The Perils of Protest

The Perils of Protest THE PERILS OF PROTEST State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan Te res a Wr i g h t University of Hawai‘i Press Honolulu © 2001 University of Hawai‘i Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 06 05 04 03 02 01 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wright, Teresa. The perils of protest : state repression and student activism in China and Taiwan / Teresa Wright. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–8248–2348–6 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0–8248–2401–6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Students—Political activity. 2. Students—China. 3. Students—Taiwan. I. Title: State repression and student activism in China and Taiwan. II. Title. LB3610.W74 2001 378.1'981'0951—dc21 00–064928 University of Hawai‘i Press books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources. Designed by Nighthawk Design Printed by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group Contents Acknowledgments vii Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 The Political Environment of Students in China and Taiwan 8 Chapter 3 Student Mobilization and Organization in China, April 15–May 10, 1989 21 Chapter 4 Student Mobilization and Organization in China, May 11–June 4, 1989 57 Chapter 5 Student Mobilization and Organization in Taiwan, March 1990 95 Chapter 6 Conclusion 129 Appendix A Autonomous Student Organizations in Beijing, Spring 1989 141 Appendix B “Letter to All University Students” (Text of Class Boycott Proposal) 142 Appendix C Autonomous Student Organizations in Taipei, Spring 1990 144 Notes 145 Bibliography 175 Index 185 v Acknowledgments I am grateful to many people and institutions for their support of this project. My research could not have been conducted without the funding of the Jacob K. Javits Fellowship, the Simpson Fellowship, University of Califor- nia, Berkeley’s Vice Chancellor’s for Research Fund, and a summer stipend from California State University, Long Beach. In addition, the Department of Sociology at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica, under the directorship of Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao, kindly took me on as a visiting scholar, providing me with work space, resources, and a great deal of helpful advice. The manuscript benefited immensely from the guidance of Elizabeth Perry, Lowell Dittmer, Thomas Gold, Dorothy Solinger, Andrea Roberts, Marcus Kurtz, and many others. I also am thankful for the words of encour- agement given by colleagues, friends, and family. Finally, I express my grati- tude toward the student and intellectual activists who took the time to share with me their thoughts and opinions. Their courage and vision are inspira- tional, and I wish them the best in their current and future endeavors. vii Chapter 1 Introduction For three long months in the spring of 1989, the unfolding Democracy Movement in mainland China entranced the world. When former Party Gen- eral Secretary Hu Yaobang died on April 15, students and citizens poured into the streets in mourning, soon transformed into more organized calls for an end to party corruption and increased political and economic reforms.1 By April 24, the students had established an all-Beijing student federation— the first citywide student organization free of any Party sponsorship or control in the communist era. Almost daily, ever-growing protests, marches, and rallies took place in Beijing. On April 27, over a hundred thousand students defied police blockades and official condemnation, marching for miles to Tiananmen Square. On May 4, over a million students and citizens flocked to the Square. Yet the Party remained intransigent. Frustrated, on May 14 a group of students began a hunger strike, soon drawing thousands of participants. Stu- dents now occupied Tiananmen Square continually, setting up an encamp- ment. Due to this occupation, on May 15, gala plans to welcome Mikhail Gorbachev for the first meeting of top Chinese and Soviet leaders since the Sino-Soviet split had to be canceled. Incensed by these bold actions, on May 19 the party declared martial law. Yet when the army then attempted to enter the city and clear out the Square, hundreds of thousands of city dwellers spontaneously blocked the soldiers. Making no use of force, the army simply turned back. Jubilant at this successful act of resistance, students continued to occupy the plaza. Early in the morning of June 4, however, the movement ended abruptly. The army again entered the city to clear out the square, but this time it would not be stopped. Those who attempted to block the soldiers and their tanks and trucks were forcefully moved—or shot. In the end, between two hundred and two thousand were dead, and thousands injured. 1 2 • The Perils of Protest These gripping events were a watershed in post-Mao Chinese politics. With the movement’s tragic end, the post-Mao cycle of political opening and constriction has been broken; since June 1989 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials have unswervingly and decisively repressed any and all attempts at autonomous political organization.2 Earlier hopes that China might make decisive moves in the direction of Western-style democracy have been aban- doned. Thus, it is crucial that we understand the causes of this movement’s sad conclusion. After so many weeks of growing popular support and inter- national attention, why did the protests go awry? Scholars have not shied away from these questions; indeed, a profusion of academic studies have sought to provide answers. Interestingly, in many of these analyses, respon- sibility is placed not only on ill-intentioned ruling elites but also on the student protestors themselves. Had students behaved in a more mature and thoughtful manner, many suggest, the movement’s terrible outcome might have been averted, or at least ameliorated.3 This book calls these assessments into question by drawing on new data and a novel methodology. Despite the prevalence of works that treat student behavior in 1989, one important source of information has not been emphasized in most studies: the student leaders themselves. Concerned that this may have produced gaps in our understanding of student motivations and actions, I conducted lengthy personal interviews with students representing all of the major factions and groups that formed.4 In the course of these interviews, I came upon revealing information from the transcription of a 1991 Paris conference where key student leaders discussed in detail their thoughts and actions during the movement.5 Taken together, these interviews and transcripts comprise the most complete and representative compilation to date of the thoughts and opinions of movement leaders in Beijing in 1989.6 To buttress this information, and to check for any distortions or misrepresentations, I consulted virtually all available student-produced documents from the movement in Beijing, as well as all major secondary sources on the movement.7 To further enhance our understanding of the movement of 1989, I have chosen an explicitly comparative perspective. Up to now, only Craig Cal- houn’s Neither Gods Nor Emperors has taken such an approach. Unlike Cal- houn’s work, however, this book focuses on a specific comparative case study: the Month of March movement of 1990 in Taiwan.8 Like that of 1989, the Month of March movement was the largest and most sustained student protest action in the history of the region. It arose as a response to an internal Kuomintang (KMT) conflict over the choice of a new president, whose selection was scheduled for March 21, 1990. This conflict had it roots in the political structure that had been in place in Taiwan Introduction • 3 since the KMT government fled to the island in the wake of the Communist victory in mainland China in 1949. Two years earlier, while the KMT was still nominally in control of the mainland, elections had been held for the National Assembly (Guomin Dahui), the body charged with ratifying the party’s choice of president.9 The assembly was comprised of representatives from China’s provinces; each was to serve a six-year term. However, follow- ing the KMT’s final defeat on the mainland in 1949, it became impossible to hold new elections once the original six-year term expired. Thus, these original representatives simply remained in office. This body of elderly statesmen continued to ratify the president every six years, yet this was little more than a formality, as there was only one real choice for president: Chiang Kai-shek. Shortly after Chiang’s death in April 1975, his son Chiang Ching-kuo rose to the position, holding the presidency uncontested until his death in 1988.10 After the younger Chiang’s death, then Vice President Lee Teng-hui, a party member of Taiwanese rather than mainland descent, became the acting president. In 1990, Chiang Ching-kuo’s final six-year term expired; thus, according to the constitution, the National As- sembly was required either to reconfirm Lee or to choose a new president. The general public would have no voice. Internal KMT conflict over the matter began in February 1990. Aware that Lee Teng-hui was virtually assured the presidency, the nonmainstream (fei zhuliu) party faction had hoped to handpick a nonmainstream vice- presidential candidate. Instead, Lee purposely bypassed any consultation with powerful nonmainstream party members and chose a mainstream loyalist to be his vice president. Angered, the nonmainstream faction countered with an alternative ticket. Subsequently, throughout the early months of 1990, these two factions maneuvered to strengthen support within the National Assembly for their candidates. The original ascent of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency had been widely heralded as a major symbol of the “Taiwanization” of the KMT and proof of the KMT’s commitment to political reform.

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