension work has to be established in order to disseminate the practical knowledge on crop husbandry acquired by the Seed Multiplication Project in the past decades.
Furthermore a programme to improve soil fertility by organic farming both in the uplands as well as in the lowlands has to be established in order to practise and secure a long-term perspective for the development of the agricultural sector towards higher productivity and towards increasing engagement and employment of people in the rural areas.
B. Recommendations
As the overall objective to improve food security as well as rural employment and incomes remains unchanged, it is obligatory to secure the financial viability of the Seed Multiplication Unit as the major supplier of the farm input ‘certified machine processed seed rice’ plus seed and seedlings for other crops in Sierra Leone and in the sub-region.
Assuming the present financial crises facing the project can be solved immediately, a second phase of four years (starting Feb.2008) is recommended. The expected outputs would be:
1.) An entity, structured like a private enterprise, with annual business report that indicates a positive development of the profit and loss calculation; 2.) Development programmes financed by special budgets in order to make use of the agricultural expertise of the Seed Multiplication Unit staff for training linkages to farmers field schools; 3.) A market policy, which enhances intensification of agriculture through an encouraging price level for farm gate prices in Sierra Leone.
Inputs required are:
1.) Long-term technical advisors on technical and business management;
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2.) Hardware and equipment to complement the present ones, including working capital; 3.) Training programmes; 4.) Market study on rice market in Sierra Leone.
A future programme design of the sustainable seed programme should clearly differentiate between the investment in the commercially structured seed production, its associated activities and the development activities like training, improving soil fertility, which do not produce an immediate financial return. However, only such a combination will pave the way for the sustainable intensification of agriculture.
The following recommendations should form part of the new project:
1.) The independence of management of the Seed Multiplication Unit to create a financially sustainable institution must be guaranteed.
2.) The CTA should be charged with management tasks. He would head the management board, members of which should be the national project co-ordinator, the seed centre managers, the production assistants, the head of the maintenance breeding and the chief accountant. The CTA would be responsible to the MAFS within the guidelines of the project documents. The responsibility in the control and management of the project funds would be shared between the CTA and the FAOR. The Project Steering Committee should act as an advisory board to support the implementation of the programme in line with the project document.
3.) In order to widen the economic base of the Seed Multiplication Unit and to increase the revenues further commercial activities should be started: e. g. importation of vegetable seed, trade in fertilizers and locally produced consumption rice. The Seed Multiplication Unit should act as a trading company, buying rice at fair prices during the harvest season, processing it to quality consumption rice and selling it at market prices. Liquidity must be high enough to compensate for temporary losses.
4.) A double entry bookkeeping system should be established in order to prepare monthly trial balances and profit and loss calculations as a management tool. Likewise a stock quantity monitoring system within the Seed Multiplication Unit has to be practised. A price observation scheme on local retail markets for locally produced and imported rice should be put in place to support decisions on buying and selling prices. The field staff should report on the prices per buttercup and per bag both on paddy (husked) rice as well as milled rice. A table of conversion rates (equivalents) between husked rice and milled rice (normally varying between 50 – 55 % milling rate), number of buttercups per bushel and per 50 kg bag, specified by variety, will help to evaluate the profit margins between the various elements of rice trade
5.) In addition to the accounting system, a record keeping system for all agricultural enterprises, mainly at the maintenance breeding site of the Seed Multiplication Unit, should be introduced to enable gross margin calculations for the purpose of the evaluation of the profitability of all different varieties, crops, and cropping patterns and
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would be taken into account for subsequent extension recommendations. This implies gathering information on the economics of each farm enterprise. Special attention must be given to labour input. The results (return to labour or return to land) will serve to evaluate the varieties, different crops on their economic performance, too.
6.) The physical capacities of the seed centres to process seed should be enlarged: spare- parts for the old rehabilitated seed cleaning machines need to be procured and stocked. In addition, one new seed-processing machine needs to be installed in the Makeni seed centre for operation in the peak season and a guarantee for continuous processing in case of an unforeseen breakdown of one of the old machines. Spare parts and tools should be re-stocked. The presently unutilized empty seed centre in Kenema should be leased to private entrepreneurs. Instead of having one cold room for the reference seed samples in each seed centre, there should be one central one in the Makeni centre (office building – safe room) only. The fuel tanks in the Kobia Station should be repaired.
7.) Responding to the expected increasing demand of the Nerica-varieties, the dryer in Kobia seed centre should be repaired and a new one installed in the Makeni centre. The programme has embarked to cultivate Inland Valley Swamps in the dry season in order to add a multiplication cycle. It seems advisable to start a crop rotation pattern that includes a fallow period in the dry season every second year in order to sustain and improve soil fertility.
8.) In order to transfer the acquired knowledge on crop husbandry practises of the Seed Multiplication Unit personnel, a linkage to the Farmers Field School Programme should be established. As an initial step, training and practical cropping work should be provided at the maintenance breeding site. A second training component should focus on rice farming during the dry season.
9.) At the maintenance site near Makeni, where a stock of basic seed for upland crops, too, is produced, a programme for soil fertility improvement introducing auxiliary plants for hedgerows and improved fallow both for lowland and for upland should be started. This will also serve as practical training ground for the extension linkages. Pigeon peas could be promoted to improve soil fertility in the upland and as a valuable source of protein. Like for rice cultivation, practical training on soil improvement could be supplied.
10.) Compilations of monthly markets reports on rice trade within the areas of operation in order to support the formulation of a market policy.
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ANNEX 3
EVALUATION OF GCP/SIL/022/GER: “Support to Sierra Leone for Establishment of a Right to Food Secretariat and Coordination Committee for Coordination of Efforts in the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food“
I. Executive Summary (Main Findings and Recommendations)
GCP/SIL/022/GER had the overall objective to facilitate actions by Sierra Leone towards the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security.
The development objective of the project corresponded to one of the highest priorities in policy in Sierra Leone (SIL) in 2002. In that regard the project was timely and focussed on partners’ demands and priorities, however outputs and activities foreseen in the project framework were too ambitious to be able to be implemented within the two-year time frame for the project, even if more funds had been available. That the design of a project framework was too grand and not rooted in the reality in Sierra Leone is one of the major weaknesses of GCP/SIL/022/GER.
Only part of the outputs envisaged in the project framework could be achieved. A Right to Food Secretariat (RTF-Sec) was established as an institution at the national level. Whether the establishment of the RTF-Sec will lead to sustainable results depends on the interest and resources on the part of the Government of SIL to maintain the institutional and political structures that have been established through the Secretariat. However, cooperation with NGOs and outreach to grassroots level and to the review and implementation of legislation and policies were not realised.
Major factors affecting the realisation of project results are: • capacity problems relating to organisational development, • failure to systematically anchor the concept of right to food (RTF) at the grassroots level.
The project should not be continued in a second phase. Instead, focused and targeted support for the problem areas is considered more useful. Considerable outreach could be realised through Farmer Field Schools (FFS) in training activities to include sensitisation and awareness-raising on the practical relevance of a right-based approach to food security in agriculture.
The main Lesson Learned from GCP/SIL/022/GER is that future country-level work must not have unrealistic expectations and targets, but should set off with a more modest and realistic project framework. This can best be achieved through a participatory planning process including all relevant stakeholders and through regular and systematic monitoring to assess the progress of the project.
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II. Introduction
The project GCP/SIL/022/GER “Support to Sierra Leone for the Establishment of a Right to Food Secretariat and Coordination Committee for Coordination of Efforts in the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food was established for an initial two years and later extended by 3 months ( total duration: March 2004 to May 2006), funded by the Federal Republic of Germany (Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection, BMELV) and implemented by FAO.
The evaluation comes after the end of the project and has several purposes: • To examine to what extent the objectives of the project have been achieved • To assess the prospects for continuation of work on the RTF in SIL • To make recommendations whether and how continued engagement on the issue of RTF in SIL is feasible including what the possible cost implications would be for the RTF-Unit • To assess - as far as possible - the wider influence of the project on the activities of the government, donors and FAO.
The assignment was carried out from 6 to 18 February 2007. The evaluation was carried out through interviews with key stakeholders in Freetown: the Minister of Agriculture and Food Security, the Minister for Presidential Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Finance, the Director of Fisheries, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights, the Chairman of the National Commission for Democracy, the Chairman of the National Alliance against Hunger, staff of the Lawyers’ Centre for Legal Assistance, the Assistant Executive Secretary of the Right to Food-Secretariat, the former FAO Representative and representatives of the National Association of Farmers of SIL and with the Director of the Institute for Agricultural Research.
During field trips to Bombali, Koinadugu and Tonkolili districts, meetings were held with District Food Security Coordinating Committees, with Farmer Field School Facilitators and Coordinators, and farmers in some villages. (See Vol II, Annex 8: List of people contacted)
The project evaluation was carried out as part of the evaluation of the entirety of FAO cooperation with SIL covering the period 2001-06.
III. Background and Context
The President of Sierra Leone pledged on 19 May 2002 to devote his current term of office (until 2007) to the right to food: “… to work even harder,…, to do everything in my power to ensure that within the next five years no Sierra Leonean goes to bed hungry. We must have the capacity to feed ourselves. We will therefore place proper and adequate emphasis on agriculture…” .
The project GCP/SIL/022/GER is part of FAO’s efforts to help the Government achieve this goal. Financial support by the German Government was channelled through FAO as co-
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operation partner of the Government of Sierra Leone, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS).
Planning for the project was initiated following a national seminar in Sierra Leone on the occasion of the first anniversary of the President’s Pledge. An indication on the part of the donor government was given, that some funding would be available to support the realisation of the RTF in SIL through the establishment of a RTF-Sec, which the Government agreed to, and had also been a recommendation of a seminar on “operationalizing the right to food in Sierra Leone”. The project document was drafted in FAO Headquarters (Legal Office and Ad Hoc Unit for the Right to Food Guidelines) with some inputs from the Government of SIL and the FAO Regional Office for Africa.
Project Outline
Overall (development) objective of the project is to facilitate actions by Sierra Leone towards the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security through the elaboration and subsequent application of rights-based policies and programmes for food security
The objectives of the projects were:
1: Establishment and functioning of the Right to Food-Secretariat
Main sub-outputs : • Right to Food-Secretariat functioning (staff, work plan and budget) • Information on the right to food is centrally available
2: Establishment and functioning of a Right to Food Coordination Committee under the Chairmanship of the Vice-President
Main sub-outputs : • Formal constitution of a Right to Food Coordination Committee • Participation and coordination of non-governmental actors, including the international community • Policies and legislation reviewed, established and implemented • Right to Food Strategy adopted, priorities established and implemented
In a wider context the project was to serve as an international pilot to assist in putting the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food, and, consequently, the right to food into practice.
The project was declared operational in March 2004 and was scheduled for two years; it was extended to 31 May 2006 with no budget increase. Given the importance of the project as a
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pilot for the internalisation of the right to food in a country context, the FAO RTF-Unit in Rome decided to support the RTF Secretariat in SIL with its own funds until December 2006. The project was declared operationally closed by FAO on 31 December 2006 and all assets were transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS). The MAFS has for the time being agreed to host the RTF-Sec and to employ an Assistant Executive Secretary. It has also agreed to pay the current costs of the Right to Food secretariat including staff salaries.
The right to food in practice – a human rights based approach to food security
The right to food is anchored in Art. 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in force since 1976), where the States Parties “recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing...” The FAO Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (Right to Food Guidelines) provide a framework for the operationalisation of the right to food, and, thus, of food security. The Guidelines have been adopted by the Council of FAO at its 127 th session in November 2004; they provide a strong political commitment for FAO and its members states towards the progressive realisation of the international right to food.
This has two aspects: working towards achieving food security for all as a right, i.e. the right to food (result) and also implementing human rights principles as procedural standards (process). The process towards realising food security for all as a right includes defining goals, accountabilities and obligations, consistent and coherent efforts to improve food security over time, and ensuring effective monitoring of progress. A human rights- based approach to food security furthermore requires adherence to the core human rights standards, those are: transparency and accountability; participation and empowerment, and realisation of the principles of non-discrimination and taking into consideration the impact of any measure upon poor and vulnerable groups.
IV. Assessment of Project Objectives and Design a. Justification
GCP/SIL/022/GER has its origins in the rights-based food security pledge of President Kabbah upon his re-election in May 2002. The statement set a political programme for SIL and generated a number of initiatives from different stakeholders which would have to be coordinated. Consequently, the government expressed the wish to establish a RTF-Sec and looked for funding. In this connection, FAO was approached for assistance by the Minister of Agriculture and Food Security.
Therefore the project and its development objective, “to facilitate actions by Sierra Leone towards the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national
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food security” supported one of the highest priorities of the country’s policy. it’s objective is to facilitate food security (through a rights-based approach ) in one of the least developed countries in the process of recovering from a civil war. The support responded to the President’s pledge and to the government’s interest for assistance.
The project is in line with the FAO Overall Strategic Framework (Goal 1): to reduce food insecurity. The project was to facilitate actions towards the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in Sierra Leone. This includes access of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to sufficient, safe, and nutritionally adequate food (Strategic Objective A.2) and also making legal and political instruments in Sierra Leone consistent with the international right to food and the Right to Food Guidelines (Strategic Objective B.2.).
The project fits into FAO’s international efforts to develop guidelines to operationalise the RTF and a human rights-based approach to food security. The project came into existence, when the FAO Guidelines were drafted and discussed in the Inter-governmental Working group. Experiences on the implementation of the right to food in Sierra Leone as one of the least developed countries could provide a useful test for the implementation of the right to food in practice.
From the perspective of the international political framework the project was legitimate: It aimed at making a direct contribution to the realisation of World Food Summit Target, reiterating MDG 1 of halving the number of hungry people by 2015, to poverty reduction and to the realisation of human rights (right to food and rights which are interrelated: right to the highest attainable standard of health, right to enjoy respect as a person, etc.). b. Objectives
GCP/SIL/022/GER had two immediate objectives: the establishment and functioning of a Right to Food Secretariat (immediate objective 1), and the establishment and functioning of a Right to food –Coordination Committee (immediate objective II, later on called: Ministerial Policy Coordination Committee).
The Right to Food Coordination Committee (RTFCC) was to provide overall guidance, formulate policies and assign tasks to the RTF Secretariat. The RTFCC would include key ministries, international organisations and civil society; it was intended to reflect the cross- cutting character of the RTF with implications and responsibilities for different stakeholders.
Mainstreaming RTF in SIL additionally needs coordination of efforts of the different stakeholders and follow-up of activities on the RTF including incentives for their implementation; thus the Government of SIL additionally wished to establish a RTF-Sec. The RTF-Sec should serve as national focal point for implementation of the RTF and service the RTFCC. Therefore the two bodies were planned to complement one another to constitute a systemic institutional framework for mainstreaming the RTF in SIL.
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c. Project Design
Outputs
The six outputs of GCP/SIL/022/GER 1.1. (A Right to Food –Secretariat established), 1.2. (Information on the Right to Food centrally available), 2.1. ( A Right to Food Coordination Committee formally constituted), 2.2. (Participation and coordination of non-governmental actors), 2.3. (Policies and legislation reviewed, established and implemented) and 2.4. (Right to Food Strategy adopted and Priorities established) are clearly formulated and relate to the different aspects of the implementation of the right to food in Sierra Leone. The problem is that the outputs seek to cover all aspect of the implementation of the right to food in SIL within a project period of 2 years. They were too numerous, too ambitious and not realistic for an LDC like SIL.
A more appropriate programme framework would have been to set up a functioning institutional and coordinating framework for the implementation of the right to food in SIL, including a monitoring system. Therefore, a project focussing on outputs 1.1 (Establishment of a Right to Food-Secretariat), 2.1 (Constitution of a Right to Food-Coordination Committee) and 2.2 (Participation and coordination of non-governmental actors) and an additional output on the establishment of a monitoring system for progress on the implementation of the right to food might have been more reasonable.
The set of outreach activities and the comprehensive review of legislation that feature as outputs 1.2 and 2.3 could become the focus of the work of the secretariat once its capacities are developed.
Activities
The project document envisaged an excessive number of activities .The diversity and complexity of activities foreseen can be illustrated by output 1.2 (Information on the right to food centrally available): the activities range from review and revision of food insecurity and malnutrition information and recommendations for their improvements; establishment of formal communication channels with line ministries and relevant government authorities; survey and analysis of best practices; identification of intervention needs at policy level; collection, summary or translation and making available relevant documentation on the right to food to all stakeholders; establishment and regular update of a website on the right to food initiative and its progress in Sierra Leone; dissemination of information to civil society, stakeholders, beneficiary population and the media; inputs to meetings on the subject of the right to food. This was totally unrealistic given the institutional and budgetary constraints.
The project document was largely drafted in Rome with suggestions from the FAO Regional Office in Accra and some inputs from the MAFS of Sierra Leone. However, the evaluation
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believes that there was inadequate stakeholder consultation concerning what was realistically possible in the time frame and with the resources available.
It would have been advisable to request adjustment of the project framework as soon as it was discovered, that the outputs could not been achieved and only a portion of those activities foreseen be carried out. Problems were already identified during the backstopping mission from 14 to 28 February 2005
Institutional Framework
The institutional setting of the project was clear and appropriate: the RTF Sec was to be established in the Vice-President’s Office to be headed by an Executive Secretary. It was to serve the RTFCC under the Chairmanship of the Vice-President.
External institutional relationships with FAO were clearly defined. FAOR as budget holder had the overall responsibility for the implementation of the project, whilst technical support and backstopping were carried out by the Legal Office in Rome.
V. Assessment of Project Implementation, Efficiency and Management a. Project Budget and Expenditure
The funds donated from the German Government amounted to 282.500 EUR (US$ 345.723). Since not all the money was dispersed within the project time of 2 years (May 2004 to May 2006) the budget could be extended for two months, i.e. until July 2006 to extend the project activities. In addition to funds available under GCP/SIL/022/GER the RTF-Unit Rome made available 30.000 EUR from GCP/INT/995/SWI for local communication and capacity development. b. Activities and Outputs
Institution-building (outputs 1.1 and 2.1)
Outputs and activities relating to institution-building have been largely implemented. The RTF-Secretariat has been established and is in function (Output 1.1) and the RTFCC has been formally constituted (Output 1.2). The Committee only convened once and fell dormant afterwards.
The RTF-Sec came into function in July 2004 when the first ES took office, the data entry clerk was appointed and a secretary seconded from the MAFS. The work of the Secretariat in 2004 was documented in the Right to Food -Secretariat Annual Report (July to December 2004). When the first ES left her post for a financially more rewarding appointment, a new ES was recruited. He published a Status Report ( Right to Food Secretariat: Project GCP/022/GER-Strengthening the Right to Food secretariat, Status Report, of July 2006 ) and a situation analysis ( Right to Food Secretariat: Situation Analysis and the way forward, of July 2006 ) both of them providing a detailed overview on what had been done by the
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Secretariat to that point. However, the project did not carry out the envisaged collection and analysis of current food security projects and programmes. From October 2006, the Executive Secretary no longer worked full-time for the RTF-Sec.
Outreach outputs (outputs 1.2 and 2.2)
Output 1.2: Information on the right to food centrally available
Government officials at various levels (national and district) as well as Members of Parliament and NGOs know about the President’s pledge and the political importance of the RTF. They understand that the RTF is closely related to the concept of food security; it obliges the government to create an enabling environment to facilitate access to food for the population through production.
Among District Food Security Coordination Committees (DFSCC) in Bombali, Konadugu and Tonkolili, the concept was less well understood. They knew about the President’s pledge, and that the right to food meant “to create an enabling environment for farming” . However, the significance of this notion was often not clear. People referred to the need for additional agricultural equipment and to the need for tractors, etc. and the overall goal to achieve food security. The practical relevance and the added value of a rights-based approach to food security had not been grasped. Knowledge about the Right to Food Secretariat was scarce.
Among local populations, information and understanding on the right to food differed and was related to the level of education. Those who knew about the right to food were all well educated, fluent in English and therefore had a chance to become familiar with the central policy objective including the right to food. Since the vast majority of Sierra Leone’s population is illiterate, it can be assumed that there is little knowledge or understanding about the RtF at grassroots level.
Right to Food – Food Security
The “right to food” and the issue of “food security” are so closely related that it would be inadequate to describe them as two different concepts: The concept of food security describes a status where all people have physical access to sufficient, safe, nutritious and adequate food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (see para. 15, Right to Food Guidelines). The precise meaning of “adequacy” is to a large extent determined by prevailing, social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological or other conditions. (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment, Right to food, para 7)
If a rights-based approach is chosen for food security, this is identical with the right to food, since the right to food has the same substantial contents as has the notion of food security. The added value of the right to food or a rights-based approach to food security is that it emphasises the individual: every person actually enjoys a RIGHT to access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food. In very short terms: the right to food considers food security
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through a human rights lens.
Therefore, it does not seem advisable to draw a distinction between the RTF and food security when working towards the realisation of the RTF/a rights-based approach to food security in a development context. A far more crucial factor seems to be to sensitise government and other state officials, that progress in the area of food security is not just a political commitment, but part of their obligation towards the people. Moreover, it is important to apply the methodology of a human rights –based approach in the process of implementation: participation and empowerment, transparency and accountability, and non- discrimination and inclusion of vulnerable groups.
Sensitisation on the “right to food”/entitlement to food security on the other hand has to avoid the misconception that a right to food/right-based approach to food security confers a general entitlement to food hand outs. Instead those enjoying the right to food have to take up their responsibility towards themselves and make use of the enabling environment to food security which the government is obliged to create.
Discussions with various stakeholders during the mission, whether at governmental level, with NGOs or at grass root level corroborated the impression that progress towards the realisation of the RTF in SIL is unaffected by a conceptual debate on differences between the right to food and food security. The important fact is to emphasise the obligation to work towards food security of every individual and use the methodology of a human rights based approach.
Activities 1.2.1 and 1.2.5: • Right to Food Coordination Committee reviews and revises collection of food insecurity and malnutrition information and makes recommendations for improvements; • Make available relevant documentation on the right to food to all stakeholders.
Since the RTFMCC is dormant these activities had to be undertaken by the RTF-Sec alone. The RTF-Sec has mandated a compilation of policies and projects carried out by all line ministries of what has been done in order to promote food security in SIL ( Food Security Status Review of 2005 ). However, this document does not contain any recommendations for improvements.
Activity 1.2.2: • Formal communication channels with line ministries and relevant government authorities established
Upon recommendation of the backstopping mission in March 2005, the Executive Secretary initiated the establishment of Right to food - focal points in key ministries: - Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security [MAFFS, later: MAFS] - Ministry of Health
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- Ministry of Trade & Industry - Ministry of the Interior - Ministry of Development & Planning - Ministry of Fisheries & Marine Resources
Aside from in MAFS, anecdotal evidence gathered by the evaluation led to doubts whether the focal points are effectively established or even known among senior ministry officials. In any case, the project did not include funds for capacity-building among ministerial focal points.
Activity 1.2.3: • Survey and analysis of best practices and successful initiatives.
This activity was not carried out.
Activity 1.2.4: • Identify intervention needs at policy level
Cooperation with the National Alliance Against Hunger (NAH) began well, with the RTF-Sec being represented in the steering committee of the NAH. After a period when the relationship deteriorated in late 2006, cooperation between the RTF-Sec and the NAH has been revived.
The RTF-Sec initiated the establishment of District Food Security Coordinating Communities (DFSCC). Following decentralisation of governmental functions in application of the 2004 Local Government Act the ES of the RTF-Sec had recommended establishing DFSCC. It was felt that they had considerable potential to facilitate outreach of the concept of RTF and at the same time to help identifying intervention needs at grass root level and therefore to contribute to the achievement of outcome 1.2.
Contact between the RTF-Sec and DFSCC has been minimal and misconceptions on the role of the RTF-Sec still persist. None of the DFSCC visited had a Strategic Plan or Programme relating to RTF. However, some creative outreach activities had already been planned, including the idea of a district food fair in Bombali and an Agriculture Show, which had been organised in Konadugu district in 2006 and was intended to be repeated in 2007, subject to availability of funds. Although such events would not automatically focus on a rights-based approach to food security and the implementation of the RTF, it would certainly provide the chance to present the concept of the RTF and its practical relevance to those participating.
Another important intervention tool to spread information and understanding on the RTF at grass root level could have been established through Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and through radio campaigns in the context of Operation Feed The Nation (OFTN). The RTF- Sec has not made use of this potential.
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Activity 1.2.6: • Establishment of a website containing information on the right to food initiative
Although the backstopping report of March 2005 expressed the view that the establishment of a webpage on the right to food should be one of the project priorities in the near future, this was not done as it was felt not to be viable. The FAOR recommended instead a strategy based on traditional media (radio and newspaper) as being more appropriate in the Sierra Leone context.
Activity 1.2.7: • Disseminate information actively to civil society, stakeholder, beneficiary population and the media
Dissemination of information to various stakeholders including civil society has not yet been carried out. The RTF-Sec did not make any use of the radio component (output 2) of OFTN.
The only relevant actions in this area were the round of visits by the ES to the newly established DFSCC where he gave presentations and handed out documentation on the RTF. As noted above, further activities were planned but not yet implemented.
Activity 1.2.8: • Inputs to meetings on the right to food
Some inputs to meetings were made by the first ES. One of the major achievements was the inclusion of food security and a rights-based approach as important aspects of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2004-2007 (Pillars II Food Security and III Human Development). This could only be achieved through numerous inputs in DACO meetings, since earlier drafts did not contain any reference to the rights-based aspects of food security. Another example for a relevant intervention was the intervention of the RTF-Sec in human rights issues in Sierra Leone for the Stakeholders Conference on Human Rights in United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSL), in December 2005.
All backstopping missions for GCP/SIL/022/GER from the initial stage of the project noticed problems in regard to implementation of outreach activities and therefore recommended the formulation and adoption of a communication strategy for the RTF-Sec The intermediate review of the communication components carried out in the beginning of September 2006 contained some concrete recommendations for immediate follow-up which have not been carried out with the exception of the revitalisation of the DFSCC. One of the reasons for this might be the part-time only involvement of the ES with RtF matters from October 2006.
Output 2.2. Participation and coordination of non-governmental actors
Although representatives of NGOs were appointed to the DFSCC, as noted previously, none of the Committees was active.
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The RTF-Sec was to systematically identify relevant stakeholders, including representatives of the most disadvantaged, but no stakeholder mapping was carried out. It was also to invite stakeholders to regular consultative meetings and to facilitate coordination among them. A round table consultative meeting took place with NGOs on the Food Security Status paper (of December 2005), but no other consultation meetings were organised. Stakeholders were not involved in the activities of the Right to Food Coordination Committee as it only met once.
Policy outputs (2.3 and 2.5)
Output 2.3: Policies and legislation reviewed, established and implemented
Activities 2.3.1 to 2.3.5 refer to studies on various policy issues; some were undertaken but they were often limited to a description of the situation and therefore without any analytical value.
Activity 2.3.1 relates to a review of sectoral plans and recommendations towards food security. The Food Security Status Review , compiled by the Secretariat in December 2005 touched upon these issues, but in a descriptive way without any recommendations. This was true also for the “Legal Analysis of the Right to Food” (Activity 2.3.2). Activity 2.3.3 led to the paper “Evaluation of policy framework for Right to Food in Sierra Leone. It gives a comprehensive outline on existing policy frameworks, contains vulnerability and poverty mapping and also includes some analytical aspects on food security through a human rights lens.
The study foreseen on monitoring mechanisms (activity 2.3.4) has been commissioned to a consultant from Freetown, but as of now no paper has been delivered. The study on possible food safety nets and income support measures, as envisaged in activity 2.3.4, has not been commissioned.
The papers produced by the RTF-Sec itself were all of good quality. A particular strength was their comprehensiveness.
Output 2.4: Right to food strategy adopted
When GCP/SIL/022/GER was declared operational in May 2004, the Food Security Strategy of Sierra Leone was in the process of being drafted. The original aim of the drafters had been to transform the planned Food Security Strategy into a Right to Food Strategy. Although this was not done, interventions towards the integration of food security and human rights aspects as cornerstones of the PRSP had a similar effect. Moreover the 2004 Food Security Strategy contains references and anchoring points for the implementation of a right-based approach to food security, starting with the President’s pledge proclaiming the RTF. The Food Security Strategy is a means to help realise the RTF, by putting a focus on vulnerable groups through disaggregated data. It considers mobilisation of farmers, fishermen, women and youth as an important aspect to achieve food security and contains an explicit reference to the role of the RTF-Sec. Although this does not constitute RTF-mainstreaming, the Food
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Security Strategy includes important points in a process towards the realisation of the right to food. c. Government Support
Because of its relevance to the President’s pledge in 2002, the project has received considerable governmental support at the political level. The RtF Sec. has access to high level government officials (e.g. direct contact with the Minister for Presidential Affairs, with the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights.
The right to food-project also receives support from the MAFS. Very close relationships between the former FAO-Representative and the Minster of Agriculture have certainly been of help in that regard. The Minister of Agriculture met often with the first ES. These meetings were used for informal exchange and monitoring and considered by the Minister of Agriculture as part of his overall responsibility as cooperation partner for GCP/SIL/022/GER. Meetings between the second ES and the Minister were much less frequent.
The Government has provided material support in the form of office space, utilities and furniture. Since this year, the Ministry of Agriculture has hosted the Secretariat in the premises of the MAFS and provided for its running costs, including salaries of the Assistant ES. Both the Minister of Agriculture and the Deputy Minister for Finance have promised to take action to set up the Right to Food-Secretariat as a “budgetary agency” so that its proper functioning and its independence can be maintained. This can only be done for the FY2008 budget which will be adopted towards the end of 2007. d. Project Management
Both Executive Secretaries selected some priorities to address whilst the other aspects were neglected: the first Executive Secretary focused on coordination of activities of different international actors and above all on anchoring the RTF in PRSP; the second ES initiated some outreach activities and contracted some of the studies foreseen in the project document, but neglected coordination with other organisations. Thus, neither of the two ES was able to address all the priorities included in the project document. Management of the RTF-Sec deteriorated noticeably after the end of GCP/SIL/022/GER, thus raising questions about its sustainability in the absence of dedicated project funding. e. Technical and Operational Backstopping
The FAO-R took a great interest in the project and worked in support for the RTF. His main focus related to political progress, while technical aspects of support were left to FAO HQ. Technical support and backstopping was carried out by the responsible officer in FAO headquarters in Rome, who had also drafted the project document.
Backstopping was carried out through regular visits that provided the chance for ample exchange, advice (BTOR of May 2004, of March 2005, of July 2006, of October 2006) and also through electronic communication. On the positive side, the backstopping officer was
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always available for advice and technical support. The officer and also other members of the RTF-Unit in Rome made many valuable recommendations for the implementation of the project. Furthermore, the backstopping officer as well as the communication officer, both undertook numerous efforts to initiate a push on outreach activities in autumn 2006, e.g. technical through support for a communication strategy and through facilitation of contacts with the Ministry of Information leading to the offer of the Minister of Information to second an information officer to the Secretariat.
On the other hand the responsible backstopping officer failed to clearly point out that the RTF-Sec would probably not be able to achieve the outputs and activities listed in the project document. Only in the report of the backstopping mission from 16 to 25 May 2006 (BTOR of July 2006) certain indications were made that the objectives of the project framework would not been fully achieved (C.2. Assessment, para. 1: “… It is clear that two years were insufficient to fully achieve all the project objectives. This should not be interpreted as a failure by ES.” ).
Until early 2006 the RTF-Sec and the competent backstopping officer had presumed that the initial stage of the project would be followed by a second phase of funding through the German government, although no such promises had ever been made.
Thus, several aspects of technical backstopping could have been improved:
• Backstopping could have been more sensitive on the fact that the project outputs could probably not be realised and a far too ambitious project framework had been drafted. The competent officer should have also drawn the attention of the RTF-Sec to this problem. It would have been useful if adjustments to the project framework had been suggested by the responsible officer. • Backstopping could have encouraged and facilitated the establishment of a participatory monitoring system measuring whether GCP/SIL/022/GER is on track (e.g. annual work plans to be accounted for in annual reports).
VI. Assessment of Results and Effectiveness a. Effects and Impact
The project was instrumental in the establishment and functioning of the RTF-Sec as a national institution at the highest political level. However, the application of rights-based policies and programmes, has yet to be internalised in SIL.
Among the major achievements of the project were: • Anchoring food security and human rights aspects as one of the major issues of the PRSP (Pillars II and III);
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• Knowledge about the political relevance of the RTF in SIL and its contents as well as knowledge about the existence of the RTF-Sec with all political stakeholders at the national level.
Most likely the RTF-Sec would probably not have been established without the project funding and technical support by FAO: availability of support and funds was timely to be able to maintain the momentum created by the President’s pledge in 2002 and to support the efforts of the President to use a human rights anchor to fight poverty. This was done first, through support for a National Symposium on Operationalising the Right to Food to discuss how the commitment of the President could be implemented; and thereafter through assistance for implementing the recommendations of the Symposium, i.e. to establish a national Secretariat for coordination and implementation of the RTF.
Without the efforts of the project, food security would not have featured as second pillar of PRSP. Pillar II of the document is now entirely dedicated to food security. It stresses investment in agriculture, rural development and roads, vital components for addressing food availability and accessibility. Pillar III also focuses on food and nutrition security concerns in the education and health sectors (school feeding, school gardens, curricula, education for mothers and vitamin supplements for children). In addition, human rights are generally prominent in the document.
As one of the pilot projects of the FAO RTF-Unit, GCP/SIL/022/GER provides experiences and material for lessons learned on the implementation of the RTF in a least developed country. b. Sustainability of Results
The establishment of the RTF-Sec was rooted in the political initiative of the President of SIL and therefore at the highest political level. However, funding for the Secretariat with a few minor exceptions was provided by the German Government through FAO. Therefore termination of financial support is not without risks for the sustainability of the Secretariat, especially since the position of ES is vacant.
As previously mentioned, the Ministry of Agriculture currently hosts and funds running costs of the Secretariat. It is understood that provision will be made for it in the national budget from FY2008, but this can only be confirmed when the budget is approved later this year.
Whether the concept of the RTF remains a priority for SIL will depend on the programme of the country after the elections. At the moment, all major political parties address the issues of food security and the need for progress on the right to food as part of their campaigns. A further condition for progress and sustainability will be the intensification of outreach activities.
Food security is covered in the PRSP, which covers the period 2005-2007. The subsequent PRSP for 2008-10, preparations for which have just started, will show whether food security with a rights-based focus is meanwhile rooted in politics in SIL.
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c. Gender Equity in Project Implementation and Results
The first ES of the RTF - Sec was a woman. Apart from that however the institutionalisation of the RTF-Sec and its activities did not have gender focus, apart from a few meetings with women’s groups and their leaders. d. Cost-effectiveness
The overall cost-effectiveness of the project was poor as it did not build sufficient critical mass to be sustainable. An project working with a new concept to establish a new institution on sound footing requires normally considerable capacity building and time.
The utility of some aspects of the project was not commensurate with their cost. The numerous studies on different aspects of food security or the RTF contracted by the Secretariat are mostly descriptive and without analytical value. These papers have remained without follow-up: they have neither been published nor otherwise been the subject of discussions in meetings relating to the right to food. Furthermore, the salary paid to the Assistant Secretary of the RTF-Sec was high by UN standards. e. Major Factors Affecting the Project Results
The ability of the Secretariat to carry out its functions to a considerable extent depends on the position of the ES. The post is currently vacant and the ES- Assistant cannot manage the Secretariat. This endangers the functioning of the Secretariat.
Another problem is the lack of capacity of the RTF-Sec to carry out substantial outreach activities. This however is essential to implement the concept of the RTF, since the RTF can only be rooted in a country context if its relevance is understood by the people, including food producers, farmers, persons without food security, etc.. As of now hardly any outreach activities have been undertaken by the RTF-Sec. The omission of these aspects puts the impact of the Secretariat on progress towards the realisation of the RTF at risks.
The project result might be furthermore affected by political priorities. While all Presidential candidates have issued commitments that implementation of the right to food continues as a priority for Sierra Leone, substantial interest is not certain. Political support at a high governmental level still seems to be important for progress on the realisation of the right to food.
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations a. Conclusions
The objectives of the project have been partly achieved: progress has been made towards the development objective through building up the RTF-Sec as an institution. The RTF-Sec contributed to anchoring the RTF as political topic with all national stakeholders. This is a
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major achievement. Sometimes the RTF and the concept of food security are mixed up in discussions, but most political actors are aware that the notion of the RTF contains additional aspects and has a focus on rights and responsibilities.
Other aspects of the project outputs have hardly been realised. These include outreach of information and awareness on the right to food to the grassroots level, coordination with other stakeholders and legislative initiatives,
Constraints negatively affecting the achievement of project objectives were:
• The over-ambitious project framework which did not reflect administrative reality in a country with serious capacity constraints on managerial and organisational aspects; • Absence of an Executive Secretary for long periods, which negatively affected the Secretariat’s performance.
Further work on RTF in Sierra Leone should focus on outreach, which has hitherto been neglected. FAO’s existing projects and activities provide excellent potential linkage points: one of the activities envisaged in “Operation Feed The Nation” is to broadcast radio information on the right to food. Furthermore, the existing countrywide structure of FFSs could be encouraged to integrate a module on the right to food in farming.
The persisting capacity problems in terms of organisation and management of the RTF-Sec are part of a wider problem of lack of qualified administrative skills and good governance. These difficulties, which also affect the functioning of the RTF-approach, can and should be addressed through individual and targeted training measures.
Lessons learned from the experience in Sierra Leone for future country-level work by FAO and the donor, the German Government
The main lessons learned from the project for future level country work are:
• To draft a realistic project framework to be achieved through participatory project planning and adequate stakeholder consultation. • To follow a grass root approach and address institution-building at a second stage. • To focus on capacity development, if need be, supported by seconded short term experts, possibly local ones. • To include a monitoring component. • That outreach aspects (reaching the grassroots level) are of crucial importance when implementing the RTF. • That pilot project conception, management, backstopping and evaluation of outcomes and results should be among the priority areas of the RTF-Unit.
Realistic project framework
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The underlying basis of successful project implementation is a realistic project framework responding to the particular country context. A feasible way to accomplish this task is by more participatory project planning with relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, in order to better assess what can be achieved with resources available. The top-down project design method used for project GCP/SIL/022/GER should be avoided. Should problems arise in the process of project implementation requiring a change of the objectives of the project all cooperation partners have the task to negotiate an adequate adjustment process of the planning framework.
Follow a grass-root approach Implementation of the RTF in developing countries with serious capacity problems might be achieved most effectively if a grass-root approach is chosen as a first stage seeking to plant understanding on the concept of RTF and its practical relevance with the population at large. The institutional questions can then be addressed at a second stage once some support is anchored at the grass-roots.
Include capacity building measures The problems faced by the RTF-Secretariat in terms of management, outreach communication and good administration show that capacity development is a core element of institution-building. It is therefore suggested to include capacity-development on these questions in any project on the establishment of institutions. This kind of support goes beyond regular backstopping and therefore requires regular support to carry out specific trainings and to give advice and support on managerial and organisational issues.
Monitoring component important In order to measure the progress of a project and to examine whether adjustments might be indicated establishment of a monitoring system is of central importance. Development and use of a standard monitoring tool for FAO- and other country-level work on the RTF would have the additional benefit to measure progress towards achievement of the RTF in different countries and, thus, would allow comparisons and exchange of experiences.
Outreach is of central importance In terms of further pilot support for the realisation of the RTF/operationalisation of the Right to Food Guidelines, outreach should be among the priorities. The concept and understanding of the RTF can only be firmly rooted if all relevant stakeholders are sensitised and see its relevance. Thus, the political class has to be targeted, but also the general population has to realise the added value of a rights-based approach to food security for their lives. Therefore awareness-raising and sensitisation on the implementation of the RTF in the context of farming might be an important aspect on work of the right to food in a country where the agricultural sector is dominating.
Apply a human rights-based approach Any country-level project on the RTF should not only aim at reaching progress in the implementation of the RTF, but the right to food / a rights-based approach to food security also has important procedural implications. Thus, the following set of principles should guide the process of implementation: participation and empowerment; transparency and
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accountability, non-discrimination and inclusion of vulnerable groups. These principles have also to be reflected in the project framework.
Piloting the RTF is a priority For the RTF to be firmly rooted in international cooperation its added value has to be demonstrated. This can best be achieved through experiences at country level where the RTF is integrated in national legal and political frameworks and the population is sensitised on its relevance. Therefore pilot project conception, management, backstopping and evaluation of outcomes and results should be among the priority areas of the RTF-Unit, leading to a frank assessment of the value of the concept. b. Recommendations
To the Sierra Leone Right to Food-Secretariat:
Focus on outreach activities aiming at sensitising the population at large on the relevance and added value of the RTF for their lives; this could be done through the following measures:
• Strengthening exchange, building synergies and forming alliances with other institutions to be able to reach out to the grass root level; primarily through close cooperation with the National Commission for Human Rights and the National Commission for Democracy, with OFTN, but also through alliance with civil society movements, like the National Alliance Against Hunger.
• Activating institutional and project links with “Operation Feed The Nation” and offering inputs for output 1 (Farmers are knowledgeable on how to improve production and food security) and output 2 (Farmers and the general public are more aware of Right to Food concepts including rights and obligations). Although GCP/SIL/024/GER has an objective to contribute to the realisation of the right to food in SIL, hardly any sensitisation has taken place to this point. Activities could be:
• To develop an input on human rights in farming for Farmer Field Schools and integrate it into the trainings (relating to output 1 of OFTN).
• These trainings should be conceptionalised in a way that they are able to address and to link with farmers at grass root level who are mainly illiterate. Thus, the training could focus on three main aspects of the right to food: • Responsibility on the part of the farmers to contribute to the process • Cooperation in farmers’ groups and beyond to ensure participation and obtain influence (empowerment) • Inclusion of vulnerable groups in the work of Farmers Field Schools.
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• The development of such an input and specific Training of Trainers would require technical assistance. There are several options to acquire the necessary input and to cover its costs: • Through GCP/INT/970/GER: the budget calculation 2007/08 entails a title for country work (900.000 EUR) and an additional title for regional trainings (300.000 EUR). Given the general mandate of the Right to Food-Unit in Rome to support national implementation of the RTF and the Voluntary Guidelines, e.g. through pilot projects, this seems an adequate intervention. • GTZ - through its cross-sectoral project on human rights in German development policy - could additionally offer to avail existing training material on human rights in farming which has been developed for Kenya. • Provide input and support for awareness-raising and sensitisation campaigns on RTF concepts to be carried out under OFTN (output 2); e. g. through radio broadcasts but also through other forms like right to food-fairs and traditional forms such as village criers. The costs for these activities could be covered by GCP/INT/995/SWI which provides US$ 30.000 to Sierra Leone for local level communication and capacity building (cf. BTOR July 2006); there is no information that this money has already been spent. Furthermore, the RTF-Sec could seek to revive the offer of the Ministry of Information of autumn 2006 to second an information officer for support on outreach activities.
• Establish monitoring mechanisms to be able to measure progress on two issues:
• the implementation of the right to food in SIL, covering legal, political and institutional anchorage but also the outreach to the grass root level, i.e. sensitisation of the rural people in the villages; • contribution of the RTF-Secretariat to this process.
It is important to obtain and use current disaggregated information on the situation of women, children, persons with disabilities and other marginalised groups in urban (Freetown, Bo) and rural areas.
To the Government of Sierra Leone:
Relating to the political level:
• Keep the RTF as a political priority; ideally through integration into the Constitution but if not deemed possible through issuance of a Presidential decree; • Ensure integration of RTF-issues into the next PRSP.
Specifically relating to the RTF-Secretariat:
• Create an independent budget line for the RTF-Secretariat, at least covering the running costs of the Secretariat, including staff salaries;
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• Fill the position of ES to the Secretariat.
To FAOR:
• Continue advocacy on the realisation of the right to food and use influence and advocacy for the right to food to remain politically relevant and a priority; • Be available for periodic advice to the RTF-Secretariat as requested or required.
To the Right to Food-Unit, FAO, Rome:
Related to the RTF-Secretariat in Sierra Leone:
• Be available for periodic advice to the RTF-Secretariat as requested or required. Such an engagement would not be costly and can generally be carried out through electronic and telephone communication from FAO headquarters in Rome.
In this context, targeted assistance in the area of capacity development: through training and advice in organisational development, management and communication might be a possible way to continue some kind of support and thereby to contribute to sustainability of the results of GCP/SIL/022/GER. Funds for these interventions could come from GCP/INT/970/GER, given the general mandate of the Right to Food-Unit in Rome to support national implementation of the right to food and the Voluntary Guidelines (budget calculation 2007/08 entails a title for country work: 900.000 EUR; and an additional title for regional training: 300.000 EUR).
In general:
• Use the experiences in Sierra Leone and in other countries to formulate lessons learned for political and project work on the RTF. This would provide the RTF-Unit with a chance to develop a forward looking and strategic perspective on RTF-issues; hence, the RTF- Unit could grow into a true focal point on RTF-issues.
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Annex 4
Evaluation of Telefood - Projects in Sierra Leone
Executive Summary
1. The Evaluation of Telefood (TFD) projects was undertaken as part of the overall Evaluation of FAO Cooperation in Sierra Leone. Because of the large number of TFD projects implemented (27 during the evaluation period), it was deemed opportune to examine them as a way to augment the evidence base with respect to the conclusions of the corporate evaluation of TFD undertaken in 2005. For this purpose eleven projects were visited by an international and a national evaluator. TFD projects in Sierra Leone have an average budget of US$6000.
2. The evaluation largely confirmed the findings of the corporate evaluation of TFD: i)TFD projects in Sierra Leone are contributions provided in isolation, and they do not benefit from strategic linkages with other FAO programmes, other international development partners or with the government; thus they are not part of broader efforts for poverty eradication; and ii) with the current TFD implementation arrangements, capacity building, an area where FAO has a major comparative advantage, is excluded. FAO technical input is thus reduced to a minimum.
3. In-depth assessment were not made as part of project appraisal, and selection of beneficiaries was in some cases inappropriate. Project monitoring and follow-up were carried out neither by FAO nor by any other partner or agency. This led to poor selection of projects and beneficiaries and negatively affected project impact.
4. The absence of technical support was one of the main causes of project failure. FAO did not have a strategy to improve this aspect nor to optimize the use of in-country available resources. Only in one case was there evidence of linkages to the FFS.
5. This evaluation found that only 20% of the projects had notable positive impact and that the sustainability of the projects was generally low. Quality and timeliness of input delivery was not always satisfactory, however this was not a major factor in determining project results.
6. The evaluation in Sierra Leone thus validates the recommendation of the TFD corporate evaluation that TFD funds should support clearly identified components of wider FAO projects and programmes, where they can be better targeted and monitored and fully meet the criteria of addressing the needs of the poor. In the case of Sierra Leone, given the potential resources represented by Farmer Field Schools (FFS), the evaluation recommends that TFD projects in the country are linked to FFS and FFS District Networks. The presence of FFS in the area should be a necessary condition for the eligibility of TFD projects and priority should be given to projects addressing fields where FFS can provide capacity building and advice. TFD projects could therefore be used to
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expand FFS to other sectors such as livestock production and aquaculture, thus opening up the FFS to the entire community. These projects should be identified at community level and reviewed in consultation with the National SPFS Coordinator.
Introduction
Sierra Leone is the second country where FAO is evaluating the entirety of its work in recent years. Given the high number of TFD projects implemented in the last five years, it was decided to carry out a more in-depth evaluation of TFD in Sierra Leone. This component of the evaluation should also serve to augment the evidence base with respect to the conclusions of the corporate evaluation of TFD undertaken in 2005.
The present evaluation is based on field visits and assessments of project documents and reports. It did not examine other aspects of the programme such as administrative costs and the fund raising dimension of TFD projects. The conclusions provided, although in some cases may refer to the corporate evaluation of TFD, exclusively address the question of whether TFD projects proved to be efficient and effective in tackling poverty and food insecurity in Sierra Leone and recommendations are intended for application in that country.
Methodological Approach to Evaluation
TFD projects were evaluated against their effectiveness in achieving their goal as it is spelled out in the Guidelines for the TFD Special Fund, namely: “They are intended to improve poor families’ means of production, enabling them to produce more food and generate cash income, thereby allowing them better access to food.”
The study targeted a sample of 11 out of 27 TFD projects, approved, implemented and completed in Sierra Leone in the last five years. The projects visited were in six districts - Bo, Bombali, Kenema, Port Loko, Moyamba and Western Area. The following criteria were adopted for the selection of the projects: • Projects should be at various stages of implementation including completed projects and on-going ones • Projects should be located in various districts • Projects should cover different types of enterprises – including crop and livestock production projects
The projects were identified by the evaluation team in consultation with the Assistant FAO Representative (Assistant FAOR) in charge of TFD projects.
An international and a national consultant held focus group discussions with the beneficiaries and visited field sites. Particular attention was given to the following:
• whether the beneficiaries were poor families in both relative and absolute terms; • benefits from the project in terms of food and income; and • sustainability of benefits.
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In addition, project documents, interim reports and final reports were analysed if available.
Elements on project identification and formulation were collected through discussions with key informants.
Summary of TFD-projects
Table 1 summarises the number and value of TFD projects per District. Table 2 provides a summary matrix of information about TFD-projects visited by the mission.
Table 1 – Number and value of TFD-projects per district
District Number of projects Total budget per district
Bo 3 US$ 17,175 Bombali 2 US$ 12,890 Bonthe 1 US$ 6,550 Kailahun 2 US$ 12,350 Kambia 2 US$ 15,840 Kenema 2 US$ 12,420 Moyamba 5 US$ 27,128 Port Loko 5 US$ 26,179 Western Area 5 US$ 32,609
Total 27 US$163,141
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Table 2 : Matrix Analysis of TFD- projects
Characteristics of Target Group Benefits
Relative Availability of Project Enterprise Number of Access to Spread to Centre or Women, Income technical Sustainability Revolving Equal Links Symbol type immediate other additional producer Children, level of support of benefits as fund division of beneficiarie sources of house- group Families Target at Feb.2007 established benefits s assistance holds group
TFD- FAOR, Vegetable producer 03/SIL/009 100 Women Medium Yes Satisfactory Yes No Yes Yes FFS, production group Gov
TFD- producer Mainly Less than FAOR, Bee keeping 6 High No No No No No 03/SIL/007 group Men satisfactory NABSL
TFD- Livestock Farmer Poor- Less than FAOR, 05/SIL/007 production Associati 60 Women Yes n.a. No No Yes medium satisfactory Gov, (Goats) on
TFD- Livestock 00/SIL/005 production producer 15 Poor- Less than Families No No No No Yes FAOR (Poultry and group households medium satisfactory piggery)
TFD- Livestock 03/SIL/001 production Less than producer 2 Family High No No No No n.a. FAOR (Cutting satisfactory grass)1
TFD- Livestock mainly 03/SIL/008 production Farmers Youth (Goats - Associati 75 n.a. Yes Satisfactory Yes Yes Yes Yes Gov and initially on Women piggery)
TFD- Palm oil Village 150 Families Poor Yes Satisfactory Yes Yes Yes Yes Gov 03/SIL/004 processing
1 A large edible rodent called “grass cutter” in other parts of West Africa.
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Characteristics of Target Group Benefits
Relative Availability of Project Enterprise Number of Access to Spread to Centre or Women, Income technical Sustainability Revolving Equal Links Symbol type immediate other additional producer Children, level of support of benefits as fund division of beneficiarie sources of house- group Families Target at Feb.2007 established benefits s assistance holds group
TFD- Livestock Teachers, Less than 00/SIL/006 production School 500 Male Mixed No No No No Yes FAOR satisfactory (Rabbits) students
TFD- Livestock Farmer FAOR, 05/SIL/003 production Associati 100 Women n.a. Yes Satisfactory n.a. No No Yes Gvt, (Poultry) on NGOs
TFD- Vegetable Less than Village 200 Families Poor No No No Yes Yes FAOR 00/SIL/003 production satisfactory
TFD- Livestock Teachers, 03/SIL/006 production School 800 Female Mixed No Satisfactory No No No Yes FAOR (poultry) students
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From Project identification to project management
The evaluation found that the way TFD projects are identified and formulated should be improved, along with the quality of projects documents.
Initial screening of project proposals was done without sufficient knowledge of the beneficiary group and the project site. FAO was insufficiently critical of projects recommended by the Ministry of Agriculture. These projects sometimes targeted beneficiaries who had high levels of income, or beneficiaries that were very limited in number, or promoted new technologies, which are usually not supported under TFD because such projects do not have technical support. Project documents often had substantial omissions such as the expected outputs or the possible risks. Project objectives, outputs, activities and budgets were often not logically linked and in some cases, outputs were foreseen without a budget for producting them. Project outputs and objectives were sometimes not clearly distinguished and in some cases the objectives were extremely unrealistic given the size of TFD projects.
Project proposals included elements which negatively affected project sustainability and expansion to further beneficiaries, such as the high budget foreseen for animal housing, on average 60% of the project budget for livestock projects, as well as high costs for fertilizer. In other cases unbalanced distribution of benefits among beneficiaries was evident already within the project design and should have been further addressed.
Management of TFD-projects in Sierra Leone is under the responsibility of the Assistant FAOR, who has a great number of responsibilities as the only Programme staff in the office. Projects in Sierra Leone had an average budget of US$5800, just over half the US$10,000 ceiling of TFD projects. This is due, according to the Assistant FAOR, to improve likelihood of approval of the projects. In the absence of budgetary provisions, monitoring of the projects through site visits is very rare.
Targeting of beneficiaries
It was found that TFD-projects in SIL did not necessarily target poor beneficiaries. In only two out of the eleven projects visited were the beneficiaries extremely poor (in another three cases, there was not sufficient information to assess this aspect). In the majority of cases, beneficiaries had a poor-medium level of income but in two cases the beneficiaries had a relatively high level of income. In those latter two cases, the effective number of beneficiaries was very low (two and six respectively).
Generally, project benefits were equitably distributed among the beneficiary group. In only one case it was evident that the team leader was at the top of a hierarchical organization, getting the major benefit out of the project. Within the two school-based projects visited, it was particularly difficult to assess the distribution of benefits. It seemed however, that the students were benefiting from the project, since their agricultural science course had included lessons on animal breeding. The evaluation met two examples of groups that were gender balanced, with good level of participatory decision-making.
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TFD projects in SIL gave a special focus to women, who were 73% of the beneficiaries. However, they were not always the main decision-makers. In at least three cases out of the eleven analysed, women had been organized by men and their degree of participation in decision-making was believed to be not significant. Since the project leaders knew that women’s participation increased the chances of project approval, this was sometimes emphasized in project documents. Similarly, youth participation was frequently mentioned, without any real involvement during project implementation.
Impact and sustainability
Out of the eleven projects visited, only three had some positive impact. However, in one case the project was changed after the inputs were purchased and in another the beneficiaries were not able to distinguish TFD support from other type of interventions received. Four projects terminated within a few months of inputs being supplied.
Livestock production projects, which represent over 50% of the all projects implemented, were particularly unsuccessful. The main reason for failure is the lack of technical advice and assistance, which meant in three cases that an outbreak of disease resulted in the death of all the animals provided. In two cases poultry production was interrupted and the animals sold at a minimum price because of a scare about High Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). Distribution of livestock not well known in the country, such as rabbits or cutting grass, created serious technical problems for the beneficiaries and did not give good results.
It was observed that where beneficiaries were poor and did not have access to sources of support besides the TFD-project, unforeseen events (e.g. theft of the livestock) led to project failure. In those cases activities ceased and facilities constructed (poultry houses, pens, etc.) were abandoned and unutilized.
On the other hand, when beneficiaries had other types of support, they could devise alternative solutions. Thus, even if the project did not have any visible and direct impact, assets were not completely lost. These groups were generally self-organized.
Revolving funds had been put in place in four occasions. In at least one case, the beneficiaries had sold part of the inputs received to create the initial capital.
Projects that had positive impact and were likely to be sustained were engaged in enterprises where the beneficiaries had experience, had established revolving funds and were managing the assets democratically among the group. In those cases benefits had also spread to additional individuals beyond those originally targeted.
Where it took place effectively, women’s participation was a positive factor for project impact. In one case, women were self-organized and fully participating in decision-making. In another case (on poultry production), chickens were sold due to HPAI but the group was reviving the enterprise. Another two projects targeting women did not achieve the anticipated direct impact, but generated other positive effects, such as the establishment of small micro credits for petty trading, and the inception of other agricultural activities not initially foreseen..
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Technical support, capacity building and monitoring
Even if technical support is not included in TFD projects, FAO could have played a greater role in advising and enabling access to guidance and training. In more than 50% of cases, technical support received by the projects was less than satisfactory, and in several cases this was a main cause of project failure. Once again, the only groups that had satisfactory access to technical assistance were those that were active and self-sufficient, capable of seeking advice or other technical services. In general, sources of technical assistance identified in the project documents, usually the Ministry or the groups themselves, were not adequately assisting the beneficiaries.
FAO ‘s available in-country resources, such as the FFS, were underutilized. Only in one case did a project have a specific linkage to the FFS, which in that case was effectively providing training and support.
FAO efficiency
FAO was still responsible for the procurement and delivery of inputs. The suppliers were in some cases identified by the beneficiaries. In a couple of cases, the inputs were not of good quality and could not be used by the beneficiaries. In one case, tools delivered to the project were produced by beneficiaries of a TCP project (TCP/SIL/2909).
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Annex 4, Appendix
Evaluations of Individual Telefood Projects
Project Title : Vegetable and Food Crop Production
Project Symbol : TFD-00/SIL/003
Project Budget: US$ 4,690
Project EOD : March 2001
Project NTE : March 2002
Background and objectives Gbuwuihun used to be a centre of adaptive crop research and extension of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Njala University Agricultural Extension Department. The village was abandoned during the war. The project was designed by the elders of the community of Gbuwuihun with the support of a member of the Moyamba District Development Agency (MODDA). The aim of the project was to support Gbuwuihun village and in particular the resettled women to reinitiate farming activities, as the country gradually returned to normalcy. In this regard, the project focussed on vegetable production and especially targeted the women of the community as those responsible for food security within their households.
The main objective of the project was to restore sustainable crop production activities to increase food production and income in the entire community and to create a source of nutritious food within the community. The project also aimed at creating a seed bank in order to sustain vegetable production within the area.
Expected Outputs/Outputs achieved Expected project outputs were: i) engage the village of Gbuwuihun and nearby farm families (a total of about 200 families) in cultivation of maize, groundnut, potato and vegetables; ii) increase vegetable production in the area and meet the consumption need of the beneficiaries; iii) create a seed bank for the continuous supply of seeds and for the sustainability of the activities started with the project; and iv) put in place a store and a drying floor to improve storage facilities.
The beneficiaries received all the inputs mentioned in the project document, i.e. assorted vegetable seeds, tools and fertilizer. The pesticides foreseen in the project document were not distributed. Seeds were generally of good quality and gave good initial production, with the exception of groundnut seeds, which arrived late and had low germination. However, tool
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quality was rated unsatisfactory by the beneficiaries. In some cases tools needed to be assembled but screws were missing, in other cases, they were not resistant and broke easily and the cutlasses were not sharp enough. Seeds and fertilizer lasted for three to four production cycles; after that, the production rapidly decreased and pests, especially grasshoppers, invaded the plots. After this, the group lost motivation and did not save any seeds for the next production cycle. The group said it had put together an amount of Le60,000 from the project. However, it is not clear if seeds, vegetables or tools were sold in order to get the initial amount. This amount was used as a revolving fund. The group started a small micro credit activity distributing credits of about of Le5000. With this money the villagers initiated small petty trading activities. No one used the funds to buy agricultural inputs. By February 2007 the capital had increased to Le252,000 and the individual microcredits to Le15,000.
Project design Project design was poor. Some of the expected outputs were not budgeted (e.g. drying floor and store). The project document foresaw the use of animal manure for fertilizer, but according to the beneficiaries’ statements, the village had only a very limited amount of livestock (goats).
Technical Assistance Technical assistance should have been provided by MODDA and the Ministry of Agriculture Extension Unit, but the community was not adequately advised and faced many technical problems, such as the attack of crops by grasshoppers and rodents and low yields. According to the community, vegetables were planted for several years in the same location, without practicing any crop rotation. The number of grasshoppers increased from one year to the other. The contacts with FAO were very rare. Although FAO was informed of the problems faced by the beneficiaries, it was not aware of the micro-credit activities started.
Benefits/Sustainability Initially the community got good harvests and could easily sell vegetables in the nearby market. With the interruption of the agricultural activities, this source of food and income was no longer available to the beneficiaries. The tools, which represented 64% of the project budget, were partly not usable due to their low quality. From the sale of tools or vegetables, the villagers could start some microcredit activities. The inclusion of fertilizer was unsustainable, since the villagers were not able to pay for fertilizer.
Conclusions The project did not have any noticeable impact on the villagers and beside the initial production and sale of vegetables, no other benefits could be noticed. It did not manage to raise interest among the villagers in pursuing agricultural activities and even the microcredit were not used for this purpose. Project results were constrained by providing tools of low- quality (sourced from beneficiaries of project TCP/SIL/2909) and delayed delivery of groundnut seeds.
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Project Title : Community Backyard Livestock Development
Project Symbol : TFD-00/SIL/005
Project Budget: US$ 4,644
Project EOD: May 2001
Project NTE : April 2002
Background and objectives The project targeted a group of displaced farmers resettled near Gbongboima Stream in Benguima, Western Area. The farmers were engaged in growing food crops and rearing livestock. Before the project’s inception, the beneficiaries had already acquired five acres of land, had started planting cassava, sweet potato, bananas and assorted vegetables, had acquired thirty chickens and had built pens for two sows and one boar. The main objective of the project was to improve livestock husbandry practices of the community in order to achieve the self-sufficiency for the twenty-five families involved.
Expected outputs/outputs achieved The expected outputs were not specified in the project document, but some activities were mentioned such as: i) the construction of four pens for pigs and a poultry house for 200 chickens; ii) the purchase of poultry (220 day-old chicks and stock poultry); iii) the provision of food for the animals; vi) the distribution of basic drugs and veterinary service.
Under the project, a poultry house was constructed and four pens were added to the initial construction. The project also provided a boar and 200 exotic layers and feed and drugs for the poultry and pigs. The farmers got some initial benefits especially from pig production, since they managed to sell three sets of pigs (each set included a boar and a sow) during the first production cycle and two during the second one. Each set was sold at Le 80,000. Benefits were partially reinvested in pig production, e.g. were used to buy feed for the pigs and were also used to buy seeds and inputs for the crops. After the initial period, feed prices increased and the benefits rapidly decreased. In addition, the pigs had not been vaccinated and began to die from unknown diseases starting in 2002. By 2003 the entire pig population was dead. All the chickens were stolen in 2003, before giving any production.
Project design The project design was rather incomplete: expected outputs were missing; the provider of technical support was not clearly identified; and beneficiaries were not adequately described. The number of beneficiaries was mentioned (25), but not the number of households, nor the breakdown between men and women. Cost of building materials was high, covering 62% of the budget. Building material did not include local materials, but rather zinc and very expensive cement. This diminished the potential of the project for replication and sustainability.
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Project beneficiaries: The direct beneficiaries of the project were fifteen members of a group of displaced farmers from Kailahun District resettled in Benguima. The group included five women and 10 men from five different households. The poverty level of the beneficiaries could not be assessed as only one beneficiary could be interviewed. However, the overall impression was that of poor to medium living conditions with livelihoods entirely dependent on crop production. It was therefore a seemingly appropriate selection of beneficiaries, although there was a very limited number of households directly benefiting from the project.
Technical support Lack of technical support is probably the main cause of project failure. The group received initial training by FAO especially in pig breeding and management, but did not get any support from the veterinary service. The veterinary service did not visit the farm and FAO did not intervene when the farmers reported pig diseases. Appropriate linkages with the veterinary service and awareness should have been built in from project formulation in order to facilitate its implementation.
Benefits/sustainability The project had some likelihood of sustainability since the farmers were already involved in livestock production. However, there were several deficiencies in project formulation/implementation which negatively affected project success: i) the farmers did not receive technical assistance; ii) training in management/bookkeeping would have been necessary to establish some kind of revolving fund; and iii) the farmers did not reinvest adequately in pig production. Benefits given by the project were very modest and were apparently equally shared among the group members, but ended rapidly. Presently, there are no benefits perceived by the farmers, and the pens and the poultry house (the only outputs left from the project), cannot be used for future activities since the beneficiaries cannot afford to pay for restocking.
Conclusions Although the project had a good start and some potential, its activities did not continue beyond project termination principally due to lack of adequate technical support received. The stolen poultry highlights the consequences of the absence of alternative solutions, once the project faces unforeseen events.
Project Title : School Rabbit Development Project
Project Symbol : TFD-00/SIL/006
Project Budget: US$ 4,335
Project EOD : March 2001
Project NTE : March 2002
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Project background and objectives The Holy Trinity Secondary School, Kenema, has 2000 male students. The school used to breed animals before the war, which served as a source of protein and were also used for instruction in courses of agricultural science. The civil war devastated the school infrastructure. The project originator is a senior teacher of the school and the objective of the project was to create a breeding stock of rabbits, to be revolved among the community and within the school.
Expected outputs/outputs achieved Expected outputs were: i) the establishment of a breeding parent stock of rabbits in Kenema; ii) the integration of rabbit growing in the Kenema community; iii) the establishment of a marketing scheme for rabbits; iv) availability of rabbit meat in the community.
FAO provided construction material and rabbits for the initial production as well as drugs and the initial feed for the animals.
Construction material was used to build a rabbit house, not far from the teacher’s house in order to ensure higher security conditions. Thirty-three rabbits were received as well as feed and drugs. Initially, the activity seemed to run well, rabbits were fed during the rainy season with grass collected in the nearby fields, grew well, and the students showed interest in them. With the dry season, the first problems arose since sufficient feed was no longer available and the rabbits, undernourished , caught unknown diseases. Furthermore some rabbits were stolen. After the teacher’s departure for two weeks all the rabbits, more than 20, were stolen.
Project design The project had no clear strategy: although it was foreseen to expand rabbit production to the entire community, it was not mentioned how this should be done. The construction material represented 38% of the entire budget.
Project beneficiaries This project is one of the few having youth as main target. Direct project beneficiaries were the teachers and the students of the school. The teacher and his wife principally took care of the rabbits. Since agriculture was one of the main subjects of the school, the breeding of rabbits raised some interest among the students.. Students’ activity was limited to the observation of the animals and to the provision of feed. Since the group benefiting from the project was potentially large, including students and their families, the beneficiaries as such were appropriate.
Technical assistance Technical assistance was inadequate. Provision of technical assistance was supposed to come from the Ministry of Agriculture, but this was not done. Though vaccines for the animals were provided by the project, the rabbits were never vaccinated. The beneficiaries never received adequate training, which in this case was absolutely necessary as rabbit raising was unknown in the area. The beneficiaries did not know the feeding habits, nor were they able to identify causes for the diseases. FAO visited the project three to four times and one time the Assistant FAO Representative came with a veterinary specialist, who provided
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some suggestions for housing and care. However, the beneficiaries felt that they been left alone with the enterprise and with its constraints. When the first rabbits were stolen, the beneficiaries did not have the means to install a new steel door instead of the wooden one, which was often broken open.
Benefits/Sustainability The project did not provide any benefit. The rabbits were kept for three months by the beneficiaries before dying or being stolen. The offspring were not sold, nor were the animals eaten. The project could have been more sustainable through the provision of technical assistance and the introduction of adequate security measures. The feeding of the animals became a problem, when after the first two months, the enterprise did not provide any revenue and feed provided by FAO was exhausted. The animals were stolen and died during the vacation period when the students did not provide regular feed and the surveillance diminished during the absence of the teacher.
Conclusions Project formulation was not adequate. Since the breeding of rabbits is very delicate it requires training and continuous veterinary assistance. In the absence of these two basic elements the project probably would have failed in any case. Given the limited funding and the current implementation arrangements of Telefood projects, it is not advisable to introduce technologies which are unfamiliar to the beneficiaries. As security is a recurrent problem, the project should have taken this factor adequately into account and devote a part of the budget to this.
Project Title : Community Cutting Grass, Development Programme
Project Symbol : TFD-03/SIL/001
Project Budget: US$ 4,640
Project EOD : March 2004
Project NTE : February 2005
Background and objectives Cutting grass (Thryonomis swinderianus) is a wild rodent which damages various crops, especially rice, nationwide. The meat of the cutting grass is appreciated and therefore the animal is usually hunted. Breeding of cutting grass is practiced in Togo and Benin, but is not known in Sierra Leone.
The project originator is a retired agricultural extension worker, who extensively travelled within and outside the country. The project took inspiration from similar activities seen in neighbouring countries. The project objective was to engage rural communities in breeding wild cutting grass as a sustainable income-generating activity with the aim to address food
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security and nutrition. The expected project beneficiaries were 70 farming families, including 25 women heads of households.
Project design The project design had some contradictions and the linkage between project outputs and the activities foreseen was not logical. Although trained farmers were included under the outputs, it was not clear from the project document, how this training should had been provided. Similarly, it was not explained how the bush meat should have been marketed. Although the project identified 30 returnees as beneficiaries, it was not clear how these beneficiaries should have been involved in the project. The project was relying on the provision of animals caught by local youth, without involving them in the project or paying them for their labour. The project budget (US$5240) was mainly used to buy construction material, 63% of the total budget, with some smaller amounts left for hunting tools and protective clothing, animal feed, vegetable seed and fertilizer, and animal health and veterinary supplies. Since the activity should had been replicated by interested farming families, high construction costs would have made it unsustainable.
Expected outputs/Outputs achieved Among the expected outputs the project document listed the following: i) farmers trained in breeding and management of cutting grass; ii) ready and guaranteed market for the purchase of bush meat; iii) enhanced income by the beneficiaries; and iv) availability of animal protein in the community.
None of the expected outputs was achieved. Inputs listed in the project document were supplied, with the exception of gloves. The construction material was used to build a fence for the animals. Vegetable seeds were used for feed production, but were only partially used for feed as the animals did not eat vegetables provided.
The animals were caught in the forest, especially during the rainy season, but beneficiaries never managed to get the animals to reproduce and never sold them. By February 2007 there remained only three animals, two males and one female.
Project beneficiaries The mission only met the project originator and his wife. The latter principally took care of the animals. The couple owned a villa, almost 50 acres of land, a palm tree plantation, over 200 chickens and various vegetable crops. Their two children studied in the United States. These farmers were not in need of support by FAO. Apparently, there were 25 farming families interested in the project. Hovewer, it was not possible for the mission to interact with other community members. The couple stated that they intended to enlarge the number of participants and explained that the project should have been a pilot for the area and for the entire Northern region, but since they had few animals at the moment, it was premature and difficult to involve other people. Three or four hunters, mainly local youth, were contracted by the couple each week and were paid in kind.
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Technical assistance The project received unsatisfactory technical assistance. Project formulation was not technically sound and missed basic elements such as an adequate training for the project beneficiaries. Hunters did not know how to properly catch the animals without hurting themselves, particularly due to the absence of boots. Training was needed to identify the ideal feeding conditions for the animals, their housing and their habits. In fact, the animals never reproduced in captivity and although at a certain stage a maximum number of 25 animals was reached, this rapidly decreased due to an unknown disease. In addition, dogs used for hunting were not adequately trained and often killed the animals. Since the breeding of cutting grass was completely new for the country, training was absolutely necessary. However, this was not possible due to FAO internal rules on Telefood projects. The project was visited three times, without providing any concrete solutions to the problems the farmers were facing. Beside FAO, the project did not receive any other assistance or support.
Benefits/Sustainability Without the provision of training and technical assistance, the project was unsustainable. The project idea had some elements of potential sustainability: the initial population was provided through hunting and so was any restocking. The farmers did not perceive any benefit from the project besides the fence built in the house of the leader farmers and cutting grass meat eaten from time to time. The people are still trying possible solutions to save the project.
Conclusions The initiative should not have been supported through TFD-projects, given the fact that the beneficiaries were unfamiliar with the type of enterprise. The introduction of a pilot activity in the country requires a different type of support with in-depth training and technical assistance.
The selection of beneficiaries was also inadequate. Immediate project beneficiaries were a couple with high income, and although the evaluators were told that several families were interested in the activity, it was not clear from the project document and from the field visit, how it would have happened.
Project Title : Community Palm Oil Processing project
Project Symbol : TFD-03/SIL/004
Project Budget: US$ 7,000
Project EOD : March 2004
Project NTE : February 2005
Background and objectives The village of Gbama, Bo District in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone, used to be one of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) pioneer oil mill sites where
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Government made available improved varieties of oil palm. Pioneer oil mill sites are characterized by satellite oil palm plantations, either government or privately owned. The mills were large steam powered processing plants which were supplied with fresh palm fruits from the satellite plantations. The location of the oil mills encouraged people in the communities to establish their own plantations. After the war, government plantations were returned to the communities. The oil mills were abandoned due to lack of spare parts and maintenance and the communities were left with no machinery to process their increasing palm fruit yields. The community went back to their traditional manual method of extracting palm oil, which was inefficient and tedious. Generally women in the village are responsible for the processing and sale of the oil. Gbama Farmers Association (GBaFA) had approached several NGOs to get a small-scale processing machine, and had finally written a project proposal for FAO, to be funded through TFD.
The objective of the project was to introduce small-scale agro-processing to assist the group in increasing and improving their palm oil production, increasing the income of women and eventually reduce poverty in the community. The project would also provide support for the repair of the village store and drying floors.
Expected outputs/outputs achieved The stated outputs (some are actually objectives) included: i) introduction of small scale processing in the community; ii) increased production of oil palm; iii) increased income; and iv) usable community and drying floor and store.
The small scale processing machine was introduced in the community and this led to an increased oil palm production. The drying floor and the store were restructured using the building material provided by FAO.
Project design The project had a simple and logical project design. Beneficiaries were adequately identified and project objectives were logically linked to outputs. The project budget was mainly used for the purchase of the processing machine and for the building material. Since the structure and processing machine was for the benefit of the entire community and for the neighbouring villages, this promoted project sustainability.
Technical assistance The group arranged for the daily maintenance of the machine. Spare parts were purchased as needed and other required assistance was obtained through ad hoc contracts. The local counsellor, who is also member of the village, supported the community by channelling their requests to further sources of support and assistance. Some NGOs were therefore contacted and provided support for road construction and health and sanitation interventions.
Project Beneficiaries GBaFA manages and is responsible for the project. GBaFA is an association of farmers formed in 1989 in the village of Gbama with 150 members, 80 men and 70 women. The Association restarted its activities in 2001 after restoration of peace and return of the community.
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GBaFA was formed to promote communal farming in the village through group work. Some members of the association established or inherited oil palm plantations or bush with wild palms. Youths and strong adults organized work groups to brush, harvest and process palm oil for plantation owners. Secondary beneficiaries are dependants of GBaFA members and the entire community.
The entire community of about 2000 people equally benefits from the project, since the use of the processing machine is open to everybody against a 10% contribution of the production. This contribution is paid also by the GBaFA members and serves as a revolving fund for maintenance and purchase of spare parts. Also neighbouring villages have access to the processing machine and contribute with 15-20% of their production to the revolving fund. Decision – making is a collective responsibility involving women. Women constitute 40% of the beneficiaries and 40% of the management.
Benefits/Sustainability The machine is more efficient than the traditional method and through its use the beneficiaries had increased their production by 30%. There are enduring benefits beyond the immediate input from the project to the community. Commissions collected from farmers for processing oil are used to pay operators and those undertaking maintenance. The establishment of a revolving fund is a guarantee of sustainability for the project.
The problems faced included: i) the generator was stolen and most operations had to be done manually; and ii) the new crushers were less resistant to pressure than those used before the war. These issues were discussed and solved by the group.
The farmers also face a more complex constraint, due to low prices. The community has largely embarked on oil palm production and most of them cultivate only a very limited area of food crops (average two acres per family). Since most of the farmers are food insecure, they are obliged to sell their produce in advance during the hunger months for low prices to get food or seeds. As a result, the farmers cannot escape from the hunger cycle.
Conclusions The project had a positive impact on the community and particular on the women, who were mostly involved with the tedious traditional extraction method. The benefits should be sustainable and the project was very relevant for the problem it intended to solve. Since the food insecurity affecting the village needs a complex intervention, the project TFD project alone does not provide a satisfactory solution to the community problems, but nevertheless represents a positive and sustainable investment for the benefit of the community as a whole.
Project Title: Hardford School Livestock Project
Project Symbol: TFD-03/SIL/006
Project Budget: US$ 5,600
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Project EOD : August 2004
Project NTE: August 2005
Background and objectives The Harford School is located in Moyamba Town, Moyamba District. It is both a day and boarding school with an enrolment of 850 girls, 24 teachers and an active Parent Teachers Association. The school has adequate land for structural expansion and agricultural development. The agriculture science department of the school was established in 1982 to promote the teaching and learning of agricultural science and to develop a school farm for feeding and income generation. Until 1994, the department had an operational poultry, piggery and small ruminant unit. The school also managed a vegetable garden. The structures and gardens were abandoned when rebels attacked Moyamba. After the war, the buildings were rehabilitated. The students resumed some vegetable growing, but the animal houses remained dilapidated and unused. The objectives of the project were to support the production of chickens; enable the school to raise funds for the future development of the Agricultural Science Department; and enable girls to acquire knowledge and develop skills and attitudes for gainful employment in agriculture and related occupation.
Expected outputs/outputs achieved Expected outputs were: i) the construction of one poultry house with shed and storage facility; ii) the production of 300 mature birds every three months: iii) the use of 100 birds to supplement school feeding; iv) the sale of 200 broilers to raise income for project sustenance and school development; v) to acquire practical skills and knowledge in nutrition and animal science.
The project had a good start and benefits were initially perceived by the entire school community and equally distributed among them. The chickens were consumed in the school and thus were part of the students’ daily nutrition. Some birds were sold, without any marketing problems and at good prices and the revenues were partly reinvested in the project. A special account was opened, the Poultry Project Account, and regular bookkeeping was maintained. The school restocked the birds through purchase in Freetown. However, after four to five months from project inception, the increasing fear of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) led to beneficiaries to sell the entire stock between October and December 2005. Apparently, the revenues were kept with the aim of reinitiating poultry production, but it was not made known to the evaluators the amount of funds still left.
Project design The project had a clear and simple design. As many other projects over 50% of the budget was used for construction material, expensive if compared with local material.
Project beneficiaries Project beneficiaries were the students and the teachers of the school. The income level of the school is a mixed with low and medium income.
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Technical support The project had a very short duration and did not face particular technical problems. Technical support and advise were provided during project life by the teacher of agricultural science.
Benefits/sustainability Benefits were initially perceived and probably equally distributed among project beneficiaries. After the animals’ sale and the interruption of project activities, no other benefit was perceived by the beneficiaries. The poultry house was well constructed and could be easily reused for further poultry production.
Conclusions The project had an early interruption due to the HPAI alarm. Apart from this, activities had good likelihood of sustainability, since the project managed to establish a revolving fund to provide for further inputs costs and since technical assistance seemed to be well planned within the project.
Project Title: Koya Honey Bee Project
Project Symbol: TFD-03/SIL/007
Project Budget: US$ 4,545
Project EOD : March 2004
Project NTE: February 2005
Background and objectives Sierra Leone has a great potential for the development of beekeeping. The demand for honey is high and the offer is limited since the traditional method of honey extraction is very inefficient. About 70% of honey and beeswax sold in the market are supplied by honey hunters and about 30% by traditional beekeepers. There is a high population of wild bees in the country and hives are easily colonized when placed in a proper environment. The market prices for honey and beeswax are very attractive. Traditional beekeepers use fire during honey harvests, often resulting in destruction of bees. The quality of the honey produced through traditional methods is poor since it is a mixture of pollen, brood and other materials. The wax is often thrown away.
The project originator is the Chairman of the National Agency for Beekeeping in Sierra Leone (NABSL). The main objectives of the Telefood project were i) the introduction of improved technology in beekeeping to ensure increased production of high quality honey and beeswax; and ii) the creation of a livelihood activity for youths, women and school pupils in rural and periurban areas.
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Expected outputs/outputs achieved Expected outputs of the project as they appear in the project document were: i) the improvement of beekeeping; ii )the increase in honey and wax production; iii) the development of honey and wax marketing system; and iv) the establishment of a community fund.
The project terminated in 2005, and in February 2007 there were no significant achievements. Inputs distributed by FAO were delivered to the association but some of them, such as the protective suits, boots and gloves had never been distributed to the beekeepers. Rather, they were kept by the group leader. Out of the 70 hives distributed by the project, 60 had been distributed to selected beneficiaries, so called “contact persons”, but the proportion of the hives that had been colonized was not known. The harvests had been very modest so far; in many cases the bees had died or absconded for reasons unknown to the beneficiaries. The beehives of one beneficiary, were colonized at 70% and the quantity he had harvested was satisfactory. He was therefore expecting to get more hives from the project coordinator. Effectively, well-placed hives colonized easily and even if there was no significant sign of impact there was the potential of some expansion of the enterprise
Project design The project had a clear justification but the outputs were not clearly identified and quantified. The project focused too much on the NABSL which was directly benefiting from the project and was also in charge of conducting project monitoring. Technical assistance was again to be ensured by NABSL, but details were not provided in the project.
Project beneficiaries Project beneficiaries identified in the project document included eight groups of beekeepers of Koya Rural District for a total of 155 men and women. However, all inputs were received by the Newton beekeeping association, which consisited of 20 members located in six village areas. The structure of the Newton beekeeper association was a very hierarchical one with the Association leader retaining full control of all project resources. The direct beneficiaries of the project were six contact persons, each of whom had a certain number of farmers working for him. Each of these contact persons had received from four to eight hives. The number of hives received depended on when the contact farmer joined the association. Contact farmers had received a first training in beekeeping management and had their independent beekeeping activity. The raw honey harvested by the farmers was sold to the Association leader, who was at the same time the President of the Newton Beekeeper Association and the Chairman of NABSL. The honey was sold at Le 2000 per pint to NABSL, which later processed and sold it at Le 3000 per pint. Processing was done with traditional techniques and marketing did not pose any problem due to the great demand of honey and to the limited supply available.
The contact persons recognized the team leader as their boss, did have quarterly meetings, but were not able to discuss or solve problems during the meetings. The participation of the members of the association in meetings and in other common activities was very low. The team leader kept inputs received by FAO and decided criteria for the distribution of hives. The protecting material (20 sets of protective material including boots, gloves, suites) and the
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smokers received , were not distributed to the beneficiaries and some of these had harvested without any protective clothes. According to the team leader this was done because associated farmers hadn’t received any specific training on this.
Contact persons met by the mission were particularly rich farmers, and one reported to own over 50 acres of land. Each contact person had farmers working for him, keeping hives and doing the harvesting. The income level of these farmers was low. Their honey was sold to the contact persons they worked for, at non-specified prices.
Technical support In the project document it was foreseen that technical support should have been provided by NABSL. Training was insufficient and more training was needed especially in bee diseases. In addition, specialists were needed for the identification of bee species. The project would have benefited from monitoring by FAO.
Benefits/sustainability Beekeeping has great potential in the area. Bees easily colonized hives placed in specific zones and the harvest exceeded three gallons per hive. Since the activity is not labour intensive this was managed as a second or third income generating activity. The scarce and unequal distribution of benefits within the association negatively affected the sustainability of the project. Farmers were handicapped in managing their daily beekeeping activities because they lacked protective clothes and even the hive inspection was dangerous. Furthermore, farmers were scarcely motivated to participate in association’s meetings and did not initiate any action autonomously. Benefits of the beekeeping activity were very limited, harvests irregular. The purification of the honey occurred through traditional methods and wax was extracted as the only sub product since the association did not own specific processing equipment for the extraction of propolis and royal jelly.
Conclusions The superficial project identification and monitoring led to the establishment of a project for the benefit of a limited number of high income beneficiaries. The project had poor likelihood of sustainability and very limited benefits.
Project Title : Kpetema Piggery Project
Project Symbol : TFD-03-SIL-008
Project Budget: US$ 5,870
Project EOD: March 2004
Project NTE: February 2005
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Summary Kpetema village is located in Bumpeh Chiefdom in Bo District. The main activity in the community is rice farming. Animal protein in the diet is scarce since livestock production significantly decreased during the war. The Movement for the Promotion of Food Security in Kpetema was formed in June 2002 to promote food production and comprised 140 people, of which 60 were older women and 55 youth (male and female). The initial project proposal presented by the group was related to piggery production. The objective of this project was to increase protein sources in the community and the main role of FAO was to have been to provide inputs for this purpose, such as piglets and construction material. After project approval and the delivery of construction material: (55% of the project budget), the Muslim community objected to the breeding of pigs in the village. FAO therefore approved to convert the project to goat production. This new project orientation was followed by series of changes which were autonomously decided by the beneficiaries, without FAO involvement: to expand the goat distribution to other community members, the beneficiaries purchased lower-cost locally available construction material and sold the zinc and timber received by FAO (for Le2,600,000). With this money the community started inland valley swamp rice production, which was not foreseen in the initial project.
Project beneficiaries The Movement for the Promotion of Food Security has grown and by February 2007 the number of members had reached 200. The group is based on democratic principles: benefits are equally distributed and decision taking is done within the Committee, with representatives of each of 15 constituent subgroups. The committee is formed by eight men and seven women and meets once or twice monthly. Strategic planning and writing of project proposals is done at committee level. The group is dynamic and able to reorient its strategy as need exists. The Movement is supported by the village and by the elders, is open to new members and formed of highly motivated youths. They dispose of a wide surface of cultivable land exceeding 25,000 acres and potentially their production could be further enlarged.
Technical Support FAO has played a marginal but critical role in this project. Even if they were sold, the provision of initial inputs was fundamental. The crop production component was initially not foreseen in the project and FAO did not play any specific role in it. FAO provided drugs for the goats and the animals were visited and vaccinated by the Veterinary Service. After the initial visits (three) the farmers did not receive any other type of technical support by FAO nor any training. Their goat breeding skills were a result of knowledge acquired before the war. The housing was constructed without any specific technical guidance and it could have been of better standard.
Benfits/sustainability Twenty-nine goats (20 female and nine male) were distributed to the beneficiaries. They goats were shared among 9 subgroups of beneficiaries. Each subgroup usually received two females and a male. Originally received in 2005, within two years the number of goats increased from 25 to about 80. The new goats were distributed to other subgroups of beneficiaries. Each group constructed housing for the goats with local material. The group decided to use local material only, in order to overcome the problem of limited external
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material available and to increase project sustainability. With the proceeds from the sold building materials, the group bought 25 bushels of IVS rice seed, tools and 10 bushels of groundnut seed. The first harvest was not very good but the second one on a 50 acre plantation, yielded 800 bushels of rice. Decisions on how to divide the benefits among the group and on which percentage should be replanted were taken within the Committee. The major constraint faced by the group was marketing at a good price in order to reinvest the money in other activities. Currently, the group uses funds from the sale of the goats for crop production, as this activity is more profitable. Since the group is not adopting practices to enrich soil fertility (e.g. the production of compost), it is likely that low soil fertility could negatively affect the sustainability of crop production activities.
The animal production component of the project is bringing benefits to the group without the need of intensive labour. Goats reproduced easily and grazed freely. Newborns were not vaccinated but had no major problems thus far. The number of people benefiting from the project grew substantially during the two years of activity, and could be potentially expanded if a viable solution would be found for the marketing of rice.
Conclusions The project cannot be compared with the initial proposal approved by FAO. The activities started by the group have been thus far successful, and FAO’s role in this sense was to support the group with initial inputs, which they would have otherwise not been able to afford. Project beneficiaries took independent decisions which proved to be successful and creative. This success was given to the good will of the beneficiaries and to their commitment. The selection of the beneficiaries was in this case, critical for project success. On the other hand, the project underscores the problems of many TFD projects, their lack of minimal monitoring and the limited technical assistance they get.
Project Title: Rural Women Vegetable Project
Project Symbol: TFD-03/SIL/009
Project Budget: US$ 6,250
Project EOD: March 2004
Project NTE: February 2005
Background and objective The project area is located in the Freetown Peninsular Mountains. The Freetown Peninsula has a vast area of inland valley swamp (IVS) cultivated by local communities. Currently the IVS is used for rainfed rice during the rainy season (May to October) and vegetables during the dry season (November to April). The women of the area have been organized into groups, since 1992. Their activities were interrupted by the war and restarted in 2000, when the women received emergency assistance from various development agencies. Through the seeds received, the women’s groups were able to cultivate in the IVS and get good harvests.
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The women farmers felt that vegetable harvests could be increased if they had access to sufficient production inputs and improved methods. The project targeted a group of about 100 women. The project objective was the increase of food production and income, as well as the improvement of the diet within the group, through the distribution of vegetable seeds.
Expected outputs/ outputs achieved The project’s expected outputs and objectives were: i) the establishment of well managed vegetable, maize and groundnut plots by beneficiary groups; ii) increase in food production in the community; and iii) the establishment of a marketing system for vegetables.
Vegetable seeds and tools were distributed by March 2004. With these inputs, the women report to have achieved good yields and a profitable, continuous and sustainable vegetable production, which enabled them to have higher revenues and to pay expenses such as school fees. The main problems were marketing of perishable vegetables and protection of harvests from thieves. No marketing system was established through the project. Marketing was organized by the women and sometimes the prices were low and did not fully repay transport costs. The project did not contribute to put in place any clear strategy nor did it provide satisfactory advice to solve this problem.
Project design The project design included a brief section on possible risks and on technical support. However, project activities did not include any element directly related to marketing, while the establishment of a marketing system is among main project outputs. This was entirely unrealistic for a Telefood project.
Possible sources of technical support are identified in the project document as well as linkages with other activities in the area, such as FFS.
Some 30% of the budget was used for fertilizer. This is considered very high, and given that currently the group does not use chemical fertilizer but rather organic material like compost, this was probably unsustainable and unnecessary.
Project beneficiaries The project beneficiaries are 10 groups of women from the Mountain and York Rural Districts, with a total of 100 women directly benefiting from the project. The women share their work and the benefits equally. On average, they work for three days a week on the common plot, spending the rest of the time cultivating their own plots. Benefits received from vegetable sales are partially reinvested in seeds and partially distributed to the women. The revenues are not kept in a bank account but are administrated by the team leader, who is also responsible, together with another literate women farmer, for bookkeeping. Men participate by cleaning the fields and doing the heavy work which cannot be easily managed by the women. The level of income of the women is low to medium. Through the advocacy of the group leade,r the group had received various project interventions and TFD was one of the projects received.
Technical support
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The women’s group was established through the Women in Agriculture and Nutrition Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture (WIAN). WIAN periodically visits the plot. The plot, around 50 acres, is used also for an FFS, with the women taking about 80% and the FFS using the remaining 20%. Some women attended FFS sessions and lately reported to the other women the practices learned. Since the group is close to Freetown, the plot was frequently visited by FAO, but beside the initial support the group did not receive any technical assistance, Marketing and security are still problems, as is the opening of a bank account.
Benefits/Sustainability Through the project, the women were able to diversify their production and cultivate vegetables during the dry season. Vegetables included garden eggs, potatoes and okra. Women report to have increased revenues and income, though they were not able to quantify this. The group was not able to distinguish TFD support from other types of agricultural support received, was not able to tell clearly when inputs were received, which kind of inputs and in which way TFD project was special to the area. Even the diversification of vegetable production was initiated before TFD project. However, two years after TFD interventions, the women were still cultivating vegetables, had created a seed bank and a continuous source of seeds. The group was observed to be cooperative with each other, hard working and had a clear idea of their most profitable crops, as well as their constraints and problems. Vegetable production was therefore an activity with high likelihood of sustainability. Marketing was not satisfactory for the group, the main constraints being transport and storage. Vegetables stored were regularly stolen and the women did not have any immediate solution to overcome the problem, which in the long run could negatively affect the sustainability of the vegetable production activities.
Conclusions
The beneficiaries had a medium level of income, and already benefited from other interventions. TFD in this case, did not target the extremely poor, but was used to continue and support activities already started. This use of TFD funds was probably more sustainable, since beneficiaries had various strategies and options for continuing their activities in case of negative unforeseen events, such as bad harvests. The linkage with FFS, their common work done in the plot and the training provided to some women of the group were positive aspects of the project. The technical support received by the beneficiaries is still unsatisfactory, since the women did not know how to address the serious marketing problems they had.
Project Name : Moawoma Rural Women Livestock Project
Project Symbol : TFD-05/SIL/003
Project Budget: US$ 8,085
Project EOD: April 2006
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Project NTE: April 2007
Background and objective The project was proposed and written by the Moawoma Rural Women Development Association (MORWODAS). This is an association which comprises several groups of women from the Kenema District with a total of 12,000 members. As a result of the war, many women became household heads and faced alone the responsibility to feed their families. The women started crop production, initially concentrating on rice and subsequently introducing other crops such as cassava, groundnuts and vegetables. The idea of MORWODAS was to integrate poultry in order to improve nutrition of its members and to contribute to their income increase, the demand for livestock products in the district being very high.
The main project objective was to solve the problem of food insecurity in Kenema District through the empowerment of rural women by undertaking the rearing of the chickens on commercial basis for home consumption and income generation. Specific stated project objectives included: i) Support the rural women and the youths in production of chickens; ii) Increase income and generate employment among the beneficiaries; iii) Expand the breeding of chickens to other members by raising interest and capacities and act as pilot project for the improved methods of chicken rearing.
Project Beneficiaries The Moawoma Association was initiated in 1995 by the current Association Coordinator, who brought together a group of 50 poor, displaced women. The women initiated a farming activity which became very prosperous and they were able to win a bid for the supply of 300 MT of rice to ICRC. In the following years the group diversified its activities including other crops such as vegetables and cassava, returned to the various Chiefdoms from which the displaced women originated, and grew in number, with membership reaching about 12,000 individuals in 2007. The Group leader, who is also Representative of the Woman’s Association on the Right to Food Board, won two medals from ICRC and FAO. Like the other five staff working for the association, she is paid part time. Benefits gained by the women are equally shared among the group. The group is creative, dynamic, cohesive and democratic. The advocacy skills of the group leader have attracted other donors and the association has received other support such as a motorized ambulance from the United Fund for Population and microcredit for vegetable production from ICRC. Direct beneficiaries of the project were initially 100 women, but the number was expected to grow during the years.
Expected Outputs/Outputs Achieved The expected outputs of the project were: i) one complete poultry house with shed storage facilities constructed; ii) 350 mature birds produced every four months; and iii) practical skills and knowledge in nutrition and animal rearing acquired by the beneficiaries. Only part of the expected outputs were achieved by the project: the poultry house was constructed with building material received by FAO and the Association paid for the labour; ii) the chickens were received (1000 layers and broilers); iii) animal health and veterinary supplies were
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received as well as feed for the animals. With the inputs received and the poultry house in place, the Association started successful production of chickens. Eggs were distributed daily to the women who sold them at the nearby market. A person was paid full time to take care of the chickens and to ensure security day and night.
However, after the first initial months of successful activity, sale of the chicken became very difficult because of an increasing fear of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in the country. In October 2006 the association decided to sell the poultry for a minimal price, following advice received by FAO. With the money received, the Association bought 10 goats and began goat breeding which seems to be profitable. Since the poultry house was constructed on hired land, and the Association did not have any income deriving from the poultry production to pay for the rent of the land, instead of abandoning the entire building, it was dismantled,and the most valuable material kept in a store. The association is building a new poultry house, bigger than the previous one, on their own property. Their idea is to restart the poultry production, now that the alarm for HPAI in Sierra Leone is for the time being over.
Project Design The project had a good and simple design. As for other project,s a great percentage of the budget was spent to acquire construction materials.
Technical Assistance The Association sourced technical assistance to solve problems. A qualified person constructed the poultry houses; a doctor from the Veterinary Service vaccinated the chickens with the drugs received from FAO; a livestock specialist showed the beneficiaries how to prepare nutritious feed for the animal. The experts were identified, contacted and paid by the association.
However, poultry production projects should not have been approved when the HPAI alarm was not completely over in the country. FAO had experienced previous cases of failure of poultry production products due to avian flu and this should have been taken into account in when to approve this project.
Benefits/Sustainability The potential sustainability of the enterprise (without considering the HPAI) was high, since the group had good cooperation, was democratic and had a good track record. In addition, the market opportunities were good for chicken and eggs. The project is now re-oriented to goat production. The strong motivation of the beneficiaries and the availability of alternative resources, enabled them to accept the changes with an adequate flexibility, to recuperate the construction material and to plan for chicken breeding in future in another area.
Conclusions The project faced problems due to unforeseen events such as the HPAI alarm in the country. FAO did not play a particular role in providing technical assistance since the group took independent initiatives, but was able to advise the beneficiaries in the actions to undertake when they facing great constraints for their marketing due to HPAI. Given that there was an
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appropriate choice of the beneficiaries, the project was reshaped and still has some potential.
Project Name : Livestock Restocking and Rehabilitation Project
Project Symbol : TFD-05/SIL/007
Project Budget: US$ 8,250
Project EOD: May 2006
Project NTE: May 2007
Background and objective Small ruminant rearing is a long-standing tradition in the Northern Province. Almost every farm family had one or two goats or sheep before the war.
The project was initiated by the NGO PASACOFAAS which has its Headquarters at Makari in the Bombali District. The NGO started as community based organization in 1984, and operates in Bombali district and parts of Western Area. PASACOFAAS had already attempted to restock their animals three times, but each time the facilities were vandalized by the thieves. In 2006, the NGO approached FAO to assist in restocking and rehabilitation of facilities for the small ruminants in the Makari community.
Project Beneficiaries Initially the project was supposed to target 60 farmers including 25 women, 25 men and 10 youths for the first year. An additional 30 farmers would have benefited during the second year. The beneficiary target was changed to 800 farmers in five different chiefdoms. Thirty groups of 30 members per group were formed, most of whom were women with nearly 250 youths. The intended beneficiaries included farmers with low and medium income. The decision to expand the number of beneficiaries, as well as their selection, was taken by the NGO after project approval. The group was still informed and frequent meetings were held to discuss problems related to the animals as well as other activities involving the community.
Expected Outputs/Outputs Achieved Expected outputs are not clearly identified in the project proposal, however it is mentioned that kids and lambs would have been handed over to subsequent beneficiaries and that the nutrition and income of the beneficiaries would have been improved.
Since the project is still on-going and the animals were delivered recently to the beneficiaries it is not possible to assess the final results. The animals had not been vaccinated by the time of the evaluation team’s visit. According to the beneficiaries, pens were built, but it was not
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possible for the team to visit them. The NGO also owned a central animal house, which had been partly restructured in view of the intended expansion of project activities.
Project Design Project objective and expected outputs were not clearly described in project design. It is for example not specified if building material, which covers 40% of the entire budget would be used to construct individual pens or for restructuring the central animal house owned by the NGO that was destroyed during the war. Sources of technical assistance were already identified in the project document and project activities are described in sufficient detail.
Technical Assistance The NGO was responsible for the monitoring and providing some technical assistance, such as for pen construction and goat breeding. The MAFS sub office at Makeni provided the project with veterinary service in case it was needed. The group was also supported by an International Volunteer.
Benefits/Sustainability Continuous monitoring and provision of technical assistance together with the great commitment observed within the beneficiaries’ group are elements which could positively affect project sustainability. However, the evaluation team feels that enlarging the group of beneficiaries to 800 was too ambitious for the project and that the group does not have a clear plan for the animal distribution, which could contribute to jealousy among the intended beneficiaries.
Conclusions It is too early to draw conclusions about the likely benefits of the project. However, the evaluators had the impression that the NGO involved project beneficiaries and was committed to ensure sustainability of the project and equal distribution of benefits. Through the NGO, the beneficiaries had access to other funding sources and this minimized the project risk. The presence of an International Volunteer, who was doing fund raising activities was another element of sustainability of the initiative.
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Annex 5
Review of TCP Projects in Sierra Leone
It is FAO corporate evaluation policy that all major evaluations that examine project activities should, in addition to any other tasks, separately review TCP projects. This is to provide accountability to FAO’s membership on the use of TCP funds provided under the FAO Regular Budget and to draw lessons for other, similar projects that may be considered for future implementation.
During the evaluation period, seven “evaluable” TCP projects were implemented in Sierra Leone 2. Three of the projects were emergency interventions and because of their similarity they are reviewed together. Two projects (TCP/SIL/2804 Agricultural Sector Review and TCP/SIL/3001 Upscaling Operation Feed the Nation) were part and parcel of other major interventions that were reviewed in the Results section and thus will not be covered in this Annex. The other two projects (TCP/SIL/2903 Emergency Assistance for War Handicapped and TCP/SIL/2905 CAADP Support) are reviewed below, along with a small preparatory activity and use of the TCP facility for FAORs.
Project Reviews
8. TCP/SIL/0166 “Emergency Agricultural Rehabilitation Assistance to ex- Combatants and Host Communities”
Duration: May 2001 - Apr. 2002 Budget: US$ 385,000
9. TCP/SIL/0167 “Emergency Support to Quality Seed Production”
Duration: Nov. 2001 - Oct. 2002 Budget: US$ 241,000
10. TCP/SIL/0168 “Urgent Provision of Seeds and Tools to War-affected Farmers”
Duration: Dec. 2001 - Sept. 2002 Budget: US$ 368,000
The three emergency projects are considered together because of their similarity in that each was involved in distributing seeds and tools to Sierra Leoneans who had been affected by the civil war. TCP/SIL/0167, while similar to the others in that it involved seeds and tools
2 Another three projects have since been approved, but they were too early in their implementation to warrant evaluation in February 2007 .
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distribution, did also have a developmental focus in encouraging quality seed production at a time when facilities for seed production in the country were destroyed.
Relevance In response to the humanitarian emergency facing Sierra Leone as a result of the civil war, a UN Consolidated Appeal had been undertaken in the country since 1998. FAO had been distributing emergency assistance in Sierra Leone since 1995, including some eight TCP projects. By the time the evaluation review period had begun, the rural population had begun returning to their villages to begin rebuilding their livelihoods and the focus of the UN Consolidated Appeal was on assisting the returning IDPs and war combatants. The goal of the assistance was to restore staple food production to pre-war levels as soon as possible. A perhaps less explicit goal was to stem the flow of population to Freetown.
FAO TCP assistance was used in all cases to fill gaps in input distribution. FAO established an Emergency Coordination Unit (ECU) in Sierra Leone in 1999 with TCP and USAID funding, to coordinate all agricultural input supplies. This involved close cooperation with a multitude of NGOs that were operating emergency activities. The coordination mechanism, which proved to be effective, helped to ensure that TCP assistance was directed where it was most needed.
Design and Implementation From available information, it appears that the projects were implemented on schedule. By the time of their approval, the ECU was well-established and sources for the inputs had been identified. Some hand tools were provided from blacksmith workshops established under a previous FAO-implemented emergency project funded by the Netherlands (OSRO/SIL/105/NET).
Project TCP/SIL/0166 targeted 15,000 farm families in five districts. It supplied 200mt of seed rice (4000 beneficiaries), 60mt of groundnut seeds (3000 beneficiaries), 10,000 kits of vegetable seeds, 2500 watering cans (one for four families receiving vegetable seeds) and 5000 sets of one hoe and one cutlass. This project also trained 40 staff of NGOs and Government in appropriate agricultural production techniques, which were then to be transmitted to the project beneficiaries. Both the project final report and the mission to Sierra Leone in 2002 for the corporate evaluation of Strategic Objective A3 on emergencies noted that there were delays in the implementation of this particular project due to procedures in Rome related to procurement.
Project TCP/SIL/0167 included areas of four districts (Kambia, Port Loko, Bombali and Moyamba) that had been involved in seed production for the Rokupr Rice Research Station (RRS) and the former German-funded Seed Multiplication Project (SMP). In order to maximize seed production, the project targeted former seed producers. It reached 568 farmers, 80% of which had formerly produced seed for one of the previous activities. Contractual agreements were made with selected farmers under which they assumed responsibility for managing seed multiplication plots and sale of seed to FAO and other agencies. RRS and SMP delivered 28.6mt of selected varieties of foundation seed to the farmers. Beneficiaries were also supplied with a total of 110mt of fertilizer, agro-chemicals,
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816 hand tools and 20,000 jute sacks. The package was to be sufficient for planting 0.8ha. The project also provided training for 44 farmer leaders and 11 Ministry of Agriculture staff in proper seed production methods. Plots of trained farmers were to serve as demonstrations.
Project TCP/SIL/0168 targeted 9325 eligible registered farm families in seven Districts plus Western Area who were not reached by assistance offered by other implementing partners with seed rice and groundnut seeds. The project also distributed 6000 sets of hand tools and vegetable seed kits to an additional 9500 farmers.
Results Project monitoring was carried out by the NGOs that handled the input distribution for projects 0166 and 0168, while a coordinating committee from FAO, RRS and SMP met regularly and monitored results of project 0167. While monitoring visits to the projects were undertaken, production results were imputed based on the amounts of inputs distributed. For 0166, it was estimated that 2915mt of paddy and 1006mt of groundnuts were produced, but no estimate was made for vegetables that were planted on 640ha.
Production estimates were similarly made for 0167, with an estimated 1194.4mt of certified seed rice produced. This was based on yield assumptions of 2mt/ha for upland rice and 3mt/ha for inland valley swamps, figures that are very much higher than normal farmer yields but which project staff felt was attainable with the inputs supplied and improved crop management.
Studies undertaken for 0168 indicated that all inputs were delivered and over 90% were planted as intended, with normal crop growth under farmer’s conditions. The project estimated that under these conditions, some 2865mt of milled rice and 1200 mt of unshelled groundnuts would have been produced, while the vegetable seeds would have been sufficient for the cultivation of 479ha.
Impact and Sustainability The final report for TCP/SIL/0166 claims that the output from the project accounted for 50% of the daily food intake for project beneficiaries in the subsequent year, helped in the re- integration of combatants and increased food security for vulnerable groups like women and children.
The final report for TCP/SIL/0167 noted that the 2003 estimated national requirement for seed rice for eligible needy families was 3200mt and that the production of the TCP project in 2002 would provide up to 37% of that requirement. The TCP project gave an impetus to the idea for the subsequent GCP/SIL/023/GER project, which aims at rehabilitation of the seed sector (see Annex 2).
Based on normal yields, it was estimated that TCP/SIL/0168 provided 47% of the food consumption needs of the 7505 beneficiaries of rice seed. The small amounts of vegetable seed received by each farmer was said to have contributed to improved nutrition but without any indicators or verification. The project estimated that each of the 4078 families receiving groundnut seed may have realized a net cash benefit of $240 per capita, but this was based
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on an optimistic price and assumed no post harvest losses, a near impossibility for the types of farmers targeted by this project.
11. TCP/SIL/2903 Emergency Assistance for the Reintegration of War-Handi-capped and Other Disabled Persons
Duration: Jan. 2003 - Dec. 2004 Budget: US$ 317,000 (originally US$ 269,000)
Relevance The project was said to be a pilot initiative, aimed at providing disabled persons with the means to become productive members of society and to earn a livelihood. It was estimated at the time of the project there were some 250,000 severely disabled persons in Sierra Leone, many of whom had become disabled during the civil war. From an earlier emergency project on blacksmith training (OSRO/SIL/105/NET), it was found that disabled persons could be trained in this skill. The project aimed to build on this and it was felt that agro-processing training would also benefit the target group.
Aside from blacksmithing, it was not clear at the outset what other types of training should be offered to the target beneficiaries and why the eventual choices (gari, pepper and sesame processing) were made. The comparative advantage of FAO to carry out this type of project can also be questioned. The project document noted that NGOs have been long involved in working with the handicapped in Sierra Leone, but claimed that little was done on economic reintegration. However, the training and supervision under the TCP was carried out by an NGO and the added value brought by FAO was not clear.
There was no explicit strategy for moving from the pilot phase to up-scaling, except to state that development of such a strategy was part of the project.
Design and Implementation The project originally was to have 10 production centres and train up to 100 beneficiaries. After the project was approved and an in-country inception mission mounted, it was decided to reduce the number of centres and target districts to four, and train 15 persons from each district (60 in total). Training was conducted by six persons under the supervision of the Movement for Assistance and Promotion of (Rural) Communities (MAPCO). An international consultant provided guidance on how to approach disabled persons for training and wheelchairs and prosthetics were provided to trainees. A training of trainers session was held. The 60 selected beneficiaries were trained in two batches of 30 each. Facilities were constructed as follows:
Port Loko District: Lunsar (blacksmithing and agro-processing) Tonkolili District: Magburaka (rice milling) Bo District: Bo (blacksmithing and agro-processing) Bonthe District: Mattru (blacksmithing)
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The training emphasized discussions on blacksmithing as an income generating activity, and practical skills for the fabrication of basic farm tools and related farm implements.
With regard to agro-processing, the issues addressed related to the acquisition of the basic principles and practices of food processing. Discussions focused on the mobilization of raw materials, practical activities to prepare recipes and the equipment used in agro-processing, packaging, storage, care and safety precautions.
The project terminal statement stated that micro-enterprise management sessions provided an insight into the development of small-scale enterprises. It further stated that particular emphasis was given to business planning, the preparations for basic enterprise management practices, with a focus on record keeping and accounting, resource mobilization, the management of proceeds, the arranging of contracts, market surveys, advertisements, the determination of market outlets and marketing. However, the evaluation mission was told by MAPCO that the business training did not go beyond simple bookkeeping.
Although the project document called for the preparation of a draft national strategy for scaling-up, this was apparently not done.
The project received visits from two backstopping officers, one the Rural Development and Land Tenure Officer in RAF (April 2004 and an earlier mission for which no report was available) and the other by the responsible SDAR officer from Rome (September 2004). The first officer made a number of recommendations, including for an M&E system for the project beneficiaries that was not implemented. The second assisted in the finalization of the training manual, one of the project ourputs. Both officers proposed follow-up proposals but these did not receive support. As no donor was ever associated with the project, this is hardly surprising.
The evaluation did not note any particular implementation difficulties with the project.
Results The four facilities were built. Blacksmithing tools were provided to those trainees, while cassava processing equipment was given to the agro-processing locations, except for Magburaka where a rice mill was located. However, the recipient organization (Tonkolili District Disabled Association) based there took out a loan in 2004 to purchase a gari-making machine from MAPCO for Le 3.45 million (US$1150). The loan was repaid.
A number of the trained blacksmiths reportedly took their tools back to their home villages and continue to practice in their own areas.
Impact and Sustainability The evaluation assesses the impact and sustainability of the TCP as very low. It visited two of the project sites, at Magburaka and Bo. The Tonkolili association reported that the rice mill is little used, as most producers prefer to mill their rice at nearby Makeni, a much larger town where a ready market exists on the spot for milled rice. The gari making activity has reduced considerably due to the high cost of transport for acquiring raw material, which means that
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the business cannot be run profitably. Group leaders would like to procure a vehicle, but said it would have to be provided free of charge for the business to be profitable.
The association claimed it was keeping business records but the mission was unable to see them. However, it is deemed unlikely that the handicapped associations can be competitive with larger scale gari producers, including the major one in the country that is located in Bo.
The evaluation did not visit any village-level blacksmiths so it is not in a position to assess their sustainability. However, handicapped blacksmiths at Bo had markedly inferior facilities to those of their non-handicapped competitors at Magburaka and Bo, who got their start under the Netherlands-funded emergency project.
The absence of performance data on the enterprises and the lack of involvement in the project of both the Government and potential donors greatly lessened the chance for any follow-up to this project.
12. TCP/SIL/2905 Assistance in the Preparation of a Medium-term Investment Programme and Formulation of Bankable Projects in Support to the CAADP Implementation
Duration: Nov. 2003 – Mar. 2005 Budget: US$ 120,000
Relevance This project (and similar ones in all African countries) was approved after the Maputo Declaration of African Heads of State in July 2003, which provided strong political support for increased investment in African agriculture through the NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). In all cases, the project was to prepare a national medium-term investment programme and a small number of priority bankable projects.
The relevance of the TCP in any given country would depend on already existing plans and strategies and how the TCP fit in with those. In the case of Sierra Leone, the project came just at the time that the Agricultural Sector Review and Agricultural Development Strategy (partly financed by TCP/SIL/2804) was being finalized. Thus, the preparation of the NMTIP provided an opportunity to operationalise recommendations of the review and contribute to the agriculture chapter of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In this case, it was timely.
Design and Implementation The project had the same template design and budget as all the CAADP projects. The project was implemented efficiently without serious delays, under the supervision of the FAO Investment Centre. Major activities included a mission to gather information, a stakeholders’ workshop and actual preparation of the national medium-term investment programme and three bankable projects.
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Results The NMTIP was completed by March 2005. It includes an assessment of the country’s economy, the agricultural and rural sectors, a strategic framework for the investment programme that follows and a SWOT analysis. The NMTIP for Sierra Leone includes nine projects, three of which were developed into bankable projects with FAO’s assistance. These were: Sustainable Land and Water Resources Development; Freetown Fisheries Harbour Complex; Programme for the Tree Crops and Forestry Sub-sector.
Impact and Sustainability The NMTIP, although a well-prepared document, does not have any particular status in Sierra Leone. None of the projects, including the bankable ones, has attracted any notable donor financing or interest yet, although it is too early to state that this will not happen. It is reported that the Government of Italy has shown some interest in part of the Programme for Tree Crops and Forestry.
13. TCP/SIL/2801 Support to Veterinary Laboratories: Advance Allocation
Duration: June-Aug. 2002 Budget: US$ 8,500
The Advance Allocation was intended to allow FAO to make an objective assessment of the needs and extent of its support to veterinary laboratories in Sierra Leone, which had been largely destroyed during the war. The mission, undertaken by a Retired Expert, was to prepare a report on the feasibility, viability and sustainability of the provision of support to veterinary diagnostic laboratories in Sierra Leone, which would provide a sound basis on which objective decisions and actions could be taken on the technical justification for support to the veterinary laboratories.
The conclusion of the report was that major support to the veterinary labs was required, much more than could be offered through TCP. A project proposal was prepared that was budgeted at US$3 million. However, no funding for this project was received.
14. TCP/SIL/2802 & 3002 TCP Facility for FAORs
Budgets: US$ 13,000 (TCP/SIL/2802), US$ 15,000 (TCP/SIL/3002)
The TCP facility for FAORs is made available to allow FAORs to respond to small, unforeseen requests for assistance by governments. The budget limit for the facility has recently been raised to $200,000.
During the evaluation period, two interventions were funded under the facility. The first was a technical and economic assessment of the state of tree crop plantations. The report included rehabilitation needs, future production potentials and covered marketing of the crops. The
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second use of the facility was for a Crop Production Manual containing guidelines for improved crop production and post harvest practices for technical extension staff. Both guidelines were distributed to Government departments and NGOs in hard copy and CD- ROM. Plans were made to develop simplified extension pamphlets from the Crop Production Manual for Farmer Facilitators of FFS and farmers generally, but this had not yet been done. This would be a practical reinforcement of the FFS and would be useful.
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Annex 6
Sierra Leone Impact Studies Farmers’ Field Schools and FAO Emergency Interventions Studies undertaken as part of the Evaluation of FAO-Cooperation in Sierra Leone 2001-2006, February 2007
Introduction
The evaluation of FAO cooperation in Sierra Leone is a comprehensive study of all FAO activities that have taken place over the period 2001-06, including field projects (both national and regional ones in which Sierra Leone participates), use made of outputs of the FAO Regular Programme and work carried out by the FAO Representation.
One of the important aims of the evaluation is to assess the impact that FAO programmes have had, including at the level of the individual farmer. This information is not generally available and could not be gathered and analyzed in the period of an evaluation mission. In order to have the information, it was necessary to conduct a major data collection exercise, involving local enumerators who have the requisite interviewing and language skills to interact with beneficiaries.
To be most valuable, impact studies should focus on areas where there has been an appreciable volume of work by FAO. From an examination of available documentation and as a result of discussions during an Inception Mission to Sierra Leone in July 2006, it was decided to carry out the impact studies in two areas: Farmers’ Field Schools and the FAO emergency operations that were carried out in 2001-02.
Farmers’ Field Schools (FFS) have been in operation in Sierra Leone since 2003. Under Operation Feed the Nation they are the operational mechanism for Pillar II (“promoting pro- poor growth for food security and job creation”) of the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. FAO has been instrumental in launching the FFS, in a start-up stage through funding by the Special Programme for Food Security and upscaling, funded by the Technical Cooperation Programme, an FAO-executed project funded by Germany (GCP/SIL/024/GER) and funding from UNDP. By the time of the final evaluation mission in February 2007, over 1400 FFS had reportedly been established in all Districts. Some of them have been supported by NGOs, particularly in Eastern Province.
FAO commissioned a study of Farmers’ Field Schools in Sierra Leone in early 2006, by the Overseas Development Institute 1. The study came up with a number of interesting conclusions and recommendations. The overall findings about the FFS were positive, with
1 Longley, C., Spencer, D., Wiggins, S., Assessment of Farmers’ Field Schools in Sierra Leone, Operation Feed the Nation, Overseas Development Institute and Dunstan Spencer and Associates, April 2006
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most recommendations aimed at reinforcing the training of facilitators, interaction with members and expanding the scope of FFS into other areas. However, the conclusions of the study were based on an extremely limited sample of 18 FFS in three Districts (Kailahun, Koinadugu and Moyamba), representing slightly over 1% of the FFS in Sierra Leone. In order to verify the conclusions of that report and to have more convincing evidence about the impact of FFS thus far, it was felt necessary to secure a considerably larger body of evidence from FFS participants and control groups.
With funding from many bilateral donors and also the UN, FAO carried out an extensive programme of emergency activities during 2001-02 in particular. Most resources were used for provision of essential agricultural inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizers, hand tools) for war- affected farmers, while later emergency activities were aimed at other aspects of agricultural rehabilitation (e.g. agricultural marketing, village-level restocking of small animals, blacksmithing).
Both FFS and emergency interventions were carried out throughout the whole country. Thus, in order to gain a balanced appreciation of their impact, a nationwide survey had to be undertaken.
Methodology
The impact studies were carried out by a Sierra Leonean team. The team was divided into two groups, each consisting of three enumerators plus one lead enumerator. In addition, there was a Lead Supervisor, who was in the field at the same time as the enumerator teams. The lead supervisor, one of the lead enumerators and one of the enumerators had also participated in the ODI study.
Since baseline data were not available on farmers prior to their participation in the FFS, the impact assessment set out to cover a statistically significant number of FFS and control villages where there have been no FFS, in order to determine difference if any due to the FFS. FFS started in 2006 were not covered as they were deemed to be too new to have shown significant results. Of the 739 Government-implemented FFS in the period 2003-05, the study covered 71 of them (nearly 10%) and 61 non-FFS sites and interviewed a total of 1380 farmers. For reasons of efficiency, the non-FFS sites were supposed to have received emergency assistance channeled through FAO, so the control villages were also used for gathering information about the utility of FAO emergency assistance. The study also covered five NGO-financed FFS in Kailahun District. The sample of FFS was designed to be in rough proportion to the total population of sites, i.e. to include sites with farmer facilitators (about 20%) and extensionist facilitators (about 80%); those receiving processing or irrigation equipment (about 10% of the sites) and those not. Two questionnaires were developed: one to be administered to village authorities, in order to profile the village as a whole and a second one to be completed with individual farmers. For individual farmers, the same questionnaire was used at both FFS and non-FFS (emergency) sites, although respondents answered some questions differentially, depending on whether or not they were FFS members and whether or not they had received emergency assistance. This was done to simplify data entry and analysis and ensure complementarity of results. At all sites, whether
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FFS or non-FFS/emergency, gender balance among interviewees was an important criterion. Of the total interviewees, 58% were men and 42% women.
In the study design, it was preferable for the interviews to cover a wide spectrum of emergency intervention types (e.g. seeds and other inputs, tools, livestock, marketing, blacksmithing) and beneficiaries (e.g. war-affected, ex-combatants, youth). However, this stratification proved difficult as the number of beneficiaries for intervention types other than seeds and tools was small.
While for the FFS comparisons were carried out between participants and non-participants, it proved impossible to use quantitative methods to compare recipients of FAO-provided emergency assistance with other types. Thus, the overall findings are more limited for the emergency interventions and based exclusively on interviews in the control villages, which were known recipients of FAO-provided emergency assistance.
For time and cost reasons, only two Districts each in Eastern, Southern and Northern Provinces were covered. Questionnaire testing was carried out in some locations in the Western Area as part of a training course for the enumerators. In each Province, one District was chosen that had over 100% self-sufficiency in rice production and one that does not (in Eastern Province, Kailahun District was the surplus area and Kono not; in Southern Province, the Districts chosen were Pujehun (surplus) and Bo (not); in Northern Province they were Kambia (surplus) and Bombali (not)). Eleven FFS sites in different villages were chosen in each District, including sites that were started in 2003, in 2005, both with extension and farmer facilitators, along with the same number of non-FFS "control" sites. Some of the control sites were in geographical proximity to FFS sites and others not. One team of enumerators covered Kambia, Bombali and Kono Districts, while the other team conducted interviews in Bo, Pujehun and Kailahun Districts.
All site selections (including control sites) were made in consultation between the Lead Supervisor, the National Coordinator for the FFS and the FAO office in Freetown. The questionnaires were drafted by the FAO Evaluation Service and finalized after discussion with FAO Freetown and the Lead Supervisor.
The enumerators received training from the FAO Evaluation Service and the Lead Supervisor. It consisted of one day of classroom instruction and two days of visiting sites in the Western Area, to develop experience in conducting interviews and gathering data (26-28 October 2006). This period also served for field testing the questionnaires. At the end of the training period, the questionnaires were slightly revised and printed in sufficient quantities. Field work was carried out from 29 October – 24 November 2006. Data entry was then carried out in Sierra Leone. Due to computer and electricity problems, the data entry took longer to complete than was initially foreseen and was completed only on 22 December 2006. Data analysis was mainly done using SPSS and Excel and statistical significance was assessed using the Chi square test. Data cleaning and analysis began in January 2007 and was completed by 31 January 2007, after which this report was written.
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Main Findings
Farmers’ Field Schools
The main question for the impact study was whether there was a difference in terms of livelihoods and food security as a result of participation in an FFS, as compared to those who did not participate. Another major question was whether there has been any “spill-over” effect in FFS villages among persons who are not members but who would have been exposed to the results of the FFS, as compared to Control Villages that did not participate at all in the FFS.
On the main question, the survey showed that rice production increased more rapidly since 2004 in FFS villages than in control villages. FFS farmers in the same village started from a higher average production than non-FFS farmers. Average rice production for both groups in FFS villages increased by about the same rate, thus indicating a likely “spill-over” effect from the FFS (Table 25). This was confirmed in the village-level questionnaire, where FFS villages showed a greater increase in food security over recent years than control villages (Table 11). However, villagers do not themselves perceive a high degree of food security yet, when this is defined as one main meal per day throughout the year, as was done for the impact study. Only 38% of village leaders in FFS villages stated that more than 75% of its inhabitants had reached that level, and 25% in Control Villages. This is considerably below the often-quoted figure of 65-70% based on the present level of rice self-sufficiency, and may be linked to the strong local preference for rice consumption in determining what constitutes a “main meal”. However, it is a question that deserves further analysis.
All respondents cited improved agricultural practices as one the most important benefits of their participation. By comparison, relatively few chose social factors such as better communication skills, enhanced self-reliance, etc. Among the most successful agricultural practices mentioned were line planting, appropriate spacing, bed preparation, timely planting, composting and crop protection techniques.
The survey showed farmers believe that increased agricultural production came as a benefit of their participation in the FFS. Some 91% reported that food production had increased on their own farms in the year(s) subsequent to their participation and 87% of these felt that the increase could at least partially be attributed to the FFS.
The survey also assessed whether farmers had actually adopted new farming practices and reasons for non-adoption. Nearly 90% of farmers claimed to have adopted new practices; the type of practice adopted was well distributed among many shown in FFS. FFS members were shown to be more innovative, with 60% of them having adopted new seed varieties within the past two years (compared to 44% of non-members) and 48% planting new crops (40% among non-members). Of the practices that were not adopted, the main one was fertilizer use, followed by row planting. Not surprisingly, the reasons for non-adoption were lack of cash (52%), followed by lack of labour (18%) and non-availability of inputs locally (16%).
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Gender was found to be an important factor in attendance at FFS, with 9% of women attending less than 50% of the sessions, compared to 3% of men (Table 35). More women than men also attended between 51-90% of the sessions, while men predominated among those attending over 90% of the meetings. Women were found to be slightly more likely than men to be involved in experiments relating to new varieties or fertilizer use, but participated significantly less in group savings schemes (57% compared to 71% for men) and were less likely to have received loans (15%, compared to 23% for men)(Tables 37 and 38). Women were more frequent adopters of some agricultural practices such as crop rotations and use of new varieties (Table 39).
Main constraints to production were the same for all groups of farmers. In order, these were harvesting and/or storage; lack of fertilizer; lack of labour (Table 23). Marketing was a particularly strong constraint for FFS farmers, probably because they market more of their production than do non-FFS farmers (Tables 31-33). This points to an important area that will have to be addressed by FFS in future.
Emergency Interventions
The key questions for the emergency interventions were the degree of food security provided in the following season and whether the inputs provided made a contribution to agricultural rehabilitation in future seasons. The study also was intended to determine any shortcomings in the delivery of inputs.
Some 448 interviewees received emergency assistance (84% of the total sample in the control villages). Emergency assistance was assessed from 2000 and reached a peak in 2002. Some assistance was received also from 2004 to 2006 (Table 1).
From the group that received assistance, 82% of the farmers received inputs channelled through FAO, but some inputs were also received from other international agencies, such as the European Union, Caritas, Africare, World Vision and the International Committee of the Red Cross (Table 2).
Planting material was by far the most common form of input distributed (97%), followed by hand tools (37%). Fertilizer was distributed to only 3% of the farmers (Table 3). The majority (52%) received between 1,1 and 10 bags of planting material and 40% received quantities smaller than one bag 3.
For 74% of respondents, the quantity of inputs received was not sufficient to feed their families until the subsequent harvest. This percentage is different from district to district varying from 63% in Bo to 88% in Bombali. Details are provided in Table 4. The quantity of seed was not sufficient for 74% of respondents and the quantity of fertilizer was insufficient for 99%. As only one respondent indicated that he still uses fertilizer, it is questionable whether distribution of extremely small quantities is worthwhile. The inputs provided had
3 One bag of rice seed is sufficient to plant 2 acres (0.8 h).
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some impact on future productivity as 48% of interviewees replanted seeds for the next cropping season.
Some 46% of the respondents encountered problems with the inputs delivered: in 31% of cases seeds had a poor germination; in 23% of cases delivery was to late for intended season; in 7% of cases the variety was not adequate for the area; and in 6% of cases they faced other problems such as the receipt of mixed varieties.
For 82% of interviewees the inputs were said to be beneficial. The majority of farmers report to have eaten some rice seeds during the hungry season and to have kept others for replanting.
Although not distributed by FAO, respondents were asked whether they had received food aid, as a proxy for indicating need. A total of 69% of the respondents received food aid, particularly in Northern and Eastern Provinces. Receipt of food aid peaked over the period 2002-2003 together with the agricultural input assistance and rapidly decreased after that (Tables 5 and 6).
The overall assessment is that the input distribution was undoubtedly useful, but may not have in itself have been provided in sufficient quantity to allow beneficiaries to achieve food security in the subsequent season. Input quality and timeliness of delivery were significant problems, according to perceptions of farmers. In only slightly less than half the cases were seeds retained for the next year, possibly because the amounts given were needed for grain before they could be replanted.
Table 1: Emergency Input Assistance by year of receipt
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
% of Farmers of non FFS Village, who received assistance
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Table 2: Input Assistance by Source
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% FAO Other International Other Missing answers Agencies
% of non FFS farmers who received agricultural input aid
Table 3: Input Assistance by Type
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% Planting material Fertilizer Handtools
%of non FFS farmers who received the input
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Table 4: Input Sufficiency by District
Was the quantity sufficient to produce a crop to feed your family Total that year? No Yes Bo 34 20 54 % within 63.0% 37.0% 100.0% District Bombali 59 8 67 % within 88.1% 11.9% 100.0% District Kailahun 52 27 79 % within 65.8% 34.2% 100.0% District Kambia 57 25 82 % within 69.5% 30.5% 100.0% District Kono 65 22 87 % within 74.7% 25.3% 100.0% District Pujehun 63 16 79 % within 79.7% 20.3% 100.0% District Total 330 118 448 % within 73.7% 26.3% 100.0% District
Table 5: Number of Villages Receiving Food Aid by Year
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
CV that received food aid
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Table 6: Percentage of Population Receiving Food Aid by Year
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% 2000 2001 2002 2003
CV population that received food aid
Questionnaires and Analysis
Village Questionnaires
The survey at village level was undertaken in 137 villages, out of which 76 had FFS and 61 did not (Control Villages). The original study design called for 22 villages per district, including eleven FFS villages and eleven control villages, plus five additional NGO FFS villages in Kailahun District. However, five villages originally identified as controls (four in Kono and one in Pujehun) actually turned out to have had FFS when visited by the enumerators (Table 7).
Table 7 - FFS and CV by District
District A Total CV FFS Bo 11 11 22 Bombali 11 11 22 Kailahun 11 16 27 Kambia 11 11 22 Kono 7 15 22 Pujehun 10 12 22 Total 61 76 137
The average number of households per village surveyed was 315. The most important economic activity undertaken is crop production, done by nearly all respondents; followed (in order) by livestock, artisanal activities and fishing (Table 8). Among crops cultivated in villages the most important are rice and cassava followed by vegetables, groundnuts and maize (Table 9), although the latter two were much less significant as a source of livelihood.
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There are differences between FFS and Control Villages in relation to the importance of livestock production as a significant economic activity (78% for FFS villages and 61% for Control Villages). The most important livestock activity is poultry, followed by sheep and goats (Table 10).
Table 8 - Economic Activities Ranked by Importance
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% FFS 50% CV 40%
30%
20%
10%
0% Crop production Livestock Artisanal activities Fishing
FFS= Farmer Field School-Village CV=Control Village
Table 9 - Crop Production – Table shows % of cultivated crops by FFS and CV
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% FFS 50% CV 40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
a e t ice les z R sav Mai Mille Other as etab C eg V Groundnuts
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Table 10 - Type of Livestock Produced
40%
35%
30%
25%
FFS 20% CV
15%
10%
5%
0% Cattle Poultry Sheep Goats Other
While none of the villages surveyed had a high level of food security 4 as recently as 2004, the number of food secure households increased during the years, with FFS villages increasing more rapidly and by 2006 some 38% of FFS villages considering themselves food-secure, as opposed to 25% of the control villages (Table 11). It should be noted that this figure is considerably below the commonly cited Government figure of about 65%, which is based on rice self-sufficiency. Informed Sierra Leone officials state that most people in rural areas do not consider that they have eaten unless they have consumed rice and this is still not available all the year round, particularly during the “hungry” months at the onset of the rainy season.
4 Defined as at least 75% of village households being food secure (one main meal throughout the year)
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Table 11 - Food Secure Households in Villages by Year
45
40 38.2 35
30 %Foodsecure household - 25 24.6 CV %Foodsecure households - 20 FFS
15
10 9.2
5 4.9
0 0 2004 2005 2006
As stated earlier, the analysis of emergency agricultural input assistance was restricted to Control Villages (CV). Table 12 shows the percentages of CV that received agricultural input aid from 2000 to 2006. Agricultural input aid was particularly significant in the immediate post-relief years of 2002 and 2003 with 40% of the interviewed CV farmers receiving some sort of inputs. Of the inputs distributed, 96% of villages received planting material and 72% received tools, while fertilizer was received by 8% (Table 13).
Table 12 - Control Villages Receiving Agricultural Input Aid, 2000-06
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
CV that received agricultural input aid
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Table 13 - Types of Agricultural Input Aid Received
100% 96%
90%
80% 72% 70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20% 8% 9% 10%
0% planting material fertilizer tools other
Percentage of Control villages that received the agric. input
Processing machines were present in 35% of FFS villages and 23% of Control Villages (Table 14). Processing machines were distributed by FAO to District FFS Networks beginning in mid-2006. There are differences among the districts concerning the presence of processing machines, with Kambia, Kono and Pujehun having the most in the six districts surveyed. In Bo and Bombali, processing machines were only found in FFS Villages while in Kono there were more in Control Villages (Table 15).
Table 14 - Presence of Processing Machines
40%
35%
30%
25%
20% Series1
15%
10%
5%
0% FFS CV
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Table 15 - Processing Machines by District
100%
80%
60% FFS CV 40%
20%
0% Bo Bombali Kailahun Kambia Kono Pujehun
There is a higher percentage of school gardens in CV as opposed to FFS villages (Table 16), and their distribution varied by district (Table 17).
Table 16 - Presence of School Gardens
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50% Series1
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% FFS CV
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Table 17 – School Gardens by District (total numbers in villages surveyed)
District Total CV FFS Bo 2 7 9 Bombali 1 4 5 Kailahun 9 8 17 Kambia 7 2 9 Kono 7 6 13 Pujehun 4 5 9 Total 30 32 62
It should be noted that, of the districts surveyed, the FAO school garden programme worked only in Kambia and Kono 5 and that there is no linkage between the presence of FFS in a village and the establishment of school gardens.
Fifty-two of the villages surveyed had one FFS, in 22 there were two FFS in the same village and in two villages there were three. Most of the FFS (88%) practice crop production, 28% deal with livestock and 24% with aquaculture. In 95% of cases, FFS met at least once per week.
Cohesive membership was given as a major reason for the selection of 46 villages for FFS establishment. Thirteen cited the village’s central location and consequent ease of access. Good leadership and availability of suitable farmland were cited by village leaders interviewed.
In 96% of cases the village leaders believe that the FFS is bringing advantages. The major disadvantage mentioned was jealousy due to restricted membership of FFS. The village FFS was known to be registered in the District network in 54% of cases. Some 28% of village leaders reported the presence of other development projects, besides FFS, in their villages.
Individual Farmer Questionnaires
Altogether 1380 persons were interviewed. Out of these, 43% of respondents were adults between 36 and 50 years old and 36% were youth aged 15-35. (Table 18).
The survey took place in six districts, with 220 people interviewed per district (except 280 in Kailahun where NGO FFS were included). Twelve people were interviewed in each FFS- village (8 FFS members and 4 non-members); 8 people were interviewed in each Control Village. Details per district are provided in Table 19.
5 The FAO school garden programme under Operation Feed the Nation has supported 10 school gardens in Kono District and 15 in Kambia. It has also supported 25 school gardens in Tonkolili District.
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There is no significant difference in the literacy level of FFS and non-FFS farmers: illiteracy for FFS farmers was 69% and for non-FFS 70%. Women constitute 42% of respondents: 47% of FFS-members and 37% of non-members (Table 20).
Table 18 - Profile of Respondents
Age 15-25 26-35 36-50 51-65 > 65 8% 28% 43% 17% 4% Sex Male 57.5% Female 42.5% Ethnic group or tribe Mende 53%, Temne 23%, Others 24% Education Illiterate 69% Literate 31% Number of men in household over 15 years 3-4 (average) 1 min; 25 max Number of women over 15 years 3-4 (average); 1 min; 20 max Number of children, 15 years or less 5 (average); 0 min; 36 max
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Table 19 - Respondent Distribution by District
Respondent Total FFS-village FFS- CV not member member Name Bo Count of 88 44 88 220 District % within 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% District Bombali Count 88 44 88 220 % within 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% District Kailahun Count 88 65 127 280 % within 31.4% 23.2% 45.4% 100.0% District Kambia Count 88 44 88 220 % within 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% District Kono Count 88 45 87 220 % within 40.0% 20.5% 39.5% 100.0% District Pujehun Count 88 44 88 220 % within 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 100.0% District Total Count 528 286 566 1380 % within 38.3% 20.7% 41.0% 100.0% District
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Table 20 - Respondent Distribution by Gender
Sex Total Female Male Respondent CV Count 198 330 528 % within CV 37.5% 62.5% 100.0% FFS-not Count 121 165 286 member % within FFS-not 42.3% 57.7% 100.0% member FFS-member Count 268 298 566 % within 47.3% 52.7% 100.0% FFS-member Total Count 587 793 1380 % within 42.5% 57.5% 100.0% Respondent
Respondents in the majority of cases (77%) had permanent rights to farm their land (74% of women and 78% of men). Crop agriculture is the most important source of livelihood for about 90% of respondents. Livestock is the most important source of livelihood only for 1% of respondents of the control groups, 3% of non-FFS farmers in FFS villages and 5 % for members of FFS. Vaccinations of livestock was extremely rare, practiced by only 1% of livestock owners. Aquaculture is the main livelihood source for a limited number of farmers in FFS villages (Table 21).
Table 21 - Most Important Source of Livelihood, by Group
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Crop Livestock Artisanal Fishing Aquaculture Other agriculture activities
FFS member FFS (not member) CV
Of those with crop agriculture as their main source of livelihood, inland valley swamp rice is the most important activity practiced in FFS Villages with a variation of 4% between FFS
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members and non-FFS members in FFS villages. The presence of inland valley swamps is reportedly a factor in deciding where to locate FFS. Upland rice follows in importance, while aside from rice, cassava is the most important crop, practiced by 44-46% of respondents and primary source of livelihood for about 5% overall. Vegetables are next as a primary livelihood source.
Table 22 - Farmers with Crop Agriculture Main Source of Livelihood, Main Crop by Respondent Group
50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Upland Rice Inland Valley Swamp Cassava Vegetables
FFS Member FFS Not Member CV
Harvesting and/or storage were identified as the main negative factor affecting agricultural production for all groups, followed by lack of fertilizer and labour shortage (Table 23).
Table 23 - Most Significant Negative Factors Affecting Agricultural Production
30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% e s g d r fall lize in tora abour a L /S ty see Ferti reparation R g li p stin Qua Land Harve
FFS FFS not member CV
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Timely land preparation is the most significant positive factor for agricultural production, even more so for farmers of control villages (Table 24).
Table 24 - Most Important Positive Factors Affecting Agricultural Production
40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% e s g d r fall lize in tora abour a L /S ty see Ferti reparation R g li p stin Qua Land Harve
FFS FFS not member CV
92% of the sample hired labour for wages at some time of the year, of which 52% hired less than 30 person/days annually with no significant difference between subgroups.
The survey measured rice production and sale on their own farm plots among respondents over three years. Since the question did not take into account the size of land holdings, conclusions can only be drawn from the movement of group totals over time. Table 8 shows that rice production started from a higher base among FFS farmers, which is not surprising given that production potential was one of the factors that may have governed their initial selection. While all three groups showed increased rice production over time, and especially in 2006, it is noteworthy that production in the FFS villages as a whole (members and non- members) moved in parallel and increased more than Control Villages, particularly in 2006. However, FFS farmers sold considerably more of their production than the other two groups. In all years and groups, sale of rice was from 15-20% of total production, with FFS farmers at the higher end compared to the other groups.
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Table 25 - Rice Production by Subgroup, 2004-2006 (kgs per respondent)
900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2004 2005 2006
FFS Non FFS CV
Table 26 - Rice Sale by Subgroup, 2004-2006 (kgs per respondent)
180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2004 2005 2006
FFS Non FFS CV
Rice farming is the main source of income for 29% of men and 22% of women overall., Other crops (including vegetables, cocoa, coffee and cassava) are main source of cash income for 68% of FFS women farmers, thus indicating less reliance on rice farming than any other group (Table 27). Rice is the main source of cash income for 28% of FFS farmers and for 22- 23% of other farmers (Table 28). Wage labour is often done by non-FFS members in FFS villages, which confirmed observations that non-FFS farmers are often hired to work in FFS plots.
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Table 27 – Major Sources of Cash Income, by Gender
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% Rice farming -Women Rice farming-Men Another crop -Women Another crop -Men
CV FFS not member FFS member
Table 28 – Major Sources of Cash Income, by Group
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% Rice Another Livestock Fishing Artisanal Wage farming crop activities labour
FFS FFS -not member CV
Table 29 below shows how much food consumption was met through food purchase and production in 2005 and 2006. In 2005 own production was the most important source of food with FFS being more self-sufficient than other groups, especially in Bo, Bombali, Kono and Pujehun. In 2006 farmers overall were more self sufficient, with own production increasing by
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an average of 4% per FFS farmers, (8% increase in Pujehun and 6% increase in Bo and Kailahun) and 6% per Control Villages. For non FFS Farmers of FFS Villages the average increase highly changes among districts with a decrease in production in own production in Pujehun district. In Kailahun Non FFS farmers significantly improve their conditions from 2005 to 2006 , being able to meet 66% of their food consumption through own production in 2006 compared to 59% of 2005.
Table 29 - Food Consumption and Purchase by District, 2005-2006
2005 2006
FFS Non-FFS CV FFS Non FFS CV
OP FP OP FP OP FP OP FP OP FP OP FP
Bo 58% 42% 50% 50% 52% 48% 64% 36% 69% 31% 67% 33%
Bombali 76% 24% 53% 47% 52% 48% 59% 41% 58% 42% 49% 51%
Kailahun 61% 39% 59% 41% 79% 21% 75% 25% 66% 34% 80% 20%
Kambia 60% 40% 56% 44% 58% 42% 52% 48% 51% 49% 70% 30%
Kono 82% 18% 82% 18% 78% 22% 91% 9% 79% 21% 79% 21%
Pujehun 60% 40% 71% 29% 55% 45% 70% 30% 49% 51% 69% 31% OP = Own production; FP= Food purchase
There were higher percentages of farmers in FFS villages who market at least some of their production (Table 30) with no significant difference between men and women (89% for men and 88% for women). A higher percentage of men (40%) market their agricultural production in their own villages than women (35%). Control village farmers market more in their own villages (40%) than FFS farmers (35%). It was found that FFS farmers marketing outside their villages travel an average distance of 23 km to market their production.
FFS farmers more often than other groups more cited difficulties in marketing their production (81%), probably because they have more production to market (Table 31). The greatest difficulty cited was transport, followed by storage and low prices (Table 32).
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Table 30 - Percentages of Farmers Marketing at least some of their Production, by Group
93%
92%
91%
90%
89%
88%
87%
86%
85%
84%
83% FFS FFS not members CV
%of farmers marketing their production
Table 31 - Difficulties in Marketing Production, by Group
82%
80%
78%
76%
74%
72%
70%
68%
66%
64%
62% FFS FFS-not members CV
% of farmers having difficulties in marketing their production
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Table 32 - Specific Marketing Difficulties, by Group
Transport
Storage
Low prices
Time/labour
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
FFS FFS-Not member CV
In the last two years, FFS farmers adopted more frequently improved seed varieties and new crops than other subgroups. The diversification of agricultural production is a major benefit of FFS participation. New crops cultivated included most often cassava, followed by vegetables and groundnuts.
Table 33 - Adoption of Improved Seed Varieties and New Crops in 2005-06
70%
60%
50%
40% use of improved seed varieties use of improved crops 30%
20%
10%
0% CV FFS(not FFS (member) member)
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The survey looked into membership in other types of farmers’ groups, such as Farmers’ Associations (FA) and Agricultural Business Units (ABU) (Table 34). Control village farmers had a somewhat higher level of ABU membership than FFS villages. The benefit of FA most often cited was group labour, while the main benefits perceived of ABU membership was the improved access to seed rice and business training. The main difficulties mentioned had to do with leadership and lack of transparency, which in the case of ABUs was likely a reference to unclear loan repayment obligations.
Table 34 - Membership in Farmers’ Associations and Agricultural Business Units
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% FFS FFS-not members CV
% of farmers who belong to a farmers'Association %of farmers who belong to ABU
Farmers who were members of FFS were surveyed about the frequency of attendance at sessions. Overall, 60% attended between 91 and 100% of the group meetings. However, it was clear that women have greater difficulties to attend. Some 9% of women and 3% of men attended less than 50% of FFS sessions (Table 35).
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Table 35 - Attendance of FFS Sessions by Gender
70%
60%
50%
40% Women Men 30%
20%
10%
0% <50% 51-90% 91-100%
There was no significant difference between men and women in terms of reasons for joining FFS groups. The great majority (89%) joined to improve agricultural practices and because they expected to receive inputs (75%).
Table 36 – Reasons for Joining FFS
Better agricultural 89 practices
Receive inputs 75
%of respondents 0-100 scale
Social reasons 20
Savings-credit 4 schemes
0 20 40 60 80 100
Among the activities undertaken by FFS, women indicated participation in experiments with new crops and fertilizer slightly more than men (Table 37).
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However, only 57% of women participated in group savings and credit, compared to 71% of men. Women were similarly less likely than men to receive a loan (15%, compared to 23% of men). Women appeared to have less information about these activities. The majority of loans was for Le 5000 or less but a few were for significantly higher amounts (see Table 21) Loans were used for (in order) to pay school fees, to buy agricultural inputs and to buy food. Other reasons cited were to pay for medical treatments, transport, petty trading and funerals. At the time of the survey, 50% of the farmers had fully repaid their loan and 22% partly. There is no significant gender difference in repayment.
Table 37 - Participation in FFS Activities by Gender
Group savings
Experiments with fertilizer
Experiments with new varieties
Experiments with plant protection methods
Training in small scale irrigation
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Women Men
Table 38 - Amount of Money (in Le) per Loan Received by Gender
160
140
120
100
F 80 M 60
40
20
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 No 0 0 00 00 00 00 5000 8000 0 0 0 0 0 0 10000 20000 25000 30000 3600 4000 4500 4600 5000 6 7 0 5 5 0 1 1 4 5
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Overall, 90% of FFS farmers stated that they had initiated new farming practices as a result of their participation in FFS. The most significant were the introduction of new crops and varieties and crop rotations. Other agricultural practices cited were line planting and crop spacing, creation of nurseries and aquaculture. There were some gender differences as women were more likely than men to adopt new crop rotations while men were more likely to adopt irrigation practices (Table 39).
Table 39 - New Farming Practices Initiated as a Result of FFS Participation – by Gender
Irrigation
Crop rotation
New crops and improved varieties
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Women Men
A small percentage (11% of men and 6% of women) was not willing to adopt farming practices learned in FFS. Of the practices cited, farmers were most reluctant to adopt fertilizer application and row planting. Main reasons were the lack of cash for inputs, followed by the lack of labour and non-availability locally of inputs.
Lessons learned through FFS are communicated to persons outside the family by 91% of FFS farmers, which is a major contributing factor to overall production gains in FFS villages cited previously. Benefits of FFS participation on food production are recognized by 89% of FFS participants. Among the most successful practices introduced were row planting, appropriate spacing, bed preparation, timely planting, compost and crop protection techniques. Input availability through FFS was cited as a factor in increased production by 34% of respondents, i.e. it was far less significant than the improved practices.
The overall quality of FFS facilitation was found to be high with 83% of farmers believing that facilitators adequately supported the FFS.
Non-FFS farmers living in a FFS village generally were aware of the FFS (87% were familiar with them), compared to 44% of farmers in Control Villages who knew about them. Non-FFS farmers stated most often that FFS were aimed at improving agricultural practices and doing
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group farming, thus confirming a basic understanding of what FFS are about. A total of 44% of non-FFS farmers in FFS villages and 7% in Control Villages stated that they had tried to join an FFS. Reasons cited for not being able to join included that groups were full or the respondents had a physical obstacle: they were sick, handicapped, or lactating and pregnant women.
Already a spillover effect from FFS to non-FFS farmers is evident. Some 61% of farmers stated that they had visited FFS plots and of those, 60% had experimented with practices on their own farms. Practices cited included row planting, bed preparation, crop rotation, and cultivation of other crops like cassava. Of these, 54% are continuing the practices seen.
Overall Conclusions of the FFS Impact Studies
FFS have proven a successful means to increase food production and food security within communities. Their reliance on improved agricultural practices, the majority of which can be practiced without additional external inputs (e.g. production and use of compost, row planting, crop rotation) are a major strength. Because of local traditions of group work and help, FFS as practiced in Sierra Leone (with large group plots) are particularly appropriate.
FFS farmers in Sierra Leone have access to more and better land and are often selected because of these characteristics: their average production is higher from the start. More vulnerable individuals (disabled, sick persons, pregnant or lactating women) tend to be excluded from the groups. This, together with the limited possibilities of expanding the membership or number of FFS within a community, contributes to create jealousy sometimes between members and non-members. Especially in Sierra Leone with a high number of disabled, opening up groups to more vulnerable individuals would seem desirable.
FFS are beneficial to women farmers and they adopt improved agricultural practices as often as men. However FFS in Sierra Leone are not sufficiently gender sensitive. Meetings are not organized taking into account women’s availability, and access to credit, and loans is more difficult than for men. A strategy is required to address women’s needs and constraints in order to improve their participation to FFS.
The attempts to improve marketing opportunities (e.g. linkage to ABU, the distribution of processing machines and trycicles) did not yield any significant result. On the contrary, perhaps due to their higher levels of production, FFS members report greater difficulties than other farmers with post harvest losses and marketing. This would need to be addressed in the future.
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Annex 7
Projects Reviewed by the Evaluation 1
Emergency
Primarily Seeds & Tools Distribution
OSRO/SIL/101/SWE Emergency Provision of Basic Food Production Inputs to War- Affected Farmers OSRO/SIL/102/HCR Emergency Assistance for the Reintegration of Sierra Leonean Returnees OSRO/SIL/104/NOR Emergency Assistance for the Reintegration and Resettlement of Returnees, Internally Displaced Persons, Host Communities and Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone OSRO/SIL/201/SWE Emergency Provision of Essential Agricultural Inputs to War- Affected Farmers in Sierra Leone OSRO/SIL/202/HCR Emergency Assistance for the Reintegration of Sierra Leonean Returnees OSRO/SIL/203/NOR Support to Women’s Household Food Security OSRO/SIL/205/NET Urgent Provision of Agricultural Assistance in Kono and Kailahun Districts OSRO/SIL/301/SWE Emergency Provision of Agricultural Inputs to Returnees and Resettled Farmers in the Eastern and Northern Regions of Sierra Leone OSRO/SIL/302/HCR Urgent Agricultural Assistance to Support the Care and Maintenance Needs of Liberian Refugee Farmers OSRO/SIL/402/EC Agricultural Support to Liberian Refugees and Host Communities TCP/SIL/0166 Emergency Agricultural Rehabilitation Assistance to Ex- Combatants and Host Communities TCP/SIL/0167 Emergency Support to Quality Seed Production TCP/SIL/0168 Urgent Provision of Seeds and Tools to War-Affected Farmers
1 Telefood excluded
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Others
OSRO/SIL/105/NET Emergency Rehabilitation of Artisanal Blacksmithery in Sierra Leone OSRO/SIL/204/USA Support to the Coordination of Agricultural Activities OSRO/SIL/303/IRE Rehabilitation of the Agricultural Marketing Infrastructure OSRO/SIL/304/IRE Livestock Rehabilitation (short-term action plan on village level restocking small ruminants, pigs and poultry) OSRO/SIL/401/SWE Emergency Agricultural Support to Youth Engagement and Employment in Sierra Leone UNTS/SIL/001/AID Awareness for Village Agriculture Extension Workers in Sierra Leone TCP/SIL/2903 Emergency Assistance for the Reintegration of War-Handicapped and Other Disabled Persons
Development
GCP/SIL/022/GER Support to Sierra Leone for Establishment of a Right to Food Secretariat and Coordination Committee for Coordination of Efforts in the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food GCP/SIL/023/GER Development of a Sustainable Seed Programme in Sierra Leone GCP/SIL/024/GER Support to Operation Feed The Nation GCP/SIL/026/IRE Provision of Seed Rice for Expanding Production in 2005 in Support of Food Security GCP/RAF/389/GER Identification of Export Opportunities for Farmer Groups of Low- Income West African Countries in the Markets for Certified Fair Trade and Organic Products GCP/RAF/404/GER Increasing Incomes of Small Farmers through Exports of Organic and Fair Trade Tropical Products TCP/SIL/2801 Support to Veterinary Laboratories: Advance Allocation TCP/SIL/2804 & Agricultural Sector Review and Formulation of Agricultural 2904 Development Strategy TCP/SIL/2905 Assistance in the Preparation of a Medium-Term Investment Programme and Formulation of Bankable Projects in Support to the CAADP Implementation TCP/SIL/3001 Post-emergency Accelerated Capacity-Building for Upscaling Operation Feed the Nation TCP/SIL/2802 & TCP Facility for FAO Representatives 3002
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Annex 8
List of Persons Contacted
FAO Headquaters, Rome Ms. Fatouma Djama Seid, Emergency Operations Officer Ms. Cora Dankers, Technical Officer, GCP/RAF/404/GER Mr. Pascal Liu, Commodity Specialist Mr. Materne Maetz, Senior Agricultural Policy Support Officer Mr. John Markie, Chief, Evaluation Service Mr. Thomas Muenzel, Agricultural Economist, Investment Centre Mr. Goolam Oodally, Agricultural Engineer Mr. Thomas Osborn, Seeds Officer Ms. Suzanne Raswant, Senior Planning Officer
Mr. Andrew Macmillan, retired, Ex-Director Field Programme Division, TCOD
FAO Africa Regional Office and West Africa Sub-regional Office, Accra/Ghana Mr. Madhy Bamba, Senior Policy Officer Mr. Dieudonne Koguiyada, Senior Country Projects Officer Mr. John Moehl, Regional Aquaculture Officer Mr. B. Mulonda-Kalende, Aquaculture Officer Mr. Robert van Otterdijk, Agro-industries and Post-Harvest Systems Officer Mr. Thomas Palmer, Senior Planning Officer Mr. Fernando Salinas, Forestry Officer Mr. Moïse Sonou, Senior Water Development Officer Mr. Edouard K. Tapsoba, Deputy Regional Representative for Africa, Sub-Regional Co-ordinator for West Africa, FAOR Ghana Mr. L. Thombiano, Senior Soils Officer
FAO Representation, Freetown/Sierra Leone Mr. Aloysius Lahai, Deputy FAOR Mr. Adrian Buchanan-Brown, Administrative Officer Mr. Felix Mathenge, CTA, GCP/SIL/023/GER Mr. Jack Jalloh, National Coordinator OFTN/FFS Mr. Joe Amara, National Consultant, School Gardens
Mr. Mohammed Farah, retired, Ex-FAOR SIL (till Aug. 2006)
*****************
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS) Hon. Minister, Dr. Sama S. Monde Hon. Deputy Minister 1, Francis Ngebeh Hon. Deputy Minister 2, John K. Sesay
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All Heads of Departments / Units and Administration
Dr. Abdullah Jallloh, Director, Institute of Agricultural Research Mr. Kamara, Acting Director, Rokupr Rice Research Station
Mr. Edward S. Dixon, Seed Centre Manager, Makeni, Bombali District Mr. S. Bangura, Production Assistant, Makeni Seed Centre Mr. Abdul Habib, Maintenance Officer, Thakoblo Varietal Maintenance Site
Mr. Sheik Kargbo, Seed Centre Manager, Seed Centre, Kobia Mr. Santigie Turay, Workshop Manager, Seed Centre, Kobia
Ministry of Finance Hon. Deputy Minister I, Joseph Kallon
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) Mr. A. B. C. Jones, Director of Fisheries Mr. Gbondo, Assistant Director of Fisheries Mr. A. A. Bangura, Coordinator, AfDB Fisheries Project
Ministry of Presidential Affairs Hon. Minister, Dr. Sesay
Members of Parliament Dr. Alusine A. Fofannah, Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights
Right to Food-Secretariat Mr. Raymond S. Komba, Assistant Executive Secretary
Donor Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) Mr. Sheka Bangura, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
National Commission for Democracy Mr. G. Coleridge-Taylor, Chairman
National Association of Farmers of Sierra Leone Mr. Murray Lamin, National Secretary General Mr. Andrew R.C.Conteh, Assistant National Secretary General
National Alliance against Hunger Mr. Francis Webber, Chairman
Lawyers Centre for Legal Assistance Mr. Abdu Icposowa, Coordinator for Reach out Training and Advocacy Unit,
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Pasaco Farmers Association, Makoth, Bombali District Mr. Andrew S. Conteh, Chairman Ms. Mariatu Turay, Coordinator Ms. Veronica I. Conteh, Agric. Coordinator Ms. Rachel Newbury, VSO, and other members
Telefood Project, Ogoo Farm Ms. Mariama Keita, Coordinator Mr. S. Yambasu, Extension Officer (MAFS) And a group of farmers
Telefood Project, Mama Beach, Tokeh Yamasaisu Youth Development Organization (A fishing Association)
Telefood Project, Newton, Koya Rural District Mr. Harding and Associates (Honey Bee Association)
MAFS, Bo District Mr. Kalloun, District Director of Agriculture
MAFS, Makeni, Bombali District Mr. Henry Kargbo, District Director of Agriculture (DDA) And other staff members. Messrs Brimah Jalloh, Gibril Amara, I Daramy and A. Koroma, Bombali Shebora Youth Committee
Local Administration, Bombali Shebora Chiefdom, Makeni, Bombali District PC Kassanga III and other Dignitaries
Mr. Henry Kargbo, District Director of Agriculture, Bombali District
Mr. Eric Dura Sesay, Chairman, Food Security Coordinating Committee
Farmer Field School (FFS), Magbenty, Bombali District Mr. Amadu Sesay, Coordinator and other members
Kpeya Farmers Association, Kenema Mr. Ibrahim Moseray, Manager
MAFS, Koinadugu District Mr. Raymond Komoba Bindi, Chief Administrator, Koinadugu District Council and other members of the Koinadugeu District Food Security Coordination Committee Dr. Jalloh, Veterinary Service, Kabala Koinadugu Women Vegetable Grower Association, Kabala
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MAFS, Moyamba District Mr. B. J. Bangura, District Director of Agriculture
Farmer Field School (FFS), Tonkolili District Mr. Joseph M. Gborie, Community Facilitator, Farmer Field Schools Mr. Jenneh S. Kawo, Community Facilitator, Farmer Field Schools Mr. Tambo Alpha Tarawallie, Farmer Field School Coordinator Mr. Anthony M. Saffa, Farmer Field School Coordinator
Mr. John Amadu Serry, Chairman, Tonkolili District Council and other members of the Tonkolili District Food Security Coordinating Committee
*****************
AfDB-Agriculture Sector Rehabilitation (ASREP) and IFAD-Rehabilitation and Community-Based Poverty Reduction (RCPRP) Projects Mr. Joost Gwinner, Project Manager Mr. Paul Koroma, Deputy Project Manager Mr. Sheku Kamara, Civil Engineer Ms. C. Sandy-Magao, Economist Mr. Foday S. Kanu, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
CORAD (Africare, CARE, CRS, World Vision) Mr. Oscar Maroto, CRS Mr. John Perry, Care International Mr. Tom Robert, World Vision
European Commission (EC) Mr. Matthias Reusing, Head, Rural Development Unit Mr. Mattia, Development Officer
GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) Ms. Saloua Nour, Programme Manager, Freetown Mr. Karlheinz Eyrich, Food Security and Rehablitation Project, Kenema
UNAIDS Mr. Leopold Zekeng, Country Coordinator
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Ms. Nancy Asangah, Country Director, UNDP (FAOR a.i.) Mr. Graham Chipande, Senior Economist Mr. Sam Harbour, Economic Adviser
World Bank (WB) Mr. Engilbert Gudmundsson, Country Director
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World Food Programme (WFP) Mr. Felix B. F. Gomez, Country Director Mr. Lansana Wonneh, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
135