Consistency of Principle in Corporate Insolvency
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Consistency of Principle in Corporate Insolvency by Rizwaan Jameel Mokal (Contact Author) Lecturer in Laws University College London Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens London WC1H 0EG England 1 Dedication To my parents, Prof. Shabnam Iqbal and Prof. Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Khan Mokal: everything good there is, I owe to them. And to my brother Sultaan. 2 Abstract The objective of this thesis is to produce a systematic and principled study of the theory of some of the most important aspects of English corporate insolvency law. It aims to present this body of law as a coherent whole, stemming from common fundamental principles, and amenable to being justified or criticised on that basis. At a high level of abstraction, the principle which is argued to underlie the law governing corporate insolvency is that all the parties affected by it are to be regarded as worthy of equal care and concern. This implies that equal attention and respect must be accorded to the interests of them all. To the extent that it succeeds in being egalitarian in this way, the law is fair and just. The argument draws on the work of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin to construct a framework within which the relevant rules and principles of insolvency law can be tested for compliance with this fundamental requirement. The argument is also very much alive to considerations of economic efficiency. The thesis consists of seven chapters. English insolvency law is of course very diverse and has evolved over a considerable period of time. It would be surprising if it did not reflect the influence of the numerous political and ideological struggles which would have been part of the legislative and judicial context at various stages of its development. Given this undeniable fact, the very notion that some common fundamental principles could be found woven into it as a whole has been questioned. The first chapter presents a way of understanding the project of the thesis, and thus of meeting this objection. The second chapter examines and criticises the Creditors’ Bargain, the best-known analytical and justificatory model in insolvency law. The third constructs an alternative (referred to as the Authentic Consent Model) while seeking to avoid the various shortcomings which it identifies in the Bargain and in other approaches extant in the literature. Chapters four, five, and six deploy the new Model alongside of economic analysis to examine three of the most basic features of English insolvency law, namely, the pari passu principle, the priority accorded to secured claims, and the liability of directors for wrongful trading. The seventh chapter concludes. 3 Table of Contents TITLE PAGE......................................................................FOUT! BLADWIJZER NIET GEDEFINIEERD. DEDICATION................................................................................................................................................ 2 ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................... 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................. 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.......................................................................................................................... 6 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION -- CONSISTENCY OF PRINCIPLE IN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY.............................................................................................................................................. 9 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 9 2. THE ROLE OF INSOLVENCY LAW IN SOCIETY ........................................................................................... 10 3. THE PLACE OF ‘EQUALITY’..................................................................................................................... 14 a. Liberty............................................................................................................................................... 17 b. Reasonableness................................................................................................................................. 19 c. Equality............................................................................................................................................. 19 4. COULD INSOLVENCY LAW REALLY BE CONSISTENT? .............................................................................. 21 5. CONSTRUCTIVE INTERPRETATION .......................................................................................................... 28 6. SOME COMMENTS ON THE ROLE OF EFFICIENCY ..................................................................................... 33 7. AN OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS................................................................................................................. 40 CHAPTER II: THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN AND THE COLLECTIVITY OF THE LIQUIDATION REGIME ......................................................................................................................... 45 1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 45 2. THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN .................................................................................................................... 47 3. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN..................................................................................... 50 4. CONSENT ............................................................................................................................................... 54 a. Mere preferences .............................................................................................................................. 55 b. Varieties of consent........................................................................................................................... 57 c. Time for the determination of self-interest ........................................................................................ 62 d. Level at which self-interest is to be reckoned ................................................................................... 62 5. THE NORMATIVE APPEAL OF THE EX ANTE POSITION .............................................................................. 65 6. THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN AS DESCRIPTION .......................................................................................... 73 7. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................................... 77 CHAPTER III: THE AUTHENTIC CONSENT MODEL -- JUSTIFYING THE COLLECTIVE LIQUIDATION REGIME ......................................................................................................................... 79 1. THE PLOT ............................................................................................................................................... 80 2. THE CAST............................................................................................................................................... 87 3. THE CHARACTERS .................................................................................................................................. 89 4. THE STAGE............................................................................................................................................. 91 a. Rationality......................................................................................................................................... 92 b. Dramatic Ignorance.......................................................................................................................... 93 c. The choice position ........................................................................................................................... 95 i. The claims of the unproductive ..................................................................................................................95 ii. What do the parties aim for?......................................................................................................................99 iii. The absence of “bargaining”?.................................................................................................................100 5. THE PERFORMANCE ............................................................................................................................. 105 6. THE DENOUEMENT............................................................................................................................... 109 7. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................ 114 4 CHAPTER IV: THE PARI PASSU PRINCIPLE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER METHODS OF INSOLVENCY DISTRIBUTION................................................................................ 116 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 116 2. THE MYTH OF PARI PASSU DISTRIBUTION.............................................................................................. 120 3. THE IMMUNITY/PRIORITY FALLACY.....................................................................................................