5.20.09Hearingtranscript

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

5.20.09Hearingtranscript THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN CONTINENTAL ASIA ON THE UNITED STATES HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION _________ May 20, 2009 _________ Printed for use of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission Available via the World Wide Web: www.uscc.gov UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION WASHINGTON : June 2009 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW, Chairman LARRY M.WORTZEL, Vice Chairman Commissioners: PETER T.R. BROOKES Hon. WILLIAM A. REINSCH DANIEL BLUMENTHAL DENNIS C. SHEA ROBIN CLEVELAND DANIEL M. SLANE JEFFREY FIEDLER PETER VIDENIEKS Hon. PATRICK A. MULLOY MICHAEL R. WESSEL KATHLEEN J. MICHELS, Associate Director The Commission was created on October 30, 2000 by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Public Law No. 106-398, 114 STAT. 1654A-334 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C.§ 7002 (2001), as amended by the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for 2002 § 645 (regarding employment status of staff) & § 648 (regarding changing annual report due date from March to June), Public Law No. 107-67, 115 STAT. 514 (Nov. 12, 2001); as amended by Division P of the "Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003," Pub L. No. 108-7 (Feb. 20, 2003) (regarding Commission name change, terms of Commissioners, and responsibilities of Commission); as amended by Public Law No. 109-108 (H.R. 2862) (Nov. 22, 2005) (regarding responsibilities of Commission and applicability of FACA); as amended by Division J of the “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,” Public Law No. 110-161 (December 26, 2007) (regarding responsibilities of the Commission, and changing the Annual Report due date from June to December). The Commission’s full charter is available at www.uscc.gov. ii June 22, 2009 The Honorable ROBERT C. BYRD President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510 The Honorable NANCY PELOSI Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515 DEAR SENATOR BYRD AND SPEAKER PELOSI: We are pleased to transmit the record of our May 20, 2009 public hearing on “The Impact of China’s Economic and Security Interests in Continental Asia on the United States.” The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act (amended by Pub. L. No. 109-108, section 635(a)) provides the basis for this hearing. In this hearing, witnesses told the Commission that the United States’ interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not necessarily incompatible with China’s, and that there may be opportunities for the United States to engage China in Continental Asia and encourage it to take a more active role in promoting peace, stability, and economic growth. China’s relationships in Central and South Asia have been longstanding, but recently it has refocused its efforts on expanding its commercial and energy interests there. As its economic stake in the region grows, its ability to influence security in the region is likely to grow commensurately, and witnesses urged the United States to engage China on promoting high standards for trade and investment that in turn give rise to good governance and improved human security. The Commission received testimony from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Schiffer, who noted that as the United States and China develop areas of common interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan, “[t]he challenge before us is to maximize the space for cooperation in pursuit of common interests, and safeguard against any negative impact resulting from areas of disagreement.” China’s overall approach to the region is to balance relations with all regional powers, including the United States and Russia, while at the same time seeking to advance its relative standing in the two countries. It does not appear currently to be seeking military capabilities to project power in the region. However, he noted that the United States must continue to track Chinese behavior in the region in the event that its military becomes more assertive in the future. Regarding Afghanistan, China’s interest in limiting extremism within its own Xinjiang Autonomous Region has resulted in support for U.S.-led efforts against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Deputy Assistant Secretary Schiffer noted that China also indirectly benefits from US and NATO forces providing security for key infrastructure and development projects in the region, which may include Chinese commercial ventures. However, these iii protections extend to all countries which have interests in key infrastructure in Afghanistan and there is no special deal for security of Chinese interests between the United States and China. Deputy Assistant Secretary Schiffer testified that investment will play as key a role as military security, and the United States wants China engaged as a partner in Afghanistan. However, he noted that China’s interests in Pakistan are different, as China and Pakistan have had a longstanding military and security relationship. He urged China to be open and transparent regarding its intentions for use of the Port of Gwadar in Baluchistan, and expansion of civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Furthering the discussion of China’s interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Dr. Walid Phares, director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, testified that China is in a “pre-9/11 mood,” not realizing the imminent danger it faces from a jihadi threat if peace is not secured in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This should be the impetus for China’s cooperation with the United States in this region. However, China views the two countries’ security through a broader lens. Mr. Abraham Denmark, a fellow at the Center for New American Security, explained that, “China sees Afghanistan and Pakistan as components of a broader struggle for dominance over South and Central Asia. China’s close relations with Pakistan are largely a check against India’s rise as a dominant power in South Asia….According to this logic, China benefits from an Afghanistan that is stable and friendly to Pakistan, because it allows Islamabad to focus on India.” He argued that stability in Pakistan is central to the United States’ and China’s approach to the region, and that China will benefit from realizing that stability in Pakistan will lead to enhanced regional security. Ms. Lisa Curtis, a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation concurred, and advised that the United States should “seek to convince China to play a responsible role with regard to its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, emphasizing the need to discourage nuclear-weapons stockpiling in a country facing the specter of further instability.” In the third and fourth panels of the hearing, the Commission examined China’s broader engagement in Continental Asia, including its trade and commercial ties. Given that the new U.S. strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan places so much weight on economic development, these panels explored how China’s economic interests may affect U.S. strategy, trade, and diplomacy in the region. Energy is one of the sectors for Chinese involvement in Central and South Asia. Ms. Julia Nanay, senior director of Country Strategies at PFC Energy, and Dr. Stephen Blank, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, both testified that China’s economic position as a cash-rich country with a growing demand for energy will make it a highly sought after business partner for countries seeking to develop their resources. With this relationship, Ms. Nanay noted, “China strengthens its energy security, while Central Asian countries diversify their export options and get investments and cash.” China is pursuing energy investments through the expansion of pipeline connections that will connect to China’s interior provinces. Dr. Blank explained that an increase in oil and gas supplies through pipelines eases China’s concerns about oil supplies relying on access to the Strait of Malacca, also known as China’s “Malacca dilemma.” iv China’s other commercial engagement in Central and South Asia is focused on securing access to natural resources. Dr. Martin Spechler, professor of Economics at Indiana University, testified that Central Asian nations have pursued an economic policy of “staple globalism,” which “involves state trading of exports and selective imports of capital goods.” In this region, China can and does conduct state-to-state trade through its state-owned enterprises. Dr. Spechler noted that even as trading relationships grow, Chinese exports to the region are unlikely to expand due to the difficulty and expense of transporting goods. Dr. Daniel Twining, senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, testified that China has made targeted investments in South Asia, primarily in weak states, and that the United States should consider the strategic impact of this investment. China’s investment in infrastructure, such as the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan, may give it access to strategic shipping lanes or land transportation routes. Furthermore, Dr. Twining argued that China’s military and security assistance may complicate U.S. diplomacy in the region. He noted that since 1990 the top three recipients of Chinese arms exports have been Pakistan, Burma, and Bangladesh. China’s trade and investment in Sri Lanka and Burma have not benefited human security in those countries. Dr. Twining argued, “Both Washington and New Delhi have a compelling interest in investing for the long term in the infrastructure of good governance and rule of law in [Sri Lanka and Burma] both for intrinsic reasons and because transparency and accountability will render them less susceptible to Chinese political influence.” Thank you for your consideration of this summary of the Commission’s hearing. We note that the full transcript of the hearing plus the prepared statements and supporting documents submitted by the witnesses can be found on the Commission’s website at www.uscc.gov, and that these can be searched by computer for particular words or terms.
Recommended publications
  • Myanmar Update April 2021 Report
    STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS & SANCTIONS IN MYANMAR APRIL 2021 REPORT Summary. This report reviews the April 2021 developments relating to human rights in Myanmar. Relatedly, it addresses the interchange between Myanmar’s reform efforts and the responses of the international community. I. Coup and Crackdown on Protests....................................................................................2 II. Political Developments......................................................................................................3 A. Rohingya Refugee Crisis................................................................................................3 B. Corruption.......................................................................................................................4 C. International Community / Sanctions...........................................................................4 III. Civil and Political Rights...................................................................................................6 A. Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Association............................................................6 B. Freedom of the Press and Censorship...........................................................................6 IV. Economic Development.....................................................................................................7 A. Economic Development—Legal Framework, Foreign Investment............................7 B. Economic Development—Infrastructure, Major Projects..........................................7
    [Show full text]
  • 9 European Countries Include Covishieldin
    https://www.facebook.com/centralchronicle CENTRAL CC PAGE 10 PAGE 11 Raipur, Friday, July 02, 2021 I Pages 12 I Price R 3.00 I City Edition I Fastest growing English Daily of Chhattisgarh www. centralchronicle.in BRIEF Akhil Gogoi walks free as court clears PM hails doctors’ contribution 9 European countries include him of all charges in saving lives from Covid Guwahati, Jul 01: New Delhi, Jul 01 (PTI): its people from coron- Covishield in ‘green pass’ Assam legislator avirus. A big credit for it Akhil Gogoi on Prime Minister goes to our hard working New Delhi, Jul 01: states may decide to extend Thursday walked Narendra Modi on doctors, healthcare workers this (the certificate) also to free after more Thursday hailed the contri- and front line workers," he Nine countries - Austria, EU travellers that received than a year-and- bution of doctors in saving said. Noting that the virus Germany, Slovenia, Greece, another vaccine". a-half in captivi- lives from coronavirus and is new and is mutating, the ty as a special Iceland, Ireland, Spain, Under these rules, asserted that his govern- prime minister said India's NIA court Estonia and Switzerland - Indians - vaccinated with ment gave paramount im- doctors, with their knowl- cleared him of all charges have cleared Serum Covishield or Covaxin - may portance to augmenting edge and experience, are under Unlawful Activities Institute of India's be subject to quarantine if healthcare infrastructure fighting the challenges (Prevention) Act for his alleged Covishield, sources said Janssen. Only those who they travel to the EU na- to combat the pandemic.
    [Show full text]
  • The Most Important Current Affairs August 2019
    The Monthly Hindu Review|Current Affairs|August 2019 The Most Important Current Affairs August 2019 Government announces Mega Merger of Union Bank of India, Andhra Bank and Corporation Public Sector Banks Bank are to be merged to become the 5th largest public sector bank with business of Rs 14.6 lakh Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has crore. announced a big consolidation of public sector Indian Bank will be merged with Allahabad Bank banks. Under the scheme of amalgamation, 10 public to become the 7th largest public sector bank sector banks are to be merged into four banks. After with business of Rs 8.08 lakh crore. the amalgamation, the total number of Public Sector The government has also announced capital infusion of Banks in the country will come down to 12 from 27 over Rs 55,000 crores into public sector banks: banks. PNB (Rs 16,000 crore), The amalgamation of banks will be in the following manner: Union Bank of India (Rs 11,700 crore), Punjab National Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce Bank of Baroda (Rs 7000 crore), and United Bank of India to be merged into one Indian Bank (Rs 2500 crore), single bank, with business of Rs 7.95 trillion to Indian Overseas Bank (Rs 3800 crore), make India’s 2nd largest bank. Central Bank (Rs 3300 crore), Canara Bank and Syndicate Bank are to be merged UCO Bank (Rs 2100 crore), to become the 4th largest public sector bank United Bank (Rs 1600 crore) and with business of Rs 15.2 lakh crore. Punjab and Sind Bank (Rs 750 crore).
    [Show full text]
  • DASHED HOPES the Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Myanmar WATCH
    HUMAN RIGHTS DASHED HOPES The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Myanmar WATCH Dashed Hopes The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Myanmar Copyright © 2019 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-36970 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org FEBRUARY 2019 ISBN: 978-1-6231-36970 Dashed Hopes The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Myanmar Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 5 I. Background ..................................................................................................................... 6 II. Section 66(d)
    [Show full text]
  • Myanmar and Southeast Asia by Barbara Crossette
    4 Myanmar and Southeast Asia by Barbara Crossette Supporters of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of Myanmar’s democracy movement, arrive for a campaign stop near Naypitaw, Myanmar, Mar. 5, 2012. They carry signs with her picture and that of her father, Aung San, founder of the Burmese army. (ADAM DEAN/THE NEW YORK TIMES/REDUX) HEN BURMA WON independence from Britain exporter to the world. Intellectual life was lively and cosmo- in 1948 it was a devastated country tormented politan, and its universities in Mandalay and Rangoon were Wby multiple crises. Geographical misfortune had among Asia’s best. Rangoon was a busy port and transporta- placed this otherworldly Buddhist nation in the path of pow- tion hub for Southeast Asia, a bridge between East and West. erful armies in World War II as Japan battled Western allies An important boon, from the Burmese nationalists’ point for control of the strategically placed country. Its capital of view, was the British decision in 1937 to separate Burma city, Rangoon, was heavily damaged; the old royal capital from Britain’s larger Indian Empire, which then stretched of Mandalay had been extensively destroyed by incendiary from the borders of treacherous Afghanistan to the sultry bombs. Oil wells and bridges had been taken out. Long- lowlands and hills of what would become Bangladesh. The standing ethnic conflicts surfaced when peace returned, Burmese were thus guaranteed their own place on the map fracturing the nation from within. Aung San, the hero of and were spared the possible fate of being swallowed up Burmese independence and the great hope for national unity and renewal, was dead, assassinated at the age of 32 at the BARBARA CROSSETTE, a member of the Foreign Policy behest of a rival, barely six months before the modern coun- Association editorial board, is a former chief New York try’s birth.
    [Show full text]
  • Burma Coup Watch
    This publication is produced in cooperation with Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Progressive Voice (PV), US Campaign for Burma (USCB), and Women Peace Network (WPN). BN 2021/2031: 1 Mar 2021 BURMA COUP WATCH: URGENT ACTION REQUIRED TO PREVENT DESTABILIZING VIOLENCE A month after its 1 February 2021 coup, the military junta’s escalation of disproportionate violence and terror tactics, backed by deployment of notorious military units to repress peaceful demonstrations, underlines the urgent need for substantive international action to prevent massive, destabilizing violence. The junta’s refusal to receive UN diplomatic and CONTENTS human rights missions indicates a refusal to consider a peaceful resolution to the crisis and 2 Movement calls for action confrontation sparked by the coup. 2 Coup timeline 3 Illegal even under the 2008 In order to avert worse violence and create the Constitution space for dialogue and negotiations, the 4 Information warfare movement in Burma and their allies urge that: 5 Min Aung Hlaing’s promises o International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 6 Nationwide opposition immediately freeze existing loans, recall prior 6 CDM loans and reassess the post-coup situation; 7 CRPH o Foreign states and bodies enact targeted 7 Junta’s violent crackdown sanctions on the military (Tatmadaw), 8 Brutal LIDs deployed Tatmadaw-affiliated companies and partners, 9 Ongoing armed conflict including a global arms embargo; and 10 New laws, amendments threaten human rights o The UN Security Council immediately send a 11 International condemnation delegation to prevent further violence and 12 Economy destabilized ensure the situation is peacefully resolved.
    [Show full text]
  • In Central Asia Seems to Be Connected Or Could Easily Be Connected with Its Efforts to Open up the Port of Gwadar
    Chinese Energy Policy in Central and South Asia Testimony of Professor Stephen J. Blank Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 Before the US-China Economiic and Security Review Commission, The Impact of China’s Economic and Security Intersts in Continental Asia on the United States May 20, 2009 Draft: not for citation or quotation without consent of the author The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or the US Government China has exploited the current global economic crisis to intensify and accelerate its previous strategy for obtaining energy security and political influence abroad. This strategy’s tactics are quite straightforward. Exploiting other countries’ and firms’ distress, using its enormous cash reserves, and benefitting from the fact that its economy appears to be less adversely affected than others have been, China, through its oil companies CNOOC, CNPC, Petro China, SINOPEC, or through governmental agencies, is either lending afflicted firms and countries (often the same since we are dealing with state energy firms) money to obtain long-term contracts, access to energy, and other comodities at below market prices if possible, and at the current low market prices where necessary. However, these are not new tactics specially crafted for the current crisis. Rather they are the same tactics that China employed earlier. But now they have much greater effect given the current crisis and the availability of so many properties from countries and firms afflicted by it. China’s economic activities abroad during this crisis are also not tied to energy alone.
    [Show full text]
  • Underneath the Autocrats South East Asia Media Freedom Report 2018
    UNDERNEATH THE AUTOCRATS SOUTH EAST ASIA MEDIA FREEDOM REPORT 2018 A REPORT INTO IMPUNITY, JOURNALIST SAFETY AND WORKING CONDITIONS 2 3 IFJ SOUTH EAST ASIA MEDIA FREEDOM REPORT IFJ SOUTH EAST ASIA MEDIA FREEDOM REPORT IFJ-SEAJU SOUTH EAST ASIA MEDIA SPECIAL THANKS TO: EDITOR: Paul Ruffini FREEDOM REPORT Ratna Ariyanti Ye Min Oo December 2018 Jose Belo Chiranuch Premchaiporn DESIGNED BY: LX9 Design Oki Raimundos Mark Davis This document has been produced by the International Jason Sanjeev Inday Espina-Varona Federation of Journalists (IFJ) on behalf of the South East Asia Um Sarin IMAGES: With special thanks Nonoy Espina Journalist Unions (SEAJU) Latt Latt Soe to Agence France-Presse for the Alexandra Hearne Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI) Sumeth Somankae use of images throughout the Cambodia Association for Protection of Journalists (CAPJ) Luke Hunt Eih Eih Tin report. Additional photographs are Myanmar Journalists Association (MJA) Chorrng Longheng Jane Worthington contributed by IFJ affiliates and also National Union of Journalist of the Philippines (NUJP) Farah Marshita Thanida Tansubhapoi accessed under a Creative Commons National Union of Journalists, Peninsular Malaysia (NUJM) Alycia McCarthy Phil Thornton Attribution Non-Commercial Licence National Union of Journalists, Thailand (NUJT) U Kyaw Swar Min Steve Tickner and are acknowledged as such Timor Leste Press Union (TLPU) Myo Myo through this report. 2 3 CONTENTS IFJ SOUTH EAST ASIA MEDIA FREEDOM REPORT 2018 IMPUNITY, JOURNALIST SAFETY AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA
    [Show full text]
  • Myanmar Dismantling Dissent Crackdowns on Internet Freedoms
    MYANMAR DISMANTLING DISSENT CRACKDOWNS ON INTERNET FREEDOMS Supported by: Myanmar Dismantling Dissent Crackdowns on Internet Freedoms 2021 Asia Centre Copyright © 2021 Asia Centre. All rights reserved. Permission Statement: No part of this report in printed or electronic form may be reproduced, transmitted or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without written permission of the Asia Centre. Copyright belongs to Asia Centre unless otherwise stated. Civil society organisations and educational institutions may use this report without requesting permission on the strict condition that such use is not for commercial purposes. When using or quoting this report, every reasonable attempt must be made to identify owners of the copyright. Errors or omissions will be corrected in subsequent editions. Requests for permission should include the following information: The title of the document for which permission to copy material is desired. A description of the material for which permission to copy is desired. The purpose for which the copied material will be used and the manner in which it will be used. Your name, title, company or organization name, telephone number, e-mail address and mailing address. Please send all requests for permission to: Asia Centre 128/183 Phayathai Plaza Building (17th Floor), Phayathai Road, Thung-Phayathai, Rachatewi, Bangkok 10400 Thailand [email protected] CONTENTS Acknowledgements v Abbreviations vi Executive Summary viii 1.Introduction 1 a.Methodology 1 b.Background
    [Show full text]
  • Religion Journal-2-5 BUR Update
    ၁၃၊ ၄၊ ၂၀၁၅ ၊ 1 Melissa Crouch ၊ 16 “ ” 34 Susan Hayward 49 Matthew J. Walton, Melyn McKay ၊ ၊ 68 ၊ 83 Benedict Rogers 100 - ၊ 111 - 115 Owen Frazer - 122 Tina L. Mufford ၀ 126 © 2015 (IGE)။ CETRA ၊ www.cetra.com။ © iStock.com/ /Alberto Marotta။ Taylor & Francis http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rfia20/13/4 ။ ။ IGE ။ Melissa Crouch ၂၀၁၁ ။ ။ ၊ “ ” ။ ၊ ၊ ။ ။ ။ ။ ။ ။ ။ ။ ၊ ၊ ။ (Crouch 2015b)။ ၁၈၉၈ Burma ။ ။ ။ ။ ” ၊ ၊ ၊ ” ။ Burma Laws Act ၊ 1 ။i ။ ။ “ ” “ ” (Huxley 1989, 24)။ ၁၉၂၀ (Aye Kyaw 1994)။ ၁၉၃၉ (Registration of Kittama Adoptions Act)ii ။ (Huxley 2014) ။ ဥ ဥ ။ (Crouch 2015a) ၊ ဥ ဒ ။ ။ ။ ( ) Kazis Act 1880။ ။ ။ Wakf ၊ ၊ ။ Mussalman Wakf Act 1924 wakf ။ (Kozlowski 1985)။ ။ ။ ။ ၊ ဥ ။ “ ” ။ ၂၀၁၃ ။ ။ ၊ 2 ၁၉၅၄ ။ ၁၉၂၀ ၁၉၃၈ ။ ၊ ။ ။ ၁၉၃၈ ၂၆ (Final Report 1939)။ “ ” ။ ဥ ဒ ။ ။ ၁၉၃၉ ၁၄/၁၉၃၉ ။ ။ ( ) ။ ။ (Chakravarti 1971, 11)။ ဥ ဒ ။ ။ ၁၉၄၀ ။ ။ ၁၉၅၃ iii ။ ) (Yegar 1972, 77)။ ။ Tinker 3 (Tinker 1986, 42)။ ဥ ဒ ။ ၁၉၃၉ ။ “ ” ။ (De 2009)။ ဥ ဒ ။ ၊ ၊ ( )၊ ၊ ဥ ဒ ။ ။ ။ ။ ။ ဥ ဒ ။ ၁၉၅၃ ၁၉၅၄ ။iv ၁၉၃၉ ။ (၁၉၅၄) ။ ။ ၂၀ ၁၄ ၂၀ ။ ။ ။ ။ ၊ ။ ဥ ။ ။ ဥ ဒ ။ 4 ။ ။ ၂၀၁၂ ။ ။ “ ” “ ” ။ ( ၂/၁၉၉၈)။ ၁၉၉၈ ။ ၂၀၁၂ ။ ။ ၁၉၅၄ ။ ( ၊ / ) ။ “ ဥ ဒ” ။ ၁၉၅၄ ။ ၂၀၁၂ ၂၀၁၃ ။ ၁၉၅၄ ။ ၁၉၅၄ ။ ။ ။ ၂၀၁၅ ။ ၁၉၅၄ ။ ။ ၊ ။v ၁၉၅၄ ။ ၊ ၁၉၅၄ ။ (HRRC 2015: 341-342)။ ။ ။ ၂၀၁၂ 5 ။vi ။ ။ ။ ၊ ။ ။ ။ - ။ ။ ။ (Smith 1965, 230)။ ။ ၁၉၄၇ ။ ။ “ ” ။ ၁၉၄၇ (s 21(1))။ (s 13, 21(3))။ “ ၊ ၊ ” (s 20)။ ၊ ၊ ။ ။ ။ 6 ၊ ၁၉၆၁ ၁၉၄၇ ။ ။ ၁၉၅၆ (Maung Maung 1963, 117)။ ၁၉၆၀ ။ ။ ၊ ၊ ။ ၁၉၆၁ ၂၆ ။vii “ ” ၅၀ ။ ။ ။ (Farrelly 2014)။ ၊ ၊ ။ ။ (၁၉၆၁) ။ ။ ။ viii ။ ၊ ။ ၁၉၆၂ ။ ။ 7 ၁၉၆၂ ။ ။ ( ၁၉၆၁) ၁၉၆၂ (TMMT 1993)။ ၁၉၆၄ ။ ။ ၁၉၇၄ ။ ။ (s 156(a)-(c))။ (ss
    [Show full text]
  • The Myanmar Coup As an ASEAN Inflection Point Charles Dunst
    VIEW The Myanmar Coup as an ASEAN Inflection Point CHARLES DUNST arly on the morning of 2 February 2021, soldiers and police officers marched through the streets of Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s capital, accompa- nied by an insentient but no less imposing cadre of tanks and helicopters. EWithin hours, the military—the Tatmadaw—had seized control of the govern- ment, cut off Internet networks, shut down the stock market, and placed under arrest numerous activists and politicians, including, most notably, Aung San Suu Kyi, the civilian government’s de facto leader. The Tatmadaw then declared a “state of emergency” in which Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military’s com- mander in chief, would govern for a year. His security forces have since responded viciously to nationwide anti- coup protests, killing upwards of 800 people, includ- ing young children in their own homes.1 But this coup nonetheless remains incomplete: Many Burmese officials—dip- lomats, police, and even soldiers—have pushed back against or defected from the military.2 The most prominent example is U Kyaw Moe Tun, Myanmar’s ambas- sador to the United Nations, who continues to side with his country’s pro- democracy demonstrators and has raised the famous three- finger salute—a pan- Asian demand for freedom borrowed from The Hunger Games film franchise—at the United Nations (UN) in New York. The junta demanded the ambassador’s resignation and charged him with high treason, but he refuses to stand down.3 (The UN General Assembly’s credentials committee will not meet until Septem- ber; it remains unclear if the UN would accept a junta- appointed ambassador.) ASEAN’s Response ASEAN’s response, however, has been anything but brave.
    [Show full text]
  • The Humanitarian Response in Myanmar
    FEBRUARY 2019 Delivering Healthcare amid Crisis: The Humanitarian Response in Myanmar ALICE DEBARRE Cover Photo: A doctor from Médecins ABOUT THE AUTHOR Sans Frontières does a medical checkup on a patient with tuberculosis ALICE DEBARRE is a Senior Policy Analyst at the and HIV confection, Shan state, International Peace Institute. Myanmar, July 5, 2013. Eddy McCall/MSF. Email: [email protected] Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS and not necessarily those of the International Peace Institute. IPI IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their welcomes consideration of a wide generous support. IPI is particularly grateful to the Bill and range of perspectives in the pursuit of Melinda Gates Foundation for making this publication a well-informed debate on critical possible. The author would also like to thank stakeholders policies and issues in international in Myanmar who generously gave their time to contribute affairs. to this research, as well as Elliot Brennan, Non-resident Research Fellow at the Institute for Security and IPI Publications Development Policy, and Derran Moss-Dalmau from the Adam Lupel, Vice President Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for their Albert Trithart, Editor insights. Gretchen Baldwin, Assistant Editor Suggested Citation: Alice Debarre, “Delivering Healthcare amid Crisis: The Humanitarian Response in Myanmar,” International Peace Institute, February 2019. © by International Peace Institute, 2019 All Rights Reserved www.ipinst.org CONTENTS Abbreviations . iii Executive Summary . 1 Introduction . 2 Myanmar: A Complex Web of Crises . 4 VIOLENCE, SEGREGATION, AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN RAKHINE ETHNIC ARMED ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPLACEMENT IN KACHIN AND NORTHERN SHAN The Provision of Healthcare in Myanmar .
    [Show full text]