How to Prevent Mass Atrocities
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Transcript How to Prevent Mass Atrocities Adama Dieng Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, UN Secretary-General Matthew Rycroft CBE Permanent Secretary, Department for International Development, UK Permanent Representative, United Nations (2014-18) Dr Kate Ferguson Director of Research and Policy, Protection Approaches Chair: Dr Champa Patel Head, Asia Programme, Chatham House 20 February 2018 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants, and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event, every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2018. 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0)20 7957 5700 F +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number: 208223 2 How to Prevent Mass Atrocities Dr Champa Patel Good evening everyone. Thank you for joining us today for this event on how to prevent mass atrocities. It’s quite a timely event. I’m sure, if you’ve heard the stories and images coming out of Eastern Ghouta today in Syria, to see the kind of bombardment, the horrific violence that’s been on display today. We’re lucky to be joined by three experts, who are able to talk about, you know, what’s possible in terms of early prevention. I’m not going to read out their very extensive biographies, because you will have had the information already. What we want to do is leave as much time for conversations and have a debate, as much as possible. But just briefly to introduce our panel. So, we’re joined by Adama Dieng of Senegal, who is the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide. We also have Matthew Rycroft with us, who’s a Permanent Secretary at the Department of International Development in the UK. And also joining us is Kate Ferguson, who’s the Director of Research and Policy at Protection Approaches and also co-founded the organisation. So, what we’ll do is, have short presentations from our speakers before we open it up for a question and answer session. So, over to you. Adama Dieng Thank you very much. I mean, I would like really, to thank Chatham House and in particular, Ellie Groves, I mean, over there for the warm welcome and chance to take part in this panel, which is also a great pleasure to be along with my good friend, Matthew, and to be joined by Kate. The subject of the panel: how to protect population better, goes to the core of my mandate and it is one of the topic that most frustrate me, as I meet with Government officials, members of the Security Council and victim of atrocity crimes, by which I mean genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity. And why are we still not doing more to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect people? It is not because we do not know how to. So, it must be because there is not sufficient motivation to do so, which is neither acceptable, nor in our interest. How can we shift this dynamic? I will speak briefly about what we know and look further into what I think could be done. But first, I would speak briefly about my mandate. As I’m sure all of you know, my role as a Special Advisor is a role of a catalyst for action by providing early warning of the risk of atrocity crimes wherever we see it and advocating for early preventative action by the United Nations system, the member states, including through the Security Council and the Human Rights Council and regional organisation. And I do so by speaking out publically, through public and private advocacy and by visiting countries when I feel that direct advocacy and the weight of my mandate can encourage preventive action. My office works with a range of actors to strengthen prevention and response capacity. We have developed many partnerships to extend our reach, particularly with civil society, including here, in the United Kingdom. But getting back to why we are failing to prevent atrocity crimes. As I said, it is not because we do not know or recognise the warning signs. We do. We know which factors increase the risk of atrocity crimes. My office has developed a framework of analyses to assess the risk of atrocity crimes in a way that is consistent and evidence-based and to tailor response majors through specific risk factors. This tool was developed on analyses of past cases of atrocity crime, with jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals and the growing body of academics. Our framework of analyses, which is here, you would see 3 How to Prevent Mass Atrocities the tool for prevention is held as a standard for this kind of risk assessment and work issue as an official United Nations document in 2014. So, we have early warning tools and we have access to the information we need to make a credible risk assessment. We also know that it is less costly, both in terms of human lives and in terms of resources, to act early. Preventive action makes sense, no doubt. However, although states have repeatedly emphasised their support for the idea of prevention, this is still not being sufficiently translated into concrete support for preventive strategies when we see early warning signs, or even when there are imminent threat to populations. In Myanmar, for example, my office raised the alarm about the situation of Rohingya back in 2010, seven years ago. But we were continually told that the focus should be to bring about change through political engagement with the Government of Myanmar, even after it became clear that that strategy was not going to work. This commitment of state has not translated into an honest assessment of national vulnerabilities. I have always insisted that no state or region can consider itself immune to atrocity crimes and that prevention must start at home. Too often, Western democracies see the prevention of atrocity crimes and their responsibility to project as a foreign policy agenda. National atrocity prevention or R2P focal points, where they exist, are located within Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their focus is on assistance to states in the global staff and not on aggressing national vulnerabilities, and there is no link to domestic policymakers. The responsibility to protect must be seen as domestic, as well as a foreign policy priority. Each society must internally assess its own resources of stress and sources of resilience and respond in the ways that makes most sense. One of the key indicators of societal stress is the kind of tension that we saw in Europe, following the influx of refugees and migrants from the Middle East and Africa, and here, in the United Kingdom, following the Brexit vote. I was shocked by the xenophobia that came to the surface, the hatred and hostility directed at other population in public discourse and in the social media. Populist leaders have been actively cultivating both irrational sentiments and mobilising prejudice and ignorance. We need to find ways to reverse these negative trends. Our first priority is to understand and response to the barriers to preventive action. I have already mentioned what I believe needs to be done in the national context. At the international level, let’s begin with the most obtuse obstacle: strong political interest on the part of powerful states that work against earnest action in situation where population are at risk. The UN Secretary Council is often paralysed, and the post-Cold War romance is dead. Compromises in the interests of the common good are being replaced with a zero-sum game approach. It is time that Security Council was reform to reflect today’s geopolitical realities. In absence of reform, we need to find ways of expanding the political base within the Council for timely and decisive collective action. The two initiatives aimed at establishing a voluntary Code of Conduct on the use of veto are important, because all Council members, permanent and non-permanent alike, should be obliged to fulfil the commitment made by the Heads of State and Government at the 2005 summit, World Summit and it would be a prerequisite for election to the Council. We also need to learn how to prevent atrocities in the absence of unity in the Council. At times, a stalemate, at the global political level, opens up opportunities for others’ actors, especially at the national and regional levels, and this was the case with the massive and co-ordinated efforts to provide 4 How to Prevent Mass Atrocities humanitarian assistance to Syrian by different actors, working together when the Security Council failed to take action. Finally, we need to hold the state accountable for their commitment, their action or inactions. This is a role that civil society has traditionally played, but it is also important role for other actors, including parliamentarian, who can use their legislative, budgetary and oversight powers, to hold Government accountable.