FIRSTPERSON
ingapore — First came the matter of de- are just a few of the significant details of this termining how much of the Airbus A380 incredibly complicated situation. was still functioning. Then the issue was The triggering failure that launched the maintaining control of the crippled aircraft drama was the uncontained failure, while climb- Sflying on the edge of a stall during approach with ing through 7,000 ft, of the airplane’s no. 2 Rolls- marginal aileron control effectiveness. Finally there Royce Trent 972 three-spool turbofan, perceived was the problem of sitting over a rapidly spreading in the cockpit as “two bangs, not terribly loud,” pool of jet fuel in an aircraft with white-hot brakes de Crespigny said. The aircraft damage caused and an engine that refused to shut down. by the heavy, high-speed engine parts leaving The uncontained engine failure on a Qantas the nacelle created what he called “a black swan A380 on Nov. 4, 2010, did not precipitate a event, unforeseen, with massive consequences. catastrophic accident, and 469 people returned “What did we know? We knew that engine safely to the ground at Singapore, said the no. 2 had failed, there was a hole in the wing, fuel Qantas Flight 32 captain, Richard de Crespigny, was leaking from the wing and we had unending because five experienced pilots in the cockpit — checklists. What we didn’t know is that no. 2 had three in the regular crew and two check captains had a failure of the intermediate pressure turbine, — worked as a unified team with cool heads and engine no. 1 had also been damaged, we had 100 a singleness of purpose. impacts on the leading edge, 200 impacts on the In his keynote speech opening Flight Safety fuselage, impacts up to the tail and seven penetra- Foundation’s 64th International Air Safety tions of the wing, going right through the wing Seminar in Singapore in November 2011, and in and up through the top. We had lost 750 wires…. an extensive interview with AeroSafety World, de We lost 70 systems, spoilers, brakes, flight con- Crespigny detailed the accident. What follows trols. … Every system in the aircraft was affected.
Saving a crippled A380.
A Black Swan Event A Black Swan BY J.A. DONOGHUE
32 | FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | AEROSAFETYWORLD | DECEMBER 2011–JANUARY 2012 FIRSTPERSON
“Flight controls were also severely to maintain attitude, de Crespigny “went to During approach, our air speed margin damaged. It wasn’t just the slats; we the control page to look at the percent- was very small. Put in 3 kt, we run off [lost] a lot of our ailerons … lost 65 age of effort of the flight controls we had the end of the runway.” percent of our roll control,” de Crespig- remaining. We had normal flight controls As it turned out, he couldn’t be ny said. The situation was made worse, except for the ailerons, and there we’d lost slow, either. “I slowed down 1 kt and he said, because, with fuel flowing out 65 percent of our roll control, lost both we got a speed warning,” he said. “That of the left wing, the aircraft was later- outer ailerons, lost one of the mids, and was unexpected, absolutely. We clearly ally unbalanced. we were left with … one mid and the high- didn’t have a 17 to 18 percent stall “We were getting pretty close to a speed ailerons, small and inboard. margin. We had two speed warnings” [cockpit work] overload situation,” work- “But we also had imbalances” due to during the approach, and “in the flare, ing through the checklists, canceling the fuel issues, he said. “I was very con- we got a stall warning.” alarms. “It was hard to work out a list of cerned about controllability. So we did “We landed 40 tonnes overweight, what had failed. It was getting [to be] too the control check, and as I rolled the a relatively good landing. When we much to follow. So we inverted our logic. aircraft up to about 10 degrees of bank, stopped, the brakes said 900 degrees C Like Apollo 13, instead of worrying about we looked at the flight controls [ECAM (1,650 degrees F), but it takes five min- what failed, I said, ‘Let’s look at what’s page] and it looked like we were using utes for heat to get to the sensor, so 900 working.’ If all we could do is build our- like 60 to 70 percent of the remaining degrees on stopping meant that those selves a Cessna aircraft out of the rubble ailerons just to do a very gentle turn. brakes were going to go well beyond that remained, we would be happy.” “I could easily reach maximum 2,000 degrees C.” Wanting to be well prepared and deflection of the ailerons, and when However, on landing “fuel sloshed drop as much fuel as possible before you reach that point, the spoilers come to the front” and began gushing out making what would still be an over- up next. You keep getting roll control of the holes in the wing leading edge. weight landing, de Crespigny entered by dumping more lift, increasing your “The auto-ignition point of kerosene is a holding pattern. “We had seven fuel stall speed. I was really worried, [know- 220 degrees C, so we were concerned.” leaks coming out of multiple parts of ing I had] to be so careful to not get the Happily, the Singapore crash rescue Saving a crippled A380. the wing. At 50 tonnes overweight, and spoilers coming up. I had to keep the crew’s response was superb, de Crespig- BY J.A. DONOGHUE no [working] fuel-jettisoning system, heading and yaw as accurate as pos- ny said. “Firemen came in and put foam this was our jettisoning system.” sible, so I decided to use the automatic down over the fuel, over the brakes, and Fortunate to have the longest run- pilot for the approach — its accelerom- the temps started going down.” way in Southeast Asia available to them, eters sense small changes and put in Finally, though, the engine no. 1 the crew still had slim margins. Taking tiny corrections earlier than I will.” refused to shut down, further delaying into account the known problems — Manual thrust control can allow evacuation. But with the threat of fire including no slats and no drooping for unbalanced thrust, which would mitigated, the aircraft was evacuated ailerons on final — the crew computed induce destabilizing yaw. “We had a before the engine was killed with mas- that the aircraft could be stopped 100 m long approach, so to get stable thrust sive amounts of fire-fighting foam.
(328 ft) before the runway end. I exactly matched [engines] one and To see the video of extended interviews with “We briefed the approach, and then four and locked them down, and used Capt. Richard de Crespigny and Michael von — one of the more emotional events engine three to adjust the approach Reth, chief of cabin service on QF32, go to of the crisis — we did … three control speed, using that [engine] because it is
landing in a landing configuration. We accurate heading control, controls were FirstPerson is a forum for sharing personal did a rehearsal for the landing with the not used very much, and with only one experiences that have yielded lessons about gear down,” using gravity to drop the engine used to fine tune the speed, [we aviation safety. We welcome your contributions. gear, he said, “flaps out and at approach maintained] minus 2 kt to plus 3 kt for Send them to J.A. Donoghue, director of publications, Flight Safety Foundation, 601 speed, and the aircraft proved out.” the whole approach.” Madison St., Suite 300, Alexandria VA 22314-1756 Knowing that the fly-by-wire stick Another pilot in the cockpit USA or [email protected]. Chris Photography Sorensen
© would mask the aileron movement needed warned, “‘Richard, you can’t be fast.’
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