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The Tangled Beard of Modal Realism

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The Tangled Beard of Modal Realism Aporia vol. 25 no. 1 — 2015 The Tangled Beard of Modal Realism KELVIN JENSEN avid Lewis is well known for his theory of modal realism. According to this theory, our world — us, the universe we inhabit, Dand anything that has ever existed therein — is just one among many. In fact, modal realism holds that there are countless worlds more or less similar to our own. There is a world, for instance, identical to ours saving one difference: in lieu of wearing a polo shirt today, I wore a button - down shirt. Other worlds are not so similar; one world, for example, consists of planets populated by unicorns. Another is governed by physical laws that permit humans to walk on water. Indeed, for any logically possible state of affairs, there is a world embodying that state of affairs. Since there are infinite possible states of affairs, there are infinite worlds. To be sure, these worlds are spatio - temporally inaccessible and causally isolated from our world, but they exist as fully as our world does. Why would Lewis preach such a bizarre metaphysical doctrine? One sole reason: usefulness (Plurality 3). Lewis believes that his theory resolves important problems in philosophy, specifically in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. Of particular renown is the solution to a perennial issue in modality, an issue that can be summarized by the following question: what makes modal properties possible? What, for instance, grounds the property I have of possibly wearing a button - down shirt? Modal realism has a ready answer: I possess the property of possibly wearing a button - down shirt because there is a world like ours in every Kelvin Jensen is a senior majoring in philosophy at Brigham Young University. His primary interests include ethics, philosophy of religion, and political philosophy. After graduating next April, Kelvin plans on attending law school. This essay tied for third place in the 2015 David H. Yarn Philosophcal Essay Contest. 46 KELVIN JENSEN respect except that my counterpart is wearing a button - down shirt. That is, modal properties are grounded in their non - modal realization on Lewisian possible worlds. Whether Lewis’s theory can truly explain modal properties — and provide the other benefits that Lewis touts — has been disputed. However, I shall not argue with Lewis here; for the purposes of this paper, I grant the benefits, all of the benefits, that he ascribes to his theory. I do, however, want to explore an objection that he treats. In his book Counterfactuals, Lewis considers several complaints about modal realism. One qualm relates to Ockham’s Razor and can be explained thus: modal realism flies in the face of ontological parsimony, which demands — at the very least — that one not recklessly postulate the existence of new entities. This prescription is two - pronged: according to quantitative ontological parsimony, one ought not to frivolously postulate additional individual entities; according to qualitative ontological parsimony, one ought not to frivolously postulate additional kinds of entities. Modal realism is thought to run afoul of both senses of parsimony — it not only postulates multiple worlds similar to ours, but also postulates multiple worlds different in kind than ours. Inasmuch as ontological parsimony is an important theoretical virtue, modal realism falls short. Lewis’s response to this objection is threefold: first, he admits that modal realism disrespects quantitative ontological parsimony but claims that this concession is innocuous (87). Quantitative parsimony is irrelevant to a theory’s truth; qualitative parsimony is what matters. Lewis doesn’t argue for this position — he simply takes it for granted. Second, he insists that modal realism in no way violates qualitative parsimony; after all, possible worlds are not different in kind than the actual world. As Lewis observes, “You believe in our actual world already. I ask you to believe in more things of that kind, not in things of some new kind” (87). And finally, he presumes that no Ockham’s Razor objection can be decisive (87). What he means is that violations of ontological parsimony — no matter how flagrant — do not, by themselves, warrant rejecting modal realism. I take issue with Lewis’s response. Quantitative parsimony is a theoretical virtue, and modal realism does disregard qualitative parsimony. That is, Lewis’s theory disrespects both quantitative and qualitative parsimony, both of which are important theoretical considerations. Perhaps a violation of ontological parsimony cannot be decisive, but the violation here is so egregious, even frightful, that we ought to turn our attention to rival theories and remold them to provide the theoretical benefits of modal realism, without the ontological costs. Let’s examine the support for my claims. Lewis is not unique in dismissing quantitative parsimony without a hearing. Many philosophers have presumed that quantitative parsimony THE TANGLED BEARD OF MODAL REALISM 47 is simply irrelevant to the truth of a theory. Why is this assumption so prevalent? According to Alan Baker, many reject quantitative parsimony because it doesn’t appear to connect to “independently recognizable theoretical virtues” (248). For instance, qualitative parsimony can be justified by appeals to epistemic conservatism, which holds, at its core, that we ought not to believe in something unless we have good reason to believe in it (248). Syntactical elegance — the other strand of Ockham’s Razor, a strand which demands simplicity in a theory’s basic principles or axioms — can be justified on pragmatic grounds. A theory that is syntactically elegant is easier to use or manipulate, and is generally more comprehensible (248). From which theoretical virtue can quantitative parsimony be derived? It can’t be derived from epistemic conservatism, for quantitative parsimony doesn’t have to do with the postulation of new kinds of entities or mechanisms. Rather, it postulates additional entities of the kinds in which we already believe. Nor does it seem likely that quantitative parsimony can be derived from pragmatic concerns. Thus, inasmuch as quantitative parsimony can’t be tied to any obvious theoretical virtue, Lewis is right — quantitative parsimony ought to be jettisoned. It may be true that quantitative parsimony isn’t justified by appeals to some recognizable theoretical virtue. But I think it can be justified by appeals to the workings of nature. Nature generally uses the simplest means to achieve her ends, and this fact justifies the prescription to keep down the number of individual entities, even if these entities are not different in kind from those in which we believe. If nature uses the simplest means to accomplish her purposes, quantitatively parsimonious theories are more likely to be true ceteris paribus. An example may prove illustrative: in the early twentieth century, physicists observed a puzzling aspect of beta decay, a type of radioactive decay in which an electron is emitted from a nucleus. Upon emission of the electron, the energy of the nucleus decreased by more energy than could be ascribed to the emitted electron. This result bemused scientists, who had anticipated that the diminution of energy in the nucleus would be equivalent to the energy of the emitted electron. Wolfgang Pauli attempted to resolve the discrepancy by conjecturing the existence of a neutrally charged particle — a “neutrino” — emitted concomi- tantly with the electron. This neutrino, Pauli reasoned, would possess an energy mass equal to the difference between the energy loss of the nucleus and the energy of the emitted electron. Pauli’s theory was accepted, and the existence of his neutrino was empirically confirmed many years later. Two features of this example stand out: the quantity of neutrinos actually emitted from the atom, and the quantity of neutrinos Pauli postulated. Only one neutrino was emitted from the anomalous atom. Had the atom emitted two neutrinos, each possessing half of the energy of the original, 48 KELVIN JENSEN nature could have achieved the same results (Nolan 333). Indeed, nature could have achieved the same results with three neutrinos, each possessing a third of the energy of the original; or four; or four hundred. But nature didn’t employ four hundred neutrinos, each with one four - hundredth of the necessary charge; she selected one neutrino. In this instance, at least, nature really did use the simplest means to accomplish her ends. Interestingly, Pauli decided to postulate only one neutrino. He could have postulated two neutrinos, each possessing half of the energy needed to account for the discrepancy. This postulation would have yielded the same explanatory power as his first theory (Nolan 333). Or he could have postulated three neutrinos, each possessing a third of the energy needed; or four; or four hundred. Yet Pauli proposed just one neutrino. Pauli was apparently guided by considerations of quantitative parsimony, and even if he wasn’t, adherence to quantitative parsimony would have encouraged him to postulate merely one neutrino had he considered the postulation of additional neutrinos. Therefore, it appears that a commitment to quantitative parsimony helps us to select theories more likely to reflect the workings of nature. At this juncture I anticipate two objections: first, although quan- titative parsimony got it right in this scenario, it may not always pick out the correct theory. There may be some instances in which nature doesn’t use the simplest means to achieve her ends. Moreover, even if there are no such instances, it’s not clear that nature will always continue to employ the simplest means. This is a fair objection, and I fear that my response may be somewhat weak. I’m not sure that the workings of nature vindicate the utility of quantitative parsimony in every instance, and I certainly don’t know whether nature will continue to use the simplest instruments to achieve her ends.
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