DOCSLIB.ORG

M&A in Japan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Erim - 08 omslag Schaik :Erim omslag Schaik 15-09-2008 12:23 Pagina 1 B&T28304 - Erim Omslag van Schaik M&A IN JAPAN 141 DIMITRI VAN SCHAIK AN ANALYSIS OF MERGER WAVES AND HOSTILE TAKEOVERS The number of mergers between large companies has been low, and hostile takeover cases have been rare in post-war Japan. Since the 1990s, however, total M&A activity has been increasing in number of cases and in value. Coinciding with this trend, hostile tender M&A in Japan offer attempts are also more frequent. Previous research argues that the low level of SCHAIKDIMITRI VAN - M&A in Japan merger and hostile takeover activity is caused by three institutional elements within the An Analysis of Merger Waves and Hostile Takeovers Japanese society: the main bank system, the horizontal keiretsu, and the specific Japanese culture. With reference to hostile takeovers we show that it is important to make a distinction between greenmail and hostile tender offers. We build an institutional model that emphasizes the necessity to consider institutional elements from a historical and context- specific perspective. Our model indicates that the vertical keiretsu and the trade association have an important impact on hostile tender offers in Japan. Regarding mergers, we examine whether the main bank system influences merger activity of companies. By using two event studies we show that involvement of a main ERIM bank does not create shareholder wealth in mergers. The main bank appears to act in order to protect its own interests as creditor. Design & layout: B&T Ontwerp en advies (www.b-en-t.nl) Print: Haveka (www.haveka.nl) Design & layout: B&T Ontwerp en advies (www.b-en-t.nl) ERIM The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder - zoek school)in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, and the Erasmus School of Econo mics. ERIM was founded in1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral pro gramme inResearch in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business knowledge. Erasmus Research Institute of ManagementErasmus Research - ERIM PhD Series Research in Management Rotterdam School of Management Tel. +31 10 408 11 82 ERIM Erasmus University Fax +31 10 408 96 40 Erasmus School of Economics E-mail [email protected] P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam Internet www.erim.eur.nl The Netherlands M&A in Japan An analysis of merger waves and hostile takeovers 1 2 M&A in Japan An analysis of merger waves and hostile takeovers M&A in Japan Een analyse van fusiegolven en vijandige overnames Thesis to obtain the degree of Doctor from the Erasmus University Rotterdam by command of the rector magnificus Prof.dr. S.W.J. Lamberts and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board. The public defense shall be held on Thursday, 30 October 2008 at 13.30 hours by Dimitri van Schaik born in Sliedrecht, the Netherlands. 3 Doctoral Committee Promotores: Prof.dr. J. Spronk Prof.dr. J.P.M. Groenewegen Other members: Prof.dr. G.A. van der Knaap Prof.dr. H.T.J. Smit Prof.dr. J.A. Stam Copromotor: Dr. O.W. Steenbeek Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) RSM Erasmus University / Erasmus School of Economics Erasmus University Rotterdam Internet: http://www.erim.eur.nl ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 ERIM PhD Series in Research in Management, No. 141 ISBN 978-90-5892-169-7 © 2008, Dimitri van Schaik All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the author. 4 Contents List of Figures iv List of Tables iv Preface vii 1 Introduction, Findings and Overview 1 1-1 Research question 3 1-2 Findings 5 1-3 Overview 7 2M&AactivityinJapan 11 2-1 Pre-war mergers 12 2-1-1 TSE listed company data 14 2-2 Post-war mergers 19 2-2-1 First merger wave 21 2-2-2 Latter half 1980s 25 2-2-3 Second merger wave 25 2-3 Hostile takeovers 32 2-4 Hostile tender offer attempts 35 2-5 Conclusion 40 3 Informal and formal institutions 43 3-1 Informal institutions 44 3-1-1 Religion and tradition 44 3-1-2 Constitution of Seventeen Articles 46 3-1-3 Ie system 48 3-2 Formal institutions 50 3-2-1 Pre-war political development and financial markets 50 3-2-2 Post-war political development and financial markets 53 3-3 Formal institutions related to M&A 56 3-3-1 Company Law 56 3-3-2 Antimonopoly Act 61 3-3-3 Securities Exchange Law 62 3-3-4 Other laws related to M&A 62 3-4 Summary 63 i 5 4 Ownership and corporate governance 65 4-1 Economic characteristics 66 4-1-1 Economic development 66 4-1-2 Administrative guidance (gyǀsei shidǀ)71 4-2 Pre-war financing and ownership 74 4-2-1 Pre-war zaibatsu 77 4-2-2 Pre-war corporate governance 78 4-3 Post-war financing and ownership 79 4-3-1 Post-war financing decision 82 4-3-2 Post-war keiretsu 83 4-3-3 Post-war corporate governance 84 4-3-4 Recent changes in corporate governance and ownership 86 4-4 Summary 89 5 Mitsubishi groups 91 5-1 Mitsubishi zaibatsu 92 5-2 Mitsubishi horizontal keiretsu 96 5-2-1 Data and Methodology 96 5-3 Mitsubishi vertical keiretsu 102 5-4 Conclusions 104 6 Institutional model for M&A 105 6-1 Framework of institutional model 106 6-2 Informal and formal institutions 109 6-3 Governance structure and M&A activity 111 6-3-1 Transaction cost economics 112 6-4 Actors 114 6-5 Institutional change 119 6-6 Concluding remarks 121 7 Institutional approach to hostile takeovers 123 7-1 Interpretations from previous research 124 7-1-1 Horizontal keiretsu 124 7-1-2 Culture 125 7-1-3 Transaction cost economics and vertical keiretsu 126 7-2 Corporate groups according to our model 127 7-2-1 Trust 128 7-2-2 Horizontal keiretsu 129 7-2-3 Vertical keiretsu 132 7-2-4 Trade associations 134 7-3 Hostile takeovers according to our model 136 7-3-1 Hostile tender offer attempts 138 7-3-2 Generated hypotheses 141 7-4 Concluding remarks 141 ii 6 8 Introduction to M&A 143 8-1 M&A terminology 144 8-1-1 Types of M&A 144 8-1-2 Mergers 146 8-1-3 Tender offers 148 8-1-3-1 Defensive measures 148 8-2 Merger motives 149 8-3 Merger waves 152 8-3-1 Drivers for merger waves 152 8-3-2 Merger waves in the United States 153 8-4 Conclusion 156 9 Merger activity 159 9-1 M&A activity over time 160 9-2 Previous research 163 9-2-1 Main bank monitoring 163 9-2-2 Previous event studies 164 9-2-3 Profitability drivers 166 9-3 Shareholder wealth of bidder companies 169 9-3-1 Data-set 169 9-3-2 Results 174 9-3-3 Conclusions 186 9-4 Shareholder wealth of the bidder and target companies 187 9-4-1 Data 188 9-4-2 Results 194 9-4-3 Conclusions 205 9-5 Conclusion 205 10 Summary and conclusions 211 10-1 Summary 211 10-2 Conclusions 216 Dutch summary 221 References 225 About the author 237 ERIM PhD Series 239 iii 7 List of Figures 2-1 Mergers in the period 1906-1937 15 2-2 Mergers in the period 1950-1997 20 2-3 Mergers between large companies in the period 1957-1978 24 2-4 M&A cases in the period 1985-2006 30 4-1 GNP growth in the period 1886-1942 68 4-2 GDP growth and inflation rate in the period 1952-2004 70 4-3 Financing as percentage of GNP in the period 1903-1944 76 4-4a Nikkei 225 daily stock average price index 80 4-4b Share ownership in 1945, 1949-53 80 4-5a Stockownership 1950-75 (%) 81 4-5b Stockownership 1950-75 (shares) 81 4-6 Loan/assets-ratio of manufacturing companies in period 1960-2006 87 5-1 Loans from Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Bank in 1975 98 5-2 Mitsubishi Keiretsu Diamond 100 6-1 Institutional model for M&A 107 6-2 Simple contracting schema 114 7-1 Ownership transformation of Mitsubishi groups 131 8-1 M&A types 145 8-2 Mergers in the United States in the period 1895-1930 153 8-3 M&A announcements in the United States in the period 1963-1998 154 9-1 CAR results of previous event studies on Japanese mergers 165 9-2 Inter-industry vs. intra-industry deals 174 9-3a CARs Japanese bidders 175 9-3b Excess trading volume Japanese bidders 175 9-4 Merger activity and Nikkei Index in the period 1981-2003 189 List of Tables 2-1 Sample companies by mergers and zaibatsu in the period 1906-1937 16 2-2 Mergers by size of bidder and target in the period 1906-1937 17 2-3 Mergers by industrial sector in the period 1916-1933 18 2-4 Mergers by size in sub-periods of 1953-1976 21 2-5 Mergers by industrial sector in sub-periods of 1953-1976 22 2-6 Merger activity by number of cases and by amount in the period 1984-2006 26 2-7 Comparison of merger activity by industrial sector between 1984-1990 and 1991-1997 27 2-8 Mergers by industrial sector in the period 1991-1997 28 2-9 Mergers by merger type in the period 1977-1983 29 2-10 M&A activity categorized by in-group and out-group cases in the period 1990-2006 31 2-11 Greenmail cases in the 1970s and 1980s 33 iv 8 2-12 Hostile tender offers in Japan 35 3-1 Important laws and regulations
Recommended publications
  • Sumitomo Corporation's Dirty Energy Trade

    Sumitomo Corporation's Dirty Energy Trade

    SUMITOMO CORPORATION’S DIRTY ENERGY TRADE Biomass, Coal and Japan’s Energy Future DECEMBER 2019 SUMITOMO CORPORATION’S DIRTY ENERGY TRADE Biomass, Coal and Japan’s Energy Future CONTRIBUTORS Authors: Roger Smith, Jessie Mannisto, Ryan Cunningham of Mighty Earth Translation: EcoNetworks Co. Design: Cecily Anderson, anagramdesignstudio.com Any errors or inaccuracies remain the responsibility of Mighty Earth. 2 © Jan-Joseph Stok / Greenpeace CONTENTS 4 Introduction 7 Japan’s Embrace of Dirty Energy 7 Coal vs the Climate 11 Biomass Burning: Missing the Forest for the Trees 22 Sumitomo Corporation’s Coal Business: Unrepentant Polluter 22 Feeding Japan’s Coal Reliance 23 Building Dirty Power Plants Abroad and at Home 27 Sumitomo Corporation, climate laggard 29 Sumitomo Corporation’s Biomass Business: Trashing Forests for Fuel 29 Global Forests at Risk 34 Sumitomo and Southeastern Forests 39 Canadian Wood Pellet Production 42 Vietnam 44 Sumitomo Corporation and Japanese Biomass Power Plants 47 Sumitomo Corporation and You 47 TBC Corporation 49 National Tire Wholesale 50 Sumitomo Corporation: Needed Policy Changes 3 Wetland forest logging tied to Enviva’s biomass plant in Southampton, North Carolina. Dogwood Alliance INTRODUCTION SUMITOMO CORPORATION’S DIRTY ENERGY TRADE—AND ITS OPPORTUNITY TO CHANGE While the rest of the developed world accelerates its deployment of clean, renewable energy, Japan is running backwards. It is putting in place policies which double down on its reliance on coal, and indiscriminately subsidize biomass power technologies that accelerate climate change. Government policy is not the only driver of Japan’s dirty energy expansion – the private sector also plays a pivotal role in growing the country’s energy carbon footprint.
  • Whither the Keiretsu, Japan's Business Networks? How Were They Structured? What Did They Do? Why Are They Gone?

    Whither the Keiretsu, Japan's Business Networks? How Were They Structured? What Did They Do? Why Are They Gone?

    IRLE IRLE WORKING PAPER #188-09 September 2009 Whither the Keiretsu, Japan's Business Networks? How Were They Structured? What Did They Do? Why Are They Gone? James R. Lincoln, Masahiro Shimotani Cite as: James R. Lincoln, Masahiro Shimotani. (2009). “Whither the Keiretsu, Japan's Business Networks? How Were They Structured? What Did They Do? Why Are They Gone?” IRLE Working Paper No. 188-09. http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/188-09.pdf irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper Series (University of California, Berkeley) Year Paper iirwps-- Whither the Keiretsu, Japan’s Business Networks? How Were They Structured? What Did They Do? Why Are They Gone? James R. Lincoln Masahiro Shimotani University of California, Berkeley Fukui Prefectural University This paper is posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California. http://repositories.cdlib.org/iir/iirwps/iirwps-188-09 Copyright c 2009 by the authors. WHITHER THE KEIRETSU, JAPAN’S BUSINESS NETWORKS? How were they structured? What did they do? Why are they gone? James R. Lincoln Walter A. Haas School of Business University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720 USA ([email protected]) Masahiro Shimotani Faculty of Economics Fukui Prefectural University Fukui City, Japan ([email protected]) 1 INTRODUCTION The title of this volume and the papers that fill it concern business “groups,” a term suggesting an identifiable collection of actors (here, firms) within a clear-cut boundary. The Japanese keiretsu have been described in similar terms, yet compared to business groups in other countries the postwar keiretsu warrant the “group” label least.
  • Integrated Report 2020

    Integrated Report 2020

    SANWA HOLDINGS CORPORATION Shinjuku Mitsui Building 52F Nishi-Shinjuku 2-1-1, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 163-0478, Japan Phone: +81-3-3346-3019 Inquiries : Corporate Communication Department https://www.sanwa-hldgs.co.jp/english/ INTEGRATED REPORT For the year ended March 31, 2020 2020 A History of Reliable Business Reliable ESG Materiality Strategy Special Feature Corporate Data Value Creation Performance Management Initiatives Our Mission Message from the Chairman The Sanwa Group is committed to offering products and services that provide safety, security and convenience to further contribute to the prosperity of society. Our Values • To deliver products and services to satisfy all customers. • To become a true global player and be highly valued in each market in the world. • To bring together the creativity of each individual in a team environment for the enhancement of corporate value. PDCA SAKURA The employees of the Sanwa Group, not satisfied with the current situation, maintain a critical mindset in doing their jobs in order to continue to pursue their best work. We review results in terms of whether or not we did things as originally planned. If not, we think about the reason why we didn’t get the intended results. Getting back to the basics such as increasing good aspects and improving bad ones is part of the Plan-Do- Check-Act (PDCA) cycle. PDCA SAKURA represents this concept as the Sanwa Group symbol. We even planted PDCA SAKURA cherry blossom trees on the grounds of main Group facilities. CONTENTS A History of Value Creation ESG Materiality Initiatives Message from the Chairman .......................................1 Future ......................................................................
  • Motor Vehicle Make Abbreviation List Updated As of June 21, 2012 MAKE Manufacturer AC a C AMF a M F ABAR Abarth COBR AC Cobra SKMD Academy Mobile Homes (Mfd

    Motor Vehicle Make Abbreviation List Updated As of June 21, 2012 MAKE Manufacturer AC a C AMF a M F ABAR Abarth COBR AC Cobra SKMD Academy Mobile Homes (Mfd

    Motor Vehicle Make Abbreviation List Updated as of June 21, 2012 MAKE Manufacturer AC A C AMF A M F ABAR Abarth COBR AC Cobra SKMD Academy Mobile Homes (Mfd. by Skyline Motorized Div.) ACAD Acadian ACUR Acura ADET Adette AMIN ADVANCE MIXER ADVS ADVANCED VEHICLE SYSTEMS ADVE ADVENTURE WHEELS MOTOR HOME AERA Aerocar AETA Aeta DAFD AF ARIE Airel AIRO AIR-O MOTOR HOME AIRS AIRSTREAM, INC AJS AJS AJW AJW ALAS ALASKAN CAMPER ALEX Alexander-Reynolds Corp. ALFL ALFA LEISURE, INC ALFA Alfa Romero ALSE ALL SEASONS MOTOR HOME ALLS All State ALLA Allard ALLE ALLEGRO MOTOR HOME ALCI Allen Coachworks, Inc. ALNZ ALLIANZ SWEEPERS ALED Allied ALLL Allied Leisure, Inc. ALTK ALLIED TANK ALLF Allison's Fiberglass mfg., Inc. ALMA Alma ALOH ALOHA-TRAILER CO ALOU Alouette ALPH Alpha ALPI Alpine ALSP Alsport/ Steen ALTA Alta ALVI Alvis AMGN AM GENERAL CORP AMGN AM General Corp. AMBA Ambassador AMEN Amen AMCC AMERICAN CLIPPER CORP AMCR AMERICAN CRUISER MOTOR HOME Motor Vehicle Make Abbreviation List Updated as of June 21, 2012 AEAG American Eagle AMEL AMERICAN ECONOMOBILE HILIF AMEV AMERICAN ELECTRIC VEHICLE LAFR AMERICAN LA FRANCE AMI American Microcar, Inc. AMER American Motors AMER AMERICAN MOTORS GENERAL BUS AMER AMERICAN MOTORS JEEP AMPT AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION AMRR AMERITRANS BY TMC GROUP, INC AMME Ammex AMPH Amphicar AMPT Amphicat AMTC AMTRAN CORP FANF ANC MOTOR HOME TRUCK ANGL Angel API API APOL APOLLO HOMES APRI APRILIA NEWM AR CORP. ARCA Arctic Cat ARGO Argonaut State Limousine ARGS ARGOSY TRAVEL TRAILER AGYL Argyle ARIT Arista ARIS ARISTOCRAT MOTOR HOME ARMR ARMOR MOBILE SYSTEMS, INC ARMS Armstrong Siddeley ARNO Arnolt-Bristol ARRO ARROW ARTI Artie ASA ASA ARSC Ascort ASHL Ashley ASPS Aspes ASVE Assembled Vehicle ASTO Aston Martin ASUN Asuna CAT CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO ATK ATK America, Inc.
  • Employer Associations, Institutions and Economic Change

    Employer Associations, Institutions and Economic Change

    www.ssoar.info Employer associations, institutions and economic change: a crossnational comparison Traxler, Franz Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: Rainer Hampp Verlag Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Traxler, F. (2004). Employer associations, institutions and economic change: a crossnational comparison. Industrielle Beziehungen : Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, 11(1/2), 42-60. https://nbn-resolving.org/ urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-344652 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use.
  • We Thank You for Your Support on This Crucial Issue

    We Thank You for Your Support on This Crucial Issue

    27 April 2012 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is good for Europe Dear Member of the European Parliament, The signatories of this letter represent thousands of European companies of all sizes and millions of workers in dozens of sectors crucial to the European economy, which are eager to get Europe out of the current economic crisis by promoting creativity, innovation and growth-enhancing measures. We are all dependent on intellectual property. We stand united in support of ACTA and any steps, such as the decision to expeditiously refer the text to the Court of Justice of the European Union, that help build confidence in the treaty. ACTA is good for Europe. Without changing EU law, it establishes common procedures for dealing with IPR infringements across countries accounting for 50% of world trade. The framework set up by ACTA will have a positive impact on protecting Europe’s industries, jobs and people. ACTA will have no negative consequences as it does not depart from EU law – as confirmed by two opinions of the European Parliament’s Legal Service as well as the European Commission. It is important to show that Europe is united and has trust in its institutions and government processes. That is why ACTA is supported by all the organisations and companies below, as well as the European Member States who joined the EU in the first step towards ratification. We therefore urge you to focus on the facts and not the misinformation and to support ACTA. ACTA is an international cooperation project that will protect Europe’s rights and people and will confirm the EU’s global importance as a responsible trading partner.
  • Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors

    Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors

    Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors Issued by the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice April 2000 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS TABLE OF CONTENTS PREAMBLE ................................................................................................................................ 1 SECTION 1: PURPOSE, DEFINITIONS, AND OVERVIEW ............................................... 2 1.1 Purpose and Definitions .................................................................................................... 2 1.2 Overview of Analytical Framework ................................................................................ 3 1.3 Competitor Collaborations Distinguished from Mergers .............................................. 5 SECTION 2: GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING AGREEMENTS AMONG COMPETITORS .................................................................................. 6 2.1 Potential Procompetitive Benefits .................................................................................. 6 2.2 Potential Anticompetitive Harms .................................................................................... 6 2.3 Analysis of the Overall Collaboration and the Agreements of Which It Consists ......................................................................................................... 7 2.4 Competitive Effects Are Assessed as of the Time of Possible Harm to Competition ..................................................................................
  • ISSN 1045-6333 the FABLE of the KEIRETSU Yoshiro Miwa J. Mark Ramseyer Discussion Paper No. 316 3/2001 Harvard Law School Cambri

    ISSN 1045-6333 the FABLE of the KEIRETSU Yoshiro Miwa J. Mark Ramseyer Discussion Paper No. 316 3/2001 Harvard Law School Cambri

    ISSN 1045-6333 THE FABLE OF THE KEIRETSU Yoshiro Miwa J. Mark Ramseyer Discussion Paper No. 316 3/2001 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 The Center for Law, Economics, and Business is supported by a grant from the John M. Olin Foundation. This paper can be downloaded without charge from: The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ JEL: G3, K2, L1, P5 Address correspondence to: University of Tokyo Faculty of Economics 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo FAX: 03-5841-5521 [email protected] [email protected] The Fable of the Keiretsu by Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer* Abstract: Central to so many accounts of post-war Japan, the keiretsu corporate groups have never had economic substance. Conceived by Marxists committed to locating "domination" by "monopoly capital," they found an early audience among western scholars searching for evidence of culture-specific group behavior in Japan. By the 1990s, they had moved into mainstream economic studies, and keiretsu dummies appeared in virtually all econometric regressions of Japanese industrial or corporate structure. Yet the keiretsu began as a figment of the academic imagination, and they remain that today. The most commonly used keiretsu roster first groups large financial institutions by their pre-war antecedents. It then assigns firms to a group if the sum of its loans from those institutions exceeds the amount it borrows from the next largest lender. Other rosters start by asking whether firm presidents meet occasionally with other presidents for lunch. Regardless of the definition used, cross-shareholdings were trivial even during the years when keiretsu ties were supposedly strongest, and membership has only badly proxied for "main bank" ties.
  • Authorised Cartels in Twentieth-Century Japan

    Authorised Cartels in Twentieth-Century Japan

    10 Policy transfer and its limits Authorised cartels in twentieth-century Japan Takahiro Ohata and Takafumi Kurosawa Introduction The history of cartel registration in Japan deserves special attention for several reasons. First, the country had the world’s most institutionalised and encompassing cartel registration system during the second half of the twentieth century. A system- atic international comparison conducted by Corwin Edwards, a renowned trust-buster in US and founder of Japan’s post-war antimonopoly law, showed that the scope of reporting requirements was the widest in Japan among the 11 nations compared (Wells 2002; Edwards 1967: 48). Second, Japan’s system clearly exhibits the dual nature of the cartel register; namely, authorisation of cartels on the one hand, and containment of them on the other. The balance between these two factors changed over time, reflecting the industrial structure, the role of state intervention, and the international environ- ment. Additionally, Japan is representative of how the practice of cartel registration flourished in the spheres between the general prohibition of cartel and economic liberalism, where laissez-faire meant the liberty of contract and relative freedom for cartels. Third, Japan’s cartel registration system exhibits the uniqueness as well as the universality of the nation’s experience. Its uniqueness lies in the dramatic volte-face in the competition policy following American occupation and policy transfer imme- diately after the Second World War. The huge leap from the promotion of cartels and a war economy to the other extreme of an idealistic and draconian post-war anti- trust law was ordered and supervised by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP).
  • The Wealth of Zaibatsu Owner Families: the Impact of Zaibatsu Busting in Occupied Japan

    The Wealth of Zaibatsu Owner Families: the Impact of Zaibatsu Busting in Occupied Japan

    Vol. 6, No. 1 (20 21) ■ ISSN 2169-0820 (Online) ■ DOI 10.5195/shashi.2021.48 ■ http://shashi.pitt.edu The Wealth of Zaibatsu Owner Families: The Impact of Zaibatsu Busting in Occupied Japan Steven Ericson Dartmouth College Abstract Contrary to widely accepted views, the former zaibatsu owner families, despite the drastic reduction in their enormous wealth, emerged from the U.S. Occupation with relatively sizable assets. The Holding Company Liquidation Commission, the Japanese agency that at the direction of Occupation Headquarters (GHQ) seized stocks that the zaibatsu families had held either directly or through their holding companies, worked to protect the families, especially by convincing GHQ to switch compensation from nonnegotiable bonds to cash. Furthermore, in the sale of stocks, the policy of giving purchase priority to zaibatsu company employees appears to have made it possible in some cases for the families to buy back shares and regain control over their former enterprises after 1952. As it turned out, the confiscatory measure was not so much the appropriation of the families’ assets under the GHQ-mandated dissolution of the combines as it was the Japanese government’s own punitive capital levy. Mitsui Takanaga, who graduated from Dartmouth College in 1915,1 was heading one of the eleven Mitsui families when the U.S. occupation of Japan officially began at the end of August 1945. As such, Takanaga would find himself on the list of 56 zaibatsu family members designated in March 1947 by the Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC), the Japanese body that carried out Occupation directives to break up the zaibatsu combines and big companies.
  • H:\My Documents\Article.Wpd

    H:\My Documents\Article.Wpd

    Vehicle Data Codes as of 1/26/2010 Press CTRL + F to prompt the search field. VEHICLE DATA CODES TABLE OF CONTENTS 1--LICENSE PLATE TYPE (LIT) FIELD CODES 1.1 LIT FIELD CODES FOR REGULAR PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE PLATES 1.2 LIT FIELD CODES FOR AIRCRAFT 1.3 LIT FIELD CODES FOR ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES AND SNOWMOBILES 1.4 SPECIAL LICENSE PLATES 1.5 LIT FIELD CODES FOR SPECIAL LICENSE PLATES 2--VEHICLE MAKE (VMA) AND BRAND NAME (BRA) FIELD CODES 2.1 VMA AND BRA FIELD CODES 2.2 VMA, BRA, AND VMO FIELD CODES FOR AUTOMOBILES, LIGHT-DUTY VANS, LIGHT- DUTY TRUCKS, AND PARTS 2.3 VMA AND BRA FIELD CODES FOR CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT PARTS 2.4 VMA AND BRA FIELD CODES FOR FARM AND GARDEN EQUIPMENT AND FARM EQUIPMENT PARTS 2.5 VMA AND BRA FIELD CODES FOR MOTORCYCLES AND MOTORCYCLE PARTS 2.6 VMA AND BRA FIELD CODES FOR SNOWMOBILES AND SNOWMOBILE PARTS 2.7 VMA AND BRA FIELD CODES FOR TRAILERS AND TRAILER PARTS 2.8 VMA AND BRA FIELD CODES FOR TRUCKS AND TRUCK PARTS 2.9 VMA AND BRA FIELD CODES ALPHABETICALLY BY CODE 3--VEHICLE MODEL (VMO) FIELD CODES 3.1 VMO FIELD CODES FOR AUTOMOBILES, LIGHT-DUTY VANS, AND LIGHT-DUTY TRUCKS 3.2 VMO FIELD CODES FOR ASSEMBLED VEHICLES 3.3 VMO FIELD CODES FOR AIRCRAFT 3.4 VMO FIELD CODES FOR ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES 3.5 VMO FIELD CODES FOR CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT 3.6 VMO FIELD CODES FOR DUNE BUGGIES 3.7 VMO FIELD CODES FOR FARM AND GARDEN EQUIPMENT 3.8 VMO FIELD CODES FOR GO-CARTS 3.9 VMO FIELD CODES FOR GOLF CARTS 3.10 VMO FIELD CODES FOR MOTORIZED RIDE-ON TOYS 3.11 VMO FIELD CODES FOR MOTORIZED WHEELCHAIRS 3.12
  • A Crossnational Comparison

    A Crossnational Comparison

    A revised version of this paper has been subsequently published Industrielle Beziehungen - The German Journal of Industrial Relations ECONOMIC CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS: A CROSSNATIONAL COMPARISON Franz Traxler University of Vienna Paper for IIRA, 13th World Congress, September 8-12, 2003, Track 4 INTRODUCTION Since more than a decade a multiplicity of economic developments have brought about significant change in the context of industrial relations. These developments include technological advances, internationalization and globalization of markets and capital, and manifold other changes in terms of production systems, work organization, the sectoral and occupational structure of the economy, macroeconomic policy etc. It is commonly assumed that the direction of all these changes is detrimental to the collective actors in industrial relations (i.e. the unions and employer associations). This detrimental effect is most evident in the case of the internationalization markets which at the same time represents the driving force behind most of the other developments mentioned. The dynamics of economic change have mainly been propelled by the ever-growing spread of internationalized market relations which in turn have given rise to intensified competition both within and across countries. This poses a serious challenge to collective actors, since market competition is at odds with the solidaristic principle of collective action: To the extent to which economic internationalization both expands and intensifies market competition, it thus threatens to erode the individual actors’ propensity to associate. While these processes challenge any type of collective actor in industrial relations, there is good reason to assume that employer associations are especially hit. This follows from their special kind of constituency.