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Possible Worlds and Ideology

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Possible Worlds and Ideology by Tom Constant A thesis submitted to Cardiff University in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy SCHOOL OF ENGLISH, COMMUNICATION AND PHILOSOPHY CARDIFF UNIVERSITY APRIL 2017 i Summary The broad aim of this thesis is to explore fruitful connections between ideology theory and the philosophy of possible worlds (PW). Ideologies are full of modal concepts, such as possibility, potential, necessity, essence, contingency and accident. Typically, PWs are articulated for the analysis and illumination of modal concepts. That naturally suggests a method for theorising ideologica l modality, utilising PW theory . The specific conclusions of the thesis proffer a number of original contributions t o knowledge: 1) PWs should only be used for explication and not as (intrinsic) 1 evidence or criteria o f assessment in ideology theory. The estimation of (e.g.) utopian possibilities, human essences and freedoms must be determined by extrinsic criteria. PWs can serve only as a window or means of expression but not as a set of evaluative premises . 2) For this purpose, a modified version of Lewisian genuine realism (GR), with its device of counterpart theory, is the best approach; the alternative theories risk constricting possibilities or smuggling in assumptions that ought to be object s of analysis in ideology theory . Th is is instructive, since ideology theorists are prone to pick and choose favoured aspects of modal philosophy without further argument. 3) Conclusions (1) and (2) suggest the adoption of GR or fictionalist GR . Overall, the actualist options are less adequate. Fictionalism, by contrast, is a worthwhile contender, but it too presents comparative weaknesses which reinforce GR’s standing as a potent challenger to the modal metaphysician. Therefore, this thesis presents additional reasons (to Lewis’s) to t hink GR true. The conclusions are not knockdown, and I draw out incentives and consequences for adopting alternative stances. The various chapters also provide specific details for comprehending and debating ideological modals . 1There is ‘intrinsic’ evidence when the means of evaluation are inherent to the PW theory. For example, an essentialist approach to PWs might take match of origins and material constitution as essences. Then the theory could provide evidence for or against some doctrine of human nature. A theory offers ‘extrinsic’ evidence if it merely illustrates independent evaluative criteria. For example, PWs can highlight contradictions. The principle of non -contradiction is of course an independent principle of logic, not peculiar to theories about PWs. ii Declarations and Statements DECLARATION This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award. Signed ……………………………… ……… (candidate) Date ………………….…………….……… STATEMENT 1 This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD Signed ……………………………… ……… (candidate) Date ………………….…………….……… STATEMENT 2 This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, and the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University’s Policy on the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Deg ree Students. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own. Signed ……………………………… ……… (candidate) Date ………………….…………….……… STATEMENT 3 I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter -library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. Signed ……………………………… ……… (candidate) Date ………………….…………….……… STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter -library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Academic Standards & Quality Committee. Signed ……………………………… ……… (candidate) Date ………………….…………….……… iii Dedication For Nia iv Acknowledgements First and f oremost , profound appreciation is due to my PhD supervisor, Professor Christopher Norris. I can thank Chris’s intellect, knowledge, open -mindedness and kind manner for enriching my pursuit of philosophy over the years . I can also thank Chris for his unwavering enthusiasm about my research idea . Furthermore, the numerous fertile academic discussions at the postgraduate philosophy reading group , invaluable for my research, owe much to Chris’s facilitative efforts . Also, thank you, Chris , for the supervisory session s, which were often several hours long and late in the day . That was above and beyond and I am very grateful. Among academic staff I can also thank Professor Alessandra Tanesini for being so generous with her time and thoughts and for encouraging me to improve my argumentative game . Many thanks are also due to Prof essor Robin Attfield, Dr . Jon Webber and Prof essor Andrew Edgar for their time and ideas . A very special dedication is due to Rhian Rattray , who se exemplary managerial work for the ENCAP department is delivered with intelligence, sense and good humour. I would have been lost without Rhian’s support and advice at several crucial points. Ackn owledgements are also due to: Barry and Helen Wilkins , for their intelligent and valuable advice, support, friendship and insight . Many PhD peers , who have generously discussed my work or inspired me into new and better ways of thinking : Julian Bennett, Dr. Ryo Chonobayashi, Dr. Mohammad Kamrul Ahsan, Dr. Robert Crich, Dr. Etienne Poulard, Dharmender Dillon, Bash Khan, Andy Jones, Ben Smart, Paul Hampson, Dr. John Saunders, Jack Price, Amanda Courtright -Lim, Matthew Jenkins , Yousef Al -Janabi , Carl Murphy, Ethan Chambers , Andrea Barale and Jernej Markelj . For cherished friendship, intellectual stimulation , comradery and spiritual support : Alex Grindulis, Cara Jones, Father Dr. James Seimens, Joshua Mathius Brown , Mark Bentley , Simon Goldsworthy, Lisenka and Tim Ex ell, Lisa Childs , Bobby Rainbird, Alex White, Lauren Faithful l, Lloyd Griffiths, Aran Ibbotson, Richard Parke r, Margaret Wade, Elizabeth A Williams, Karen England, Bev He ms, Lisa Williams , James Morris , Meg Peasley, Keith Lynch, Sophie Pandey, Brett Hu tchins and Lyndon Bailey. v For their many (often unique) contributions : Robert (Bob) , Ben and Aimee Constant , and Adam Greenley . A nd to my mother, Gabby Constant, who sadly left us in 2011. I owe a huge and agonising debt to her that I can no longer repay. Roshan Kissoon, Adam Johannes and , the (sadly) late , Frank Trombley , for their va st knowledge, understanding and ethical conviction. Sophia Miller, for being such a brilliant and influential first tutee. For mag nificent friendship and for spurring me to greater philosophical heights : Robert Cole, who sadly passed away in 2015 . He is painfully missed and cheerfully remembered . Sincere thanks and acknowledgements to Rob’s family, Brian, Elaine, Adam and Zoe Cole , and Rob’s girlfriend, Jo Higgins, for their hospita lity and kindness . For their open -heartedness , open -handedness and so much support and assistance to Nia and me : Charles, Sheryl and Rhodri Fussell . For their warmth , wi sdom, humour and jazz CDs: Doug and Beryl Harris . A separate dedication belongs to Scott Kemp for his splendid friendship, encouragement and lucid intellectual company . Thank you also to Scott’s family, Sam, Mia and Molly, for many delightful experiences and fond memories. Most importantly, I m ust express a deep and enduring love and appreciation for Nia Fussell. Thank you for your affection and companionship , for keeping me (relatively!) grounded , and for buying most of the books . Since the PhD started , we have become engaged, married and now parents -to -be . Thanks to you, I enjoy a wonderful, fulfilling life and can look forward to a bright , joyful future . ‘Sin e qua non ’ as they say (and I say, in Chapter IV!) . Lastly , a huge thank you to anybody who offered kindness, enco uragement, an interested ear or helpful contributions during the period of my research. vi Glossary of Abbreviations Abbreviation Definition ACT Actualist realist cou nterpart theory. A branch of AR. Not all ARs are ACT s AR Actualist realism BR Book realism. A species of AR CPW Canonical possible worlds. An ontologically non -committal application of possible worlds CR Combinatorial realism. A species of AR C-relation (s) Counterpart relation (s) CT Counterpart theory EP The e rsatz pluriverse (as in Sider 2002). A species of AR and ACT FCT Fictionalist counterpart theory. FCT is a part of FGR FGR Fictionalist genuine realism. FGR contains FCT GCT Genuine realist counterpart theory. GCT is a part of GR GR Genuine realism. GR contains GCT IM (s) Ideological modality / ideological modal(s) NR Nature realism. A species of AR PR Plantingan realism. A species of AR PW (s) Possible world(s) S Introduced in Chapter V, 'S' abbreviates the sentence 'It is possible to have possibilities you don’t currently have' T A proposed possible worlds analysis of ideological modality (the focus of the thesis) (U) -possibility Introduced in Chapter III, a (U )-possibility is a utopian possibility (defined more precisely in the text) Chapter III also refers to (U) -modals, (U) -conc eptions, (U)
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