PMC Research Center Policy Paper Policy

Russia’s Disinformation Economic Diplomacy Campaigns in Georgia: inA Study Georgia: of State and ExistingCivil Society Practice Response and Future Prospects PMC Research Research PMC

2019 Tbilisi 2019 Tbilisi

PMC Research Center

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response

Author: Irakli Sirbiladze Reviewer: Mikheil Darchiashvili

2019 Tbilisi Research TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ...... 6

Introduction ...... 6

Disinformation, Propaganda and Fake News: A Conceptual Overview and Definitions ...... 8

Post-Truth Era: Unpacking the Aims of Russia’s Influence Operations Worldwide ...... 10

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: Scale, Means and Aims...... 11

State Response to Russian Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia ...... 20

Civil Society Response to Russian Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns ...... 26

Assessing Georgia’s Response to Russian Propaganda and Disinformation: A Discussion ...... 31

Conclusion ...... 40

Policy Recommendations ...... 41

Research EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The paper concludes with policy recommendations for the Georgian state, civil society actors and interna- Since Georgia decided to steadily embark on a path tional community at large, calling upon all stakehold- towards Western integration, it has been subject to ers to take specific measures and cooperate more to Russia’s conventional and non-conventional warfare deal with the root causes of the problem. tactics. After the annexation of Crimea, both globally and regionally, Russia has modernized its toolkits of influence. Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns have become a cornerstone of Russia’s re- INTRODUCTION visionist project. Among many other states, Georgia Russia’s disinformation and influence campaigns have has also become a target of Russia’s disinformation become a worldwide concern, especially in the after- machinery. math of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Not Russia has carried out its propaganda and disinfor- only has Russia transformed the conventional prac- mation campaigns against Georgia with the help of tice of waging interstate wars but, together with tradi- various actors within and outside Georgia with the tional military activities, it has also deployed a variety aim of undermining Georgia’s aspirations to build a of other tools at its disposal to achieve its objectives. democratic, rule-of-law-oriented European state and This mixture of hard and soft power instruments has to join NATO and the EU. Russia’s disinformation cam- come to be known as ‘hybrid warfare1,’ exemplified paigns – carried out both online and offline - rest on by the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine, which, back in exploiting the fears of the public, aim at undermining 2013, outlined the notion that the difference between Georgia’s independent statehood and foreign policy war and peace is being blurred, and that wars are be- choices, and at presenting Russia as an alternative to ing waged without any declaration and, once begun, Georgia’s Western options. Addressing the quotidian proceed according to an unfamiliar template2. The negative consequences of Russian disinformation in rules of war, as the Doctrine stipulates, have changed, Georgia has therefore become an undertaking for the and certain political and strategic goals are now bet- entire nation. ter realized through resorting to non-military means.3

Assessing the measures taken by state actors and Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics - with disinformation non-state actors in Georgia, the paper concludes that and the spread of fake news at the heart – have not the latter is more cognizant of the problem than the been limited only to Ukraine, but have reached oth- former. While the Georgian state has politically ac- er countries as well. Russia’s alleged interference in knowledged Russian propaganda and disinformation the US presidential elections in 20164 and the use of campaigns as a challenge, the practical measures un- a nerve agent on territory of the UK in 2018 demon- dertaken in response are at a nascent stage and lack strate the scale and ambition of Russia’s influence op- institutional coordination. Efforts have been under- erations. Russia’s broader aims include destabilizing taken to promote Georgia’s European and Euro-At- Western democracies through “sowing confusion, lantic integration, but the danger of overlooking the stoking fears, and eroding trust in Western and dem- multi-layered and multi-purpose character of the Rus- ocratic institutions.”5 Russia is particularly adamant in sian disinformation campaigns is palpable. 1 Hoffman, G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Centu­ Civil society actors, on the other hand, have imple- ry:The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for mented a wide variety of activities to debunk, mon- Policy Studies, available at: https://potomacinsti­ itor and expose Russian disinformation campaigns, tute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hy­ bridwar_0108.pdf along with carrying out important media literacy 2 Gerasimov, V. (2013). The Value of Science Is in the work. However, a lack of resources makes their efforts Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the unsustainable and limited in scope. The need to pro- Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Opera­ tions. Military-Industrial Kurier, from Military Review mote state and civil society as well as intra-civil soci- 2016, Army University Press, United States of America ety cooperation remains vital to thwart the disinform- 3 ibid ing state. 4 Mueller, R. (2019). Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Although an important segment of the public in Geor- Elections. U.S. Department of Justice, available at: gia remains vulnerable to Russia’s ‘high’ and ‘low’ pro- https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/18/muel­ ler-report-pdf-download-text-file-1280891 paganda efforts, Russia’s ongoing aggression against 5 Helmus, T et al. (2018). Russian Social Media Influence: Georgia makes the long-term success of Russia’s disin- Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Eu­ formation campaigns difficult. rope. Rand Corporation

6 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response its use of hybrid warfare tactics against its immediate values and institutions and, by fueling anti-Western neighbors, especially Ukraine and Georgia, both of attitudes in Georgia, disrupting Georgia’s foreign policy which have embarked on a path towards democrati- and its aspiration to join NATO and the EU. Political ac- zation and integration into Western political, security knowledgement of the threat by the Georgian state as and economic institutions. well as the vulnerability of Georgia to Russian soft pow- er is discussed elsewhere7, albeit a detailed account of Given the scale of Russia’s ambitions and the means at the what, how, and why of Russian disinformation cam- its disposal, neighboring countries are confronted by paigns in Georgia is lacking. The present research adds Russia’s hard as well as soft power capabilities. This is to the existing accounts to have documented how Rus- also true in relation to Georgia, whose independence sian propaganda works in Georgia8 by providing more and sovereignty, declared pro-Western foreign pol- definitional and conceptual clarity; namely by delving icy and democratic consolidation efforts make the more comprehensively into Russia’s objectives, and by country a subject of Russia’s full-scale traditional and documenting and assessing the steps taken by state non-traditional military, political and economic mea- actors and non-state actors to counter Russia’s disinfor- sures. These pose an existential threat to the country’s mation campaigns in Georgia. national security, statehood and democracy. The research paper relies on a qualitative research This research paper is limited to discussing Russia’s methodology and utilizes both primary and sec- disinformation campaigns in Georgia, and does ondary sources to answer the research questions. In not cover the means and aims of Russia’s conven- particular, to unpack the scale and aims of Russian tional warfare against Georgia, which have been disinformation campaigns in Georgia and elsewhere, addressed elsewhere6. Primarily, the research aims the paper consults numerous academic articles, pol- at understanding three major interrelated themes: icy documents and research papers. To understand first, the scale, means and aims of Russia’s disinfor- the state’s response to Russian disinformation, the mation campaigns against Georgia; second, the research paper scrutinizes official state documents responses of the Georgian state to Russian propa- related to countering disinformation as well as rel- ganda and disinformation; and, third, the responses evant statements and interviews of Georgian policy of Georgian civil society to Russia’s disinformation makers. The paper also assesses the specific policy campaigns. initiatives introduced by state actors (both govern- To do so, the paper asks three research questions: ment and opposition) and discusses the status of 1) How do Russian disinformation campaigns work in their implementation. Georgia, what are their aims, and how are they man- To better understand the responses from civil society ifested? 2) How has the Georgian state responded to actors, along with analyzing relevant reports and re- Russian propaganda and disinformation? 3) How has search papers, the paper details and assesses specific Georgian civil society responded to Russian propa- policy initiatives and campaigns carried out by Geor- ganda and disinformation? Answering these ques- tions would allow for a better understanding of the 7 see Zurabashvili. T. (2018). Russia’s Disinforma­ status quo, and can lead to identifying possible policy tion Activities and Countermeasures: Lessons from recommendations to ensure that Georgia remains re- Georgia. available at https://www.kremlinwatch. eu/our-reports/ , last accessed on July, 11, 2019 ; silient and able to effectively counter Russia’s disinfor- Kapanadze.S. (2015). Russia’s Soft Power in Geor­ mation campaigns. Studying both state and civil so- gia – A Carnivorous Plant in Action. In Rostoks and ciety actors would allow a holistic assessment of the Spruds (eds). The different faces of “soft power”: the Baltic States and Eastern Neighborhood be­ steps taken as well as identifying those that need to tween Russia and the EU. Latvian Institute of Inter­ be taken in response to Russian disinformation cam- national Affairs, pp.162-183 paigns and influence operations. 8 see primarily the annual reports from Media Develop­ ment Foundation (MDF) in Georgia, available at http:// Russian disinformation campaigns in Georgia are www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/research/1/6; last acces- sed July, 14, 2019; see also: Popescu and Zamfir. largely aimed at undermining Georgia’s democratic (2018). Propaganda Made-to-Measure: How Our Vulnerabilities Facilitate Russian Influence; A Study 6 See: Asmus, D. (2010). A Little War That Shook the of Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia and the Republic of World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West Moldova. Global Focus, pp.162-196; Tugushi, et and others. Palgrave Macmillan, United States of al. (2018). Georgia. in Disinformation Resilience in America; Allison, R. (2009). The Russian case for Central and Eastern Europe. Prism Ukraine, pp.135- military intervention in Georgia: international law, 156; Adzinbaia and Zawadzka. (2018). Countering norms and political calculation. European Security, Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda in Georgia. 18(2), pp.173-200; Warsaw Institute

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 7 gian civil society actors. To complement the findings, ity” that is produced by “the blurring of modes of war, five exploratory interviews have been conducted the blurring of who fights, and what technologies are with: a representative of a state institution (one brought to bear.”10 interview)9; representatives of civil society (two interviews); and representatives of the expert com- Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 saw a more so- munity (two interviews). The research focuses on phisticated use of hybrid warfare tactics, and gave rise post-2014 cases of disinformation campaigns, given to a concerted use of information warfare tactics by that the annexation of Crimea (which occurred in Russia to justify its illegal actions. According to Alli- 2014) constitutes a key event that gave rise to Russia’s son, in justifying the annexation of Crimea, Russia has influence operations and disinformation campaigns resorted to the use of ‘partial truth and disinforma- both regionally and internationally. tion’ and ‘making unfounded assertions of “facts’’ to convince both domestic and international audienc- The research paper is structured as follows. First, it es.11 The signs of Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics provides a conceptual overview of relevant terms were already detectable in the Russian-Georgian War such as disinformation, propaganda and fake news, in 2008, in which Russia combined non-tradition- and lays out working definitions for using specific al means of warfare with more prevalent traditional terminology throughout the paper. Second, it over- means. views global trends in terms of the rise in disinforma- tion campaigns with a primary focus on unpacking Elsewhere, the use of disinformation and fake news Russia’s intentions in pursuing global information as part of electoral campaigning has to some ex- warfare activities. The third chapter details the scale, tent become a worldwide phenomenon. This came means and aims of Russia’s disinformation campaigns to be known as ‘post-truth politics,’ which, in 2016, in Georgia. The fourth and fifth parts of the paper re- Oxford Dictionaries nominated as the word of the spectively detail specific measures taken by Georgian year, and defined it as “relating to or denoting cir- state and civil society actors in response to Russia’s cumstances in which objective facts are less influ- disinformation campaigns. The sixth part of the paper ential in shaping public opinion than appeals to 12 discusses and assesses those measures. Finally, the emotion and personal belief.” paper concludes by offering policy recommendations The distortion of objective facts to shape public opin- to state and civil society actors in Georgia as well as to ion has also become a vital part of Russia’s foreign the international community. policy calculus and its positioning in the world. Rus- sia has engaged itself in a political, economic and in- formational rivalry against the West with the aim of DISINFORMATION, PROPAGANDA changing domestic politics of target countries in favor AND FAKE NEWS: A CONCEPTUAL of its national interests. Russia’s aims and ambitions in OVERVIEW AND DEFINITIONS global affairs are discussed in the next chapter, how- Globalization and its attendant technological chang- ever here it is essential that key terms and concepts es have altered the nature of doing politics, including are defined to make sense of what is meant when the the ways in which warfare is conducted. Although research paper refers to terms such as ‘disinformation,’ traditional ways remain dominant, powerful state and ‘propaganda,’ ‘fake news,’ ‘resilience,’ and ‘strategic non-state actors have resorted to the use of technolo- communications.’ gy as a means of achieving political objectives. In the The most prominent term that describes the idea of wake of the War on Terror since September 11, 2001, manipulating public opinion is propaganda, which the concept of hybrid warfare has gained particular Edward Bernays, back in 1928, defined as “the exec- prominence both in the policy making and academic utive arm of the invisible government” and has since literature. Pioneering work by Hoffman defined -hy brid warfare as “a wide range of variety and complex- 10 Hoffman,G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Poli­ cy Studies, p.14, available at: https://potomacinsti­ 9 Various state institutions – in particular the Minis­ tute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hy­ try of Defense, Administration of the Government bridwar_0108.pdf of Georgia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 11 Allison, R. (2014). Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in LEPL Information Center on NATO and the EU – have Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules. Inter­ been contacted for an interview. Most of them cited national Affairs, 90(6), p.1259 time constraints to refuse the interview, while there 12 Oxford Dictionaries. (2016). Word of the Year. avail­ has been no response from the Administration of able at https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the- the Government of Georgia. year/word-of-the-year-2016

8 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response become an instrument in the hands of the minority to In response to disinformation campaigns in gener- influence the majority, and to “mold the mind of the al and to Russian disinformation campaigns in par- masses.”13 The aim of propaganda is to “persuade its ticular, a whole variety of actors, especially Western subject that there is only one valid point of view and states and institutions, have introduced concepts and to eliminate all other options”14 and, although the two developed practical measures that are necessary for concepts do overlap, propaganda is not necessarily a mitigating the impact thereof. According to Lanoszka, form of disinformation.15 The difference between pro- countermeasures undertaken by target states repre- paganda and disinformation lies in the fact that pro- sent one of the barriers to the strategic success of the paganda can sometimes be factually and normatively disinforming state.21 These countermeasures can be correct and its essential requirement is not to be func- more efficient if target states are conducting strategic tionally misleading16, while disinformation represents communications and by so doing bolstering societal “misleading information that has the function of mis- resilience towards disinformation campaigns. leading someone.”17 By strategic communications this research paper This research paper therefore rests on the defini- refers to the ability of the state to communicate tion offered by Fallis and understands disinforma- purposefully to achieve its objectives.22 Purposeful tion as something functioned to deliberately mis- communication is “the essence of strategic communi- lead and deceive the target audiences. Following cations,” while the term strategic implies that activities Lanoszka, disinformation campaigns are conceptu- are “not random or unintentional communications.”23 alized as “a systematic government effort aimed at Resilience, on the other hand, is understood as “the using disinformation to mislead a particular audi- balance of perceived national strength and vulnera- ence – whether a government or key members of bility after an adversity or a traumatic event.”24 Follow- 18 society – in order to influence the policy process.” ing the EU’s definition of strategic communications as Based on these definitions, Russian disinformation “increased public awareness of disinformation activi- campaigns in Georgia are understood as a system- ties by external actors, and improved EU capacity to ic effort undertaken by the Russian government to anticipate and respond to such activities,”25 the aim of mislead the Georgian public and by so doing un- strategic communication efforts undertaken by the dermine Georgia’s democracy, statehood and for- Georgian state shall be to raise public awareness of eign policy choices. disinformation campaigns carried out by Russia and In addition to disinformation and propaganda, the to develop capabilities to identify and respond to term ‘fake news’ is extensively utilized. According to such campaigns. Allcot and Gentzkow, fake news refers to “news ar- In terms of disinformation resilience, following ticles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and the Disinformation Resilience Index developed by could mislead readers”19 while a broader definition Ukrainian Prism, societal resilience and vulnerability is could include conspiracy theories, false statements understood by observing the following three factors made by politicians and “reports that are slanted or at play: 1) population exposure to Kremlin-backed misleading but not outright false.” 20 media; 2) quality of systemic responses; and 3) vulner- ability to digital warfare.26 The first looks at the extent

21 Lanoszka, A. (2019). Disinformation in international 13 Bernays, E. (1928). Propaganda. p. 19 politics. European Journal of International Security, 14 Cull, N, Culbert, D and Welch, D. (2003). Propagan­ 4, p.230 da and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 22 Hallahan et al. (2007). Defining Strategic Communi­ 1500 to the Present, Santa Barbara, CA, pp. 318–19. cation. International Journal of Strategic Communi­ 15 Lanoszka, A. (2019). Disinformation in international cation, 1(1), p.4 politics. European Journal of International Security, 23 Ibid 4, p.229 24 Eshel, Y and Kimhi, S. (2016). A new perspective on 16 Ibid national resilience: Components and demograph­ 17 Fallis, D. T. (2015). What is disinformation?. Library ic predictors. Journal of Community Psychology, Trends, 63(3), p. 413 44(7), p.834 18 Lanoszka, A. (2019). Disinformation in international 25 European Union, Questions and Answers about the politics. European Journal of International Security, East StratCom Task Force, 2016, available at: https:// 4, p.229 eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-home­ 19 Allcot, H and Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media page/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-the-east- and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of Eco­ stratcom-task-force_en nomic Perspectives, 31(2), p.213 26 Russian Disinformation Resilience Index, Ukrainian 20 Ibid Prism, available at: http://prismua.org/en/dri/

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 9 to which the population is exposed “to a specific set of sia’s military aggression in Georgia in 2008 and the sub- media narratives and disinformation.” In other words, sequent recognition of the independence of Georgian the higher the exposure, “the wider the opportunities territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Os- to influence societal processes and decisions of state setia represented a new low in Russia’s relations with bodies.”27 The second examines the extent to which the West; in 2014 disagreements between the West the state has demonstrated preparedness to count- and Russia loomed large over the annexation of Crimea er Russian disinformation campaigns as well as “the and the still-continuing aggression in Eastern Ukraine; quality of countermeasures [used] by the media com- meanwhile, in 2015 Russia’s military engagement in munity and civil society.”28 Finally, the third unpacks the Syrian Civil War in support of the Assad regime and assesses the ability of the state to prove digitally served to deteriorate relations even further. resilient amid the rising “popularity of online media, Despite Western countries deciding to impose eco- social media, and various types of communication on nomic sanctions on Russia over its annexation of the internet.”29 Crimea and violation of the rules of engagement, the In assessing the state and civil society responses to Kremlin on the one hand spares no efforts to legiti- Russian disinformation campaigns, this research pa- mize its illegal actions and foreign policy undertak- per examines the vulnerability of the Georgian pop- ings and, on the other, continues to undermine the ulation to both traditional and non-traditional media Western-led international order by sowing discord in outlets deployed by Russia in the service of propa- Western societies. One of its ways of doing so is by ganda and disinformation, and tries to assess the engaging in informational warfare with the spread of state and strategic nature – that is, purposeful and disinformation and fake news a central component non-random communicative activities - of the sys- thereof. temic responses undertaken by both state and non- Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its military in- state actors in Georgia. volvement in Syria have been two major events that set Russia on a collision course with the West. At the same time, Russia decided to intensify and system- POST-TRUTH ERA: UNPACKING atize its hybrid warfare tactics. Disinformation cam- THE AIMS OF RUSSIA’S INFLUENCE paigns have always been carried out to defend and OPERATIONS WORLDWIDE advance specific foreign policy decisions, and have been aimed at misleading the international commu- Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation cam- nity and convincing domestic audiences. paigns is not an isolated act devoid of higher pur- poses. On the contrary, disinformation campaigns, to The most persistent exercise of Russia’s disinforma- paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz, are a continuation of tion and influence campaigns could be observed: politics by other means, and are always subordinated during31 and after the annexation of Crimea in to Russia’s wider foreign policy goals. 2014; during the US presidential elections in 201632; following the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight Russia’s foreign policy objectives are generally aimed at MH1733; and following the Skripal case when Rus- restoring its status as a great power and undermining sia attempted to kill a former Russian spy and his the world order led by Western countries, primarily by daughter.34 These cases demonstrate both the de- the US. Great power status requires Russia to exercise fensive and offensive character of Russia’s disinfor- dominance in at least one region30 and to extend its in- fluence to other regions as well. Russia’s foreign policy 31 has hence often unfolded in opposition to the foreign Eitze, J and Gleichmann, M. (2014). Ten Myths Used to Justify Russian Policy in the Ukraine Crisis. Kon­ policies of Western countries, thus leading to the de- rad-Adenauer-Stiftung terioration of relations between them since the early 32 See Mueller, R. (2019). Report on the Investigation 2000s. In 2003, Russia opposed the US intervention in into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Elections. U.S. Department of Justice, available at: Iraq and criticized Western countries for their decision https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/18/muel­ to recognize the independence of Kosovo in 2008; Rus- ler-report-pdf-download-text-file-1280891 33 See more here: EUvsDisinfo. (2019). Renewed Fo­ 27 Ibid cus on MH17. available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ renewed-focus-on-mh-17/ 28 Ibid 34 See more here: EUvsDisinfo. (2018). Novichok Re­ 29 Ibid turns and So Does Disinformation. available at: 30 Buzan, B and Waever, O. (2003). Regions and Pow­ https://euvsdisinfo.eu/novichok-returns-and-so- ers: the Structure of International Security. Cam­ does- disinformation/ bridge University Press

10 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response mation campaigns - that is, Russia uses disinforma- TO’s eastward enlargement. Russia’s engagement in tion to sow confusion over its role on the one hand, the Syrian Civil War, its support to the Maduro regime and on the other proactively advances its foreign in Venezuela as well as its use of the so-called Wag- policy agenda. ner Group to gain geopolitical and other benefits41 are indicative of Russia’s readiness to utilize an array Russia’s foreign policy goals therefore point to po- of military, diplomatic, economic, informational tools tential target countries of its propaganda and disin- and any others at its disposal to achieve its objectives. formation. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2016, recognizes an integral As argued earlier, the use of disinformation campaigns role that ‘soft power’ plays in “achieving foreign poli- and the conducting of influence operations world- cy objectives.”35 The concept understands soft power wide are therefore just a means to an end, namely to include “the tools offered by civil society, as well as achieving Russia’s foreign policy objectives and by so various methods and technologies – from informa- doing undermining the influence of Western societ- tion and communication, to humanitarian and oth- ies. At the regional level, which is more closely scru- er types.”36 Amid the growing antagonism between tinized in the remainder of the research paper, Russia Western countries and Russia – in particular over deploys propaganda and disinformation campaigns Ukraine and Syria – “Russia uses propaganda, cyber to disrupt democratization efforts of the target coun- operations, and proxies to influence neighboring and tries and undermine their aspirations to undergo a Western countries.”37 process of Europeanization and join Western security, political and economic institutions. By deploying disinformation and propaganda cam- paigns, Russia aims at undermining the unity of West- Both globally and regionally, therefore, Russia’s dis- ern societies and exploiting various crisis situations information campaigns rest on the principle that is that are, or have been, unfolding in Europe and North characteristic of a post-truth era: ‘what is true, is what America. Moreover, in defense of conservative values, feels true, rather than what is empirically verifiable.’42 Russia “in many ways utilized the rhetoric of right–wing The next chapter demonstrates how that principle activists and groups in Europe and the United States, manifests itself in relation to Georgia, which, especial- who oppose what they regard as destructive liberaliz- ly after the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, has become ing trends that are perceived to be undermining estab- a key target of Russia’s traditional and non-traditional lished religious traditions, ethnocultural cohesion, and means of warfare. the family”38 and lent support to these groups to “gain leverage on European politics and undermine the liber- al-democratic consensus in the West.”39 RUSSIA’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS Apart from being offensive in terms of waging disin- IN GEORGIA: SCALE, MEANS AND AIMS formation campaigns and exploiting crisis situations As is the case elsewhere, Russian disinformation cam- 40 through the use of ‘agitainment’ tactics , Russia more paigns vis-à-vis Georgia operate in line with its foreign broadly aims at undermining liberal international or- policy objectives. Russia’s approach towards Georgia der, transatlantic unity and weakening US hegemony. following the collapse of the USSR has largely been For those purposes, Russia continues to oppose West- characterized by attempts to attenuate Georgia’s sov- ern policies elsewhere, in particular the policy of NA- ereignty and restrict its independent foreign policy choices. Georgia’s response to Russia has in most cas- 35 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Feder­ ation, 2016, available at: https://www.rusemb.org. es been dissenting but, on some occasions, especially uk/rp_insight/ in the 1990s after Georgia joined the Commonwealth 36 Ibid of Independent States (CIS), it pursued an accommo- 37 Helmus, T et al. (2018). Russian Social Media Influ­ dating approach to Russia. ence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in East­ ern Europe. Rand Corporation, p.1 Despite its membership in the CIS, the extent of Geor- 38 Tolz, V and Teper, Y. (2018). Broadcasting agitain­ ment: a new media strategy of Putin’s third presi­ gia’s dissent towards Russia was expanding not least dency. Post-Soviet Affairs, p.7 39 Shakhovtsov, A. (2018). Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. Abington: Routledge 41 Reynolds, N. (2019). Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mer­ 40 Agitainment defined as “an ideologically inflected cenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner content that, through adapting global media for­ Group. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace mats to local needs, attempts to appeal to less en­ 42 Hutchings, S. (2017). Fake news and “post truth”: gaged and even sceptical viewers” – see Tolz, V and some preliminary notes. Russian Journal of Commu­ Teper, Y. (2018). nication, 9(2), p.2

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 11 because of the latter’s efforts to instigate separatism in order to convince both domestic and international in Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/ audiences of the acceptability of its actions. Tskhinvali. As Descalzi pointed out, in the CIS region “Moscow acts against the central government in all of Given that Russia’s disinformation activities are obe- the conflicts involving a separatist faction.”43 Georgia dient to its foreign policy, it is reasonable to argue joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program in 1994, that Russia intensified its disinformation machinery signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement against Georgia especially after the Russian-Georgian (PCA) with the EU in 1996, and became a member of War in 2008. However, as Russia’s appetite for assert- the Council of Europe in 1999. Georgia engaged itself ing dominance in the region grew with the annex- more in regional and strategic initiatives, demon- ation of Crimea in 2014, Russia increased the scale of strated first and foremost by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan its influence operations vis-à-vis Georgia too, primari- pipeline initiative. In 1997, together with Azerbaijan, ly because of Georgia’s unwaveringly pro-Western for- Moldova and Ukraine, Georgia founded GUAM44, eign policy posture. which was increasingly perceived as an anti-Russian platform given that the majority of its member states, except for Ukraine at the time, were facing separatism Scale of Russian disinformation and territorial problems. campaigns in Georgia

From the early 2000s45, and especially after the 2003 As mentioned above, in the aftermath of the Rus- Rose Revolution, Georgia embarked more steadily sian-Georgian War in 2008, Russia engaged in a justifi- on the path towards NATO and EU integration, which catory discourse both domestically and international- Russia staunchly opposed. Russia dubbed the so- ly. Domestically, courtesy of the Russian state media called ‘colour revolutions’ and waves of democrati- propaganda, the Russian public has generally appor- zation in Georgia and Ukraine as being orchestrated tioned the blame for initiating the war on Georgia. Ac- by the US. As a result, in 2007, Georgia was perceived cording to the public opinion polls conducted by Le- as “the most difficult and uncooperative CIS member vada Center, 34 percent of Russians held the Georgian state with respect to Moscow” and was given “the leadership liable for the war, while 24 percent of the most negative value amongst all of Russia’s interna- public blamed NATO and the US.47 Meanwhile, only 8 tional partners.”46 It was at that time - the first signs percent of respondents held Russia accountable for of which appeared in 2006 when Russia imposed an the war.48 In 2013, Georgia was ranked the country embargo on Georgian products and deported ethnic most hostile to Russia except for the US.49 Georgians - when Russia started to consolidate its Internationally, on the other hand, Russia failed to efforts to wage conventional and non-conventional convince the international community of the legali- warfare against Georgia to thwart its democratization ty and necessity of its actions against Georgia. Only and Western integration efforts. a handful of countries (Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru To that end, Russia carried out military aggression and Syria) followed Russia in recognizing the inde- against Georgia in 2008, occupied the Abkhazia and pendence of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South South Ossetia/Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, and then Ossetia/Tskhinvali, while a substantial majority of UN recognized their independence. Russia then engaged member states, including four permanent members in deploying concerted propaganda and disinforma- of the UN Security Council, rejected Russia’s justifica- tion campaigns to justify its illegal actions in Georgia, tion to militarily invade Georgia, and its occupation and recognition of the independence of its territories. 43 Gayoso Descalzi, C. A. (2011). Russian hegemony Georgia was successful in refuting Russian disinfor- in the CIS region: an examination of Russian influ­ mation vis-à-vis the Russian-Georgian War even to the ence and of variation in consent and dissent by CIS states to regional hierarchy. PhD thesis, The London extent that it led to one Russian journalist concluding School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), that “Russia has definitely lost the information war p.53 44 See more about GUAM here: http://guam-organi­ zation.org/en/about-the-organization-for-democra­ 47 See the results of the poll here: https://www.levada. cy-and-economic-development-guam/ ru/2018/08/06/avgust-2008-goda/ 45 Statement by President of Georgia Eduard Shevard­ 48 Ibid nadze at the EAPC Summit, available at: https:// 49 See more here: Levada Poll: The Top Friends www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122h.htm and Enemies of Russia in the Neighbourhood 46 Markedonov, S. (2007). Paradoxes of Russia’s Geor­ and Beyond, 2013, available at: https://www.le­ gia Policy. Russia in Global Affairs, available at: vada.ru/2013/06/18/vneshnepoliticheskie-vra­ https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_8551 gi-i-druzya-rossii/

12 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response that the US waged on us. In the eyes of almost all the propaganda and disinformation vocabulary is largely countries of the world, Russia is seen as an aggressor threat-based, attempting to convince the Georgian that has attacked a weak Georgian state.”50 public that Western countries and NATO are not inter- ested in accepting Georgia. 54 Especially in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, Russian propaganda and disinformation cam- One of the most persistent characteristics of Russia’s paigns against Georgia went beyond the theme of the disinformation campaigns in Georgia is the exploita- Russian-Georgian War and extended to the issue of tion of ongoing events or crises and then trying to Georgia’s integration with Western political, econom- present them in such a fashion that undermines the ic and military institutions. Fundamentally, according image of the West. The most prominent example to the late Alexander Rondeli, Russian propaganda thereof is the Lugar Laboratory case when Russia ac- and disinformation includes the following overarch- cused Georgia of hosting the American laboratory ing narratives: 1) Georgia has to stay with Russia due which, according to the disinformation narrative, ex- to its geography, and common history and religion; perimented on human beings that resulted in a num- 2) Georgian and Russian people are friendly with each ber of deaths.55 In reality, the Richard Lugar Center for other and only the Georgian government is threat- Public Health Research, part of the National Center for ening this friendship by taking a pro-Western foreign Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC), facilitates policy path; 3) Russia will never allow Georgia to join Georgian-American “cooperation in the area of pre- NATO and the EU and is ready to take hard measures vention of proliferation of technology, pathogens and to prevent Georgia from taking such steps; and 4) the expertise related to the development of biological West is an unreliable partner, while Georgia is delud- weapons.”56 In response to Russian allegations, the US ed about its Western prospects.51 Embassy in Georgia characterized reports in the Rus- sian media as “nonsense and typical of Russian misin- However, one of the major pillars of Russian propa- formation and propaganda campaigns.”57 ganda and disinformation – that the West is not a reliable partner and that Georgia’s hopes for Western Russia also accused the US of running a secret bio- integration are illusive - has been destroyed by Geor- logical weapons lab in Georgia. The Lugar case de- gia’s signing of the Association Agreement with the serves particular attention on two counts: 1) the EU and its concomitant benefits, such as visa-free ac- active phase of disinformation and propaganda cess to the Schengen area and increased economic coincided with or followed Russia’s actions on the connectivity through the Deep and Comprehensive global stage, especially with regard to the attempt Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Russia has had to to poison an ex-Russian spy and his daughter in therefore modify its approach and make it more tai- the UK; and 2) Russia attempted to deploy a ‘wha- lored to new realities. One of the ways to do so has taboutism’ approach to show that it is the West that been to engage in quotidian efforts of undermining is to be blamed for installing secret biological weap- the image of Western institutions in Georgia. ons labs in Georgia and elsewhere. One piece of fake news even proclaimed that “Georgian traces may be Through conducting informational warfare against found in the case of the poisoning of the ex-GRU col- Georgia, Russia attempts to influence the public and onel Sergei Skripal in Great Britain.”58 undermine the soft power of the EU by using noto- rious tropes that falsely portray the EU as an institu- tion that “imposes homosexuality”52, and denouncing 54 Georgia’s integrational processes as one-sided and See more here: EUvsDisinfo, available at: https:// euvsdisinfo.eu/report/russia-will-never-allow- 53 beneficial to the EU only. In relation to NATO, Russia’s ukraine-or-georgia-to-join-nato/ 55 See more on Lugar Lab case here: 56 Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of 50 Shakhovtsov, A. (2018). Russia and the Western Far Georgia, Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Right: Tango Noir. Abington: Routledge, p. 134 Research, available at: http://www.ncdc.ge/Han­ 51 Rondeli, A. (2014). Moscow’s Information Campaign dlers/GetFile.ashx?ID=d8d25a85-1dea-4dab-bdbe- and Georgia. Expert Opinion, Georgian Foundation e995ae333f1b for Strategic and International Studies 57 The Embassy of the United States in Georgia. 52 See more here : EUvsDisinfo, available at: https:// (2018). Statement on Lugar Center (October 6). euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-and-nato-try-to- available at: https://ge.usembassy.gov/state­ force-georgians-to-become-lgbt/ ment-on-lugar-center/ 53 See more here: EUvs Disinfo, available at: https:// 58 See more here: EUvsDisinfo, available at: https:// euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-association-agree­ euvsdisinfo.eu/report/georgian-trace-may-be- ment-between-eu-and-georgia-has-only-one-bene­ found-in-the-case-of-poisoning-ex-gru-colonel-ser­ fit/ gei-skripal-in-the-great-britain/

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 13 In the context of Georgia’s domestic politics, the dis- national rolling news channel, RT.”63 The President of information campaign around the Lugar lab spread Russia, Vladimir Putin, has himself remarked that the the message that it represented a danger to Geor- aim of RT was to break “the Anglo-Saxon monopoly gian citizens, and linked the lab to one of the pol- on the global information streams.”64 Along with RT, icy initiatives of the Georgian government – the Sputnik is also recognized as - in the words of the Hepatitis C elimination program. One piece of fake President of France, Emmanuel Macron - an “organ of news linked the Lugar lab to this program and falsely influence and propaganda.”65 claimed that it had caused the deaths of nearly 100 people.59 Implementing Russia’s disinformation operations is not limited to media platforms with domestic and Looking the scale of Russian propaganda, the primary international coverage, but state institutions and rep- target group of disinformation campaigns is certain- resentatives thereof are often themselves the agents ly the Georgian public at large, but some groups in of disinformation. For instance, the social media plat- Georgia are more susceptible to Russian propagan- form, Twitter, temporarily suspended the account da than others. The most vulnerable groups are eth- of the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs in Syria, nic minorities who are more dependent on Russian- allegedly due to the posting and spreading of fake language media sources60. However, according to an news.66 In addition to traditional media, social media NDI-commissioned public opinion poll in April 2019, platforms are also extensively utilized by Russia to 14 percent of ethnic Georgians watch non-Georgian influence public opinion. The Notorious Internet Re- TV channels61, and the first four TV channels listed by search Agency, a platform based in St. Petersburg and those respondents were Russian media companies.62 designed to influence the 2016 US presidential elec- This is indicative that, to differing degrees, both eth- tion process, utilized different tactics to render the nic and non-ethnic Georgians are vulnerable to Rus- electorate “in a state of profound and radical doubt sian disinformation and propaganda. This is especially about what to believe - a state of epistemic anarchy.”67 true given that Russian-language sources are not the primary means of spreading disinformation in Geor- Other agents of Russia’s disinformation campaigns gia, as demonstrated throughout this paper. and propaganda in the former Soviet states include pro-Russian political parties, individual politicians, NGOs, and representatives of the Orthodox Church.68 These groups or actors, together with traditional and The means of Russian disinformation non-traditional media platforms, appear to be the campaigns in Georgia amplifiers of Russia’s disinformation messages.

Russia has a variety of instruments at its disposal to The means Russia have deployed to influence the plan and execute disinformation campaigns world- public in Georgia can thus be divided into two broad wide. Firstly, the most powerful tool in the Kremlin’s categories: 1) agents of influence operating interna- arsenal to conduct disinformation campaigns is the tionally (outside Georgia); and 2) agents of influence Russian state-controlled media, which operates both operating domestically (inside Georgia). The aims at domestically and internationally. According to Peter Pomeranzev and Michael Weiss “no organization bet- 63 Peter Pomeranzev and Michael Weiss cited in Shak­ ter traces the transformation of Kremlin thinking from hovtsov, A. (2018). Russia and the Western Far soft power to weaponization than the Kremlin’s inter- Right: Tango Noir. Abington: Routledge, p.134 64 Putin quoted in Shakhovtsov, A. (2018). Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. Abington: Rout­ 59 Ibid, available here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ ledge, p.134 nearly-100-dead-as-a-result-of-free-hep-c-vaccine- 65 McAuley, 2017 cited in Dimitrova, A. (2017). The El­ from-the-lugar-lab/ ements of Russia’s Soft Power: Channels, Tools, and 60 See the report by Media Development Foundation. Actors Promoting Russian Influence in the Eastern (2018). Anti-Western Propaganda 2018. available Partnership Countries, EU-STRAT Working Paper, at: https://www.scribd.com/document/416301900/ No. 04 Anti-Western-Propaganda-2018#from_embed 66 The Telegraph. (2019). Russian embassy in Syr­ 61 The same number for ethnic minorities in Georgia ia’s Twitter account suspended after posting White differ significantly: 52 and 67 per cent of those liv­ Helmets ‘fake news’. available at: https://www. ing in ethnic Armenian and ethnic Azerbaijani set­ telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/07/31/russian-embas­ tlements respectively watch non-Georgian TV chan­ sy-syrias-twitter-account-suspended-posting-white/ nels. see the next footnote 67 Ibid; 62 National Democratic Institute. (2019). Public At­ 68 Wilson, A. (2015). Four Types of Russian Propagan­ titudes in Georgia: Results of April 2019 survey. da. Aspen Review Central Europe, available at: available at: https://www.ndi.org/publications/re­ https://www.aspen.review/article/2017/four-types- sults-april-2019-public-opinion-polls-georgia of-russian-propaganda/

14 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response both levels are to spread systemic and targeted disin- gia linking it with ‘bioweapons development.’73 formation campaigns to undermine Georgians’ trust in democracy and the West, and to present Russia as • Russian state institutions and government officials an alternative model of governance and a substitute (primarily, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Russian for Western integration. state institutions and government officials are directly and regularly involved in spreading dis- Outside Georgia, the following key actors aim to serve information and propaganda. In relation to Geor- Russia’s goals by engaging in a concerted disinforma- gia, the involvement of Russian state institutions tion campaign: and their representatives as well as government officials is frequent. The most recent example was • Russian state-controlled media (among others, RT, Vladimir Putin’s attempt to falsify Georgian his- Sputnik, Channel 1 Russia). According to Flem- tory, one notable tactic of Russian propaganda ming Splidsboel Hansen: “the state-controlled and disinformation in Georgia.74 The most famous Russian media serves as a force multiplier. It case when different state agencies were collec- augments other capabilities, kinetic as well as tively engaged in the spreading of disinformation non-kinetic, which the Russian state may em- about Georgia was the Lugar lab case.75 ploy in its pursuit of political goals.”69 Examples of the spread of fake news and disinformation by • Individuals that align with, pick up and help dissem- Russian media outlets - such as RT, Sputnik and inate the messages of Russian propaganda. The Channel One - operating outside Georgia are Kremlin often resorts to “the use of internation- numerous. When entering the words ‘Georgia’ al commentators and experts” who are not nec- and ‘RT’ in the search engine of the Disinforma- essarily experts in the literal sense of the word, tion Review (designed by the European Union’s but voice, justify and defend positions that are East StratCom Task Force), there alone one can “in line with pro-Kremlin narratives”.76 Two useful find more than ten fake news reports by these experts or commentators especially stand out three media outlets from 2016 to (June) 201970. in relation to the Lugar lab case. The first is Igor The usual topics of disinformation, among oth- Giorgadze, the former Minister of State Securi- ers, are concerned with the ongoing illegal oc- ty of Georgia (1993-1995) seen widely as a “KGB cupation of Georgia’s territory, NATO-Georgian point man”77and whose news briefing - where he relations, and Georgian-EU relations as well as claimed that Lugar laboratory was experimenting anti-government and anti-Kremlin protests in on people and producing biological weapons78 Georgia in June 2019.71

• Russian-funded internet agencies (primarily, the In- 73 Myth Detector. (2019). Kremlin’s Virus in Geor­ ternet Research Agency). Alongside traditional me- gia: Three Pieces of Disinformation on Swine Flu. dia, the internet is the most important tool in Rus- available at: https://mythdetector.ge/en/myth/ sia’s arsenal to spread disinformation and engage kremlins-virus-georgia-three-pieces-disinforma­ in informational warfare against Georgia. One of tion-swine-flu 74 See other examples of falsification of history by the the most notable disinformation campaigns that agents of Russian’s propaganda here: https://myth­ the Internet Research Agency (IRA) has carried detector.ge/en/myths/falsification-of-history out vis-à-vis Georgia was regarding the Lugar lab 75 Myth Detector. (2019). Kremlin’s Virus in Geor­ gia: Three Pieces of Disinformation on Swine Flu. case. The Federal News Agency (FNA) - believed available at: https://mythdetector.ge/en/myth/ to be related to the IRA72 - helped spread fake kremlins-virus-georgia-three-pieces-disinforma­ news and disinformation about swine flu in Geor- tion-swine-flu; Myth Detector. (2019). What Partic­ ular Sources Does the Kremlin Cite for Spreading Conspiracy Theories about Lugar Lab?. available at: https://mythdetector.ge/en/myth/what-particu­ lar-sources-does-kremlin-cite-spreading-conspira­ 69 Flemming Splidsboel Hansen. (2017). Russian hy­ cy-theories-about-lugar-lab brid warfare: A study of disinformation. Danish In­ 76 EUvsDisinfo. (2017). Useful experts in Russian me­ stitute for International Studies (DIIS), p.30. dia. available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/useful-ex­ 70 EU vs Disinfo, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinforma­ perts-in-russian-media/ tion cases/?text=Georgia+RT&disinfo_issue=&­ 77 Eurasianet.org.(2018).Moscow stirs fear of Amer­ date=&offset=10 ican germs, available at: https://eurasianet.org/ 71 Ibid moscow-stirs-fear-of-american-germs 72 See report by New Knowledge. (2018). The Tactics & 78 See an article by Myth Detector here: http://myth­ Tropes of the Internet Research Agency. p.38, avail­ detector.ge/en/myth/giorgadzes-claims-about-hep­ able at: https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4326998/ atitis-c-treatment-program-allegedly-caus­ ira-report-rebrand_FinalJ14.pdf ing-death-are-groundless

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 15 - led Russian officials and journalists to build up consciously or unconsciously, help Russia to spread its the story. The second is Bulgarian investigative propaganda and disinformation against Georgia: journalist, Dilyana Gaytandzhieva. Russian TV • Media actors. Annual research by the Media outlets, namely Zvezda, a Russian nationwide TV Development Foundation (MDF) identified network run by the Russian Ministry of Defence, media outlets that disseminate anti-Western released an interview with Gaytandzhieva, where propaganda and disinformation. ‘Anti-West- she again spoke about the trafficking of human ern propaganda and disinformation’ shared by blood and pathogens to Georgia.79 Georgian-speaking actors is conceptualized as Inside Georgia, Russian propaganda and disinforma- indirect Russian propaganda and disinforma- tion campaigns rely on the notion that they will be tion as opposed to direct Russian propaganda more successful if “the message comes from a source and disinformation. In 2018 alone, the research that shares characteristics with the recipient” and that identified about 2,392 anti-Western comments spread by 18 media outlets under review.84 The “communications from groups to which the recipi- research further concluded that the follow- ent belongs are more likely to be perceived as credi- ing five media outlets were leading in terms of ble.”80 This is exactly why the primary actors who help spreading anti-Western messages in Georgia: 1) spread Russian disinformation in Georgia are locals. In Georgia and World (Geworld.ge); 2) news agen- this regard, it is safe to say that Russian disinformation cy Sakinformi; 3) Obieqtivi TV; 4) Asaval-Dasavali works best if the disinformation targeted to Georgia is and 5) Alia.85 conveyed in the local language. Apart from indirect Russian propaganda spread Before discussing the agents of Russian propaganda by Georgian media outlets, Sputnik Georgia op- and disinformation within Georgia, it is worth noting erates in the Georgian language and is regularly that contemporary Russian propaganda and disinfor- engaged in the spreading of disinformation. In mation campaigns are believed to be: 1) high-volume 2018 and 2019, Sputnik Georgia spread the fol- and multichannel; 2) rapid, continuous, and repetitive; lowing disinformation: linking protests in Tbilisi 3) lacking commitment to objective reality; 4) and in June 2019 to Joe Biden86, former Vice-Presi- lacking commitment to consistency.81 The implemen- dent and Democratic Party candidate for the US tation process is “highly segmented, using different presidential elections in 2020; portraying the tools and techniques against different states in the protests in Tbilisi in June 2019 as pre-planned to region.”82 However, even selected tactics used else- distort Georgian-Russian relations;87 depicting where rest on the 4-D approach, which is increasingly the signing of the UN Global Compact for Migra- becoming recognized in understanding propaganda tion as Georgia being forced to receive migrants and disinformation campaigns. The four Ds are: 1) Dis- from Syria and Africa;88 spreading disinformation miss the critic; 2) Distort the facts; 3) Distract from the and conspiracy theories about the Lugar lab in main issues; and 4) Dismay the audience.83 Georgia89; and presenting migrants and Islamic Russia is therefore actively engaged in Georgia in the spread of disinformation and propaganda based on 84 Media Development Foundation. (2018). Anti-West­ these characteristics and with the help of various ac- ern Propaganda 2018. p.11 available at: https:// tors. In particular, the following actors in Georgia, either www.scribd.com/document/416301900/Anti-West­ ern-Propaganda-2018#from_embed 85 Ibid, p.18 79 See an article by Myth Detector here: http://www. 86 EUvsDisinfo.(2019). Joe Biden is behind the protests mythdetector.ge/en/myth/how-kremlin-tries-cov­ in Georgia. available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/re­ er-russian-trace-skripal-case-lugar-laboratory port/joe-biden-behind-the-protests-in-georgia/ 80 Paul,C and Mattews, M. (2016). The Russian “Fire­ 87 Ibid, Protests in Georgia were planned in advance hose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might to distort Georgian-Russian relations. available at: Work and Options to Counter It. Rand Corporation, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/protests-in-georgia- p.3, available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/per­ were-planned-in-advance-to-distort-georgian-rus­ spectives/PE198.html sian-relations/ 81 Paul,C and Mattews, M. (2016). The Russian “Fire­ 88 Ibid, By signing the UN Global Compact for Migra­ hose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might tion, Georgia will be forced to let in migrants from Work and Options to Counter It. Rand Corporation, Syria and Africa, available at: https://euvsdisinfo. p.3, available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/per­ eu/report/by-signing-the-un-global-compact-on-mi­ spectives/PE198.html gration-georgia-will-be-forced-to-let-in-migrants- 82 Lucas, E and Nimmo, B. (2015). Information War­ from-syria-and-africa/ fare: What Is It and How to Win It?. Center for Euro­ 89 Ibid, “Cold rooms” in the Lugar laboratory, avail­ pean Policy Analysis, Infowar Paper No. 1, p.6 able at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/cold-rooms- 83 Ibid in-the-lugar-laboratory/

16 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response terrorists as the fastest-developing issue in the lems’; ‘European integration/visa liberalization is country.90 useless’; ‘the West fights against Orthodox Christi- anity’; ‘the West imposes homosexuality’; and ‘So- • Political parties/politicians. Political parties and ros fights against Georgian identity.’96 individual politicians are often engaged in the spreading of anti-Western messages, and voic- • Church. Representatives of the Orthodox Church ing opinions that align with Russia’s interests. in Georgia are often found to be spreading an- Research by the MDF identified the Alliance of ti-Western messages and help to disseminate the Patriots of Georgia and the United Democrat- Russian disinformation messages. For example, ic Movement as “the two political parties that in 2018 alone, a number of religious officials in 91 most frequently spread anti-Western messages.” Georgia spread anti-Western messages related Georgian Troupe, Free Georgia, Socialist Geor- to Ukrainian autocephaly (portraying autoceph- gia and some members of the Georgian Dream aly as a project of the US special services) and 92 have also spread anti-Western messages. The blaming George Soros for imposing unaccept- messages spread by certain political parties and able values.97 The aims of the Russian disinforma- politicians are aimed at undermining the public’s tion campaigns and some values of the Georgian trust in the Western integration process. In 2018 Orthodox Church often align with each other. alone, these messages included but were not lim- For instance, Russia portrays itself as the savior ited to the following themes: ‘the USA encourag- of conservative values (family, tradition, religion, es bio-subversion’; ‘sanctions imposed on Russia etc.) and blames the West for threatening these is provocation’; ‘opposition between Russia and the USA/West negatively affects Georgian inter- values. In fact, portraying the West as decadent ests’; ‘the West is not able to defend us’; ‘NATO = and a threat to conservative values has been one provoking Russia’; ‘the 2008 war was encouraged of the most common pro-Kremlin disinformation 98 by the USA’; ‘the USA runs Georgia’; ‘Migrants are narratives. A considerable number of clergymen imposed on us’; and ‘Europe/the West imposes in Georgia have picked up and deployed simi- unacceptable values.’93 lar messages aimed at portraying the West as a threat to Orthodox Christian identity and values. • Civil society actors. Civil society actors are among The messages, among others, have included the the most active disseminators of anti-Western following: ‘the West imposes homosexuality’; ‘the messages in Georgia. In 2018 alone, the MDF iden- West fights against Orthodox Christianity’; ‘the tified 24 civil organizations and movements that West fights against family traditions’; and ‘the EU had been engaged in the spreading of anti-West- Association Agreement subjugates Georgia.’99 ern messages.94 The leading organizations in this regard are as follows: Public Assembly; the Asso- The Orthodox Church has been especially vocal in its ciation of Defenders of Rights, Eurasian Institute; opposition of the rights of LGBTQ people in Georgia Georgian March; the Yevgeni Primakov Center; De- as well as to the passage of anti-discrimination legis- mographic Society XXI; Stalinist; the Strategic Insti- lation in 2014. Since then, the Orthodox Church has tute of Management; Global Research Center; and begun to celebrate Family Purity Day on May 17th to 95 the Society for Protecting Children’s Rights. The counter the celebration of International Day Against messages spread by these actors coincide with the Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia by LGBTQ aims of the Russian disinformation campaigns in groups and their allies. Given the importance of the Georgia, that is, to undermine Georgia’s European Orthodox religion for many Georgians and given their and Euro-Atlantic integration. The civil society ac- steady trust towards the Church100, the Church is an tors listed above place emphasis on the following important actor in influencing the public in terms of themes: ‘visa liberalization=demographic prob- their trust in Western integration. However, over the years, public opinion polls in Georgia have demon- 90 Ibid, Trending issue in Georgia: Islamic terrorists and migrants, available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ report/georgians-are-worried-about-islamic-terror­ 96 Ibid, pp. 32-33 ists-and-migrants/ 97 34 91 Media Development Foundation. (2018). Anti-West­ 98 EUvsDisinfo. (2019). 5 Common Pro-Kremlin Disin­ ern Propaganda 2018. p.26, available at: https:// formation Narratives. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/5-com­ www.scribd.com/document/416301900/Anti-West­ mon-pro-kremlin-disinformation-narratives/ ern-Propaganda-2018#from_embed 99 Media Development Foundation.(2015). Anti-West­ 92 Ibid ern Propaganda, pp.42-43, available at: http://mdf­ 93 Ibid, pp.27-31 georgia.ge/uploads/Antidasavluri-ENG-web.pdf 94 Ibid, 100 Civil.ge.(2018). TI-Commissioned Public Opinion Sur­ 95 Ibid, p.32 vey. available at: https://civil.ge/archives/241208

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 17 strated both public trust towards the Church and sup- and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali and recognizing them port for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.101 as independent states. It is here that Russia unveiled concerted disinformation campaigns against Geor- The aims of Russian disinformation gia, although Russian propaganda had already been campaigns in and against Georgia building up since the Rose Revolution.

Russian disinformation campaigns and propaganda, The post-war period brought even more concerted as noted above, are an extension of Russia’s foreign disinformation campaigns against Georgia, despite policy objectives. That said, the Russian disinforma- the new Georgian government’s efforts in 2012 to re- tion campaigns against Georgia have existed and will store cultural and economic relations with Russia. In continue to exist as long as Georgia is able to conduct the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, as Georgia an independent foreign policy and pursue democrat- and Ukraine continued to be defiant in their pro-West- ic transformation processes. Russian foreign policy ern foreign policy aspirations, Russia advanced its ef- towards its neighbors has always been, in the words forts to undermine their democracy, statehood and of Neil McFarlane, “hierarchical, hegemonic and inter- pro-Western integration processes. In this third phase, 102 ventionist.” therefore, Russia’s approach to Georgia has included: Russia’s foreign policy towards Georgia can be divid- a military option (war; occupation of Georgian territo- ed into three major phases: post-independence to ries; the so-called ‘borderization’ process and its quo- Rose Revolution (1991-2003); pre-war period until tidian negative consequences); information warfare; 2008 (2004-2008); and the post-war period after 2008. the regular erection of new barbed wire fences (most 104 In the first phase, Russia’s approach towards Georgia recently in the village of Gugutiantkari ); the kidnap- rested on formal support for Georgia’s sovereign- ping and detention of Georgian citizens by Russian 105 ty and territorial integrity, while de facto Russia had occupying forces (most recently the kidnaping and been instigating separatism, leading to war and eth- detention of well-known Georgian traumatologist Dr. 106 nic cleansing against Georgians and producing over Vazha Gaprindashvili ); and a flight ban in response 300,000 internally displaced persons and refugees. to anti-Kremlin protests in June 2019. Georgia was part of the CIS and its foreign policy to- Overall, the aims of Russian propaganda and disinfor- wards Russia then was more or less accommodating. mation campaigns vis-a-vis Georgia are as follows: Russia’s rationale in relation to Georgia, during this phase, was to keep “disputes alive – even if in sus- • Undermining Georgia’s democratic consolidation pended animation – for future potential use.” Giles and statehood. This is done through the spread- identified this approach in Russia’s toolkit as ‘dormant ing of the following narratives through various issues’ whereas Russia “maintains passive and poten- media sources identified by the EUvsDisinfo plat- tial leverage through the ability to reawaken disputes form: ‘Georgia is occupied by the USA, Russia only at any time in the future.”103 managed to free Abkhazia and South Ossetia from this occupation’107; ‘Georgia is a US colony’108 ; ‘US Russia’s leverages started to be put into practice after Ambassador Ian Kelly is Georgia’s informal ruler’; the Rose Revolution in 2003, when Georgia started to 109 ‘Georgian authorities had more freedom under embark steadily on a path towards democratization Soviet rule than the current [Georgian] authorities and Western integration. In this phase, Russia enacted another toolkit in its arsenal, namely economic mea- sures and a trade embargo against Georgia in 2006. As Georgia had not succumbed to Russia’s demands 104 Civil.ge. (2019). Georgian Officials Condemn New to abandon its EU and NATO aspirations, Russia car- Fencing in Gugutiantkari. available at: https://civil. ge/archives/316831 ried out military aggression in 2008, invading Geor- 105 Civil.ge. (2019). Eight Detained Georgians Released gia and occupying the Georgian regions of Abkhazia from Tskhinvali Custody. available at: https://civil. ge/archives/317274 106 See the statement from the U.S. Embassy, avail­ 101 Agenda.ge.(2019). NDI Poll: EU, NATO support at a able at: https://ge.usembassy.gov/the-us-embas­ 5-year high in Georgia. available at: https://agenda. sy-statement-on-detention-of-dr-vazha-gaprin­ ge/en/news/2019/261 dashvili-november-16/ 102 MacFarlane, S.N. (2003). Russian Perspectives on 107 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/geor­ Order and Justice. in Foot, Gaddis and Hurrel (eds.) gia-is-occupied-by-the-usa-russia-only-managed-to/ Order and Justice in International Relations. Oxford: 108 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/geor­ Oxford University Press, p.206 gia-is-a-us-colony/ 103 Giles, K. (2015). Russia’s Toolkit. Giles et al. (eds.). 109 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ The Russian Challenge. Chatham House Report, p.41 us-ambassador-jan-kelly-is-georgias-informal-ruler/

18 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response have from America’;110 ‘Georgia is a testing ground and ‘NATO activities in Georgia pose a serious for the West’;111 ‘Georgia will become a military threat of destabilization in the South Caucasus protectorate of the United States’112; and ‘protests and to the security of the Russian Federation’;122 in Georgia are a Russophobic provocation.’113 • Undermining Western values and presenting them as • Undermining Georgia’s integration with the Euro- alien to Georgian values. Narratives include: ‘Euro- pean Union, by, among other actions, portraying peans will set as a precondition for Georgia’s NATO the EU as a self-interested actor. Narratives in- and EU membership not only the holding of gay clude: ‘Georgia: EU integration will impoverish parades on Rustaveli Avenue and the legalization us, just like the Baltic countries’;114 ‘Europe and of same-sex marriage, but also the recognition of NATO try to force Georgians to become LGBT and the independence of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali re- turn children immoral, so that they may later ar- gions’123; ‘Georgian neo-liberals, with the help of range Maidan and color revolutions in Russia’;115 Americans, have introduced all types of perversity, ‘100,000 North Africans will be resettled in Geor- nihilism, a lack of faith in the country […]124’; and gia’;116 and ‘Only Europe gains from the Associa- ‘the Georgian people have lost their moral values tion Agreement with Georgia.’117 due to Euro-Atlantic integration’;125 Falsifying histo- ry; presenting Russia as an alternative to the West • Undermining Georgia’s integration with NATO, and savior of Georgia. Narratives include: ‘Russia through the use of fearmongering tactics, and de- has always protected Georgia from threats and ploying narratives that NATO is not interested in ac- will continue to do so’ 126; ‘Georgia’s statehood can cepting Georgia as a member. Narratives include: only be saved by Russia [...]127; ‘Russia performed 118 ‘NATO does not need countries like Georgia’ ; a peacekeeping mission in Georgia in 2008.’;128 ‘In ‘the US need Georgia only in order to irritate and 1801, Georgia joined Russia of its own free will’;129 ;119 provoke Russia’ ’The West is forcing Georgia to ‘Georgia freely joined the USSR’130; and ‘There was accept the independence of Abkhazia and South no Russian occupation in Georgia.’131 Ossetia in order to drag Georgia into NATO’;120 ‘A secret US lab in Georgia might be spreading deadly pathogens against Russian interests’121;

122 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ 110 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ nato-activities-in-georgia-poses-a-serious-threat- secretaries-of-the-communist-party-central-com­ of-destabilization-in-the-south-caucasus-and-to- mittee-had-more-freedom-than-the-current-geor­ the-security-of-the-russian-federation/ gian-authorities-have-from-america/ 123 111 EUvsDisinfo. (2019). Europeans will set as precon­ See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/geor­ dition for Georgia’s NATO and the EU membership gia-is-a-testing-ground-for-the-west/ not only the holding of gay parades on Rustaveli 112 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/geor­ Avenue and the legalisation of same sex marriage, gia-will-become-a-military-protectorate-of-the-unit­ but also the recognition of the independence of Ab­ ed-states/ khazia and Tskhinvali regions. available at: https:// 113 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/pro­ euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europeans-will-set-as-pre­ tests-in-georgia-provoked-by-the-west-and-ukraine/ condition-for-georgias-nato-and-the/ 114 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/geor­ 124 see more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/geor­ gia-eu-integration-will-impoverish-us-just-like-the- gian-neo-liberals-with-the-help-of-the-americans- baltic/ have-introduced/ 115 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu­ 125 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the- rope-and-nato-try-to-force-georgians-to-become- georgian-people-have-lost-their-moral-values-due-to/ lgbt/ 126 EUvsDisinfo. (2019). Russia has always protected 116 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/100- Georgia from threats and will continue to do so. Tur­ 000-north-africans-will-be-resettled-in-georgia/ key appropriated Georgian lands, Russia will again 117 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ defend Georgia and the whole Caucasus. available only-europe-gains-from-the-association-agree­ at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/russia-has-always- ment-with-georgia/ protected-georgia-from-threats-and-will-continue/ 118 EUvsDisinfo.(2019). NATO does not countries like 127 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/geor­ Georgia. available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ gias-statehood-can-only-be-saved-by-russia/ nato-does-not-need-countries-like-georgia/ 128 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/rus­ 119 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/us- sia-performed-a-peacekeeping-mission-in-georgia- need-georgia-only-in-order-to-irritate-and-provoke/ in-2008/ 120 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the- 129 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/in- west-is-forcing-georgia-to-accept-the-indepen­ 1801-georgia-joined-russia-of-its-own-free-will/ dence-of/ 130 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/geor­ 121 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/is-a- gia-freely-joined-the-ussr/ secret-us-lab-in-georgia-spreading-deadly-patho­ 131 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/there- gens-against-russian-interests/ was-no-russian-occupation-in-georgia/

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 19 Russian disinformation campaigns in Georgia are tar- • political statements made by representatives of geted, concerted and aimed at influencing the Geor- the Georgian government as well as the parlia- gian public and their trust in the democratic process. mentary majority and opposition factions; The scale, means and aims of the Russian disinforma- tion campaigns in Georgia require a response from • strategic documents that acknowledge the threat state actors and non-state actors, so that Georgia can of Russian disinformation and propaganda; and continue to consolidate its democracy and advance • practical steps (such as policy initiatives, estab- its aspirations to join NATO and the EU. The follow- lishment of relevant government agencies, initi- ing chapter overviews the responses of the Georgian ation of relevant legislation in the Parliament of state to Russian propaganda in Georgia. Georgia) undertaken by both executive and legis- lative branches of government.

STATE RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN Although this paper focuses on the period after 2014 PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION in its assessment of policy responses, it is reasonable CAMPAIGNS IN GEORGIA to briefly examine whether there had been any ac- knowledgment - at the level of strategic documents Russia’s attempts to subvert Georgia’s democracy, state- - of the Russian propaganda and disinformation in hood and independent foreign policy stand in stark con- Georgia prior to 2014. trast to the aspirations of Georgia to form a democratic Georgia’s National Security Concept (hereinafter re- and rule-of-law-oriented European state; a pledge en- ferred as “the Concept” or “the Concepts” when re- shrined in various state documents, and overwhelmingly ferring to more than one of its editions) has been a and continuously approved by the public.132 Countering key document that assesses “the country’s security Russian disinformation hence requires a strategic ap- environment” and discusses “national values and in- proach from the Georgian state. This, first and foremost, terests.”135 Since restoring its independence in 1991, necessitates an acknowledgement of the scale and na- Georgia has adopted two Concepts in 2005 and 2011 ture of the challenge and, second, the employment of respectively. Neither uses words such as ‘propaganda’ advanced measures to effectively combat Russia’s disin- or ‘disinformation’ although information security poli- formation campaigns inside and outside Georgia. cies are outlined largely in terms of mitigating the im- This chapter evaluates the nature of the Georgian re- pact of cyberattacks and handling crisis situations.136 sponse to Russian disinformation campaigns in Geor- This is probably due to the fact that greater signifi- gia in line with the methodology developed by Kremlin cance has been attached to traditional security threats Watch.133 The methodology looks at three qualitative emanating from Russia, while cyberattacks have been measures to understand the effectiveness of the state seen as part of the Russian military policy. The Con- response: 1) political acknowledgment of the threat cepts have not recognized Russian propaganda and by state representatives; 2) government strategy and disinformation campaigns as part of Russia’s wider applied countermeasures; and 3) counterintelligence foreign policy calculus, although one might find that responses.134 To make sense of Georgia’s response, the to be reasonable given that Russia only added a new, paper will look at the first and second aspects of the more orchestrated and multi-layered dimension to its methodology. In particular, it examines: propaganda and disinformation campaigns amid the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine and since the an- nexation of Crimea in 2014. 132 The latest poll conducted in December 2018 reg­ isters public support for NATO and the EU to be The annexation of Crimea, and more broadly Rus- ‘at a five-year high’. see more here: https://www. ndi.org/publications/results-december-2018-pub­ sia’s confrontational foreign policy posture towards lic-opinion-polls-georgia ,last accessed on August, the West and its allies, has been a wake-up call for 20, 2019. the Georgian government in terms of acknowledg- 133 Kremlin Watch is a strategic program led by think- tank European Values Center for Security Policy that ing the threat of Russian disinformation campaigns. aims at exposing and confronting Russia’s influence However, the government’s approach can inconclu- and disinformation operations. see more on the pro­ gram here https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/#about-us 134 KremlinWatch.eu.(2018). 2018 Ranking of counter­ 135 MacFarlane, N. (2012). Georgia: National Security measures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion Concept versus National Security. Chatham House, operations. Kremlin Watch Report, available at: p.3, available at: http://css.ge/files/Papers/0812pp_ https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/userfiles/2018-rank­ macfarlane.pdf ing-of-countermeasures-by-the-eu28-to-the-krem­ 136 National Security Concept of Georgia, 2005, p.4; p.15; lin-s-subversion-operations.pdf See also National Security Concept of Georgia 2011

20 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response sively be divided into two phases: 2014-2016; and Political acknowledgement of the threat 2016 until the present. The first phase largely failed of Russian disinformation to address the threat of Russian propaganda and disinformation, while in the post-2016 phase certain Since 2014, senior Georgian politicians, both from strategic documents and political discourse have in- the government and opposition, have acknowledged dicated the government’s acknowledgment of the the threat of disinformation and propaganda. A likely threat of Russian propaganda and disinformation in first public acknowledgment of the threat of Russian Georgia. For example, the Communication Strategy propaganda and disinformation by the government of the Government of Georgia on Georgia’s EU and was made in 2015 by the then President of Georgia, NATO Membership for 2017-2020137 overviews the Giorgi Margvelashvili. In his annual address to the Par- strategic environment and securitizes Russia’s pro- liament of Georgia, he stressed the aims and means of paganda campaigns against Georgia, while a similar Russian propaganda in Georgia: document adopted for 2014-2017 failed to mention “Georgia is one of the objects of Russia`s globally Russia at all or to discuss the consequences of Rus- expanded ideological propaganda campaign. The sian propaganda with respect to Georgia’s aspira- aim of Russian ‘soft power’ is to discredit Western 138 tions to join NATO and the EU. values as well as to achieve Georgia`s refusal of This is contrary to the experiences of Western countries Euro-Atlantic integration. In this regard, it uses and institutions, in particular the EU and NATO, which a conglomerate of local anti-Western forces. In acknowledged the challenges of Russian propaganda order to discontinue this attack, it is necessary and disinformation already back in 2014 with the cre- to consolidate the pro-Western agenda internal- ation of a NATO Strategic Communication Centre of ly and to coordinate activities with our Western 143 Excellence139, the adoption of the EU’s Action Plan on partners.” 140 Strategic Communication, and the establishment of The same year, the then Prime Minister of Georgia, the EU East StratCom Task Force in 2015. The first offi- Giorgi Kvirikashvili, also acknowledged the threat of cial Georgian state document which plainly acknowl- Russian propaganda and disinformation, stating that edged Russian propaganda as a challenge was adopt- he was “also very concerned about increased Russian 141 ed in 2017 by the Ministry of Defense , although, as propaganda.”144 The Prime Minister appeared to be- of now, there remains no separate state document come more cognizant of the threat in the following which examines the scale of Russian propaganda and few years. In 2018, when addressing the NATO-Geor- disinformation campaigns or presents an action plan gia Public Diplomacy Forum, he linked anti-Western outlining how the government shall address the chal- propaganda in Georgia with Georgia’s efforts to join lenge. Attempts to produce such a document – within NATO by arguing that “it is becoming clearer by the the framework of the Thematic Inquiry on Disinforma- minute that the closer we approach NATO, the more 142 tion and Propaganda - have been undertaken by intense anti-Western propaganda grows in the coun- the Parliament of Georgia, yet no publicly accessible tr y.” 145 He also underlined the need “to assess and document has so far been produced. counter such threats” through “providing the popu- lation with correct fact-based information about why Euro-Atlantic integration is so important to our coun- try and our future.”146 137 The Strategy of the Government of Georgia on Com­ municating about Georgia’s EU and NATO Member­ ship 2017-2020, pp.4-5 143 Administration of the President of Georgia. (2015). 138 The Strategy of the Government of Georgia on Com­ 2015 Annual Report of the President of Georgia, municating and Informing about Euro-Atlantic Issues, available at: https://www.president.gov.ge/eng/ http://gov.ge/files/275_38230_373340_1237-1.pdf , prezidenti/cliuri-mokhseneba/2015-clis-saparla­ accessed on August, 18, 2018 mento-mokhseneba.aspx 139 NATO Strategic Centre of Excellence, available at: 144 Tabula.ge.(2015). კვირიკაშვილი: მეც ძალიან შეშფო­ https://www.stratcomcoe.org/ თებული ვარ გაზრდილი რუსული პროპაგანდის გამო 140 EU Action Plan on Strategic Communication, 2015, (Kvirikashvili:­ I am also very concerned about in­ available at: http://archive.eap-csf.eu/assets/files/ creased Russian propaganda). available at: http:// Action%20PLan.pdf www.tabula.ge/ge/story/103288-kvirikashvi­ 141 Ministry of Defense, Communication Strategy li-mec-dzalian-sheshfotebuli-var-gazrdili-rusuli-pro­ 2017-2020, available at: https://mod.gov.ge/up­ pagandis-gamo loads/2018/2018/PDF/strategia_eng_2018.pdf 145 Government of Georgia. (2018). Prime Minister’s 142 Parliament of Georgia, Thematic Inquiry on Disin- Speech at the NATO-Georgia Public Diplomacy Fo­ formation and Propaganda, http://www.parliament.ge rum. available at: http://gov.ge/index.php?lang_id= /en/saparlamento-saqmianoba/komitetebi/saga- ENG&sec_id=497&info_id=65232 reo-urtiertobata-komiteti-147/tematuri-mokvleva 146 Ibid

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 21 Kvirikashvili’s successor, Mamuka Bakhtadze, has also This has been particularly noticeable in the last joined in acknowledging the threat of Russian dis- few months.” 151 information and propaganda. In his words: “Russian propaganda is a challenge. However, when it comes Statements of senior political leaders demonstrate a to the effect of propaganda and ‘soft power’ the an- consensus on the acknowledgement of Russian pro- swer from the Georgian people is clear: we have made paganda as a threat to Georgia and its pro-Western our choice for Europe long before.” 147 foreign policy aspirations. Scattered political narra- tives provided by the politicians were later integrated Of particular importance here is also the annual Am- into strategic state documents, which will be over- bassadors’ Conference held by the Ministry of Foreign viewed in the section that follows. Affairs of Georgia. In 2017, the participants, for the first time148 and among other important issues facing State documents acknowledging the threat Georgia “paid special attention to the need to fight of Russian propaganda and disinformation against anti-Western propaganda and to raise pub- lic awareness in this regard.”149 The then Chairperson The SSG was among the first to acknowledge the of the Parliament of Georgia, Irakli Kobakhidze, also threat of Russian information warfare in Georgia. Al- voiced concerns over Russian propaganda in Geor- though the annual reports published by the SSG have gia and stressed the need to undertake “appropriate seen the Russian threat strictly through the lens of measures against propaganda.” 150 counter intelligence, it has laid the foundations for acknowledging the threat in other state documents. Georgian pro-Western opposition political parties Its 2016 report noted the use of non-violent means and parliamentary factions have also been vocal in – another phrase for disinformation and propaganda terms of acknowledging the threat. In April 2018, – by referring to the “special forces of different coun- the political party “Movement for Liberty - Europe- tries” to obtain intelligence information.152 Since then, an Georgia” initiated draft legislation in the Parlia- reports issued both in 2017 and 2018 have taken note ment of Georgia aimed at countering the dissem- of the ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics and the use of “the pro- ination of Russian propaganda in Georgia. Sergi pagandist media campaign and the disinformation Kapanadze, Vice-Speaker of the Parliament of Geor- components, cyber operations and certain cyberat- gia, remarked that: tacks, destructive political groups and socio-populist “The use of Russian propaganda and Russian ‘soft unions.”153 The 2017 report listed the following key in- power’ by the Russian Federation has become terests of foreign intelligence agencies: quite active in the country. This is reflected not • to encourage anti-Western sentiments in Geor- only through the appearance of new political par- gian society; ties that directly propagate pro-Russian messages, but also through non-governmental organiza- • to damage Georgia’s reputation as a reliable part- tions and foundations promoting Russian ideas. ner on the international level;

• to stimulate distrust, uncertainty, hopelessness and nihilism in society; 147 Agenda.ge. (2018). PM says Russian propaganda is • to create a destabilizing base on ethnic and reli- challenge for Georgia, all of Europe. available at: https://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1859 gious grounds, with the aim to cultivate disinte- 148 See the press release of the event by the Ministry gration processes throughout the country; and of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, available in Georgian .154 language here: http://mfa.gov.ge/News/ambasado­ • to promote the polarization of Georgian society riali-2017-khval-oficialurad-gaikhsneba.aspx, last accessed on August 20, 2019 149 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2017). Georgia’s Euro­ 151 Parliament of Georgia. (2018). „ევროპული საქართ­ pean and Euro-Atlantic integration on the agenda ვე­ლო“ პარლამენტში ახალ საკანონმდებლო ინიციატივას of Ambassadorial 2017. available at: http://www. წარადგენს (“European Georgia” will present new mfa.gov.ge/News/ambasadoriali-2017-is-fargleb­ draft legislation to the Parliament”). available at: shi-saqartvelos-evrop.aspx http://www.parliament.ge/ge/parlamentarebi/depu­ 150 Parliament of Georgia. (2018). Irakli Kobakhidze: ty-chairmen/sergi-kapanadze/news4/evropuli-saqa­ against the background of occupation of two our rtvelo-parlamentshi-axal-sakanonmdeblo-iniciati­ historic regions, Russian propaganda is utterly un­ vas-waradgens.page acceptable for me personally. available at: http:// 152 www.parliament.ge/en/parlamentarebi/chairman/ The Report of the State Security Service of Georgia, chairmannews/irakli-kobaxidze-rodesac-chve­ 2016, available at: https://ssg.gov.ge/uploads/ანგა­ ni-ori-istoriuli-regioni-okupirebulia-rusuli-propa­ რიშები/Report%202016%20%20EN.pdf ganda-piradad-chemtvis-absoluturad-miugebelia. 153 Ibid, 2017, pp.7-8 page 154 Ibid

22 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response A similar report issued in 2018 deployed even stron- Similar language is used in the 2018-2020 Strategy ger wording to describe the aims and means of var- of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of ious foreign policy intelligence agencies. The report Georgia. The Strategy acknowledges the emergence noted that: of new security challenges such as hybrid threats, in- formation warfare and anti-Western propaganda.160 “…during the reporting period, a disinformation The Strategy notes that the Foreign Affairs Committee campaign has been an important tool of the “hy- of the Parliament of Georgia should work, including brid warfare.” Polarization of the population, dis- on the international stage, on preventing and coun- seminating false opinions and fear, as well as in- tering these threats, and recognizes that “the Com- fluencing important processes by manipulating mittee has a special role to play in working on the social opinion have been deliberately conducted relevant legal base.”161 through fake news, distorting facts and the falsi- fication of history.”155 Another milestone strategic document that acknowl- edges the nature of Russian propaganda and disinfor- The language adopted by the SSG reports since 2015 mation campaigns is the 2017-2020 Strategy of the reflects the chronology of a changing focus of the Geor- Government of Georgia for Communicating Geor- gian government vis-à-vis propaganda and disinforma- gia’s EU and NATO Membership. The first chapter of tion. While the 2015 report failed to mention any such the Strategy provides an overview of the strategic threat and the 2016 report did so only modestly, the environment which necessitates the taking of certain language used in the reports issued in 2017 and 2018 measures to counter Russian disinformation and pro- demonstrated that the government had come to recog- paganda. The document stipulates that: nize the importance of the political acknowledgement of the threat of disinformation and propaganda. “In August 2008, during the Russian Federation’s large-scale military aggression against Georgia, Other state documents have also followed the pattern different elements of hybrid warfare were active- and have recognized new challenges to Georgia. Two ly deployed, including propagandistic informa- documents published by the Ministry of Defense – the tion campaign and cyberattacks. In 2014, during Strategic Defence Review 2017-2020 and the Commu- aggression against Ukraine, the Russian Federa- nication Strategy 2017-2020 – have spearheaded the tion intensified propaganda and disinformation state approach towards Russian disinformation and even more.”162 propaganda. The Strategic Defence Review notes that “the use of elements of “soft power” and economic The Strategy further underlines that: tools by the Kremlin against Georgia’s national security represents a challenge for its security environment.”156 “The Russian Federation continues to conduct The document further stipulates that “the Kremlin will activities directed at the annexation of Georgia’s particularly focus on reinforcing the elements of its occupied regions and actively carries out propa- soft power to ensure the weakening of state institu- ganda campaigns to hinder Georgia’s integration tions, strengthening of pro-Russian civil and political into the European Union and NATO. Moreover, movements and discredit pro-Western foreign policy Russia continues to carry out information warfare agenda.”157 The Communication Strategy 2017-2020 of against Georgia and other Eastern Partnership the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, which sets out key countries as well as against the member states of communication objectives and desired communica- the European Union and NATO, and by so doing tion outcomes of the Ministry, is similarly explicit in rec- poses a threat to European and Euro-Atlantic uni- ognizing the threat of Russian propaganda and disin- ty. The propagandistic and disinformation cam- formation.158 It stipulates that “the current information paigns of the Russian Federation aim at weaken- environment poses a serious threat to Georgia’s nation- ing societal unity in these countries, discrediting al security and its Euro-Atlantic foreign policy.”159 160 Strategy of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Par­ liament of Georgia 2018-2020, p.15, available at: 155 Ibid, 2018, p.11 http://parliament.ge/en/ajax/downloadFile/108826/ 156 Strategic Defense Review 2017-2020, Ministry of For._Rel_._Committee_AP_Eng_, last accessed on Defense of Georgia, p.53, available at: https://mod. August, 24, 2019 gov.ge/uploads/2018/pdf/SDR-ENG.pdf , last ac­ 161 Ibid cessed on August 24, 2019 162 Strategy of the Government of Georgia for Commu­ 157 Ibid, p.54 nicating Georgia’s EU and NATO Membership 2017- 158 Communication Strategy 2017-2020, Ministry of 2020, author’s own translation, available at: https:// Defense, p.2 matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/3650131?publi­ 159 Ibid, p.3 cation=0

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 23 Western values and reducing support for the When discussing the government’s approach to European Union and NATO.”163 Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns against Georgia, it is important to make a distinc- It is important to reiterate here that a similar com- tion between steps that the government has taken munication strategy adopted by the Government in response to Russian disinformation campaigns as of Georgia for the period of 2014-2017 did not broadly defined (that is, propaganda and disinforma- mention Russia or consider Russian propaganda tion extending beyond the theme of Georgia’s Europe- and disinformation campaigns as a threat to Geor- an and Euro-Atlantic integration and including a wide gia’s integration into the EU and NATO. Since that variety of other topics) and steps that the government document was adopted in 2013, prior to Russia’s has taken to inform the public about the process and annexation of Crimea, a premium was not placed benefits of EU and NATO integration. While conduct- on recognizing Russian propaganda and disin- ing proactive strategic communication on the latter formation campaigns as a hindering factor to the mitigates the impact of the Russian propaganda and implementation of Georgia’s pro-Western foreign disinformation campaigns, failure to take overarching policy priorities. The shifting focus of the govern- and holistic measures against Russian disinformation ment in 2017 reflected the altered international cir- campaigns that are more broadly conceived threat- cumstances (the annexation of Crimea, a more em- ens the effectiveness of the response. boldened Russia on the world stage, and Russia’s intense disinformation campaigns against Western The first practical action undertaken by the Govern- countries and their allies) as well as on the expan- ment of Georgia was the creation of strategic commu- sion of the scale, means and aims of Russia’s disin- nication departments within the country’s ministries. formation campaigns against Georgia. While some of the ministries established strategic communication departments already in 2015166, most To conclude, while public acknowledgement of achieved this only by 2018. On February 11, 2018, the the threat by senior politicians goes back to 2015, then Prime Minister of Georgia, Mamuka Bakhtadze, it is only since 2017 that government officials have announced that all ministries would have strategic recognized the importance of the threat and en- communications units “to reduce the influence of gaged more systematically to acknowledge Rus- anti-Western propaganda, inform the public about sian propaganda and disinformation campaigns as Euro-Atlantic integration and to establish an efficient, a challenge. More focused practical steps to count- coordinated and proactive strategic communications er Russian propaganda and disinformation have system.”167 hence appeared in a similar time period (from 2017 to 2018), although some foundations had already The Administration of the Government of Georgia been laid earlier. The following sections discuss ac- created the Strategic Communications Unit in 2018, tions that have so far been taken by the Georgian the Department of Strategic Communication and state (executive and legislative branches of the Public Relations of the Ministry of Defense was es- government) in response to Russian propaganda tablished in September 2016, while the Ministry of and disinformation in Georgia. Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia also created strategic communications Practical steps to counter Russian departments in 2018. Among the strategic commu- propaganda and disinformation campaigns nication units of the Administration of the Govern- Although the acknowledgement of the threat ema- ment of Georgia, the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, nating from Russian disinformation campaigns has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and the garnered a near-universal consensus at the political Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, only the Minis- elite level164, “the authorities have taken very little try of Foreign Affairs has been tasked by statute with concrete actions to counter Russian influence oper- “analyzing anti-Western propaganda and planning ations, and when they have done so, their activities have lacked the necessary resources and inter-agency 166 See information on this here: Strategy of the Gov­ coordination.”165 ernment of Georgia on Communicating about Geor­ gia’s EU and NATO Membership 2017-2020 167 Government of Georgia. (2018). მთავრობის გადა- წყვეტილებით, ყველა სამინისტროში სტრატეგიული 163 Ibid, author’s own translation კომუნიკაციების სტრუქტურული ერთეულები შეიქმნება 164 Zurabishvili, T. (2018). Russia’s Disinformation Ac­ (According to the decision of the government, the tivities and Counter Measures: Lessons from Geor­ strategic communications units will be established gia. Kremlin Watch Report, p.4 in all the ministries). available at: http://gov.ge/in­ 165 Ibid dex.php?lang_id=-&sec_id=491&info_id=68608

24 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response and implementing response measures.”168 Under the sian Federation or by an organization, individual or Ministry’s supervision also falls the Information Cen- legal entity whose main beneficiary is Russia; ter on NATO and the EU169, which is tasked with “en- • prohibit the Government of Georgia from being suring public accessibility to easily comprehensible legally able to fund, gain procurement from, or information on NATO and the EU.”170 direct budgetary means to organizations that are The Ministry of Defense is tasked with informing the against Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic in- public about the NATO integration process, while oth- tegration; and er aspects of Russian propaganda and disinformation • prohibit the Government of Georgia from fund- campaigns remain outside its statutory scope. Mean- ing media organizations that are directly spread- while, the rest of the ministries conduct strategic com- ing messages of Russian propaganda and oppose munications according to the goals and objectives of Georgia’s territorial integrity.174 their respective ministries.171 The response of the executive and legislative branch- The decision of the Parliament of Georgia to establish es of the Government of Georgia has thus been limit- a Thematic Inquiry on Disinformation and Propagan- ed to the following major activities: da is also worth noting. The Inquiry aims “to research and analyze the major challenges and problems ex- 1) Creating strategic communications units within min- isting in the country on issues of disinformation and istries. While the declared objective of this step has propaganda.”172 The Thematic Inquiry also intends to been to counter anti-Western propaganda and “gather evidence during inquiry process and prepare disinformation, only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia is statutorily tasked with analyzing an- evidence based conclusions along with recommen- ti-Western propaganda and coming up with policy dation project for the purpose of improving the activ- responses. A significant amount of work has been ities of the executive branch.”173 undertaken in this regard by the Information Cen- Another practical step to counter Russian propaganda ter on NATO and the EU, especially in terms of pro- and disinformation was initiated by the parliamenta- moting Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic inte- ry faction “Movement for Liberty – European Georgia.” gration, and in terms of explaining the benefits of The parliamentary faction initiated an anti-Russian membership to the wider public as well as refuting propaganda legislative package which set out to: myths about NATO and the EU. Promoting NATO and EU integration, however, could be assumed • prohibit the spending of money in Georgia for pro- to be only one, albeit a very important, dimension paganda purposes by the Government of the Rus- of combating the aims of the Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns in Georgia. 168 Statute of the Strategic Communications Depart­ ment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2) Thematic Inquiry on Disinformation and Propa- article 2, author’s own translation, available at: ganda launched by the Parliament of Georgia. This https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/ step is intended to better comprehend the con- view/4216908?publication=0 sequences of disinformation and propaganda for 169 See the structure of the Ministry here: http://www. mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/DiplomatService/Structure. Georgia, but the research document is still not aspx publicly available. 170 See more here: http://infocenter.gov.ge/eng-info­ center-public-information/ 3) Legislative package proposed by the parliamentary 171 Statute of the Administration of the Government minority. While the legislative package mostly in- of Georgia, 2018, available at: https://matsne.gov. cluded the imposition of financial constraints in ge/ka/document/view/4234622?publication=0 , au­ thor’s own translation ; Statute of the Department relation to spreading Russian disinformation and of Strategic Communication and Public Relations propaganda in Georgia, the parliamentary major- of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, available at: ity has expressed no political will to legislate on https://mod.gov.ge/uploads/2019/Ianvari/Debule­ bebi/strategiuli_komunikaciebis_da_saz.urtiertobis_ this matter. dep.debuleba.pdf Statute of the Strategic Communications Depart­ ment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 174 Kapanadze, S. (2019). „ევროპული საქართველო“ article 2, author’s own translation, available at: რუსული­ პროპაგანდის შესამცირებლად პარლამენტს https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/ კანონპროექტების პაკეტს სთავაზობს (“European Geor­ view/4216908?publication=0 gia” proposes draft legislation package to the Parlia­ 172 Parliament of Georgia, Thematic Inquiry on Disinfor­ ment to reduce Russian propaganda). available at: mation and Propaganda, 2018, available at: http:// https://1tv.ge/news/evropuli-saqartvelo-rusuli-pro­ www.parliament.ge/uploads/other/113/113563.pdf pagandis-shesamcireblad-parlaments-kanonpro­ 173 Ibid eqtebis-pakets-stavazobs/

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 25 4) Media literacy project implemented by the Georgian campaigns, similar to the EU’s East StratCom Task National Communications Commission (GNCC). Force. The government has also failed to adopt any From January 2018, according to the amend- action plan that would come up with a coordinated ments to the Law on Public Broadcasting, the response to Russian disinformation and propaganda, GNCC is obliged to carry out the function of sup- similar to the Action Plan Against Disinformation ad- porting the development of media literacy. The opted by the EU in 2018.179 GNCC has set up a media literacy department and elaborated the “ML development strategy Unlike the Georgian state, however, civil society ac- and action plan encompassing EU experience” to tors have been far more active and generally “quick- raise the awareness of the public, and to develop er and more flexible in monitoring and debunking 180 their critical and creative thinking skills. 175 pro-Kremlin disinformation.” The next chapter maps out the measures taken by civil society organizations Based on the available policy responses made by the (CSOs) in Georgia against Russian disinformation Georgian state and following the methodology de- campaigns and propaganda. veloped by Kremlin Watch, it is reasonable to argue that, in terms of the government’s counter-activities, Georgia falls into the category of “Partial initiatives CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN in some areas.” According to Kremlin Watch, this is PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION conceptualized as “a few single initiatives and steps CAMPAIGNS being taken to counter disinformation and influence operations. The effectivity of these measures is ques- CSOs in Georgia have undertaken significant efforts 176 tionable.” In particular, the Georgian state is adopt- to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation ing partial initiatives in some areas if “one or only a campaigns. The efforts included, but were not limited few departments of the state administration show to: the myth-busting, fact-checking, monitoring and concern with disinformation and influence opera- reporting of anti-Western messages; running media 177 tions and takes steps to counter them.” literacy campaigns; engaging traditional media plat- In terms of the acknowledgment of the threat by the forms and running campaigns aimed at promoting government, Georgia falls into the category of “Gov- Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration; es- ernment admits the threat” whereby a “critical mass tablishing social media and other platforms to count- of the governing politicians admits the existence of er Russian propaganda and disinformation; and initi- the threat and allows individual government bodies ating relevant legislation in the Parliament of Georgia. to start under-the-radar, ad-hoc responses.” 178 This chapter will provide an overview of the specific civil society actors behind these campaigns and the That being said, it is worth underlining that no sub- nature thereof.181 stantial initiatives have been thought-out that would advance the government’s approach with regard to Before discussing civil societal responses, howev- fighting against Russian propaganda and disinforma- er, it is important to mention a generally assumed tion or to study the aims, means and scale of the Rus- role of the civil society actors in contributing to so- sian disinformation campaigns, and to determining cietal resilience and countering (Russian) disinforma- what policy responses would best address the chal- tion campaigns. According to Fried and Polyakova: lenge. For instance, the government has not shown “civil society can be faster and more effective than any intention to establish its own, state-led platform most governments in identifying, countering, and – similar to the EU’s Disinformation Review - which would fact-check the claims made by the agents of 179 European Commission. (2018). Action Plan against Russian disinformation campaigns and would be Disinformation. available at: https://eeas.europa. proactive in raising awareness about misinforma- eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54866/ tion. Moreover, the government has also yet to set up action-plan-against-disinformation_en a separate unit that would be tasked primarily with 180 Zurabishvili, T. (2018). Russia’s Disinformation Ac­ tivities and Counter Measures: Lessons from Geor­ researching Russian propaganda and disinformation gia. Kremlin Watch Report, p.5 181 The list of CSOs given here are not conclusive, and many other organizations in Georgia, most­ 175 GNCC.(2019). Annual Report 2018, p.10, available ly through conducting research activities, do con­ at: https://www.gncc.ge/uploads/other/4/4120.pdf tribute to countering Russian propaganda and 176 KremlinWatch. (2018). 2018 Ranking of counter­ disinformation. See all the CSO submissions to measures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion the Parliament of Georgia here: http://www.parlia­ operations. p.5 ment.ge/en/saparlamento-saqmianoba/komitetebi/ 177 Ibid sagareo-urtiertobata-komiteti-147/tematuri-mokv­ 178 Ibid, 4 leva/received-materials

26 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response discrediting Russian propaganda.”182 One of the ways Fact-checking, myth-busting of doing so is to educate the public as well as relevant and media literacy media groups on “how to quickly identify suspected disinformation.”183 Fact Check Georgia (Factcheck.ge)

The role of civil society has also been emphasized Factcheck.ge, active from 2013, is a platform run by by Bret Schafer who characterizes digital disinforma- Georgia’s Reforms Associates (GRASS), a multi-profile tion as a ‘whole-of-society problem’ which requires think tank. The goal of the project, according to the ‘whole-of-society solutions.’184 Civil society, in Scha- think tank’s website, is “to enhance democratic checks fer’s analysis, has the following four important roles to and balances and increase government accountabil- play in fighting against disinformation: ity by using fact-checking as a tool for making the country’s political and electoral process more com- 1. Monitor, counter and expose disinformation. This, petitive, deliberative and transparent.”186 Schafer argues, includes taking both proactive measures (to raise awareness of disinformation Although the project was not initially intended to tactics and techniques) and reactive measures (to make efforts to fight against fake news and anti-West- analyze, verify and debunk specific narratives ad- ern propaganda, from 2016 onwards it has defined vanced by disinformation agents); fake news as “false or manipulative information 2. Building resilience through education. Civil society spread by some media outlets, politicians or specific 187 should not limit its activities to fact-checking and accounts on social networks.” The platform notes myth-busting, and should engage more with the that “this verdict [fake news] is mostly applied to as- 188 public, including at the local level, to educate cit- sess the sources spreading anti-Western messages.” izens about the tools with which they can protect Since 2016, Factcheck.ge has identified more than 60 themselves against disinformation; news outlets as fake news, and has described some news sources as containing a “manipulation of facts”, 3. Applying pressure when and where needed. Civil and has even devoted a few articles on raising aware- society should demand that the elected officials ness about Russian propaganda and disinformation take the threat of digital disinformation seriously campaigns.189 and apply pressure on platforms or services that facilitate the spread of disinformation; Myth Detector (Mythdetector.ge)

4. Addressing the root causes. Civil society should ad- Myth Detector, run by the MDF, is a non-govern- dress the core grievances of the public that disin- mental organization, which aims at fighting against formation seeks to exploit. 185 “anti-Western propaganda through providing fact- based information and enhancing media literacy.”190 In the next chapter of this paper, the countermea- Mythdetector.ge works to shed light on ‘information sures taken by Georgian civil society actors will be scrutinized in this light. To be specific, it will exam- influence activities’ carried out by foreign and domes- ine the extent to which the responses have been in tic actors based on a four-step approach: 1) identify; line with the above-listed four primary roles that civil 2) deconstruct; 3) study the transparency of sources; 191 society is supposed to play to mitigate the negative and 4) explain. impact of disinformation. Before doing so, however, it would be advisable to describe the activities that civil society actors have carried out against Russian 186 Georgia’s Reforms Associates. (2018). Factcheck. disinformation campaigns in Georgia from 2014 on- ge. available at: https://grass.org.ge/en/projects/ wards. factcheck-ge-1142 187 Factcheck.ge. (n.d.). Methodology. available at: https://factcheck.ge/en/chven-shesaxeb/%E1%83 %9B%E1%83%94%E1%83%97%E1%83%9D%E1% 83%93%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9A%E1%83%9D%E 1%83%92%E1%83%98%E1%83%90 182 Fried, D and Polyakova, A. (2018). Democratic De­ 188 Ibid fense against Disinformation. Atlantic Council Eur­ 189 Ibid. ყალბი ამბები (Fake News). available at: https:// asia Center, p.10 factcheck.ge/ka/%E1%83%A7%E1%83%90%E1%8 183 Ibid 3%9A%E1%83%91%E1%83%98-%E1%83%90%E1 184 Schafer, B. (2018). A Democratic Response to Dig­ %83%9B%E1%83%91%E1%83%94%E1%83%91% ital Disinformation: The Role of Civil Society. Amer­ E1%83%98?page=1 ican Institute for Contemporary German Studies. 190 Myth Detector. available at: https://www.mythde­ Johns Hopkins University, pp.39-43 tector.ge/en/about-project 185 Ibid 191 Ibid

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 27 Its webpage operates in four languages: Georgian, En- of media in democratic societies, transparency and ac- glish, Armenian, and Azeri.192 Myth Detector carries out countability of media, and verification tools and the myth-busting activities in the following categories: ed- skills necessary to create multimedia content.198 ucation, demography, European integration, econom- ics, defense/security, identity, history, conflict, media, Although these initiatives are taking shape, it is gen- migrants, politics, legal/criminal, healthcare/biosafety, erally acknowledged that the “programs designed to NATO integration, NGOs, and various others.193 In addi- improve media literacy among society are few and at 199 tion to myth-busting, at the heart of the Myth Detector a nascent stage.” platform is the aim to work towards detecting manip- Monitoring, reporting and exposing ulation (with photos, videos and the new dimension of anti-Western propaganda trolls) and the falsification of history. One of the ways deployed by civil society actors to re- The media literacy work, with the Myth Detector Lab sist and respond to Russian propaganda and disinfor- at its center, aims at educating the public about pro- mation campaigns, often also framed as anti-Western paganda and disinformation. Two aspects of Myth propaganda, is the comprehensive monitoring and Detector’s media literacy activities are particularly no- reporting of cases, actors and narratives. Since 2014, ticeable: the Media Literacy Guideline; and the Myth the MDF, standing at the center of the campaign, has Detector Lab. The Media Literacy Guideline, produced produced the most authoritative reports in terms of in Georgian and Russian languages, “aims at equip- understanding how anti-Western propaganda works ping media consumers with useful skills to help them in Georgia. In its reports, the MDF has identified vari- verify false information and hence resist disinforma- ous actors that are key sources of anti-Western propa- 194 tion.” The Guideline: deals extensively with the chal- ganda. These sources, in all reports since 2014-2015, lenges of the dissemination of false information on include the media, political parties and politicians, social media; overviews cases of manipulation and members of the public, the clergy, and civil society false information in social, print and TV media outlets; actors. Throughout the years, leading sources of an- teaches readers how to check a website’s credibility ti-Western propaganda have been the media and po- and how to find archived pages and materials; informs litical parties/politicians.200 readers of tools one can utilize to identify a person’s identity, verify the accuracy of photo and video ma- The reports also document and categorize the nar- terials, find YouTube videos and verify their accuracy; ratives and the nature of anti-Western messages and advises on how to deal with online trolls.195 through the years. The 2018 report, which compared data with trends in 2016 and 2017, identified an in- The Myth Detector Lab, on the other hand, recruits a crease in anti-US, anti-NATO and anti-UK messages cohort of young people, and aims to respond to “dis- as well as those that emphasized the threat of Geor- information challenges by means of strengthening gia losing its identity. Furthermore, the report stated: media literacy, promoting critical thinking and en- “the trend of portraying Russia as an alternative to the hancing tools to distinguish quality media products West and idealizing authoritarian governance has be- 196 from manipulated media content among youth.” The come more apparent in the past two years.”201 Anti-EU Myth Detector Lab has thus far produced more than messages, while present in recent years, decreased 70 materials and “14 fact-checking articles that have significantly in 2018 possibly due to “the enforcement appeared in EU StratCom’s weekly Disinformation Re- of the visa-free travel regime.”202 views.”197 The platform has recruited six groups of youth who complete a 3.5-month-long program on a weekly In addition to the reports documenting anti-West- basis to study media literacy, the role and functioning ern propaganda, in 2017, the MDF also co-produced the Kremlin Influence Index, which assessed political, media and civil society dimensions of the Kremlin’s 192 Ibid 193 Ibid, Myths, available at: https://www.mythdetector. ge/en/myths/myth 198 Ibid 194 Myth Detector. (2017). Media Literacy Guideline, 199 Kintsurashvili, T, Kurdadze, D and Gelava, S. (2017). How Combat Manipulation and False Informa­ Georgia. in Kremlin Influence Index 2017 – Joint Re­ tion. available at: http://mythdetector.ge/en/page/ search Report. p.22, Kyiv, Detector Media media-literacy-guideline-how-combat-manipula­ 200 See 2014-2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 reports by tion-and-false-information-2017 MDF. Available here: http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/ 195 Ibid eng/research/1/6 196 Ibid, Myth Detector Lab, available at: http://myth­ 201 see the 2018 report by MDF, p.12, available at: detector.ge/en/laboratory http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/view_research/169 197 Ibid 202 Ibid

28 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response influence in Georgia, and examined the responses Engaging traditional media to counter to Russian influence manifested by political, media Russian disinformation and civil society actors. Georgia’s general index was 54/100, whereas, for the sake of comparison, other Civil society actors have been utilizing traditional me- countries studied scored as follows: Hungary - 61/100; dia platforms (the most popular source of information Ukraine - 49/100; and Czech Republic - 54/100.203 in the country) for advancing their fight against Rus- sian propaganda and disinformation. Transparency In terms of exposing the work of Russian disinforma- International Georgia and the Coalition for Euro-At- tion, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research lantic Georgia, in particular, have responded to the Lab (DFRLab) also undertakes significant efforts both challenge by implementing campaigns and popular- internationally and within Georgia. Within Georgia, izing them in the media. Civil society actors, alluding DFRLab has conducted numerous analyses exposing: to the official motto of the Georgian state (Strength is pro-Kremlin narratives aimed at challenging the vis- in Unity (Dzala Ertobashia)), have conducted a pub- it of the Secretary General of NATO204; anti-Western lic campaign entitled “Strength is in Europe.” which is narratives in relation to Anaklia Port205; and anti-LGBT aimed at “resisting anti-European and anti-Western messages disseminated before Tbilisi Pride was sup- propaganda.”210 posed to be held in Georgia.206 The campaign, carried out with the support of the US- The analyses by DFRLab demonstrate that, in relation AID-funded East-West Management Institute’s (EWMI) to NATO membership, the narratives aim to “discredit ACCESS program, has been promoted through tradition- NATO, instill fear of an escalation of the Russian-Geor- al media means. The TV company Rustavi 2, has been gian conflict among Georgians, and undermine Geor- broadcasting a “bi-weekly TV rubric # Strength is in Eu- gia’s NATO integration process.”207 In terms of the con- rope now […] as part of the “Other Midday” TV-show.”211 struction of a strategically important port in Anaklia, the The EWMI website reported: “the rubric is dedicated to analysis found that “the ultimate goal of the disinforma- showcasing Western values and their conformity with tion campaign likely was to influence public opinion in Georgian culture and traditions, demonstrating Western Georgia regarding the port project to align more closely support to Georgia, evaluating Georgia’s Soviet past and with Russian interests.”208 In relation to Tbilisi Pride, the its impact on the Georgian mentality, and exposing an- messages were mostly spread by anti-Western and far- ti-Western disinformation and myths.”212 right groups, and aimed at demonizing the West and presenting LGBT groups as a threat to Georgia. 209 The campaign generally aims to raise awareness and promote the benefits of the European and Euro-Atlan- tic integration process for the Georgian public. Another 203 See the Kremlin Influence Index report, available aim of the ‘Strength is in Europe’ campaign is to refute at: http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/view_research/5 204 Buziashvili, E. (2019). Pro-Kremlin Narratives Chal­ any false information “spread through the operation of lenge NATO Sec General’s Georgia Visit. DFRLab, the Russian propagandistic machinery that [Georgia’s] available at: http://acge.ge/2019/05/pro-kremlin-nar­ European and Euro-Atlantic integration is against na- ratives-challenge-nato-sec-generals-georgia-visit/ tional interests and preservation of traditions.”213 205 Buziashvili, E. (2019). Pro-Kremlin Outlets Fail in Anti-West Sentiment Push around Anaklia Port. DFRLab, available at: https://medium.com/dfrlab/ The “Defend Liberty” campaign carried out by a group pro-kremlin-outlets-fail-in-anti-west-sentiment- of media and CSOs also aimed at protecting Georgia push-around-anaklia-port-b2729b424fe5 against the “Kremlin’s Information War.” The campaign 206 Buziashvili, E.(2019). Anti-LGBT Facebook Posts noted “a steady shift in opinion toward support of the Proliferate in Georgia Before Tbilisi Pride. DFRLab, available at: http://acge.ge/2019/05/anti-lgbt-face­ Russian narrative” and a “meteoric rise in populari- book-posts-proliferate-in-georgia-before-tbili­ si-pride/ 210 207 Buziashvili, E. (2019). Pro-Kremlin Narratives Chal­ Radiotavisupleba.ge (2018). კამპანია - „ძალა ევროპა­ lenge NATO Sec General’s Georgia Visit. DFRLab, შია“ ( Campaign – “Strength is in Erope). available at: available at: http://acge.ge/2019/05/pro-kremlin-nar­ https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/eka-gigauri-du­ ratives-challenge-nato-sec-generals-georgia-visit/ ta-skhirtladze-dilis-saubrebshi/29146846.html 208 Buziashvili, E. (2019). Pro-Kremlin Outlets Fail in 211 EWMI. (2017). # Strength is in Europe – TV show. Anti-West Sentiment Push around Anaklia Port. available at: http://ewmi-access.org/strength-is-in- DFRLab, available at: https://medium.com/dfrlab/ europe-tv-show/ pro-kremlin-outlets-fail-in-anti-west-sentiment- 212 Ibid push-around-anaklia-port-b2729b424fe5 213 Europeforgeorgia.ge, Coalition for Euro-Atlantic 209 Buziashvili, E.(2019). Anti-LGBT Facebook Posts Georgia, author’s own translation, available at: Proliferate in Georgia Before Tbilisi Pride. DFRLab, http://www.europeforgeorgia.ge/%e1%83%99%e1 available at: http://acge.ge/2019/05/anti-lgbt-face­ %83%90%e1%83%9b%e1%83%9e%e1%83%90% book-posts-proliferate-in-georgia-before-tbilisi-pride/ e1%83%9c%e1%83%98%e1%83%90/

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 29 ty […] of pro-Russian and xenophobic politicians.”214 aims at “increasing the strategic communications ca- Within the campaign, a number of events and public pacity of the Government of Georgia”221 and focuses rallies have been organized, including meeting with more on middle-level professionals than on the de- IDPs and protests against Georgia’s energy negotia- cision-makers and politicians in the Government of tions with Gazprom.215 Georgia.222 The project envisages workshops, train- ings and study trips as well as helping institutions to Online and offline platforms to counter improve the legislative framework, and establish and Russian disinformation develop coordination rules.223 A number of social media as well as online and offline Legislative initiatives platforms have also emerged to respond to Russian influence operations and disinformation campaigns. Civil society actors have also introduced certain leg- ‘Information Defence Legion’, created in 2018, aims at islative packages aimed at mitigating the impact strengthening Georgia’s information security and ac- of Russian propaganda and disinformation. In par- knowledges that “the foreign policy course of a unit- ticular, in 2017, Transparency International Geor- ed, strong and democratic state is threatened by the gia initiated a package of legislative amendments continued circle of hostile Russian propaganda and against pro-Russian, anti-state propaganda aiming disinformation.”216 The platform, however, has recog- to “prohibit pre- electoral agitation, including ad- nized the limited societal influence of those already vertisements that include the threat of violation by working against Russian propaganda and disinforma- the Russian Federation of the territorial integrity and tion, and has sought to expand the reach of the cam- constitutional order of Georgia, the independence paign to every citizen of Georgia.217 The platform of- and sovereignty of the country and/or the legitima- fers membership to anyone interested218, and carries tion of occupation.”224 out different types of activities, including public lec- tures, an overview of various political developments The purpose of the law, according to the draft legisla- as well as extensive appearances in traditional media tion package, is “to neutralize direct and indirect influ- outlets.219 ence methods, used by Russia, by which Russia tries to change the Western course of the development of In addition to online platforms, the Strategic Com- the country and influence the political environment munications Center-Georgia, recognizing the impor- in Georgia.”225 The adoption of this legislation would tance of strategic communications to survive in the have required amendments to the “Law on Broad- information age, offers various training modules in casting,” the “Electoral Code”, the “Political Unions of strategic communications for interested stakeholders. Citizens”, and the “Law on the Constitutional Court of The Center aims at “passing on knowledge based on Georgia.”226 international experience and practice to professionals working in the sphere of communications for state, As demonstrated above, civil society actors in Georgia private, public or political organizations.”220 have taken a number of counter-measures to resist Russian propaganda and disinformation. However, Training the public sector in strategic communica- civil society actors working on this issue themselves tions has also been at the core of the Georgian Center recognize that more work needs to be done and that for Strategy and Development’s activities, which has it must be acknowledged that “only a certain part of implemented a four-year-long project – the Govern- civil society realizes the problem of misinformation ment of Georgia’s Strategic Communications Program and the climate in this regard is created by those - funded by the US Embassy in Georgia. The project NGOs who treat the problem purposefully and work

214 See more about the campaign here, http://georgi­ aforliberty.org/ 221 See more about the project here: http://gcsd.org.ge/ 215 Ibid en/services/government-of-georgia-strategic-com­ 216 საინფორმაციო თავდაცვის ლეგიონი (Information De­ munications-program/ fense Legion), author’s own translation, available at: 222 Goguadze. G, author’s interview, September, 2019 https://www.facebook.com/pg/InfoArmy.ge/ 223 Ibid about/?ref=page_internal 224 Transparency International Georgia. (2017). Package 217 Infoarmy.ge, available at: https://www.infoarmy.ge/ of legislative amendments Against Pro-Russian An­ ge/about ti-State Propaganda. available at: https://www.trans­ 218 See information here https://www.infoarmy.ge/ge parency.ge/en/post/package-legislative-amend­ 219 Ibid ments-against-pro-russian-anti-state-propaganda 220 Strategic Communications Center-Georgia, available 225 Ibid at: http://strat.com.ge/index.php/ 226 Ibid

30 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response on these topics regularly.”227 The next chapter exam- while Bulgaria has passed legislation “compelling me- ines the impact of both civil society and state activi- dia outlets to declare sources of funding other than ties vis-à-vis the Russian propaganda and disinforma- revenues generated by commercial activities, such as tion campaigns in Georgia. grants and donations from overseas.”230

In the post-Soviet space and beyond, Ukraine has tak- en the boldest measures, such as banning Russian so- ASSESSING GEORGIA’S RESPONSE cial media networks and adopting sanctions against TO RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AND Russian state-funded media outlets and their jour- DISINFORMATION: A DISCUSSION nalists.231 Ukraine has also established the Ministry Following the overview of the initiatives undertaken of Information, which created the so-called “informa- by state and non-state actors to counter Russian pro- tion troops” to debunk disinformation in the Russian paganda and disinformation campaigns in Georgia, media and started “broadcasting pro-Ukrainian radio this chapter aims at understanding the following: 1) and TV stations to some regions in Crimea and reb- 232 The strategic nature of the response undertaken by el-controlled areas.” Ukraine’s Ministry of Education the Georgian state. In line with the definition outlined and Science has also launched a pilot media literacy 233 in the conceptual part of the paper, ‘strategic’ is here program in 50 schools in four Ukrainian cities. Lat- understood as conducting purposeful and coordinat- via has also “relied on a policy of fines and broadcast ed actions in response to Russian propaganda and suspensions targeting biased reporting in the coun- disinformation; 2) The discussion of the responses try’s east,” and launched programs to support media 234 undertaken by CSOs and the impact of their activities literacy and investigative journalism. on the wider public; and 3) Based on the analysis of These policy initiatives can be summed up to include nationally-representative public opinion polls, assess- the following measures: 1) legislative action; 2) me- ing the extent of the public’s resilience with respect to dia literacy action; 3) the setting-up of ministries and Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns. structural units specifically designed to fight disin- State Response: first baby steps, devoid formation; 4) strengthening the role of public broad- of a strategic approach casters in raising awareness regarding disinformation; and 5) requiring media outlets to declare their sources Before moving on to discuss the nature of the steps of funding. undertaken by the Georgian state, it is important to briefly review the major policy responses that have Drawing from the responses of the Georgian govern- generally been deployed by other state actors to ment and parliament to Russian disinformation cam- counter disinformation and survive in the age of in- paigns, it is clear that the countermeasures adopted formation warfare. According to A Report of Anti-Dis- by the Georgian state are in their formative years. The information Initiatives, states have generally taken threat of anti-Western propaganda is acknowledged actions “ranging from legislative and legal action to only in strategic documents, while practical measures media literacy and public awareness campaigns to are marginal and limited to thematic inquires, the fight the spread of disinformation.”228 For instance, the creation of strategic communications departments EU has “recommended the creation of an indepen- within the ministries, and the initiation of media lit- dent network of European fact-checkers as well as an eracy programs by the GNCC. Unlike other states that online platform that would support the Commission’s have taken measures discussed above, Georgia has, work. It also committed to backing transparency in until now, failed to join the ranks of these countries, political advertising, closing fake accounts, and de- and has in practice overlooked the significance of the monetizing purveyors of disinformation.”229 Sweden Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns and the Netherlands, on the other hand, have relied against it. on countering disinformation through education, Where the state has been relatively cognizant of the problem, by establishing strategic communications departments or running limited-in-scope media liter- 227 Kintsurashvili, T, Kurdadze, D and Gelava, S. (2017). Georgia. in Kremlin Influence Index 2017 – Joint Re­ search Report. p.22, Kyiv, Detector Media 230 Ibid 228 Robinson. O, Coleman, A. and Sardarizadeh. S. 231 (2019). A Report of Anti-Disinformation Initiatives. Ibid, p.10 Oxford Technology and Elections Commission, Uni­ 232 Ibid versity of Oxford, pp.3-11 233 Ibid 229 Ibid 234 Ibid

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 31 acy campaigns, its approach has still been half-heart- igate the digital media environment.”240 The Strategy ed. In particular, while establishing strategic commu- recognizes that the media literacy skills, among oth- nications departments has been a step in the right ers, will help people “critically analyze and assess direction and the publicly acknowledged goal of this content and be able to identify false news, such as policy has been to, among others, counter anti-West- disinformation (for example, propaganda), mislead- ern propaganda, the policy is still at its initial stage of ing information and harmful information (for in- development and lacks clear focus to counter Russian stance, hate speech).”241 The media literacy project propaganda and disinformation campaigns. Further- and campaign carried out by the GNCC is a welcome more, those in charge of strategic communications de- development and an important long-term measure partments “lack experience not only in strategic com- in terms of countering Russian disinformation and munications, but also in communications in general.”235 propaganda as well as the spread of false informa- tion in general. Furthermore, the primary focus of the strategic com- munications departments has been to inform the However, the fruits of this project are yet to be reaped public about the activities and policies carried out by given that it was only established in 2018 and its ac- respective ministries, with the exception of the Min- tivities are to be carried out this year and in the com- istry of Foreign Affairs which is tasked on paper with ing years. Additionally, there has been criticism of dealing with anti-Western propaganda. Most impor- the work of the GNCC’s Media Academy due to du- tantly, strategic communications carried out by the plicating efforts already undertaken by civil society Government of Georgia are often aimed at promot- and professional journalism organizations in terms of ing, and informing the public about, the benefits of training journalists. Another line of criticism empha- Georgia’s membership in NATO and the EU. While this sizes the Department of Media Literacy Development is an important, valuable and commendable task in in the GNCC to be understaffed.242 Despite this, some fighting Russian disinformation campaigns, it demon- initiatives have already been put in practice, such as strates that the focus of the government’s strategic piloting media literacy modules in four schools243, communications is limited to the process of European which could create a basis for expanding the scale and Euro-Atlantic integration and fails to extend to and scope of the media literacy campaigns in the fu- other aspects of Russian propaganda and disinfor- ture. According to MP Nino Goguadze, the GNCC “does mation campaigns. The lack of transparency in this very important projects for journalists and for media regard is also a matter of concern. The public gener- literacy, but these projects need to be strengthened ally lacks information on what has been done by the even more.”244 government in terms of: countering the influence of an outside power; how it fights against informational Another illustration that the Georgian state response warfare; what its methods are; and what results have to Russian disinformation campaigns is in its formative been achieved.236 stages has been the parliament’s Thematic Inquiry on Disinformation and Propaganda. The purpose of the In terms of media literacy, the GNCC has adopted the Inquiry has been “to research and analyze the major Strategy237 and relevant action plan238 to support the challenges and problems existing in the country on development of media literacy in the country. While issues of disinformation and propaganda, to gather providing an overview of the political environment evidence during inquiry processes and to prepare ev- to explain the need for media literacy, the Strategy idence-based conclusions along with recommending refers239 to the report of the European Commission’s projects for the purpose of improving the activities of High Level Group of Experts (HLEG), which recom- the executive branch.”245 mends the promotion of “media and information lit- eracy to counter disinformation and help users nav- 240 HELG, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-sin­ 235 Dzvelishvili. N, Author’s interview, September 2019 gle-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert- 236 Ibid group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation 241 237 GNCC. (2018). მედია წიგნიერების განვითარების ხელ- Ibid, p. 6, author’s own translation შეწყობა - სტრატეგია (Supporting the Development of 242 Dzvelishvili, N. (2019). Author’s interview, Septem­ Media Literacy – Strategy). available at: http://gncc. ber 2019 ge/uploads/other/3/3285.pdf 243 Ibid 238 GNCC. (2018). მედია წიგნიერების განვითარების ხელ- 244 Goguadze, N. (2019). Author’s interview, September შეწყობის სამოქმედო გეგმა (The Action Plan of Support­ 2019 ing the Development of Media Literacy), available 245 The Parliament of Georgia, Thematic Inquiry on Disin­ at: http://gncc.ge/uploads/other/3/3293.pdf formation and Propaganda, 2019, available at: http:// 239 Ibid, Strategy, p.3 www.parliament.ge/uploads/other/113/113563.pdf

32 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response In the course of producing evidence-based conclu- job within its competence, be it civil society, state in- sions and recommendations, the Thematic Inquiry stitutions, public broadcaster or GNCC, but coordina- Group received written submissions from 17 local and tion among them is very weak, if there is any coordi- international organizations246, held verbal hearings nation at all.”253 with those organizations247, and also heard the repre- sentatives of the executive branch, such as the Minis- These findings alone indicate that the government ter for Reconciliation and Civic Equality of Georgia248, currently lacks a coordinated approach towards fight- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Ministry ing the Russian disinformation and propaganda cam- of Defense of Georgia, the LEPL Information Center on paign, and that the Parliament of Georgia has only NATO and the EU, the Public Broadcaster of Georgia, recently started to acknowledge its role in asking and the GNCC.249 According to MP Nino Goguadze, questions about the transparency of the various orga- the core task of the Thematic Inquiry has been to “ex- nizations that are believed to be involved in spread- amine what the state has been doing, how it perceives ing Russian propaganda and disinformation. the problem, how difficult the problem is and how the However, although these demonstrate that the gov- 250 government reacts to the problem.” Although the ernment’s approach to Russian propaganda and executive branch of the government is responsible for disinformation campaigns is only starting to take policy planning and implementation, the Parliament, effect, the initiative of the parliamentary opposition she observed, could be an institution where the ex- “European Georgia” to mitigate the impact of Russian change of ideas among various actors takes place, so propaganda in Georgia – including by means of in- 251 that the issue remains on the agenda. troducing funding restrictions for Russia or its affiliat- Preliminary findings of the Thematic Inquiry Group ed organizations as well as restricting the allocation showed there was a need: 1) to establish a special of Georgia’s budgetary resources to entities that are coordinating body at the executive branch level; and against Georgia’s declared pro-Western foreign poli- 2) to initiate discussions at the level of the legislative cy and its territorial integrity - has not yet seen any branch of the government on “making the activities light. The Draft Parliamentary Ordinance initiated by of organizations in Georgia more transparent, so that opposition MPs Sergi Kapanadze and Giorgi Kandela- our citizens have complete information about which ki, entitled “On Monitoring, Identification and Fight- of the country’s interests stand behind the organiza- ing Against the Propagandistic Activities Carried Out 254 tion and what interests these organizations serve”.252 by the Russian Federation,” was scheduled to be A lack of coordination among various actors has also presented before the Plenary Session between May 255 been stressed as an impeding factor. According to MP 25-June 28, 2019 ; however, the vote on this has not Nino Goguadze: “each institution does an important yet been held. The Strategy and Action Plan of the Foreign Affairs 246 Parliament of Georgia. (2019). The verbal hearing Committee of the Parliament of Georgia (adopted in of the Thematic Inquiry Group on Disinformation 2018), the launching of a Thematic Inquiry on Disin- and Propaganda at the Foreign Relations Commit­ tee. Available at: http://www.parliament.ge/en/ formation and Propaganda (established in February saparlamento-saqmianoba/komitetebi/sagareo-urt­ 2019) as well as the initiation of the specific draft iertobata-komiteti-147/sagareo-komitetis-axali-am­ legislation by opposition MPs (May 2019) all demon- bebi/sagareo-urtiertobata-komitetis-dezinformaci­ is-da-propagandis-sakitxebze-tematurma-mokv­ strate that the Parliament of Georgia has only recently levis-djgufma-zepiri-mosmena-gamarta.page – five years after the annexation of Crimea - taken ini- 247 Ibid tial steps to makes sense of the nature of the threat of 248 Parliament of Georgia. (2019). The Foreign Rela­ Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns. tions Committee Thematic Inquiry Group on Dis­ information and Propaganda meeting the State These steps are in contrast to the actions undertak- Minister for Reconciliation. Available at: http:// www.parliament.ge/en/saparlamento-saqmiano­ en by other international actors who find themselves ba/komitetebi/sagareo-urtiertobata-komiteti-147/ the target of Russian disinformation campaigns. The sagareo-komitetis-axali-ambebi/sagareo-urtiertoba­ EU, for instance, has presented the Action Plan on ta-komitetis-dezinformaciis-da-propagandis-sakitxeb­ ze-tematuri-mokvlevis-djgufi-samoqalaqo-tanaswo­ Strategic Communications in 2015 and launched the robis-sakitxebshi-saxelmwifo-ministrs-shexvda.page 249 Goguadze, N. (2019). Author’s interview, Septem­ 253 Goguadze, N. (2019). Author’s interview, Septem­ ber, 2019 ber, 2019 250 Goguadze, N. (2019). Author’s interview, Septem­ 254 See the document in Georgian language here: https:// ber, 2019 info.parliament.ge/file/1/BillReviewContent/220975? 251 Ibid 255 See dates here: https://info.parliament.ge/#law-draft­ 252 Ibid, author’s own translation ing/18114

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 33 East StratCom Task Force in the same year. The House and the EU, but additionally included the implemen- of Commons of the United Kingdom held “an exten- tation of the 2017-2020 Strategy of the Government sive and high-profile inquiry into disinformation and of Georgia for Communicating Georgia’s EU and NATO ‘fake news’ between September 2017 and February Membership, and the conducting of visa-free aware- 2019”256 leading to the production of an authoritative ness campaigns and public opinion polls across Geor- final report in February 2019.257 Meanwhile, in 2014, gia.261 The Ministry noted that the “implementation of NATO also established the Strategic Communications strategic communications takes on special meaning Centre of Excellence to advance its aims and support in the context of anti-Western propaganda, which is its policies, operations and activities.258 a major challenge for the entire democratic world.”262

When assessing the responses by a state to Russian In 2014 and 2017, the government adopted relevant disinformation and propaganda, an important dis- strategies to communicate European and Euro-Atlan- tinction emerges that deserves some attention. That tic integration issues to internal and external audienc- is, the difference between activities that the govern- es, which is indicative of the dedication that the gov- ment has carried out in relation to promoting Geor- ernment has shown to that end. However, even on the gia’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration and issues related to communicating about NATO and the those that the government has undertaken to fight EU, a strategic dimension is lacking due to “scarce in- against other aspects of Russian propaganda and dis- stitutionalization and a lack of engagement at a high information campaigns. political level”263 and due to the fact that “the struc- tural units involved in strategic communication, both Judging by the activities implemented by the Ministry on the national level and in the agencies are still in of Foreign Affairs and other state-funded institutions, the process of formation.”264 Although the 2018 Annu- such as the Information Center on NATO and the EU, al Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs covers the the Georgian state does indeed conduct strategic elaboration of the ‘strategy action plan’ and method- communications to raise the awareness of the pub- ology to proactively communicate positive messages lic about the benefits of integration with the EU and about NATO and the EU as well as to dispel the “myths NATO. The Information Center on NATO and the EU created by anti-Western propaganda,”265 the activities, alone carries out a substantial number of activities to primarily those carried out by the Information Centre that end. For instance, in 2018 alone, the Center im- on NATO and the EU, have only been confined to dis- plemented up to 600 activities (meetings, trainings, pelling myths regarding NATO and the EU. seminars, etc.) together with large-scale information- al events and campaigns such as “Europe Days” and Although conducting still-inchoate strategic commu- “NATO Days.”259 As a result, about 37,500 people have nications on the Western integration process does been informed, through direct communication, on respond to some aspects of the Russian disinforma- NATO and the EU and Georgia’s integration efforts tion campaigns and propaganda, focusing only on with respect to both.260 communicating the benefits of the EU and NATO risks overlooking other aspects of Russian propagan- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself implements vari- da and disinformation. As the analysis of the narra- ous activities aimed at EU and NATO integration, while tives of the Russian disinformation campaigns has the 2018 Annual Report - under the heading of Strate- demonstrated, in addition to undermining Georgia’s gic Communications - listed activities, most of which pro-Western foreign policy, Russia’s disinformation duplicated those of the Information Center on NATO

261 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. (2018). Annu­ 256 House of Commons. (2019). The launch of the al Report 2018. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov. Sub-Committee on Disinformation. Available at: ge/HeaderNav/PublicInfo/GeneralInformation/Annu­ https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/ al-Reports.aspx?lang=en-US cmselect/cmcumeds/2090/2090.pdf 262 Ibid. p.106 257 Ibid. Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report. 263 Atlantic Council of Georgia. (2016). Analysis of Geor­ Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ gian National Strategic Communication System on cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf the Issues of Euro-Atlantic Integration. p.7, available 258 See more here, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/faq at: http://acge.ge/analysis-of-georgian-national-stra­ 259 Other activities also included: Information Campaign tegic-communication-system-on-the-issues-of-eu­ on Visa free Regime, NATO-Georgia Public Diploma­ ro-atlantic-integration/ cy Forum and Civil Education Olympiad. Informa­ 264 Ibid tion Center on NATO and the EU. (2018). Annual 265 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. (2018). Annual Report 2018. p.5, Available at: http://infocenter.gov. Report 2018. p. 106, Available at: http://www.mfa. ge/2416-annual-report-2018.html. gov.ge/HeaderNav/PublicInfo/GeneralInformation/ 260 Ibid Annual-Reports.aspx?lang=en-US

34 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response campaigns are aimed at: questioning Georgia’s abil- of the Georgian state and society.270 To cite an exam- ity to govern itself; instrumentalizing and falsifying ple of this, when countering the Russian disinforma- history and bringing analogies of the Soviet past to tion campaigns against the Lugar lab, the aim of stra- undermine Georgia’s post-independence efforts to tegic communications should be to demonstrate to exercise sovereignty; sowing discord in society by the public the benefits of the existence of the Lugar spreading hate speech in relation to ethnic, religious, lab in Georgia.271 sexual and other minorities living in Georgia; bring- ing tensions in Georgia’s relations with its neigh- Civil society response: determined boring countries, especially through encouraging but lacking resources the spread of anti-Turkish sentiments in Georgia; As argued previously, Georgian CSOs have been active presenting immigrants as a threat to Georgian soci- in countering the Russian disinformation campaigns ety; and presenting Russia as an alternative path for against Georgia. This section discusses and assess- Georgia’s future development. es the countermeasures implemented by Georgian The presence of these challenges requires the adop- CSOs in terms of the following aspects: 1) whether tion of a strategic response to not only advance Geor- their activities have been aimed at monitoring, coun- gia’s EU and NATO integration, but to also respond tering and exposing disinformation; 2) whether their to the multi-layered and multi-purpose nature of the responses go beyond fact-checking and myth-bust- Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns. ing and include building public resilience through Thus far, the government has not established any education; 3) whether CSOs have applied pressure on platform or body that focuses specifically on under- the government; and 4) whether their activities are standing the means and aims of the Russian propa- aimed at addressing the root causes of the problem. ganda and disinformation campaigns and on coming MONITOR, COUNTER AND up with strategic responses to not only dispel the EXPOSE DISINFORMATION myths spread by the Russian disinformation cam- paigns, but to also proactively address the root causes In terms of monitoring, countering and exposing dis- of the problems seized upon by such campaigns. information, Georgian civil society has been the most active group, and a significant part of its resources has The need for a coordinating body within the execu- been directed towards carrying out the monitoring tive branch is also acknowledged by MP Nino Gogua- and detecting of anti-Western propaganda and dis- dze who thinks that “there should be a body that information campaigns in Georgia. Several organiza- will coordinate with other institutions of the execu- tions or platforms particularly stand out in terms of 266 tive branch.” The Thematic Inquiry will offer to the their focus on monitoring and exposing anti-Western government its recommendation as to which body propaganda. should be responsible for such coordination.267 Here, however, the difficulty of distinguishing be- It is thus far clear that the government has failed to tween genuine value systems held by individuals and recognize the reiterative nature of the Russian propa- what counts as a Russian disinformation campaign ganda and disinformation campaigns and has failed needs to be pointed out. While actors both inside and 268 to proactively plan how to respond. For instance, outside Georgia are engaged in anti-Western pro- the Georgian state should be engaged in refuting paganda, in some cases actors that spread it are not claims advanced by disinformation campaigns, pre- necessarily the agents of Russian disinformation cam- venting the spread of certain disinformation cam- paigns. In some instances, the narratives advanced by paigns by proactively explaining to the public the na- certain Georgian-speaking actors cannot be concep- ture of disinformation and emphasizing the strategic tualized as disinformation per se, but rather as “a con- importance of Georgia’s Western integration and de- fluence of narratives, normative statements, opinions 269 mocratization. Furthermore, the core mission of the that are based on some values or on the assessment strategic communications departments has to be to of the situation.”272 For instance, some far-right and invalidate disinformation campaigns through means anti-liberal groups in Georgia that voice conservative of presenting the process as a positive achievement values are hard to link directly to Russia, and their val- ue systems exist irrespective of their possible links to 266 Goguadze, N.(2019). author’s interview, September 2019 267 Ibid 270 Buziashvili. E, author’s interview, September, 2019 268 Goguadze. G, author’s interview, September 2019 271 Ibid 269 Tangiashvili. N, author’s interview, September 2019 272 Tangiashvili. N, author’s interview, September 2019.

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 35 Russia’s disinformation machinery. This is in fact what mation “break out of the bubble of capital cities and renders the fight against Russian disinformation dif- engage the public at the local level, especially in disaf- ficult – in that “it is always difficult to find direct- con fected communities that are often targeted by malign nections with foreign country and foreign sources.”273 influence operations.”279 However, the statements or opinions voiced by some individuals or groups in Georgia are exploited by, or In terms of building resilience through education, the often serve the aims of, the Russian disinformation activities of CSOs have been relatively limited, mostly campaigns.274 due to a lack of financial resources. While the impor- tance of media literacy has been noted and some of The MDF with its Myth Detector platform, Fact Check the civil society actors, primarily the MDF, do carry Georgia and the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab have di- out media literacy programs, it is also believed that rected their efforts toward monitoring, countering “media literacy is one solution, but it is not a silver and exposing disinformation. The MDF has conduct- bullet.”280 Media literacy programs should go together ed extensive monitoring of anti-Western propagan- with civic education and efforts directed at improving da since 2014, while Myth Detector is engaged in civic participation.281 quotidian efforts to debunk myths spread by Russian disinformation campaigns. Fact Check Georgia has Generally speaking, the activities of Georgian civil made fighting fake news and disinformation part of society actors in terms of building resilience through its work since 2016, while DFRLab has been using education are dependent on the availability of funds innovative open-source methods to expose Russian and on the priorities of international donors, such 282 disinformation. as embassies and international organizations. In 2017, the US Embassy in Georgia announced an In so doing, CSOs not only “react to disinformation open competition on media literacy programs with and myths and provide the public with accurate, the aim “to improve media literacy skills among fact-based information”275 but also construct “a cor- young Georgians between the ages of 16 and 24 and rect narrative and help local media cover the real sit- to include ethnic minorities and people at risk of be- uation.”276 Therefore, the efforts of civil society actors ing socially marginalized.”283 are both reactive and proactive, and this demon- strates that non-state actors are acting “as a watch- Within this framework, the Media Development Foun- dog, policing social media and exposing disinfor- dation runs the project “Media Literacy Youth Lab for mation campaigns as they emerge.”277 However, it is Responsible Media Consumption” (September 2018 difficult to assess what effects such activities have on - September 2020), with projects planned to be car- members of the public and whether or not these ini- ried out “in 17 cities across Georgia, including the 284 tiatives bear measurable fruit in terms of mitigating regions densely populated with ethnic minorities.” the impact of the Russian disinformation campaigns The MDF also runs another Dutch Embassy-commis- in Georgia. sioned project entitled “Promoting Media Literacy and Critical Thinking in Schools,” which targets “Geor- BUILDING RESILIENCE THROUGH gian schools by providing a media & information liter- EDUCATION acy (MIL) curriculum and preparing teachers for MIL classes aimed at the development of critical thinking The second aspect of the civil society response lies abilities and critical consumption of media content in its ability to “help to inoculate the public against among youth.”285 information manipulation by supporting education outreach and media literacy programs.”278 Here, it is important that CSOs and those researching disinfor- 279 Ibid 273 Goguadze, N.(2019). author’s interview, September 280 Ibid 2019 281 Ibid 274 Ibid 282 Dzvelishvili, N. author’s interview, September, 2019 275 Kintsurashvili, T (2018) cited in Prism Ukraine. 283 The U.S. Embassy in Georgia, available at: https:// (2018). Disinformation Resilience Index. pp.137-179 ge.usembassy.gov/education-culture/grant-pro­ 276 Jinjjikhadze, Kh. (2018). cited in Prism Ukraine. grams-2/media-literacy-program/ (2018). Disinformation Resilience Index. pp.137-179 284 MDF, Media Literacy Youth Lab for Responsible Me­ 277 Schafer, B. (2018). A Democratic Response to Digital dia Consumption, available at: http://mdfgeorgia.ge/ Disinformation: The Role of Civil Society. American eng/view_actives/67 Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Johns 285 MDF, Promoting Media Literacy and Critical Thinking Hopkins University, pp.39-43 in Schools, available at: http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/ 278 Ibid eng/view_actives/63

36 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response With funding from the USAID ACCESS program, a mation in a systematic manner.290 In short, govern- number of civil society projects have been imple- ment support would ensure the sustainability and mented since 2015, including: the MDF’s anti-West- long-term character of media literacy initiatives and, ern propaganda myth-busting efforts; public together with short-term civil society projects, yield campaigns led by Transparency International to greater results. promote Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic in- tegration and the fight against anti-Western pro- Applying pressure on the government paganda; and the Strategic Communications Cen- Although various public opinion polls conducted in ter of Georgia’s activities directed at countering Georgia in the last few years have generally recorded “anti-Western disinformation by producing and a low level of trust towards government institutions, disseminating pro-Western strategic narratives of political parties and CSOs291, according to the IRI polls 286 Georgia.” While these projects are significant and of 2018 and 2019, a significant percentage of respon- their scopes extend beyond the capital city, they are dents (52 in 2018, 47 in July 2019, and 50 in October primarily focused on the youth and less of a premi- 2019) think that the activities of CSOs have an impact um is placed on reaching out to older generations or a significant impact on government policy292. To “who may have the necessary critical thinking skills this end, CSOs should be more proactive in terms of 287 but lack familiarity with digital concepts.” Engag- pushing the fight against Russian propaganda and ing with all age categories is important to inform as disinformation campaigns forward and onto the gov- many people as possible of the nature and means ernment’s agenda. of Russian disinformation campaigns. In terms of pressuring the government, civil society The importance of state and civil society cooperation actors in Georgia have so far focused on introducing – as well as avoiding overlapping work - in terms of legislative initiatives and running public campaigns increasing media literacy in Georgia is of vital signif- aimed at promoting the benefits of Georgia’s Euro- 288 icance. Although the role of civil society is import- pean and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, CSOs, ant in terms of fostering public resilience through like the government, also risk falling into the trap of education, the lion’s share of the responsibility rests understanding the fight against Russian propaganda with the government and the Ministry of Education and disinformation campaigns as equating to busting and Science and the Public Broadcaster of Georgia myths regarding the EU and NATO integration pro- in particular. According to MP Nino Goguadze, be- cesses. cause the resources of the GNCC are limited in terms of media literacy, the Ministry of Education and Sci- Although there is a lack of resources and an otherwise ence of Georgia should play a role in this regard and busy agenda for CSOs hindering them from carrying even get some help from the civil society sector.289 out more comprehensive and targeted campaigns The Public Broadcaster of Georgia should also add to that would address all of the important aspects of Rus- the existing programs and do more to fight disinfor- sian propaganda and disinformation, closer intra-civil society cooperation is needed to mitigate the impact of disinformation campaigns. CSOs should make sure that they not only coordinate on the matters of pres- 286 See more here: http://ewmi-access.org/technolo­ gy-tools/completed-grants/ suring the government to make the fight against Rus- 287 Schafer, B. (2018). A Democratic Response to Digital sian propaganda and disinformation a priority under- Disinformation: The Role of Civil Society. American taking, but they should also combine the resources at Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Johns Hopkins University, pp.39-43 their disposal and include in their activities as many 288 Parliament of Georgia. (2019). Written Submission regions of Georgia as possible. by Nata Dzvelishvili, Available at: http://www.par­ liament.ge/ge/ajax/downloadFile/113567/%E1%83 %A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%A5%E1%83%90%E1 %83%A0%E1%83%97%E1%83%95%E1%83%94 %E1%83%9A%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A1_%E1%83 290 Ibid %9F%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A0%E1%83%9C%E1 291 CRRC, see more here: http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot. %83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1 com/2019/02/ngos-in-georgia-low-trust-high.html %E1%83%A2%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A0%E1%83 292 IRI,https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/geor­ %98_%E1%83%94%E1%83%97%E1%83%98%E1 gia_poll_2.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2dMZP-bZyesqnpKbQ­ %83%99%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1_%E1%83%A5 IS_-WlPopVxsfmLLQeyhxFBO0O3LGFi8FsyB7X78; %E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%A2%E1%83% see also here: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/ 98%E1%83%90 files/2018-5-29_georgia_poll_presentation.pdf and 289 Goguadze, N.(2019). author’s interview, September here : https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/ 2019 georgia_poll_11.18.2019_final.pdf

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 37 Addressing the root causes Georgia also agreed that the country is “not a democ- racy” than at any time over the last five years.300 Addressing the root causes of a disinformation cam- paign – that is, “the real-world issues that disinforma- From an economic perspective, since 2009, Georgians tion seeks to exploit”293 - should be a vital part of the consistently report economic issues such as jobs, rais- civil society response. Root causes are usually under- ing prices/inflation, pensions, poverty and wages as stood to include: declining trust in the democratic the most important national issues faced by them or process and in political party systems; a lack of citizen their families.301 Unless efforts are made by state and participation; and a continuous assault by authoritar- civil society actors together to address these root ian regimes, such as those of Russia and China, on the causes, Russian disinformation campaigns will con- Western-led liberal international order. tinue to seek to exploit them to achieve their ends. This is especially concerning as the research demon- 294 According to Freedom House and the Economist In- strates that exposure to a conspiracy claim further 295 telligence Unit, Georgia is ‘partly free’ and a ‘hybrid undermines trust in government services and institu- regime.’. Along with derailing Georgia from its Western tions, including those that are not related to an actual journey, a central part of Russia’s policies in relation to claim.302 Georgia is to undermine trust in the democratic pro- cess, and to present Georgia’s democratization efforts The role of CSOs, therefore, is crucial to address core as failed or ineffective in terms of bringing welfare to grievances of the public in addition to myth-busting the population. It is in light of economic difficulties and fact-checking initiatives. There has been a grow- that appealing to Soviet nostalgia is an important ing realization in Georgian civil society that mere part of the Russian disinformation campaigns.296 fact-checking and myth-busting efforts, although im- portant, are not enough in mitigating the impact of Given that a number of public opinion polls have Russian disinformation campaigns. Civil society actors 297 shown that Georgians distrust political parties and are now focusing their efforts on narrative-telling and that 41 percent of the public believe that the dissolu- more investigative works, but it is important that they 298 tion of the USSR was “a bad thing,” addressing root are based on an in-depth study of what the narratives causes becomes important. The root causes exploited are and which audiences should be targeted303. by Russian disinformation are largely of a political and economic nature. Politically, growing nihilism towards In terms of addressing the root causes of the issue, democracy undermines the legitimacy of the political that is, the political and economic grievances of the process and consequently citizens lose interest in par- public, CSOs have played an important role. Indeed, ticipating. For example, an NDI-commissioned public their role in terms of exercising watchdog functions opinion poll in 2019 demonstrated that 36 percent of and helping the democratic process in the country Georgians “do not believe they have significant influ- is enormous. On issues of the economy, although ence over their country’s decisions.”299 More people in more of a premium is placed on the importance of civil and political rights, civil society actors have 293 Schafer, B. (2018). A Democratic Response to Digital also played an important role, especially in terms Disinformation: The Role of Civil Society. American of helping with the implementation of Georgia’s Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Johns DCFTA with the EU. Hopkins University, pp.39-43 294 See more here: https://freedomhouse.org/report/ Public Resilience: How vulnerable is freedom-world/2018/georgia 295 See more here: https://www.eiu.com/topic/democra­ the Georgian public to Russian cy-index disinformation campaigns? 296 See more here: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/a-true- flourishing-of-estonian-culture-science-and-indus­ It is important to assess the Georgian public’s vul- try-took-place-under-the-soviet-rule-it-does-not- nerability to Russian propaganda and disinformation look-like-an-occupation/ campaigns to make sense of the extent of the prob- 297 Kakhishvili, L. (2019). Decreasing level of trust in Georgian political parties: What does it mean for de­ lem and its impact on the public’s understanding of mocracy and how to avoid negative consequences. Georgian Institute of Politics, Policy Brief, Issue 17 300 298 See NDI’s July 2019 public opinion poll, available at: Ibid https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20 301 see NDI Georgia’s July 2019 public opinion poll July%202019%20poll-Issues_ENG_For%20distribu­ 302 Katherine Levine Einstein and David M. Glick. (2015). tion_VF.pdf Do I Think BLS Data are BS? The Consequences of 299 NDI public opinion poll, 2019, available here: https:// Conspiracy Theories. Political Behavior, 37 (3), pp. www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-georgians-los­ 679-701 ing-faith-their-country-s-democracy-report-enthusiast 303 Tangiashvili. N, author’s interview, September, 2019

38 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response disinformation threats emanating from Russia. To Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns discuss these, it is important to identify who the vul- can be said to have two dimensions: high propagan- nerable groups are, the extent to which they are resil- da and low propaganda.311 Low propaganda refers to ient against Russian disinformation, and the extent to manipulating the public in terms of appealing to val- which they believe in Georgia’s democratic and West- ues and culture, whereas high propaganda refers to ern future. sowing fear in the Georgian public through empha- sizing the possibility of military aggression and eco- The Disinformation Resilience Index by Ukrainian nomic sanctions. Prism as well as NDI’s public opinion polls identified the following groups to be particularly vulnerable to The findings of the NDI polls demonstrate the public’s propaganda: 1) older generation; 2) ethnic minori- vulnerability in this regard. In terms of low propagan- ty groups; 3) people with lower income; 4) people da, more people in 2018 believed in the myths about who lack education, including those not knowing culture and values than in 2017.312 Forty-three percent English;304 and 5) conservative ‘active believers’ who of the public believed that NATO imposes Western val- belong to the Georgian Orthodox Church.305 ues on Georgia, while 22 percent believed that NATO is a threat to the Georgian Orthodox Church. In terms The NDI submission to the parliament also shows of the EU, one-third of the public believe that visa-free that 53 percent of the public believe that Russian movement with the EU will lead to losing Georgian propaganda exists in Georgia, but there are differ- identity and mentality. Almost half of the public also ences in the levels of susceptibility between ethnic believed that visa-free access to the EU will lead to an Georgians and ethnic minorities, between those influx of refugees into Georgia.313 As far as high propa- with higher income versus those with lower income, ganda is concerned, 72 percent of the public believe between those living in the capital city and those that gaining NATO membership will lead to Russian living elsewhere, as well as those well-educated ver- aggression against Georgia. The public also sees Rus- 306 sus those less well-educated. The NDI’s submission sia in terms of its military strength, with the majority goes on and argues that “citizens with pro-Russian believing that, in terms of military strength, Russia is and anti-Western attitudes do not perceive Russian stronger than the US.314 propaganda in Georgia.”307 These poll results – which acknowledge public atti- In terms of the extent of their resilience against Rus- tudes at particular times at which the surveys are con- sian disinformation and the public’s understanding of ducted - demonstrate that disinformation messages the existence of propaganda and disinformation, 48 spread through Russian disinformation campaigns percent of the public believe that Russia spreads lies are having an impact on some members of the pub- and false information (as opposed to 25 percent and lic, and that their vulnerability is mostly due to a fear 26 percent who believe the same in relation to the EU of possible military and economic aggression from 308 and the US). People also believe that the main chan- Russia as well as of Georgian culture and values be- nels of Russian propaganda in Georgia are Georgian ing compromised as Georgia integrates more with the 309 media companies, political parties and social media. West. Apart from fears of a military, cultural and eco- The public is at its least resilient in terms of disinfor- nomic nature, some members of the public are also mation myths – especially those that focus on culture losing faith in democracy and political parties. This and values as well as on Russia’s possible use of mili- illustrates that unless steps are taken to address the tary aggression and economic sanctions - which have core issues and vulnerabilities listed above along with 310 an impact on their attitudes and thinking. those to mitigate the quotidian impact of the Russian disinformation campaigns, these campaigns will con- tinue to exploit the public’s vulnerabilities and un- dermine Georgians’ trust in democracy, independent statehood and pro-Western integration. 304 NDI’s written submission to the Parliament of Geor­ gia, 2019 305 Prism Ukraine. (2018). Disinformation Resilience In­ dex. pp.137-179 311 ‘High’ and ‘low’ understood as in ‘high politics’ and 306 NDI’s written submission to the Parliament of Geor­ ‘low politics’ gia, 2019 312 NDI’s written Submission to the Parliament of Geor­ 307 Ibid gia, 2019 308 Ibid 313 Ibid 309 Ibid 314 NDI’s written submission to the Parliament of Geor­ 310 Ibid gia, 2019

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 39 On the other hand, one important caveat applies here, face-to-face interviews with concerned actors and that undermines the possibility of the Russian disin- with subject experts. formation campaigns in Georgia becoming ultimately successful. The majority of Georgians continue to see The research paper has introduced relevant concep- Russia as a national security threat, with Russian mili- tual definitions, defining terms such as propaganda, tary aggression, the illegal occupation of Georgian ter- disinformation, resilience, and strategic communica- ritories and Russian propaganda being the top three tions, followed by a discussion of the so-called ‘post- threats to national security.315 In addition, according truth era’ that has ensued globally. to an NDI-commissioned public opinion poll in April In providing an overview of the aims of Russia’s in- 2019, nearly half of Georgians think Georgian-Russian fluence operations and disinformation campaigns, relations since 2012 have had a negative impact on it has been argued that on a global level Russia’s Georgia’s economy (43 percent), politics (45 percent) actions are subordinated to its wider foreign policy 316 and security (47 percent). The latest public opinion goals to re-establish Russia’s status as a great pow- poll conducted by the International Republican Insti- er and to undermine the Western-led international tute (IRI) meanwhile demonstrated that 83 percent of order. As far as Russia’s regional and country-spe- the public see Russia as a political threat, and 72 per- cific goals are concerned, Russia aims to keep the 317 cent see it as an economic threat. post-Soviet states within its sphere of influence by With this in mind, notwithstanding Russia’s attempts thwarting their democratization and Westernization to sow discord among the Georgian public, the suc- efforts. cess of the Russian propaganda and disinformation Russia’s aims vis-à-vis Georgia are to halt its democ- campaigns is not straightforward, not least because ratization process and undermine its foreign poli- of Russia’s aggression in 2008 and its continued illegal cy aspirations to join NATO and the EU. To achieve occupation of Georgian territories. However, by con- these goals, in addition to traditional security mea- tinuing to undermine trust in democracy, the econ- sures, Russia conducts concerted propaganda and omy, politics and Western integration, Russia aims disinformation campaigns against Georgia. Vari- at putting Georgia’s democratization and Westerni- ous actors inside and outside Georgia are helping zation on hold, with the intention to discover which Russia in accomplishing its objectives. It is often political party or parties in Georgia will act in line with assumed that the most influential actors spreading 318 Russia’s interests. the messages of Russian disinformation are Geor- gian-speaking.

CONCLUSION In terms of countering the Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns, it is safe to argue that the This research paper has attempted to understand the authorities in Georgia have acknowledged the threat, scope, means and aims of the Russian disinformation although practical measures aimed at mitigating the campaigns in Georgia, and to assess and discuss the effects of Russian disinformation campaigns are ei- responses undertaken by the state actors and non- ther non-existent or just taking effect. While the Geor- state actors in Georgia. In doing so, the research pa- gian state has incorporated the threat of Russia’s influ- per has relied on a qualitative research methodology, ence operations in some of its strategic documents, engaging with primary and secondary sources (state strategic communications departments are lacking documents, legislation, annual reports by state actors, focus on the Russian disinformation campaigns per public opinion polls, websites, and published research se and focus mainly on promoting Georgia’s Europe- outputs of concerned CSOs as well as academic and an and Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, there is policy literature) and, where possible, conducting also no coordinating government institution which will respond to a multi-faceted and multi-purpose disinformation campaigns conducted by Russia. The 315 See the blog by CRRC Georgia, 2019, available at: Parliament of Georgia has also only recently started http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2019/07/per­ ceived-threats-to-georgias-security.html to make sense of the nature of the problem of Russian 316 See NDI polls here: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/ disinformation. files/NDI%20Georgia_April_2019_Public_Issues%20 Poll_ENG_Final.pdf Unlike the state, the civil society actors in Georgia 317 See IRI polls here: https://www.iri.org/resource/first- have been more responsive to the threat of Russian georgian-national-poll-protests-reveals-loss-trust- propaganda and disinformation campaigns. Their government-decade%E2%80%99s-worth-economic 318 Tangiashvili. N, author’s interview, September 2019 countermeasures include, but are not limited to,

40 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response myth-busting, fact-checking, legislative actions, pub- already existing National Security Council should lic campaigns and media literacy programs. That said, assume these functions; however, civil society actors lack financial resources and their dependence on donor organizations makes • The Government of Georgia should mandate the their countermeasures less sustainable. To this end, Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport themselves realizing the lack of resources, CSOs call of Georgia to include media literacy as part of its upon the government to cooperate with interested work, including by means of piloting media liter- stakeholders, to improve coordination and to devise a acy programs in the schools across different re- long-term plan aimed at countering Russian disinfor- gions of Georgia; mation campaigns. • The Government of Georgia should mandate the In terms of assessing public resilience, based on var- Public Broadcaster of Georgia to carry out regu- ious public opinion polls, the research paper has lar programs that will raise the public’s awareness observed that members of the public – particularly about the Russian disinformation campaigns and ethnic minorities, those living outside the capital city, develop their critical analysis skills; those less educated and those who do not know En- • The Government of Georgia should cooperate glish - are the most vulnerable to Russian propaganda with CSOs, use their expertise and experience and and disinformation campaigns. Russia, the paper has make sure that any planned activities vis-à-vis argued, carries out low and high propaganda to ex- fighting Russian propaganda and disinformation ploit the public’s security, political, cultural and eco- take into account the work already carried out by nomic fears. However, Russia’s ongoing aggression civil society actors. The Government of Georgia against Georgia makes the success of the Russian dis- should see and treat civil society as its ally in the information campaigns difficult. fight against Russia’s influence operations;

• The Government of Georgia should strengthen POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS the capacity of local self-government units (mu- nicipalities) to fight against Russian propaganda For the Government and Parliament of Georgia and disinformation campaigns, and recognize their role as important actors to this end; • Both on paper and in practice, the government should recognize the threat of a multi-faceted • The Parliament of Georgia should, as soon as pos- and multi-purpose Russian disinformation cam- sible, conclude and publish its Thematic Inquiry paign against Georgia. While efforts aimed at on Disinformation and Propaganda and make promoting the EU and NATO should continue this available to the public. Furthermore, politi- (through the efforts of the Information Center on cal parties should reach a consensus and adopt NATO and the EU), a plain differentiation should a parliamentary resolution or ordinance that be made between conducting strategic commu- recognizes the threat of Russian disinformation nications in response to Russian disinformation campaigns and introduces measures necessary campaigns and conducting strategic communi- to mitigate its effects; The relevant parliamentary cations to promote the benefits of integrating committees should also hold public hearings on with NATO and the EU. Understanding and ob- the measures necessary to counter Russian dis- serving one’s impact on the other should also be information and propaganda campaigns to, on facilitated.; the one hand, understand what the government has done in this regard and, on the other hand, • The Government of Georgia should designate an to take advice from academic circles, experts and autonomous body to proactively study and detail CSOs; and the scope, aims and manifestations of the Russian disinformation campaigns in Georgia and, when- • The recently-established LEPL Research Center of ever necessary, officially refute the false claims the Parliament of Georgia should study the rele- advanced by the Russian disinformation narra- vant anti-disinformation initiatives implemented tive, and conduct strategic communications to by different states, and offer relevant parliamen- promote the national idea of Georgia as a dem- tary committees corresponding advice on the ocratic, rule-of-law and human-rights-oriented possible course(s) of action that the Parliament of pro-Western country; alternatively, to avoid the Georgia can take to counter Russia’s disinforma- additional institutional and financial burden, the tion campaigns.

Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response 41 For Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) For the international community

• CSOs should continue their myth-busting, • The international community, and in particular fact-checking and media literacy efforts, and the allies of Georgia, should continue to assist work towards making sure that the impact of the Georgian government as well as CSOs in their their work is also felt by other age groups rath- fight against Russian disinformation campaigns. er than youth, and that their activities are regular This should include supporting projects that, to and cover areas outside the capital city. To do so, the greatest extent possible, reach out to all age more intra-civil society coordination is necessary, categories and all regions of Georgia; including, but not limited to, using each other’s premises in different regions of Georgia – as well • The US, the UK, the EU, NATO and other Western as universities across the nation - to directly com- countries or groups should continue to support municate with members of the public about the the Government of Georgia to better acknowl- nature of Russian disinformation campaigns; edge the threat of Russian propaganda and dis- information, and to take appropriate legal and • CSOs should apply more sustained pressure on practical measures towards mitigating its nega- the government to acknowledge the threat of tive consequences; and Russian propaganda and disinformation, includ- ing through the means of constantly keeping the • Western countries should themselves be directly issue on the public agenda. To do so, CSOs should engaged with the Georgian public to make sure become more coordinated and plan activities to that it is informed, among other things, about bring the issue to the government’s attention; NATO and the EU and their activities and assis- and tance provided in Georgia.

• CSOs should also continue applying pressure on the government in terms of addressing the root causes of the problem exploited by the Russian propaganda and disinformation campaign. CSOs should themselves plan more long-term cam- paigns that not only educate the public on the effects of the Russian disinformation campaigns, but also campaigns that educate the public on the merits of democracy, citizen participation during and after elections, human rights, and the history of Georgia.

42 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response

44 Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns in Georgia: A Study of State and Civil Society Response