Ralph Thiele

Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 6/2021

Space Competition

This special Fokus series on the Strategic Review 2. Open for Business lites into simultaneously per launch of Global Hotspots consists of seven parts and is with his Falcon 9 launch system – already based on the AIES online discussion on the same For half a century, space-related innova­ 955 in total by the end of 2020. The current topic. The online lectures of the authors are tion meant scaling Apollo-era technolo- license is for 12,000 in low orbit. available at: aies.at/global-hotspots gies. Ever larger, weightier, billion-dollar The application for another 30,000 has satellites were designed to operate for been filed. OneWeb and Kuiper (Amazon) 1. Context forty years or more. Participation in such are planning on a comparable scale. projects was reserved for a few, elite Geostrategic competition is global in organizations and large corporations. communications have fuelled the scope. The boundaries between civil and Governments and military leaders set the majority of commercial growth since the military competition have become fluid direction and provided large budgets. 1980s. This development will also drive and marked by geostrategic competition, progress as regards government and multiple hybrid threat situations, attacks Today, seventy-five percent of space defence usage in the upcoming decade as on businesses and critical infrastructure, revenues are earned commercially.4 As their demand for satellite communications and the threat of prolonged, low-intensity access to space gets cheaper, satellites is constantly increasing – from a level of or shorter, high-intensity conflicts.1 Hybrid are becoming mass-produced devices. approximately 35Gbps today to a projec- scenarios are gaining in importance as a Evolving technologies have brought space ted 150Gbps and more by 2025.6 Additio- preferred form of confrontation.2 capability into the reach of states, interna- nally, there is the rapidly growing global tional organisations, corporations and indi- demand for earth observation data and In particular, Russia and China integrate viduals that a decade ago had no realistic the increasing demand for highly accurate civil and military competition at every ambitions in this regard. In between, more systems providing level, including the development of their than 80 countries have entered the global significant potential for the development international trade, investment, natio- . Ongoing technological of new products and services. Both, large nal technology base, and political and progress is a key catalyst. companies and start-ups have been diplomatic activities. Both are using new, investing in space as a promising business disruptive dual-use technologies as the For example, miniaturization allows the sector. key to advancing own capabilities and development of smaller launch vehicles, geopolitical ambitions. The dynamics of which in turn can spend comparatively 3. No Fence in Space this geostrategic environment present EU, small and light satellites with enhanced NATO and member states with a variety of capabilities. Thanks to breakthroughs in Serious threats to space infrastructure demanding requirements. In this equation modular computer architectures, robotics, are relatively new phenomena. For a long space holds a critical role. artificial intelligence and more, new time, space used to be an ecosystem of its launch systems and satellites are beco- own. As more countries and commercial Space-based services have become key to ming cheaper, more innovative and more firms have begun participating in satellite commercial, governmental and milita- useful. Commercial space companies have construction, , space explo- ry systems, platforms and information stimulated innovation with new business ration, and so forth, new risks and threats requirements. Space systems imagery, and models and the integration of disruptive have also emerged for space-enabled geolocation services allow users to access technologies.5 Space applications are both services. In this widening battlespace and fuse data and information in near real- a prerequisite and an important driver for of the future, it will be much harder for time. Together with timing and navigation, future technologies such as 5G, additive EU, NATO, member nations and allies to space-based capabilities provide secure manufacturing, autonomous systems, IoT defend against every possible threat given high bandwidth and the connection of and many others. asymmetry of the possible attacks and the fixed and on-the-move 5G networks.3 They diversity and complexity of the attack vec- enable high mobility, wide geographical Currently, an almost revolutionary variety tors. Today, it is increasingly understood coverage and precision. In particular, mili- of satellites are taking off into space, espe- that space assets have been vulnerable to tary command & control use space-based cially low- and medium-orbit, digital-ca­ all kind of attacks for far too long. systems, coupled with meshed networks pable, largely interference-resistant, highly systems to support deployed operations flexible in operation, with enormous The taxonomy of space weapons de- as these enable data-exchange in difficult bandwidths and low latency. SpaceX’s veloped by Todd Harrison provides a environments. The use of space and space- Starlink program in particular shows well-structure overview of the developing derived data will likely increase over the how it’s done. Every month Elon Musk is threat spectrum: 7 next two decades. current­ly putting up to 60 Starlink satel-

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Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 6/2021

 Earth-to-space kinetic, include physical akin to that of being hit by an ASAT missile their focus of attack to weaken Western systems such as anti-satellite (ASAT) – magnifies the already existing problem command and information systems. Emer- missiles designed to destroy satellites of congestion in space, thus rendering ging quantum technologies - including without placing the weapon system or unusable. Against this backdrop, the space-based sensors and secure commu­ any of its components into orbit. capability of Space Situational Awareness nications and data processing based on  Earth-to-space non-kinetic, includes (SSA) has gained in relevance in order to quantum encryption – will add to the jammers, laser dazzlers or cyberattacks deliver detailed knowledge of any given existing trend. launched from Earth aiming to inter- space object’s location, and to ensure fere, temporarily or permanently, with the ability to track and predict its future NATO has only recently discovered space satellite capability. location. as an operational domain, though it has  Space-to-space kinetic, includes physi- built own C4ISR capabilities decades ago, cal systems launched from other satel- Of course, cyber threats have an important on a predominantly US backbone. NATO’s lites physically intercepting satellites in role in space. Actors can use offensive Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated order to disrupt or destroy them. cyberspace capabilities and other hybrid in late 2019,  Space-to-space non-kinetic, includes means to enable a range of reversible disrupting space-based systems from to non-reversible effects against space “Making space an operational domain another satellite using non-kinetic systems. In particular, hybrid warfare will help us ensure all aspects are taken means such as high-powered micro- allows for the diffusion of opponents’ SSA into account to ensure the success of our waves, jammers, and robotic technolo- via information operations, i.e. electronic missions …”. 11 gy for satellite servicing and repair.8 warfare, and cyber operations. In fact,  Space-to-Earth kinetic, addresses im- upcoming challenges cross-cut space In Europe, in the past, three flagship pacting a terrestrial target from space. and cyber domains. Ground-based space programmes – Copernicus, Galileo, Egnos  Space-to-Earth non-kinetic, addresses infrastructure is particular vulnerable to – have been at the fore of its space acti- impacting terrestrial targets by lasers, cyber-attacks. There are plenty of access vities. With view to upcoming challenges high-power microwaves, and other points which can be attacked – including the EU also strives for high-quality, and types of radiofrequency weapons. the antennae on the satellites, the ground secure space-related data and services stations, and the earth-based user termi- as well as a leading role for the EU in the All of these systems exist – perhaps with nals. Such attacks range from exploiting space sector.12 Current initiatives aim the exception of space-to-earth kinetic as the physical vulnerabilities of a ground to strengthen capabilities with view to there is no confirmed open knowledge. site to electronic warfare, to disrupting the critical infrastructures, cyber-security or They are tested by several actors from East, connection between the space segment quantum technologies.13 Governmental West and elsewhere. We can expect upco- and the operator. Satellite Communications (GOVSATCOM) ming capabilities for manoeuvre warfare as another key space initiative of the EU in space. In a number of critical space technologies, at the crossroads of space, security and such as quantum, cyber and electronic defence aims to ensure reliable, secure With battlefields being heavily impacted warfare, states such as China and Russia al- and cost-effective satellite communica- by disruptive technologies and warfare ready have an edge over the West, and this tion services in both the commercial and becoming increasingly hybrid, an array tends to increase due to the proliferating military environments. of disrupting technologies is spilling effect such technologies have upon each over into the military domain, including other. China’s success in satellite-based The US is focussed on maintaining leader- robotics, energy storage solutions, cloud QKD – delivering next-generation encryp- ship in space as it considers space as of computing, advanced materials, nano tion keys to networks in geographically vital national interest. In December 2019, technology, 3D printing and many more. dispersed areas – is a shining example of the US Congress authorised building the Many of these disruptive technologies that what should be expected. United States . Its mission will are relevant for the military originate from be to: the commercial sector. As a consequence, 4.  run the existing constellation of US the number of vulnerabilities keeps further military satellites that are currently growing. Vis-à-vis these challenges, the unhindered managed by the services; access to – and freedom to operate in –  operate the military’s launch facilities; Along with the masses of small satellites space has become of vital importance to  execute financial planning and pro- that have started populating space in the NATO, the EU and their member nations.9 gramming to purchase satellites and future, will increase rapidly. Their military strength rests in large ground support equipment; and Given their enormous speed, even very part on space-based C4ISR10, timing and  train a specialised cadre of space small objects can cause a huge amount of navigation. Competitors and opponents officers and enlisted personnel.14 damage. The risk of collision with debris – understand this. Space has long been

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Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 6/2021

Also, Chinese and Russian military doc­ Focus and investment NATO, the EU and their respective member trines underline the importance of space nations would be well-advised to further for modern warfare. Both states want The more space is used for security purpo- increase their investment in space-related to use their own capabilities to limit the ses, the more infrastructures and services research and development (R&D) activities. military effectiveness of the US and its must be secure and reliable.16 Consequent- Innovation needs to be upscaled, taking allies, and have implemented this goal by ly, the EU aims to translate the upcoming advantage of disruptive technologies such means of military reorganisation in 2015. hybrid and disruptive technological chal- as AI, robotics, 5G or quantum for space Both countries have developed robust and lenges into viable, security/defence capa- capabilities. Not only the commercial com- efficient capabilities, including space- bilities, which also yield dividends on both petition in space is challenging. Hybrid based ISR, as well as improvements to European and global markets. This calls for and further threats to security and defence space launchers and satellite navigation an orchestrated, focussed and engaged are real and growing dynamically. constellations. These provide for monito- investment in research & development in ring opponents forces and deploying own order to ensure that innovation responds Ralph Thiele, President, EuroDefense forces in a targeted manner. to commercial and military needs, but also Germany and Managing Director, StratByrd enhances the capacity to manage space Consulting. China has expanded its space capabilities technologies and protect critical space by several orders of magnitude. The scale infrastructures. of Chinese investment surpasses that of all Endnotes other nations. China is the lead - At a time where Industry 4.0 is revoluti- 1) Ralph Thiele. Disruptive Technologien - Chancen und Risiken launch nation in the world. It operates onising collaboration, production and im Kontext hybrider Gefahrenlagen. In Jäger, Thomas, Daun, two space stations, and has only recently services, integration of satellite Internet of Anna, Freudenberg, Dirk (Hrsg.). „Politisches Krisenmanage- ment 3: Führung, Recht, Organisationen“. 2021. landed a on the far side of the Things (IoT) and Global Navigation Satel- 2) Anthony Cordesman. The Biden Transition and U.S. moon. In 2018, the country conducted lite System (GNSS) constitute a valuable Competition with China and Russia: The Crisis-Driven Need 25 per cent more orbital launches than capability to loop hardware products in to Change U.S. Strategy. CSIS 2021. https://csis-website-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/2020811.Burke_ 17 the US. Counterspace capabilities are of both remote and extreme environments. Chair.AHC_.GH9_.pdf particular interest to China. In 2018 alone, Already today, there is a premium on dis- 3) Matt Leonard. Encrypting satellite communications. GCN. 27 April 2018. https://gcn.com/articles/2018/04/27/darpa-satellite- it tested several ASAT. ruptive and game-changing technologies communications-encryption.aspx that are autonomous, reconfigurable, agile 4) Wilbur Ross. Remarks at the Sixth Meeting. U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington, Tuesday, Long gone is the Soviet Union’s Cold and adaptable. The space industry benefits August 20, 2019. https://www.commerce.gov/news/spee- War era dominance in the space domain. in particular from advanced technologies, ches/2019/08/remarks-us-commerce-secretary-wilbur-l-ross- Yet, Russia remains a prominent space capabilities, business models and services. sixth-national-space-council 5) ESRE. Whitepaper. Selected Trends and Space Technologies power. Since the mid-2000s, Russia has These include: Expected to Shape the Next Decade. November 2017. https:// started modernising many of its langu-  Real-time, multi-domain Space Situati- esre-space.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESRE_Whitepa- per_-2017.pdf ishing space capabilities. It appears that onal Awareness; 6) Patrick Biewer. The future of secure satellite communications. it is currently developing ASAT weapons,  Automated cyber forensics and ana- Luxembourg Space Agency. 13 December 2019. https://space- ground- and air-based laser weapons, lytics; agency.public.lu/en/news-media/news/2019/the_future_of_se- cure_satellite_communications.html# and a network of electronic weapons,  Autonomous and automated space 7) Todd Harrison. International Perspectives on Space Weapons. supported by capable offensive cyber systems; May 2020. https://aerospace.csis.org/international-perspecti- ves-on-space-weapons/ capabilities, targeting satellite systems  Digital beam forming, able to reconfig­ 8) DIA. Challenges to Security in Space. January 2019. https:// and related ground stations. ure SAT footprints as missions require; www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/1754150/ defense-intelligence-agency-releases-report-on-challenges-to-  On-board resilience and self-healing us-security-in-spa/ The Chinese and Russian space sur- satellites; 9) EDA. 2018 CDP Revision. The EU Capability Development veillance networks are ideally suited  New concepts in space-ground opera- Priorities. Brussels. Pg. 9. https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/ default-source/eda-publications/eda-brochure-cdp to search for, track, and classify third tions, i.e. enhanced predictive techno- 10) Command, Control. Communication, Computer, Intelli- countries satellites. Both states have logies, or dynamic encryption; gence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 11) Daniel Boffey. NATO leader identifies space as the next an impressive portfolio of cyber and  Hardware products, such as flat panel ‘operational domain’. Brussels. November 20, 2019. https:// electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, antennas (FPA), that will increase the amp-theguardian-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/amp.theguar- energy weapons and ground-based ASAT efficiency of satellite communication dian.com/world/2019/nov/20/nato-identifies-space-as-next- operational-domain missiles. Russian and Chinese satellites on-the-move demand for armed 12) Council of the EU. The EU shapes its future have repeatedly demonstrated their capa- forces; programme. Brussels. 13 March 2019. https://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/13/eu-shapes-its- bilities for precise maneuvers in space.  Predictive and automated threat analy- future-space-policy-programme/ These enable, for example, the repair of sis, advanced data analytics; 13) UKRI. UK and Singapore collaborate on GBP 10m satellite project. 27 September 2018. https://stfc.ukri.org/news/uk-and- satellites in space, but also provide the  Advanced quantum capabilities in singapore-collaborate-on-10m-satellite-project/ capability to damage or destroy satellites the areas of computing and crypto- 14) James Stavridis. - What to expect when of opponents without kinetic impact.15 graphy. you‘re expecting a new branch of the military. Bloomberg News (TNS) December 30, 2019 http://m.startribune.com/what-to-

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Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 6/2021

expect-when-you-re-expecting-a-new-branch-of-the-milita- ry/566569632/

15) DIA. Challenges to Security in Space. January 2019. https:// www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/1754150/ defense-intelligence-agency-releases-report-on-challenges-to- us-security-in-spa/

16) Kai-Uwe Schrogl (Editor in Chief). Handbook of Space Secu- rity 2020 (2nd edition). Berlin 2020. https://www.springer.com/ gp/book/9783030232092

17) Juan Fraire, Sandra Céspedes, Nicola Accettura. Direct-To- Satellite IoT - A Survey of the State of the Art and Future Re- search Perspectives: Backhauling the IoT Through LEO Satellites. ADHOC-NOW2019: Ad-Hoc, Mobile, and Wireless Networks, Oct 2019, Luxembourg, Luxembourg. pp.241-258, 10.1007/978-3- 030-31831-4_17. hal-02315399 https://hal.laas.fr/hal-02315399/ document

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