www.rsis.edu.sg 25 – 31 AugustJuly 2014 2015

Monthly Report of International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research

PAKISTAN

Trends

 The Taliban militants continued to strike security check posts, military convoys and other targets in different areas of Pakistan’s north-western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), despite the military’s claims of destroying the physical infrastructure based on which the militants thrived.1 The sleeper cells of the militant groups are gradually resurfacing, which exposes Pakistani military’s stated substantive gains as a part of the on-going military operation Zarb-e-Azb (Sword of the Prophet) in North Waziristan Agency (NWA). .

 Malik Ishaq, an anti-Shia militant commander and head of the Sunni extremist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), was killed in a staged police encounter in Pakistan’s Punjab province. Ishaq’s two sons and nine other accomplices were also killed in the shootout. Ishaq was first arrested in 1997 after confessing in a newspaper interview to have killed more than 100 members of the Shia community.2 After 9/11, LeJ formed an alliance with the Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qaeda. It is reported that Ishaq was attempting to organize the network of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) group in Pakistan.

Analysis

1 Two troops, three militants killed in Bannu,” Dawn, July 31, 2015, accessed August 11, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1197487/two-troops-three-militants-killed-in-bannu;”Four soldiers, 7 militants killed,” Dawn, May 24, 2015, accessed August 11, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1183863/four-soldiers-7-militants-killed; “Prayer leader blows himself up in Charsadda mosque,” Dawn, May 23, 2015, accessed August 11, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1183714/prayer-leader-blows-himself-up-in-charsadda-mosque. 2 Nasir, Jamal. “LeJ leader, two sons, 12 other militants killed,” Dawn, July 30, 2015, accessed on 3 August 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1197227/lej-leader-two-sons-12-other-militants-killed.

 In light of the above trends, the gains made against militant groups in the Pakistani tribal areas are fragile and reversible. The reprisal attacks against the security forces and other targets in the mainland Pakistan show that militant groups retain a residual capacity to revive and come back. As long as the sleeper cells of militants are not dismantled only targeting the terrorist infrastructure will not suffice. Two other factors should also be taken into account to make meaningful headways in fight against home-grown terrorism; a) militants have resurrected their training camps and sanctuaries in Afghanistan, b) ideological support coming from radical madrassas and funding from the Arab Gulf countries is keeping militancy alive. Moving beyond a security-centric approach, focusing on the ideological strength and sources of terrorist financing are critical in the fight against terrorism.

 Despite open confessions from Ishaq of his involvement in attacks on the Shia community, weak evidence based on faulty prosecution made it difficult for the judiciary to execute him. This abysmal situation forced the security forces to kill him in a staged encounter. While such questionable practices may work for short term gains, they cast doubts about the military’s claims of ensuring the rule of law. Moreover, the gains which military claims to achieve are coming at the cost of human rights violations, trampling the rule of law and undermining Pakistan’s fragile democracy.3

Implications

 The militant groups are reviving through reprisal attacks after absorbing the shocks of the military operations. The small-scale attacks can be a precursor to a large-scale attack in the near future.

 Rather than focusing on hampering the operational capabilities of the groups through military operations, there is a need to renew focus on the core sources that these groups derive strength from. As long as sleeper cells and remaining pockets of different militant groups are not dismantled the military operations will be ineffective in the longer run.

 Ishaq’s killing could possibly lead to an escalation of the Sunni-Shia conflict in Pakistan. Based on the history of sectarian violence in Pakistan, such killings

3 Siddiqui, Taha & Walsh, Declan. “In Pakistan, Detainees Are Vanishing in Covert Jails,” New York Times, July 25, 2015, accessed August 11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/world/asia/detainees-vanish-in-secretive-facilities-as-pakistan- fights-taliban.html?_r=0.

have resulted in retaliation from the other side. LeJ might target Shia political leaders or scholars to avenge his killing. i