Sri Lanka's North I: the Denial of Minority Rights
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SRI LANKA’S NORTH I: THE DENIAL OF MINORITY RIGHTS Asia Report N°219 – 16 March 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. A LEGACY OF WAR AND DESTRUCTION ............................................................... 3 A. THE NORTH DURING THE WAR .................................................................................................... 3 B. THE FINAL TOLL IN THE NORTH ................................................................................................... 4 1. Property damage, theft and loss ................................................................................................... 4 2. The dead and missing ................................................................................................................... 5 3. The population question ............................................................................................................... 7 III. MILITARY RULE: CONTROLLING THE POPULATION ...................................... 8 A. REGISTRATION AND SURVEILLANCE ............................................................................................ 9 B. MONITORING OF “REINTEGRATED” LTTE SUSPECTS AND EX-COMBATANTS ............................. 10 C. CURRENT ROLE OF TAMIL PARAMILITARIES .............................................................................. 12 D. THE SHARP END OF MILITARY RULE: VIOLENCE, REPRESSION OF DISSENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS .................................................................................................... 13 E. THE QUIET BEFORE THE STORM? ............................................................................................... 16 IV. SINHALISATION: POWER, CULTURE AND DEMOGRAPHY ........................... 17 A. SINHALISATION AS AN EFFECT OF MILITARISATION ................................................................... 17 B. POPULATION MOVEMENTS: CHANGING THE FACTS ON THE GROUND? ....................................... 19 1. Mannar-Madhu Road ................................................................................................................. 20 2. Vavuniya .................................................................................................................................... 20 3. The resurrection of the Mahaweli scheme and renewed colonisation in Manal Aru/Weli Oya ............................................................................................................................. 22 V. CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: MUSLIMS RETURN TO THE NORTH ................................................................................................................... 26 A. DIFFICULT RETURN .................................................................................................................... 26 B. POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND FORCED RETURN?..................................................................... 28 VI. LAND POLICY AND THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT ............................................................................................................... 30 VII. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS .............................. 32 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 35 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA ......................................................................................................................... 36 B. MAP OF SRI LANKA’S NORTHERN PROVINCE ................................................................................... 37 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 38 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009 ......................................................... 39 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 41 Asia Report N°219 16 March 2012 SRI LANKA’S NORTH I: THE DENIAL OF MINORITY RIGHTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Deepening militarisation and the lack of accountable claimed by Tamil nationalists and fought for by the guer- governance in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province are prevent- rilla. Tamil demands for self-rule in the north (together ing a return to normal life and threaten future violence. with the now multi-ethnic east) have been bitterly con- Scene of the most bitter fighting in the civil war, the tested by many Sinhalese; the failure to grant regional au- Tamil-majority north remains under de facto military oc- tonomy gave birth to demands for a separate state and led cupation, with all important policies set by Sinhala offi- to civil war. While the conflict continued, large portions cials in Colombo. The slow but undeniable movement of of the north functioned as a refuge for Tamils fleeing vio- Sinhala settlers into the fringes of the north and other lence and discrimination in Sinhala-majority areas in the forms of government-supported “Sinhalisation” are reig- south, while also putting them under the control of the to- niting a sense of grievance and weakening chances for a talitarian LTTE. Some 75,000 Tamil-speaking Muslims real settlement with Tamil and other minority parties to expelled from the north by the movement in 1990 – now devolve power. The international community, especially grown to as many as 200,000 – remain displaced from those governments and aid agencies supporting the recon- their homes and lands. struction of the area, should demand a fundamental change of course and should structure their assistance so as to en- Deepening militarisation of the province presents a threat courage the demilitarisation and democratisation of the to long-term peace and stability. Far in excess of any le- former war zone and full respect for minority rights. gitimate need to protect against an LTTE revival, the mil- itarisation of the north is generating widespread fear and With the massive number of troops in the north have anger among Tamils: indeed, the strategy being executed come various forms of Sinhalisation. The almost entirely runs the risk of inadvertently resurrecting what it seeks to Tamil-speaking north is now dotted with Sinhala sign- crush once and for all – the possibility of violent Tamil boards, streets newly renamed in Sinhala, monuments to insurrection. The construction of large and permanent Sinhala war heroes, and even a war museum and battle- military cantonments, the growing involvement of the fields that are open only to Sinhalese. Sinhala fishermen military in agricultural and commercial activities, the sei- and businessmen are regularly given advantages not ac- zure of large amounts of private and state land, and the corded to Tamils. The slow but steady movement of Sinha- army’s role in determining reconstruction priorities are all la settlers along the southern edges of the province, often serious concerns. They are discussed in a companion re- with military and central government support and some- port, Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military. times onto land previously farmed or occupied by Tamils, is particularly worrying. These developments are consistent This report examines how effective military control over with a strategy – known to be supported by important of- the civil administration as well as control and surveillance ficials and advisers to the president – to change “the facts of civil society, along with government-supported Sin- on the ground”, as has already happened in the east, and halisation, has undermined many of the expected benefits make it impossible to claim the north as a Tamil-majority from an end to the war. Enforced disappearances, violent area deserving of self-governance. crackdowns on protestors in various towns and extrajudi- cial punishments have shown the sharper edge of military The Northern Province has been at the centre of a half- policing and revealed the deep mistrust on both sides of century of ethnic conflict. Comprising the Jaffna peninsu- the civil-military and Tamil-Sinhala divides. la and the Vanni region, the latter largely controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from the Continued Sinhalisation and militarisation of the north 1990s until 2009, the province bore the brunt of the 25 threaten to render pointless the stalled negotiations on de- years of war that came to a bloody end in May 2009, with volution between the government and the Tamil National up to 40,000 civilians killed and the military defeat of the Alliance (TNA), the clear favourite among Tamil voters in LTTE. The north constitutes the core of the homeland the north after victories in parliamentary and local govern- ment elections. Despite strong pressure from the Indian Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Minority Rights Crisis Group Asia Report N°219, 16 March 2012 Page ii and U.S. governments, the government of President Ma- hinda Rajapaksa shows little inclination to offer any tan- gible devolution of power to the north (or the multi-ethnic east); even the limited powers legally devolved to provin- cial councils under the current constitution are not in prac- tice shared. In the absence of a functioning provincial council – despite repeated government promises of early elections – the north is ruled directly by the governor, a retired