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Russia's Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia

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Russia's Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia PMC Research Center Policy Paper Policy Russia’s Disinformation Economic Diplomacy Campaigns in Georgia: Ain Study Georgia: of State and CivilExisting Society Practice Response and Future Prospects PMC Research Research PMC 2019 Tbilisi 2019 Tbilisi PMC Research Center Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response Author: Irakli Sirbiladze Reviewer: Mikheil Darchiashvili 2019 Tbilisi Research TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ........................................................................................ 6 Introduction .................................................................................................... 6 Disinformation, Propaganda and Fake News: A Conceptual Overview and Definitions .......................................................... 8 Post-Truth Era: Unpacking the Aims of Russia’s Influence Operations Worldwide ................................................................... 10 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: Scale, Means and Aims ....... 11 State Response to Russian Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia ........................................................... 20 Civil Society Response to Russian Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns ............................................................................ 26 Assessing Georgia’s Response to Russian Propaganda and Disinformation: A Discussion .............................................. 31 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 40 Policy Recommendations .............................................................................. 41 Research EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The paper concludes with policy recommendations for the Georgian state, civil society actors and interna- Since Georgia decided to steadily embark on a path tional community at large, calling upon all stakehold- towards Western integration, it has been subject to ers to take specific measures and cooperate more to Russia’s conventional and non-conventional warfare deal with the root causes of the problem. tactics. After the annexation of Crimea, both globally and regionally, Russia has modernized its toolkits of influence. Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns have become a cornerstone of Russia’s re- INTRODUCTION visionist project. Among many other states, Georgia Russia’s disinformation and influence campaigns have has also become a target of Russia’s disinformation become a worldwide concern, especially in the after- machinery. math of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Not Russia has carried out its propaganda and disinfor- only has Russia transformed the conventional prac- mation campaigns against Georgia with the help of tice of waging interstate wars but, together with tradi- various actors within and outside Georgia with the tional military activities, it has also deployed a variety aim of undermining Georgia’s aspirations to build a of other tools at its disposal to achieve its objectives. democratic, rule-of-law-oriented European state and This mixture of hard and soft power instruments has to join NATO and the EU. Russia’s disinformation cam- come to be known as ‘hybrid warfare1,’ exemplified paigns – carried out both online and offline - rest on by the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine, which, back in exploiting the fears of the public, aim at undermining 2013, outlined the notion that the difference between Georgia’s independent statehood and foreign policy war and peace is being blurred, and that wars are be- choices, and at presenting Russia as an alternative to ing waged without any declaration and, once begun, Georgia’s Western options. Addressing the quotidian proceed according to an unfamiliar template2. The negative consequences of Russian disinformation in rules of war, as the Doctrine stipulates, have changed, Georgia has therefore become an undertaking for the and certain political and strategic goals are now bet- entire nation. ter realized through resorting to non-military means.3 Assessing the measures taken by state actors and Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics - with disinformation non-state actors in Georgia, the paper concludes that and the spread of fake news at the heart – have not the latter is more cognizant of the problem than the been limited only to Ukraine, but have reached oth- former. While the Georgian state has politically ac- er countries as well. Russia’s alleged interference in knowledged Russian propaganda and disinformation the US presidential elections in 20164 and the use of campaigns as a challenge, the practical measures un- a nerve agent on territory of the UK in 2018 demon- dertaken in response are at a nascent stage and lack strate the scale and ambition of Russia’s influence op- institutional coordination. Efforts have been under- erations. Russia’s broader aims include destabilizing taken to promote Georgia’s European and Euro-At- Western democracies through “sowing confusion, lantic integration, but the danger of overlooking the stoking fears, and eroding trust in Western and dem- multi-layered and multi-purpose character of the Rus- ocratic institutions.”5 Russia is particularly adamant in sian disinformation campaigns is palpable. 1 Hoffman, G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Centu­ Civil society actors, on the other hand, have imple- ry:The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for mented a wide variety of activities to debunk, mon- Policy Studies, available at: https://potomacinsti­ itor and expose Russian disinformation campaigns, tute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hy­ bridwar_0108.pdf along with carrying out important media literacy 2 Gerasimov, V. (2013). The Value of Science Is in the work. However, a lack of resources makes their efforts Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the unsustainable and limited in scope. The need to pro- Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Opera­ tions. Military-Industrial Kurier, from Military Review mote state and civil society as well as intra-civil soci- 2016, Army University Press, United States of America ety cooperation remains vital to thwart the disinform- 3 ibid ing state. 4 Mueller, R. (2019). Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Although an important segment of the public in Geor- Elections. U.S. Department of Justice, available at: gia remains vulnerable to Russia’s ‘high’ and ‘low’ pro- https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/18/muel­ ler-report-pdf-download-text-file-1280891 paganda efforts, Russia’s ongoing aggression against 5 Helmus, T et al. (2018). Russian Social Media Influence: Georgia makes the long-term success of Russia’s disin- Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Eu­ formation campaigns difficult. rope. Rand Corporation 6 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response its use of hybrid warfare tactics against its immediate values and institutions and, by fueling anti-Western neighbors, especially Ukraine and Georgia, both of attitudes in Georgia, disrupting Georgia’s foreign policy which have embarked on a path towards democrati- and its aspiration to join NATO and the EU. Political ac- zation and integration into Western political, security knowledgement of the threat by the Georgian state as and economic institutions. well as the vulnerability of Georgia to Russian soft pow- er is discussed elsewhere7, albeit a detailed account of Given the scale of Russia’s ambitions and the means at the what, how, and why of Russian disinformation cam- its disposal, neighboring countries are confronted by paigns in Georgia is lacking. The present research adds Russia’s hard as well as soft power capabilities. This is to the existing accounts to have documented how Rus- also true in relation to Georgia, whose independence sian propaganda works in Georgia8 by providing more and sovereignty, declared pro-Western foreign pol- definitional and conceptual clarity; namely by delving icy and democratic consolidation efforts make the more comprehensively into Russia’s objectives, and by country a subject of Russia’s full-scale traditional and documenting and assessing the steps taken by state non-traditional military, political and economic mea- actors and non-state actors to counter Russia’s disinfor- sures. These pose an existential threat to the country’s mation campaigns in Georgia. national security, statehood and democracy. The research paper relies on a qualitative research This research paper is limited to discussing Russia’s methodology and utilizes both primary and sec- disinformation campaigns in Georgia, and does ondary sources to answer the research questions. In not cover the means and aims of Russia’s conven- particular, to unpack the scale and aims of Russian tional warfare against Georgia, which have been disinformation campaigns in Georgia and elsewhere, addressed elsewhere6. Primarily, the research aims the paper consults numerous academic articles, pol- at understanding three major interrelated themes: icy documents and research papers. To understand first, the scale, means and aims of Russia’s disinfor- the state’s response to Russian disinformation, the mation campaigns against Georgia; second, the research paper scrutinizes official state documents responses of the Georgian state to Russian propa- related to countering disinformation as well as rel- ganda and disinformation; and, third, the responses evant statements and interviews of Georgian policy of Georgian civil society to Russia’s disinformation
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