STEPHEN С. ROWELL Wilno
NOLITE CONFIDERE IN PRINCIPIBUS: MIKHAIL GLINSKY, SIGISMUND THE OLD AND THE COUNCIL OF LORDS
The fifteenth century witnessed a series of important changes in the governance of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, not the least of which was the growth of the power and self-identity as a political force among a central kernel of the Lithuanian Council of Lords. This formed a gradual transition from the leadership of Vytautine Lithuania (Gasztold [Goštautas] and his entourage) to a Radziwiłł [Radvila]- dominated politics by the end of the period, which was accompanied by antagonism between those who made a career at court in the personal entourage of the monarch and over time moved out to take administrative posts and those who developed their careers from being major local landowners and leaders to become holders of the main central offices of state and only later took an interest in other power areas such as the court and the Church. It is in this dynamic context that we might examine the rise and fall of the Glinskys rather than solely the traditional narrower scenario of crimes d'etat. The story of Mikhail Glinsky and his „rebellion" against Sigismund the Old in 1508 has been the object of political exempla, belles lettres, tales and black propaganda even from before the affair began in earnest with the murder of Jan Zabrzeziński, former palatine of Trakai, one February night in Grodno in 1508'. In the sixteenth century the name of Glinsky rapidly became a by-word for infamy and treason, and his fate a deliberate warning to other would-be political malcontents. Frequent use of the word zfdjradtsa in Lithuanian sources appears to date from this time2. Glinsky, we are told briefly, was the favourite creature of Alexander Jagiellończyk, whose fall from grace was so painful that Prince
1 L. Finkel, Elekcja Zygmunta I. Sprawy dynastii jagiellońskiej i unii polsko-litewskiej, Kraków 1910, pp. 226-227, on the basis of Sigismund Herberstein's commentary and the diary of Łukasz Noskowski; the same date is given in Maciej Drzewicki's diary, see appendix below. 2 The word is of Polish origin (as opposed to the Eastern Slavonicpredatel, izmennik) - M. Va s m e r, Etimologicheskii slovar'russkogo iazyka, translated from the 1956-1958 Heidelberg edition {Russisches etymologisches Wörterbuch) by O.N. Trubachcv, II, Moscow 1986, p. 105; cf. I.I. Srczncvskii, Materiały dla slovaria drevnerusskogo iazyka, I, St Petersburg 1893, p. 997. Lithuanian Metrica VI, fol.49v, 57v (1495), 220v (1501). These deal with cases of defections to Muscovy where their pro-
77 Mikhail rose up in arms against his monarch and in cahoots with the Muscovite tyrant in order to seize the throne. He was the prime example of a wilful noble and a warning to all other potential disloyal elements. This predicament began to change only with L. FinkePs groundbreaking study of the election of Sigismund the Old as grand duke of Lithuania and subsequently king of Poland3. In this study we will concentrate on three main questions, viz.: was Mikhail Glinsky merely a creation of Grand Duke Alexander and the creator of his own family's undoubted position at court? Did Glinsky's training affect his relationships with other political factions within the Grand Duchy, including the Jagiellonian monarchs? Did Glinsky belong to a faction wider than that of his family? Was Mikhail Glinsky merely the creation of Alexander Jagiellończyk, who came to naught after his patron's death? King Sigismund claimed after the fact (of,.treason") in 1508 that in comparison with other members of the Council of Lords Mikhail Glinsky „не по отечеству славен был а ласкою брата нашого"4. То some extent the monarch had a point. Unlike most noble leaders in the Council Mikhail was not known as beres de (although his cognomen, Glinsky, does refer back to his ancestral estates and he did refer to himself later as de Turov) and had no patrimonial land base on which to rely for support in the way that local landowners often became local office holderss. His extensive estates in Podlasie and Polesie (Turov, Goniądz, Raigorod) were granted to him in perpetuity by a grateful monarch and supplemented by command of several
perty is not to be granted to their kinpo blizkosti but falls forfeit to the grand duke. References to rebels appear in Latin texts from the Grand Duchy with more frequency at this time - KDKDW, p. 703. In his Quincunx (ed. K.J. Turowski, Kraków 1858, p. 73) Stanisław Orzechowski notes that the Kingdom of Poland has never produced a traitor like Glinsky. In contemporary texts Glinsky's name appears alongsidezradtsa orproditor. 3Finkel,£/e£g'
|7S state offices6. As befitted a high-ranking member of the grand-ducal court and Council he owned a house in Vilnius and a lakeside residence in Trakai. However, the Glinskys were not homines novi, even though they were far from being men of the centre. They were of Tatar princely stock7 and converts to Russian Orthodox Christianity, claiming connections with Vytautas, whom their ancestor is alleged to have rescued during the Battle of Vorskla (1399), and their power was based in southern lands of the Grand Duchy3. The market value of such «princes» may have fallen somewhat by the end of the fifteenth century-Stanislaw Górski makes fun of impoverished princes, claiming that there were many such impecunious nobles in Lithuanian Rus': „est in Lithuania ducum vulgarium numerus magnus [...] Hi licet pauperes sint, ducum tamen ex vetusto genere nomen ас titulum retinent"9. A similar attempt to besmirch the reputation of Grand Hetman Prince Konstanty Ostrogski was made in 1525 by Olbracht Gasztold10. However, birth did not guarantee the Glinskys' success. They owed their power to a range of factors, namely matrimonial alliance with princely families from Lithuanian Rus', service at court and subsequent royal largesse. Their connections with important Tatar khans (Mengli Girey, Shah Ahmed) were extremely useful to Lithuanian rulers faced with military incursions on their southern borders from Tatar hordes. They came to greater prominence first in the service of Swidrigiello, whose chancellor was Boris Ivanovich, Mikhail's grandfather". When Swidrigiello died in 1452, his court did not die with him; it was transformed and dispersed. The Chreptowiczes, for example, moved to Casimir I(IV)'s court12. They moved to the personal space of the grand duke-king, not necessarily to Vilnius, the administrative centre of Church and State (more so in the absence of the monarch). The Glinskys were also part of this world. Mikhail's grandfather served Vytautas, Swidrigiello and Casimir; he married the widow of the Gediminid prince, Ivan Korybutovich Lengvenovich and made connections away from the south (Chernigov) in the north-eastern palatinate of Minsk. His nephews Vatslav and Yaroslav Ivanovich served Marcin Gasztold
' Osheikovski, Trakai, Turov, Goniądz, Lisovo (Bielskpowiat), Punia, Vilnius house (granted in 1508 to Ostrogski), Mozhcikovo and Bikushki (Zholud powiat), Raigorod- Wold, Kniaziowie..., pp. 81, 85. 7 See S. Kryczyński, Początki rodu książąt Glińskich. Prace historyczne w 30-lecic działalności profesorskiej Stanisława Zakrzewskiego, Lwów 1934, pp. 397-410 and M.E. B y c h k o v a, Rodoslovie Glinskikh iz Rumiantsevskogo sobrania, Zapiski otdela rukopisei Gosudarstvennoi Biblioteki 38: 1977, pp. 112-113, 120-121. ' Bychkova, Rodoslovie... ' S. G ó r s k i, Commentarius rerum gestarum a Sigismundo primo, rege Polonie magno duce Lithuanie, AT.I.p. 15. 10 Calling him a low-born, Ruthenian impoverished prince - AT, VII, pp. 258-269. " O. Halecki, Ostatnie lata Świdrygicłły, pp. 111, 141, 212, 287. "Halecki./foW.pp. 255,275.
79 (palatine of Kiev) and Mikołaj Radziwiłł respectively, according to sixteenth- century Muscovite genealogical texts13. His daughter Fedka married Alexander Drozdcza, grand-ducal lieutentant of Kamieniec in Podole (1470-1475), whose son Andrei went on to become constable of Vilnius, lieutenant of Belsk and, controversially, lieutenant of Lida and Mikhail Glinsky's associate. Drozdcza, like Vassily Glinsky led a grand-ducal embassy to the Tatars in 149614. The Glinskys in one sense were provincial but the provinces from which they hailed on the eastern and southern borders of the Grand Duchy were significant territories, possession of which was disputed by the Lithuanians, Poles, Muscovites and Tatars. Mikhail's father Lev married into Mstislavl via the widow of Gavriil Meleshkovich, and their daughter Fedka Lvovna married Marcin Bohdanowicz Chreptowicz, brother of Jan Litawor Chreptowicz (who was also probably of Tatar descent). Litawor worked in the court treasury together with another southern noble, of likely Tatar ancestry, Soltan Aleksandrovich. Under Casimir he was keeper of Utena, and later was ambassador to Poland, Prussia, Muscovy and Mazovia under Alexander and eventually marshal of Sigismunde court. It may well be that the marriage of Mikhail's sister into the Chreptowicz family was what opened the way for Mikhail to enter the court of Casimir Jagiellończyk (where his kinsmen already were making a career for themselves as diplomats and continued to do so under Alexander while Mikhail was still abroad) as Litawor's servant and through his patron obtain a chance to study abroad like a normal nobleman's son. However, this meant that he studied politics not in Lithuania among the powerful interrelated and landed governing elite but abroad as a court knecht, a creature for which Lithuanian noblemen did not much care and whose descendants required time to work their way into the political elite, as the case of the more patient and ultimately successful Sapiehas shows. It may be that his journey to the Empire was made from Prussia (where he may have been part of Litawor's embassy to Prussia and Poland in 1493, as Kananovich suggests) perhaps for the funeral of the late Frederick III in November 1493 to form part of the panoply, which included the English pretender Richard Plantagenet15. The claim that Glinsky spent twelve years abroad made by Stanislaw Górski may very well be an exaggeration, although scholars have long since noted that Mikhail's name does not appear in Lithuanian sources alongside those of his
15 This information comes from a latc-sixteenth-ccntury Rodoslovic published in Vremamik im- peratorskago Moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikb X (1851), pp. 84-S5, 157-15S, taken from Sinod Library ms S60 and Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, ms A. " Wolff, Kniaziowie..., pp. 78-79; Lietuvos metrika (1427-1506). Knyga Nr 5, Użrasynu{knyg.t 5 [LM 5], cd. E. Banionis, Vilnius 1993, p. 99. 11 LM 5, No. 17, pp. 70-72, March 9 1493 (response of John Albert, ibid., No. 30, p. 81-S4, dated 1494, recording a meeting with Frederick of Brandenburg); Bychkova, Rodoslovie..., p. 121 cla ims that Mikhail went to the Germans with Litawor; on the funeral of Emperor Frederick III sec A. Wroc, Pcrkin. Л story of deception, London 2004, pp. 149-151. Mikhail is not listed in the in-
|80 brothers between 1482 and 1496, but we should also note that his name is not mentioned before that either and it is unwise to argue from this silence, as the documentary lacuna may simply be a coincidence16. Mikhail converted to Catholicism while abroad, thus avoiding the error of Soltan Aleksandrovich, who accepted the union of Florence as a Uniate but was himself rejected shamefully by the Vilnius lords17. He studied diplomacy, languages and martial skills on the hoof at the courts of influential patrons, the Emperor Maximilian and Duke Albert (nicknamed Animosus) of Saxony18. His style is first and foremost knightly, a feature that was not lost on sixteenth-century commentators and historians". His status was based on personal relationships, which were spread over a broad spectrum (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland, the Holy Roman Empire, Hungary, Silesia, and Denmark) rather than in a small fixed patrimonial area. In this lies his strength and greater weakness, which his enemies in the Council of Lords would exploit. After serving with Albert of Saxony and the Emperor Maximilian he returned with his skills honed to Vilnius, a major court centre under Alexander, ca 1498, in March of which year he is noted in the court accounts20. This period also coincides with a growing interest shown by Alexander and his brother John Albert in crusading, a policy which required good diplomatic relations with other Catholic powers21. Albert of Saxony was the father-in-law of those princes' sister, Barbara (who married Prince George in 1496); and Frederick of Saxony, grand master of the Teutonic Order (an acquaintance of Glinsky), was their brother-in-law22.
dexes of the relevant volumes of Regesta Imperii XIV (under Michael, Glinsky, Polen, Litauen or Russland), although Maximilian was concerned with relations between Poland, Hungary and the Turks - Nos. 571, 2176,3211,3679; Poland and Mazovia (1480) and Prussia (1481). 16 Górski, Commentańus..., p. 15; cf. Bychkova, Sostav..., p. 61. 17 O. Halecki, Od unii florenckiej do unii brzeskiej, I, tr. A. Niklewicz, Lublin-Rome 1997, pp. 140-141. " Bychkova, Rodoslovie..., p. 121; Górski, Commentańus..., p. 15. It may be worthwhile sear ching the holdings of the Sächsisches Hauptsstaatsarchiv in Dresden. " A typical example is the later historian Maciej Stryjkowski, who writes of „Micha! Gliński w sprawach rycerskich mąż sprawny" - Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiej Rusi, II, Warsaw 1846, repr. 1985, p. 333. 20 L. Kolanko ws ki, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonów, 1:1377-1499, Warsaw 1930, 434 n. 6 (p. 435). 21 J. Sm o lu cha, Papiestwo a Polska w latach 1484-1526. Kontakty dyplomatyczne na tle zagrożenia tureckiego, Kraków 1999, pp. 75-77. 22 It may or may not be complete coincidence that the Saxon knight Christoph von Schleinitz was sent to Moscow in the autumn of 1510 to treat with the exile - Finkel, Elekcja..., pp. 229-230. Frederick and Glinsky-letter of July 9 1503 - ibid., pp. 99-100; Górski says that Glinsky studied the military art in Albert's entourage (Commentańus..., p. 15); Herberstein adds that this was during the Saxon duke's campaign against Friesland in 1498-Zapiski o Moskovii, cd. VL Yan i n, Moscow 1988, p. 188. This detail may be Herberstein's deduction, which is not mentioned in other sources.
81 According to Pamiat', Glinsky translated «German» texts from embassies to the court of Alexander23. Even his seal betrayed his «foreign» style. It bears a lily growing on a stand and the legend s. michel. herczog. linczk: vetus2\ Here then was a young man with up-to-date skills and good connections at home and even better ones abroad. His brothers had already begun to gain posts in Russian lands in the 1480s, not to mention his connection with Litawor and former members of Swidrigiello's court. When Alexander granted the Lososinaya estate (Slonim powiat) to Vassily Lvovich Glinsky on December 13 1504, he states that this is a reward f or services rendered to Kings Casimir, John Albert and himself". Scholarly tradition makes Mikhail the source of his kinsmen's good fortune. This is not so. His brothers made their careers before Mikhail returned from abroad by being useful in important matters at a difficult time, namely the disputes with the Tatars and Muscovy and fears over losing control of Kiev. Their fortunes became more solid still after 1495 when Vassily and Bogdan accompanied Alexander's grand duchess, Elena, to Vilnius26. The head of this mission was their affine Jan Litawor Chreptowicz. The careers of Vassily and Ivan Glinsky were hardly damaged by the success of their brother, but Mikhail was not responsible for their rank, nor did they lose status after Mikhail's star began to wane when Sigismund came to power. Those Glinskys who remained in Lithuania after 1508 continued to enjoy royal favour. Mikhail's old patron and brother-in-law, Litawor Chreptowicz probably helped him obtain the keepership of Utena (1499-1507), which Chreptowicz had held himself in 148927. Utena is an exception among powiaty in the Vilnius Palatinate because it belonged to the grand duke and had no local noble landowners. The keeper of Utena was a type of co-owner with the ruler and could appoint his own deputy; it was thus a means to avoid the problems of a powerful local gentry and at the same time a honey pot to arouse the envy of other non-local but neighbouring Lithuanian nobles (such as the Radziwills, who had long dominated neighbouring areas of Trans-Nerijan Lithuania such as Užpaliai, Pienioniai and Anykščiai)28. He was also appointed as keeper of Merkinė (Merecz) in the Palatinate of Trakai. Merkinė too had no local ranking landowners - Glinsky obtained a large estate at Liškiava, which after his rebellion fell to
" Bychkova, Rodoslovie..., p. 121. 24 Akta unii Polski z Litwą 138}-1791 [AUPL], ed. S. Kutrzeba, W. Semkowicz, Kraków 1932, No. 78, Aug. 9 1501. This differs from the coat of arms traditionally attributed to the Glinskys (cross argent on a field gules) which is reminiscent of a Tatar tamga -Kryczyński, Początki..., p. 403. » LM 5, p. 270. " I. Danilowicz, Skarbiec dyplomatów papieskich, cesarskich..., II, Vilnius 1862, No. 2085, p. 240. "Z. Wojtkowiak, Litwa zawilejska w XV i pienvszcj polowie XVI wieku, Poznań 1980, pp. 71-73. 11 Ibid.
Į 82 Princess Anastasia Semenova Slutskaya; the Radziwiłłs and Sapiehas gained estates in the area only after 15082'; in time he became holder of mint and wax monopoly, court marshal, prominent in royal favour and a clear pain in the side of the new Vilnius court and administration clique. Grand Duke Alexander seems to have tried his best to place Glinsky in offices where there were no major local gentry (and hence no natural local holder of the keepership or lieutenancy). However, his presence did infringe on the familial ambitions of certain important families - his presence in Utena and marshalcy at court (in place of the imprisoned Grzegorz Ościkowicz) may have displeased the Radziwiłł family who were cousins to the Ościkowiczes and hailed from Trans-Nerijan estates. At the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Council of Lords was dominated by a group of four interrelated, wealthy and powerful men: Radziwiłł, Zabrzeziński, Kiszka and Kieżgajło [Kęsgailą]30. Later sources mention that Mikhail cleared boyars out of the way in front of the grand duke, in other words he controlled access to the monarch, a state of affairs that was bound to displease other noblemen: „Коли король Александр пойдет к церкви или от церкви и князь Михаило Глинский перед королем детей боярских розбивает"31. In December 1500 he is already mentioned as court marshal, as a replacement for Grzegorz Ościkowicz, who had been captured by the Muscovites at the battle of Vedrosha. Indeed the number of important officers captured by the Muscovites, including Jan Litawor Chreptowicz, Bogdan Fedorovich Glinsky and Konstanty Ostrogski, may have benefited the careers of Mikhail Glinsky and his brothers and Litawor's siblings. In the spring of 1500 Alexander had difficulty putting down an Aufruhr or rebellion in the Grand Duchy. It is tempting to speculate whether Glinsky had a hand in repressing the uprising, which is mentioned only in correspondence between the grand master of the Teutonic Order and the grand duke32. Later that year serious raids were inflicted on the Grand Duchy by Tatar marauders. Presumably Glinsky helped deal with these too. The reign of Alexander saw several threats of rebellion arise within the Grand Duchy, such as that involving the brother of Bishop Tabor of Vilnius33. Mikhail is credited with training the first Lithuanian troop of hussars in the Hungarian style in 1501. Mikhail Glinsky supported Alexander over the latter's claims to the throne of Poland (as did the rest of the lords) and bore witness to various stages of the union treaty drafted in Melnik in 1501. For some reason Glinsky has been portrayed by
" A. Černiauskas, H. Gudavičius, V. Vai t kevičiu s, Л/ег&ша istorijos bruožai, Vilnius 2004, pp. 145-154, 161-164. 10 Pietkiewicz, Wielkie Księstwo..., pp. 90-97, 100-102. 51 Bychkova, Rodoslovie..., p. 121. "J. Voigt, Geschichte Preussens, IX (Königsberg 1839), 272 citing Foliant Y, 328, Apr. 25 1500 (Saturday before Quasimodogeniti). " KDKDW, p. 591.
83 some historians as an opponent of the union with Poland and as a member of a group of noblemen in opposition to alleged pro-union lords34. There is no evidence for the existence of any such parties. We should resist the temptation to think in monolithic terms such as „Poland" or „Lithuania", when fifteenth-century politics was dominated by the antagonistic relationship between influential noble groups (most notably in Małopolska), who may have regarded themselves as being the true „Poland" (and by 1508 indeed, „Lithuania"), and the monarch. As Grand Duke-King Alexander became involved in Polish affairs Mikhail encountered heightened opposition from the Vilnius lords. He may have helped his kin and fellows from Lithuanian Rus' gain preferment, as is alleged traditionally over the case of Drozdcza, his cousin. He was part of a circle of affines and siblings, which enjoyed grand-ducal favour. In Krakow in 1504 Glinsky, Chreptowicz and Kłoczko witnessed asset of charters granted by the monarch (including ones for Chreptowicz and Kłoczko themselves)35. Witnessing a charter does not make a witness the guiding spirit behind the document, of course, but it may reflect belonging to a favoured or interested inter-connected group, rather than just part of an ad hoc audience at court. In Alexander's reign the Chreptowiczes (Martin and Fedko) and Mikhail Glinsky dominated the sub-treasurer's office and the mint. In 1503 Glinsky accused Jan Zabrzeziński, then palatine of Trakai, of trying to kill him and was dissatisfied with Alexander's attempt to quell the dispute by binding both sides to keep the peace36. With two thrones Alexander was no longer in a position to control political court-administration rivalries in Lithuania, although in 1505 he did remove Zabrzeziński. When Alexander died, as Finkel has argued convincingly, Glinsky did his utmost to advance the early election of Sigismund to the Lithuanian throne (thereby in effect guaranteeing him the Polish throne)37. Sigismund's reaction to continued disputes between Glinsky and Zabrzeziński (who spread the rumour that Glinsky had been plotting to seize the throne after Alexander died and even that Glinsky had arranged for the monarch's death) was to avoid a libel case, despite promising to hear it, and taking the balancing measure of removing Glinsky from the marshalcy. It should be noted that although Mikhail Glinsky lost offices his brothers did not38. Glinsky is described by all, including his enemies, as being noble, proud, and skilled. Górski calls him „homo audax animo, ingenio sagax, corpore etiam
" N. A d a Jauskicnč, KiškugiminėLDKXV-XVIIa. Genealoginis tyrimas, Vilnius 2003, p. 103; Trimonienė, Lietuvos..., p. 47, views this ironically; Krupska, Przekaz.., pp. 118-119. " LM 5, pp. 265, 266, 26S. ,lAkty Litovskoi mariki, 1.2, cd. F.I. Lcontovich, Warsaw 1S97, No. 661, p. 123. "Finkel, Elekcja... " Ibid., p. 184; On July 27 1507 Vassily Glinsky was made starosta for life of Brest with control of its castle and kliuch: LM S, No. 210.
I 84 robustus ас ad pericula subeunda promptus"39. It is clear that such a man's patience would not last forever as the monarch continually avoided granting him an opportunity to gain redress against Zabrzeziński. He attempted to get his broad gamut of connections to help him return to court dominance, first and foremost Sigismunde own brother, Władysław Jagiellończyk of Hungary and Bohemia, and the Tatar khan, Mengli Girej. This had no effect^even though the Hungarian king did send his envoy Pniowski to Vilnius in the summer of 1507 and the Tatar khan claimed to have sent many letters to the monarch asking for the marshalcy to be restored to Glinsky on threat of breaking good relations between Mengli and Sigismund40. In 1507 Mikhail was warned (or provoked) by the Polish chancellor, Jan Łaski, that he would never be safe from the Lithuanian lords41. Maciej Drzewicki, the vice-chancellor of Poland, claims that Łaski was the agent provocateur behind the rebellion. This would make sense in so far as the chancellor attempted to train the Lithuanian lords as a counterweight to Sigismunde authority in the Polish tradition. However, Drzewicki sees Łaski as the evil genius behind most of the major disturbances affecting Sigismunde reign42. Whatever the case may be, in February 1508 Glinsky's patience broke and he took the law into his own hands, killing his defamer. Then further attempts were made to obtain support, while he secured his own power base, asking for intercession via the Council of Lords from the king who deliberately avoided him still43. He gets a chance to speak to envoys he cannot trust. The Polish lords tell the Lithuanians that the king is busy and cannot come and stress repeatedly that they should deal with the matter as though the king were present: „ex quo [the enemy] videbit Dominationes vestras non minus absente domino facientes ad defensionem, quam facturos crederet una cum domino suo"44. This amounted to a carte blanche for Mikołaj II Radziwiłł and his friends and clean hands for the king, who as king of Poland and grand duke was unable politically to support a favourite who caused great trouble for him with the ever-stronger Vilnius —based administration lords. The Glinsky Affair took place during war with Moscow but it was not connected directly with Moscow. 1508 also saw many attacks from Tatar forces on the Grand Duchy but these were not connected or coordinated always with Glinsky's actions. Glinsky began seeking support from his old connections
35 Górski, Commentarius..., p. 15; on Glinsky's character see Finkel, Elekcja..., p. 91. 40 See appendix, p. 94 and LM 8. 41 See appendix, p. 94. 42 Ibid. 4' Letter from Lords to Glinsky - Materiały do dziejów dyplomacji polskiej z lat 1486-1Я 6 (Kodeks zagrzebski),ed.J. Garbacik, Wroclaw-Warsaw-Kraków 1966,No. 53,pp. 165-166; correspondence between Vilnius and Kraków -ibid., Nos. 50-52, pp. 159-165 and below appendix, p. 94. 44 Appendix, p. 94.
85 - Denmark, the Empire, and the Tatars, while Sigismund did his best to counter these pleas, changing his explanation of events to match Glinsky's claims, trying to portray him as a danger to all, even to Moscow (accusing him of unfounded harm to Elena and eventually of planning not to serve Vassily but to retreat to the Dikiye Pole whence to attack both the Grand Duchy and Muscovy)45. Glinsky went to Moscow as a last resort; members of many leading families from Lithuanian Rus', including his own, had already done this before. From his first years in Moscow he continued to ask for help in intercession with the king. At the height of the troubles Glinsky is portrayed clearly by members of the Polish Council as being a danger to both the royal majesty and themselves. Vice- Chancellor Maciej Drzewicki notes that Glinsky conspired „adversus prefatum regem Sigismundum et adversus barones ducatus magni"46. Within three weeks of the beginning of the affair the Tatar khan Mengli Girey had written to Sigismund in favour'of his old friend Glinsky (to whom he had been petitioning Sigismund to restore the marshalcy). On February 21 Sigismund informed the khan that Glinsky had attacked him, his lord and assembled wicked men to go to Kaunas to release Shah Ahmed in order to attack Mengli from the Nagay steppes. For years Mengli had asked Glinksy to help keep Shah Ahmed imprisoned in Lithuania. He asks Mengli not to listen to Glinsky's envoys and their pleas for aid47. The monarch also says he will pay the 4,500 gold pieces he owes the khan. In other words, Sigismund is attempting to cut Glinsky off from Tatar aid through veiled threats (to Mengli from Ahmed) and pecuniary reward. Some time around March 12, if we are to believe the author of Russkiivremennik, Mengli Girej offered to set the Glinsky brothers up as rulers of Kiev48. What is striking about this source is that the main «rebel» during the open stages of the conflict is Ivan Glinsky, the former lieutenant of Kiev, rather than his brother Mikhail. By late April the stakes are higher. Sigismund portrays the danger to himself, his council of lords and all the grand duchy's lands, saying that Glinsky has sworn allegiance to the Muscovite and promised him control of the Grand Duchy's southern and eastern border towns (which officially Mengli Girey granted by patent (yarlyk) to the grand dukes of Lithuania). Muscovite envoys have treated with Glinsky in Mozyr; the rebels have promised to release Shah Ahmed, have killed Zabrzeziński, captured Tatar envoys, Sigismunde men and
41 Л.Л. Zi m i n, Novoco vosstanii Mikbaila Glinsbogo v 1508 g., Sovctskic arkhivy 1970: 5, p. 70. j 86 Kaffa merchants4'. Six weeks later on June 11 Sigismund repeats the story about Zabrzeziński and an attempt to release Shah Ahmed from Kaunas50. He refutes arguments put forward by Glinsky and retold by the khan, namely that everything happened because Glinsky was stripped of the marshalcy; he accuses him of having tried to seize the throne after Alexander died; he claims he had allowed Glinsky to retain all the lands he had seized svavole; the Council and Zabrzeziński told him about Glinsky's actions; Glinsky does not have Shah Ahmed (as the rebel is said to have informed the khan) and Sigismund has sent an envoy to Kaunas to make sure (perhaps the ruse had worried Mengli indeed). Glinsky's envoys embellish their accounts to the khan. He promises to send Glinsky's letters addressed to Moscow, which he has intercepted. The coup de grace in this battle of information between Mengli, Sigismund and Glinsky is contained in an undated letter issued between the end of July and the beginning of October 150851: Glinsky, Sigismund says, rebelled because he did not obtain the marshalcy (Glinsky's own explanation to Mengli) but this is because the marshalcy belongs to Grzegorz Ościkowicz (despite the fact that he was still in Muscovite captivity); it has been said that „таковый молодец добрый штож иного в Литве такого нет"52 and so, Sigismund concedes in contradiction, it is - there is no such traitor as he in Lithuania; his services to Alexander (which Glinsky himself vaunted) were bad; he murdered Zabrzeziński, and has sided with Shah Ahmed and Moscow; he is not of illustrious lineage, like the members of our council, but prospered through royal grace and favour; ever since he has been in Muscovy Mengli's envoys have been detained there. Meanwhile Sigismund attempted to undermine Glinsky's position with Vassily Ivanovich too. He mentions how Mengli Girey has tried to intervene to make peace; Glinsky used magic to kill Vassily's brother-in-law, Alexander (an argument he did not present to Mengli) and tried to make trouble for his father, Ivan III. He has done manyprikrosti to Queen Elena, Vassily's sister, and has allied himself with smerd' and parobki (churls and knaves) like himself53. He complains that Vassily has detained Sigismund's envoys at Glinsky's request54. Later Sigismund attempts to persuade the Muscovite to hand Glinsky over to him, with further suggestions of his untrustworthiness. In the end he even accuses him of having rebelled in order to avoid trial in Lithuania. While this correspondence was under way and Glinsky was still hoping for reconciliation with Sigismund, it seems that matters in Lithuania were proceeding
4* LM 8, No. 63. 50 LM 8, No. 64. 51 LM 8, No. 69. "Ibid., p. 111. 51 LM 8, No. 65, 21.06.1508. Sigismund uses the vocabulary of Muscovite political insult. 5,LM8,No. 68, 05.08.1508.
87 in such a way that no reconciliation would be possible. From early April the lands of the Glinsky brothers and their kin and supporters were being redistributed by the king in Kraków via Bishop Tabor, Alexander Jurewicz Holszański, Miko łaj II Radziwiłł, Stanislaw Janowicz Kieżgajło, Stanisław Piotrowicz Kiszka and Olbracht Gasztold. Despite the fact that a policy of sequestrating rebel property was discussed by the Vilnius Sejm only at the end of 1508, between April 8 and 10 of that year Fedor Kollantai was granted Klevitsa (owned by Vassily Glinsky) because he had escaped from the Glinskys, leaving his wife and children behind55; the Epimakhovichi gained Ratom which the Drozdczas had once owned; Radziwiłł had already become lieutenant in Goniądz and Raigorod; in May Jan Sapieha, the scribe who had been in Kraków with Sigismund and drafted the April charters, was granted Mikhail Glinsky's estate at Lisovo56; other grants of land once owned by Ivan, Mikhail and Vassily Glinsky follow in June, July and August 150857. Some grants were made temporarily and altered. Some was granted in compensation for damage done by the rebels, some were granted to service colleagues of the Glinskys, some were sought as restoration of former holdings by heirs sold to, passed on as dowry payment to or otherwise acquired by the Glinskys58. Some land was restituted to men formerly suspected of taking part in the rebellion (such as Ivashko Nemirovich, a former client of Ivan Glinsky5'). Did Glinsky belong to a faction? There have been unsuccessful attempts in the past to portray Mikhail Glinsky as a „Russian" or a champion of an „Orthodox" party and it seems quite clear that he did not belong to an ethnic or confessional clique. He was willing to exploit religious sentiments in order to enlist the sympathies of Russian Orthodox subjects of the Grand Duchy, when this was relevant, and those of possible Catholic intermediaries (such as the burghers of Gdańsk or Emperor Maximilian) as need arose for him to escape from Orthodox Muscovy. The Ruthenian and Orthodox Ostrogsky, commander of Sigismunde army, was loyal to his master. However, it seems that the Glinksys were important as members of a group of southern lords, which included the Chreptowiczes, the Drozdczas and the Daszkowiczes40. The Pamiat' records that Mikhail's father Lev had belonged to a group of boyars in the retinue of Ivan Yurevich Lengvenovich Mstislavski and these men's kin were active politically
55 LM 8, Nos. 305-306. "LM 8, No. 310. " LM 8, Nos. 317-319, 328, 330, 337. " LM 8 Nos. 306-307, 310, 312, 315 (cf. 379), 317-318 (cf. 337, 391), 319, 324, 32S (cf. 352), 351 (cf. 305), 375-376, 410. Later settlements from 1509-1510: Nos. 424, 429, 457, 521, 542, 623. "LM 8, No. 521. 40 Glinsky and Drozdcza witness a charter for Ciolck, 27.02.1500, KDKDW 467, p. 549; Vassily Glinsky and the Chreptowiczes - 1505, KDKDW 597, p. 713.
I SS in the time of Alexander61. It is through this connection that Mikhail Glinsky's relationship with Gasztold is worth serious consideration. Members of his family had served Marcin Gasztold in the 1480s; they originated from the palatinate of Kiev, which was governed by Marcin Gasztold between 1471 and 1480. Between 1480 and 1483 Marcin was palatine of Trakai and had married Holszańska princesses, whose patrimonial heartlands were in the Kiev region. This period coincides with the Glinskys' first appearances at court (Ivan Borisovich, Mikhail's uncle, served as ambassador to the Crimea in 1474 and 1480)62. They remained loyal during the Kiev Uprising of 1481. The Gasztolds seem to have entered a wilderness period, during Marcin's period in Kiev, despite the fact that government of this palatinate was a mark of great trust on the part of Casimir IV and that later Marcin was granted the palatinate of Trakai. His son Olbracht was left an orphan to be brought up by his Trabski (Drutsk) and Holszański kin. In effect the Gasztolds cut themselves off from the leading families of central Lithuania. Olbracht was of similar age to Mikhail (judging by their „student" years in the early 1490s) and formed a matrimonial alliance with a Vereiskaya princess, also from the south. Politically the men were of similar loyalty to the ruling house and both had conflicts with Mikołaj II Radziwiłł (although not with his father Jan) and his circle. Olbracht went to the imperial court as envoy in 1501and from that year was active at the court of Grand Duke Alexander; both men placed their seals to documents dealing with the „Union of Melnik"63; in 1502 Olbracht, Mikhail, Wojciech Szyfowicz (from Volyn) and Alexander Chodkiewicz (another who would be arrested in the aftermath of the Glinsky affair) witnessed a charter for Semen Yurevich Holszański64. Gasztold began to climb back onto the political ladder in 1503 when he was appointed lieutenant of Novgorodok. We do not know which way Olbracht reacted to the Glinsky-Zabrzeziński trial of 1503, but he is likely to have been either neutral or pro-Glinsky65. If we regard Mikhail's actions as being taken against the leading members of the council rather than the grand duke directly, we can understand why Mikhail should want Olbracht to intervene with the monarch and why Radziwiłł and the council would press for
" Bychkova, Rodoslovie..., pp. 112-113: Svetitel, Potsolt, Oglich, Stepan Esmanovich, father of Ivan Raevskii, and Gavriil Meleshkovich. " 1492 - Ivan Borisovich Glinsky is lieutenant of Chernigov and envoy to Mengli Girej, LM 5, pp. 55-56; 1493 Ivan Lvovich is sent to Yury Glebovich in Smoleńsk, LM 5, p. 69. See E. B a n i o n i s, Lie tuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės pasiuntinybių tarnyba XV-XVI amžiais, Vilnius 1998, pp. 97-98. "AUPL, No. 78 (09.08.01, Belsk); 82, p.146-147 (23.10.01, Melnik); 83, p. 148 (30.10.01, Mclnik), all the Glinskys, Gasztold and the Chrcptowiczes. "Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków w Siawucie, I,cd. Z. Radzimiński, B. Gorczak, Lwów 1887, No. 122. " M. Kuźmińska, Olbracht Marcinowicz Gasztold. Działalność Olbrachta Gasztolda 1503-1522, Ateneum Wileńskie 4, 13: 1927, p. 354.
I 89 Olbracht's arrest (some time after the „rebellion" had been settled). Olbracht made strenuous claims that he was not part of the conspiracy but he did not deny that he maintained contact with Mikhail66. In 1507 he lost the lieutenancy of Novgorodok to Ivan Glinsky (who in turn had been demoted from Kiev) but regained it in 1508. Glinsky and Gasztold were neighbours as landlords in Podlasie. As Kuźmińska points out, calling on Olbracht for intercession does not make Olbracht an accessory to Glinsky's rebellion. However, it does imply shared interests of some kind. Interestingly in 1511 Sigismund bound Radziwiłł and Gasztold to keep the peace between themselves on pain of a fine of 10,000 zl (the same penalty inflicted by Alexander on Glinsky and Zabrzeziński in 1503)67. It seems that Gasztold used Glinsky and then abandoned him. Glinsky was undoubtedly Alexander's favourite, and gained advancement through the monarch's appreciation of Glinsky's undoubted skills. Glinsky, like his wider kin (and Gasztold), was faithful to the House of Jogaila. If Glinsky was an oppositionist, he opposed a leading faction in Lithuanian politics, but not the ruler. The Pamiat' states clearly and concisely that Glinsky acted „за нежалование короля Жигимонта и за обиду от литовскихъ панов"68. There seems to be little ground for supporting the view that Glinsky sought from the start to usurp Sigismund's throne or that his attempts to gain access to the monarch were the result of the realisation after the capture of Mozyr and other towns that he lacked the troops to win6'. It is more likely that the attack on Zabrzeziński was the result of a deeply-rooted personal antipathy which could not be resolved by the king or his courts. After the palatine of Trakai was murdered Glinsky sought to consolidate his position for the purposes of defence against possible retribution from Zabrzezinski's allies - Novgorodok was held by his brother, Turov was his own domain, Mozyr was in the hands of another ally. When approaches to the Council of Lords and the monarch did not bear fruit (or at least, not the fruit the Glinskys desired70), he set about using Vassily Ivanovich of Moscow as his last resort to force Sigismunde hand. However, the Muscovite refused to be drawn into open battle with the Lithuano-Polish army and Glinsky had no choice but to retreat to Moscow from whence he continued to seek reconciliation with Sigismund. Even before his flight, if we can trust the dating of a Moscow source, Glinsky was asking Vassily to allow him to go to Maximilian supposedly to create
" As he wrote in his 1525 memoriale for Queen Bona - AT, VII, pp. 258-269. " Opisanie rukopisnago otdelenia Vilenskoi Publichnoi Biblioteki, III, Vilnius 1898, appendix No. 6, pp. 45-46. " Z i m i n, Novoc..., p. 70. " E. Gudavičius, Lietuvos istorija, Vilnius 1999, pp. 506-50S. 70 Z imi n, Novoe..., p. 70. According to Russkii vremcnnik, Sigismund sent the Oszmiana nobleman and courtier (the Lithuanian seutifer and lieutenant of Radun) Janusz Stankowicz Kostcwicz to treat with Ivan Glinsky and his brothers but these „цслованьс Янову не поверили"'.
90 a Moscow-Vienna axis against Poland-Lithuania (although in Glinsky's own letter to Maximilian that was written the following year, 1509, there is no talk of such an alliance)71. The affair shows that by 1508 the leading faction in the Council could gain the upper hand over the monarch and remove its competitors - those who fled with Glinsky or who were associated with him (such as the Chreptowiczes and Olbracht Gasztold) never regained their old prominence. It is worth noting that those who fled with Glinsky are called princes and dvoryane korolevskie72. The Glinsky affair shows the consolidation of the future Radziwiłł clique (succeeding the Gasztolds and the Swidrigiełło party), the land and family network of central Lithuania, and the politics of the lords over the grand duke in a personal context - it has nothing to do with acts of union or alliances with the Polish lords against the throne; it is somewhat ironic that both Gasztold and Radziwiłł mimicked Glinsky's network of «friends», marrying into the old south-Ruthenian princely lines and enlisting the favour of Emperor Maximilian (in Radziwiłł's case, to gain an imperial title. In a certain sense it reveals the tensions of those making a career primarily in the grand-ducal court versus noblemen involved in administration of territories of the Grand Duchy. It shows the demands of realpolitik over chivalric culture of personal service and obligations (in effect Sigismund betrayed Glinsky for raisons d'etat). It has nothing to do with religion, nothing to do with nationality (Glinsky's supporters were landowners of Lithuanian Rus' and his clientele, not Panslavic fighters). It was not a coup d'etat, even though in its later stages it took on a deliberate tactic of isolating the palatinates of Vilnius and Trakai from the southern and eastern parts of the Grand Duchy. Glinsky was intelligent; everyone agrees on that; no intelligent person would think that a man opposed by the leading administrators of the realm and abandoned by the monarch would be able to rule a land which the monarch himself was finding it increasingly difficult to bring to heel. It was an avantyura, to use Mikhail Krom's word, in so far as it was never planned and separate actions were taken for different reasons (the murder of Zabrzeziński was a personal affair, interpreted by the Lithuanian Council as an attack on all its members; the Kiev escapades may have been concerned primarily with Ivan Lvovich Glinsky; the retreat to Moscow, where the Lvovich Glinsky's uncle Bohdan Fedorovich was a prisoner,
" Cf. Vassily Ivanovich to Maximilian, Aug. 28 1508: Pamiatniki diplomaticbeskich snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi, I: S imperieiu rimskoiu 1488-1594, ed. G. Th. Karpov, St Petersburg 1892, col. 151-154, with Glinsky's 1509 letters to Maximilian and Gdańsk-Finkel, Elekcja..., appendix 7, pp. 276-279. 72 Zim in, Novoe..., p. 70. The burghers passed Glinsky's letter containing „orane meritum causae, quam olim cum domino Sabrosynsky consiliario Sacrac Vcstrac Majestatis sc habuissc assent" on to the king and asked what they should reply: Akta stanów Prus Królewskich, V.2, cd. M. Biskup, Warsaw-Poznań 1974, p. 254 (dated before Jan. 21 1510).
91 who did not return to Lithuania, was a common tactic among Lithuanian nobles of Ruthenian origins). The affair was a prime example of thinking on the hoof. Glinsky was a favourite, and favourites are unavoidable in closed communities, but favourites have their own enemies and cannot expect their patrons to support them to the end. It is dangerous to put one's trust in princes, as Lord Strafford found out to his cost in 1640. Glinsky opposed Zabrzeziński and his clique, but not his monarch, who deliberately ignored him and for whose favour he petitioned his connections to intercede with the king. Having discovered a family link between Zabrzeziński and Radziwiłł, Professor Tegowski has attributed the cause of the rebellion to Glinsky's lack of kinship with the Lithuanian ruling elite (in effect the quartet of Radziwiłł, Zabrzeziński, Kiszka and Kieżgajło) and this is almost certainly an important reason for the animosity that existed between Glinsky and Zabrzeziński73. Until he went to Muscovy Glinsky did not marry (and we do not know whether he had any matrimonial ambitions in Lithuania74); Olbracht Gasztold too married the 'wrong' woman in the sense that his attempts to form a power base in the manner of the Holszańscy and Gediminid princes in Lithuanian Rus' were a strategy that was out of date probably even before the unsuccessful Kiev Rebellion of 1481. However, he did make a marriage alliance later between his family and the Radziwiłłs. Nevertheless, no one can doubt that Gasztold belonged by descent to the Lithuanian ruling elite. The Glinsky debacle of 1508 has been regarded as having been treason from the start and so it would be useful to examine the concept of treason in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Treason is a political crime against the person or majesty of the ruler. In England Perkin Warbeck was referred to by King Henry VII as „our traitor"; similarly Sigismund calls Mikhail Glinsky nash zradtsa75. Jūratė Kiaupienė in her study of Lithuanian boyars asks what Glinsky regarded as his „patria". She admits that no one can give an answer to this question, and indeed it is irrelevant74. From Glinsky's own protestations to the emperor it seems clear enough that the duke did appreciate the difference between public service and private affairs, asking that „all our tireless services for the commonwealth be not despised for the sake of a private man [Zabrzeziński]"77. Glinsky's ..rebellion"
73 J. Tę g o w s k i, Slub tajemny Jana Janowicza Zabrzezińskiego. Garść uwag o powiązaniach rodzinnych elity moinowladczej na Livwie w XV i początkach XVI wieku. Średniowiecze polskie i powszechne 2: 2002, pp. 246-257, esp. p. 257. " Drzewicki notes in his almanach under the date Aug. 22 1503, „Domino Glinsky natus filius et baptisatus Paulus". It is unknown who this Glinsky was. " Wroc, Perkin...; LM 8, No. 64 and passim. "J. Kiaupienė, „Mes, Lietuva". Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės bajorija XVI a. (viešasis ir privatus gyvenimas), Vilnius 2003, p. 126. " Glinsky to Maximilian and, separately, the Burghers of Gdańsk, July 15 1509: „nostraque indefessa obscquia erga communcm rem publicam propter privatum hominem nc dispicerct" - Finkel, Elckcj.t..., pp. 279-280. j 92 developed unplanned out of an armed response to a breakdown of the relationship between a lord (Sigismund) and his man (Glinsky). Even though he had no established patrimony, Glinsky knew his patńa was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; he expected the grand duke to be his father. Sources for Lithuanian concepts of treason are hard to find before the First Lithuanian Statute of 1529 (which was codified by a man accused of having been involved with Glinsky in his treason, namely Olbracht Gasztold)78. Casimir Jagiellonczyk's law charter issued to Smoleńsk in 1468 makes no mention of it. From a story (roman) popular in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the sixteenth century we find the same insistence on treason as a personal offence. For example the king cannot fail to help Tristan because the latter has provided him with faithful service: „Трыщан, который так много вчинил для мене, коли бых не дал, то бых был зрадца, бо есмо умовил з ним и кдым его потребовал, на моым великим потребу"7'. For reasons of state Sigismund was unable to produce the unequivocal support Glinsky required in his velikym potrebu: as ruler of two realms he could not afford to support a favourite whose very existence caused severe political discontent. The Lithuanian lords had no wish to see Glinsky return and we may speculate whether such opposition did not set about deliberately to prevent such a return, as Decius claims was the case in 1514, when Sigismund is said to have been willing to receive the exile back and grant him an amnesty. Glinsky set out to force his master's hand and having failed, defected to Muscovy in an attempt to try again from there, as many had tried before him80. In conclusion therefore we may say that Glinsky was not merely Alexander Jagiellonczyk's creature, and he did have a coterie that was broader than his own family. It may well be that he and the Chreptowiczes and Chodkiewiczes were satellites of Olbracht Gasztold. However, he was not part of the dominant Vilnius circle of the younger Radziwiłł and his friends and affines; and his service associates, apart from those whose position depended almost entirely on him (viz. those who fled to Muscovy along with him), were not willing to support him against the monarch and the leading lights of the Council. Mikhail Glinsky was a traitor in so far as he took up arms against his king; and this rebellion dates from mid-March 1508 rather than the murder of Zabrzeziński on February 2 of
71 Pirmasis Lietuvos Statutas - Pervyy Litovskiy Statut, ed. S. Lazutka etai, II, Vilnius, 1991,pp. 65-69, stating that those who flee to foreign lords forfeit their honour, patrimony and other pro perty and such property cannot be inherited by their children. " Povest' о viteziakh: Is" LDK kultūrinio palikimo. Pasakojimas apie riteri Tryščaną. Rankraštinis XVI amžiaus romanas apie Tristaną ir Izoldą, tr. A. Antanavičius, Vilnius 2003, p. 124. " O.P. Backus, The Motives for West Russian Nobles in Deserting Lithuania for Moscow 1377-1514 (Laurence, Ka., 1957), discusses the phenomenon of trans-border «defection» by nobles from the Grand Duchy to Muscovy.
Į 93 that year. In terms of the chivalric novel, which portrays the essence of fifteenth- century knightly culture with which the court of Glinsky's patron, the Weisskönig, Maximilian, was imbued, the Jagiellonian monarch can be said to have betrayed him; as for opposition, Glinsky himself was the object of opposition (from the Vilnius lords) not the creator of it (vis-ä-vis the monarch). He became the favourite of a grand duke of Lithuania, but when the latter was also king of Poland he could no longer keep his balance between the lords and the absent monarch. However, like Soltan before him and Khodorkovskiy (a character from quite a different opera) a long time after him, he made the mistake of not knowing his place and overestimating his own power and authority.
APPENDIX 1 [1508, March, Krakow] Jan Buczacki, Crown rotmistrz, introduced to the members of the Lithuanian Council with regard to his mission in Lithuania. The Polish side stresses that the monarch is unable to come to Lithuania because he is busy with unfinished affairs in Poland. He will come after Easter. The Lithuanian lords are encouraged repeatedly to act in the king's absence as they would in his presence, so as to deny comfort to the Enemy.
BCzart., TN 27, pp. 625-634v. Dated wrongly by copyist to 1505.
Isto eventu infelici et insuperante, contingente ex parte Michaelis Chlin- skii1, mox regia maiestas curas sollicitudinesque suas committit, ut hoc faceret, quod vestrae dominationes voluerunt crebriusque inscripserunt2, sed quia erat in prosecutione negotiorum Regni, quae inciperat et non determinaverat non potuitque, пес dominis visum erat, ut subito se convertisset in paucitate curiae contra hostem subditum suum ita suaque maiestas expedivit istos, quos sciunt dominationes vestre, cum Domino Firley3, palatino Lublinensi; voluitque maiestas sua, ut directe ad vestram dominationem Dominus Firley ivisset, prout ibat. Sed dum Modzyr4 receptum erat et palatinus Kijoviensis cum seditibus illius castri scripserunt et literas Michaelis copiam direxerant, quia voluit Kijoviam aggredi,
1 Mikhail Lvovich Glinsky (d. 1534). 1 Cf. Materiały do dziejów..., Nos. 50-52, pp. 159-165. J Mikołaj Firlej z Dąbrowicy (d. 1526), chorąży of Kraków and starosta of Lublin. 4 Mozyr, city on Prypct river in the Gomel District (now Belarus).
I 94 mox maiestas consentienbus consiliariis // Regni committit Dominum Firley ad ducem Constantinum5 mandatque commenditate habita confligere cum Michaele. Deus optimus potest, ut illic feliciter succedat, sua tamen maiestas postea non intellexit, qualiter res se habeatur in illis locis; post hoc Dominus Firley ad Domi num Constantinum se committit, credit sua maiestas, quia et Dux Constantinus et Dominus Firley, sicut idon(e)i milites, servient maiestati regiae contra illum hostem; sit ut misericors Deus tribuat. Data hac occupatione Michaeli, quae necesse erit, respectum habere ad istos duos campiductores in omnem eventum fieri potuit et potest congregatio populi securior in medio terrae Lithuaniae, prout sua maiestas istud forsan committebat per cancellarium Ruthenicum fieri et sperat adhuc futurum, si necesse est. Credit enim maiestas sua, quare vestrae dominationes non minori fide et virtute omnia facient obstante maiestate sua ad resistendum hosti, qui facturi essent presente ea. // Et liceat non dubitat, si necessitas exigat, quia dominationes vestrae absque stimulo ad arma consurgenti, tamen quia dominis illis consiliariis visum erat, ut aliquit de medio eorum ad vestras dominationes ivisset, qui et maiestatis Regis et dominorum illorum nomine hic cum vestris dominationibus esset. Idcirco cum missae ad dominationes vestras in rebus istis primumque majestatis regiae nomine Dominationes vestras, de quorum fide virtuteque sua maiestas non dubitat, hortor, rogo et mando, ut se gerant absente domino, sicut decet bonos homines, quatenus hostis nuliam habeat confidentiam in hoc, quod vestrae Dominationes absque domino nihil factum esset vel quod non aliter non coacti tueri vellet; cum enim hostis audiet vestras Dominationes non minus prompte contra hostem surrexisse quam praesenti maiestate sua consurrecturi essent, timidior sit, immo verebitur, quia nulio plus facerent // praesente domino, sic quoque non confidens, quod sua perfidia inter fideles locum esset habitura, minus audebit, minus agere curabit, ex quo videbit Dominationes vestras non minus absente domino facientes ad defensionem, quam facturos crederet una cum domino suo. Caeterum vero habent Dominationes vestrae, quia sua maiestas sua in persona et cum gentibus illis, quos illi consiliarii decreverunt, isto domino dirigendos post Pascha6 statim veniet simulque cum vestris Dominationibus dignabitur agere con tra hostem quemlibet id quoque Altissimi dextra tribuet feliciter quodque vestris Dominationibus videbitur ea necessitate et consulta deliberatione faciendum. Si enim Dominationes vestrae absente maiestate regia nullum facerent sua motione ad defensionem iudicium nimirum Hosti cor erigeretur cuilibet, ut etiam veniente et praesente maiestate sua plus audeat contra // eas et majestatem suam, quam debent.
5 Konstanty Ostroróg (1460-1530), Lithuanian hetman from 1497, held in Muscovitc captivity 1500-1507, castellan of Vilnius from 1511, palatine of Trakai after 1522. 'Easterl508: April 23.
95 Igitur maiestas regia hoc consilium atque mandatum per me intimat vestris Dominationibus, quatenus sicut prudentes et fidelissimi consiliarii atque subditi consulant et agant absente maiestate sua pro defensione Dominii istius suaeque maiestatis honore, ut essent consulturae facturaeque praesente ea, prout de ve stris Dominationibus sua maiestas non dubitat et tantum confidit fidei ac virtuti constanti vestrae, ut licet fortasse contra potentiorem se itura esset maiestas sua, tamen freta fidei et constantiae vestrae suam praesentiam ad omnes eventus una cum vestris Dominationibus exhibebit, dum feliciter veniet; sed necesse est, ut hostis quilibet intelligat eam obedientiam ac zelum optimum et promptitudinem esse ad defensionem in vestris Dominationibus, quae praesente ea et debet et consueverunt semper esse //et dum sic est, quod et vestrae Dominationes moneri debeant, et ad eas maiestas regia ventura est, vestrae Dominationes tempestive maiestatem regiam informent, qua itura est et in quem locum sit ventura. Inquanto dolore et molestiis modo sint domini Regni Poloniae consiliarii pro istis eventibus malis et angustiis Dominii istius et vestrarum Dominationum fra- trum suorum, Deum testantur, quia non in minoribus quam eorum agentur res. Dolent enim nimium primura necatum esse adeo immani truculentique песет dominum olim fratrem suum atque vestrum7; dolent vestre Dominationes caris- sirno animo et consilii collega orbatas esse, dolent universam hanc rempublicam tanquam terrore quodam concuti, ne ex hoc periculo in eam veniant. Quamobrem domini Regni Poloniae consiliarii me ad vestras Dominationes consulendas // legarunt, orant fraterneque hortantur casum hune velut prudentes modestius ferant, graviter quidem ferendus est, et sicut vestrae Dominationes sic поп minus per dominos Regni Poloniae; verum, quia inter mortales majora etiam nonnunquam fiunt pericula, etsi gesta aevi praeteriti Principum, persona- rum privatarum et locorum recenseri voluissent, casus quantumcunque maximi deliberatis consiliis utilius faciliusque mederi consueverunt, quam praecipitibus vel festinatis. Idcirco domini fratres vestri rogant, quatenus licet hostis earum impruden- ter improbeque ageret et agat, vestrae tamen Dominationes probe speculentur qualemcunque quisque motus cuilibet motori pollicentur finem, sicut mėlius Dominationes vestrae quam Domini Poloniae positionem отпет istius Dominii nesciunt, vero latentem machinationes, quae si ultra eam est, quae innocentem// effluxit sanguinem, vestrae Dominationes dominis illis fratribus suis non aegre ferant, dum regiae maiestati suadent, ut se non subito ad indeliberatas projieiat occasiones, ne se et personas Dominationum vestrarum insperati dederet periculo. Consultius est, reverendi magnificiquc domini, ut deliberationibus non despe- ratis, sed bonis hostis quicunque aggrediatur, ne subitum tantummodo aliquod
71.c. Jan Zabrzeziński, castcllan of Trakai, 1492-1498, palatine of Trakai, 1498-1505, grand marshal, 149S-I508, niurdered by Glinsky's servam, Fcb. 2, 1508.
I 9f, videremur vel ea desperatione vel ex coactione fecisse. Cum tamen non virtus, constantia et Iustitia communis nostrae amicitiae debeat, ut si per deliberationes bonas procedemus, dextera tandem excelsi juste praeviabitur actionem, ratione enim ipsa nos ducente meliores sperare debuimus eventus, dum id, quod necesse est, prosequeremur non per desperationem пес per occasionem, sed non per festinatam deliberationem. Itaque Dominationes vestrae optimum habeant // animum, quanta vis est hostis domestici vestri, quae si magna esset, nichilominus cum per injustitiam et per infidiam procedat, cumque major fuerit vestrarum Do minationum fides, virtus, innata constantia et justitia, justus ipse dominus, justas maiestatis regiae vestrarumque Dominationum non deseret occasiones. Cuius maiestatem regiam et vestras dominationes fratres suos illi non deserent omni possibili modo. Et sicut hac vice ad subjectam hanc necessitatem id, quod subito fecerunt domini fratres vestri confidunt vestrae Dominationes grate accipiant, rogarunt, ut maiestas regia fratrem ipsorum communem de primis consiliariis in auxilium vestrarum Dominationum dirigeret Dominum Lublinensem palati- num. Sic eis sicut fuerunt, quia consultius visum est illis8 quod // faceret esse forte possibile esset cum Michaele confligerent cuius utriusque Deus clementissimus prosperare dignabitur occasione. Mihi vero mandarunt, ut persona mea sive hic cum vestris Dominationibus sive alibi, ubi mandarent tamen facerem, quantum possibilitas ad mentem suaderet et forsan, si necessitas est tanta, non inutile fieret, vestras Dominationes aliquod defensionis facere iudicium regia maiestate absente, ut nullum hostis haberet de vestris Dominationibus dubitum, quia et absente et praesente domino parati essent ad omne defensionis negotium. Si vero vestris Dominationibus aliter videbitur faciendum, rogant domini Regni Poloniae consiliarii fratres vestri, velint nil agere, consulere et procedere, ne maiestatem regiam domini communem nostrum gratiosissimum personasque earum per indeliberatas festinatasque actiones inducerent ad ea, quae viae fortasse postea mederi possent vel non possent, cum iis se domini fratres vestri vestrae carit[at]i fraternae commendant et orant id consilium hoc finem bene interprae- tent, cum illi corde optimo et sincero sic agant et consulant, ut ea conscientia sic vestris Dominationibus ut solis ipsis profuturm intelligunt.
2 1507-1509? Manuscript annotations to Maciej Drzewicki's Almanach, BN, Inc. Qu. 55 (Microfilm 97071) [Formerly BOZ Inc. 196], commonly referrcd to as Drzewicki's Diary: Johann Stoefflcr, Jacob Pflaum, Almanach nova ab a. 1499- 1531 (Ulm: Ioannes Reger, 13 Feb. 1499).
' que struck out.
197 Anno Domini 1509 die mensis Januarij 19 Gastoldus Albertus9, Phethko te- zaurarius10, Martinus Conyuschi" et piures alii per12 Summum principem dominum Sigismundum Dei gratia Polonie regem, magnum ducem Lithwanie capti sunt et sub custodiam missi, Gastoldus namque, dum prandebat apud magnificum Stanis- laum Kynszgal13 capitaneum Samagitie, illic per eum retentus est sine strepitu et in custodiam missus ibidem in domo; Churthko14 apud palatinum Trocensem Nico- laum Radiwilowicz15 servams est scilicet sub custodia. Martinus vero Conyuschi Chreptowicz per Stanislaum Kiska capitaneum Grodniensem16, demum et Alexander Kothkowicz17 et dux Polubyensky18 capti sunt. Hii omnes capti sunt propter scelus lese majestatis, qua non modo captivi eius mali complures, videlicet Ulrich, Widra", Calanthai et dux Lucomsky20 ipsos accusarent, sed etiam alys documentis rei crimi- nis esse recognoscebantur conspirationem namque cum Duce Michaele Glynsky adversus prefatum regem Sigismundum et adversus barones Ducatus Magni. Cogi- tavitque ymmo et annixus est idem Glynsky Magnum Ducatum occupare interfecto Zabrezynsky et earn ob rem rege a ducatu absente arma monita et exercitus suos accumulare studuit, ducemque Moskoviensem2' iam accepto castro Mozir induxit, ut validum exercitum in Magnum Ducatum ducibus Jacobo Zacharia22 et Daniele Sczemya23 mitteret sibi in subsidium. Eo vero tempore licet prefati complures ip- sum destituere nec sibi adhesere. Hi bello validissimo finito concordiamque cum Moskoviensi duce facta prefato crimine lese majestatis notati sunt.
1507 Julius 18 Julii venit quidam Pnyowsky24 Moravus orator regis Hungarie in Vilnam: acturus pro duce Hlynsky contra Johannem Zabrzeszinsky, qui dux per Johannem
'Olbracht Gasztold (d. 1539), palatine of Novgorodok (1508), palatine of Polotsk from 1513, later palatine of Trakai, Vilnius and chancellor of the Grand Duchy. 10 Fedko Bohdanowicz Chreptowicz, court sub-treasurer (1494-1501), land sub-treasurer of the Grand Duchy (1501-1509). 11 Marcin Bohdanowicz Chreptowicz, court eguerry (koniush i nadvomiy), 1495-1509. 11 Mte [maiestatem] struck out. 11 Stanislaw Kieżgajlo [Kęsgailą], starosta of Žemaitija (1486-1527), castellan of Trakai (1499-1522), castellan of Vilnius (1522-1527). 14 A confusion of the name Fedko (Chreptowicz). 15 Mikołaj II Radziwiłł (d. 1521), palatine of Trakai (1505-1510), palatine of Vilnius (1510-1521). "Stanislaw Kiszka (d. 1514), starosta of Grodno, marshal of the Grand Duchy (1492-1511). 17 Alexander Ivanovich Chodkiewicz, marshal, courtier. " The Polubinski princes from Volyn, royal servitors. " Jan Wydra, royal scribe, associated with Glinsky. 20 Prince Fedor Ivanovich Łukomski. :l Vassily III Ivanovich (1479-1533), son of Ivan the Great, father of Ivan the Terrible; grand duke of Muscovy (1505-1533). " Yakov Zakharin, Muscovite hetman. 15 Daniii Shchcnya, Muscovite army commander. "Johannes Pniowski.hercs de Sorovinitz-Glinsky's letter to Maximilian, July 15, 1509, Finkel, Elekcja..., p. 278.
Į 98 Zabrzeszinsky fuit inculpatus, quod proditorio nomine mortuo Alexandra rege ducatum occupare voluisset.
3 S.d. Maciej Drzewicki attributes the origins of the Polish wars with Muscovy, Prussia and Turkey, and the Glinsky Rebellion to the connivings of Jan Łaski, archbishop of Gniezno.
BN, BOZ, TG XXV, nr 3195, p. 216.
Originem belli Moscowitici Johannes de Lasko25 tunc regni cancellarius in Lithwania existens hoc modo fecit, quodque bellum aduc durat. Dato enim Duci Michaeli Glynsky a Maiestate Regia responso placabili et mansueto, ut quiete viveret domi in Ducatu Lithuanie manens, de honore suo securus, donee Rex in Lithuaniam rediret, ut tunc cum feliciter rediret, voluit sua Maiestas decernere inter ipsum et suos adversarios id, quod iustum esset. Responso vero modo supradicto dato adierit a semetipso /Laski/26, inquiens: „Domine Michael, Tu nequaquam eris securus inter istos dominos, qui te odio habent, et in tuam vitam machinantur neces de tua securitate". Michael dux tali admonitione severa audita in lacrimas prorupit, inquiens „Ne mini sum culpabilis, sed iam cogarcogitare de securitate mea". His vero dictis machi- natus est in mortem Zabrzeszinsky palatini tunc Trocensis et interfecit eum etc. Nam et tempore Alexandri Regis /idem Laski/ concitaverat talem tumultum inter Regem et dominos Lithuanie, quod nec rex erat bene securus a dominis, neque domini a rege, sic quod difficili negotio erat ille motus, qui ipso auctore exulatus fuit, sopitus et compositus. Motus belli prutenici etiam ipso Autore emerserant. Nam dominum Tho- mam iret et sibi legationem committi curavit. Instantione brevi fuit expeditus, sed prohibitum ei fuit, ne quid in prutenicis rebus ageret. Ipse vero illic existens cepit de rebus prutenicis cum oratoribus agere et disputare. Quiquidem oratores ausa ex eius disputacione accepta machinati sunt bello ea recuperare, que jure non potuerunt. Cumque ex urbe redijsset iam archiepiscopali dignitate honoratus, cepit novas practicas cum cruciferis et episcopo pomesaniensi, volens rem novam et mirabilem inducere et persuadere, ut ex ordine cruciferorum Rex Polonie quociens vacaret Regnum, eligeretur conatusque fuit ct regni proccribus istud persuadere Maiestate Regia invita. //
" Jan Łaski (1456-1531), chancellor of the Crown of Poland, 1503-1510, archbishop of Gniezno from 1510. 2i Archiepiscopo struck out.
99 Postea ivit in Prussiam tamquam limina ecclesie sancti Adalberti, ubi marti- rium passus est visitaturus et ibi iterum cum novis practicis ordinem commovit et bello originem fecit et inde illusus redijt. Bellum vero Hungaricum, quod nunc geritur Turco auctore, quis dubitat ab eodem accepisse viręs. Quod quidem bellum quam pericolosum sit christiane reipublice et huic regno plane constat. Alia gesta in detrimentum reipublice et regis, quis posset enunciare, pietas serennissimi regis omnia equo animo ferebat, sed ea gesta ipsius perpetue erant ineurrabilia et non defante obliviscentur. Nam ea inobedientia, qua omnia in regno perturbantur quod que nuntii terrarum tantam usurparunt in re publica auctoritatem ipso auctore, facta est. Ita quod auctoritas regia in his non profi- cit, que ad bene dirigendum regnum oportuna esse videntur. Curabimus tamen quantum fieri bona ratione poterit, ut sensius et suecessive regie auctoritati viam restituamus, sine qua regnum bene dirigi non potest et etiam maiestas adiuvet auctoritate et sapientia sua. Servator sum vestre maiestatis fidelissimus et cetera semper.