Privacy as a precondition to social protection: On why there is a need to conceptualise privacy from a Marxist perspective Mehek Vajawatt Msc, International Migration and Public Policy programme, Class of 2020, London School of Economics and Political Science Photo by Adrien Olichon on Pexels Photo cropped and modified to black and white ABSTRACT Concerns about privacy and its ambit have never been higher than they are today, in a post-Snowden and post-Cambridge Analytica world. These concerns bring to mind a quote from Franzen written in 1998 – “On closer examination, though, privacy proves to be the Cheshire cat of values: not much substance, but a very winning smile” (Franzen, 1998). It is interesting that ‘privacy’ as normative value is held as a ‘requisite of freedom’ (Douglas, 1952) and essential for ‘an autonomous life’ (Delaney and Carolan, 2008) while the contents of privacy are dismissed for being chimerical. Thus, the value attributed to the ‘right to privacy’ is far greater than the value attributed individually to ‘contents of privacy.’ This difference in normative values allows intrusions into ‘contents of privacy’ justifiable on grounds of a higher norm such as public interest or national security. Having contextualised the debate, I argue in my essay for an alternative conception of privacy, based on Karl Marx. Marxian ideology allows us to take seriously the critique of individualistic privacy notions as well as critically analyse the power imbalances of control and access of a State vis-à-vis an individual. In this essay, I engage with these chimerical characteristics of privacy; examining in the first half its liberal basis and its limitations. In the second half I present a Marxist critique of liberal notions of privacy and an alternative view of privacy. In this analysis, I examine challenges to building state capacity at global, national and regional levels in data protection and governance. The essay concludes with a renewed call for an examination of the liberal basis of privacy and to redefine privacy as a social, collective right instead of an individual one. [Privacy as a precondition to social protection: On why there is a need to conceptualise privacy from a Marxist perspective] INTRODUCTION Concerns about privacy and its ambit have never been higher than they are today, in a post-Snowden and post-Cambridge Analytica world. Headlines bemoaning erosions of privacy have become common, followed most often with politicians declaring renewed efforts to protect privacy (Fuchs, 2011). In this cat and mouse game of erosion and protection of privacy, it loses its substantive meaning while having a winning smile (Franzen, 1998). The implications of loss of privacy have never been greater than today where every aspect of life has become entangled in a digital web of interconnectedness. All too often ‘the right to privacy is neglected as governments around the world (often in tandem with companies) rush to introduce new technologies in social protection systems’ (Collander, 2019). By embedding technology without adequate protection into systems meant to provide socio-economic rights, people at their most vulnerable at faced with a no-choice trade-off. They are to accept increasing surveillance and intrusion into their lives in order to assert their socio-economic rights such as right to food, housing and education and access social security and protection schemes (Collander, 2019). Today, systems and social protection have become reliant on collection and processing of vast amount of personal data and surveillance online and offline. In an automated world, opaque infrastructure and systems are hidden behind other normative ideals that compete with and erode right to privacy. This begs the question – what can be done? Does Marxist ideology help us resolve some key challenges in how we think about privacy as championed in liberal democracies? What does privacy look like in such a world? In this essay, I first engage with these Cheshire characteristics of privacy; the concept of privacy is examined from the perspective of various scholars who have attempted to define and refine the notions of privacy. Second, I analyse the criticism 285 THE PUBLIC SPHERE | 2021 ISSUE of an individualistic notion of privacy and study its limitations. This is done through the purview of consent and surveillance. Consent forms the basis by which individuals use, distribute or divulge personal information about themselves in the public sphere. Surveillance is used to examine the erosion of consent when privacy is weighed against normative values of public good such as safety, security or public good. Subsequently, the second half of the essay examines a Marxist critique of liberal notions of privacy. This approach is especially utilised to uncover the role of exploitation, inequality, class struggles and commodification of the personal information that is pervasive in the liberal notions of privacy. Finally, an alternative view of privacy is put forward based on a social conception of privacy. Wikipedia and WT.Social serve as examples of this alternative view of privacy. Conceiving contents of privacy as a collective right rather than self-possession allows individuals to seize the ‘power’ from states that seek to intrude upon privacy. The intrusion is no longer framed as good-of-one versus good-of-all. Contents of privacy are no longer choppable or parcelled among different rights. It is a single collective right claimed by the members of the society. The essay concludes with a renewed call for an examination of the liberal basis of privacy and to redefine privacy as a social, collective right instead of an individual one. I leave this introduction with words from Mario Savio’s ‘operation of the machine speech’ (Pacifica Radio Archives, 2007) given in support of the Free Speech Movement in 1964: “Well, I ask you to consider: If this is a firm, and if the board of regents are the board of directors; and if President Kerr in fact is the manager; then I’ll tell you something. The faculty are a bunch of employees, and we’re the raw material! But we’re a bunch of raw materials that don’t mean to be—have any process upon us. Don’t mean to be made into any product. Don’t mean ... Don’t mean to end up being bought by some clients of the University, be they the 286 [Privacy as a precondition to social protection: On why there is a need to conceptualise privacy from a Marxist perspective] government, be they industry, be they organized labor, be they anyone! We’re human beings! There’s a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can’t take part! You can’t even passively take part! And you’ve got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels ... upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you’ve got to make it stop! And you’ve got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you’re free, the machine will be prevented from working at all!” THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY Academic labour has diverged and converged in defining the concept of privacy. Professor Fuchs provides a comprehensive overview of the dominant ideas in the typology of definitions of privacy (Fuchs, 2011). He begins with the definition advanced by Habermas which modelled privacy as a relation between private and public spheres of a modern society. It was based on the idea that privacy distinguishes between what is visible and what is hidden. Gormley discerns privacy as the ability of an individual to self-determine and regulate information about themselves. Mills argued of privacy as some space in human existence that was sacred and entrenched from authoritative intrusion. Solove further distinguishes privacy as protection from the Big Brother and control over information use. Privacy was to be understood as a matter of pragmatism. These scholars build upon Brandeis and Warren’s famous definition of privacy as the ‘right to be let alone’ (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Written as a critique against the prevalent tabloid journalistic practices of their time, privacy was meant to be invoked as a protection of the individual from external scrutiny. Right to be let alone was to be an umbrella right of protection against intrusion into the personal. The scale and extent of this protection was dependant on the context, and 287 THE PUBLIC SPHERE | 2021 ISSUE privacy extended as necessary. The normative value of privacy for Brandeis and Warren was greater than the content of personal life it sought to protect. Schoeman, Gavinson, Sewell and Barker, Allen and Burk (Fuchs 2011, 143) conceived privacy as the restricted access and limited control of others in inquiring into personal affairs of an individual. They explicitly linked the basis of privacy to the liberal school of thought. Mills, Brandeis and Warren conceive of privacy as an umbrella or a circle around an individual which is only penetrable at the discretion of the individual. Solove (2002), on the other hand conceives right to privacy as essentially a catch-all horizontal term for different but related practices. While these definitions differ in content and substantive meaning, what is common is that privacy is an individualistic, moral right. It is up to the individual to determine what is personal and private, and what is disclosed and thus, public (Moor, 1997). Privacy can hence be varied by the individual at different times and different places. Fuchs points to the most prominent privacy theory of this kind, which was postulated by Alan Westin. Westin defined privacy as the “claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” (Westin, 1967, p.